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{{Short description|1999 Indian military operation}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=August 2023}}
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{{Third-party|November 2022|date=November 2022}}
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] Bn used in Operation Safed Sagar]]

{{campaignbox Kargil War}} {{campaignbox Kargil War}}
{{campaignbox Indo-Pakistani Wars}} {{campaignbox Indo-Pakistani Wars}}


'''Operation Safed Sagar''' was the ] assigned to the ]'s strike to support the ] during ] that was aimed to flush out Regular and Irregular troops of the ] from vacated Indian Positions in the ] sector along the ]. It was the first large scale use of air power in the ] region since the ]. '''Operation Safed Sagar''' ({{langx|hi|ऑपरेशन सफेद सागर}}, lit. "Operation White Ocean") was the ] assigned to the ]'s role in acting jointly with the ] during the 1999 ] that was aimed at flushing out regular and irregular troops of the ] from vacated Indian Positions in the ] sector along the ].<ref name="indianairforce.nic.in"> indianairforce.nic.in</ref> It was the first large scale use of ] in the ] region since the ].


==Operations==
==Ground operations==

{{Indian Air Force}}
===Ground operations===
{{main|Kargil War}} {{main|Kargil War}}


Initial infiltrations were noticed in ] in early May, 1999. Because of the extreme winter weather in Kashmir, it was common practice for the Indian and Pakistan Army to abandon forward posts and reoccupy them in the spring. That particular spring, the Pakistan Army reoccupied the forward posts before the scheduled time not only theirs but also which belonged to India, in a bid to capture Kashmir. Initial infiltrations were noticed in ] in early May 1999. Because of the extreme winter weather in Kashmir, it was common practice for the Indian and Pakistan Army to abandon forward posts and reoccupy them in the spring. That particular spring, the Pakistan Army started reoccupying the forward posts well before the scheduled time. In a preliminary step in their bid to capture Kashmir, they reoccupied not only their own posts, but also 132 posts that belonged to India.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ti_xPBoC8hY|title = Guns and Glory Episode 7: 1999 Indo-Pak War in Kargil, Part 1|website = ]}}</ref>


By the second week of May, an ] on an Indian army ] acting on a tip-off by a local ] in the ] sector led to the exposure of the infiltration. Initially with little knowledge of the nature or extent of the encroachment, the Indian troops in the area initially claimed that they would evict them within a few days. However, soon reports of infiltration elsewhere along the LoC made it clear that the entire plan of attack was on a much bigger scale. ] responded with ], a mobilisation of 200,000 Indian troops. However, because of the nature of the terrain, ] and ] operations could not be mounted; the scale of most fighting was at the ]al or battalion level. In effect, two ] of the Indian Army,<ref></ref> numbering 20,000, along with several thousand from the ] and the air force were deployed in the conflict zone. By the second week of May, an ] on an Indian army ] acting on a tip-off by a local ] in the ] sector led to the exposure of the infiltration. Initially with little knowledge of the nature or extent of the encroachment, the Indian troops in the area initially claimed that they would evict them within a few days. However, reports of infiltration elsewhere along the LoC soon made it clear that the entire plan of attack was on a much bigger scale. ] responded with ], a mobilisation of 200,000 Indian troops. However, because of the nature of the terrain, ] and ] operations could not be mounted; the scale of most fighting was at the ]al or battalion level. In effect, two ] of the Indian Army,<ref>{{cite journal |url=http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE4-6/malik.html |url-status=dead|title=Lessons from Kargil. |first1=V.P. |last1=Malik |journal=Bharat-Rakshak Monitor |issue=May–June 2002 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090408082728/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE4-6/malik.html |archive-date=8 April 2009 }}</ref> numbering 20,000, along with several thousand from the ] and the air force were deployed in the conflict zone.
the ] moved into the region in full force. Soon, the intruders were found to be well entrenched and while artillery attacks had produced results in certain areas, more remote ones needed the help of the air force. the ] moved into the region in full force. The intruders were found to be well entrenched and while artillery attacks had produced results in certain areas, more remote ones needed the help of the air force. To avoid the escalation, the ] (GoI) cleared only limited use of Air Power on May 25, more than three weeks after first reports, with the instructions that IAF fighter jets will remain within Indian territory to launch attack on intruder's position within Indian territory and IAF was not permitted to cross the Line of Control under any circumstance.


==Air operations== ===Air operations===
<!-- Deleted image removed: ] of ]'s successful strike mission on Tiger Hill.]] -->


====Summary of air operations====
The Indian Air Force (IAF) was first approached to provide air support on 11 May with the use of helicopters. On 21 May a ] on a ] mission, flown by Wg Cdr CH Kulkarni ,Sqn Ldr A Perumal and Sqn Ldr UK Jha, was hit by ]. The flight was however, recovered safely, and returned to base on one engine. On 25 May, the ] authorized the IAF to mount attacks on the infiltrators without crossing the LoC. Initial indications from the government to the IAF was to operate only ]s. However, the ] put forth the argument that in order to create a suitable environment for the helicopters, ] action was required. On 26 May, the go-ahead was given and the IAF started its strike role . Flying from the Indian airfields of ], ] and ], ground attack aircraft ], ], ], Jaguars and the ] struck ] positions.Of note, although the MiG-21 is built mainly for air interception with a secondary role of ground attack, it is capable of operating in restricted spaces which was of importance in the Kargil terrain.
{{Main|Kargil Air War}}
<!-- Image with unknown copyright status removed: ] news footage shows downed Indian airman Ft Lt Nachiketa of the ] being interviewed in Pakistan.]] -->
Breakdown of Total Number of Sorties Flown by Aircraft Type:<ref>{{cite web |url=http://vayu-sena.tripod.com/kargil-summary1.html/ |title=Kargil War, Progress of Air Operations |work=VayuSena}}<br />States that the ''IAF and MoD Annual Report'' are the sources for this data.</ref>
{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Type !! Number of Sorties !! % Effort
|-
| Transport || 3427 || 44.9%
|-
| Helicopters || 2474 || 32.4%
|-
| Fighters || 1730 || 22.7%
|-
| Total || 7831 ||
|}
Breakdown of Air Operations by Task (Fast Jets)
{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Role !! Number of Sorties !! % Effort
|-
| Air Strikes || 578 || 48%
|-
| CAP & Escort || 462 || 39%
|-
| Recce || 159 || 13%
|-
| Total || 1199 ||
|}


==Aftermath==
The first strikes were launched on the ], when the ] struck infiltrator positions with fighter aircraft and ]s.<ref name=BBCN></ref> The initial strikes saw ] carrying out offensive sorties, with ]s and (later) ] providing fighter cover. ] gunships were also deployed in the ] sector.<ref name= Bharat-rakshak.com></ref> ] ] was at this time closed to civilian air-traffic and dedicated to the Indian Air Force.<ref name=BBCN/>
The lessons learned in this limited war influenced Indian Air Force to upgrade its combat fleet. It acquired and later started co-developing ] ] heavy fighters with Russia beginning in the early 2000s. Development of ] was also accelerated. {{Citation needed|date=August 2021}}


==See also==
However, on 27 May, the first fatalities were suffered when a ] and a ] jets were shot down over Batalik Sector by Pakistan Army.<ref name= BBC></ref><ref name=telegraph>{{cite web
|url = http://www.telegraphindia.com/1060522/asp/frontpage/story_6254165.asp
|title = Flyer pushes frontier again - Nachiketa returns to area where his plane was shot down
|accessdate = 2006-09-18
|work =
|publisher = Telegraph India
}}</ref> The following day, a Mi-17 was lost- with the loss of all four of the crew- when it was hit by three ] while on an offensive sortie.<ref name= Bharat-rakshak.com/> These losses forced the Indian Air Force to reassess its strategy. The helicopters were immediately withdrawn from offensive roles as a measure against the man-portable missiles in possession of the infiltrators.


; AGPL (Actual Ground Position Line), south to north runs through the following:
On 30 May, the Indian Air Force called into operation the ] which was deemed the best aircraft capable of optimum performance under the conditions of high-altitude seen in the zone of conflict. Armed initially with 250&nbsp;kg "dumb" bombs, ] over three days, struck infiltrator positions in ], ] and Point 4388 in the Drass Sector. The strikes on Muntho Dhalo on 17 June also destroyed logistics and re-supply capabilities of the infiltrators in the Batalik Sector.<ref name= Bharat-rakshak.com/> Through the last weeks of June, the Mirages, armed with ] as well as with "dumbs", repeatedly struck the heavily defended ]. The first of these missions were observed by the (then) ], ACM AY Tipnis<ref name= Bharat-rakshak.com/>
* ], LoC ends and AGPL begins
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ], AGPL ends at LAC


; Borders
The ]s used were ] and the ]. The transport planes were ], ] and ]. On May 27, the IAF had sent a MiG-27 on a photo ] mission over the Indian side of the ] in Kashmir. Piloted by ], he ejected from his MiG-27 after an engine ] due to Pakistani retaliation. ], who was in his ] tried to trace the downed MiG despite a blatant threat in the form of enemy ]s. Within minutes his plane was shot at by a ] shoulder fired missile. Having crashed, it is believed by the Indian military that he survived the crash but was killed by ] soldiers or irregulars. The body of Ahuja bore two point-blank bullet wounds as per the postmortem done by the Indian authorities. The point-blank injuries clearly indicate the intent of the enemy and a treatment in violation of Geneva conventions. Flt Lt Nachiketa was later paraded on Pakistan TV, this prompted India to accuse Pakistan of violating the ] on the treatment of ].
* ] (AGPL)
* ] (IB)
* ] (LoC)
* ] (LAC)
* ] (SC)
* ]
* ]
* ]


; Conflicts
The next day the air force lost an Mi-17 Helicopter to a shoulder fired missile near Tololing, killing the crew of four. This resulted in a change in strategy and technology. With the ]is providing around 100 ] kits to the ], the air force chose to make maximum use of this and retaliated with regular sorties on Pakistani occupied ]s. The aircraft operated at 10,000 meters AGL (33,000 feet above ]), well out of MANPADs range, leading to a drop in the accuracy rate of the bombs. The low number of airstrips for take off and landing of the flights also constrained the efficiency of the attacks. Despite this, there were hundreds of sorties on the intruders with no further material or personnel casualties enabling a gradual takeover of the mountain posts by Indian troops. According to IAF the "air strikes against the Pakistani infiltrators, supply camps and other targets yielded rich dividends."
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]


; Operations
By July all the remaining intruders had withdrawn and the operation was ended, being declared a success by the IAF in having achieved its primary objectives. However there has also been criticism of the methods initially used and the type of planes being unsuitable to the terrain that resulted in early losses. This is believed by many in the air force as coming as a wake up call to upgrade the aging fleet of craft (especially the attack aircraft and helicopters) to better enable them to fight in the mountainous region. But, in the context of the war and in light of the poor information available on the infiltrations, the Indian Air Force was able to coordinate well with the Army and provide air support to the recapture of most the posts before Pakistan decided to withdraw its remaining troops.
* ], by India
* ], by India


; Other related topics
==Aftermath==
* ]
The lessons learned in this limited war influenced India to urgently upgrade its combat fleet. It acquired and later started co-developing ] ] heavy fighters with Russia beginning in the early 2000s. The process of acquiring ] was also initiated in 2001, India's largest military tender to date. ] ] was declared the winner in January 2012.
* ], after whom Quaid Post was renamed to Bana Top
* ], westernmost town in Trans-Karakoram Tract
* ]
* ]
* ] for transfer of Trans-Karakoram Tract to China


==See also== ==References==
*]
*]

==References and sources==
{{reflist}} {{reflist}}
*
*
{{military of India}}
{{military of Pakistan}}


==External links==
{{coord missing|Pakistan}}
*{{citation |url=http://indianarmy.nic.in/arkargil/news.htm |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060212014057/http://indianarmy.nic.in/arkargil/news.htm |archive-date=12 February 2006 |date=15 July 1999 |title=Kargil Update, Indian Air Force. Periodic Updates – Operation Safed Sagar |work=Indian Army, Government of India}}
*{{cite journal |url=http://mod.nic.in/samachar/oct01-02/html/ch2.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120717064424/http://mod.nic.in/samachar/oct01-02/html/ch2.htm |archive-date=17 July 2012 |title=Operation Safed Sagar: A Doctrine Rewritten |journal=] |issue=October 2001}}

{{military of Pakistan}}


{{DEFAULTSORT:Safed Sagar 1999}}
]
] ]
] ]
] ]

Latest revision as of 12:09, 8 November 2024

1999 Indian military operation

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A MiG-23 Bn used in Operation Safed Sagar
Kargil War
Indo-Pakistani conflicts
Kashmir conflict

Other conflicts

Border skirmishes

Strikes

Operation Safed Sagar (Hindi: ऑपरेशन सफेद सागर, lit. "Operation White Ocean") was the code name assigned to the Indian Air Force's role in acting jointly with the Indian Army during the 1999 Kargil war that was aimed at flushing out regular and irregular troops of the Pakistani Army from vacated Indian Positions in the Kargil sector along the Line of Control. It was the first large scale use of Airpower in the Jammu and Kashmir region since the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971.

Operations

Ground operations

Main article: Kargil War

Initial infiltrations were noticed in Kargil in early May 1999. Because of the extreme winter weather in Kashmir, it was common practice for the Indian and Pakistan Army to abandon forward posts and reoccupy them in the spring. That particular spring, the Pakistan Army started reoccupying the forward posts well before the scheduled time. In a preliminary step in their bid to capture Kashmir, they reoccupied not only their own posts, but also 132 posts that belonged to India.

By the second week of May, an ambush on an Indian army patrol acting on a tip-off by a local shepherd in the Batalik sector led to the exposure of the infiltration. Initially with little knowledge of the nature or extent of the encroachment, the Indian troops in the area initially claimed that they would evict them within a few days. However, reports of infiltration elsewhere along the LoC soon made it clear that the entire plan of attack was on a much bigger scale. India responded with Operation Vijay, a mobilisation of 200,000 Indian troops. However, because of the nature of the terrain, division and corps operations could not be mounted; the scale of most fighting was at the regimental or battalion level. In effect, two divisions of the Indian Army, numbering 20,000, along with several thousand from the Paramilitary forces of India and the air force were deployed in the conflict zone. the Indian Army moved into the region in full force. The intruders were found to be well entrenched and while artillery attacks had produced results in certain areas, more remote ones needed the help of the air force. To avoid the escalation, the Government of India (GoI) cleared only limited use of Air Power on May 25, more than three weeks after first reports, with the instructions that IAF fighter jets will remain within Indian territory to launch attack on intruder's position within Indian territory and IAF was not permitted to cross the Line of Control under any circumstance.

Air operations

Summary of air operations

Main article: Kargil Air War

Breakdown of Total Number of Sorties Flown by Aircraft Type:

Type Number of Sorties % Effort
Transport 3427 44.9%
Helicopters 2474 32.4%
Fighters 1730 22.7%
Total 7831

Breakdown of Air Operations by Task (Fast Jets)

Role Number of Sorties % Effort
Air Strikes 578 48%
CAP & Escort 462 39%
Recce 159 13%
Total 1199

Aftermath

The lessons learned in this limited war influenced Indian Air Force to upgrade its combat fleet. It acquired and later started co-developing Sukhoi Su-30MKI heavy fighters with Russia beginning in the early 2000s. Development of HAL Tejas was also accelerated.

See also

AGPL (Actual Ground Position Line), south to north runs through the following
Borders
Conflicts
Operations
Other related topics

References

  1. Operation Safed Sagar indianairforce.nic.in
  2. "Guns and Glory Episode 7: 1999 Indo-Pak War in Kargil, Part 1". YouTube.
  3. Malik, V.P. "Lessons from Kargil". Bharat-Rakshak Monitor (May–June 2002). Archived from the original on 8 April 2009.
  4. "Kargil War, Progress of Air Operations". VayuSena.
    States that the IAF and MoD Annual Report are the sources for this data.

External links

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