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{{Short description|Concept that taxpayers should be able to choose what their taxes are used for}} | |||
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{{Taxation}} | {{Taxation}} | ||
In ], '''tax choice''' (sometimes called '''taxpayer sovereignty''',<ref name=brown>{{cite journal|last=Brown|first=Daniel J.|title=The Case for Tax-Target Plans|journal=Journal of Education Finance|date=Fall 1979|volume=5|issue=2|pages=215–224|jstor=40703229|publisher=University of Illinois Press|quote=For educators, these "new" values reflect a demand for taxpayer sovereignty, greater choice among educational programs, and more responsiveness on the part of educational systems.}}</ref> '''earmarking''', '''participatory taxation''' or '''fiscal subsidiarity'''{{sfn|Buchanan|1963}}{{failed verification|date=February 2013}}) is an emerging type of ] in which individuals or groups of taxpayers decide how to allocate part of their taxes of a ] or public ] ] through a process of democratic ] and decision-making. Its proponents apply the theory of ] to ]. They claim taxpayers react positively when they are allowed to allocate portions of their taxes to specific spending.<ref>{{cite magazine |last=Lamberton |first=Cait |title=Your Money, Your Choice | magazine=Democracy: A Journal of Ideas | date=4 March 2011 | url=https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/20/your-money-your-choice/}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |author1=Sherry Xin Li |author2=Catherine Eckel |author3=Philip J. Grossman |author4=Tara Larson Brown |title=Do Earmarks Increase Giving to Government? |date=2011 |s2cid=168228863 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal| doi=10.1016/0167-2681(93)90003-8 | volume=22 | issue=3 | title=Fiscal exchange, collective decision institutions, and tax compliance | year=1993 | journal=Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization | pages=285–303 | last1 = Alm | first1 = James | last2 = Jackson | first2 = Betty R. | last3 = McKee | first3 = Michael}}</ref> | |||
Existing examples of tax choice includes: ] and ]. | |||
In ], '''tax choice''', or taxpayer sovereignty,<ref name=brown>{{cite journal|last=Brown|first=Daniel J.|title=The Case for Tax-Target Plans|journal=Journal of Education Finance|year=1979|month=Fall|volume=5|issue=2|url=http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/40703229?uid=3739256&uid=2134&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&sid=21101710375947|accessdate=January 26, 2013|page=215|publisher=University of Illinois Press|quote=For educators, these "new" values reflect a demand for taxpayer sovereignty, greater choice among educational programs, and more responsiveness on the part of educational systems.}}</ref> is the argument that taxpayers should have a greater say in how their individual taxes are allocated. This theory, which is based on the ], applies the same concepts of ] theory to taxpayers. Tax choice studies have shown that allowing taxpayers to directly allocate even a small percentage of their taxes can increase their level of satisfaction.<ref> | |||
</ref><ref></ref><ref></ref> | |||
== Tax relationship between the state and taxpayers == | |||
== Freedom of choice == | |||
The term tax sovereignty emphasizes the perceived equal status of state and ], instead of the traditional view of the dominant position of the state in ]. Tracing back to the ] of the state, Viktoria Raritska points out that “the legitimacy of the state as a formal institution is substantiated by the people’s refusal of their freedoms and an agreement to submit to government in exchange for the protection of their guaranteed rights”.<ref name=":1">{{Cite book|title=System of Financial Law : system of tax law : conference proceedings.|others=Masarykova univerzita. Katedra finančního práva a národního hospodářství.|year = 2015|isbn=978-80-210-7827-7|edition=1st|location=Brno|oclc=920663188}}</ref> Proponents of tax sovereignty believe that in a traditional system of taxation, the ] gives up their ] in exchange for the protection from the state and the provision of ]s; which impels the state to take public interests as its obligation to maintain ] and ] safety. | |||
This mutual relationship makes ] a link between the state and ]. Proponents of tax sovereignty believe that in such a relationship, the taxpayer endows power to the state to ensure the satisfaction of the ]. Furthermore, they propose that the ] has granted the state tax sovereignty. “It is due to the fact that the taxpayer endows the state with tax sovereignty. Thus, state has not only the rights on taxation, but also the obligations, which correspond to the taxpayer's rights”.<ref name=":1" /> Therefore, the existence of the state's perceived tax sovereignty is attributed to the ]. | |||
The freedom of choice concept is central to the idea of giving taxpayers more control over how their taxes are spent. Here are two passages which highlight the importance of choice... | |||
The Swedish economist ]’s theory also argues that "taxation should be based on the principle of value and counter-value, as if taxation was a voluntary transaction between the individual and the state".<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Johnsen|first=Garmann|date=December 1994|title=The impact of the Scandinavian controversy about just taxation on public choice; a late homage to Einar Einarson|journal=Public Choice|volume=81|issue=3–4|pages=323–338|doi=10.1007/bf01053236|s2cid=154569863|issn=0048-5829}}</ref> | |||
:As indicated by the emergence of the taxpayers' revolt and concerns for inflation, America is entering an era of economic conservatism. The citizentry is asserting that taxpayers must have a choice in the services provided, that these services should reflect their priorities, and that reasonable value is expected for tax dollars. For educators, these "new" values reflect a demand for taxpayer sovereignty, greater choice among educational programs, and more responsiveness on the part of educational systems. Daniel J. Brown, | |||
== Opinions == | |||
:I find that some members of the Liberal Party accept the Collectivist position, and I am disturbed by it. It implies a pronounced lack of faith, not only in free enterprise subject to antimonopoly control but also in the 'Middle way', i.e. the encouragement of non-profit making institutions such as educational trusts, housing and hospital associations. ...I do not suggest, and have never suggested that education and housing should be turned over to free enterprise. What I would like to see is greater diversity in the provision of these services, whether public or private, so that there is a genuine possibility of choice for ordinary citizens. - ], The Welfare Society | |||
Daniel J. Brown{{r|brown}} examines tax-target plans in educational programs. | |||
], in his 1961 book ''The Welfare Society'',{{page needed|date=February 2013}} advocates greater diversity in public services (education, housing, hospitals).{{clarify|reason=is Peacock talking about tax choice as part of greater diversity?|date=February 2013}} | |||
== Revealing preferences == | |||
== Optimal quantities of public goods == | |||
Compulsory taxation solves the ], but it does not solve the ]... | |||
According to Vincent and Elinor Ostrom, it is possible that government may oversupply, and a market arrangement may undersupply, those public goods for which exclusion is not feasible.<ref>Kennett, Patricia (2008). ''''. Edward Elgar Publishing. p. 56. {{ISBN|978-1845424367}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |author1=Vincent Ostrom |author2=Elinor Ostrom |date=2003 |url=http://sobek.colorado.edu/~mciverj/Ostrom-PG&PC.PDF |title=Public Goods and Public Choices |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050520201711/http://sobek.colorado.edu/~mciverj/Ostrom-PG&PC.PDF |archive-date=20 May 2005}}</ref> | |||
== Foot voting versus tax choice == | |||
:Whereas the income received for providing a private good conveys information about the demand for that good, taxes collected under the threat of coercion say little about the demand for a public good or service. Payment of taxes indicates only that taxpayers prefer paying taxes to going to jail. Little or no information is revealed about user preferences for goods procured with tax-supported expenditures. As a consequence, the organization of collective consumption units will need to create alternative mechanisms to prices for articulating and aggregating demands into collective choices reflecting individuals' preferences for a quantity and/or quality of public goods or services. - ], ], | |||
] and voting with one's taxes are two methods that have been proposed to allow taxpayers to reveal their preferences for public policies. Foot voting refers to where people move to areas that offer a more attractive ] of public policies. In theory foot voting would force local governments to compete for taxpayers. Tax choice, on the other hand, would allow taxpayers to indicate their preferences with their individual taxes. ] wrote: "In the ], for example, there is costless mobility; individuals seek out a jurisdiction that provides exactly the level of output of the public good that they wish to consume. In so doing, they reveal their preferences for 'local' public outputs and generate a ] outcome in the public sector."<ref>{{citation |last=Oates |first=Wallace E. |date=May 2006 |url=http://www.ifigr.org/publication/ifir_working_papers/IFIR-WP-2006-05.pdf |title=On the Theory and Practice of Fiscal Decentralization |location=Lexington, KY |publisher=Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081201085332/http://www.ifigr.org/publication/ifir_working_papers/IFIR-WP-2006-05.pdf |archive-date=1 December 2008}}</ref> | |||
== Legislative measures == | |||
In the absence of people's ] for ], governments are likely to ] public funds. In other words, without knowledge of the actual demand for public goods, it's likely that the government will oversupply or undersupply public goods. <ref></ref> | |||
Four bills involving tax choice have been introduced by the United States Congress since 1971. The ], enacted in 1971, allows taxpayers to allocate $3 of their taxes to presidential election campaigns.<!--I think the current number is $3. Needs verification/updating.--> The 2000 Taxpayers’ Choice Debt Reduction Act would have allowed taxpayers to designate money toward reduction of the national debt.<ref></ref> The 2007 Opt Out of Iraq War Act would have allowed taxpayers to designate money toward certain social programs.<ref></ref> The 2011 Put Your Money Where Your Mouth Is Act would have allowed taxpayers to make voluntary contributions (not tax payments) to the government.<ref></ref><ref>Kasperowicz, Pete, . ''The Hill", 18 April 2011.</ref> These later bills died in committee. | |||
== In popular culture == | |||
:If the individual can make separate fiscal choices for each public-goods program, which a structure of earmarked taxes conceptually allows him to do, directly or indirectly, he is informed as to the alternatives that he confronts, at least to the extent that the payment institutions allow, and subject, of course, to all of the qualifications noted in previous analysis. The uncertainty that he faces is clearly less than that which is present in the comparable decision on a “bundle” of public goods or services, with the mix among the separate components in the bundle to be determined in a separate decision process or through the auspices of a delegated budget-making authority. If this mix is not announced in advance to the voter-taxpayer, he must try to predict the outcome of another decision process, in which he may or may not participate, a process that need not exist at all in the more straightforward earmarking model where all revenue sources are specifically dedicated. - ], | |||
When asked what her first ] as ] would be, ] advocated a mix of ] and tax choice, stating "you should get to choose where your money goes instead of giving it and just letting them decide, I think you should decide."<ref>{{cite AV media | people = Ellen DeGeneres, Mario Lopez | date=4 May 2016 | title=What Ellen DeGeneres Would Do If She Were President | language = English | url=http://extratv.com/videos/0-o2eskl66/ | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160507230653/http://extratv.com/videos/0-o2eskl66 | archive-date = 7 May 2016 | url-status=live | publisher = ]}}</ref> | |||
In 2009, during the ], ] advocated for a form of tax choice in his third ]. He wrote: "One possible approach to development aid would be to apply effectively what is known as fiscal subsidiarity, allowing citizens to decide how to allocate a portion of the taxes they pay to the State. Provided it does not degenerate into the promotion of special interests, this can help to stimulate forms of welfare solidarity from below, with obvious benefits in the area of solidarity for development as well."<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20090629_caritas-in-veritate_en.html |title=Caritas in Veritate 'Charity in Truth' |publisher=] |author=Benedict XVI |date=7 July 2009 |access-date=7 July 2009 |url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110902070515/https://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20090629_caritas-in-veritate_en.html|archive-date=2 September 2011}}</ref> | |||
Tax choice would allow taxpayers to consider the ] of their tax allocation decisions. The opportunity cost valuations of taxpayers would integrate ] which could help ensure that there was an optimal supply of public goods. In essence, tax choice would create a market for public goods and taxpayers would have the option to shop for themselves in the public sector. There would be a dynamic and mutually influential relationship between the ] of public goods.<ref></ref> | |||
In 1983, a short story '''' by ] writer ]. The plot of the short story involves a man offered the choice to participate in allocating his taxes with the assistance of ]. | |||
Several studies have indicated that allowing taxpayers to allocate their taxes according to their preferences can increase their ] taxes... | |||
: "We, the People," written in a flush of bitter anger, but with an undertone of hope -- has over the years gathered me more response than anything else I've ever written. I was told that someone once sent copies to all the members of the Senate when they were considering tax reform. It has been used in classrooms to teach the critical difference between a Democracy and a Republic. I wrote it years ago, but I feel it is as pertinent today as it was when it appeared in Analog magazine. - Jack C. Haldeman II, | |||
:We find that allowing earmarks more than doubles both contributions and the likelihood of giving to government organizations. Participants give on average $1.68 from a $20 initial payment for general purposes, compared to $5.52 for cancer research and $4.04 for disaster relief; the likelihood of giving increases from 30 percent for general purposes to 66 percent for cancer research and 61 percent for disaster relief. - | |||
The short science fiction story by Jack C. Haldeman II, ''We, The People'' was originally published in September 1983 in ]. | |||
==Concentrated benefits and diffuse costs== | |||
== Examples == | |||
"Concentrated benefits and diffuse costs" is the label that is used within the political economic community to refer to the distributive consequences of ].<ref></ref> Rational ignorance is the ] of taxpayers having a vanishingly small say over how their taxes are spent. Tax choice, by giving taxpayers more of a say how their taxes are spent, would reduce, if not eliminate, the problem of benefits being concentrated and costs being widely dispersed. This is because taxpayers, rather than spending ], would be spending their own money which is why they would have an incentive to ensure that the benefits of government programs were greater than the costs. | |||
=== Iceland === | |||
:In the private sector, the voluntary sector of the economy, we know that something is "well worth the money" if people are willing to spend their own money on it. In government, politicians work to separate the payment of taxes from the receipt of specific services. We're not asked "will you pay $100 right now for farm subsidies and $4000 for Medicaid and $1600 for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and $130 for a new presidential helicopter and ... ?" | |||
Taxpayers in Iceland who belong to an ] or secular humanist organization<ref name="report2014">{{cite web | url=https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?year=2014&dlid=238390 | title=International Religious Freedom Report for 2014: Iceland | access-date=2015-12-07 | author=Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor | date=2014 | publisher=]}}</ref> must pay a congregation tax (Icelandic: ''sóknargjald'', plural ''sóknargjöld'')<ref name="innan">{{cite web | url=https://www.innanrikisraduneyti.is/raduneyti/starfssvid/kirkjumal/almennt/ | title=Kirkjumál og skráð trúfélög og lífsskoðunarfélög | access-date=2015-12-07 | publisher=] (Innanríkisráðuneytið) | language=is | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160323172941/https://www.innanrikisraduneyti.is/raduneyti/starfssvid/kirkjumal/almennt/ | archive-date=2016-03-23 | url-status=live }}</ref> which is deducted from income taxes and goes to the individual's respective organization.<ref name="report2014"/> In the past, the ''sóknargjald'' of those who do not belong to any recognized religious organization went to the ],<ref>{{cite web | url=https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2004/35460.htm | title=International Religious Freedom Report for 2004: Iceland | access-date=2015-12-07 | author=Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor | date=2004 | publisher=]}}</ref> but this was changed in 2009.<ref>{{cite web | url=http://www.althingi.is/altext/137/s/0155.html | title=Frumvarp til laga um ráðstafanir í ríkisfjármálum | access-date=2015-12-07 | date=2009 | publisher=] | language=is | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151208071858/http://www.althingi.is/altext/137/s/0155.html | archive-date=2015-12-08 | url-status=live }}</ref> In cases of individuals not belonging to a registered religious group or secular humanist organization, the amount that would otherwise be used for the ''sóknargjald'' remains now part of the income tax budget. In 2015, the monthly ''sóknargjald'' amounted to 824 ],<ref name="innan"/> about $US6. | |||
=== Italy === | |||
:If we did get such a question, we might well decide that lots of government programs were not "well worth the money" to the people who would be paying the money. - ], | |||
Italian taxpayers devolve a compulsory 8 ‰ = 0.8% (eight ], i.e. ]) from their annual income ] return to an organised ] recognised by Italy or, alternatively, to a state-run ] scheme.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.governo.it/Presidenza/DICA/2_CONCERTAZIONE_AMMINISTRATIVA_MONITORAGGIO/Servizio_2/ottoxmille/ottopermille.html|title=Italian prime minister's office' explanation of the "otto per mille"}}</ref> | |||
=== Spain === | |||
== Foot voting vs tax choice == | |||
The Spanish tax declaration form has one checkbox for the Catholic Church, none for other religious groups and a second checkbox for activities of social interest. These checkboxes don't influence the total tax amount, but, for each ticked checkbox, 0.7% of the total amount are used as indicated. <ref name="Periódico">{{cite web|url=https://www.elperiodico.com/es/economia/declaracion-renta/20220623/dinero-casilla-iglesia-casilla-solidaria-declaracion-renta-13678769|date=2022-06-23|language=es|title=¿Qué hace Hacienda con tu dinero si no marcas la casilla solidaria ni la Iglesia en la declaración de la renta?|access-date=2022-07-31|website=El Periódico}}</ref> | |||
] and voting with your taxes are two methods that could allow taxpayers to reveal their preferences for public policies. Foot voting refers to where people move to areas that offer a more attractive ] of public policies. | |||
=== Japan === | |||
:In the ], for example, there is costless mobility; individuals seek out a jurisdiction that provides exactly the level of output of the public good that they wish to consume. In so doing, they reveal their preferences for "local" public outputs and generate a ] outcome in the public sector. - Wallace E. Oates, | |||
In Japan, city residents can choose to allocate a portion of their taxes to their hometowns...aka ]. In 2021 more than 7 million taxpayers choose to do so resulting in a total allocation of $6 billion (). | |||
In theory foot voting would force local governments to compete for taxpayers. Tax choice, on the other hand, would allow taxpayers to indicate their preferences with their individual taxes. In theory this would force government organizations to compete for funding. In both cases...increased competition would decrease the ] of government organizations. | |||
== In popular culture == | |||
In 2009 ] endorsed tax choice in his book '']'': | |||
:One possible approach to development aid would be to apply effectively what is known as fiscal subsidiarity, allowing citizens to decide how to allocate a portion of the taxes they pay to the State. Provided it does not degenerate into the promotion of special interests, this can help to stimulate forms of welfare solidarity from below, with obvious benefits in the area of solidarity for development as well. - ], | |||
== See also == | == See also == | ||
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==References== | == References == | ||
{{reflist}} | {{reflist|3}} | ||
== |
== Further reading == | ||
*Baker, Russell |
* Baker, Russell – The New York Times. 1990 | ||
* Binowski, Brittany – . Forbes. 18 June 2012 | |||
*Listokin, Yair - 2012 | |||
* Blinder, Alan S. – 1989 | |||
*Lamberton, Cait Poynor - 2012 | |||
* Buchanan, James M. – Public Finance in Democratic Process: Fiscal Institutions and Individual Choice 1967 | |||
*{{cite web|last=Indiviglio|first=Daniel|title=What If Taxpayers Could Decide How Their Money Is Spent?|url=http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/10/what-if-taxpayers-could-decide-how-their-money-is-spent/63946/|publisher=The Atlantic|accessdate=18 April 2012}} | |||
* {{cite journal |last=Buchanan |first=James M. |jstor=1829016 |title=The Economics of Earmarked Taxes |journal=Journal of Political Economy |volume=71 |issue=5 |pages=457–469 |year=1963 |doi=10.1086/258794 |s2cid=153517472 }} | |||
* Buchanan, James M. - 1967 | |||
* Le Grand, Julian - 2007 | |||
* Maricano, Alain - 2010 | |||
*{{cite web|last=Mae|first=Brandy|title=Choosing Where Taxes Go|url=http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2011/09/03/guest-post-choosing-where-taxes-go/|publisher=Forbes|accessdate=18 April 2012}} | |||
* Binowski, Brittany - . Forbes. 18 June 2012 | |||
*Blinder, Alan S. - 1989 | |||
* Kimball, Miles - . 25 Aug 2012 | |||
*{{cite web|last=Kuznicki|first=Jason|title=How Responsible Are You for Where Your Taxes Go?|url=http://ordinary-gentlemen.com/blog/2011/04/08/how-responsible-are-you-for-where-your-taxes-go/|publisher=The League|accessdate=18 April 2012}} | |||
*{{cite web|last=Wynn|first=L. S.|title=What is Personal Tax Earmarking?|url=http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-personal-tax-earmarking.htm|publisher=wiseGEEK|accessdate=19 April 2012}} | |||
*Yglesias, Matthew - Think Progress. 19 April 2011 | |||
* Peacock, Alan - "The Welfare Society". 1961 | |||
*Anderson, Lincoln - The Villager. 2007 | |||
*LeBoutillier, John - Newsmax. 27 Mar 2001 | |||
* Oates, Wallace E. - | |||
* Paunic, Alida - | |||
* Kennett, Patricia - | |||
* Ostrom, Vincent & Ostrom, Elinor - | |||
* Brown et all, | |||
* Frey, Bruno & Torgler, Benno - | |||
*Jimerson, Jeff - Walloa County Chieftain. 20 June 2012. | |||
*Severe, Kenneth - The News Tribune. 11 Jan 2009 | |||
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Latest revision as of 18:33, 1 October 2024
Concept that taxpayers should be able to choose what their taxes are used forThis article includes a list of general references, but it lacks sufficient corresponding inline citations. Please help to improve this article by introducing more precise citations. (February 2012) (Learn how and when to remove this message) |
In public choice theory, tax choice (sometimes called taxpayer sovereignty, earmarking, participatory taxation or fiscal subsidiarity) is an emerging type of citizen sourcing in which individuals or groups of taxpayers decide how to allocate part of their taxes of a municipal or public budget appropriation through a process of democratic deliberation and decision-making. Its proponents apply the theory of consumer choice to public finance. They claim taxpayers react positively when they are allowed to allocate portions of their taxes to specific spending.
Existing examples of tax choice includes: Business improvement district and Tax increment financing.
Tax relationship between the state and taxpayers
The term tax sovereignty emphasizes the perceived equal status of state and taxpayer, instead of the traditional view of the dominant position of the state in taxation. Tracing back to the legitimacy of the state, Viktoria Raritska points out that “the legitimacy of the state as a formal institution is substantiated by the people’s refusal of their freedoms and an agreement to submit to government in exchange for the protection of their guaranteed rights”. Proponents of tax sovereignty believe that in a traditional system of taxation, the taxpayer gives up their natural liberty in exchange for the protection from the state and the provision of public services; which impels the state to take public interests as its obligation to maintain social order and citizen safety.
This mutual relationship makes taxation a link between the state and taxpayers. Proponents of tax sovereignty believe that in such a relationship, the taxpayer endows power to the state to ensure the satisfaction of the public interest. Furthermore, they propose that the taxpayer has granted the state tax sovereignty. “It is due to the fact that the taxpayer endows the state with tax sovereignty. Thus, state has not only the rights on taxation, but also the obligations, which correspond to the taxpayer's rights”. Therefore, the existence of the state's perceived tax sovereignty is attributed to the taxpayer.
The Swedish economist Knut Wicksell’s theory also argues that "taxation should be based on the principle of value and counter-value, as if taxation was a voluntary transaction between the individual and the state".
Opinions
Daniel J. Brown examines tax-target plans in educational programs.
Alan T. Peacock, in his 1961 book The Welfare Society, advocates greater diversity in public services (education, housing, hospitals).
Optimal quantities of public goods
According to Vincent and Elinor Ostrom, it is possible that government may oversupply, and a market arrangement may undersupply, those public goods for which exclusion is not feasible.
Foot voting versus tax choice
Foot voting and voting with one's taxes are two methods that have been proposed to allow taxpayers to reveal their preferences for public policies. Foot voting refers to where people move to areas that offer a more attractive bundle of public policies. In theory foot voting would force local governments to compete for taxpayers. Tax choice, on the other hand, would allow taxpayers to indicate their preferences with their individual taxes. Wallace E. Oates wrote: "In the Tiebout model, for example, there is costless mobility; individuals seek out a jurisdiction that provides exactly the level of output of the public good that they wish to consume. In so doing, they reveal their preferences for 'local' public outputs and generate a Pareto-efficient outcome in the public sector."
Legislative measures
Four bills involving tax choice have been introduced by the United States Congress since 1971. The Presidential Election Campaign Fund, enacted in 1971, allows taxpayers to allocate $3 of their taxes to presidential election campaigns. The 2000 Taxpayers’ Choice Debt Reduction Act would have allowed taxpayers to designate money toward reduction of the national debt. The 2007 Opt Out of Iraq War Act would have allowed taxpayers to designate money toward certain social programs. The 2011 Put Your Money Where Your Mouth Is Act would have allowed taxpayers to make voluntary contributions (not tax payments) to the government. These later bills died in committee.
In popular culture
When asked what her first executive order as president of the United States would be, Ellen DeGeneres advocated a mix of voluntary taxation and tax choice, stating "you should get to choose where your money goes instead of giving it and just letting them decide, I think you should decide."
In 2009, during the Great Recession, Pope Benedict XVI advocated for a form of tax choice in his third encyclical. He wrote: "One possible approach to development aid would be to apply effectively what is known as fiscal subsidiarity, allowing citizens to decide how to allocate a portion of the taxes they pay to the State. Provided it does not degenerate into the promotion of special interests, this can help to stimulate forms of welfare solidarity from below, with obvious benefits in the area of solidarity for development as well."
In 1983, a short story We, The People by science-fiction writer Jack C. Haldeman II. The plot of the short story involves a man offered the choice to participate in allocating his taxes with the assistance of Artificial intelligence.
- "We, the People," written in a flush of bitter anger, but with an undertone of hope -- has over the years gathered me more response than anything else I've ever written. I was told that someone once sent copies to all the members of the Senate when they were considering tax reform. It has been used in classrooms to teach the critical difference between a Democracy and a Republic. I wrote it years ago, but I feel it is as pertinent today as it was when it appeared in Analog magazine. - Jack C. Haldeman II, Political Science Fiction
The short science fiction story by Jack C. Haldeman II, We, The People was originally published in September 1983 in ANALOG.
Examples
Iceland
Taxpayers in Iceland who belong to an officially registered religious group or secular humanist organization must pay a congregation tax (Icelandic: sóknargjald, plural sóknargjöld) which is deducted from income taxes and goes to the individual's respective organization. In the past, the sóknargjald of those who do not belong to any recognized religious organization went to the University of Iceland, but this was changed in 2009. In cases of individuals not belonging to a registered religious group or secular humanist organization, the amount that would otherwise be used for the sóknargjald remains now part of the income tax budget. In 2015, the monthly sóknargjald amounted to 824 Icelandic krónur, about $US6.
Italy
Italian taxpayers devolve a compulsory 8 ‰ = 0.8% (eight per mil, i.e. eight per thousand) from their annual income tax return to an organised religion recognised by Italy or, alternatively, to a state-run social assistance scheme.
Spain
The Spanish tax declaration form has one checkbox for the Catholic Church, none for other religious groups and a second checkbox for activities of social interest. These checkboxes don't influence the total tax amount, but, for each ticked checkbox, 0.7% of the total amount are used as indicated.
Japan
In Japan, city residents can choose to allocate a portion of their taxes to their hometowns...aka hometown tax. In 2021 more than 7 million taxpayers choose to do so resulting in a total allocation of $6 billion (source).
See also
- Choice architecture
- Hometown tax
- Hypothecated tax
- Microeconomic reform
- New public management
- Participatory budgeting
- Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act
- Tax reform
- Voluntary taxation
- YouCut
- Motivation, Agency, and Public Policy
- Nudge
- The Other Invisible Hand
References
- ^ Brown, Daniel J. (Fall 1979). "The Case for Tax-Target Plans". Journal of Education Finance. 5 (2). University of Illinois Press: 215–224. JSTOR 40703229.
For educators, these "new" values reflect a demand for taxpayer sovereignty, greater choice among educational programs, and more responsiveness on the part of educational systems.
- Buchanan 1963.
- Lamberton, Cait (4 March 2011). "Your Money, Your Choice". Democracy: A Journal of Ideas.
- Sherry Xin Li; Catherine Eckel; Philip J. Grossman; Tara Larson Brown (2011). "Do Earmarks Increase Giving to Government?". S2CID 168228863.
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(help) - Alm, James; Jackson, Betty R.; McKee, Michael (1993). "Fiscal exchange, collective decision institutions, and tax compliance". Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 22 (3): 285–303. doi:10.1016/0167-2681(93)90003-8.
- ^ System of Financial Law : system of tax law : conference proceedings. Masarykova univerzita. Katedra finančního práva a národního hospodářství. (1st ed.). Brno. 2015. ISBN 978-80-210-7827-7. OCLC 920663188.
{{cite book}}
: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link) CS1 maint: others (link) - Johnsen, Garmann (December 1994). "The impact of the Scandinavian controversy about just taxation on public choice; a late homage to Einar Einarson". Public Choice. 81 (3–4): 323–338. doi:10.1007/bf01053236. ISSN 0048-5829. S2CID 154569863.
- Kennett, Patricia (2008). Governance, globalization and public policy. Edward Elgar Publishing. p. 56. ISBN 978-1845424367
- Vincent Ostrom; Elinor Ostrom (2003). "Public Goods and Public Choices" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 20 May 2005.
- Oates, Wallace E. (May 2006), On the Theory and Practice of Fiscal Decentralization (PDF), Lexington, KY: Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations, archived from the original (PDF) on 1 December 2008
- Taxpayers’ Choice Debt Reduction Act
- Opt Out of Iraq War Act of 2007
- Put Your Money Where Your Mouth Is Act
- Kasperowicz, Pete, "Rep. Campbell proposes tax form change to encourage donations to the government". The Hill", 18 April 2011.
- Ellen DeGeneres, Mario Lopez (4 May 2016). What Ellen DeGeneres Would Do If She Were President. Extra. Archived from the original on 7 May 2016.
- Benedict XVI (7 July 2009). "Caritas in Veritate 'Charity in Truth'". Vatican Publishing House. Archived from the original on 2 September 2011. Retrieved 7 July 2009.
- ^ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2014). "International Religious Freedom Report for 2014: Iceland". U.S. Department of State. Retrieved 2015-12-07.
- ^ "Kirkjumál og skráð trúfélög og lífsskoðunarfélög" (in Icelandic). Ministry of the Interior (Innanríkisráðuneytið). Archived from the original on 2016-03-23. Retrieved 2015-12-07.
- Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2004). "International Religious Freedom Report for 2004: Iceland". U.S. Department of State. Retrieved 2015-12-07.
- "Frumvarp til laga um ráðstafanir í ríkisfjármálum" (in Icelandic). Alþingi. 2009. Archived from the original on 2015-12-08. Retrieved 2015-12-07.
- "Italian prime minister's office' explanation of the "otto per mille"".
- "¿Qué hace Hacienda con tu dinero si no marcas la casilla solidaria ni la Iglesia en la declaración de la renta?". El Periódico (in Spanish). 2022-06-23. Retrieved 2022-07-31.
Further reading
- Baker, Russell – Taxpayers' Choice The New York Times. 1990
- Binowski, Brittany – Why Mandatory Taxes Are Bad – And How The Government Should Fix Them (But Probably Won't). Forbes. 18 June 2012
- Blinder, Alan S. – The Economics of Public Finance: Essays 1989
- Buchanan, James M. – Public Finance in Democratic Process: Fiscal Institutions and Individual Choice 1967
- Buchanan, James M. (1963). "The Economics of Earmarked Taxes". Journal of Political Economy. 71 (5): 457–469. doi:10.1086/258794. JSTOR 1829016. S2CID 153517472.
- Le Grand, Julian - The Other Invisible Hand: Delivering Public Services through Choice and Competition 2007