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| '''Physical determinism''' generally refers to the assertion of a ] ] (greater ]).<ref name="Papineau2002">{{cite book|author=David Papineau|title=Thinking About Consciousness|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=N__qpV4e9-sC|accessdate=6 February 2013|year=2002|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-924382-2|page=240}}</ref><ref name=stanfordcausaldeterminism>{{cite encyclopedia|last=Hoefer |first=Carl |editor=Edward N. Zalta | title=Causal Determinism | encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009 edition) |date=Apr 1, 2008 |editor=Edward N. Zalta, ed |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/determinism-causal/}} See also {{cite book|author=Popper, K| name=Of Clouds and Cuckoos, included in Objective Knowledge|date=1978|page=p212|quote=Newton himself may be counted among the few dissenters, for he regarded the solar system as ''imperfect'', and consequently as likely to perish (citing, Henry Pemberton's ''A View of Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophy)}}</ref> Physical determinism holds that a complete description of the ''physical'' state of the world at any given time and a complete statement of the ''physical'' laws of nature together entail every truth as to what ''physical'' events happen after that time.<ref name=Ginet /> Physical determinism is therefore synonymous for ], that all future events are governed by the past or present according to all-encompassing deterministic laws.<ref name=Horst /> | |||
| Physical determinism has also been considered more broadly as a position in ], in which all ''physical'' events occur as described by ''physical'' laws, but this definition is at odds with the definition of ] (which is only the opposite of physical determinism in its common sense above).<ref name=Bishop /> | |||
| ==Causal completeness== | |||
| {{See also|Causal closure}} | |||
| Physical determinism is related to the question of ''causal completeness'' of science, the idea that every real event has a scientific explanation, that science need not search for explanations beyond itself.<ref name=Sarkar/> If causal completeness does not apply to ''everything'' in the universe, then the door is open to events that are not subject to physical determinism (see causal closure below).<ref name=Atmanspacher/> For example, a relatively common view of mental events is that they are an ] produced as a by-product of neurological activity, and without ]. In this case, only a failure of physical determinism would allow room for their causal significance. | |||
| The scope of physical determinism is also related to the question of ''causal closure'', the idea that no physical event has a cause outside the physical domain. The notion of causal completeness (physical system integrity) has been claimed to be maintainable even when rejecting causal closure if the physical system is ].<ref name="CSLewis1">{{Cite book| author=Lewis, C.S. | title=Miracles | year=1947| page=24| isbn=0-688-17369-1}}</ref> | |||
| ==Other theories== | |||
| A peculiar formulation of physical determinism skirts the issue of causal completeness. It is based upon connections between 'events' supplied by a theory: | |||
| {{quote| "a theory is deterministic if, and only if, given its state variables for some initial period, the theory logically determines a unique set of values for those variables for any other period."<ref name=Nagel/>|Ernest Nagel|''Alternative descriptions of physical state'' p. 292 }} | |||
| This quote replaces the idea of 'cause-and-effect' with that of 'logical implication' according to one or another theory that connects events. In addition, an 'event' is related by the theory itself to formalized ''states'' described using the parameters defined by that theory. Thus, the details of interpretation are placed where they belong, fitted to the context in which the chosen theory applies. Using the definition of physical determinism above, the limitations of a theory to some particular domain of experience also limits the associated definition of 'physical determinism' to that same domain. That limitation leaves open the question whether there is a physical "]" waiting to be invented. | |||
| ==See also== | |||
| *] | |||
| *] | |||
| *] | |||
| *] | |||
| *] | |||
| *] | |||
| ==References== | |||
| {{reflist|refs= | |||
| <ref name=Atmanspacher> | |||
| {{cite book |author=Robert C Bishop, Harald Atmanspacher |chapter=Chapter 5: The causal closure of physics and free will |page=101 |title=The Oxford Handbook of Free Will: Second Edition |editor=Robert Kane, ed |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=4YUJhIiyMFoC&pg=PA101 |isbn=0195399692 |year=2011 |publisher=Oxford University Press |edition=2nd}} | |||
| </ref> | |||
| <ref name=Bishop> | |||
| {{cite book |author=Robert C Bishop |chapter=Chapter 4: Chaos, indeterminism, and free will |page=84 |title=The Oxford Handbook of Free Will: Second Edition |editor=Robert Kane, ed |isbn=0195399692 |year=2011 |publisher=Oxford University Press |edition=2nd |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=4YUJhIiyMFoC&pg=PA84}} | |||
| </ref> | |||
| <ref name=Ginet> | |||
| This definition is from {{cite book |title=On Action |author=Carl Ginet |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=mRns0NYdns0C&pg=PA92 |page=92 |isbn=052138818X |year=1990 |publisher=Cambridge University Press}} | |||
| </ref> | |||
| <ref name=Horst> | |||
| {{cite book |title=Laws, Mind, and Free Will |author=Steven W Horst |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=B58sSJy0eN0C&pg=PA98 |page=98 |isbn= 0262015250 |year=2011 |publisher=MIT Press}} | |||
| </ref> | |||
| <ref name=Nagel> | |||
| {{cite book |title=The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation |author=Ernest Nagel |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=u6EycHgRfkQC&pg=PA285 |pages =285-292 |chapter=§V: Alternative descriptions of physical state |isbn=0915144719 |year=1999 |publisher=Hackett |edition=2nd }} | |||
| </ref> | |||
| <ref name=Sarkar> | |||
| See for example, {{cite book |title=The Philosophy of Science: N-Z, Index |author=Sahotra Sarkar, Jessica Pfeifer |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=b_ixzEzskwYC&pg=PA566 |chapter=Physicalism: The causal impact argument |page=566 |isbn=041597710X |year=2006 |publisher=Taylor & Francis}} | |||
| </ref> | |||
| }} | |||
| ] | |||
| ] | |||
| ] | |||
| ] | |||
| ] | |||
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