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{{Short description|Offering of loans exclusively from time deposits}} | |||
{{Public finance}} | |||
{{Globalize|date=June 2021}} | |||
'''Full-reserve banking''', also known as '''100% reserve banking''', refers to a hypothetical alternative to ] in which banks would be required to keep the full amount of each ] funds in ], ready for immediate withdrawal on demand. Funds deposited by customers in ] accounts (such as checking accounts) could not be ] by the bank because it would be legally required to retain the full deposit to ensure an adequate reserve for customer payments. Proposals for full reserve banking systems generally do not place such restrictions on deposits that are not payable ], for example ]s or savings accounts.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://en.wikipedia.org/A_Program_for_Monetary_Reform |title=A Program for Monetary Reform, Douglas, Paul H.; Hamilton, Earl J.; Fisher, Irving; King, Willford I.; Graham, Frank D.; Whittlesey, Charles R. (July 1939)}}</ref> | |||
{{Banking}}'''Full-reserve banking''' (also known as '''100% reserve banking''', or '''sovereign money system''') is a system of banking where banks do not lend ] and instead only lend from ]. It differs from ], in which banks may lend funds on deposit, while fully reserved banks would be required to keep the full amount of each customer's ] in ], available for immediate withdrawal. | |||
] that included full-reserve banking have been proposed in the past, notably in 1935 by a group of economists, including ], under the so-called "]" as a response to the ].<ref> Jeremy Warner, UK Telegraph</ref><ref>{{Cite web|last=Weisenthal|first=Joe|title=BAN ALL THE BANKS: Here's The Wild Idea That People Are Starting To Take Seriously|url=https://www.businessinsider.com/banning-banks-2014-4|access-date=2020-11-30|website=Business Insider}}</ref> | |||
Full-reserve system is not currently in practice anywhere in the world, however full-reserve banking was practiced briefly by the ] in the early 17th Century. Proposals for a system of full-reserve banking have been made by various economists, including ].<ref>{{citation | last = Fisher | first = Irving | |||
| title=100% Money | |||
| year = 1935 | |||
}}{{page needed|date=November 2012}}</ref> | |||
Currently, no country in the world requires full-reserve banking across primary credit institutions, although Iceland has considered it.<ref>, Financial Times</ref><ref>"Iceland looks at ending boom and bust with radical money plan". ''The Telegraph''. Retrieved 2020-11-30.</ref> In ], 75% of Swiss voters voted against the ] which had full reserve banking as a prominent component of its proposed reform of the Swiss monetary system.<ref></ref><ref>{{Cite web|last=Atkins|first=Ralph|date=10 June 2018|title=Swiss voters reject 'sovereign money' initiative|url=https://www.ft.com/content/686e0342-6c97-11e8-852d-d8b934ff5ffa |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221210/https://www.ft.com/content/686e0342-6c97-11e8-852d-d8b934ff5ffa |archive-date=2022-12-10 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live|access-date=2020-11-30|website=Financial Times}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|last=swissinfo.ch/sb|title=Vote survey shows no generation gap but misunderstandings|url=https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/sovereign-money-and-gambling-votes_vote-survey-shows-no-generation-gap-but-misunderstandings/44282652|access-date=2020-11-30|website=SWI swissinfo.ch|language=en}}</ref> | |||
==History== | |||
{{Details|Fractional reserve banking#History}} | |||
==Views |
==Views== | ||
In the post-World War II era, economists have shown little interest in 100%-reserve banking, although some have examined the issue and concluded that the costs and inconvenience of a full-reserve banking system would outweigh any benefits.<ref name="Diamond-Dybvig">{{Citation |last=Diamond |first=Douglas W |coauthors=Philip H. Dybvig |title=Banking Theory, Deposit Insurance, and Bank Regulation |journal=The Journal of Business |date= |year=1986 |month=Jan |volume=59 |series= |issue=1 |pages=55–68 |jstor=2352687|quote=In conclusion, 100% reserve banking is a dangerous proposal that would do substantial damage to the economy by reducing the overall amount of liquidity. Furthermore, the proposal is likely to be ineffective in increasing stability since it will be impossible to control the institutions that will enter in the vacuum left when banks can no longer create liquidity. Fortunately, the political realities make it unlikely that this radical and imprudent proposal will be adopted. |doi=10.1086/296314 |postscript=.}}</ref><ref name=White2003>{{cite journal |url=http://sensiblemoney.ie/data/documents/tir_07_3_white.pdf |first=Lawrence H. |last=White |title=Accounting for Fractional-Reserve Banknotes and Deposits—or, What’s Twenty Quid to the Bloody Midland Bank? |journal=The Independent Review |volume=7 |issue=3 |month=Winter |year=2003 |issn=1086-1653 |pages=423–41}}</ref> However, economist ] at one time advocated a 100% reserve requirement for checking accounts<ref>{{Citation | |||
| last = Solow | |||
| first = Robert M. | |||
| title = Financial crises, contagion, and the lender of last resort | |||
| publisher = Oxford University Press | |||
| date = March 28, 2002 | |||
| chapter = On the Lender of Last Resort | |||
| page = 203 | |||
| chapterurl = http://books.google.com/books?id=2486Jp8TjEcC&pg=PA201&dq=financial+crises,+contagion,+and+the+lender+of+last+resort&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=9#v=onepage&q&f=false | |||
| isbn = 978-0-19-924721-9}}</ref> and economist ] has also called for an end to fractional-reserve banking.<ref>{{Citation | |||
| last = Kotlikoff | |||
| first = Laurence J. | |||
| last2 = Leamer | |||
| first2 = Edward | |||
| title = A Banking System We Can Trust | |||
| journal = Forbes.com | |||
| date = April 23, 2009 | |||
| url = http://people.bu.edu/kotlikoff/newweb/Abankingsystemwecantrust_4_2009.pdf | |||
| accessdate = September 14, 2010}}</ref> ] examined the possibility of full-reserve banking and stated that it would eliminate the financial risks associated with ]s. Rothbard also stated that fractional-reserve banking is fraudulent and inflationary.<ref>{{Citation | |||
| last = Rothbard | |||
| first = Murray N. | |||
| title = The Mystery of Banking | |||
| publisher = Ludwig von Mises Institute | |||
| url = http://www.mises.org/Books/mysteryofbanking.pdf | |||
| accessdate = September 14, 2010 | |||
| isbn = 978-1-933550-28-2}}</ref><ref name="The Case for a 100% Gold Dollar">, Murray Rothbard</ref> | |||
=== In favor === | |||
Because banks would not earn revenue from lending against demand deposits, depositors would have to pay fees for the services associated with checking accounts. This, it is felt, would likely be rejected by the public.<ref name=White2003/><ref name="Allen 1993 703–717">{{cite journal |jstor=725805 |title=Irving Fisher and the 100 Percent Reserve Proposal |first=William |last=Allen |journal=Journal of Law and Economics |year=1993 |month=October |volume=36 |pages=703–17 |issue=2 |doi=10.1086/467295}}</ref> Because banks would not be permitted to lend out funds deposited in demand accounts, lending could be expected to be done instead by unregulated institutions, possibly destabilizing the financial system. Unregulated institutions (such as ] issuers) would take over the economically necessary role of financial intermediation.<ref name="Diamond-Dybvig"/><ref>{{cite journal |last=Diamond |first=Douglas |coauthors=Philip Dybvig |title=Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity |journal=Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review |year=2000 |month=Winter |volume=24 |issue=1 |pages=14–23 |url=http://minneapolisfed.org/research/qr/qr2412.pdf|accessdate=29 August 2012}}</ref> | |||
{{main|Monetary reform}} | |||
Economist ] at one time advocated a 100% ] for checking accounts,<ref>{{Citation | last=Solow| first = Robert M.| title=Financial crises, contagion, and the lender of last resort| publisher=Oxford University Press| date = March 28, 2002| chapter = On the Lender of Last Resort| page = 203 |chapter-url = https://books.google.com/books?id=2486Jp8TjEcC&q=financial+crises,+contagion,+and+the+lender+of+last+resort&pg=PA201 | isbn = 978-0-19-924721-9}}</ref> and economist ] has also called for an end to fractional-reserve banking.<ref name=":3">{{cite magazine |last1= Kotlikoff |first1=Laurence J. |last2=Leamer |first2=Edward |title=A Banking System We Can Trust |magazine=Forbes |via=Boston University |date=April 23, 2009 |url=http://people.bu.edu/kotlikoff/newweb/Abankingsystemwecantrust_4_2009.pdf |access-date= September 14, 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110604020252/http://people.bu.edu/kotlikoff/newweb/Abankingsystemwecantrust_4_2009.pdf |archive-date = June 4, 2011}}</ref> ] economist ] has written that reserves of less than 100% constitute fraud on the part of banks and should be illegal, and that full-reserve banking would eliminate the risk of ]s.<ref>{{Citation | last = Rothbard | first = Murray N. | title = The Mystery of Banking | year = 2008 | publisher = Ludwig von Mises Institute | url = https://www.mises.org/Books/mysteryofbanking.pdf | access-date =September 14, 2010 | isbn = 978-1-933550-28-2}}</ref><ref name="The Case for a 100% Gold Dollar">, Murray Rothbard</ref> ], another economist of the Austrian school, has also strongly argued in favor of full-reserve banking and the outlawing of ].<ref name="Soto">{{cite book|author=Jesús Huerta de Soto|title=Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles|url=https://archive.org/details/bub_gb_AJLGKdOZneMC|access-date=4 August 2013|edition=3rd|year=2012|publisher=Ludwig von Mises Institute|isbn=978-1-61016-388-0}}</ref> | |||
The ] led to renewed interest in full reserve banking and ] issued by a ]. ]ers point out that fractional reserve banking leads to unpayable debt, growing ], inevitable ], and an imperative for perpetual and ] ].<ref>{{cite book |last1=Jackson |first1=Andrew |last2=Dyson |first2=Ben |title=Modernizing Money. Why our Monetary System is Broken and how it can be Fixed |date=2012 |publisher=Positive Money |isbn=978-0-9574448-0-5}}</ref> ], chief economist at the '']'', endorsed full reserve banking, saying "it would bring huge advantages".<ref name="Weisenthal">{{cite web|last1=Weisenthal|first1=Joe|title=BAN ALL THE BANKS: Here's The Wild Idea That People Are Starting To Take Seriously|url=http://www.businessinsider.com/banning-banks-2014-4|publisher=Business Insider}}</ref> | |||
==Current examples== | |||
], Chief Economics Commentator at the '']'', argues that many people have a fundamentally flawed and oversimplified conception of what it is that banks do. ] and ] agree, in a paper entitled "A Banking System We Can Trust", arguing that the current financial system did not produce the benefits that have been attributed to it.<ref name=":3" /> Rather than simply borrowing money from savers to make loans towards investment and production, and holding "money" as a stable liability, banks in reality create credit increasingly for the purpose of acquiring existing assets.<ref name=":1">{{Cite web|url=https://www.core-econ.org/martin-wolf-banking-credit-and-money/|title=Martin Wolf: Banking, credit and money|date=2013-11-11|website=CORE|language=en|access-date=2020-03-11}}</ref> Rather than financing real productivity and investment, and generating fair asset prices, Wall Street has come to resemble a casino, in which trade volume of securities skyrockets without having positive impacts on the investment rate or economic growth.<ref name=":3" /> The credits and debt banks create play a role in determining how delicate the economy is in the face of crisis.<ref name=":1" /> For example, Wall Street caused the housing bubble by financing millions of mortgages that were outside budget constraints, which in turn decreased output by 10 percent.<ref name=":3" /> | |||
There is currently no full reserve banking system in existence anywhere in the world. | |||
==== Money supply problems ==== | |||
===Islamic banking=== | |||
In '']'', ] argues that legalized fractional-reserve banking gave banks "carte blanche" to create money out of thin air.<ref name=":4">{{Cite book|last=Rothbard, Murray N. |title=The mystery of banking|date=2008|publisher=Ludwig von Mises Institute|isbn=978-1-933550-28-2|edition=2nd|location=Auburn, Ala.|oclc=275097518}}</ref> Economists that formulated the Chicago Plan following the Great Depression argue that allowing banks to have fractional reserves puts too much power in the hands of banks by allowing them to determine the amount of money in circulation by changing the amount of loans they give out.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://houseofdebt.org/100-reserve-banking-the-history|title=100% Reserve Banking — The History|date=2014-04-26|website=House of Debt|language=en-US|access-date=2020-03-17}}</ref> | |||
==== Fractional-reserve banking fraud issues ==== | |||
In theory, ] is often synonymous with full-reserve banking, with banks achieving a 100% reserve ratio.<ref name=TFP>{{dead link|date=November 2012}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |doi=10.1163/A:1013840123393 |title=Concepts of Paper Money in Islamic Legal Thought |year=2001 |last1=Siegfried |first1=Nikolaus A. |journal=Arab Law Quarterly |volume=16 |issue=4 |pages=319–32 |jstor=3382052}}</ref> In practice, however, this is not the case, and no examples of 100 percent reserve banking are observed. According to ] Bangladesh:{{quote|The fractional reserve system versus 100% reserves would have different policy implications. Under the former system, banks would have the ability to draw profits on funds that they have exerted no productive effort. Such earning is against the original spirit of Islamic banking. One solution may lie in the ] of commercial banks, which has already occurred in most of these countries. As regards the latter, we have a fair amount of theoretical insight from the western literature but do not have any valuable empirical observations on the operations of 100% reserves even in countries that have adopted Islamic banking. These Islamic banks are still operating under fractional reserve system. Hence, the operation of monetary policy under 100% reserves system needs further research.<ref name="urlConcept and ideology :: Issues and problems of Islamic banking">{{cite web |url=http://www.islamibankbd.com/page/ih_12.htm |title=Concept and ideology :: Issues and problems of Islamic banking |work= |accessdate= |archiveurl = http://web.archive.org/web/20070716151628/http://www.islamibankbd.com/page/ih_12.htm |archivedate = 2007-07-16}}</ref>}} | |||
Deposit bankers become loan bankers when they issue fake warehouse receipts that are not backed by the assets actually held, thus constituting fraud.<ref name=":4" /><sup>:97</sup> Rothbard likens this practice to counterfeiting, with the loan banker extracting resources from the public.<ref name=":4" /> However, ] argues that fractional-reserve banking does not constitute fraud, as by Rothbard's own admission an advertised product must simply meet the "common definition" of that product believed by consumers. Caplan contends that it is part of the common definition of a modern bank to make loans against demand deposits, thus not constituting fraud.<ref>{{Cite web |title=The Morality of Fractional Reserve Banking|last=Caplan|first=Bryan|date=2011-05-12|website=Econlib|language=en-US |url=<!-- https://www.e c o n l i b.org/archives/2011/05/the_morality_of_1.html -->}}{{rs|reason=source is blacklisted;|date=May 2023}}</ref> | |||
===Digital gold or silver=== | |||
Some ]ers believe a new free market in money production and distribution will one day erode the government's control of the ].<ref>{{cite book |title=Free Market Money System |first=F.A. |last=Hayek |year=2008 |isbn=978-1-933550-37-4 |authorlink=Friedrich Hayek}}{{page needed|date=November 2012}}</ref> They state that in a free market, and in the absence of ] laws, a predominantly full-reserve banking system with a ] or ] would develop spontaneously.<ref>{{cite book |url=http://www.mises.org/books/Theory_Money_Credit/Contents.aspx |title=The Theory of Money and Credit |first=Ludwig |last=von Mises |year=1953 |lccn=52-12074}}{{page needed|date=November 2012}}</ref> | |||
==== Balance sheet fundamentals ==== | |||
Since 1996, various private firms have promoted a form of ] called ]. Many of these currency providers have claimed to act as full-reserve "]s" with a one-to-one ratio of the currency they issue to an underlying hard asset, usually ] or ] metal which they hold in vault as reserves. The most prominent recent example was ]. In 2011 e-gold pleaded guilty to U.S. Federal charges of money laundering and is currently being liquidated under the trusteeship of a court-appointed agent.<ref>e-gold liquidation website {http://www.egoldclaimsprocess.com/}</ref><ref>e-gold blog {http://blog.e-gold.com/}</ref><ref></ref> | |||
Furthermore, Rothbard argues that fractional reserve banking is fundamentally unsound because of the timescale of a bank's balance sheet.<ref name=":42">{{Cite book|last=Rothbard, Murray N. |title=The mystery of banking|date=2008|publisher=Ludwig von Mises Institute|isbn=978-1-933550-28-2|edition=2nd|location=Auburn, Ala.|oclc=275097518}}</ref> While a typical firm should have its assets be due prior to the payment date of its liabilities, so that the liabilities can be paid, the fractional reserve deposit bank has its demand deposit liabilities due at any point the depositor chooses, and its assets, being the loans it has made with someone else's deposits, due at some later date.<ref name=":42" /> | |||
=== Against === | |||
Most economists and other observers believe that the free market favors fractional reserve banking and that 100% reserve banking can meet the needs of only a small, extremely risk-averse, niche market.<ref name=White2003/> | |||
==== New fees ==== | |||
Some economists have noted that under full-reserve banking, because banks would not earn revenue from lending against demand deposits, depositors would have to pay fees for the services associated with checking accounts. This, it is felt, would probably be rejected by the public.<ref name="White2003">{{cite journal |url=http://sensiblemoney.ie/data/documents/tir_07_3_white.pdf |first=Lawrence H. |last=White |title=Accounting for Fractional-Reserve Banknotes and Deposits—or, What's Twenty Quid to the Bloody Midland Bank? |journal=The Independent Review |volume=7 |issue=3 |date=Winter 2003 |issn=1086-1653 |pages=423–41 |access-date=2012-11-30 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150429081711/http://sensiblemoney.ie/data/documents/tir_07_3_white.pdf |archive-date=2015-04-29 }}</ref><ref name="Allen 1993 703–717">{{cite journal |jstor=725805 |title=Irving Fisher and the 100 Percent Reserve Proposal |first=William |last=Allen |journal=Journal of Law and Economics |date=October 1993 |volume=36 |pages=703–17 |issue=2 |doi=10.1086/467295|s2cid=153974326 }}</ref> However, in economies where central banks enact zero and negative interest rate policies, some writers have noted depositors are already paying to put their savings in fractional reserve banks.<ref></ref> | |||
==== Shadow banking and unregulated institutions ==== | |||
In their ], economists ] and ] warned that under full-reserve banking, since banks would not be permitted to lend out funds deposited in demand accounts, this function would be taken over by unregulated institutions. Unregulated institutions (such as ] issuers) would take over the economically necessary role of ] and ], therefore destabilizing the financial system and leading to more frequent financial crises.<ref name="Diamond-Dybvig">{{Citation |last1=Diamond |first1=Douglas W. |author2=Philip H. Dybvig |title=Banking Theory, Deposit Insurance, and Bank Regulation |journal=The Journal of Business |date= Jan 1986 |volume=59 |issue=1 |pages=55–68 |jstor=2352687|quote=In conclusion, 100% reserve banking is a dangerous proposal that would do substantial damage to the economy by reducing the overall amount of liquidity. Furthermore, the proposal is likely to be ineffective in increasing stability since it will be impossible to control the institutions that will enter in the vacuum left when banks can no longer create liquidity. Fortunately, the political realities make it unlikely that this radical and imprudent proposal will be adopted. |doi=10.1086/296314 |postscript=.}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last=Diamond |first=Douglas |author2=Philip Dybvig |title=Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity |journal=Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review |date=Winter 2000 |volume=24 |issue=1 |pages=14–23 |url=http://minneapolisfed.org/research/qr/qr2412.pdf|access-date=29 August 2012}}</ref> | |||
Writing in response to various writers' support for full reserve banking, ] stated that the idea was "certainly worth talking about", but worries that it would drive financial activity outside the banking system, into the less regulated ].<ref>{{cite news |last=Krugman|first=Paul|date=April 26, 2014 |title=Is A Banking Ban The Answer? |url=https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/04/26/is-a-banking-ban-the-answer/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 |newspaper=] |access-date = September 18, 2015 }}</ref> | |||
==== Misses the problem ==== | |||
] argues that the 2008 financial crisis was not largely a result of depositors attempting to withdraw deposits from commercial banks, but a large-scale run on shadow banking.<ref name=":2">{{Cite web|url=https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/04/26/is-a-banking-ban-the-answer/|title=Is A Banking Ban The Answer?|date=2014-04-26|website=Paul Krugman Blog|language=en-US|access-date=2020-03-11}}</ref> As financial markets seemed to have recovered more quickly than the 'real economy', Krugman sees the recession more as a result of excess leverage and household balance-sheet issues.<ref name=":2" /> Neither of these issues would be addressed by a full-reserve regulation on commercial banks, he claims.<ref name=":2" /> | |||
== Further reform == | |||
Kotlikoff and Leamer promote the concept of limited purpose banking (LPB), in which banks, now mutual funds, would never fail, as they would be barred from owning financial assets, and their borrowing would be limited to financing their own operations.<ref name=":3" /> By establishing a Federal Financial Authority, with the task of rating, verifying, disclosing and clearing all LPB mutual funds, there would be no need to outsource such tasks to private entities with perverse incentives or lack of oversight.<ref name=":3" /> Cash mutual funds would also be created, holding only cash tied to the value of the United States dollar, eliminating the threat of bank runs, and insurance mutual funds would be established to pay off the losses of those that own part of the mutual fund, as insurance companies are currently able to sell plans that purport to insure events for which it would be impossible for them to pay off the entirety of the losses experienced by the insured parties.<ref name=":3" /> The authors contend that LPB can accommodate any conceivable risk product, including ]s.<ref name=":3" /> Under LPB, liquidity would increase as such funds become publicly available to the market, which would determine how much bank employees would be paid.<ref name=":3" /> | |||
Most importantly, what limited purpose banking won't do is leave any bank exposed to ] risk since people, not banks, would own the CDS mutual funds.<ref name=":3" /> | |||
== See also == | == See also == | ||
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*, IMF Working Paper, Jaromir Benes and Michael Kumhof, August 2012 | *, IMF Working Paper, Jaromir Benes and Michael Kumhof, August 2012 | ||
* (Pascal Salin) | |||
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Latest revision as of 16:00, 26 December 2024
Offering of loans exclusively from time depositsThe examples and perspective in this article may not represent a worldwide view of the subject. You may improve this article, discuss the issue on the talk page, or create a new article, as appropriate. (June 2021) (Learn how and when to remove this message) |
Full-reserve banking (also known as 100% reserve banking, or sovereign money system) is a system of banking where banks do not lend demand deposits and instead only lend from time deposits. It differs from fractional-reserve banking, in which banks may lend funds on deposit, while fully reserved banks would be required to keep the full amount of each customer's demand deposits in cash, available for immediate withdrawal.
Monetary reforms that included full-reserve banking have been proposed in the past, notably in 1935 by a group of economists, including Irving Fisher, under the so-called "Chicago plan" as a response to the Great Depression.
Currently, no country in the world requires full-reserve banking across primary credit institutions, although Iceland has considered it. In a 2018 ballot referendum, 75% of Swiss voters voted against the Sovereign Money Initiative which had full reserve banking as a prominent component of its proposed reform of the Swiss monetary system.
Views
In favor
Main article: Monetary reformEconomist Milton Friedman at one time advocated a 100% reserve requirement for checking accounts, and economist Laurence Kotlikoff has also called for an end to fractional-reserve banking. Austrian School economist Murray Rothbard has written that reserves of less than 100% constitute fraud on the part of banks and should be illegal, and that full-reserve banking would eliminate the risk of bank runs. Jesús Huerta de Soto, another economist of the Austrian school, has also strongly argued in favor of full-reserve banking and the outlawing of fractional reserve banking.
The financial crisis of 2007–2008 led to renewed interest in full reserve banking and sovereign money issued by a central bank. Monetary reformers point out that fractional reserve banking leads to unpayable debt, growing economic inequality, inevitable bankruptcy, and an imperative for perpetual and unsustainable economic growth. Martin Wolf, chief economist at the Financial Times, endorsed full reserve banking, saying "it would bring huge advantages".
Martin Wolf, Chief Economics Commentator at the Financial Times, argues that many people have a fundamentally flawed and oversimplified conception of what it is that banks do. Laurence Kotlikoff and Edward Leamer agree, in a paper entitled "A Banking System We Can Trust", arguing that the current financial system did not produce the benefits that have been attributed to it. Rather than simply borrowing money from savers to make loans towards investment and production, and holding "money" as a stable liability, banks in reality create credit increasingly for the purpose of acquiring existing assets. Rather than financing real productivity and investment, and generating fair asset prices, Wall Street has come to resemble a casino, in which trade volume of securities skyrockets without having positive impacts on the investment rate or economic growth. The credits and debt banks create play a role in determining how delicate the economy is in the face of crisis. For example, Wall Street caused the housing bubble by financing millions of mortgages that were outside budget constraints, which in turn decreased output by 10 percent.
Money supply problems
In The Mystery of Banking, Murray Rothbard argues that legalized fractional-reserve banking gave banks "carte blanche" to create money out of thin air. Economists that formulated the Chicago Plan following the Great Depression argue that allowing banks to have fractional reserves puts too much power in the hands of banks by allowing them to determine the amount of money in circulation by changing the amount of loans they give out.
Fractional-reserve banking fraud issues
Deposit bankers become loan bankers when they issue fake warehouse receipts that are not backed by the assets actually held, thus constituting fraud. Rothbard likens this practice to counterfeiting, with the loan banker extracting resources from the public. However, Bryan Caplan argues that fractional-reserve banking does not constitute fraud, as by Rothbard's own admission an advertised product must simply meet the "common definition" of that product believed by consumers. Caplan contends that it is part of the common definition of a modern bank to make loans against demand deposits, thus not constituting fraud.
Balance sheet fundamentals
Furthermore, Rothbard argues that fractional reserve banking is fundamentally unsound because of the timescale of a bank's balance sheet. While a typical firm should have its assets be due prior to the payment date of its liabilities, so that the liabilities can be paid, the fractional reserve deposit bank has its demand deposit liabilities due at any point the depositor chooses, and its assets, being the loans it has made with someone else's deposits, due at some later date.
Against
New fees
Some economists have noted that under full-reserve banking, because banks would not earn revenue from lending against demand deposits, depositors would have to pay fees for the services associated with checking accounts. This, it is felt, would probably be rejected by the public. However, in economies where central banks enact zero and negative interest rate policies, some writers have noted depositors are already paying to put their savings in fractional reserve banks.
Shadow banking and unregulated institutions
In their influential paper on financial crises, economists Douglas W. Diamond and Philip H. Dybvig warned that under full-reserve banking, since banks would not be permitted to lend out funds deposited in demand accounts, this function would be taken over by unregulated institutions. Unregulated institutions (such as high-yield debt issuers) would take over the economically necessary role of financial intermediation and maturity transformation, therefore destabilizing the financial system and leading to more frequent financial crises.
Writing in response to various writers' support for full reserve banking, Paul Krugman stated that the idea was "certainly worth talking about", but worries that it would drive financial activity outside the banking system, into the less regulated shadow banking system.
Misses the problem
Krugman argues that the 2008 financial crisis was not largely a result of depositors attempting to withdraw deposits from commercial banks, but a large-scale run on shadow banking. As financial markets seemed to have recovered more quickly than the 'real economy', Krugman sees the recession more as a result of excess leverage and household balance-sheet issues. Neither of these issues would be addressed by a full-reserve regulation on commercial banks, he claims.
Further reform
Kotlikoff and Leamer promote the concept of limited purpose banking (LPB), in which banks, now mutual funds, would never fail, as they would be barred from owning financial assets, and their borrowing would be limited to financing their own operations. By establishing a Federal Financial Authority, with the task of rating, verifying, disclosing and clearing all LPB mutual funds, there would be no need to outsource such tasks to private entities with perverse incentives or lack of oversight. Cash mutual funds would also be created, holding only cash tied to the value of the United States dollar, eliminating the threat of bank runs, and insurance mutual funds would be established to pay off the losses of those that own part of the mutual fund, as insurance companies are currently able to sell plans that purport to insure events for which it would be impossible for them to pay off the entirety of the losses experienced by the insured parties. The authors contend that LPB can accommodate any conceivable risk product, including credit default swaps. Under LPB, liquidity would increase as such funds become publicly available to the market, which would determine how much bank employees would be paid.
Most importantly, what limited purpose banking won't do is leave any bank exposed to CDS risk since people, not banks, would own the CDS mutual funds.
See also
- Austrian business cycle theory
- Chicago plan / The Chicago Plan Revisited
- Committee on Monetary and Economic Reform (Canada)
- Fiat money
- Fractional-reserve banking
- Monetary reform
- List of monetary reformers
- Money creation
- Narrow banking
- Positive Money
- Reserve requirement
- Hard currency
- Seigniorage
- Swiss sovereign money referendum, 2018
- Broad money
References
- A banking revolution Jeremy Warner, UK Telegraph
- Weisenthal, Joe. "BAN ALL THE BANKS: Here's The Wild Idea That People Are Starting To Take Seriously". Business Insider. Retrieved 2020-11-30.
- Iceland's daring raid on fractional reserve banks, Financial Times
- "Iceland looks at ending boom and bust with radical money plan". The Telegraph. Retrieved 2020-11-30.
- Switzerland's 'Vollgeld' banking overhaul: how reform would work
- Atkins, Ralph (10 June 2018). "Swiss voters reject 'sovereign money' initiative". Financial Times. Archived from the original on 2022-12-10. Retrieved 2020-11-30.
- swissinfo.ch/sb. "Vote survey shows no generation gap but misunderstandings". SWI swissinfo.ch. Retrieved 2020-11-30.
- Solow, Robert M. (March 28, 2002), "On the Lender of Last Resort", Financial crises, contagion, and the lender of last resort, Oxford University Press, p. 203, ISBN 978-0-19-924721-9
- ^ Kotlikoff, Laurence J.; Leamer, Edward (April 23, 2009). "A Banking System We Can Trust" (PDF). Forbes. Archived from the original (PDF) on June 4, 2011. Retrieved September 14, 2010 – via Boston University.
- Rothbard, Murray N. (2008), The Mystery of Banking (PDF), Ludwig von Mises Institute, ISBN 978-1-933550-28-2, retrieved September 14, 2010
- The Case for a 100% Gold Dollar, Murray Rothbard
- Jesús Huerta de Soto (2012). Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles (3rd ed.). Ludwig von Mises Institute. ISBN 978-1-61016-388-0. Retrieved 4 August 2013.
- Jackson, Andrew; Dyson, Ben (2012). Modernizing Money. Why our Monetary System is Broken and how it can be Fixed. Positive Money. ISBN 978-0-9574448-0-5.
- Weisenthal, Joe. "BAN ALL THE BANKS: Here's The Wild Idea That People Are Starting To Take Seriously". Business Insider.
- ^ "Martin Wolf: Banking, credit and money". CORE. 2013-11-11. Retrieved 2020-03-11.
- ^ Rothbard, Murray N. (2008). The mystery of banking (2nd ed.). Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises Institute. ISBN 978-1-933550-28-2. OCLC 275097518.
- "100% Reserve Banking — The History". House of Debt. 2014-04-26. Retrieved 2020-03-17.
- Caplan, Bryan (2011-05-12). "The Morality of Fractional Reserve Banking". Econlib.
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(help) - ^ Rothbard, Murray N. (2008). The mystery of banking (2nd ed.). Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises Institute. ISBN 978-1-933550-28-2. OCLC 275097518.
- White, Lawrence H. (Winter 2003). "Accounting for Fractional-Reserve Banknotes and Deposits—or, What's Twenty Quid to the Bloody Midland Bank?" (PDF). The Independent Review. 7 (3): 423–41. ISSN 1086-1653. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-04-29. Retrieved 2012-11-30.
- Allen, William (October 1993). "Irving Fisher and the 100 Percent Reserve Proposal". Journal of Law and Economics. 36 (2): 703–17. doi:10.1086/467295. JSTOR 725805. S2CID 153974326.
- Texan Gold Depository
- Diamond, Douglas W.; Philip H. Dybvig (Jan 1986), "Banking Theory, Deposit Insurance, and Bank Regulation", The Journal of Business, 59 (1): 55–68, doi:10.1086/296314, JSTOR 2352687,
In conclusion, 100% reserve banking is a dangerous proposal that would do substantial damage to the economy by reducing the overall amount of liquidity. Furthermore, the proposal is likely to be ineffective in increasing stability since it will be impossible to control the institutions that will enter in the vacuum left when banks can no longer create liquidity. Fortunately, the political realities make it unlikely that this radical and imprudent proposal will be adopted.
- Diamond, Douglas; Philip Dybvig (Winter 2000). "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity" (PDF). Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review. 24 (1): 14–23. Retrieved 29 August 2012.
- Krugman, Paul (April 26, 2014). "Is A Banking Ban The Answer?". New York Times. Retrieved September 18, 2015.
- ^ "Is A Banking Ban The Answer?". Paul Krugman Blog. 2014-04-26. Retrieved 2020-03-11.
External links
- The Chicago Plan Revisited, IMF Working Paper, Jaromir Benes and Michael Kumhof, August 2012
- In Defence of Fractional Monetary Reserves (Pascal Salin)