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| '''Physical determinism''' is a position in ] that holds that a complete description of the ''physical'' state of the world at any given time and a complete statement of the ''physical'' laws of nature together entail every truth as to what ''physical'' events happen after that time.<ref name=Ginet/> In different words, physical determinism holds that all physical events occur as described by physical laws.<ref name=Bishop/> | |||
| Sometimes the restrictions to ''physical'' events and ''physical'' laws are ignored, and physical determinism is used as a synonym for ], that all future events are governed by the past or present according to all-encompassing deterministic laws.<ref name=Horst/> However, in this article this practice is avoided. | |||
| The initial definition leaves open just what "physical" might mean, or a "complete description". So, for example, one could take ''physical determinism'' as: | |||
| {{quote|"a concept only relevant to the mathematical models of physics and other physical sciences, although its relevance to the world of everyday choice and action is questionable...if thoughts, feelings, and desires are not physical events, it is unlikely that physical theories are appropriate models for thinking about such nonphysical events.<ref name=Bishop/>|Robert C. Bishop |Chaos, indeterminism, and free will, p. 84}} | |||
| ==Causal completeness== | |||
| The scope of physical determinism is related to the question of the ''causal completeness'' of science, the idea that every real event has a scientific explanation, science need not search for explanations beyond itself.<ref name=Sarkar/> If causal completeness does not apply to the universe, then the door is open to events that are not subject to physical determinism.<ref name=Atmanspacher/> For example, a common view of mental events is that they are an ] only correlated with neurological activity, and without causal impact. However, a failure of physical determinism would allow room for their causal significance. | |||
| A more general formulation of physical determinism skirts the issue of causal completeness. It is based upon connections between 'events' supplied by a theory: | |||
| {{quote| "a theory is deterministic if, and only if, given its state variables for some initial period, the theory logically determines a unique set of values for those variables for any other period."<ref name=Nagel/>|Ernest Nagel|''Alternative descriptions of physical state'' p. 292 }} | |||
| This quote replaces the idea of 'cause-and-effect' with that of 'logical implication' according to one or another theory that connects events. In addition, an 'event' is related by the theory itself to formalized ''states'' described using the parameters defined by that theory. Thus, the details of interpretation are placed where they belong, fitted to the context in which the chosen theory applies. Using the definition of physical determinism above, the limitations of a theory to some particular domain of experience also limits the associated definition of 'physical determinism' to that same domain. That limitation leaves open the question whether there is a physical "]". | |||
| ==Popper's three worlds== | |||
| A much more general reservation about the applicability of physical determinism stems from the formulation of ]. ] split the world into three categories:<ref name=Popper/> | |||
| * World 1: the world of physical ]s and ]s, including ] entities | |||
| * World 2: the world of ] objects and events, including conscious and subconscious experiences | |||
| * World 3: the world of products of the human mind, including art, science, and religion. | |||
| World 3 is a creation of the human imagination (a part of World 2), and includes physical theory as a particular case. Accordingly, one could argue that physical determinism is a child of this process, and although it has its successes in World 1, it may not apply to World 2 or World 3. The subjective aspects of World 3, which are not readily subsumed in the third-person perspective of science used to explain World 1, are described in the article ]. | |||
| ==References== | |||
| {{reflist|refs= | |||
| <ref name=Atmanspacher> | |||
| {{cite book |author=Robert C Bishop, Harald Atmanspacher |chapter=Chapter 5: The causal closure of physics and free will |page=101 |title=The Oxford Handbook of Free Will: Second Edition |editor=Robert Kane, ed |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=4YUJhIiyMFoC&pg=PA101 |isbn=0195399692 |year=2011 |publisher=Oxford University Press |edition=2nd}} | |||
| </ref> | |||
| <ref name=Bishop> | |||
| {{cite book |author=Robert C Bishop |chapter=Chapter 4: Chaos, indeterminism, and free will |page=84 |title=The Oxford Handbook of Free Will: Second Edition |editor=Robert Kane, ed |isbn=0195399692 |year=2011 |publisher=Oxford University Press |edition=2nd |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=4YUJhIiyMFoC&pg=PA84}} | |||
| </ref> | |||
| <ref name=Ginet> | |||
| This definition is from {{cite book |title=On Action |author=Carl Ginet |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=mRns0NYdns0C&pg=PA92 |page=92 |isbn=052138818X |year=1990 |publisher=Cambridge University Press}} | |||
| </ref> | |||
| <ref name=Horst> | |||
| {{cite book |title=Laws, Mind, and Free Will |author=Steven W Horst |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=B58sSJy0eN0C&pg=PA98 |page=98 |isbn= 0262015250 |year=2011 |publisher=MIT Press}} | |||
| </ref> | |||
| <ref name=Nagel> | |||
| {{cite book |title=The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation |author=Ernest Nagel |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=u6EycHgRfkQC&pg=PA285 |pages =285-292 |chapter=§V: Alternative descriptions of physical state |isbn=0915144719 |year=1999 |publisher=Hackett |edition=2nd }} | |||
| </ref> | |||
| <ref name=Popper> | |||
| {{cite web |title=Three Worlds|author=Karl Popper |date=April 7, 1978 |work=The Tanner lectures on human values |url=http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/documents/popper80.pdf |publisher=The University of Utah |accessdate=2013-01-24}} The list of lectures is found in the . | |||
| </ref> | |||
| <ref name=Sarkar> | |||
| See for example, {{cite book |title=The Philosophy of Science: N-Z, Index |author=Sahotra Sarkar, Jessica Pfeifer |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=b_ixzEzskwYC&pg=PA566 |chapter=Physicalism: The causal impact argument |page=566 |isbn=041597710X |year=2006 |publisher=Taylor & Francis}} | |||
| </ref> | |||
| }} | |||
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