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{{Short description|About mathematical infinity}}
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==Introduction==
In ], the theory of ]s was first developed by ]. Although this work has become a thoroughly standard fixture of classical ], it has been criticized in several areas by mathematicians and philosophers.
The pure mathematicians and applied mathematicians who object to ] claim
that ] introduced into mathematics an element of fantasy which should be expunged.
The basic argument was stated most elegantly and concisely by ]
when he wrote:


] implies that there are sets having ] greater than the infinite cardinality of the set of ]. Cantor's argument for this theorem is presented with one small change. This argument can be improved by using a definition he gave later. The resulting argument uses only five axioms of set theory.
<blockquote> "...classical logic was abstracted from the mathematics of finite sets and their subsets...Forgetful of this limited origin, one afterwards mistook that logic for something above and prior to all mathematics, and finally applied it, without justification, to the mathematics of infinite sets. This is the Fall and original sin of set theory ..." (Weyl, 1946) </blockquote>


Cantor's set theory was controversial at the start, but later became largely accepted. Most modern mathematics textbooks implicitly use Cantor's views on ]. For example, a ] is generally presented as the infinite set of its points, and it is commonly taught that there are more real numbers than rational numbers (see ]).
In other words, Weyl amongst others claimed that Cantor built a theory starting with a few assumptions about sets which can be proven true when our domain of discourse is finite sets, and then claimed (without actual proof) that we can retain logical consistency if we extend our domain of discourse to include infinite sets.


== Cantor's argument ==
Since the original inception of Cantor's set theory it has been rigourously formalised in a number of different ways and these various rigourisations are collectively referred to as ]. The most common formulation of Cantor's theory is known as ]. The fact that this axiomatic theory cannot be proved consistent is today understood in terms of ] and it is not generally regarded as reason to doubt the theory.


] that infinite sets can have different ] was published in 1874. This proof demonstrates that the set of natural numbers and the set of ]s have different cardinalities. It uses the theorem that a bounded increasing ] of real numbers has a ], which can be proved by using Cantor's or ]'s construction of the ]s. Because ] did not accept these constructions, Cantor was motivated to develop a new proof.<ref>Dauben 1979, pp. 67&ndash;68, 165.</ref>
Cantor's argument that there are sets that have a cardinality (or "power" or "number") that is greater than the (already infinite) cardinality of the whole numbers 1,2,3,... has probably attracted more hostility than any other theoretical argument, before or since. Logician ] has commented on the energy devoted to refuting this "harmless little argument". What had it done to anyone to make them angry with it?


In 1891, he published "a much simpler proof ... which does not depend on considering the irrational numbers."<ref>Cantor 1891, p. 75; English translation: Ewald p. 920.</ref> His new proof uses his ] to prove that there exists an infinite set with a larger number of elements (or greater cardinality) than the set of natural numbers '''N'''&nbsp;=&nbsp;{1,&nbsp;2,&nbsp;3,&nbsp;...}. This larger set consists of the elements (''x''<sub>1</sub>,&nbsp;''x''<sub>2</sub>,&nbsp;''x''<sub>3</sub>,&nbsp;...), where each ''x<sub>n</sub>'' is either ''m'' or ''w''.<ref>Dauben 1979, p. 166.</ref> Each of these elements corresponds to a ] of '''N'''—namely, the element (''x''<sub>1</sub>,&nbsp;''x''<sub>2</sub>,&nbsp;''x''<sub>3</sub>,&nbsp;...) corresponds to {''n''&nbsp;∈&nbsp;'''N''': &nbsp;''x<sub>n</sub>''&nbsp;=&nbsp;''w''}. So Cantor's argument implies that the set of all subsets of '''N''' has greater cardinality than '''N'''. The set of all subsets of '''N''' is denoted by ''P''('''N'''), the ] of '''N'''.
This article summarises the argument and examines some of the objections that have been raised against it.


Cantor generalized his argument to an arbitrary set ''A'' and the set consisting of all functions from ''A'' to {0,&nbsp;1}.<ref>Dauben 1979, pp.166–167.</ref> Each of these functions corresponds to a subset of ''A'', so his generalized argument implies the theorem: The power set ''P''(''A'') has greater cardinality than ''A''. This is known as ].
== Cantor's argument ==


The argument below is a modern version of Cantor's argument that uses power sets (for his original argument, see ]). By presenting a modern argument, it is possible to see which assumptions of ] are used. The first part of the argument proves that '''N''' and ''P''('''N''') have different cardinalities:
Cantor's 1891 argument is that there exists an infinite set (which he identifies with the set of ]s), which has a larger number of elements, or as he puts it, has a greater 'power' (Mächtigkeit), than the infinite set of ] 1, 2, 3, ...


* There exists at least one infinite set. This assumption (not formally specified by Cantor) is captured in formal set theory by the ]. This axiom implies that '''N''', the set of all natural numbers, exists.
There are a number of steps implicit in his argument, as follows
* ''P''('''N'''), the set of all subsets of '''N''', exists. In formal set theory, this is implied by the ], which says that for every set there is a set of all of its subsets.
* The concept of "having the same number" or "having the same cardinality" can be captured by the idea of ]. This (purely definitional) assumption is sometimes known as ]. As ] said, "If a waiter wishes to be certain of laying exactly as many knives on a table as plates, he has no need to count either of them; all he has to do is to lay immediately to the right of every plate a knife, taking care that every knife on the table lies immediately to the right of a plate. Plates and knives are thus correlated one to one."<ref>Frege 1884, trans. 1953, §70.</ref> Sets in such a correlation are called ], and the correlation is called a one-to-one correspondence.
* A set cannot be put into one-to-one correspondence with its power set. This implies that '''N''' and ''P''('''N''') have different cardinalities. It depends on very few assumptions of ], and, as ] puts it, is a "simple and beautiful argument" that is "pregnant with consequences".<ref>Mayberry 2000, p. 136.</ref> Here is the argument:
*:Let <math>A</math> be a set and <math>P(A)</math> be its power set. The following theorem will be proved: If <math>f</math> is a function from <math>A</math> to <math>P(A),</math> then it is not ]. This theorem implies that there is no one-to-one correspondence between <math>A</math> and <math>P(A)</math> since such a correspondence must be onto. Proof of theorem: Define the diagonal subset <math>D = \{x \in A : x \notin f(x)\}.</math> Since <math>D \in P(A),</math> proving that for all <math>x \in A,\, D \ne f(x)</math> will imply that <math>f</math> is not onto. Let <math>x \in A.</math> Then <math>x \in D \Leftrightarrow x \notin f(x),</math> which implies <math>x \notin D \Leftrightarrow x \in f(x).</math> So if <math>x \in D,</math> then <math>x \notin f(x);</math> and if <math>x \notin D,</math> then <math>x \in f(x).</math> Since one of these sets contains <math>x</math> and the other does not, <math>D \ne f(x).</math> Therefore, <math>D</math> is not in the ] of <math>f</math>, so <math>f</math> is not onto.


Next Cantor shows that <math>A</math> is equinumerous with a subset of <math>P(A)</math>. From this and the fact that <math>P(A)</math> and <math>A</math> have different cardinalities, he concludes that <math>P(A)</math> has greater cardinality than <math>A</math>. This conclusion uses his 1878 definition: If ''A'' and ''B'' have different cardinalities, then either ''B'' is equinumerous with a subset of ''A'' (in this case, ''B'' has less cardinality than ''A'') or ''A'' is equinumerous with a subset of ''B'' (in this case, ''B'' has greater cardinality than ''A'').<ref>Cantor 1878, p. 242. Cantor 1891, p. 77; English translation: Ewald p. 922.</ref> This definition leaves out the case where ''A'' and ''B'' are equinumerous with a subset of the other set—that is, ''A'' is equinumerous with a subset of ''B'' and ''B'' is equinumerous with a subset of ''A''. Because Cantor implicitly assumed that cardinalities are ], this case cannot occur.<ref>Hallett 1984, p. 59.</ref> After using his 1878 definition, Cantor stated that in an 1883 article he proved that cardinalities are ], which implies they are linearly ordered.<ref>Cantor 1891, p. 77; English translation: Ewald p. 922.</ref> This proof used his well-ordering principle "every set can be well-ordered", which he called a "law of thought".<ref>Moore 1982, p. 42.</ref> The well-ordering principle is equivalent to the ].<ref>Moore 1982, p. 330.</ref>
* That the elements of no set can be put into ] with all of its subsets. This is known as ]. It depends on very few of the assumptions of ], and, as ] puts it, is a "simple and beautiful argument" that is "pregnant with consequences". Few have seriously questioned this step of the argument.


Around 1895, Cantor began to regard the well-ordering principle as a theorem and attempted to prove it.<ref>Moore 1982, p. 51. A discussion of Cantor's proof is in ]. Part of Cantor's proof and ]'s criticism of it is in a reference note.</ref> In 1895, Cantor also gave a new definition of "greater than" that correctly defines this concept without the aid of his well-ordering principle.<ref name=Cantor1895>Cantor 1895, pp. 483&ndash;484; English translation: Cantor 1954, pp. 89&ndash;90.</ref> By using Cantor's new definition, the modern argument that ''P''('''N''') has greater cardinality than '''N''' can be completed using weaker assumptions than his original argument:
* That the concept of "having the same number" can be captured by the idea of ''one-to-one'' correlation. This (purely definitional) assumption is sometimes known as ]. Cantor argues (1883 §1) that every well-defined set has a determinate ''power'', and that two sets have the same power if they can be correlated with one another, element for element. As ] says, "If a waiter wishes to be certain of laying exactly as many knives on a table as plates, he has no need to count either of them; all he has to do is to lay immediately to the right of every plate a knife, taking care that every knife on the table lies immediately to the right of a plate. Plates and knives are thus correlated one to one" (1884, tr. 1953, §70).


* The concept of "having greater cardinality" can be captured by Cantor's 1895 definition: ''B'' has greater cardinality than ''A'' if (1) ''A'' is equinumerous with a subset of ''B'', and (2) ''B'' is not equinumerous with a subset of ''A''.<ref name=Cantor1895 /> Clause (1) says ''B'' is at least as large as ''A'', which is consistent with our definition of "having the same cardinality". Clause (2) implies that the case where ''A'' and ''B'' are equinumerous with a subset of the other set is false. Since clause (2) says that ''A'' is not at least as large as ''B'', the two clauses together say that ''B'' is larger (has greater cardinality) than ''A''.
* That there exists at least one infinite set of things, usually identified with the set of all finite whole numbers or "natural numbers". This assumption (not formally specified by Cantor) is captured in formal set theory by the ]. This assumption allows us to prove, together with Cantor's theorem, that there exists at least one set that cannot be correlated one-to-one with all its subsets. It does ''not'' prove, however, that there in fact exists any set corresponding to "all the subsets".
* The power set <math>P(A)</math> has greater cardinality than <math>A,</math> which implies that ''P''('''N''') has greater cardinality than '''N'''. Here is the proof:
*# Define the subset <math>P_1 = \{\,y \in P(A): \exists x \in A\,(y = \{x\})\,\}.</math> Define <math>f(x) = \{x\},</math> which maps <math>A</math> onto <math>P_1.</math> Since <math>f(x_1) = f(x_2)</math> implies <math>x_1 = x_2, \, f</math> is a one-to-one correspondence from <math>A</math> to <math>P_1.</math> Therefore, <math>A</math> is equinumerous with a subset of <math>P(A).</math>
*# Using ], assume that <math>A_1,</math> a subset of <math>A,</math> is equinumerous with <math>P(A).</math>. Then there is a one-to-one correspondence <math>g</math> from <math>A_1</math> to <math>P(A).</math> Define <math>h</math> from <math>A</math> to <math>P(A)\text{:}</math> if <math>x \in A_1,</math> then <math>h(x) = g(x);</math> if <math>x \in A \setminus A_1,</math> then <math>h(x) = \{ \, \}.</math> Since <math>g</math> maps <math>A_1</math> onto <math>P(A), \, h</math> maps <math>A</math> onto <math>P(A),</math> contradicting the theorem above stating that a function from <math>A</math> to <math>P(A)</math> is not onto. Therefore, <math>P(A)</math> is not equinumerous with a subset of <math>A.</math>


Besides the axioms of infinity and power set, the axioms of ], ], and ] were used in the modern argument. For example, the axiom of separation was used to define the diagonal subset <math>D,</math> the axiom of extensionality was used to prove <math>D \ne f(x),</math> and the axiom of pairing was used in the definition of the subset <math>P_1.</math>
* That there does indeed exist a set of all subsets of the natural numbers is captured in formal set theory by the ], which says that for every set there is a set of all of its subsets. This allows us to prove Cantor's assertion that there exists a set with a greater number of elements than the set of natural numbers. The set '''N''' of natural numbers exists (by the axiom of infinity), and so does the set '''R''' of all its subsets (by the power set axiom). By Cantor's theorem, '''R''' cannot be one-to-one correlated with '''N''', and by Cantor's definition of number of "power", it can be shown that '''R''' has a greater number than '''N'''. QED.


== Reception of the argument == == Reception of the argument ==


Initially, Cantor's theory was controversial among mathematicians and (later) philosophers. As ] claimed: "I don't know what predominates in Cantor's theory – philosophy or theology, but I am sure that there is no mathematics there."{{Citation needed|date=July 2013}} Many mathematicians agreed with Kronecker that the ] may be part of ] or ], but that it has no proper place in mathematics. Logician {{Harvard citations|txt = yes|last = Hodges|first = Wilfrid|authorlink = Wilfrid Hodges|year = 1998}} has commented on the energy devoted to refuting this "harmless little argument" (i.e. ]) asking, "what had it done to anyone to make them angry with it?"<ref>{{Citation | first = Wilfrid | last = Hodges | author-link = Wilfred Hodges | year = 1998 | title = An Editor Recalls Some Hopeless Papers | periodical = The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic | volume = 4 | issue = 1 | pages = 1–16 | jstor = 421003 | doi = 10.2307/421003 | publisher = Association for Symbolic Logic| citeseerx = 10.1.1.27.6154 | s2cid = 14897182 }}</ref> Mathematician ] has referred to Cantor's theories as “simply not relevant to everyday mathematics.”<ref>{{cite web|last1=Wolchover|first1=Natalie|author-link=Natalie Wolchover|title=Dispute over Infinity Divides Mathematicians|url=http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/infinity-logic-law/|website=Scientific American|access-date=2 October 2014}}</ref>
From the start, Cantor's Theory was controversial among mathematicians and (later) philosophers.


Before Cantor, the notion of infinity was often taken as a useful abstraction which helped mathematicians reason about the finite world; for example the use of infinite limit cases in ]. The infinite was deemed to have at most a potential existence, rather than an actual existence.<ref>{{Citation | first = Alexander | last = Zenkin | year = 2004 | title = Logic Of Actual Infinity And G. Cantor's Diagonal Proof Of The Uncountability Of The Continuum | periodical = The Review of Modern Logic | volume = 9 | issue = 30 | pages = 27–80 | url = http://projecteuclid.org/euclid.rml/1203431978}}</ref> "Actual infinity does not exist. What we call infinite is only the endless possibility of creating new objects no matter how many exist already".<ref>(] quoted from Kline 1982)</ref> ]'s views on the subject can be paraphrased as: "Infinity is nothing more than a figure of speech which helps us talk about limits. The notion of a completed infinity doesn't belong in mathematics."<ref>{{cite book|last1=Dunham|first1=William|title=Journey through Genius: The Great Theorems of Mathematics|year=1991|url=https://archive.org/details/journeythroughge00dunh_359|url-access=limited|publisher=Penguin|page=|isbn=9780140147391}}</ref> In other words, the only access we have to the infinite is through the notion of limits, and hence, we must not treat infinite sets as if they have an existence exactly comparable to the existence of finite sets.
<blockquote>
I don't know what predominates in Cantor's
theory - philosophy or theology, but I am sure
that there is no mathematics there (])
</blockquote>


Cantor's ideas ultimately were largely accepted, strongly supported by ], amongst others. Hilbert predicted: "No one will drive us from the ] for us."<ref>(Hilbert, 1926)</ref> To which ] replied "if one person can see it as a paradise of mathematicians, why should not another see it as a joke?"<ref>(RFM V. 7)</ref> The rejection of Cantor's infinitary ideas influenced the development of schools of mathematics such as ] and ].{{cn|date=July 2024}}
Before Cantor, the notion of ] was often taken as a useful abstraction which helped mathematicians reason about the finite world, for example the use of infinite limit cases in calculus. The infinite was deemed to have at most a potential existence, rather than an actual existence.


Wittgenstein did not object to mathematical formalism wholesale, but had a finitist view on what Cantor's proof meant. The philosopher maintained that belief in infinities arises from confusing the intensional nature of mathematical laws with the extensional nature of sets, sequences, symbols etc. A series of symbols is finite in his view: In Wittgenstein's words: "...A curve is not composed of points, it is a law that points
<blockquote>
obey, or again, a law according to which points can be constructed."
Actual infinity does not exist. What we call infinite
is only the endless possibility of creating new objects
no matter how many exist already (] quoted from Kline 1982)
</blockquote>


He also described the diagonal argument as "hocus pocus" and not proving what it purports to do.
] views on the subject (paraphrased): "Infinity is nothing more than a figure of speech which helps us talk
about limits. The notion of a completed infinity doesn't belong in mathematics". In other words, the only access we have to the infinite is through the notion of limits, and hence, we must not treat infinite sets as if they have an existence exactly comparable to the existence of finite sets.

Many mathematicians, along with ] argued that the completed infinite may be part of ] or ], but that it has no proper place in mathematics.

Cantor's ideas ultimately were accepted, strongly supported by ], amongst others. Even ] and the ], who developed their schools of mathematics as a reaction to Cantor's infinitary ideas, generally no longer argue that mathematicians should abandon Cantor's Theory. It would appear that Hilbert's prediction has proved accurate:

<blockquote>
"No one will drive us from the paradise which
Cantor created for us" (Hilbert, 1926)
</blockquote>

(To which ] replied "if one person can see it as a paradise of mathematicians, why should not another see it as a joke? (RFM V. 7)).

== Naïve objections ==

Objections to Cantor's proof (together with objections to ]) are a standard feature of mathematical discussions. These are generally flawed in some way.

Many of these objections depend on objections to step two of the argument. These typically use applications of the ], or other assumptions that require "counting" all the natural numbers. Thus they rely on the assumption that we can "count" all such numbers by a process that at some point comes to an end. This is what Cantorians deny. They say this begs the question. Of course we can count finite numbers, indeed this constitutes one definition of a finite number. But who is to say that all numbers are finite, given that Hume's principle shows that infinite sets can also be compared in size? Cantor argued in his philosophical writing and correspondence that all objections based on the finitude of our "normal" concept of number, thus involve a ].

<blockquote> All so-called proofs against the possibility of actually infinite numbers are faulty, as can be demonstrated in every particular case, and as can be concluded on general grounds as well. It is their "initial falsehood" that from the outset they expect or even impose all the properties of finite numbers upon the numbers in question, while on the other hand the infinite numbers, if they are to be considered in any form at all, must (in their contrast to the finite numbers) constitute an entirely new kind of number, whose nature is entirely dependent upon the nature of things and is an object of research, but not of our arbitrariness or prejudices. (Letter to Gustac Enestrom, quoted in Dauben p. 125) </blockquote>

Other objections depend on the idea that it is possible to define a function mapping every whole number on to some subset of whole numbers (though not one which captures every such subset). Cantor's theorem shows that at least one diagonal set is left over. We can then define a new function that does capture this diagonal set, and then define a further function that captures this set and so on ''ad infinitum''. The problem with this objection is that it assumes there is a ''set'' yielded by this infinite process. Since Cantor's argument proves there can be no such set (indeed it is a necessary consequence of set theory – see ]) – the objection once more begs the question.

Hodges (1998 – see ]) has written an entertaining paper outlining other attempts. These include

* the claim that Cantor had chosen the wrong enumeration of the positive integers
* the argument that Cantor had used the wrong positive integers
* a denial that proof by contradiction is valid

For a list of anti-Cantor sites generally regarded as "cranky", see the external link below.



== Objections to Hume's principle ==

As argued above, many naïve objections depend on implicitly denying Hume's principle, and are therefore question-begging. Wittgenstein ''explicitly'' denies the principle, arguing that our concept of number depends ''essentially'' on counting. "Where the nonsense starts is with our habit of thinking of a large number as closer to infinity than a small one"

<blockquote> The expressions "divisible into two parts" and "divisible without limit" have completely different forms. This is, of course, the same case as the one in which someone operates with the word "infinite" as if it were a number word; because, in everyday speech, both are given as answers to the question 'How many?'(PR §173) </blockquote>

<blockquote>Does the relation m = 2n correlate the class of all numbers with one of its subclasses? No. It correlates any arbitrary number with another, and in that way we arrive at infinitely many pairs of classes, of which one is correlated with the other, but which are never related as class and subclass. Neither is this infinite process itself in some sense or other such a pair of classes. In the superstition that m = 2n correlates a class with its subclass, we merely have yet another case of ambiguous grammar. (PR §141). </blockquote>

He argues that the sign for a list of things is itself a list, and that a list is therefore inherently finite ("The symbol for a class is a list ... A cardinal number is an internal property of a list." (PR § 119)

Anti-Cantorians who propose that a "reality criterion" should be added to mathematics are also (in effect) denying that the concept of "number" truly applies to infinite sets. They argue that we must take steps to guarantee that formal conclusions reached in the world of abstractions can be translated back into assertions about the concrete world. Now that we have a microscope for mathematics (i.e. the computer), it makes sense to think of the world of computation as real and concrete; infinite sets and ]s of infinite sets (and hence, real numbers etc.) exist only as useful fictions (abstractions) which help us reason about the concrete reality underlying mathematics; ]s and the ] for abstractions should guarantee that any statement about the infinite should have implications for approximations to the infinite. Statements which have no implications observable in the world of computation, are fictions.

They argue that it is not clear that anyone has produced a collection of axioms and rules of inference that satisfy these criteria, and are powerful enough to do all potentially useful mathematics. The ] have made progress towards that goal .

Others have argued that the mathematical logic that underpins set theory is essentially mathematical, and therefore lacks genuine logical underpinnings.

<blockquote> ...classical logic was abstracted from the mathematics of finite sets and their subsets...Forgetful of this limited origin, one afterwards mistook that logic for something above and prior to all mathematics, and finally applied it, without justification, to the mathematics of infinite sets. This is the Fall and original sin of set theory ..." (Weyl, 1946) </blockquote>

<blockquote>
We cannot use the modern axiomatic method to establish the theory of sets. We cannot, in particular, simply employ the machinery of modern logic, modern mathematical logic, in establishing the theory of sets (Mayberry 2000, 7)
</blockquote>

<blockquote> If God has mathematics of his own that needs to be done, let him do it himself."
(] (19XX)) </blockquote>



Philosopher Hartley Slater, in a number of papers, has repeatedly argued against the concept of "number" that underlies set theory (see external link below).

In reply, Cantoreans quote Cantor's saying (now inscribed on his tombstone) that "the essence of mathematics lies entirely in its freedom" (Grundlagen §8).

<blockquote>Mathematics is in its development entirely free and is only bound in the self-evident respect that its concepts must both be consistent with each other, and also stand in exact relationships, ordered by definitions, to those concepts which have previously been introduced and are already at hand and established. In particular, in the introduction of new numbers, it is only obligated to give definitions of them which will bestow such a determinacy and, in certain circumstances, such a relationship to the other numbers that they can in any given instance be precisely distinguished. As soon as a number satisfies all these conditions, it can and must be regarded in mathematics as existent and real. (ibid.) </blockquote>


== Objection to the axiom of infinity == == Objection to the axiom of infinity ==
{{further|Finitism}}


One of the most common (and also the most respectable) objections to Cantor's theory of infinite number involves the axiom of infinity. It is generally recognised view by all logicians that this axiom is not a logical truth. Indeed, as ] (1979, p.305) has argued "there is room for doubt about whether it is a contingent truth, since it is an open question whether the universe is finite or infinite". ] for many years tried to establish a foundation for mathematics that did not rely on this axiom. Mayberry (2000, p.10) has noted that "The set-theoretical axioms that sustain modern mathematics are self-evident in differing degrees. One of them – indeed, the most important of them, namely Cantor's axiom, the so-called axiom of infinity – has scarcely any claim to self-evidence at all". A common objection to Cantor's theory of infinite number involves the ] (which is, indeed, an axiom and not a ]). Mayberry has noted that "... the set-theoretical axioms that sustain modern mathematics are self-evident in differing degrees. One of them—indeed, the most important of them, namely Cantor's Axiom, the so-called Axiom of Infinity—has scarcely any claim to self-evidence at all"<ref>Mayberry 2000, p.&nbsp;10.</ref>


Another objection is that the use of infinite sets is not adequately justified by analogy to finite sets. ] wrote:
This approach is known as ].
{{blockquote|... classical logic was abstracted from the mathematics of finite sets and their subsets …. Forgetful of this limited origin, one afterwards mistook that logic for something above and prior to all mathematics, and finally applied it, without justification, to the mathematics of infinite sets. This is the Fall and original sin of set theory ..."<ref>Weyl, 1946</ref>}}

Richard Arthur, philosopher and expert on Leibniz, has argued that Cantor's appeal to the idea of an actual infinite (formally captured by the axiom of infinity) is philosophically unjustified. Arthur argues that Leibniz' idea of a "syncategorematic" but actual infinity is philosophically more appealing. (See external link below for one of his papers).


The difficulty with finitism is to develop foundations of mathematics using finitist assumptions, that incorporates what everyone would reasonably regard as mathematics (for example, that includes ]). The difficulty with finitism is to develop foundations of mathematics using finitist assumptions, that incorporates what everyone would reasonably regard as mathematics (for example, that includes ]).

== Objections to the power set axiom ==






==See also== ==See also==
*]


==Notes==
*]
<references/>


== References == == References ==
* {{Citation

| last1 = Bishop
*Bishop, E. ''Introduction to Foundations of Constructive Analysis''
| first1 = Errett
* Cantor, G. .
| author-link = Errett Bishop
* Frege, G. (1884) ''Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik'', transl. as ''The Foundations of Arithmetic'', J.L. Austin, 2nd edition 1953.
| last2 = Bridges
* Dauben, G., ''Cantor''.
| first2 = Douglas S.
* ], 1926. "Über das Unendliche". Mathematische Annalen, 95: 161&mdash;90. Translated as "On the infinite" in van Heijenoort, ''From Frege to Gödel: A source book in mathematical logic, 1879-1931'', Harvard University Press.
| title = Constructive Analysis
* Hodges, W.
| publisher = Springer
* ], 1982. ''Mathematics: The Loss of Certainty''. Oxford, ISBN 0195030850.
| series = Grundlehren Der Mathematischen Wissenschaften
* Mayberry, J.P., ''The Foundations of Mathematics in the Theory of Sets'', Encyclopedia of Mathematics and its Applications, Vol. 82, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000
| year = 1985
* ], 1908. "". Address to the Fourth International Congress of Mathematicians . Published in ''Revue generale des Sciences pures et appliquees'' 23.
| isbn = 978-0-387-15066-6
* Sainsbury, R.M., ''Russell'', London 1979
}}
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| edition = 3rd
| location = Oxford
| year = 2001
}}


== External links == == External links ==
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Latest revision as of 15:28, 8 July 2024

About mathematical infinity
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In mathematical logic, the theory of infinite sets was first developed by Georg Cantor. Although this work has become a thoroughly standard fixture of classical set theory, it has been criticized in several areas by mathematicians and philosophers.

Cantor's theorem implies that there are sets having cardinality greater than the infinite cardinality of the set of natural numbers. Cantor's argument for this theorem is presented with one small change. This argument can be improved by using a definition he gave later. The resulting argument uses only five axioms of set theory.

Cantor's set theory was controversial at the start, but later became largely accepted. Most modern mathematics textbooks implicitly use Cantor's views on mathematical infinity. For example, a line is generally presented as the infinite set of its points, and it is commonly taught that there are more real numbers than rational numbers (see cardinality of the continuum).

Cantor's argument

Cantor's first proof that infinite sets can have different cardinalities was published in 1874. This proof demonstrates that the set of natural numbers and the set of real numbers have different cardinalities. It uses the theorem that a bounded increasing sequence of real numbers has a limit, which can be proved by using Cantor's or Richard Dedekind's construction of the irrational numbers. Because Leopold Kronecker did not accept these constructions, Cantor was motivated to develop a new proof.

In 1891, he published "a much simpler proof ... which does not depend on considering the irrational numbers." His new proof uses his diagonal argument to prove that there exists an infinite set with a larger number of elements (or greater cardinality) than the set of natural numbers N = {1, 2, 3, ...}. This larger set consists of the elements (x1x2x3, ...), where each xn is either m or w. Each of these elements corresponds to a subset of N—namely, the element (x1x2x3, ...) corresponds to {n ∈ N:  xn = w}. So Cantor's argument implies that the set of all subsets of N has greater cardinality than N. The set of all subsets of N is denoted by P(N), the power set of N.

Cantor generalized his argument to an arbitrary set A and the set consisting of all functions from A to {0, 1}. Each of these functions corresponds to a subset of A, so his generalized argument implies the theorem: The power set P(A) has greater cardinality than A. This is known as Cantor's theorem.

The argument below is a modern version of Cantor's argument that uses power sets (for his original argument, see Cantor's diagonal argument). By presenting a modern argument, it is possible to see which assumptions of axiomatic set theory are used. The first part of the argument proves that N and P(N) have different cardinalities:

  • There exists at least one infinite set. This assumption (not formally specified by Cantor) is captured in formal set theory by the axiom of infinity. This axiom implies that N, the set of all natural numbers, exists.
  • P(N), the set of all subsets of N, exists. In formal set theory, this is implied by the power set axiom, which says that for every set there is a set of all of its subsets.
  • The concept of "having the same number" or "having the same cardinality" can be captured by the idea of one-to-one correspondence. This (purely definitional) assumption is sometimes known as Hume's principle. As Frege said, "If a waiter wishes to be certain of laying exactly as many knives on a table as plates, he has no need to count either of them; all he has to do is to lay immediately to the right of every plate a knife, taking care that every knife on the table lies immediately to the right of a plate. Plates and knives are thus correlated one to one." Sets in such a correlation are called equinumerous, and the correlation is called a one-to-one correspondence.
  • A set cannot be put into one-to-one correspondence with its power set. This implies that N and P(N) have different cardinalities. It depends on very few assumptions of set theory, and, as John P. Mayberry puts it, is a "simple and beautiful argument" that is "pregnant with consequences". Here is the argument:
    Let A {\displaystyle A} be a set and P ( A ) {\displaystyle P(A)} be its power set. The following theorem will be proved: If f {\displaystyle f} is a function from A {\displaystyle A} to P ( A ) , {\displaystyle P(A),} then it is not onto. This theorem implies that there is no one-to-one correspondence between A {\displaystyle A} and P ( A ) {\displaystyle P(A)} since such a correspondence must be onto. Proof of theorem: Define the diagonal subset D = { x A : x f ( x ) } . {\displaystyle D=\{x\in A:x\notin f(x)\}.} Since D P ( A ) , {\displaystyle D\in P(A),} proving that for all x A , D f ( x ) {\displaystyle x\in A,\,D\neq f(x)} will imply that f {\displaystyle f} is not onto. Let x A . {\displaystyle x\in A.} Then x D x f ( x ) , {\displaystyle x\in D\Leftrightarrow x\notin f(x),} which implies x D x f ( x ) . {\displaystyle x\notin D\Leftrightarrow x\in f(x).} So if x D , {\displaystyle x\in D,} then x f ( x ) ; {\displaystyle x\notin f(x);} and if x D , {\displaystyle x\notin D,} then x f ( x ) . {\displaystyle x\in f(x).} Since one of these sets contains x {\displaystyle x} and the other does not, D f ( x ) . {\displaystyle D\neq f(x).} Therefore, D {\displaystyle D} is not in the image of f {\displaystyle f} , so f {\displaystyle f} is not onto.

Next Cantor shows that A {\displaystyle A} is equinumerous with a subset of P ( A ) {\displaystyle P(A)} . From this and the fact that P ( A ) {\displaystyle P(A)} and A {\displaystyle A} have different cardinalities, he concludes that P ( A ) {\displaystyle P(A)} has greater cardinality than A {\displaystyle A} . This conclusion uses his 1878 definition: If A and B have different cardinalities, then either B is equinumerous with a subset of A (in this case, B has less cardinality than A) or A is equinumerous with a subset of B (in this case, B has greater cardinality than A). This definition leaves out the case where A and B are equinumerous with a subset of the other set—that is, A is equinumerous with a subset of B and B is equinumerous with a subset of A. Because Cantor implicitly assumed that cardinalities are linearly ordered, this case cannot occur. After using his 1878 definition, Cantor stated that in an 1883 article he proved that cardinalities are well-ordered, which implies they are linearly ordered. This proof used his well-ordering principle "every set can be well-ordered", which he called a "law of thought". The well-ordering principle is equivalent to the axiom of choice.

Around 1895, Cantor began to regard the well-ordering principle as a theorem and attempted to prove it. In 1895, Cantor also gave a new definition of "greater than" that correctly defines this concept without the aid of his well-ordering principle. By using Cantor's new definition, the modern argument that P(N) has greater cardinality than N can be completed using weaker assumptions than his original argument:

  • The concept of "having greater cardinality" can be captured by Cantor's 1895 definition: B has greater cardinality than A if (1) A is equinumerous with a subset of B, and (2) B is not equinumerous with a subset of A. Clause (1) says B is at least as large as A, which is consistent with our definition of "having the same cardinality". Clause (2) implies that the case where A and B are equinumerous with a subset of the other set is false. Since clause (2) says that A is not at least as large as B, the two clauses together say that B is larger (has greater cardinality) than A.
  • The power set P ( A ) {\displaystyle P(A)} has greater cardinality than A , {\displaystyle A,} which implies that P(N) has greater cardinality than N. Here is the proof:
    1. Define the subset P 1 = { y P ( A ) : x A ( y = { x } ) } . {\displaystyle P_{1}=\{\,y\in P(A):\exists x\in A\,(y=\{x\})\,\}.} Define f ( x ) = { x } , {\displaystyle f(x)=\{x\},} which maps A {\displaystyle A} onto P 1 . {\displaystyle P_{1}.} Since f ( x 1 ) = f ( x 2 ) {\displaystyle f(x_{1})=f(x_{2})} implies x 1 = x 2 , f {\displaystyle x_{1}=x_{2},\,f} is a one-to-one correspondence from A {\displaystyle A} to P 1 . {\displaystyle P_{1}.} Therefore, A {\displaystyle A} is equinumerous with a subset of P ( A ) . {\displaystyle P(A).}
    2. Using proof by contradiction, assume that A 1 , {\displaystyle A_{1},} a subset of A , {\displaystyle A,} is equinumerous with P ( A ) . {\displaystyle P(A).} . Then there is a one-to-one correspondence g {\displaystyle g} from A 1 {\displaystyle A_{1}} to P ( A ) . {\displaystyle P(A).} Define h {\displaystyle h} from A {\displaystyle A} to P ( A ) : {\displaystyle P(A){\text{:}}} if x A 1 , {\displaystyle x\in A_{1},} then h ( x ) = g ( x ) ; {\displaystyle h(x)=g(x);} if x A A 1 , {\displaystyle x\in A\setminus A_{1},} then h ( x ) = { } . {\displaystyle h(x)=\{\,\}.} Since g {\displaystyle g} maps A 1 {\displaystyle A_{1}} onto P ( A ) , h {\displaystyle P(A),\,h} maps A {\displaystyle A} onto P ( A ) , {\displaystyle P(A),} contradicting the theorem above stating that a function from A {\displaystyle A} to P ( A ) {\displaystyle P(A)} is not onto. Therefore, P ( A ) {\displaystyle P(A)} is not equinumerous with a subset of A . {\displaystyle A.}

Besides the axioms of infinity and power set, the axioms of separation, extensionality, and pairing were used in the modern argument. For example, the axiom of separation was used to define the diagonal subset D , {\displaystyle D,} the axiom of extensionality was used to prove D f ( x ) , {\displaystyle D\neq f(x),} and the axiom of pairing was used in the definition of the subset P 1 . {\displaystyle P_{1}.}

Reception of the argument

Initially, Cantor's theory was controversial among mathematicians and (later) philosophers. As Leopold Kronecker claimed: "I don't know what predominates in Cantor's theory – philosophy or theology, but I am sure that there is no mathematics there." Many mathematicians agreed with Kronecker that the completed infinite may be part of philosophy or theology, but that it has no proper place in mathematics. Logician Wilfrid Hodges (1998) has commented on the energy devoted to refuting this "harmless little argument" (i.e. Cantor's diagonal argument) asking, "what had it done to anyone to make them angry with it?" Mathematician Solomon Feferman has referred to Cantor's theories as “simply not relevant to everyday mathematics.”

Before Cantor, the notion of infinity was often taken as a useful abstraction which helped mathematicians reason about the finite world; for example the use of infinite limit cases in calculus. The infinite was deemed to have at most a potential existence, rather than an actual existence. "Actual infinity does not exist. What we call infinite is only the endless possibility of creating new objects no matter how many exist already". Carl Friedrich Gauss's views on the subject can be paraphrased as: "Infinity is nothing more than a figure of speech which helps us talk about limits. The notion of a completed infinity doesn't belong in mathematics." In other words, the only access we have to the infinite is through the notion of limits, and hence, we must not treat infinite sets as if they have an existence exactly comparable to the existence of finite sets.

Cantor's ideas ultimately were largely accepted, strongly supported by David Hilbert, amongst others. Hilbert predicted: "No one will drive us from the paradise which Cantor created for us." To which Wittgenstein replied "if one person can see it as a paradise of mathematicians, why should not another see it as a joke?" The rejection of Cantor's infinitary ideas influenced the development of schools of mathematics such as constructivism and intuitionism.

Wittgenstein did not object to mathematical formalism wholesale, but had a finitist view on what Cantor's proof meant. The philosopher maintained that belief in infinities arises from confusing the intensional nature of mathematical laws with the extensional nature of sets, sequences, symbols etc. A series of symbols is finite in his view: In Wittgenstein's words: "...A curve is not composed of points, it is a law that points obey, or again, a law according to which points can be constructed."

He also described the diagonal argument as "hocus pocus" and not proving what it purports to do.

Objection to the axiom of infinity

Further information: Finitism

A common objection to Cantor's theory of infinite number involves the axiom of infinity (which is, indeed, an axiom and not a logical truth). Mayberry has noted that "... the set-theoretical axioms that sustain modern mathematics are self-evident in differing degrees. One of them—indeed, the most important of them, namely Cantor's Axiom, the so-called Axiom of Infinity—has scarcely any claim to self-evidence at all …"

Another objection is that the use of infinite sets is not adequately justified by analogy to finite sets. Hermann Weyl wrote:

... classical logic was abstracted from the mathematics of finite sets and their subsets …. Forgetful of this limited origin, one afterwards mistook that logic for something above and prior to all mathematics, and finally applied it, without justification, to the mathematics of infinite sets. This is the Fall and original sin of set theory ..."

The difficulty with finitism is to develop foundations of mathematics using finitist assumptions, that incorporates what everyone would reasonably regard as mathematics (for example, that includes real analysis).

See also

Notes

  1. Dauben 1979, pp. 67–68, 165.
  2. Cantor 1891, p. 75; English translation: Ewald p. 920.
  3. Dauben 1979, p. 166.
  4. Dauben 1979, pp.166–167.
  5. Frege 1884, trans. 1953, §70.
  6. Mayberry 2000, p. 136.
  7. Cantor 1878, p. 242. Cantor 1891, p. 77; English translation: Ewald p. 922.
  8. Hallett 1984, p. 59.
  9. Cantor 1891, p. 77; English translation: Ewald p. 922.
  10. Moore 1982, p. 42.
  11. Moore 1982, p. 330.
  12. Moore 1982, p. 51. A discussion of Cantor's proof is in Absolute infinite, well-ordering theorem, and paradoxes. Part of Cantor's proof and Zermelo's criticism of it is in a reference note.
  13. ^ Cantor 1895, pp. 483–484; English translation: Cantor 1954, pp. 89–90.
  14. Hodges, Wilfrid (1998), "An Editor Recalls Some Hopeless Papers", The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, vol. 4, no. 1, Association for Symbolic Logic, pp. 1–16, CiteSeerX 10.1.1.27.6154, doi:10.2307/421003, JSTOR 421003, S2CID 14897182
  15. Wolchover, Natalie. "Dispute over Infinity Divides Mathematicians". Scientific American. Retrieved 2 October 2014.
  16. Zenkin, Alexander (2004), "Logic Of Actual Infinity And G. Cantor's Diagonal Proof Of The Uncountability Of The Continuum", The Review of Modern Logic, vol. 9, no. 30, pp. 27–80
  17. (Poincaré quoted from Kline 1982)
  18. Dunham, William (1991). Journey through Genius: The Great Theorems of Mathematics. Penguin. p. 254. ISBN 9780140147391.
  19. (Hilbert, 1926)
  20. (RFM V. 7)
  21. Mayberry 2000, p. 10.
  22. Weyl, 1946

References

"Aus dem Paradies, das Cantor uns geschaffen, soll uns niemand vertreiben können."
Translated in Van Heijenoort, Jean, On the infinite, Harvard University Press
  • Kline, Morris (1982), Mathematics: The Loss of Certainty, Oxford, ISBN 0-19-503085-0{{citation}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  • Mayberry, J.P. (2000), The Foundations of Mathematics in the Theory of Sets, Encyclopedia of Mathematics and its Applications, vol. 82, Cambridge University Press
  • Moore, Gregory H. (1982), Zermelo's Axiom of Choice: Its Origins, Development & Influence, Springer, ISBN 978-1-4613-9480-8
  • Poincaré, Henri (1908), The Future of Mathematics (PDF), Revue generale des Sciences pures et appliquees, vol. 23, archived from the original (PDF) on 2003-06-29 (address to the Fourth International Congress of Mathematicians)
  • Sainsbury, R.M. (1979), Russell, London{{citation}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  • Weyl, Hermann (1946), "Mathematics and logic: A brief survey serving as a preface to a review of The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell", American Mathematical Monthly, vol. 53, pp. 2–13, doi:10.2307/2306078, JSTOR 2306078
  • Wittgenstein, Ludwig; A. J. P. Kenny (trans.) (1974), Philosophical Grammar, Oxford{{citation}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  • Wittgenstein; R. Hargreaves (trans.); R. White (trans.) (1964), Philosophical Remarks, Oxford{{citation}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  • Wittgenstein (2001), Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (3rd ed.), Oxford{{citation}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)

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