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			Alright, I know I'm not the only one who found this section weird and unhelpful. I leave it here on the off-chance there is anything of value in it. Feel free to revert... <sup>]</sup><sub>]</sub> 06:40, 30 June 2006 (UTC)
	==Propositional attitudes==
			:==Additional observations about truth==
	I agree with Nathan - this section is not relevant. Bring it to talk, folks. ] 05:47, 13 May 2006 (UTC)
			:Honest intentions play a unique role in the ethics of epistemology. ] understands truthfulness to be one of the dimensions of valid speech.<ref>Habermas, Jurgen, ''] (1976), "What Is Universal Pragmatics?", 1st published, "Was heißt Universalpragmatik?", ''Sprachpragmatik und Philosophie'', ] (ed.), Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main. Reprinted, pp. 1–68 in Jürgen Habermas, ''Communication and the Evolution of Society'', Thomas McCarthy (trans., 1979)</ref> The moral importance of honest intent is underscored by the remarks of ]: “Herein someone avoids false speech and abstains from it. He speaks the truth, is devoted to truth, reliable, worthy of confidence, not a deceiver of people. Being at a meeting, or amongst people, or in the midst of his relatives, or in a society, or in the king's court, and called upon and asked as witness to tell what he knows, he answers, if he knows nothing: "I know nothing," and if he knows, he answers: "I know"; if he has seen nothing, he answers: "I have seen nothing," and if he has seen, he answers: "I have seen." Thus he never knowingly speaks a lie, either for the sake of his own advantage, or for the sake of another person's advantage, or for the sake of any advantage whatsoever.”<ref></ref> In its most extreme form, the obligation to tell the truth may manifest itself as a strong form of ], which holds that "It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything on insufficient evidence".<ref>Clifford, William K., ''The Ethics of Belief'' (1877).</ref>
	::Agreed insofar as the section is relevant only to caution the reader that not all statements should be taken on their literal face value (also covered in the meaning of "proposition"). And we even forgot to mention the propositional attitudes such as "express as sarcasm" and "express as parody" and other such forms, potentially resulting in an endless section. I am going to collapse this section by removing the least directly relevant portions, and will not object to further collapsing of its content to reflect its placement in the introduction to the major theories of truth... ] 18:37, 13 May 2006 (UTC)
	:I have removed this material and shortened this section to two paragraphs, with the brief third paragraph currently serving as a way of separating our those who take belief and thought as the locus, and those who take sentences and propositions as the locus ... ] 19:07, 13 May 2006 (UTC)
	:::"Deviations of observations from expectations are commonly perceived as '']s'', phenomena that call for '']s'' to reduce the shock of amazement. Deviations of observations from intentions are commonly experienced as '']s'', situations that call for plans of action to reduce the drive of dissatisfaction. Either type of discrepancy forms an impulse to '']'' (Awbrey & Awbrey 1995)." ...19:07, 13 May 2006 (UTC)
			:It reads like an elephant took a rather large dump. ] 00:16, 2 July 2006 (UTC)
	== Article is now too Abstract/Advanced ==
			==Correspondence theory==
	I could have sworn I wrote the following to this page a little while ago but its not here an not even in the history. Spooky. Anyway, this is what I said:
			Is this sentence related to some form of new-age mysticism? "Correspondence theory traditionally operates on the assumption that there is an objective truth with which humans are capable of being properly aligned." Properly aligned? What role does astrology and pyramid power play? OK seriously, this sentence and those that follow will not be of any help to most of our audience. In addition, parts of it seem to be OR. I think the best approach may be to start over -- put each section in talk and let the group of us discuss the best way to get the point across, and, frankly, forget about what is already written.<br>
	I've been away for a month and the article has totally changed. Some changes are for the better, but most have made it unreadable to the Misplaced Pages audience. Only someone with a master's degree (at least) in philosophy can understand most of it. Remember who we are writing for. This is someone who has looked up "Truth" in the encyclopedia because he doesn't initially know anything about it. Another problem is that Jon Awbrey's style is very abstract. Even I can't figure out what some of the sentences mean, because the terminology is so airy and vague. We need to use concrete terms. Finally, so of what's been added is of dubious relevance to the topic. I'm going to try to correct these problems but keep the good stuff Jon A. has added. --] 05:58, 13 May 2006 (UTC)
			As part of my job, I edit the work of others -- this section would be one I'd delete and send back for a major rewrite. ] 17:01, 30 June 2006 (UTC)
			::OK, let's get started. ... ] 17:07, 30 June 2006 (UTC)
			::Made a minor change in first paragraph. First sentence of second paragraph now reads like this:
			::*Correspondence theory traditionally operates on the assumption that truth is a matter of accurately copying "objective reality" and then representing it in thoughts, words and other symbols.<ref>''See, e.g.,'' Bradley, F.H., "On Truth and Copying", in Blackburn, ''et al'' (eds., 1999),''Truth'', 31-45.</ref> ... The footnote cites to:See, e.g.,'' Bradley, F.H., "On Truth and Copying", in Blackburn, ''et al'' (eds., 1999),''Truth'', 31-45.
			::The last sentence of the second paragraph refers to proponents of constructivist, consensus and pragmatic theory, all of which focus on the human role in forming conceptions of truth. Correspondence theory does ''not'' make these points of emphasis. Though some versions no doubt try to incorporate them, that is not the view of correspondence theory. (That was the point of the part of the paragraph about language translation too--if the translations are not exact, we get different so-called "objective" relationships.) Will try to find a cite for that.
			::Anything else? ... ] 17:22, 30 June 2006 (UTC)
			The first paragraph looks great! I just edited the second -- revert it if you hate it.<br>
	==Comportment==
			One thing, I don't know what to do with this, it doesn't really fit:
			Commentators and proponents of several of the other theories introduced below also have asserted that correspondence theory neglects the role of the persons involved in the "truth relation." {{Fact|date=October 2007}} {{Or|date=October 2007}}<br>
			Also, Kant has to go: synthesize it and use it (the whole quote) as a ref (footnote). ] 17:30, 30 June 2006 (UTC)
			::How about something like: "Proponents of several of the additional theories below have gone farther to assert that there are yet additional issues, such as interpersonal power struggles and other factors involved in deciding what is seen as truth." ... ] 17:43, 30 June 2006 (UTC)
			::Will get to Kant. Need some time to synthesize without sacrificing the basic observations about circularity, if at all possible. That helps to set the reader up for Pragmatic theory, among others. ... ] 17:43, 30 June 2006 (UTC) ... Jim (and anyone else), I'm forced to break from this for now and will get back to the task of synthesizing Kant blockquote a bit later, along with any other relevant issues. Kudos; thanks boss. ... ] 17:48, 30 June 2006 (UTC)
			:Yes, that's a great rewrite. Should we include "personal bias" in there as one of the other factors?
			:Synthesising Kant might be the biggest challenge of this entire article...it should be all downhill from there (of course, there's still Pierce to contend with!) ] 17:55, 30 June 2006 (UTC)
			::I like the illustration of "geist" even better (Is it "mind" or "spirit"), but that one will work quite well. Gottago for now... ] 18:08, 30 June 2006 (UTC)
			:Thanks. Well, I tackled Kant - I hope I didn't bruise him too much. Feel free to comment, change it, take it out and shoot it, etc. ] 19:26, 30 June 2006 (UTC)
			::Back briefly. I should pull that stuff about Kant's view for the present. The way I see it, the real purpose of that paragraph's insertion was to ''prove'' to readers why philosophers have so often not been content to rest with correspondence theory, maybe to set up for explaining just how complicated it got a century after Kant. Trust me, it got so complicated that this section is not the place to present that material. It can be done in a separate section such as, say, "More on correspondence theory". You should also know that Correspondence theory includes Tarski's semantic theory and other notable slants, and Tarski was one of the ones seeking a language-independent truth predicate--it's an acknowledged classic among philosophers. Making this and other things understandable will be a challenge that will last for awhile, but it can be done in the end, or at least reasonably summarized in ] with "main article" links as we do around here with highly complex slants on subjects of common interest. Some of these are soooo complicated they should be left out of the article on ] for sure, since we're not writing for professional philosophers here... ] 20:04, 30 June 2006 (UTC) I should add a qualifier to what I just said, lest a troll happen by and notice a fine detail. Tarski has traditionally been classed under correspondence theory discussions, but since deflationary theory became known as deflationary theory, he has one leg in each camp (posthumously--rolling over until each leg gets its own tombstone). That's one reason (in addition to readability) why it's quite sensible that his theory goes after the deflationary theories are introduced. Could be done differently, but that's a sensible way of organizing. ... ] 20:22, 30 June 2006 (UTC)
			:Looks and sounds good to me. ] 00:17, 2 July 2006 (UTC)
			Forgive me for my impudence in this matter, but reference to the distance to the moon is a Pragmatic approach to correspondence and does not necessarily represent the correspondence theory. My reasoning for this comes from my personal understanding that correspondence theory lends to an objective truth outside and regardless of any use-value of the proposition, whereas within a Pragmatic approach truth is oft cashed out strictly in use-value. My suggestion then would be to relocate this part “For example, there is a true distance to the moon when we humans attempt to go there, and this true distance is necessary to know so that the journey can be successfully made.” to the section on Pragmatic truth theory, or do away with it altogether. Thank you for you time. --18:31, 20 February 2008 (UTC)] (])
	JA: Nathan, there is no excuse for wholesale blanking of text. There is no excuse for putting messages on my personal user page, and my name is Jon, not Jim. I am giving you the benefit of the doubt only because it is late on a Friday night. Any other time this would be a Test0 situation at the very minimum. This is an article that has been gone over with a fine-toothed comb by many editors for months now. Their work deserves a modicum of respect. Maybe you've been away for a while and don't know that. I am doing my best to imagine extenuating circumstances for you. I have told you three times to bring your criticisms to the talk page. That is the way that we've been operating here for quite a while now. I suggest that everybody go take a nap to clear their heads, and we will go through it all again as carefully as need be, but tomorrow, as there is no particular hurry about truth. ] 06:12, 13 May 2006 (UTC)
			== Section 1.2: Truth as expressed more generally ==
	:NL: I think you have badly overreacted. (1) I'm not doing any "wholesale blanking". I give reasons for my rewrites and a reason for my removal of one section. Another editor has already endorsed my removal of it. (2) Leaving messages on a user page is a standard way of communicating on wiki. (Or am I thinking of the user's talk page? Its been so long since I did it, I've forgotten.) (3) Sorry, about the name. I corrected it as soon as I realized my mistake. (4) What is a "Test0 situation"? (5) This article has been "gone over" for a lot longer than "months", and for a long time before you came along. Quite a bit of the article as it stood a month ago was my writing. I'm respectful of your contributions (see below and my note on your page), so I expect you to be respectful of my work too. (6) I don't need extenuating circumstances, since I've done nothing wrong. (7) I was so busy editing, that I didn't notice your reverts or your request that I come to the talk page until your 4th revert. I did try to put a comment here at that time, but there must have been an edit collision, because it disappeared. I've re-added it above. (8) I LIKE a lot of what you've done and I think in the future you and I will be allies against the barbarians. But I think most of your writing belongs somewhere else, directed to a more philosophically educated audience. Perhaps you could move it to a series of advanced philosophical topics and then we can have links to those on the Truth page? Nap time... --] 06:37, 13 May 2006 (UTC)
			This section appears to be the source of the OR problem. It rambles quite a bit, and contains no citations. ] is specific to ]; but the links to ] and ] could be re-worked into another section - the part of the intro that talks about truth and meaning, perhaps? ] (the article) says nothing about truth; ] is a stub, and again says nothing about truth.
	JA: Nathan, it is simply not permissible to alter the text of a sourced quotation, and it is extremely poor scholarly practice to alter arbitrarily a close paraphrase of a cited source text. But that is precisely what you are doing with the Dissoi Logoi material that is closely paraphrased from Kneale & Kneale. This violates all sorts of ] principles. ] 06:28, 13 May 2006 (UTC)
			Is there anything worth keeping here? ] 23:38, 1 July 2006 (UTC)
	:NL: Did I do that? I don't think so. Since the original was Greek, "initiate" is a translation of a Greek word that could be more clearly (for our audience) with "beginner". I don't understand your remarks about paraphrase. I edited something and gave reasons why. What's the problem? --] 06:37, 13 May 2006 (UTC)
			:Certainly not the way it's currently written. ] 00:24, 2 July 2006 (UTC)
	RN: In Greek, "initiate" and "beginner" are not synonyms -- not even close.
	:NL: They are not "in" Greek. They are in English. And when "initiate" is a noun it means the same thing as "beginner." See below. (I can't imagine what you even intended to say. There's only ONE Greek word at issue here, so the question of whether two Greek words are synonyms does not arise.) --] 21:28, 13 May 2006 (UTC)
			::Indeed this section does seem to constitute OR, but it raises the question of how to integrate philosophical notions of truth that do not fit well into the pre-given categories (thinking here particularly of thinkers like Nietzsche, Foucault, Heidegger, and Nishida) — and indeed, earlier theories of truth (particularly Aquinas whose ''verum est adaequatio intellectus et rei'' which is only formally similar to correspondence theory). Any thoughts? <sup>]</sup><sub>]</sub> 03:30, 2 July 2006 (UTC)
	== Stop reverting ==
			:::Aquinas actually did use the Latin word correspondentia to refer to a relationship between thought and reality, at least in one place. Although, as I indicated already within the various protracted discussions now archived, Russell was responsible for making the term widely known as such in the context of establishing correspondence and coherence as competing tensions. Kant did use a term readily translatable as "correspondence" too, though was not exactly, shall we say, popular reading. There's a place for all of this if priorities are kept in a reasonable sequence for the article. I suspect someday it'll be either a fairly lengthy article and/or have many linked offshoots and a reasonable way of giving readers a pathway to their particular foci. The section currently being discussed (]) might be a reasonable place to start with such views as just mentioned by lg0774 (and Banno in next talk section below). Just vaguely hypothesizing here, perhaps Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre, Derrida could be one thread. For now, how about starting by slightly retitling this section and begin briefly summarizing some of these views subsectioned by author, then see where it goes? ... ] 04:26, 2 July 2006 (UTC)
			:::And yes, I am in favor of jettisoning that whole meandering beginning to "Truth as expressed more generally". There are plenty of ways of summarizing the "realist" vs. "anti-realist" distinction without getting bogged down in it. ... ] 07:30, 2 July 2006 (UTC)
			::::My point about Aquinas is not so much about the particular words used as the meaning of those particular words within context — for example, Aquinas admits something like revelation as a basis of truth (as opposed to the expression of correspondence theory on this page — the correspondence with fact). That said, I would favor eliminating the section under question, as it is just as much a straight-jacket on notions of truth currently not included in the "Major theories of truth", as, (1) it focuses exclusively on truth in sign relations and (2) it seems to develop no new ideas of what truth is itself. As to the single thread, I am not so sure how well that would work. For example, Heidegger takes one notion of truth from Aristotle and applies it to Nietzsche; Foucault takes Nietzschean truth in a different direction. <sup>]</sup><sub>]</sub> 04:18, 4 July 2006 (UTC)
			:::::Agreed lg, yes Aquinas was variously on both sides of that "fence". Personally I think it's time to begin including some of these views you just mentioned, And this section seems a reasonable place to add this type of material, organizing as necessary along the way. ... ] 16:48, 4 July 2006 (UTC)
			===Removal===
			I've deleted the section. Here is the dif: . ] 21:44, 4 July 2006 (UTC)
			* The discussion of "realist" theories is unsupported by citations, and appears to cross over with the previous discussion of the distinction between substantive and robust theories.
	Folks, stop the revert war or I will lock the article. Play nice. ] 06:33, 13 May 2006 (UTC)
			* Much of the writing is confused - for example, "meaning-bearing element" is unexplained, and precedes the introduction of signs in the section ''Approaches relating to signs in general''
			* look, I could go on, and will if need be; but basically the whole section sucks.
			My recommendation is to re-insert anything of use into other parts of the article. ] 21:51, 4 July 2006 (UTC)
			:This removed from first paragraph of Pragmatic theory:
	:Thanks, Banno. (But please note, I haven't been reverting. JA was, but I didn't realize it for a long time.) --] 06:43, 13 May 2006 (UTC)
			:*The most critical differences involve the role of ] and ] within ]. ... 04:19, 5 July 2006 (UTC)
			:The link to ] directs the reader to a poorly developed article, and the idea of summarizing "realist" approaches to truth is at least postponed for the present. I assume at some point we'll get back to a brief synopsis of how this concept of "realist" cuts across the various theories according to a number of writers, but for now it's here for future reference. Or, with a rewrite, this whole discussion of "realism" could ''very'' reasonably be worked into the article on ]. For now, in my estimation of it, the current article reasonably covers the basic concept with its references to "objective", especially with respect to correspondence and pragmatic theory. ... ] 04:19, 5 July 2006 (UTC)
			== Truth and Power ==
	==Debatable sentence removed for rewriting and placement elsewhere as appropriate==
	Last sentence of reflection and quotation section placed here for rewriting and placement in the Formal definitions section or elsewhere as appropriate...] 15:45, 13 May 2006 (UTC)
	: It is hardly an accident, then, that matters of ], ], and ] are bound up with each other in ] and ]." ... 15:45, 13 May 2006 (UTC)
			A section is needed on ] and ] (at the least). ] 23:44, 1 July 2006 (UTC)
	::Of course, you realize that taking the above quote out of context commits the very act that the section in question discusses. However, the sentence in question totally misrepresents Gödel number, so I agree with its removal. ] 19:24, 13 May 2006 (UTC)
	:::Understood Rick. Now I imagine we will be required to quote it and reflect, part of which involves quoting the word quotation within a quotation now taken out of its original context ;-) ... ] 19:38, 13 May 2006 (UTC)
			:]! ]! ]! (OK, he's one of my favourites. ;) [[User:Jim62sch|<font
	==Minor modification to Truthbearer section==
			==Truth in Jurisprudence==
	I removed "the ] in ..." changed to "modern", because the analysis of propositions did not start with the linguistic turn, but with the advent of analytic philosophy. Further, the dissecting of syntax and linguistic interpretation did not begin with Derrida ''et al'', but has been a gradual trend leading up to the linguistic turn anyway. May as well keep it simple as reasonably possible in the intro section...] 19:33, 13 May 2006 (UTC)
			I just noticed that this section of the article (in ]) might violate NPOV because it says nothing about ] or ] jurisprudence. More seriously, this section is written about ] jurisdictions (UK, US, etc.). Should this be qualified in some way? I believe it's quite possible some jurisdictions might actually refer to their courts as, for instance, "finders of truth", but don't know for sure. The idea of referring to a court as a "finder of truth" gives me the willies-- not completely sure why at the moment; maybe it reminds me of Orwell, or maybe of recent events in the US. ... ] 17:06, 7 July 2006 (UTC)
			:In German criminal procedure, which is an ], the evidence phase of the court proceedings is often referred to as ''Wahrheitsermittlung'', which means something like "determining the truth", or "investigation of the truth". --]] 22:12, 31 July 2006 (UTC)
			A great example of a true statement in court is simply having many pictures of a crime scene, many witnesses that all have enough consistent statements about who was there and what was done. True statements about the past are very common and often very consistent among any witnesses that were there, and what can be determined with photos, science, and qualified experts. This is some food for thought.
	==Major problem with intro section of Philosophy of truth==
	This section began as an attempt to introduce the concept of truth predicate, and has since fallen into nearly complete explanatory disarray. I missed it until Nathan Ladd called it to my attention. I have no problem with the first paragraph. The second paragraph doesn't say anything meaningful and is in several respects wrong as it's currently written. Theories of truth can ''not'' be classified according to the schema presented, indeed most of the substantive theories (possibly excepting the Pragmatic theory of ] and the Russell version of correspondence theory) do not fit into this classification. Even the linguistic-analytic new kids on the block are not necessarily explained effectively by these three criteria. That renders the attempt at explaining semiotics excessive in this introductory section. I wish there were a way to get this in early in the article, but it's just too much for both the writers and the readers to expect at this introductory stage of the article. I think all but the first paragraph should be removed and rewritten to be used somewhere else. In particular, the last two paragraphs have something meaningful to contribute, but not as part of the intro. I will therefore remove it until some better sense can be made of this relatively recent development in the article. Personally I would be comfortable with just moving right into truthbearers here and presenting the analytic-linquistic and semiotic material in a separate section where Kripke and Semantic theory is currently introduced ... ] 20:52, 13 May 2006 (UTC)
	:It is conventional to refer to a philosophical treatment of a particular subject matter as a ''theory'', whether or not it qualifies as a theory by either empirical or logical criteria. Most of the discussion below follows this convention.
			--] 06:16, 16 August 2006 (UTC)
	:Theories of truth can be classified according to the following features:
	:* Primary subjects. What kinds of things are potentially meaningful enough to be asserted or not, believed or not, or considered true or false?
	:* Relevant objects. What kinds of things, in addition to primary subjects, are pertinent to deciding whether to assert them or not, believe them or not, or consider them true or false?
	:* Value predicates. What kinds of things are legitimate to say about primary subjects, either in themselves, or in relation to relevant objects?
			==Order of presentation of notable philosophers' views==
	:In some discussions of meaning and truth that consider forms of expression well beyond the limits of literally-interpreted linguistic forms, potentially meaningful elements are called '']s'', or '']'' for short, taking these words in the broadest conceivable senses.
			I have no extremely strong opinion on the order of presentation of the views of notable philosophers on "truth". I do, though, happen to think the historical order of presentation (chronological) is a more relevant way of presenting these views. This is because each of these philosophers was building in various ways on the work of those that came before. ... ] 19:24, 31 July 2006 (UTC)
			:I agree, and suggest to use the date of birth for ordering, while also indicating for each the life period, such as "'''Aquinas (c. 1225 – 1274) and the scholastics'''" and "'''Baudrillard (b. 1929)'''". &nbsp;--]] 21:54, 31 July 2006 (UTC)
	:Most treatments of truth make an important distinction at this point, though the language in which they make it may vary. On the one hand there is a type of very basic sign that is said to be true or false of various objects. For example, in logic there are ''terms'' such as "man" or "woman" that are true of some things and false of others, and there are ''predicates'' such as "__is a man" or "__is a woman" that are true or false in the same way. On the other hand there is a type of complete sign (or representation) that expresses what grammarians traditionally call a ''complete thought''. Here one speaks of ''sentences'' and ''propositions''. Some considerations of truth admit both types of signs, ''terms'' and ''sentences'', while others admit only the bearers of complete thoughts to judgments of truth or falsity. Recent literature in linguistic-analytic philosophy uses the term ''truthbearers'' to describe the vehicles of complete thoughts, but with no intention of prejudging whether they bear truth or falsehood. ... 20:52, 13 May 2006 (UTC)
			::Agreed. Chronological ordering makes the most sense as one can follow the flow of the philisophical discussion. ] 22:14, 31 July 2006 (UTC)
	== Use "beginner" not "initiate" ==
			==Pic==
	The English word "initiate" when used as a noun means beginner. So whatever Greek word is being translated as "initiate" we can also translate as "beginner". And since the latter is a more familiar term, it makes the the article more readable to use it. To the editor who wrote an edit annotation that "In Greek "initiate" and "beginner" mean different things" (and who then added a snotty remark.): You are confused. These two words are English words, so it makes no sense to say "In Greek" they mean different things. What matters is that in English they mean the same thing. --] 21:23, 13 May 2006 (UTC)--] 21:23, 13 May 2006 (UTC)
			I care little for puritanical views, thus I have restored ''La Vérité'' as an appropriately stylised representation of Truth (unless, of course, one is a fan of that priggish jackanapes John Ashcroft who draped various nude statues in cloth). Also, since the likelihood of Jesus and Pilate ever having had ''any'' conversation is slim to nil a picture of such an imaginary event is hardly fitting as a depiction of "truth". ] 22:24, 31 July 2006 (UTC)
	::How about "I am a novice"? I don't see the importance...] 21:35, 13 May 2006 (UTC)
	::::The point is that the passage in question is a translation from the Greek. "Initiate" does not mean "beginner" in English either, but the difference is more important in Greek, where an "initiate" was one who was formally initiated into a mystery cult. Only initiates were privy to the secrets of the cult. The formal status of an initiate is important to the point being made, a point lost if the word "beginner" is used, which has no formal status -- that is, there is no point at which one officially becomes a beginner or officially stops being a beginner. I am sorry that you find the use of correct language "snotty", but there it is. ] 21:38, 13 May 2006 (UTC)
			:I well remember my trip to the Louvre, and seeing small French schoolchildren sitting in front of a huge nude painting, while their teacher lectured on the subject of art. That the picture of truth should raise even an eyebrow, much less a protest, just shows how far removed from reality some Americans are. ] 22:59, 31 July 2006 (UTC)
	::::::It was your annotation, not your language, that I called snotty. The formal status of an intiate is NOT relevant to the point being made. In fact, waat the sentence means doesn't matter. All that matters to the point being made is that the sentence is true when one person says it but false when another does. That's because the subject is "I" and the predicate is not universally true of everyone. I'm going to rewrite the whole thing plainer. We don't need to quote an obscure Greek source to make such a pedestrian point. --] 21:53, 13 May 2006 (UTC)
			::Some? It's our national gift to the world. ;| ] 08:24, 1 August 2006 (UTC)
	:The point is not the question that is being raised, which is today a commonplace, but that this document is the first extant document that raises the question. Second, it is important that the predicate, "... is an initiate." apply to some people but not to others. The predicate "... is a beginner." is vague enough to apply to anyone. In any case, the first example known to raise this question should be quoted correctly, not incorrectly. ] 23:19, 13 May 2006 (UTC)
	::Thanks for clarifying, but please note that the passage did not say anywhere that this was the earliest known time the point was made. --] 23:42, 13 May 2006 (UTC)
			::: Truth is usually held as being something of such holy value (even to those who have no belief in God) as to not be mocked by pictures of naked women (not that I hold all such picutres to necessarily be in any way pornographic - though many times they are insulting to human sensibilities).
	==The bibiography is bloated and inappropriate==
			::::I do not mean to show how much of a philistine that I am by requesting the removal of this undoubtedly great piece of art. I propose a culturally unbiased view of truth (ie: one that's not French, or affiliated to any nation's work). Perhaps a mathematical depiction? I think that many individuals look upon Euler's formula as being true in its beautiful simplicity. Surely this is only a small request for such an important article. If wikipedia can't get the Truth right - what can it do?
	The bibliography is filled with references to works that are not cited in the text. Also, most of them are inappropriately advanced for our audience. And there is no guidance as to what a beginner to the subject of truth should turn to next. There are also a lot of references to articles in other encyclopedias. Surely, that is an implied admission that we have failed to do explain the subject adequately ourselves. The bibliography should be limited to (1) Introductory (but longer than an encyclopedia article) texts, (2) A handful of classic works on truth, and (3) works actually cited in the text. (Also, for no apparent reason, the header "For further reading" appears in the middle of all this.)--] 22:21, 13 May 2006 (UTC)
			] 14:59, 8 August 2006 (UTC)
	::The "Further reading" section is, or should have been, limited to works not cited in the body text of the article. Works cited should all be in the "Referrences", except those which used footnotes...] 22:36, 13 May 2006 (UTC)
	:::I think '''most''' of the entries in the References section are not cited in the text. --] 23:03, 13 May 2006 (UTC)
	==Move Bib to Talk for Case-by-Case Re-Exam==
			As much as I don't want to give into prudery or priggishness, it does seem like this painting raises more eyebrows than necessary -- and that the painting does not add to the informational nature of the article. I at least think that it should be father down in the article rather than the first thing one sees -- perhaps in ]. Also, I think that it's a rather male perspectve that a naked woman represents truth or virture, and a naked man represents strength or power -- a somewhat biased view (both culturally and in terms of gender). Thanks, ]<font color="chartreuse">|</font>] 14:59, 12 August 2006 (UTC)
	* ] (ed., 1997), ''The Frege Reader'', Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, UK.
			:Note: ''La Vérité'' ("Truth") by Jules Joseph Lefebvre is a suitable illustration for the article Truth. It would be contrary to Misplaced Pages's policy on censorship to remove it without a compelling reason. Please refer to ]. In other words, my dear followers of the John Ashcroft principles regarding art, the picture stays. ] 15:15, 12 August 2006 (UTC)
	* ] (1900–1901), ''Lectures on Ethics 1900–1901'', Donald F. Koch (ed.), Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL, 1991.
			:I agree with the above, it seems however, that someone keeps moving it to a place further down the article and without coming to any agreement about moving it here on the talk page. Since most people I've read above seem to want to leave it on the first page and not move it, I tried moving it back, however, last time I tried fixing unauthorised changes, I was blocked from the system.--] 23:31, 17 August 2006 (UTC)
	* Dewey, John (1932), ''Theory of the Moral Life'', Part 2 of John Dewey and ], ''Ethics'', Henry Holt and Company, New York, NY, 1908. 2nd edition, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1932. Reprinted, Arnold Isenberg (ed.), Victor Kestenbaum (pref.), Irvington Publishers, New York, NY, 1980.
			::I agree with Jim and Rick as well; I'm just tired of arguing about it, or even reading others arguing about it. There's no compelling reason to remove it, nor is there a compelling reason to keep it either. Someone (I think it was Stevertigo) moved it down in the article a couple weeks ago; I moved his preferred pic farther down in the article, added a few more pics, and there they've sat until now. i frankly don't see the need to have any images up front in an article like this; they're nice little touches, but really don't explain anything anyway.
			::I should also say, though, it'd be nice to have a better photo of Habermas... ] 00:01, 18 August 2006 (UTC)
			==Image:Epistemology-x.gif==
	* ] (1991), ''Frege and Other Philosophers'', Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
	* Dummett, Michael (1993), ''Origins of Analytical Philosophy'', Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
	* ] (1997), ''Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984, Volume 1, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth'', Paul Rabinow (ed.), Robert Hurley et al. (trans.), The New Press, New York, NY.
			I can't see what this adds to the article. Nor is it particularly clear ''what'' it is supposed to show. ] 20:24, 1 August 2006 (UTC)
	* ] (1986), ''The Idea of the Good in Platonic–Aristotelian Philosophy'', P.&nbsp;Christopher Smith (trans.), Yale University Press, New Haven, CT. 1st published, ''Die Idee des Guten zwischen Plato und Aristoteles'', J.C.B. Mohr, Heidelberg, Germany, 1978.
			:Frankly, I'd like to see every single one of the pics gone from the article. La verite doesn't explain anything, the Pilate/Jesus pic doesn't explain anything, and none of the others do either. The only one that explains anything at all is the diagram, however simplistic and limited it is. Is it possible to get a consensus to remove all images from this article?... ] 22:30, 1 August 2006 (UTC)
	* Grover, Dorothy (1992), ''A Prosentential Theory of Truth'', Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
			:I think this diagram is misleading and only refers possible to Plato's view of truth as justified true belief. Yet even he thought that the fiction of a Final Judgment would serve society well (see The Republic). The other images give artistic expression to something, ie, truth, that is hard to describe. I think Lefebre's painting expresses both the idealism of the shining globe and the pragmatism or realism of the beautiful woman; wasn't the Trojan war fought over Helen? ] 23:30, 1 August 2006 (UTC)
	* ] (1979), ''Communication and the Evolution of Society'', Thomas McCarthy (trans.), Beacon Press, Boston, MA.
			::In fact, the description given in the wikicommons for that diagram is not even close to the whole story. I don't even want to go into it right now, but justification and refutation of belief is one of the most central problems of epistemology and "philosophy of truth" right up until today. After you get past that, it's ''all'' constructivist in one form or another, including the concept of ''episteme''. (And by the way, constructivism and pragmatic theory are ''not'' analytic philosophy by any reasonable characterization of what is ordinarily meant by analytic philosophy).
	* Habermas, Jürgen (1990), ''Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action'', Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen (trans.), Thomas McCarthy (intro.), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
			::Either way, I'd like to see all of the pics out of there myself, because they are more of a source of dispute than the damn article itself, and they explain absolutely nothing--squat, to the readers. I don't mind them being there, but the frequent arguments over them outweigh what they add to the article in my opinion. ... ] 01:18, 2 August 2006 (UTC)
			::Sorry was not aware of these disputes about the pictures, but I think my explanation of the symbolism might help, no?
	* Habermas, Jürgen (2003), ''Truth and Justification'', Barbara Fultner (trans.), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
			::Yes, I was mistaken about constructivism being analytic but it is not a term I'm aware of these philosophers using or being easily categorised as, let us say it is at least an Anglophone term. That pragmatism and contructivism flow from Hegel is undisputed but I think both fail to capture Nietzsche's point of view, he held against pragmatism by suggesting that the answer to what was useful was itself problematic, his ideas of the Genealogy of truth are closer to the mark. ] 23:30, 2 August 2006 (UTC)
			==Recent attempts to rewrite intro==
	* Kirkham, Richard L. (1992), ''Theories of Truth'', MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
			The intro was hashed over and over by many editors some months ago. The longstanding version introduces the subject properly. Contrary to recent attempts to qualify the disagreements of definition of truth as limited to philosophy, after much research by many editors it was quite clear that even dictionaries differ widely in how to define it. Please do not change it into a personal POV about the subject. ... ] 15:47, 2 August 2006 (UTC)
			I agree that the intro is good overall, but it needs some mention of the many fields of knowledge that have great agreement about what true statements are and what they mean. To enter the whole debate with the idea of mere perspectives and only disagreement is quite misleading.
	* ] (1975), "An Outline of a Theory of Truth", ''Journal of Philosophy'' 72 (1975), 690–716.
			I hope you will reconsider. At least edit it better, and do not just delete it all over and over. Thanks for your consideration and all the excellent work you do. I mean no harm. I want to help edit this to include a better explanation about those who claim a very clear and precise idea of correspondence theory.
	* Kripke, Saul A. (1980), ''Naming and Necessity'', Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
			--] 06:10, 16 August 2006 (UTC)
	* ] (1946), ''An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation'', 'The Paul Carus Lectures, Series 8', Open Court, La Salle, IL.
			:Hi Joseph. I appreciate the comments. The added material did not belong in the section on Correspondence theory. It may have a place in other sections. I also think you may have a point about the intro, and the idea that there are certain agreements within limited fields about the idea of true/false propositions in limited realms such as the digital data realm, logic and math. Once of the problems is a lack of sourcing (], ]). Also, the added material needs some more work on the writing to make better sense and not be "all over the place" in its meaning. A great deal of debate went into arriving at that brief intro, by at least seven or eight editors. ... ] 06:24, 16 August 2006 (UTC)
			== Malaprop Lead & XS Reverts ==
	* ] (ed., 1971), ''Reference and Modality'', Oxford University Press, London, UK.
			JA: I count 3 reverts by ] since this one:
	* ] (ed., 1984), ''Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox'', Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
			<blockquote>
			15:14, 2 August 2006 Stevertigo (Talk | contribs) m (restoring my lede reverted by Kenosis - not an anon - not "vandalism" of course - just a clarification to make a sad theoreticist intro a more balanced and happy one)
			</blockquote>
			JA: More importantly, the lead he/she keeps insisting on is not even grammatical. ] 17:01, 2 August 2006 (UTC)
			== Lede ==
	* ] (1953), ''Truth and Consequence in Mediaeval Logic'', North-Holland, Amsterdam, Netherlands, 1953. Reprinted, Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 1976.
			You can gang up and count reverts all you want to. It would be easier if newbie editors such as yourselves would simply edit the material rather than revert it. -]|] 19:01, 2 August 2006 (UTC)
			:::See ] and ], and not that you're biting the right people, but also ]. With the type of attitude you've displayed here over the course of the past few days, it will become increasingly difficult to assume good faith re your edits (see WP:AGF -- "This policy does not require that editors continue to assume good faith in the presence of evidence to the contrary. Actions inconsistent with good faith include vandalism, '''personal attacks''', sockpuppetry and '''edit warring'''). In addition, in looking over your failed self-nom for Admin, you are exhibiting the same behaviours presently that caused your nom to be voted down 38-16-5.
	* Nietzsche, Friedrich (1968). "Uber Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinn", ("On Truth and Lying in an Extra-moral Sense"), in Jürgen Habermas (ed.), ''Erkenntnistheoretische Schriften'', Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, Germany.
			:::Your rewrite of the LEAD brings nothing to the article except more words that don't really say anything. Your removal of ''La Vérité'', obviously without having read this discussion page, was inexcusable and just this side of vandalism. I'd suggest you rethink the position you wish to take on this article -- the intro took much work, and much time by very seasoned editors to get it to a neutral definition. Obviously, anything that does not help to move the article forward in the same vein will be problematic. (i.e., POV edits like the removal of La Vérité will be reverted as NPOV vios.). ] 10:19, 4 August 2006 (UTC)
			::I don't particularly think I've actually done anything that should justifiably be the target of Stevertigo's anger. But I felt the need to request sanctions for the four reverts today, so now he has a reason if he insists on it. Three reverts, notification given, then a fourth, should be known to be OB on the WP. It is nonetheless heartening to see some kind of comment on the talk page. As indicated above, this intro was hashed over many times by many editors, and the longstanding version tells the reader like it is. The article then proceeds to introduce the various perspectives. May I suggest reading the various perspectives, then checking several dictionaries to confirm the legitimacy of the longstanding lead in this article? ... ] 19:36, 2 August 2006 (UTC)
	* ] (1981), ''Reason, Truth, and History'', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
			::: No anger. I simply dislike having my work undone for sake of some notion of preservationism --particularly for a lede which I myself and had made some arguably strong . All of which led to this version, which forms the basis for a consensus formulation upon which others can work from. My recent edits were thus inline and limited to the consensus form, and only clarified some ambiguities and biases implied in the current minimalist version. Further, this version does not adequately approach the basic requirements that a lede be descriptive enough to stand as an article. Some of us use ]s to preview linked articles from within articles we are reading, and this, along with other factors ("Misplaced Pages 1.0," readability) shapes our view that ledes need to be substantive and not excessively terse. Apologies for the reverts - I should have gone straight to talk. But then, so indeed should have you. -]|] 20:33, 3 August 2006 (UTC)
	* Quine, W.V. (1982), ''Methods of Logic'', 4th edition, Harvard Unversity Press, Cambridge, MA.
			::::That you were reverted by several different editors should tell you something regarding the edits, I would think. ] 10:22, 4 August 2006 (UTC)
	* Quine, W.V. (1992), ''Pursuit of Truth'', Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990. Revised edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1992.
			{| valign="top"
	* Quine, W.V., and ] (1978), ''The Web of Belief'', Random House, New York, NY, 1970. 2nd edition, Random House, New York, NY, 1978.
			! ]
	* ] (2000), ''Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy'', Barbara Herman (ed.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
	* Rescher, Nicholas (1973), ''The Coherence Theory of Truth'', Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
	* ] (1991), ''Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers, Volume 1'', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
	* ] (1913), ''Theory of Knowledge (The 1913 Manuscript)'', Elizabeth Ramsden Eames (ed.), Kenneth Blackwell (collab.), George Allen & Unwin, 1984. Reprinted, Routledge, London, UK, 1992.
	* Russell, Bertrand (1940), ''An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth'', 'The William James Lectures for 1940 Delivered at Harvard University', George Allen & Unwin, 1950. Reprinted, Thomas Baldwin (intro.), Routledge, London, UK, 1992.
	* ], and ] (eds., 1988), ''Propositions and Attitudes'', Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
	* ] (1969), ''The Religious Experience of Mankind'', Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, NY.
	* Tarski, Alfred (1944), "The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics", ''Philosophy and Phenomenological Research'' 4 (3), 341-376.
	* ] (1966), ''Religion, An Anthropological View'', Random House, New York, NY.
	* Williams, Bernard (2002), ''Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy'', Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
	::Here are the remainder of the unused references (most of which were already unused prior to my last several edits). Some of them are duplicates from above. They may be useful in putting up a section "For further reading" or such...] 16:57, 17 May 2006 (UTC)
	* ] (ed., 1901–1905), ''Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology'', 3 volumes in 4, Macmillan, New York, NY.
	* Blackburn, Simon, and Simmons, Keith (eds., 1999), ''Truth'', Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. Includes papers by James, Ramsey, Russell, Tarski, and more recent work.
	* Clifford, W. K. (1877), "The Ethics of Belief and Other Essays". (Prometheus Books, 1999)
	* Field, Hartry (2001), ''Truth and the Absence of Fact'', Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
	* ] (1976), "What Is Universal Pragmatics?", 1st published, "Was heißt Universalpragmatik?", ''Sprachpragmatik und Philosophie'', ] (ed.), Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main. Reprinted, pp. 1–68 in Jürgen Habermas, ''Communication and the Evolution of Society'', Thomas McCarthy (trans.), Beacon Press, Boston, MA, 1979.
	* Horwich, Paul, (1988), ''Truth'', 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
	* ] (1904), ''A World of Pure Experience''.{{fact}} <!--Publisher & Place of Publication Needed-->
	* James, William (1907), ''Pragmatism, A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, Popular Lectures on Philosophy'', Longmans, Green, and Company, New York, NY.
	* James, William (1909), ''The Meaning of Truth, A Sequel to 'Pragmatism''', Longmans, Green, and Company, New York, NY.
	* James, William (1912), ''Essays in Radical Empiricism''.{{fact}} Cf. Chapt. 3, "The Thing and it's Relations", pp. 92–122.
	* Le Morvan, Pierre (2004), "Ramsey on Truth and Truth on Ramsey", ''British Journal for the History of Philosophy'', 12 (4) 2004, 705–718, .
	* ], ''Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce'', vols. 1–6, ] and ] (eds.), vols. 7–8, ] (ed.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1931–1935, 1958. Cited as CP vol.para.
	* Peirce, C.S. (1877), "The Fixation of Belief", ''Popular Science Monthly'' 12 (1877), 1–15. Reprinted (CP 5.358–387), (CE 3, 242–257), (EP 1, 109–123). .
	* Peirce, C.S. (1901), "Truth and Falsity and Error" (in part), pp. 718–720 in J.M. Baldwin (ed.), ''Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology'', vol. 2. Reprinted, CP 5.565–573.
	* ] (1927), "Facts and Propositions", ''Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 7'', 153–170. Reprinted, pp. 34–51 in F.P. Ramsey, ''Philosophical Papers'', David Hugh Mellor (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1990.
	* Ramsey, F.P. (1990), ''Philosophical Papers'', David Hugh Mellor (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
	* ] (ed.), ''Dictionary of Philosophy'', Littlefield, Adams, and Company, Totowa, NJ, 1962.
	16:57, 17 May 2006 (UTC)
	==Proposed merge of ] and ]==
	The article ] has been created and edited by a single user. The subject matter does not appear to differ substantially from this pre-existing article. Strongly recommend merging any usable material to here and making ] a re-direct. Comments? ] 05:18, 15 May 2006 (UTC)
	:JA: All articles in WikiPedia are created by single users and edited by single users until such time as other users take part in their development.
	::What steps have you taken to notify other users of the existence of this article, so that they can support it? ] 15:47, 15 May 2006 (UTC)
	:JA: The article ] is still a Wikiwork-in-Progress, as all pages in WikiPedia are. The use of the epithet "theory" follows a very common practice in WP for indicating that it covers the more abstract, advanced, technical, theoretical aspects of the subject in a more complete and comprehensive detail. Indeed, the division of the same subject matter into different levels of treatment is such a routine practice that there are several sets of templates already in use for handling this very common type of situation, and there is one of them, <nowiki>{{seeintro}}</nowiki> in use at the top of the ] article.
	::The argument that ] is a "more advanced" article is nonsense. It is more limited in its content than this article, rather than more advanced. Rather, it is original research or vanity - notice the reference to Jon's own article. Nor does the present content warrant such an approach. ] 15:47, 15 May 2006 (UTC)
	:JA: Per talk page discussion at ], it has become evident at this point that there will be no such advanced, comprehensive, or technical development of the subject matter of theories of truth in the introductory article ], and so there is no conflict between the two levels of treatment.
	::What does this mean? Are you sugesting that hte material on, say, Kripke's work is at an introductory level? ] 15:51, 15 May 2006 (UTC)
	:JA: I am following the model of numerous other (Introductory, Comprehensive) article pairings in WikiPedia, for instance, the following:
	{| class="wikitable"
	|-		|-
			! Kenosis
	! Introductory !! Comprehensive
			! SV
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			Common dictionary definitions of '''truth''' mention some form of accord with '']'' or '']''. There is, however, no single definition of truth about which scholars agree, and numerous theories of truth continue to be widely debated. Differing opinions exist on such questions as what constitutes truth, how to define and identify truth, what roles do revealed and acquired knowledge play, and whether truth is subjective, relative, objective, or absolute. This article introduces the various perspectives.
	| ]
	|-		|
			The word '''truth''', according to common dictionary ]s, has some form of accord with '']'' or '']'', and is strongly tied to the concept of "]."
	| ]
			However, "truth" is often used within the context of ] arguments, as well as within particular conceptual frameworks, which attempt to expand or redefine its definition according to the view from within those frameworks.
	| ]
	|-
			There is no ''single'' definition of "truth" about which people can agree, and numerous ]s, ]s, and ] about the ''nature of truth'' continue to be widely debated.
	| ]
			As such, there is a great variance of opinion with respect to such questions as, ''what constitutes truth, how to define and identify truth, what roles do 'revealed' and 'acquired knowledge' play,'' and ''whether truth is best defined as subjective, relative, objective, or absolute.''
	| ], ]
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			This has already been repeatedly discussed on talk by numerous editors, and I properly summarized the results above. Read the article, familarize youself with the fundamental problems the subject presents to phiilosophers and other commentators, and read the archives. It took a great deal of work and discussion to arrive at the longstanding intro. ... ] 00:20, 4 August 2006 (UTC)
	:JA: '''&there4; Oppose Merge'''. ] 07:00, 15 May 2006 (UTC)
			==Getting the Lead Out==
	:: Comment. But that implies something about ]. Are not { ], ], ], ] etc } members of some {]}, with an ] and interrelation? What does this imply for the role of the ], ], etc. Are we talking about a community or ecology of ideas? I am sure that this is published ground, and is not original research. Do you have names for the scholars? End of comment. --] 11:03, 15 May 2006 (UTC)
			JA: SV, some history. Up until 12 May 2006 or so, this editorship was operating on a ] basis, and every line in the article had been gone over multiple times by multiple editors until there was a genuine if somewhat grudging consensus about it among those with the intestinal fortitude to stick around. That is no longer the case with the article at large, which remains under the ban of a NPOV Dispute so severe that the present stick-arounders are not even capable of the minimal respect for other POVs that would be tokenized by their leaving the maintainance tag on the article. It is not even strictly ] that the present lead is the consensus version, as we quit having consensus when a couple of admins got into the fray, and simply imposed their preferences by fiat without going through all the bother of the incremental, iterative process that had been the rule before the not so happy ]. Still, the present lead does retain some ragged remnant of the consensus that once existed, and so I maintain a certain nostalgia for it. ] 14:36, 4 August 2006 (UTC)
	:::JA: Ancheta, I'm sorry, but your comment is obviously way over my head. Perhaps there needs to be some third level of discussion page where it could be taken up? Alas, tertium non datur so farum. ] 12:24, 15 May 2006 (UTC)
	::We get the point, Jon. No need to take up valuable space with an irrelevant list. The question remains, is the separation into two articles justified ''in the present context''. I say no. Does any one here, apart from Jon, support the existence of ]? ] 15:54, 15 May 2006 (UTC)
	Mission control we have a bit of a problem. I've only been involved as a registered user for three months now, though I have had an opportunity to watch the development of the ] article and a few others very closely and with great interest for at least the last year and a half. That's enough time to develop some sense of what OR, NPOV, and other basic foundational precepts of Misplaced Pages are about when set in the context of controversy. What is now presented to the various editors is an article titled ] which is mistitled. This article should under no circumstances be merged, but rather should:
	:*(1) be immediately removed, written at home, office, or the local Starbucks, and after the author is satisfied with the content, be submitted to a web or paper journal for possible publication, after which it can be cited and included as ]; or,
	:*(2) Retitled to reflect its content, which is something like ]; or,
	:*(3) rewritten so it is not a repository for one editor's miscellaneous research on the subject, and split (with reasonably accurate reflection of the actual content) into several articles that might perhaps be something like ], ], etc.
	:Under no circumstances should the current article on ] be merged. ... ] 14:42, 15 May 2006 (UTC) Without offering a detailed analysis, the last of these three would be my preference. I apologize for getting angry...] 15:02, 15 May 2006 (UTC)
	::JA: Kenosis, your speculations about many things are of course your own. Like many speculations that people get away with on mere talk pages, they are unfounded, unqualified, unsourced, and unsupported by empirical data. There are definite protocols for deleting articles, procedures that are based on specific criteria, and these criteria must be applied across the board to all pages in WikiPedia, or else WikiProtocols give up their right to be called legitimate. ] 15:16, 15 May 2006 (UTC)
	:Kenosis, are you considering listing the article at ]? If so, see ]. But if there is no material on the other article that could be used here, I suggest we simply redirect rather than delete. ] 15:36, 15 May 2006 (UTC)
	::No Banno, I am not advocating deletion, certainly not at this stage. I would instead expect that in the end, such material will find its way into more accepted delineations of content according to topic (i.e., well sourced and ''standard'' within their respective realm of presentation). If the intent is to present a balanced view of more obscure and/or "advanced" issues in the theories of truth, the content should of course recognizably reflect this and be organized accordingly. Right now it's just a repository for Jon's preferred approach, which can be empirically shown to be the case if necessary.
	::Jon Awbrey I already trust implicitly (and explicitly) to arrive at top-shelf products in certain areas-- for instance, in ] I immediately felt gratitude that he had arrived at that page, because he is extremely adept at handling complex technical topics of this general kind. For another instance, after some points of contention, he did a proberbial "bang up job" with what he got involved in ]. On yet other articles the content has gotten arguably too finely developed and lengthy for most readers, especially in opening sections of articles. As well, the technique of attempting to guide the reader through a set of conundrums rather than summarizing in encyclopedia or "journalistic" style of organization has been troublesome to me. (Writers for journalistic media are normally expected to ''assume'' editors and other decisionmakers will be involved, and put the most important stuff up front in summary fashion with a readily identifiable hierarchy of presentation. And they are expected to assume that if, say, the last half of the content is truncated for lack of space or whatever, what they put up high in the body text will then tend to survive the hatchet job. This indeed is part of the general set of Misplaced Pages recommendations for article writing.) I trust the material at issue here will find the right slots in Misplaced Pages in due course...] 18:00, 15 May 2006 (UTC)
	:::JA, it is customery to indent talk page comments so that the flow of a thread is obvious. Also, please take care not to delete others comments on the talk page. ] 15:49, 15 May 2006 (UTC)
	==Discussion of Proposed Merge 2==
	JA: Creating new head to lessen edit conflicts. ] 15:58, 15 May 2006 (UTC)
	JA: When Banno gets done fiddling with the talk page, maybe I'll be able to get a word in edgewise. Meanwhile there's real work to do. ] 16:14, 15 May 2006 (UTC)
	: Why this outburst? Why this superfluous heading? ] 16:19, 15 May 2006 (UTC)
	JA: As I said above, in order to lessen edit conflicts. I either read it somewhere in WP or some old WP hand told me that creating new sections from time to time would reduce the chances that many folks are editing the same section at once, and I always follow advice and custom right up to the point where I run into walls, and then I do something else.
	JA: On a possibly related note, I wish you would take care not to edit my talk page comments, as you appear to have mangled their contents and formats several times now, for instance: and
	.
	: My apologies. Note that I repaired the damage as son as I was made aware of it, as I did for the material that was apparently inadvertently removed by yourself earlier. ] 22:46, 15 May 2006 (UTC)
	JA: Either that or it's some inadvertent effect of an edit conflict, which is why I try to avoid them. ] 17:00, 15 May 2006 (UTC)
	JA: '''Point 1.''' With regard to the following query:
			JA: FYI, the last actual consensus version read like this:
	<blockquote>		<blockquote>
			Common dictionary definitions of '''truth''' mention some form of accord with '']'' or '']''. There is, however, no single definition of truth about which scholars agree. Numerous theories of truth continue to be widely debated. What sorts of things can properly be called true or false? What tests can establish a claim as being true? How do we ''know'' something to be true? Which truths, if any, are subjective, relative, objective, or absolute? Does truth, as a concept, have a rigorous definition, or is it unavoidably imprecise?
	What steps have you taken to notify other users of the existence of this article, so that they can support it? ] 15:47, 15 May 2006 (UTC)
	</blockquote>		</blockquote>
			: As I recall, additional consensus had been reached to remove the question marks and syntax them as affirmative statements. This was done in order to avoid the repeated insistence by passersby to try to ''answer'' the questions right in the intro. More, the slight move towards standard Wiki lead format was hard to object to, since it seemed to represent an improvement. The brief last sentence tacked onto the end of the current intro was added by me just a couple days ago. ... ] 16:01, 4 August 2006 (UTC)
	JA: I am not aware of any WikiPolicy that requires a user to notify anybody before creating an article. I used the {seeintro} template to refer hapless readers to ] simpliciter by way of a less technical introduction, but the complementary {introduction|...} template that is used on several of the introductory physics articles did not seem very "complimentary" to me, so I was looking for another. The format that they use in several math intros seemed a bit friendlier, but I was still mulling it over. ] 17:40, 15 May 2006 (UTC)
			::1) Jim's cut in was improper, and his complaint about biting the newbies is misplaced - that policy applied only to very new people who dont understand the process. Older newbies that should know better should at least be reasonable. The intro is still terrible and does not meet Wikipedias ]. What to do about it? -]|] 00:36, 5 August 2006 (UTC)
	: I would have though it a common courtesy, given your explanation for the existence of the page. ]
			:::::Mea maxima ultima altima culpa, sed dixisti "It would be easier if newbie editors such as yourselves..." ergo quem dixerim? ] 00:15, 6 August 2006 (UTC)
			::::Look, I'm so sorry, very apologetic, like mea culpa mea maxima culpa. But the "standards" here are in fact "guidelines" and not a homogenous formula that editors can't override for any given article if they see good reason to within the local expression of the consensus process. In the context of intense disagreements that have come across the talk page and edit history, we've learned that several of the editors of this article know this subject as well as nearly anyone around, at least a couple know it better than most college philosophy professors, and many more participating editors have at least looked at the subject more deeply than the vast majority of people. The current intro properly reflects the consensus we'all came to, thus requiring some very persuasive and specific arguments to merit even looking at it in detail again, and also requiring a reasonable new consensus in order to implement major changes to it. ... ] 04:31, 5 August 2006 (UTC)
	JA: '''Point 2.''' With regard to the accusations of originality on my part issuing from the direction of Kenosis. I personally and strongly resent those remarks. There is not a single article that I've touched on in the time that I've been here that is not better sourced, better grounded in common cultural contents, or at least better punctuated, for my having touched on it. Requests for standard sources have always been met to the extent that anybody could stand to read them. ] 18:24, 15 May 2006 (UTC)		JA: What's an oldie to do? I would suggest trying to make your criticisms both constructive and explicit. It would also help if your "improvements" were grammatical and exhibited a grasp of the subject matter, which they do not currently do. Just to be explicit, the sentence, ''The word '''truth''', according to common dictionary definitions, has some form of accord with fact or reality, and is strongly tied to the concept of "veracity"'', makes no sense at all. ] 01:32, 5 August 2006 (UTC)
			JA: '''Question marks considered beneficial.''' And here I should have thought that stimulating passers-by to try and answer a philosophical question was the very mark of success in this endeavor. Silly me ... ] 04:00, 5 August
	: No one doubts your capacity to cite sources; But authors are, shall we say, not encouraged to cite their own work. But this is a side issue. The main issue here is: ''where'' should the information be placed? ] 22:46, 15 May 2006 (UTC)
			2006 (UTC)
			:: Ken: I understand that there is some protectionism associated with this article, and that its due to trying to keep things from falling apart. But philosophy is ultimately dependent on words, and so our descriptions of philosophical concepts are not just about philosophy, but our use of language. So while the guidelines are not homogenous, they do point to a methodology and a basic standard for what the intro should contain, and that trancends any protectionism associated with a particular article. I understand that there is some fear that any changes will only cause things to fall apart. Thats not a fear I share. JA: the addition of "veracity" was simply to denote, according to a basic rule of ''disambiguating'' related terms, a difference between "truth" as the word is used philosophically, and "veracity" which is generally applied to particular arguments. Hence, looking at the basis of any philosophical (including religious) concept of truth, we must define the underlying logic which applies to the word -ie. its definition. From there we can talk about how controversial truth is. This version, while somewhat more subtle, is not much better that Rick Norwoods' version: "truth is a statement that corresponds with reality. If someone says, "It is raining," and it is raining, then the statement is the truth. If it is not raining, then the statement is a falsehood." -]|] 12:08, 5 August 2006 (UTC)
			:::Cool. Yep. That's where it all started, repeatedly in fact. What you're referring to is Bertrand Russell's definition from Problems of Philosophy in the early 20th Century, and it's a classic definition ("Truth consists in some form of accord with reality").. I briefly had advocated in support of Rick Norwood's preference to include that definition or a close variation thereof in the introduction, and some knowledgeable editors raised POV hell about it. Fact is, it's not so simple as just "correspondence with reality". ... ] 15:22, 5 August 2006 (UTC)
			{| valign="top"
	JA: '''Point 3.''' With regard to this query, copied from above:
			! ]
			|-
			! Kenosis
			! SV
			|-
			|
			Common dictionary definitions of '''truth''' mention some form of accord with '']'' or '']''. There is, however, no single definition of truth about which scholars agree, and numerous theories of truth continue to be widely debated. Differing opinions exist on such questions as what constitutes truth, how to define and identify truth, what roles do revealed and acquired knowledge play, and whether truth is subjective, relative, objective, or absolute. This article introduces the various perspectives.
			|
			The word '''truth''', according to common dictionary ]s, has some form of accord with '']'' or '']'', and is strongly tied to the concept of "]."
			However, "truth" is often used within the context of ] arguments, as well as within particular conceptual frameworks, which attempt to expand or redefine its definition according to the view from within those frameworks.
			There is no ''single'' definition of "truth" about which people can agree, and numerous ]s, ]s, and ] about the ''nature of truth'' continue to be widely debated.
	<blockquote>
			As such, there is a great variance of opinion with respect to such questions as, ''what constitutes truth, how to define and identify truth, what roles do 'revealed' and 'acquired knowledge' play,'' and ''whether truth is best defined as subjective, relative, objective, or absolute.''
	What does this mean? Are you sugesting that the material on, say, Kripke's work is at an introductory level? ] 15:51, 15 May 2006 (UTC)
			|}
	</blockquote>
			===Back to Webster===
	JA: The article merely mentions Kripke's work in passing. Not being subject to Humean error, I do not expect attempts to develop that material beyond the level of mere allusion to meet with any different reception than the attempts to develop other sections have already met with in the past, namely, a lamentable hue and a tumultuous cry, the tearing of hair and the scraping of slates whenever the section in question grows past the age of 3 or 4 paragraphs. Do you? (Cf. Humean error). ] 05:00, 16 May 2006 (UTC)
			JA: I'm warning ya — don't make me turn this car around ... ] 15:32, 5 August 2006 (UTC)
	JA: '''Point 4.''' With regard to the following comment:
			:SV: Im warning you, dont make me quote Mencken on philosphy. -]|] 21:19, 5 August 2006 (UTC)
	<blockquote>
	The argument that ] is a "more advanced" article is nonsense. It is more limited in its content than this article, rather than more advanced. Rather, it is original research or vanity - notice the reference to Jon's own article. Nor does the present content warrant such an approach. ] 15:47, 15 May 2006 (UTC)
	</blockquote>
			This article is part of the Philosophy WikiProject, if someone wanted a dictionary
	JA: The article on ] is intended to cover the subject of truth at a theoretical level that the present levelers of ] have decided not to aspire to. Their option in doing that is wholly appropriate. There is no harm, and indeed much benefit, in having both introductory and more advanced articles. This need is already clearly recognized in many subject areas, as evidenced by the Table of articles given above. I have myself worked on both sides of that ledger in several of the above cases, depending on which side needed the most work at a given time.
			definition they would go to a dictionary. It sounds like a school essay beginning
			with a dicitonary definition. I suggest it goes staight to the point of what someone might be looking for looking it up. I also think the image on the top
			is so narrow that it is hard to make out what it means.--Lucas 23:21, 5 August 2006 (UTC) ]]
			::Well, here's what the Wiktionary says, not that it's anything but a brief statement of correspondence theory:
	JA: What ''is'' inappropriate is the notion that having an article with one sort of intended reader must preclude the existence of articles that serve the interests and the needs of any other sort of intended reader. ] 18:18, 16 May 2006 (UTC)
			::*'''truth''' (''plural:'' ])
			::# That which conforms to ].
			::# The degree of correspondence between a representation and what is being represented.
			::Suggestions? ... ] 23:37, 5 August 2006 (UTC)
			:::Actually I'm sorry I asked already. As I reread the above, the statement "...staight to the point of what someone might be looking for looking it up" obviously means "... straight to my preferred theory rather than summarizing the various theories below..." ... ] 23:54, 5 August 2006 (UTC)
			No, straight to the point of an encyclopedic '''explanation''' or summary of expertise, rather than a dictionary '''definition''' ] 20:11, 16 August 2006 (UTC)
	JA: '''Point 5.''' With regard to the following comments:
			::Which, with eight or nine editors participating in the formation it, leads the intro to where it is at present. ... ] 20:23, 16 August 2006 (UTC) ... There are actually also about eight or nine major theories of truth, each of which involve their own slant on the topic, and a whole slew of minor slants which often don't bear any resemblance to one another. The decision was made to keep'm separated, and just tell it like it is. ... ] 20:31, 16 August 2006 (UTC)
			I wouldn't suggest that it'd be easy but it is a valid criticism. Perhaps some general information placing the article within the main areas, philosophy, epistemology. Thus avoiding those recent mistaken additions I dont think the defintion at the moment actually adds anything since most people already have at least a rough idea of what truth is to them and in my opinon the naivety of the dictionary definition is misleading. Perhaps some etymology of the word and related words? ] 20:55, 16 August 2006 (UTC)
			:Fine: Truth < ME ''treue'' < OE ''treow(e)'' (faith) < IE ''*dree-'' <*''deru'' > TREE, (firm (as a tree)). This etymology only works for some Gmc languages, indicating that the concept is somewhat newer than the break-up of ] and ] into separate languages. ] 23:13, 16 August 2006 (UTC)
	<blockquote>
			:I get:
	The main issue here is: ''where'' should the information be placed? ] 22:46, 15 May 2006 (UTC)
			::The stem forms perhaps show a different ablaut grade, u beside eu, eo, whence OE. trúwa, trúa, faith, good faith (see TRUCE), trúwian to TROW, trust, confide, and ON. trúr true; but, as tr does not appear before the 13th c., when u and eu (ew) in other words had phonetically fallen together, it is possible that ME. truthe really comes from OE. treowe. See also TROTH
	</blockquote>
			:Good point about the languages, we could also look at veritas and aletheia.
			:--] 00:55, 17 August 2006 (UTC)
			:::Alethia is simple: alpha-privative plus lethe (forgetfulness), so, not forgetful (< PIE *laidh-, root *la, hidden). Psychologically, that's a very interesting constuction.
	JA: The information should be placed in a place where editors with a particular "theory of the intended reader", also known as a "]", will not interfere with its being communicated to potentially interested readers. The wholly imaginary user models of certain editors are nothing more than a kind of "]" or wishful thinking on their part, wholly unsupported by any sort of empirical data – for example, the kinds of survey research and statistically sampled needs assessments that I used to do for a living. These editors seem to be clueless to the fact that "average reader" is a statistical term of art, not just another figment of their imagination. I think it is rather evident from both sides of the Table that I gave above that not all WP editors and WP readers are operating at the grammar school reading level. ] 02:35, 17 May 2006 (UTC)
			:::Veritas <PIE *weros, to be friendly, to be true. > Ger, ''wahr'' true, OE ''waer'', a compact.
			:::Bodha (Sanskrit)<PIE *bheudh- to be alert. ("to bid" is a cognate)
			:::Pravda (Russian) <PIE *reg- right (we get rule, regulate, reign, raj, etc from this root).
			:::Unforunately, I don't know the Persian word for truth, but if I can find it, I'll pass it along. ] 01:28, 18 August 2006 (UTC)
			::That is interesting Jim, just by the etymologies we include almost all the overwrought theories of philosophy, English:truth as certainty, Slavic: truth as power, Greek: truth as revelation, etc. What about Hebrew?
			::This is one argument not to use the opening line giving the English dictionary's Victorian prejudice toward truth as correspondence.
			::--] 23:21, 23 August 2006 (UTC)
			:::Sorry, I stop at Indo-European languages, I've never taken more than a cursory glance at Semitic languages. Although you do raise a good question. It'd be interesting to see what the tri-literal is to determine to what other Semitic words (Hebrew, Arabic, Aramaic, etc.) it is related. ] 23:47, 23 August 2006 (UTC)
			==The Devil and Noah Webster==
	JA: '''Point 6.''' With regard to the following remarks:
			JA: '''Da capo al infinito ...''' In a case like this, it's perfectly acceptable, and perhaps even preferable, to begin an article with a synopticon of dictionary definitions. I wrote five or six of these myself just last winter. The array of meaning is actually quite rich in all of the customary connotations of the word, both salient and silent, and, no, despite some opinions to the contrary, none of these nuances boil down to "the correspondence theory of truth", partly because they encompass such a diversity of senses and partly because there is no such thing as "the" ''X'' theory of truth, in particular, where ''X'' = correspondence. And starting with dictionary entries is a perfectly good way of reminding readers of this fact, since all intelligent readers are used to the idea that dictionary entries are not "real" definitions, but only tell us about the customary linkages among largely undefined words, pointing for instance to further undefineds like ''accord'' and ''correspondence'' in the case at hand. And intelligent readers understand what a far cry dictionary entries are from any brand of theoretical definition of a concept. But at least a competent synopsis of lexical glosses serves to get the article off <math>\square 1</math>. ] 02:00, 6 August 2006 (UTC)
	<blockquote>
	No one doubts your capacity to cite sources; But authors are, shall we say,{{weasel}} not encouraged to cite their own work.{{fact}} But this is a side issue.{{weasel}} ] 22:46, 15 May 2006 (UTC)		:: See New essay ] (]). Please feel free to have it out there once and for all. ] 15:48, 22 November 2006 (UTC)
	<p>
	Rather, it is original research or vanity{{fact}} — notice the reference to Jon's own article. Nor does the present content warrant such an approach. ] 15:47, 15 May 2006 (UTC)
	</blockquote>
			==Added subsection==
	JA: Some journals allow self-reference in citations. Others do not. If you know of an explicit guideline or policy in WP that forbids editors to cite papers they have authored, then please point me to it. Otherwise, keep your weasel-worded insinuations of vanity in the projective imagination from whence they issue. So far I only know of the guidelines at ], which I suggest that you review. We are not talking about somebody's personal blog here. The paper that I cited was presented at a peer-reviewed conference in 1992, revised by its 2 co-authors over the next 3 years, and published in a peer-reviewed journal in 1995. And it was hardly the only work cited in our formerly "bloated" list of references. When WP as a whole achieves the standard of sourced and peer-reviewed references of which that bloat was but the most anorexic sample, then we'll be getting somewhere. And why am I even discussing this with "editors" who do not use their real names? ] 12:12, 17 May 2006 (UTC)
			I just added a subsection on ]. Seems to me he had a great deal to say about truth that, while perhaps not suitable for the introduction of the article, might perhaps be worth quoting a few of his often-insightful aphorisms. ... ] 03:50, 6 August 2006 (UTC)
			JA: Yes, the line between journalism and philosophy having been erased of late, let me put in a word for ]. No doubt others will have their favorites. ] 04:00, 6 August 2006 (UTC)
	== Truth in math ==
			::Well, maybe there's a mathematico-logical solution to the editorial quagmire that might inevitably result. Perhaps ultimately a section on ]'s views? ... ] 04:26, 6 August 2006 (UTC)
	Kenosis, thanks for your comments. There's no way to do this whole subject justice in less than 2-3 paragraphs. I'm a little worried that I've given undue weight to ] (mostly because I'm just now reading ]'s latest book.)
			JA: Ha! I'm glad somebody got the one about "]". ] 04:50, 6 August 2006 (UTC)
	John Awbrey- you're pretty good at demanding appropriate attributions; if you can think of a better way to refer to Boolean logic feel free. Thanks! --] 17:02, 16 May 2006 (UTC)
	:M_a_s, two to three paragraphs is quite consistent with other threads within the existing article. You would certainly have my backing on it to synopsize accordingly. Please start by using your best judgment in introducing this topic to a general readership in a way that can also be understood by mathematicians to reflect the lay of the land, so to speak. We can later link to, say, a more developed section in ] or other appropriate main article in due course. Your efforts and thought very much appreciated...] 19:07, 16 May 2006 (UTC)
			::Mencken and Twain sound like good choices. George Bernard Shaw might be good, even Oscar Wilde (although he ''was'' a bit odd). Actually, something on Eric Blair's writings, not just ''1984'' but his essays, as well as Huxley's novels (especially ''A Brave New World'' and ''Point Counter Point'') and his essays could work. Maybe a ''Clockword Orange'', too. Wait, this sound like a new spinoff article -- Truth in Novels.
	== Continuum Hypothesis ==
			::And yes, this article sometimes seems like it has an infinite loop. To score it as an opera beyond Wagnerian proportions ''da capo al infinito'' might be appropriate, with a parenthetical ''ad libitum'' added in for good measure. Talk page might need ''fortissimo'' added. ] 11:07, 6 August 2006 (UTC)
			:::Actually I think Jim may have meant Wignerian, as in ] ("n'n'nice kitty").;-) ... ] 12:47, 6 August 2006 (UTC)
			:::: The solution for infinite loops is to fork when there is enough material: "]" maybe. :} -]|] 20:00, 7 August 2006 (UTC)
			JA: I haven't checked lately — who can keep up wit da sooth'o'da'week? — but we used to have sections on truth in art, truth in fic, truth in lit, and so on, and these are perfectly acceptable topics, but not everybody who draw(l)s a truth is able to say zactly how he or she or ] manged to do that. ] 16:06, 6 August 2006 (UTC)
			: Ah - John beat me to it. -]|] 20:03, 7 August 2006 (UTC)
			==Cant==
	Rick, thanks for editing. The continuum hypothesis is historically probably more significant than ] (and Chaitin's / Wolfram's construction.) CH was Hilbert's 1st, probably for a reason. But to me, probably because I'm not a set-theorist, CH and AC have always felt too vague and too "so what." The appeal of Chaitin to me was that, here it is, an (exponential) Diophantine equation in some 1000's of variables, but nonetheless there's no way to know whether there are a finite or infinite (or in one case an even or odd) number of solutions.
	Algorithmic information theory and the CH are marginally related, in the sense that their study and development is a direct offshoot of Godel. CH does belong here, I think at least for historical purposes, but there should probably be a way to incorporate Hilbert's 1st and Hilbert's 10th.
	Thoughts? --] 23:28, 16 May 2006 (UTC)
	:I all depends on how well written it is. It is hard to be clear, correct, and brief. ] 00:18, 17 May 2006 (UTC)
	Good edits. "Naive" I think is a little POV... In my eye Hilbert wasn't really naive in his assumptions. (] 00:18, 17 May 2006 (UTC))
	:Thanks. "Naive" is in the sense the word is used in Paul Halmos' ''Naive Set Theory''. ] 13:30, 17 May 2006 (UTC)
	== Janitorial Tags ==
	JA: I always have trouble spelling "maintainance". I have placed tags on several sections that are very incomplete, poorly written, poorly justified as to their relevance, and cite no sources whatsoever. I know, this is ] of most articles in WP, but I've been informed that it can "help" to call attention to it. ] 12:34, 17 May 2006 (UTC)
	:Good job, Kenosis, JA. I was going to add Honor's Class but you beat me to it. ] touches on some of these but it's not nearly as scholarly.
	==Maintaining a Balanced And Critical Point Of View==
	JA: The existence of a ''neutral point of view'' (NPOV), like the existence of a ''god's eye view'' (GEV), an ''absolute frame of reference'' (AFOR), a ''value free science'' (VFS), an ''ontologically neutral language'' (ONL), or the ''ether bunny'' (EB), is yet another charming '']'' (L-T-C) that the children of several ages past were fond of telling themselves long past the age when they should have known better. Some of these myths of our own divinity and bulls of our own infallibility are proverbs well lost and, with a little luck, have lost their last post-pubertal devotees, but some of them still serve as ideals, or ]s, so long as we do not confuse the earnest wish with the extant reality. That sort of mental confusion is what is commonly diagnosed as '']''. By way of avoidng that confusion, I will invite the use of the term ''balanced and critical point of view'' (BACPOV), instead. ] 12:14, 18 May 2006 (UTC)
	JA: As an object example, chosen not at random but more for its brevity, let us examine the following text from the article on ]:
	<nowiki>
	'''Coherence theory'''
	<p>
	{{main|Coherence theory of truth}}
	<p>
	There is no single coherence theory of truth but rather an assortment of distinct perspectives that are commonly collected under this title. A pervasive tenet is the idea that truth is primarily a property of whole systems of propositions and can be ascribed to individual propositions only derivatively according to their coherence with the whole. Where theorists differ is mainly on the question of whether coherence entails many possible true systems of thought or only a single absolute system. For coherence theories in general, truth requires a proper fit of elements within the whole system. Very often, though, coherence is taken to imply something more than simple logical consistency. For example, the completeness and comprehensiveness of the underlying set of concepts is a critical factor in judging the utility and validity of a coherent system.<ref>], for instance, assembled a controversial but quite coherent system in the early 19th Century, whose utility and validity continues to be debated even today. Similarly, the systems of ] and ] are characteristic systems that are internally coherent but controversial in terms of their utility and validity.</ref>
	<p>
	Some variants of coherence theory are claimed to characterize the essential and intrinsic properties of formal systems in logic and mathematics.<ref>Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.2, "Coherence Theory of Truth", auth:Alan R. White, p130-131 (Macmillan, 1969)</ref> However, formal reasoners are content to contemplate ] but mutually contradictory systems side by side, for example, the various ]. On the whole, coherence theories have been criticized as lacking justification in their application to other areas of truth, especially with respect to assertions about the ], ] data in general, assertions about practical matters of psychology and society, especially when used without support from the other major theories of truth.<ref>Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.2, "Coherence Theory of Truth", auth:Alan R. White, p131-133, ''see'' esp., section on "Epistemological assumptions" (Macmillan, 1969)</ref>
	<p>
	Coherence theories distinguish the thought of ] philosophers, particularly of ], ], and ], along with the British philosopher ].<ref>Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.2, "Coherence Theory of Truth", auth:Alan R. White, p130</ref> They have found a resurgence also among several proponents of ], notably ] and ].
	</nowiki>
	JA: '']'' ... ] 12:14, 18 May 2006 (UTC)
	RN: If you read the Wiki description of NPOV you will find it says pretty much what you are saying. It acknowledges that absolute nutrality is not possible, and if possible would not be desirable, but it suggests that people of good will can come together to avoid partisan pleading. The problem is not NPOV in the article on Calculus, but NPOV in the article on George Bush.
	JA: Been there, read that, and of course it's all the usual common sense things to say, but you'd be surprised how much common sense can be lost once an acronym becomes an e-lip-servered anachronym. I have a feeling that both Leibniz and Newton would beg to differentiate themselves from your other POV, and I'm pretty sure that it's easier to figure out what Dubya is about than it is to rechnen what Calc is about. But never mind that now, what I had in mind here had to do with far more petty pedantic peccadillos than the commander in chief of our assembled armadillos. ] 15:28, 18 May 2006 (UTC)
	JA: The question of NPOV and his big sister BACPOV came up in regard to the section on coherence theories of truth. In particular, the qualifying phrase "are claimed to" was deleted from the sentence below on the grounds that it was POV.
	<nowiki>
	Some variants of coherence theory are claimed to characterize the essential and intrinsic properties of formal systems in logic and mathematics.<ref>Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.2, "Coherence Theory of Truth", auth:Alan R. White, p130-131 (Macmillan, 1969)</ref>
	</nowiki>
	JA: Yes, it's true that the "apostrophaic passive voice auxiliary construction" (APVAC) is a usual suspect when it comes to weaseling in a POV bias. "Yet Another Man Behind The Sceeen" (YAMBTS). Sorry, statistically speaking, it really is usually just men. However, in this case I claim that omitting the hedge — that's like a screen only seldom so high — is the surer bet to bias the statement all the more.
	JA: Given this lesson of two evils, is there a third way, a higher path? Yes, the best way to deal with APVAC's is to replace them with statements of the form "So&so said such&such here&when&where". For example, in the present instance, this would yield a line like this:
	<blockquote>		<blockquote>
			A careful analysis of what Kant is saying here can help to explain why there are so many theories of truth on the contemporary scene
	] (1969, 130–131) argues that some variants of coherence theory characterize the essential and intrinsic properties of formal systems in logic and mathematics.
	</blockquote>		</blockquote>
			Who says it does? ] 20:17, 8 August 2006 (UTC)
	JA: Then readers can clique on the linque and decide for themselves whether they want to believe a drummer. And as you well know, to say that Alan R. White is true is just to say that Alan R. White. ] 14:20, 19 May 2006 (UTC)		JA: That was a rhetorical segue. Feel free to write your own. ] 20:20, 8 August 2006 (UTC)
			: I think what Banno means is '']'' - an often used diatribe. -]|] 01:53, 9 August 2006 (UTC)
	RN: But suppose Alan R. Black. ] 14:24, 19 May 2006 (UTC)
			JA: The purpose of that segue was simply to introduce the quotation from Kant, and the source was given for that. What I wrote by way of introduction seemed like common sense to me at the time, but what's common is common for everyone, to adapt a line of mother wit. At any rate, the rewrite has rendered the issue moot. ] 02:04, 9 August 2006 (UTC)
	:Just reviewing some of this earlier discussion. Alan White obviously was a less-than-famous philosopher/academician, but the strength of the Encyclopedia of Philosophy is in its extensive peer review process, not in the notability of mostly deceased authors in a field that hasn't changed much in nearly forty years (even in light of Haack's and others' recent contributions, including highly questionable ones such as the classification of "robust" theories). As I analyze the situation, nothing much has changed since the ] Peirce, James and Dewey weighed in a century ago. Since then it seems to me it's been pretty much "academic" ;-) Haack's "foundherentism", for instance, is mainly just a neologism for her brand of pragmatic theory if you ask me (but pls don't ask me as I'm not notable here either)... ] 20:10, 3 June 2006 (UTC)
	== Merge or delete ==		== Half-truth; Truths Paradox ==
			(I was in the process of modifying this posting when I noticed too late that it was linked to another site...please advise...)
	Editors might consider commenting on this
			In the bible is this remarkable story of Adam and Eve in the garden, opening this 'pandora's box' by taking of the tree of knowledge and believing that they would be like God to know the Truth, as God would.
			Having discovered the negative dimension to Truth back in 1994, it is with great priviledge that I make this entry concerning Truth.
			There are several new dimensions to the concept of half-truths. Several new types have been recently identified and presented to wikdictionary.org. with corresponding changes to the definitions to the concepts of 'truth' and 'lie'.
			One particular type of half-truth is the statment that is part of a greater truth. This suggests the half-truth is in fact a truth, yet it may form a deceptive lie; the paradoxical nature of truth.
			This phenomena also allows for truths, minor or half-truths to be both aboslute and relative; a duality of truth. ( Source: The Jesus Christ Code. ) The classic example is the two opposite sides to a coin, each representing an absolute truth, both relative to the frame of reference. It is also important to appreciate that a coin has three sides, and the third is not visible from either side, the depth of truth; which raises the question who knows The Truth in the infinite sense ?
			The philosopher, Alfred North Whitehead, is quoted as saying, "There are no whole truths; all truths are half-truths. It is trying to treat them as whole truths that plays the devil." So Mr. Whitehead comes close to suggesting that all truths are half-truths, yet does not label them as potential lies. While Mr. Whitehead does mention the devil he may be closer to the truth of this matter than he may have ever believed.
			Truth appears dimensional, that is it exists in true nature on different levels, within certain 'boxes' of philosophy. The challenge of connecting truths within different levels is the challenge of logic.
			When one views the hidden and deceptive world of half-truths, in reference to the original sin and the garden of eden, the potential origin of this inability to see this negative side to truth may be explained.
			A scientific model for Truth can be found in LIGHT. The refracted colors of colorless forming the political half-truths of Truth.
			In the matter of intentional lies, it is a fact the current definition of 'truth' makes no mention of 'half-truths', the bible says that the devil lied to us, ie Adam and Eve...so would this be considered an intentional lie to us by the devil ?
	discussion. ] 21:50, 18 May 2006 (UTC)
			(Source: The Jesus Christ Code. Caesar J. B. Squitti )
	Here is what I wrote on the "Articles for deletion" page:
			--] 17:32, 15 August 2006 (UTC)
	*'''keep''': The article ] is both too long and too technical. That article should give a brief discussion of truth in philosophy, with each major school defined, but the more technical parts should be moved to ]. On the other hand, the article ''truth theory'' should cover a variety of ideas, not just one philosophical specialty. ] 13:17, 19 May 2006 (UTC)
	::How long before we get to remove the suggested merge tag? I don't see any support for it....] 00:23, 22 May 2006 (UTC)
			::This is intereseting, perhaps you could add a section to the main article "truth in politics" and read some history on it, add a paragraph on that history and then you'll have plenty of scope for saying "half truths" (of which, luckily, I've never been told).--] 03:10, 16 August 2006 (UTC)
	Do it. ] 13:21, 22 May 2006 (UTC)
	:Thanks Rick. I'd ideally like to get an OK from others too before proceeding to remove this tag. Anyone seen our "in-house administrator" Banno lately? ...] 02:09, 23 May 2006 (UTC)
	::I simply don't have time at present to follow through with this, so go ahead and remove it, if that is the consensus. But it will mean a re-working of both articles. What underpins my concern here is that this topic is by its nature synthetic - a bringing together of a range of ideas. Because of this, it is difficult to make it encyclopedic, and I suspect that to be the reason that it is avoided in other encyclopedias. It is difficult, when bringing in ideas from a range of philosophers and over a range of topics, not to introduce bias of one form or another; this is a difficulty that is not so pronounced in articles on particular philosophers or particular arguments. ] 02:24, 23 May 2006 (UTC)
	:Agreed what you say, Banno. As I look over the article as it presently is written, it seems to be as good a summary of the various theories as I've seen anywhere. We could certainly quibble righteously in a number of areas -- it could be simpler, more complex, could be shorter, could be longer, etc., but it seems to me to have a structure that can likely be brought into the future somewhat intact...] 02:49, 23 May 2006 (UTC)
	== Apeironism ==
	WimLoo has added a link (in the wrong place) to his article on his theory of truth, which he calls ]. I'll leave it to the experts whether this theory should have a link and/or an article. ] 13:42, 25 May 2006 (UTC)		NB to contributor: Please remove the copyright symbol from this page, along with all material for which copyright is claimed. Thank you, ] 17:54, 15 August 2006 (UTC)
	:Removed. No hits on Google, and no sources in the article on the "subject". Probably someone should move to delete the article on Apeironism too... ] 15:13, 25 May 2006 (UTC)
			Thanks ! CS
	== Truth in Math Redux ==
			::Of course, there's just ''one'' problem: see ] ] 01:32, 18 August 2006 (UTC)
	Regarding the discovery of "true statements about the natural numbers that cannot be proven true": I have seen an exponential Diophantine equation that has been mapped via Lucas's (I think) theorem from a Universal Turing Machine, such that they have a solution in one variable if and only if the UTM as represented by the other variables halts. See, e.g. ]. I'm sorry I'm slobbering the description... At any rate though the equation was actually constructed. IIRC it had about 40 unknowns.
			The work has been published in various media forms for the past 17 years, and on a website.
	Now, I can make the claim, (A) "This Diophantine Equation has a solution." This very well might be true, but appealing to the Church-Turing thesis, I would have no way to prove it (because I can't see whether the UTM halts or not.) More importantly a FAS would not be able to prove it as well.
			--] 19:13, 19 August 2006 (UTC)
	I can likewise make the claim, (B) "This Diophantine Equation does not have a solution." Again, this might be true for the same reason.
			::The website fails ]. As for the rest, he who asserts must prove. ] 21:39, 19 August 2006 (UTC)
	But if I accept the ], then either A or B is true.
			=====Jesus=====
	So, in a sense, isn't it true to say that a true statement has been constructed about the natural numbers and yet it cannot be proven true? (I don't know which one it is, though, A or B.)
			Any reference to Truth should include a mention of ] considered the son of God by some, a prophet by others, but no doubt a philosopher of sorts.
			Most notable claim involving truth, is the quotation, " "I am the way, the truth, and the life" (John 14:6) <ref>http://www.newadvent.org/summa/100201.htm</ref>
	Thoughts? --] 16:20, 1 June 2006 (UTC)
			More directly was the claim by Jesus Christ to be "The Light of the World".
	==Picture troubles==
			<blockquote>The first chapter of the Gospel of John can be divided in two parts :
	I would consider the removal of the picture of "The Truth". It would be inappropriate for some of our younger readers. Just a suggestion.
			The first part (v. 1-18) is an introduction to the Gospel as a whole, stating that the Logos is "God" (divine, god-like, a god according to other translations) and acts as the mouthpiece (Word) of God "made flesh", i.e. sent to the world in order to be able to intercede for man and forgive him his sins (The Good News of the Gospel). This portion of John's gospel is of central significance to the development of the Christian doctrine of Incarnation. Comparisons can easily be drawn from this part to Genesis 1 where the same phrase In the beginning first occurs along with the emphasis on the difference between the darkness (such as the earth was formless and void, Genesis 1:2) vs light (the ability to see things not understood/hidden by the darkness, John 1:5). The summation of this comparison occurs in the statement, the law given through Moses...grace and truth came through Jesus Christ (v. 17, NIV). Here John successfully bridges the gap for the reader -- including Jewish readers well-versed in the Torah -- from the Law to the One who would fulfill the Law (such as the requirement of animal sacrifice for the forgiveness of sins, Hebrews 9:22), Jesus.
	-Jarrad from the United Kingdom
			</blockquote> <ref>John 1: Misplaced Pages Encyclopedia </ref>
	:There was some discussion about the image at ]. --] 21:07, 1 June 2006 (UTC)
			The second used light to provide us with a concept as a gateway to a deeper understanding to Truth, as Jesus himself had said, the life, the truth and the way, to it.
	JA: Well, we have this guideline about not being censored. Aside from all that the artist is mainstream legit, and the image is hardly more risque than what comes over the tube these days. I think it quite easily passes that quaint old test of "redeeming social value". More importantly, the work ''says something'' that I find very apt in this context, and I had been planning to exegize what it says a little bit under the head of "truth in art", until I got busy with other things. ] 21:34, 1 June 2006 (UTC)
			:Uh, no. ] 23:47, 23 August 2006 (UTC)
	You do have a point Jon about the work sending a message to the viewer. I wholeheartedly agree. But I think many younger readers might find it uncomfortable to see that sort of image. Also, parents might not approve of letting their children have access to this website if such images are shown.
			==Removed material==
	-Jarrad from the United Kingdom
			I've removed the following sentence from the intro to the section on "Philosophy of truth". The reason I removed it is in the edit summary. ... ] 04:52, 15 August 2006 (UTC)
			*The basic rule of non-contradiction is applied in ] and ] to determine whether statements contradict, and therefore one or both statemnts must be false. ... 04:52, 15 August 2006 (UTC)
			Just a note: Contradiction, may involve two seperate dimensional ], where both are true, merely different dimensions, or relative views...both involve minor truths. IE square root of 9 is +3 and -3 ....
	JA: My mother being an artist, I learned to see these things differently from an early age. It's what's in the mind of the viewer that puts the finishing touches on an image. My natural desire is to try and make other people comfortable, but then the dutious part of me is forced to consider the consequences of any given course of conduct. WP is a big place. If we remove the freely chosen image here for the sake of some viewers' comforts, will they not just move on to the gallery of artists' works and insist on the same consideration there? It seems very likely that some would. And then where would we end up? Pretty soon, no WP atoll. ] 16:44, 2 June 2006 (UTC)
			--] 18:48, 24 August 2006 (UTC)
	RN: At the Louvre I was interested to see classes of schoolchildren sitting on the floor, looking up at huge pictures of nudes, while their teacher lectured them on the painting. It is only in fundamentalist countries, such as Arabia and the United States, where nudity is considered harmful to children. I see no reason for Misplaced Pages to pay any attention to such nonsense, which is more Victorian than Christian in any case. ] 18:57, 2 June 2006 (UTC)
			This just removed from the section on "Correspondence theory", for reasons given in the edit summary: ... ] 04:58, 16 August 2006 (UTC)
	: The problem is nudity in an article about truth/Truth. Personally, I would have no problem with the image in an article about the painter. I would hate to see Misplaced Pages banned in many schools in the United States (due to percived inaccuracy and nudity in articles such as this one). --] 20:21, 2 June 2006 (UTC)
			*In ] and with the ] the notion of true and false statements is widely accepted because of specific and clear evidence. The most primitive ] is by ], such as pointing to the real, universal, existing sun or moon and giving it an ], common, or even a new name. The statement that the sun exists is true, just as many other natural facts, sensory observations, can be proven by anyone, at anytime in history, and anywhere. There is the true existence of the sun even with a variety of more specific definitions about the changing sun. Universal facts and claims of ] are widely accepted and agreed upon by many in all nations, and throughout history, because of the universal nature of giving evidence and proof for one's claims that are not mere ] or ]. The ] that uses true or probable statements, ], and ] has discovered true and probable conclusions about the world around us that very few can deny. ... 04:58, 16 August 2006 (UTC)
			::The statement that the sun <u>exists</u> is ''not'' true. All we can say is that it existed 8 minutes and 20 seconds ago (roughly). If it blinked out at the moment you read this, you'd be oblivious to its demise for 8 minutes and 20 seconds. Thus, we ''assume'' that it exists at this particular moment based on experience and an expectation of continuity. ] 23:39, 24 August 2006 (UTC)
	JA: Nobody went out looking for a random nude to paste on the front page, by way of selling more copies at 0&cent; per. The image was already used in the Icelandic version, where I'm sure that nudity is not taken lightly, if you catch my (snow-)drift, and I'm guessing that it was thought appropriate there because the painter evidently had something to say about Truth, in the way that painters do. But I missed the part about "inaccuracy". What was that about? ] 03:22, 3 June 2006 (UTC)
			:::It is, of course, possible to assume that something is true and for it to actually be true. It is also possible to assert something without actually knowing it. For instance, when people lie. Also, when people make mistakes (a phenomenon which has been known to occur from time to time). Jim62sch, the third and fourth sentences you wrote in the above do not support the first two sentences. Sententiae tuae prima secundaque non sequuntur. Suppose someone says "the sun exists", and eight minutes, twenty seconds later you find out that it, in fact, did exist at the time the statement was made, what you find out is that the statement was true when it was made. (Assuming some reasonable choice of intertial frame of reference). ] 06:31, 8 December 2006 (UTC)
	RN: Some schools ban Misplaced Pages due to supposed "inaccuracy". In fact, I think bans due to inaccuracy are fairly common. I've never heard of any bans for nudity. I do remember a school banning a web page about Robert Frost because it contained the line "the little horse must think it queer". But giving in to censors only makes them more rabid. ] 21:31, 3 June 2006 (UTC)
			== Taking the idea of truth and true statements in math, logic, and science seriously ==
	== Physical Symbol Systems ==
			The introduction needs some impartial and open minded editing.
	JA: I have added a head — that's 3, but who's counting? — for approaches to symbol systems that take the physical properties of symbols into account, using the rubric that ] researchers borrowed from ]. I suggest that it is better to take up these questions under a separate heading, as opposed to confounding the discussion of sentences and propositions in their more usual linguistic and logical terms with what are excessively distracting notions, if not utter category confusions. ] 14:22, 4 June 2006 (UTC)
	::I'm wholeheartedly in favor of such a section, and believe it will improve the article. Having written a farily widely sold book related to audio theory/technology/practice (no I'm not divulging which one), this section has a definite place in my own heart. So I' m not disinterested and completely objective about this preference for inclusion, though such a section seems to have a very legitimate place in the article. But I'd like to move the section so it's not plopped in with the "major theories", OK? ... ] 15:55, 4 June 2006 (UTC)
			That there are some true statements about some subjects and things is widely accepted and universal in math, science, law, and logic. Even in the subject of history all will agree, based on clear evidence, that Hitler existed. It is not just about mere perspectives, and in some branches of learning there is no great disagreements about what the ideas of true and truth means. The introduction needs to mention the common and ancient definition of true statements and propositions. There is no justice in rewriting such an ancient idea in such a relativistic way. Who gave some of you the great authority to redefine such an important and ancient etymologically defined word? To claim that there are no true statements and no partially agreed upon ideas of true statements is the most dogmatic and imposed idea that I have ever heard of. The introduction as it is now is scary, not very open minded, and makes a great and final universal claim that there are no great agreements and proof about some well defined and clearly argued for true statements, only disagreement and mere perspectives about the ancient idea of truth and true.
	== No misleading edit summaries please ==
			Thanks for listening and considering my argument seriously, with no personal attacks please. Thanks for all the great work that you do on Misplaced Pages. I acknowledge that a lot of great work has been done already. I ask for some minor edits based on good arguments and persuasive evidence. Where do you see the failure of what I am saying. I would love to know. Assuming that you agree that we can know about some things.
	To ] and others: Don't make a lot of edits in a single edit and then provide an edit summary that makes it appear you changing much less. (Did you perhaps revert back to an older version than you intended? )--] 18:04, 4 June 2006 (UTC)
	Let me elaborate a bit: You wiped out the bibilography and made substantial changes to a large number of paragraphs spread throughout the article. (Your edit summary did not alert people to all these changes, so most of your edits were unexplained. (See here .) You don't need advance permission to make an edit, but you do need to explain them. If edit summaries don't give you enough space, then use the discussion pages.--] 18:22, 4 June 2006 (UTC)
	:Me again: On further review, it looks like something weird happened around that time and a very old version of some the article got edited back in, so apologies if you were only trying to fix that. But the main point still holds, your edit summary should have mentioned that you were doing that. --] 22:17, 4 June 2006 (UTC)
			--] 06:39, 16 August 2006 (UTC)
	==Massive destruction of recent work on the article==
			:Interesting and thank you. What can we conclude from the above?
	Whoever keeps reverting to the version of the article from well over a month ago neglects to consider the cautious analysis and work of many editors that went into bringing the article to its current form from that of six weeks ago. This has happened twice today...] 19:48, 4 June 2006 (UTC)
			:First, that the writer has an absolutist sense of truth, at least judging from his question regarding "redefining" the word. And yet, he qualifies what appears to be a belief in the absolute by citing on the one hand "there are some true statements about some subjects and things is widely accepted and universal" and on the other, a requirement that truth be "based on clear evidence". In the first case, wide acceptance does not make something true in the absolutist sense, it merely means that it is widely accepted, thus its truth is relativistic. After all, for many years, it was widely accepted that the sun went round the earth. Did that acceptance make it true? If wide-acceptance is our criterion, then yes, it was true. In the second case, using the same model, if "clear evidence" is the criterion, then yes, based on the knowledge of the time it was true, although today, based on both wide-acceptance and clear evidence it is false.
			:Second, the author makes a statement requesting, "no personal attacks please", implying that he sees as a truism that personal attacks are bad. But, does he see this as an absolute? His other statements would seem to indicate that he sees this as a qualified truism, after all how else could one reconcile his request with, "Who gave some of you the great authority to redefine such an important and ancient etymologically defined word?" So then, is the author more interested in absolute truth, or relative truth?
			:Thus, the article is written as it is written. ] 17:03, 16 August 2006 (UTC)
			::::In response to the above, it is difficult to label anyone as absolutist or relativistic. Depending on the specific issue and statements made, one might have made either kinds of statements, or perhaps there are other possibilities. A human is not some label we put on them, but a great mix of opinions, knowledge, and statements both true and false can come from the same person. It is also possible to have both correspondence theory and wide acceptance working together in some way because they are not necessarily exclusive and contrary. As for the question of authority, it was perhaps too leading. Sorry, my mistake. There are authoritative claims made on Misplaced Pages, and there are problems that can arise from this, and perhaps a more general question is about who has the last words on any specific claim? There is editing that goes on, but there can be the rule of the majority, or the rule of those who can delete faster and more often. It really is ironic that we all use computers that are built because so many have true knowledge about how to program and build them. Again, it seems to me that one of the most absolute statements that anyone can make is that there are no true statements anywhere, at anytime, by anyone that is based on correspondence theory and wide agreement because correspondence actually works. The claim that there is no truth cannot be true, yet it can be imposed by the majority or by the most willful. Perhaps we are being armchair philosophers while some scientists and others who have truth claims are building these computers for us to use, and cars that work for us to drive. This is an interesting debate, thanks for the comments and criticism. This ancient debate will not go away anytime soon. In fact, some extreme and radical Muslims, who often think thoughts that we are not used to, would call most of us the great Satan and prefer to chop off our heads. Perhaps it would be more fun to debate if God exists or not, then we can decide if true statements exist or not.
	Regarding the following sentence made succinct by Nate Ladd ("''Truthbearer'', in the context of modern philosophical discussion, is never applied to a person or group of persons; rather, the term is applied to the kinds of entities above because they are deemed specific enough to reasonably be subjected to a close analysis of whether or not they are true.") and the section relating to truthbearers generally: The controversial modern term "truthbearer" is relegated to its own section presently, with a link to the Stanford Encyclopedia discussion, because the term is ''not'' universally accepted. Rather, it is one way that a number of writers use to identify ''entities'', that is, specific propositions or thoughts or judgments, etc. that are specific in their character. This is different than asserting ''anything'' that is "capable of being true or false". This is why the particular sentence currently is written the way it is. ... ] 19:48, 4 June 2006 (UTC)
			::::--] 03:31, 17 August 2006 (UTC)
	:1. I don't think anyone has deliberately gone back to a version that is over a month old. But let's work forward from the present version.
	:2. I don't understand your defense of your wordy sentence. Whether the term is universally accepted or not has nothing to do with that sentence, in either your version or mine. The sentence simply points out that, unlike a waterbearer, or lawyer, or shoemaker, or some other kind of "-er" noun, this one does not refer to a person; it refers to a thing. I know that's what the sentence is trying to say, because I wrote it originally. It was put in a long time ago because we discovered that readers were taking "truthbearer" as a reference to God. If you want to add another sentence that means something else (such as that the term "truthbearer" is not universally used), please do so; but we still need the existing sentence in a non-wordy way. Otherwise, people use that paragraph as a justification for adding all sorts of theological junk to the article.
	:3. For my own enlightment, could you cite a published work that objects to the term "truthbearer"? I can't find a single writer (about truth) on my shelf that does not use that word.
	:--] 21:49, 4 June 2006 (UTC)
	Point by point (roughly):
	*(1)Re "But let's work forward from the present version.": Fine, yes that is how it should be done.
	*(2)Re the "wordy sentence": Truthbearer, among those writers who choose to use the term, refers not only not to people or gods, but also does not apply to whole paragraphs with 20 or 34 different points within, let alone to whole books (non-fiction or fiction? autobiography or memoir?, etc.). It applies to entities reasonably specific enough to be subjected to a specific analysis-- one point at a time, so to speak. For the uninformed reader who is interested enough, daring enough or foolhardy enough to dive into our minefield on ] here, this needs to be stated, just as it needed to be stated that a truthbearer is not a person or a god.
	*(3)Re "could you cite a published work that objects to the term "truthbearer"?": Can't find one for you at present, but it is clear from the secondary resources such as the Stanford Encyc. article link you saw before, that it is a modern term not wholly accepted (at least not as of yet). Further evidence of the possibility that the term "truthbearer" may never find full agreement (or perhaps may even end up being a passing fad) may be found in the disagreement about what kinds of entities belong in the category of "truthbearer". I suppose time will tell... ] 01:44, 5 June 2006 (UTC)
			::There are at least four major substantive theories of truth (the article stretches it to five, separating out consensus from constructivist theory). Here's a simple fast-and-loose description of a few of the issues that make it not-so-simple as we'd sometimes like to believe. Correspondence theory is very often taken as the initial view. Problem with correspondence theory is that it quickly arrives at a point where most people will say, essentially "well, OK, so how do ya' explain this or that?" Fact is, it turns out there's no such thing as a pure correspondence, and that it's a social process wherein ideas are exchanged and folks develop mutually shared exchanges of words and, presumably, of the concepts involved. Those concepts are never exactly alike between two individuals, let alone all humankind. Enter constructivist theory. Not only do people mutually shape ideas of truth ("Is dat true, Clem?" "Yep, Festus, y'kin take that one to the bank,"). it turns out that even the "authorities" on the subject, the dictionaries, textbooks, encyclopedias, etc., help to shape what is held to be "truth". In Turkmenistan today, for instance, there is only one set of truths--those of ]. Turkmen today have very good reason to believe in constructivist theory, and to varying degrees most humans have some degree of reason to sense the constructivists have something constructive to say about the issue in even the most free-thinking societies. Coherence theory is about, in part, how truth "hangs together", about that funny feeling one gets when something doesn't fit into the body of thought or belief each of us develops as we progress through life. It's also about logical and mathematical coherence. ("If it doesn't fit, you must acquit"; or, "Run JavaScript = False"). Sometimes logically coherent systems do not necessarily ], and at the very least require a method of justification, which both scholars and people in general don't always agree how to do. Pragmatic theory is a synthesis of sorts, involving elements of correspondence, coherence and constructivist, with a central premise that truth is verified, in the end, by applying it rather than merely by thinking about it. There you also run into the problem of "well, I tried it and it didn't work that way for me"; "are you sure we're talking about the same thing?", etc. etc.
	JA: IMWBO (in my worker-bee opinion), Nathan Ladd's conduct in his recent sorties of drive-by shoutings is just plain vandalism, and should be reverted until he learns to respect the admittedly hard-won consensus process that had until lately resulted in a steadily improving article. The constant "I read a book (Kirkham 1992) on truth once" attitude, on top of the overall ''ignoratio'' with regard to the most basic elements of the subject matter and the general campaign of disinformation, has turned the article into a mass of sophomoric confusions that is no longer of any service to the unsuspecting reader. ] 23:58, 4 June 2006 (UTC)
			::Then there are the "deflationary theories", which assert that when Clem tells Festus he kin take that one to the bank, he's doing nothing more than expressing agreement with the idea Festus put forward. And that is all that need be said about the word "truth", leaving the rest of the analysis to the separate issue of epistemological justification (how to prove, verify, or otherwise gain agreement that the word "true" is properly applied to something, ideally beyond merely agreeing to call it truth).
			::This very fast-and-loose sampling of issues merely touches the surface of why there is no one view or definition of truth. Certainly the intro could read differently, but the numerous editors that were involved chose to write the intro to keep it simple and to the point, and leave all the complicated and often contradictory stuff in the individual sections. ... ] 01:49, 17 August 2006 (UTC)
			One thing that should come out of this discussion is an attempt to have all Misplaced Pages articles indicate what paradigm they are using for the article to write it.
	:I wish I could say I'm surprised that you resort entirely to name-calling and have not once given a rational argument to justify disagreement with any of my edits. Those who have done that in the years I've been on wiki will tell you I'm often convinced by rational argument. But I'm never intimidated by bullies, which is what you are. You're going to have to include me in your "concensus" like it or not. --] 00:33, 5 June 2006 (UTC)
			I notice that some such articles do that, witness "Evidence (legal).
	==Peirce and James should not be together==
			The point is that it makes a big difference in what area you are discussing the topic.
	Peirce's and James' theories have virtually nothing in common, as Peirce himself pointed out. They should be in separate sections. I'll do that soon unless someone can make a case here that they should remain together. --] 00:26, 5 June 2006 (UTC)
			There is logic and truth in various areas, but often they have nothing to do with each other, except peripherally.
	::I would assert that we should follow the standard procedure here, which is that classes of things that are classed together by virtually all writers and commentators should not be reinterpreted by the writers of Misplaced Pages. Pragmatism is so called by virtually everyone because it has common threads, just as "science" has common threads, and "religion" has common threads despite the wide variety found within these classifications. ] once said that "there are as many forms of pragmatism as there are pragmatists". Note carefully that he used the words "pragmatism" and "pragmatists", and was not arguing that, say, "half the so-called pragmatists here are not really pragmatists". The three major pragmatists, Peirce, James and Dewey, are recognized as having the common thread that the truth value of people's concepts is developed, verified (or refuted) and honed in an interactive process within communities of inquirers. Truth, partial truth and falshood are discovered in ''practice'' by the observed results of implementing one's concepts in real life. Peirce is actually the original common thread (from "How to Make Our Ideas Clear, 1878: "There is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference in practice.") James and Dewey follow from the same. Charles Peirce cannot posthumously change this, nor should the Misplaced Pages editors-- Peirce tried while alive and failed to separate himself...] 01:28, 5 June 2006 (UTC)
			A scientific truth is different than a logical truth or a legal truth or a philosophical one. I find the articles on Misplaced Pages often do not indicate which of these perspectives they are using for the article. That makes the article almost useless or even worse than useless, due to one being unable to separate out which perspective is being explained.
	::Thank you, Kenosis, for giving a specific reason for disagreeing with one of my edits. You've convinced me with "classes of things that are classed together by virtually all writers and commentators should not be reinterpreted by the writers of Misplaced Pages". --] 19:04, 5 June 2006 (UTC)
			] <small>—The preceding {{#ifeq:{{{Date|{{{Time|00:46, August 24, 2007}}}}}} | | comment was }} ]{{#ifeq:{{{Date|{{{Time|00:46, August 24, 2007}}}}}} | | | &#32;comment was added at {{{Date|{{{Time|00:46, August 24, 2007}}}}}} (UTC{{{Zone|{{{3|{{{2|}}}}}}}}}) }}.</small><!-- {{undated}} --> <!--Autosigned by SineBot-->
	JA: Nathan Ladd's statements are simply false. Peirce took exception to James with regard to very specific issues, ones that James sometimes expressed in rough accord with Peirce and other times did not. Most of the differences had to do with differences in their expertise — James knew little and cared less about the issues of logic and math that Peirce wrestled with — and differences in their intended audience — James often wrote what were expressly described as "popular lectures" and would often sacrifice precision for the sake of a catchy phrase. Despite how intense humans being can get about the devils and the details, they had more in common than they differed about. ] 03:12, 5 June 2006 (UTC)
			== correspondence theory ==
	::And thank you, Jon, for the same reason; even though every sentence in your remark after the first one is evidence that what I said is true. ;-) --] 19:04, 5 June 2006 (UTC)
			In ] and with the ] the notion of true and false statements is widely accepted because of specific and clear evidence. The most primitive ] is by ], such as pointing to the real, universal, existing sun or moon and giving it an ], common, or even a new name. The statement that the sun exists is true, just as many other natural facts, sensory observations, can be proven by anyone, at anytime in history, and anywhere. There is the true existence of the sun even with a variety of more specific definitions about the changing sun. Universal facts and claims of ] are widely accepted and agreed upon by many in all nations, and throughout history, because of the universal nature of giving evidence and proof for one's claims that are not mere ] or ]. The ] that uses true or probable statements, ], and ] has discovered true and probable conclusions about the world around us that very few can deny.
	JA: If you think that a statement like "they had more in common than they differed about" is evidence for a statement like "Peirce's and James' theories have virtually nothing in common", then I fear that your judgment of virtue is beyond repair. ] 19:15, 5 June 2006 (UTC)
			Correspondence theory is used by all of us, and used very often. You cannot walk down the street with dangerous cars passing by if you do not have any correspondence theory that works because it actually does accurately describe some of what exists.
	==What was Kirkham (1992) thinking?==
			--] 06:39, 16 August 2006 (UTC)
	Re: Paragraph removed from "Signs, sentences and propositions" and placed in the section on "Truthbearers": The following material was just added to the paragraph explaining propositions to the reader which is now in the Truthbearer section: "But postulating abstract entities -propositions- is not the only way to account for this phenonemon. It has been argued, by Kirkham for example, that ''sentence-tokens''; the actual physical embodiment of a sentence as a collection of ink molecules or sound waves, can be truthbearers. Since the two utterances are different physical entities, we escape the contradiction of calling the same entity true and false. [Ref to Kirkham, 1992)"
			== Truth definition from Objectivism ==
	: An obvious limitation to Kirkham's supposition is that it is now impossible to say the same sentence twice. (Could you say that again? Er, no.)...] 02:20, 5 June 2006 (UTC) I should also point out that this sentence I just wrote regarding Kirkham's view is a different sentence on my computer than it is on yours. Are we talking about the same thing here? Am I actually reading what I wrote before I clicked on "Save page"? Er, no...] 02:24, 5 June 2006 (UTC)
			How come the article does not mention ]? Here is a possible start: "Truth is an epistemological unit: the recognition of a fact." There is not a single word 'recognition' in the entire article. I propose to start a section on Objectivist view on 'truth'. ] 18:47, 16 August 2006 (UTC)
	::Interesting, Kenosis. But you should put your criticisms, which are OR, into a journal article. Kirkham is a respectable philosopher who wrote a peer-reviewed book published MIT Press. His views can be cited here, whether you or I agree with them or not. If you can find another published philosopher who has made your criticism of Kirkham (or some other criticism), then by all means add that in. But you can't veto a source I've cited because you personally have an unpublished, un-peer-reviewed, criticism of him.
			::Given the current organization of the article, which took very extensive work by many editors and countless person-hours, I'd suggest putting Ayn Rand in the notable philosophers section, and proceeding from there. What you've pointed out also anticipates the need for a future section on epistemology generally, with one or more "main article" links to the appropriate topic fork(s). ... ] 18:59, 16 August 2006 (UTC)
			::The Objectivist view of truth isn't notably different from the garden variety correspondence theory as presented here and in its own article, as your quote indicates. --] 23:40, 23 August 2006 (UTC)
			== Pic again ==
	::(By the way, I don't think your criticism is very strong. Kirkham doesn't say that there are no such things as sentences in an abstract sense (sentence types); so he does not have to deny that two utterances can be the "same sentence" in some sense. He is simply adding that there is another sense of "sentence" (sentence token) in which any two utterances have to count as different sentences. The latter he argues is the kind of thing that has truth or falsity.) --] 19:14, 5 June 2006 (UTC)
			I'm tired'a arguing about this pic every two weeks. We compromised a couple weeks back the last time editors were moving images back and forth, and ended up with ''no'' images up in the intro. Now La Verite is in the article twice, once in the intro and once farther down. This is not an issue of censorship or defending anything; the image doesn't explain anything about truth and neither do any of the other ones, so there's no need to have La Verite, or any of them, up front in the article. ... ] 23:19, 17 August 2006 (UTC)
	:::The fact that these observations are casual and unsourced is consistent with my offering them here on the talk page-- and I have no intention of publishing counterarguments to Kirkham at present. Further qualifications to Kirkham's firsthand argument about tokens, may well fit quite handily in this new section Jon just opened up. Don't really know how it'll play out, as folks frequently confuse theories of truth with theories generally. For instance, one of our editors here just recently confused the continental rationists views as being called coherence theories of truth, when in fact coherence theory ''describes, characterizes,'' or ''distinguishes'' their thought systems. It's an easy mistake to make. But as to Kirkham's supposition about tokens solving the problem, they don't, because one frequently needs to go outside the literal sentence and describe the context in which the sentence was offered, asserted, demanded, questioned, speculated, etc., in order to properly analyze it. (That's a substantial part of the value of the article's paragraph about propositional attitudes by the way.) The statement "i am a football fan" is different when I utter it than when you utter it not because they are different sound waves or electron patterns on a screen, but because ''I'' uttered it rather than someone else. Kirkham's supposition simply does nothing but confuse the issue and render such things as photocopies, books, and all restatements and reproductions meaningless (imagine if one of your professors rejected a printout of a research paper because it wasn't the original set of electrons you had used to write the paper?). No matter how one parses it, we end up with some concept like what is understood as "propositions" (some sign, symbol, representation, or potentially meaningful combination thereof that is offered as having truth value to the person to whom it is being offered--how's that for OR? on the talk page of course). ... ] 04:28, 6 June 2006 (UTC)
	::::I'm still unconvinced, but I don't want to belabor the point, since this page is for discussing the article. No amount of analyzing the sentence tokens is going to change the fact that they are physically distinct. This is all that's needed to escape contradiction when calling one true and the other false. Nothing else your going to discover about the two sentence tokens no matter how, or how long, you analyze them is going to change that fact. I don't understand your remarks about photo copies. Photocopies just illustrate Kirkham's point. There is a sense in which two copies of this page are "the same page", but there is also a sense (physical) in which they are not the same page. This perfectly ordinary fact makes it clear why there's nothing extraordinary in saying exactly the same thing about sentences. At any rate, have we settled the question of whether the Kirkham book can be cited? --] 13:34, 6 June 2006 (UTC)
	:::::I have no problem with citing to Kirkham. But a section on "physical symbol systems" was just carved out to deal with this issue that is sufficiently complex ''not'' to be offered as a "handy solution" to the "I am an initiate" or "I am a football fan" example". The question of the truth of such a statement as "I am a football fan" is resolved by intuitively or explicitly analyzing the questions such as "Who said that?" (e.g., "Nate said it"), "When did they say it? (e.g., "Well, that was long ago and is no longer true")", "Was the person serious or just kidding?" (e.g., "Oh yes, he was quite serious"), "Has anyone ever seen him at a football game or watching football? (Er, no), etc., and not resolved by asking "What set of sound waves was it?, (e.g., Oh, but it was a ''particular'' set of sound waves as evidenced on a printout of a spectral analysis). What Kirkham proposes is ''not'' a solution to the problem. In some ways Kirkham's proposal doesn't cover the breadth of the issues. If a police officer gives you his uniform and badge and you wear it does that make you a cop? No, it makes you an impostor, despite the fact that you're using the exact same token, the exact same electrons (give or take a few stray particles lost or gained in the exchange). In other ways Kirkham's proposal is so broad as to render his own distinction meaningless. If you follow him and start thinking that the issue is what set of sound waves, electrons, ink on the paper, etc., it ends up, you might say, costing $1000 to try to save a nickel, when there are far simpler ways to escape the ancient conundrum of how "I am an initiate" is a statement dependent on who said it in order to evaluate its potential truth. ...] 16:06, 6 June 2006 (UTC)
	:::::Further, the movement of the ''entire'' paragraph into the "Truthbearers" section now conflates the flow of the rest of the explanation that was put in having to do with introducing the reader to the idea of "Signs, sentences and propositions". From an editorial and organizational standpoint, that proposed move is counterproductive in light of the fact that the contribution "I am a football fan" was integrated into the article for use as an example showing that "it is not the literal sentence to which truth and falsity apply but what the sentence expresses, the proposition that it states." This is far more relevant to introducing the meaning of propositions than to introducing the concept of "truthbearers" in my estimation ...] 16:06, 6 June 2006 (UTC)
			:Yep, trying to provide tangibility to an abstact is perty near impossible. And you kin take that to the bank. ;) ] 01:36, 18 August 2006 (UTC)
	JA: Kirkham is a 2nd or 3rd hand source for this material, and it is easily possible to do much better. The type-token distinction is a rather ancient idea, but Peirce is generally recognized — by those who read — as the one who did the most to bring it into contemporary discussion. And we don't need to read Kirkham to know what Peirce — or in another connection, Tarski — wrote about anything. As I indicated before, I added a new head for dealing with this entire class of issues. It will add nothing but confusion to muddle it into the critical distinction between sentences and propositions. ] 02:58, 5 June 2006 (UTC)
			::Well Keno, I dont think president Bush will be looking in at it, in his own immortal words: "One of the great things about books is sometimes there are some fantastic pictures." ] 01:02, 18 August 2006 (UTC)
			== Whitehead ==
	::Actually, only the type/token distinction is 2nd hand. The argument for sentence-tokens as truth bearers is Kirkham's. --] 19:14, 5 June 2006 (UTC) Addendum: Since many criticisms of "sentences" as truth bearers presuppose that sentences are not physical entities, we do a disservice to our readers by not making the distinction betweem types and tokens. We need to distinguish propositions from '''both''' sentence-types and sentence-tokens. --] 19:18, 5 June 2006 (UTC)
			Unsure about this new section on Whitehead, quote is out of context. At least with the earliar Adam/Eve story, it was intersting; "Mythology about Truth" might be an interesting section to add.
			On Whitehead: What is truth for "process philosophy"? Not sure what the point of existing paragraph on him is. Should we also include all other quotes, Shakespeare, plus anyone vaguely witty, whenever they use the word "truth"?
	JA: The problem is to explain how sentences with indices like I, here, now, this, that, yonder, etc. make different propositions in different contexts, while other sorts of sentences do not have that property. Resorting to the ] of the individual utterance — the moving finger that writes and moves on — gets you nowhere with that problem, since every utterance has just as much "thisness" as any other, whether it contains a word like "this" or not. ] 05:02, 6 June 2006 (UTC)
			Much better to remove this section and update the Hegel section, wherefrom Whitehead got his ideas on truth (as something that moves, is realised/revealed, and NOT 'constructed' as it hints earliar) and is more interesting.] 23:24, 23 August 2006 (UTC)
	:Glad to see you have decided to grasp the issues rather than hurl insults. And because you have, we've made progress of sorts. Because I can see that we've had different ideas of what the problem is. You haven't described the problem of indexicals for the concept of truth. What you are describing is a problem in the philosophy of language, and its only a "problem" for those who believe propositions exist. I, on the other hand, am writing about the classical problem that confronts one who takes sentence-types as truth bearers: One and the same sentence can be true and false. The (unsourced) argument presently in the text uses this problem as the basis for an argument in favor of taking propositions as truth bearer. If that argument is left standing alone, then we have a POV discussion of truth bearers: one which has an argument for propositions but no argument for sentence tokens, or sentence types, or beliefs, etc. To restore NPOV we need to either delete that argument or add to it at least one argument for another candidate truth bearer. (Actually, to be fair we should have at least on argument for every proposed type of truth bearer.) I can go either way. What I can't accept is a POV discussion of truth bearers. NPOV is the heart and soul of wikipedia. --] 13:23, 6 June 2006 (UTC)
			== Truth in Science ==
	::I'm not commenting on the details above, but I notice there is no footnote to the Kirkham book in the article as of today. But the article does refer to Encyclopedia of Philosophy articles that are decades old. What is wrong with this picture? --] 04:18, 10 June 2006 (UTC)
			This may be a silly point - but would it not make sense to hold truth in science to be *the* truth according to which humans live?
			:Yes, it would not. ] 22:19, 10 September 2006 (UTC)
			:It would be an extremely controversial point, at the least. Just for example: I don't know how my life is changed by whether physicists discover ] in one of those big underground tanks where they've been waiting on that discovery for twenty years now. Certain models as to the ] will change, and that may or may not indirectly affect my life or that of later generations if I don't live long enough. In the meantime, the truth according to which I live is the truth of the phenomenal world, where tables are solid brown objects and my body is another solid object which might bump into the table if I'm not careful. --] 20:40, 12 September 2006 (UTC)
			I don't think thtat this is a silly point, though it needs some development and disambiguation. It is controversial, but certainly there are contemporary philosophers who hold the view that truth in science is the same as truth in our everyday lives. But there are variations which you don't distinguish. One might think that it's correspondence in both. Or constuctivist. Or pragmatist. -Christofurio, consider the difference between what is known and what is true but unknown.] 11:47, 7 December 2006 (UTC)
			:We can consider that difference if you like, but the anonymous editor above spoke of scientific truth as the truth "according to which humans live." Known truth is that according to which we live. At any rate, I didn't say that the observation was necessarily wrong, only that it was "extremely controversial." You said the same, without the adjective. --] 13:20, 17 April 2007 (UTC)
			==Proposed correspondence-theory material ==
	JA: Nathan Ladd had the unfortunate habit of mass deleting previously consensual text in the process of adding his own bits, so the Kirkham refs probably got lost in the process of reverting his unjustified deletions. On a related note, what's been wrong with the WikiPicture for a long time now is a general lack of sourcing and an excess reliance on 2ndary sources like Kirkham and 3rdary sources like other encyclopedia articles. They come in handy when you're in a hurry, but they often lead to mush in the long run, and so it's best to gradually replace them with primary sources as you get the time. ] 04:50, 10 June 2006 (UTC)
			I have removed the following newly added material from the section on "Correspondence theory" for discussion and sourcing.
			*Philosophers who adhere to this theory state that underlying this theory is the notion that the human being's intelligence and sense perception are capable of capturing the ] of the known object. Most of these philosophers also warn that to deny this capability risks falling into ], whereby each person constructs his own truth, and thus lives egoistically, out of touch with the demands of reality. .... 16:45, 16 September 2006 (UTC)
			<p>The first sentence presumes an "essence" of known objects. The term "essence" is traditionally a troublesome one in philosophy in the context of both ontology and epistemology. The second sentence, in my estimation, would need to be (1) properly sourced as to who or which group of philosophers holds such a view, and (2) placed elsewhere because it is a counterargument which appears to involve some kind of broad psychospiritual slant, using as it does "constructs", "egoistically", "out of touch with the demands of reality", etc. And the assertion "to deny this capability risks falling into relativism" is a whole argumentative line of thinking that sounds, offhand, like a form of ] overlayed with a ] POV. ... ] 16:45, 16 September 2006 (UTC)
			::I would have just taken it out and shot it. ] 20:36, 16 September 2006 (UTC)
			== "Notable Philosophers" ==
	:Hmmm. Having looked at the edit history it now seems to me that your description of what happened with Mr. Ladd is inaccurate and self-serving. Looks to me like he was the victim here. --] 19:36, 11 June 2006 (UTC)
			What criterion are being used for inclusion in this list? Can anyone add their favourite? Perhaps those that consist of a quote should be removed? ] 01:50, 5 October 2006 (UTC)
	==NPOV Dispute §1. Toward a more balanced perspective==
			::Personally I have no objection to Bohr and Whitehead being included for now. If it gets out of hand, there'll be a stronger basis for removing some of the less "notable" views. Maybe I'll defer to Jim62sch; if he really wants he can take a couple out and "shoot them", as he said above. As long as there are no serious objections by other editors to such a removal, I'll support it. ... ] 02:26, 5 October 2006 (UTC)
			== Correction to 'Philosophy of truth' opening paragraph needed ==
	JA: The article on ] currently suffers from an acute POV problem that I have remarked on periodically, but not yet tried to address in any bolder or more direct way. But the 1-eyed character of the Encyclops in question, and the distortions imposed by a 2-dim map of the relevant terrain, now threaten to become a permanent block in the road of inquiry and a source of continuing disservice to all those who inquire after the best thoughts of our kind on the subject of truth. That is something that must now be addressed. ] 11:06, 5 June 2006 (UTC)
			The opening paragraph of 'Philosophy of Truth' reads: "Questions about what is a proper basis on which to decide whether and to what extent words, symbols, ideas and beliefs may be said to be true, whether for a single person or an entire community or society, are among the many important questions addressed by the theories introduced below." This is misleading, because words and symbols might refer or represent but it is never appropriate to describe them as true or false. This is also the case for most ideas, e.g. "Let's go to the shops." Surely it is more appropriate to list the entities that the theories consider to be truth bearing?
	JA: The current POV of the article is fairly described as a "linguistic-analytic point of view" (LA POV). This is a POV that arises out of the logicist-atomist-empiricist-positivist philosopy (LAEPP) that was popular in some quarters during the 1900's. The fact that several other POVs are accorded token mention in the article does nothing to balance the LAEPP-sidedness of the article, as the other POVs are all described as they appear from the LA POV. The fact that a very minor theme of this nominal philosophy is used as the major axis for classifying other approaches to the subject is only one of the more striking bits of evidence for its lack of balance. On top of that we have the fact that many traditionally recognized aspects of the subject cannot even be intelligently discussed from the LA POV. ] 11:26, 5 June 2006 (UTC)
			I suggest "Questions about what is a proper basis on which to decide whether and to what extent claims, propositions, and beliefs may be said to be true..." Comments please.
	: Jon, as I recall, you yourself put in additional material concerning the LA emphasis. Of course it is emphasized--indeed this slant dominated and continues to affect the character of the philosophical discussion for a whole century. Other slants provided by other editors were based on modern ''reactions'' to the LAEPP and derivative LA slant, most conspicuously the "deflationary" theories. We've actually discussed this before in attempting to sort through the immense confusion, and made great headway in presenting the major theories as a result. I would certainly agree that it would be beneficial to provide better balance in the article, though it should be done cautiously and with some interactive planning if possible so as to potentially achieve this aim successfully. Haack's foundherentism, for instance, is a worthy slant (even if not particularly an advance over the pragmatists' perspective). So do other noteworthy slants, including the constructivist and consensus theories--I believe these were earlier tagged as stubs, and would not object to tagging them again as an incentive to expand them to equivalent length as some of the other sections. Appreciate your comment here...] 15:29, 5 June 2006 (UTC)
			(Thanks, Kenosis, for fixing my erroneous edits - in both cases I misunderstood the established text.) ] 19:13, 6 October 2006 (UTC)
	JA: It is one of the POVs in the mix of contemporary conversation on meaning and truth, though not as dominant outside certain parishes as some would have us believe. And I have been tolerant of the article's bias so long as it was providing a coherent account of how things look from the "lonely wooden towers" of one peculiar POV. But if the canversation (= can'o'worms) is opened up yet again to include concrete-physical-sign-token-vehicles, as various and sundry semioticians have long discussed them, then I cannot sit still for yet another raft of unnecessarily vague neo-logicist terms on a par with "truthbearer", not when there is a vast literature of prior wisdom on the subject. ] 15:52, 5 June 2006 (UTC)
			:Inabyssian, I appreciated seeing the obvious thought that went into your edits yesterday.
	:OK then, so let us call this to the attention of Banno, RNorwood, JimWae and other regular participants and see if there is a reasonable guideline for what's notable among the modern experiments, of which there are many, and some of which are so obscure that they perhaps best belong in the ] article but not here. We just ran into a classic example of an ill-considered "solution" to the problem of positional statements in the form of Kirkham's resurrection of the physical token. Your (JA's) attempt at a solution by providing a section for this appears to be potentially very useful to readers. A token (e.g. a coin) has certain identifiable characteristics analogous to a proposition (leading us, of course, back to the LA concepts of "sentences" and their underlying propositions). A quarter is identifiably different than a nickel, two different quarters generally say the same thing even though not the same physical object. The shape of a quarter has a monetary truth value connected with it, though doesn't of itself settle the question of who the quarter truthfully belongs to, nor the question who last gave the quarter to whom with what intent. This section has potential, though right now I don't have the sources in hand myself. Maybe I'll order a few books and be able to help in a week or two...] 16:23, 5 June 2006 (UTC)
			:<p>The editors here have been through this essential discussion at least a couple of times before (now viewable in the lengthy archived discussions from earlier in 2006). The current wording arose as an ] way to try to avoid unnecessary disputes over the article being biased towards "correspondence theory", and also several other issues involved in this inherently broad topic. Perhaps Banno, Jim62sch and others recall the lengthy wrangling and the long, unweildy list of "entities" that the article ended up with in addition to claims/propositions and ideas/beliefs. Others argued for "sentences", "signs", "truthbearers" and a host of other "entities" along the way, and it ended up wildly out of control and highly unstable. The introductory paragraph currently introduces the broad topic, with sections for each of the four basic classes ot theory (five with "consensus theory", which is arguably a subset of "constructivist epistemology"). Correspondence theory has a main-article link in its respective section, and that article still needs a great deal of work. That article on ] appears a reasonable place (one of at least several possible reasonable approaches) to summarize or discuss more specifically the issues that surround the concepts of "truth-bearers" signs, symbols, propositions (communicative entities) as well as ideas, concepts, beliefs (mental entities) as they are argued to "correspond" to a hypothetical "objective" reality. Similarly, to the extent that propositions may be said to "cohere" within a consistent system of some kind, ] would be a reasonable place to discuss this aspect as it relates to the kinds of entities under consideration for their possible "truth value", as well as as it relates to consideration of an entire internally consistent schema or system.
			:<p>As to the current introductory paragraph, "words" and "symbols" are already mentioned, so there is no need to begin adding additional terms applied to various types of groups of words at that initial stage of introducing the section to the reader of the article, at least in my view. .. ] 01:08, 7 October 2006 (UTC)
			Thanks for the history of this discussion - I can see this issue would have been quite a slog! It certainly makes good sense to discuss 'truth-bearers' in more detail elsewhere, but nevertheless it seems a mistake that this opening sentence mentions candidates for truth-bearers, namely words and symbols, that can't be and aren't said to be, true by any of the theories described, or indeed by any theory of truth. Of course they play a role in all of the theories, as do beliefs, claims, propositions, etc, but since words and symbols are never 'true,' (they may or may not correspond or represent, etc, which is a different matter) their prominence in the introduction seems misleading (at least to me). Anyway, thanks for the response. ] 08:19, 7 October 2006 (UTC)
	:So, what do you propose to add to the article?...] 16:24, 5 June 2006 (UTC)
			:Yep, understood, sort of. Whether words and symbols are of necessity properly termed truth-bearers tends to be a product of correspondence theory analysis (see, for one instance, the article on "Correspondence Theory of Truth" in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy online). Over the course of the 20th century, correspondence theorists as a group have had a tendency to get tangled up better'n a darned frantic cat with an infinintely long ball of yarn. Perhaps the articles on ] and ] are more appropriate places for that material. ... ] 09:56, 7 October 2006 (UTC)
			The Stanford Encyclopedia article indicates only that truth-bearers may be understood as '''composed''' of words, at least for the Correspondence as Isomorphism approach - this does not support the sentence as it stands. I seem to have been pigeon-holed as a correspondence theorist (nothing could be further from the truth (!)) - this is the only reason I can think of as to why I don't seem to be able to make clear my objection to the sentence as it stands. Yet my point has nothing to do with the correspondence theory; as I tried to point out in my last comment, '''no''' theory of truth treats words or symbols as truth-bearers, so a sentence that suggests that they do is misleading. Words and symbols should not be mentioned in this sentence. Oh well, I seem to be repeating myself/labouring the point - perhaps I am so far wrong that I'm lucky I've been treated politely. Enough from me - thanks for responding :-) ] 12:06, 7 October 2006 (UTC)
	JA: The spasmodic constriction in depth and horizon that overtook certain quarters of philosophy beginning with the early years of the 1900s was due in large part to a spate of eliminationist movements that are in fact very typical of the fads that arise every time the calendar ticks overs a couple of double-aughts — and this is of course a tenfold cautionary tale for the times and the morés of our triple-aught ticking off. There was in those years a kind of industrial revolution that occurred in philosophy — academic factories sprang up that put the lately automated mechanisms of syntax to work on cranking out new &and; improved (limited warranty) "truths" on a mass-production basis. Bold tycoons of philosophy proposed to return us to the ''tabula rasa'', wiping the slate of our collective historical consciousnes clean of all the benighted somnambulist mysticism of our aboriginal pre-scientific ]. They were doing us a favor — we know because they wouldn't stop telling us so. ] 13:04, 5 June 2006 (UTC)
			::As I understand ]'s point, it can as it were be split into two parts. Allow me to explain it in a silly way. Part 1. Imagine that this opening para contained this: "... to decide whether and to what extent articulated sounds, graven images, ideas and beliefs may be said to be true, ...". Wouldn't you think then: ''What? Sounds, images..., what has that to do with anything?'' Without going into a discussion as to the ability of sounds and images to function as bearers, it ought to be clear that these are not appropriate notions for being listed ''here''. So OK, let's leave them out. Then we have: "... to decide whether and to what extent ideas and beliefs may be said to be true, ...". Part 2. Now you think: ''Hmm. Ideas and beliefs... a bit thin.'' Indeed, something is missing. What should we add back in? Maybe "phonemes, graphemes"? No, not quite right. Then "syllables, signs"? Nope. What about "words, symbols"? Same problem: not appropriate. Last try: "claims, statements, propositions". Well, yes, appropriate, but it gets a bit long. So let us remove some from the list "claims, statements, propositions, ideas and beliefs" that are redundant. &nbsp;--]] 19:17, 7 October 2006 (UTC)
	JA: The fact is that philosophy has a life before, around, and after analytic philosophy, and this is no longer news anywhere but in certain parochial backwaters. I see no reason why WP should continue to languish in that backwatered-down condition. So I will begin to propose a few specific ways that this backwardness can be amended. ] 14:20, 5 June 2006 (UTC)
			:::Hold up a second please. This analysis, in saying ''"What about "words, symbols"? Same problem: not appropriate."'' just ran by the already existing language in the article at about 70 miles an hour. "Words" includes truthbearers, propositions, sentences, clauses, pharases, etc., etc., anything linguistic that carries meaning with the intent to convey a concept or image to another person. "Symbols" readily includes a variety of additional forms that are capable of having communicative value, including math symbols, pictoral images and can even include metaphors and other analogies. The last time around we had an absolute quagmire, in part because "truthbearer" is a categorical term that includes a number of communicative entities, with disagreement among different published writers about the range of entities that are properly termed truth-bearers. There also has never been full accord on the meaning of "propositions" ever since it was first proposed in the early 20th Century, in part because of the confusion about whether it is the sentence, phrase, clause, etc. which is the proposition, or does it need to be interpreted and argued what is the underlying meaning that is the actual proposition, so there is a whole tangled mess of debate right with that set of issues alone. For one thing, each word of a concise phrase or sentence tends to have a truth value or a meaning involved; there's a big difference between the conjunctions "and" and "or", and between the articles "the" and "a", etc., etc. Additionally, there is lack of agreement across the disciplines (notably semiotics, liguistics and philosophy) about the words "sign", "symbol", "signal" and a few others. A word can be a signal, and so can a nod of the head. The existing language accommodates these and many other points of great confusion adequately by the use of "words, symbols, ideas and beliefs". Admittedly it is a bit of a stretch to shoehorn physical gestures such as a nod of the head, into the existing language in the article ("words, symbols, ideas and beliefs"). A physical gesture certainly is covered by the concept truth-bearers; but truth-bearers is a confusing concept for the uninitiated, and tends to be specific to correspondence theory, while the words "words, symbols, ideas and beliefs" run across all five of the major theories that the section proceeds to introduce to the reader. This is an introductory sentence to a long, long, section, and as such is not, in my opinion, the place to get bogged down in this whole quagmire or give a long laundry list of specific terms. ... ] 19:52, 7 October 2006 (UTC)
			Examples of words include 'cat', 'dog,' etc - no truthbearers, propositions, sentences, clauses, or phrases, can be found in this list. Symbols are forms with communicative value, but communicative value is not truth. Words and symbols carry meaning but can never be said to be true. It is a mistake to use these terms instead of terms like proposition and claim, however problematic they are; to do so is to replace a problematic term with one used incorrectly.] 22:22, 7 October 2006 (UTC)
	JA: One of the distinctive features of the linguistic-analytic POV continues to be the idea of "Logic Through Syntax Alone". The excessive enthusiasm for what could be achieved through syntactic analysis led the early slate-wipers to put out of mind all of the previous generations of progress that had been achieved on the broader fronts of semiotics, including what was later re-invented under the neo-logicist heads of semantics and pragmatics. With the so-called progress of spasmodern times, when the unbalanced excess of stress on syntax began to wane, certain quarters of academic literature had quite literally managed to forget that there had been a vast resource of work done on aspects of meaning, signficance, and truth that previous thinkers were never so 1-dimensional as to dream could be reduced to syntax. What was thought well-lost was not so well-lost, but a continuing attitude of "we're too modern to do stuff like homework" made them try to recreate fragments of the loss from scratch. Scratch indeed. ] 14:50, 5 June 2006 (UTC)
			:Of course it's true that a single word generally does not of itself have a truth value when held out in isolation from a "statement" of some kind ("statement" being yet another candidate for the laundry list of possible entities to be subjected to consideration for their possible truth value). The word "words" includes all linguistic strings, including all of the above and much, much more. As I said, I don't believe this is the place for a laundry list. Incidentally, "utterance" is one of the commonly offered candidates too.
	:RE. "One of the distinctive features of the linguistic-analytic POV continues to be the idea of "Logic Through Syntax Alone": I could not agree more. Future improvements in the article should indeed reflect this limitation of what you've termed LAEPP and its stepchild LA...] 17:24, 5 June 2006 (UTC)
			:<p>What is being suggested for that introductory sentence of the "Philosophy of truth" section? To replace "words, symbols, ideas, and beliefs" with what? ... "strings of words"?... ] 02:43, 8 October 2006 (UTC)
			::For simplicity, my preference is "statements and beliefs", not really a laundry list. I see "proposition" as essentially a synonym for "statement", while "claim" is subsumed by "statement" (a claim is a statement put forward as being true). The problem with "utterance" is the same as for "word" or "string of words", namely that many utterances, such as "gosh" and "my o my", cannot meaningfully be subjected to a truth examination. We need noun phrases that cover such things as "Water is wet" and "The Moon consists of Emmenthaler cheese" while excluding "Come here!", "pflrfllpl", and "ɮɥʡʉʲ<sub>ɽЋ</sub>". &nbsp;--]] 04:19, 8 October 2006 (UTC)
	JA: Back to the unidentional format, as I dislike the steadily narrower writing that comes out of the other way of doing things, and I don't like the prospect of losing an argument simply by dint of being slammed up against the wall of the Forum — plus I suspect a political bias in the fact that it's always the far-right wall. ] 16:52, 5 June 2006 (UTC)
			:::Among the limitations of using "statements and beliefs", to name just a couple: ''ideas'' under investigation or held in suspension without necessary belief as to their truth value; math and logic ''symbols'' or sets of symbols in the setting of correspondence, coherence and/or pragmatic theory. Believe it or not, a great deal of thought went into picking those four nouns in order to avoid a POV coming primarily from correspondence theory analysis. ... ] 05:16, 8 October 2006 (UTC)
			:::: If the terms 'words' and 'symbols' include strings of words or sets of symbols (which I don't agree that they do - else the opening sentence could be understood as referring to 'strings of ideas' or 'sets of beliefs'), then they are too broad, because such strings or sets include many things that have no truth value. The term 'ideas' has the same problem. I feel it is best to limit this list to things that do have truth value, but I also don't see how the suggested terms have any POV problem - the suggested terms are used by all theories of truth.] 06:47, 8 October 2006 (UTC)
			:::::The exsiting words were intended to be broad enough to accommodate the entire range of entities that could potentially be subjected to consideration under any of the five major theories (conspicuously absent are "things", including "things-in-themselves", i.e. ]). These four words ("words, symbols, ideas and beliefs") do in fact cover the broad sphere of linguistic and symbolic communicative entities, as well as the broad sphere of mental entities. Note very carefully that the language does not say "a word, symbol" but uses the plural form to accommodate the extremely wide range of entities that can readily come into play across the five theories. This includes literal statements, figurative statements, jokes, stories, movies, paintings, totem poles, masks, photographs, mathematical and logical symbols, phrases, propositions, cynical statements, questions, answers, evasive answers, sarcastic statements, inadvertent mistakes, intentional deceptions, half-truths whether literal or pictorial, physical evocations intended or interpreted as having a meaning, groupings of varying kinds of communicative entites such as truth-bearers, utterances, sentences, groups of sentences taken in context both with one another and in context with the wider setting in which they're placed, provisional propositions, assertions, hypothetical questions, hypothetical answers, fictional material, memoirs, and non-fiction, , and mental entities such as thoughts, mental images, ideas generally, mild intentions, firm intentions, musings, firm beliefs, tentative beliefs, symbolic thought, categorical thinking, stream of consciousness, hallucinations, fear-based avoidance thinking, groupthink, zeitgeist, individual geist, shared mentality, etc., etc., etc. ... ] 17:30, 8 October 2006 (UTC)
			::While I believe that a great deal of thought went into picking those four nouns, which were introduced in , I do not see that the particular formulation was the result of a consensus process; at least, I can't find it discussed on the talk page. I do not blame Kenosis for that; at around the same time I posted . It was quite impossible then to have a meaningful discussion, thanks to the prolixity of one now permablocked editor. I find myself in agreement with Inabyssian on this (in my opinion minor) issue. I too fail to see a POV risk. &nbsp;--]] 13:15, 8 October 2006 (UTC)
			:::The sentence currently under discussion was initially introduced in April, roughly 1700 edits ago. April 20th-23rd were very busy days for this article. At the beginning of April 20, the article looked like . By the end of the April 22 it looked like . In between, the initial form of the sentence now under discussion was introduced as a lead-in prior to the beginning of the then-section "Major theories of truth" . Then, on April 23 I introduced the sentence as a beginning of that section in a slightly different form than it exists presently. As sections were changed and moved around by various editors including myself, the sentence was moved around accordingly and also removed for awhile. I reintroduced it on June 18 with roughly the current phrasing. On June 25 I moved it . Then on June 29 found its way , then later the same day I moved it as a lead for the section on Philosophy of truth, with the current wording put in place to avoid the repeated problems involved in using more specific language of ''what'' the five major theories were assessing as having some potential relationship to the word "truth". That language has been fairly stable since then. If it needs to be more explicitly consensused or changed, that's certainly OK with me. ... ] 18:10, 8 October 2006 (UTC)
			== Multi-dimensional truths ==
	JA: First off, the deliberately vague neologism of "truthbearer" is a prime example of LA Philosophie "reinventing the wheel but making it square", simply because they disdained to read the history of what had gone before, the level of sophistication of which they are far from grasping even as we speak. But at least we could work around that with a gloss of the pertinent variety that fell under its umbrella. But the umbrella turns inside out when exposed to truthbearers of genuine physical force, and that makes it all the more necessary to do some of the long-post-poned homework on those more pragmatic folks who dealt with these problems from the start. Indeed, many of the same issues eventually got forced on the attention of researchers in numerous fields, from linguistics — the whole Chomsky–Skinner debate was largely about this — to artificial intelligence, where one of its forerunners, ] was well aware of both the Scholastic and the Peircean traditions, to the theme of '']'' in cognitive science, to the theme of '']'' in several of the just-mentioned fields. And there are already several not-always-aware-of-each-other voyages of re*discovery in the literatures that followed on classical semiotics without always knowing who had gone before. ] 17:56, 5 June 2006 (UTC)
			Multi-dimensional truths.
	JA: The theme of ] is discussed at somewhat x-cruciating length in Peirce's ], (or ]), where it arises in connection with his classification of ]s into icons, indices, and symbols, and also in relation to his categories (cf. the stub work in progress "]". A lot of this discussion refers in turn to ]'s "]" and to the ] concept of ]. ] 19:34, 5 June 2006 (UTC)
			In the arena of mathematical truths, one plus one equals two, but only within certain dimensions.
	JA: The discusion of physicality in symbol systems long ago passed the level that folks have so far been willing to tolerate in this introductory article. Anything that approaches an up-to-date account would have to cover 5 or 6 decades worth of work in ], ]s, ], and ]. The state of the art in this area long ago ceased to consider things like individual tokens as the main items of discussion, since they are viewed as nothing more than aspects of the primary reality of a system, which is that system's state. So the least we can do here is to try and avoid saying anything radically misinformative or just plain silly in comparison to current levels of thinking. ] 20:36, 5 June 2006 (UTC)
			In the pure concrete world 1 + 1 = 11, in the pure abstract world 1(a) + 1(b) = 1(c) where 1(c) is greater than the other two. Example the amalgamation of one city with one city is still one city.
	JA: The most pressing need at this point is to relocate the article in the broader context of long-standing discussions about the inseparable subjects of expression, inquiry, meaning, and truth. Two specific needs in this regard are (1) to overcome the hopelessly POV-bound peculiarites of the term "truthbearer", and (2) to find a less POV-centric way of classifying theories than the eliminationist criterion of whether the predicate "ISA_TRUTH" is amenable to periphrasis in canonical linguistic contexts. ] 15:04, 6 June 2006 (UTC)
			What i call 'thinking outside books'
	==NPOV Dispute §2. Consensus changes==
			We must appreciate that many truths are based on the relative position of reality subject to the realities of position.
	I think there's a misunderstanding by some editors of this page about the role of concensus. Prior to the recent activity of Kenosis and Jon Awbrey, the article had changed little in a long time. That's because it embodied a concensus of those who were watching it. JA and K were right to make changes where they thought they could improve on it. It would have been wrong for anyone to stop them on the grounds that they were changing something that had consensus agreement (even though that is exactly what they were doing). By the same token, no one now can reject a change merely on the grounds that it changes a preceding concensus. Particular reasons have to be given for and against each change in terms of what's good for the article. It is a hallmark of Wiki that no decision is ever final. Concensus isn't something that is reached once on wiki and then left unchanged. Concensus has to be re-reached on an almmost daily basis as new editors become active and old ones move away. --] 19:28, 5 June 2006 (UTC)
	JA: Once again, the majority of Nathan Ladd's statements are simply false, and exhibit a lack of due attention to the facts. Anybody who was here at the time knows that the article went through major extensions and revisions, all of which were raked over in detail on the discussion page, and what remained had every line gone over multiple times by multiple editors. That kind of consensus deserves respect, and is not to be trashed in a trice by anyone who gets back from Spring Break or something and simply can't take the time to deal with what's there. ] 19:42, 5 June 2006 (UTC)
			While this may be (original research that I cannot quote, someone else can quote it, as it is not their original research)
	: Once again with the namecalling. Your remarks don't address the point. There's never a consensus that's permanent. As the pool of editors changes, so too the consensus must be established and reestablished. There have been many many "at the times" when the article was gone over my many editors long before you were ever on wikipedia. You cannot pick a particular date in the past and declare it to be a consensus which cannot be deviated from by anyone else. (And if that were allowed, I'd be entitled to do it with the version last edited before you got involved!) Moreover, the logic of your position is that ANY change, even those you make, are bad because of course all changes deviate from yhour arbitrarily chosen consensus date. Its transparently obvious you are just trying to immunize yourself from being edited by declaring your views to be a consensus which is not made of concrete. Your not fooling anyone. --] 12:58, 6 June 2006 (UTC)
			--] 09:24, 19 October 2006 (UTC)
	JA: Several editors have repeatedly given reasons, both philosophical and organizational, as to why the indexicality and physicality issues should not be confounded with the commonly recognized important distinction between sentences and propositions, and we have introduced a new heading where those questions can be taken up, with all due consideration to the various literatures that have addressed those topics over the last 150 years at least. ] 20:00, 5 June 2006 (UTC)
			== Foucault ==
	: No one wants to "confound" the sentence/propositional distinction with other distinctions. I want the article to discuss sentence tokens as truthbearers in addition to discussing propositions and sentence types. You have ''not'' given any reason why we should have a POV discussion of truth bearers that leaves unmentioned one kind of truth bearer. --] 12:58, 6 June 2006 (UTC)
			This section seems to me to be too brief. My recollection is that he describes truth an power as two sides of the same coin; bringing to the fore the difference between the analytic approach and the continental approach by emphasising the political impact of what is true and what isn't. I;m sure that his writing should have more prominence, but not being that interested in continental philosophy, I don;t have the citations at hand. Someone must. ] 22:11, 28 October 2006 (UTC)
	JA: Both I and Kenosis, just in STM, have addressed this issue and given ample reasons why the indexicality and physicality issues should not be visited on the hapless reader in the process of trying to convey the key distinction between propositions and sentences, by that or any other name. This is not a POV issue. All of these topics, including the thesis that you mistakenly originate with Kirkham, have an extremely long history in numerous specialized literatures. They are all quite fascinating topics, some of them having occupied me personally for at least three decades, just in LTM, but that does not give them primary pertinence to the topics that are most pressing to introduce at this point in the article, or even immediate materiality to what you of all people have insisted remain at the level of an introductory article. Insert ironicon here. ] 13:24, 6 June 2006 (UTC)
			== re-structure ==
	JA: There is no question of immunity. It is simply a matter of weighting each statement in the text with the quantum of ] extruded toward a mediate consensus about its current state. It is simply a question of giving due regard to the labors of others. So where's the question? ] 15:40, 6 June 2006 (UTC)
			I've substantially re-structured the article. The aim was to bring disparate sections together in the hope that they can be linked by some sort of narrative. Comments? ] 00:06, 29 October 2006 (UTC)
	==NPOV Dispute §3. Real theories & Nominal theories==
			::Interesting approach. Among other things in the way here is that the scholastics, if the editors ever get around to developing that little section, are not properly sectioned under classical philosophy. Alfred North Whitehead isn't continental, and Fromm very arguably doesn't belong in that grouping either. I'm a bit disappointed that the trio of "Truth in Mathematics", "Truth in law" and "Truth in science" never came to fruition to round out the perspectives, but personally can live with what you've done, so long as the basic presentation of the four or five major "substantive" theories and the deflationary theories remains fundamentally intact. (I also wonder how long it will take before someone comes in and says essentially, "well, technically the "Formal theories section aren't formal, but rather are yada-yada..."? I think I can hear it already: "The mathematics section is actually composed of arguments ''about'' formal proofs rather than formal theories ''of'' mathematical proofs", and "Tarski's semantic theory is a metaproposition, not a formal theory." or whatever.) Overall I have no objection to attempting this approach. ... ] 00:55, 29 October 2006 (UTC)
			:::Then replace ''Classical'' with ''historical'' or ''''antiquated'' and remove Whitehead (which doesn't add much anyway). I think we can get away with leaving Fromm where he is. I'd like to fill out the formal maths section more, which contains the proto-"Truth in Mathematics" stuff. Perhaps we can work on it together. Glad the changes didn't meet with outright rejection - thanks. ] 04:12, 29 October 2006 (UTC)
			== Kripke ==
	JA: I thought that I had lit enough flares and sounded enough horns to alert every equestrian and pedestrian in the vicinity, but my use of "real" versus "nominal" merely returns us to the time-honored tradition of calling spades ''spades''. It is "substantive" and "deflationary" that are the diversionary neo-logicisms on this scene, though it's okay by me if we retain them in passing as sops to the ]. ] 17:30, 6 June 2006 (UTC)
			I believe I started the inclusion of Kripke ; as I recall Nathan Ladd placed the present version, after some discussion (see archive 4); it of course is quite different from what is in the actual Kripke article. Nathan appears to be inactive at present. ] 20:52, 5 November 2006 (UTC)
	: The whole ] business is tragic, and the current intro to the article is quite correct. There are, however, "major" theories, and "minimalist" theories appear to me to deserve mention under that head, for lack of a better title to date. What I am having a bit of a problem with at the moment is the introduction of the neo-classical or "substantive" theories as "realist" theories. This is because not all of them are "realist", while all five classifications ''are'' substantive. Perhaps we're better off defining what is meant by "substantive" than by retitling the subsection head as "realist". Consensus and constructivist theories are ''not'' realist theories, and coherence theory generally also is not "realist" because of the inherent problem of justification that attaches. This leaves us with correspondence and pragmatic, with an issue about how to organize the rest.... ] 03:29, 7 June 2006 (UTC)
			Kenosis, is the reference I provided sufficient? ]
			== The Truth ==
	JA: Sure, but I just started at the top of the section and will probably take a while to munch my way through. The point that I've been trying to articulate for many moons now is that the article currently employs a classification scheme that is in fact one of the goggle-reticles of a partisan POV. No way to cleanse all the ] of course, but we can certainly brush off some of the mustier cobwebs from the threshold of the article. ] 04:04, 7 June 2006 (UTC)
			If something has arguments on whether it is true or false, then it is in fact not true. The only thing that can be true is something universally accepted, such as this statement "The sky of the planet Earth appears to be the color blue to those who do not suffer from color blindess". Everyone agrees on that being true I'm sure. Anyway this article makes truth seem as if it's an opinion. The Truth is what is. <small>—The preceding ] comment was added by ] (]) 20:46, 20 December 2006 (UTC).</small><!-- HagermanBot Auto-Unsigned -->
	JA: Re-reading your comments, I realize that I probably need to emphasize 2 or 3 points. The word "substantive" is not likely to get a standard definition, as we only started using that as a stop-gap replacement for the greater evil, POV-wise, of "inflationary". But the use of "realist" has been pretty well defined as I gave it, with only a slight adaptation, from ancient times (], 2348 BC). A careful reading of the definition will reveal that coherence and consensus theories are not necessarily excluded from being realist in this sense. It depends on the details of the particular formulation. The main question to ask is this: Do well-formed questions have objective answers, in the sense that all observers who pursue a question are destined to come to the same answer? Asked another way, is there something that causes inquiries to gravitate toward a determinate end? Even if you don't start out assuming real objects, a positive answer to these questions is the moral equivalent believing in an objective reality. ] 04:38, 7 June 2006 (UTC)
	:Substantive" is as opposed to "responsive" which characterizes the basic nature of the minimalists, though we don't dare call them "responses and objections" here, because they are so widely called theories (or do we dare characterize them as "responses and objections to the major theories"?). "Deflationary" or "minimalist" is as opposed to the "X is true" or "Y is not-true" fomulations of the problem by Russell ''et al''. So your criticism is fair enough. But I requested that we approach this earlier on with something more explicit than hinting in the introduction about "touchstone for distinguishing" some of the theories of truth. Even the slight concession towards directness to the reader that you (JA) acceded to at the time was, shall we say, reluctantly accepted. Best we be more explicit about what the deflationists are responding to, per the rather extensive comments you made above about the straglehold Russell developed in the philosophical discussion that only began to abate after he died in 1971. ...] 05:02, 7 June 2006 (UTC)
			=== Truth and The Truth ===
	JA: I haven't looked at it in a while to see if it's still there, but we did once have a fairly careful reading of Ramsey to see exactly what he was about, shorn of all the secondary source chatter. That is what always works best for me. The argument that Ramsey used basically just adapts a very old technique of nominal thinkers everywhere, known as ''periphrasis''. Supposedly, if you can explain a word away by talking your way around it in "every", but really just every context you wish to think about, then the word and its concept are otiose. This clearly puts the last court of appeal for every concept squarely within the jursidiction of LA. ] 05:18, 7 June 2006 (UTC)
			The article might want to distinguish '''truth''' from '''the Truth''' or '''Truths'''. Examples of the latter are commonly found in religious texts eg ] 18:37, 'witness to the Truth', and the Buddhist ]. ] (]) 10:11, 21 April 2008 (UTC)
			== Universally Accepted? ==
	: And I don't necessarily object to the use of "realist" in the sense that consensus and constructivist theories are realist about the social phenomena that they argue give rise to what is regarded as "truth". In that sense of the word (which I currently imagine to be probably dead meat in a serious OR debate here) "realist" does not stand together with the modern use of the term "anti-realist" in the context of "truth" analyses. But I'd need to do some further research on that. I'll get back to ya' on it. ... ] 05:09, 7 June 2006 (UTC)
			There are no Universally Accepted propositions.
	JA: Speaking of baloney, since I do not confuse the "modern predicate" with the "truth predicate", its use here only prompts me to ask "Where's the beef?" ] 05:24, 7 June 2006 (UTC)
			Is the sensation which I call blue really the same as that which my neighbor calls blue? Is it possible that a blue object may arouse in him the same sensation that a red object does in me and vice versa? (Bridgman, P. W. - Logic of Modern Physics - p30 - Nobel prize winner in 1946)
	: There is no beef, only baloney (and an occasional sausage). 'Night...] 05:28, 7 June 2006 (UTC)
			"The Truth is what is" smacks of the Correspondence Theory, which has been Discredited.
	JA: I can dig up some references more recent than Methuselah if you're worried about the risk of personal genesis on my part, but the fact is that the term "realism" long time passing had but one sensible definition in philosophy, and that was Platonic or Scholastic realism, a thesis that things like essences, generals, hypostases, potentials, properties, qualities, universals, und so weiter could be real, where the word "real" meant "having properties all its own". One did not need a term-of-art "realism" to say (1) "I believe that there is a reality" or (2) "I believe that real things are real", since there is no art to the sophomoric solipsism that would say otherwise. At the turn of the 1900s, however, sophomoric solipsism acquired a whole new raft of PR-men to tout its putative virtues, and the former terms-of-art have been all but tooted out of hearing by the new-fangled terms-o-fart. ] 12:38, 7 June 2006 (UTC)
			According to this theory (correspondence), truth consists in the agreement of our thought with reality. This view ... seems to conform rather closely to our ordinary common sense usage when we speak of truth. The flaws in the definition arise when we ask what is meant by "agreement" or "correspondence" of ideas and objects, beliefs and facts, thought and reality. In order to test the truth of an idea or belief we must presumably compare it with the reality in some sense.
	: Fair enough then. I'm OK with "Realist (substantive) theories..." as a description for the "big five" for lack of a better overarching term. The parenthetical "substantive" gives credit for some modern classifications of these difficult-to-classify groups and matches the format of the parenthetical "minimalist" farther down. Let's see how it plays. Frankly, I think it'd deserve a strong and convincing argument, or some approach where we all say "Aha! That's it!", to overrule such an approach. I still caution, though, about the quirksome use of "anti-realist" in recent truth discourse. ... ] 17:03, 7 June 2006 (UTC)
			In order to make the comparison, we must know what it is that we are comparing, namely, the belief on the one hand and the reality on the other. '''But if we already know the reality, why do we need to make a comparison? And if we don't know the reality, how can we make a comparison?''' (Randall, J. & Buchler, J.; Philosophy: An Introduction. p133)
			The Randall book is an excellent introduction to philospophy.
	JA: Just so you don't get too comfy, then, here's the next thought. If there are realist and not-so-realist varieties of POVs like coherence theories and consensus theories, then maybe that distinction is not such a good one to pick for the initial partition of Gaul, and maybe we should consider another. ] 17:12, 7 June 2006 (UTC)
			--] 16:49, 31 December 2006 (UTC)Berjm
	: How about the "Iraq method"-- three countries according to ethnicity?. Maybe "traditional substantive theories" works after all. Only complaint I have at the moment is that the developing description is beginning to meander again. How soon can I and others get in there and distill the work without vehement objection? (Gotta go--talk later) ..] 17:42, 7 June 2006 (UTC)
			==Augustine's contradiction==
	JA: A due respect for the rack'n'pinions of history demands that it be called the ] (TOV) method, on account of all the interesting history that it catalyzed. But a review of those histories is leading me to believe that it might be better to focus on the never-say-die-ing questions and the oft-overlapping spotlights that traverse the "field of view" (FOV), rather than the old turf'n'serf divisionary-re-visionisms — "the territory is however we colo(u)r the map" — techniques of partition'n'publish'n'perish that gave us such a Gutzeit in the Cold2Cryogenetic Wars of n-humane past&times;, if you catch my paradigm shift in spite of all the semantic drift. ] 13:30, 8 June 2006 (UTC)
			There is an explicit contradiction in Augustine's definition. He first says: "Even if every created thing ceases to exist, Truth will continue to exist.", and then "Without a mind, truth could not exist." Does anybody know of some author who has pointed to this specific contradiction?
	==NPOV Dispute §4. Material removed for discussion and analysis==
	I have removed the following material for further analysis and discussion as to its value to the article...] 04:31, 8 June 2006 (UTC)		:Didn't Augustine believe in the existence of One mind that was ''not'' a "created thing"? I'm not sure I see the alleged contradiction. --] 20:27, 3 February 2007 (UTC)
			There is no contradiction. Truth exists in the mind of God. ] 14:58, 5 February 2007 (UTC)
	: "The latter terms imply that the property or relation in question exists independently of individual opinion or perception, and thus can be inquired into with a reasonable expectation of arriving at a definite answer. To speak of objectivity and reality in regard to truth is not to say that truth exists exclusively of mind in general or separate from all mention of conscious agents."04:31, 8 June 2006 (UTC)
			== Statement; is it possible, that truth may be an "unconscious object"? (an attempt to define a model of Truth?) ==
	JA: Two points. (1) I'm not the one who raised the twin spectres of indexicality and physicality in this setting, but if we're going to take them up in a serious way, then there's some background material that will need to be patched in. I'm doing that where it occurs to me, recognizing that some reordering may have to happen later on. (2) I was working up a proper treatment of realism in its own right. I'm not convinced that its main purpose is to classify the theories that are currently placed under the head of realism, so I'm not tailoring it to fit around them. ] 04:40, 8 June 2006 (UTC)
			Is it possible that truth may be an "unconscious object" common to all?
	: No harm, no foul, no sweat at present...] 04:53, 8 June 2006 (UTC)
			unconscious = Truth", "My" definition of Truth - the degree of best fit, of data coming in from the reality, super-imposed on an "unconscious" philosophical model of reality and interpreted as a feeling. Example I point at an "object" a person is sitting on and call the "object" a "chair", other people in the vicinity of the object have the same model which they call a "chair”. In this case the object "chair" is a truth for all the people perceiving the object. (This truth is this case, is limited by the experience of the reality, these viewers have had i.e. how evolved is their conscious model of reality?) Absolute truth is an unconscious (objective) model, which describes all objects, events, perceptions, nothing is left out of this model. This model is common to all in this reality, though only part of the model is conscious, i.e. accessible to any one individual’s conscious mind, at any given point of time.] 08:40, 4 January 2007 (UTC) Alan
			" truth is verified and confirmed by the results of putting one's concepts into practice."
	JA: One more point. The statement that you deleted is essential for avoiding a number of very popular but very false dichotomies. ] 04:44, 8 June 2006 (UTC)
			====Pragmatic theory====
	: No matter, the form of "explanation" I removed doesn't explain anything of relevance in its current form; perhaps in more articulate form they belong in the ] article. ...] 04:53, 8 June 2006 (UTC)
			{{main|Pragmatic theory of truth}}
			The three most influential forms of the ''pragmatic theory of truth'' were introduced around the turn of the 20th century by ], ], and ]. Although there are wide differences in viewpoint among these and other proponents of pragmatic theory, they hold in common that truth is verified and confirmed by the results of putting one's concepts into practice.<ref>Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.5, "Pragmatic Theory of Truth", 427 (Macmillan, 1969).</ref>
	JA: There's a very common misapprehension out there that people who say nice things about objectivity and reality must somehow be denying the subjective relational side of experience in the very same breath. It is necessary to stress that the forms of realism worth having do not require this. ] 05:14, 8 June 2006 (UTC)
			==Removed section on Augustine of Hippo==
			I've removed this subsection, which was among "notable philosphers' views of truth", and am placing it here for now. The main reason is that this presentation of Augustine is more theology than it is philosophy of the concept of truth. and, it is excessively lengthy and was in drastic need of being more concise and organized to fit the article on ] ... ] 04:04, 16 January 2007 (UTC)
			*===Augustine of Hippo===
			]’s definition of Truth.
	==NPOV Dispute §5. Making a mess of an article==
			*'''1. Truth Exists:-'''
	What is going on here. After a large amount of work and a great deal of lengthy discussion, there ''was'' an article on ] that gave reasonable explanations/summaries/synopses of the major slants on truth. Admittedly it was capable of being improved. Jon Awbrey split off the obscure slants into an article called ], and gave for all to see an argument that there was a place for a "simpler" set of explanations about "truth" and a separate, more technical one. That article on ] (the more technical one), despite the lack of "interference" from editors other than Jon Awbrey, currently is a mess of disorganized, confused and extremely lengthy meanderings interspersed with highly technical jargon without direction or balance in both content and style. Now it's happening to the article on ] again. Please stop and put it back so there is a reasonable lead-in and then discussion of the ''major'' perspectives on truth. No doubt we can continue to work on it bit-by-bit from there. ... ] 16:58, 8 June 2006 (UTC)
			It is self-defeating to deny the existence of truth. If someone claims that “Truth does not exist”, then we can counter by asking if the claim is True or False. If the claim is False, then Truth Exists, and if the claim is True, then Truth Exists.
			*'''2. Truth is Unchangeable:-'''
	JA: (DIYD)<sup>2</sup> all over again. Just a few days ago there was this hue and cry that the article had become too stable and stodgy, and there was this persistent insistence that we shove a whole new layer of more physical logs under the abstract pyramid so tortoisoid in its infinitesimal momentum, and now, after spending a week in advance notification and discussion about what sorts of springs and catches would have to be arranged in order to budge it off the status quo, now, all of sudden it appears that the immunity is on the other foot. What good does it do to discuss things in advance on the talk page if nobody is taking the trouble to read it, or taking the proposals seriously when they do? There's not a single thing here that I haven't reiterated for months and months now. Do I really have to put a POV tag back on the article just to convince you that I really mean it? What is this, the "maintainance tag theory of truth"? ] 17:14, 8 June 2006 (UTC)
			It is impossible for truth to change. What is true today always has been and always will be true. All true propositions are immutable truths. Pragmatic views of truth that imply that what is true today may be false tomorrow are untrue. If truth changes, then pragmatism will be untrue tomorrow, if indeed it could ever be true.
			*'''3. Truth is Eternal:-'''
	::There was no such persistence. One editor comes along and asks a few questions (actually reasonable ones based on published material by Kirkham), and JA goes off on a Joycian tear. Ridiculous...] 17:19, 8 June 2006 (UTC)
			By extension of its Unchangeable nature, Truth must be Eternal. Even if every created thing ceases to exist, Truth will continue to exist. But suppose someone asks, “What if truth itself should someday perish?” Then the truth that “Truth has perished” would still exist eternally. Any denial of the eternity of truth turns out to be an affirmation of its eternity.
			*'''4. Truth is Spiritual:-'''
	JA: Point 1. Despite the de(con)structive style of critique, I took those criticisms seriously, and I have laid down some of the caissons and shorings that it would take to address them responsibly, and not just as a desultory fillip inserted as diversionary material in the midst of other important topics. ] 17:26, 8 June 2006 (UTC)
			The existence of truth presupposes the existence of minds. Without a mind, truth could not exist. The object of knowledge is a meaningful thought which resides in one or more minds.
	::Despite this assertion just made by JA, the persistent outcry from numerous editors has been "too obscure! too technical! too much meandering! lacking in focus!" etc. along the same lines. To which I would add: "lacking in balance of other equivalently technical perspectives! non-parsimonious!". And, sure enough, here we go again. A new article was created to deal with this stuff and justified accordingly by JA. Please ''use'' it accordingly as well...] 17:41, 8 June 2006 (UTC)
			*:'''a. Truth is Not a function of Matter:-'''
	JA: Look, I was there. There was a persistent re*version of any version that did not mention a particular pet idea in the particular place of choice. So I provided a place to potty train that pet idea. I resisted taking it in because I know from some acquaintance with its grandsires and grandbitches that it takes some care and feeding if you don't want a mess all over the yard. If it turns out, as very often happens, that the e-thusiasts in question lose interest in the stray idea that followed them home once they realize that caring for it might actually involve some ], then, yes, I'll gladly find a more responsible home for it, but right now its still imprinted on the place. Grow up and let grow up, that's my motto. ] 18:16, 8 June 2006 (UTC)
			*:The existence of truth is incompatible with any materialistic view of man. Materialists believe that all thinking and reasoning is merely the result of the motion of particles in the brain. But one set of relative physical motions is not truer than another set. Therefore, if there is no mind, there can be no truth; and if there is no truth, materialism cannot be true. Truth cannot be a function of the position of material objects because if a thought was the result of some physical motion in the brain, no two persons could have the same thought. A physical motion is a fleeting event different from every other motion. Two persons could not have the same random motion, nor could one person have the same random motion twice.
			*:'''b. Truth is Not a function of Time:-'''
	:I agree with ] completely with what he says in this section. --] 04:04, 10 June 2006 (UTC)
			*:If thoughts were the result of physical motions in the brain, memory and communication would be impossible. We are able to recall the past because we have minds and not because of the motion of particles in our brains. Thus, if one is able to think the same thought twice, truth must be independent of time.
			*:'''c. Truth is Not a function of Space:-'''
	::Yes. Although I do not agree with a lot of other things he says on this page. It is right to say this article is a mess. --] 03:48, 11 June 2006 (UTC)
			*:Truth is independent of Space as well. Not only does truth defy time and matter; it defies space as well. For communication to be possible between two or more people, the identical truth must be in two or more minds at the same time. If, in opposition, anyone wished to deny that an immaterial idea can exist in two different minds at the same time, his denial must be conceived to exist in his own mind only; and since it has not registered in any other mind, it does not occur to us to refute it!
			*'''5. Truth is Superior to the human mind:-'''By its very nature, truth cannot be subjective and individualistic. Truth is immutable, but the human mind is changeable. Even though beliefs vary from one person to another, truth itself cannot change. Moreover, the human mind does not stand in judgment of truth; rather truth judges our reason. While we sometimes judge other human minds (as when we say, for example, that someone’s mind is not as keen as it should be), we do not judge truth. If truth and the human mind were equal, truth could not be eternal and immutable since the human mind is finite, mutable, and subject to error. Therefore, truth must transcend human reason; truth must be superior to any individual human mind as well as to the sum total of human minds. From this it follows that there must be a mind higher than the human mind in which truth resides.
	==NPOV Dispute §6. Meta-analytical section removed==
			*'''6. Truth is God:-'''We have seen that Truth exists, is unchangeable, eternal, spiritual, and is superior to the human mind. But only God possesses these attributes. If we substitute the word “God” for the word “Truth” in the list of attributes, we see that:
	This metaphilosophy does not belong in this article. That's why the ] article was created. If it fits there, please put it there. ... ] 18:07, 8 June 2006 (UTC)
			*:God Exists-
	<blockquote>
	Any attempt to address a subject so deeply entangled with all human forms of expression and inquiry and so wide-ranging in the complexities of its issues must begin by identifying a few points of focus for the initial setting out and a few lines of likely direction for organizing the account.
	<p>
	As a practical matter, academic studies and everyday discussions of truth always begin by acknowledging, either tacitly or expressly, a particular horizon for their activity. That is, they accept a number of limitations on the subject matter and a variety of restrictions on the methods and styles that are considered ''in bounds'' of sensible proceedings. The alternative, an attempt to proceed without bounds of any kind, typically results in discursive chaos and intellectual paralysis. Though practical methods depend on observing the practical limits of a given horizon, it is still possible under the right conditions to integrate the bits of data from localized frames of reference into more comprehensive and consensual views of the subject matter. This strategy of integration has been given a number of different names in different fields, notably by ], who called it the '']'', referring to the way that domains of personal and disciplinary expertise form "chains of overlapping neighborhoods" (Polanyi 1966, p. 72).
	<p>
	These considerations lead to the following pair of questions to ask about any discussion or investigation of truth:
	<p>
	* Aspects. What sorts of subjects and predicates are considered within bounds? Is the discussion concerned with a broader or a narrower domain of subject matters and a deeper or a shallower spectrum of things that can be said about these subjects?
	<p>
	* Approaches. What attitudes, methods, and styles of discussion are characteristic of a given approach to the aspects of truth that are acknowledged by the approach in question? All human approaches to absolutes are just that, approximations to desired levels of accuracy and completeness that are yet to be achieved. Depending on the application, an approach to a subject may be nothing more than a hazy impression of the area, or it may be so advanced as to admit of an axiomatic theory.
	</blockquote>
			*:God is Unchangeable-
	==NPOV Dispute §7. Conceptual problems==
			*:God is Eternal-
	The following is the current form of the introduction to the five major theories, not counting the "deflationary" theories. What is this all supposed to mean to a reasonably intelligent but previously uninformed reader?. ''Platonic realism'' in the link from "realism"? Anything more current? What about consensus and constructivist theory in this proposed schema? What do the four "definitions" intend to refer to? These "definitions" of what a "realist" theory is doesn't explain anything meaningful, at least not as an intro for a previously unexposed reader to the five major classes of substantive theories of truth. We just went over this argument, and JA held that the rightful place for the more technical article was ]... ] 18:18, 8 June 2006 (UTC)
			*:God is Spiritual-
	<blockquote>
	'''Realist (substantive) theories of truth'''
	<p>
	A ] theory of truth treats ''truth'' as a meaningful concept, having ] to a ] or a ] that exists ''objectively'' or ''in reality''. The terms "objectively" and "in reality" imply that the property or relation in question exists independently of individual opinion or perception, and thus can be inquired into with a reasonable expectation of arriving at a definite answer. To speak of objectivity and reality in regard to truth is not to say that truth exists exclusively of mind in general or separate from all mention of conscious agents.
	<p>
	In this variety of perspectives, the concept of truth may refer to any or all of the following types of things:
	:# A property of a meaning-bearing element that it possesses in and of itself.
	:# A definable relation among meaning-bearing elements.
	:# An identifiable relation among meaningful elements and other types of objects in reality.
	:# A specifiable relation among meaningful elements, objects in reality, and interpretive agents.
	<p>
	It is an assumption of realist theories that ascribing truth to meaning-bearing elements says something significant about them. Theorists working within realist conceptual frameworks analyze truth as a descriptive property with a character that can be discovered through philosophical investigation and reflection. The task for such theorists is to explain the alleged character of truth. Appreciating what these theories say and what they do not say is critically dependent on understanding the concepts of '']'' and '']''. In particular, it is crucial to observe the distinction between relations of ''independence'' or ''invariance'' and relations of ''exclusion'' or ''separation''.
	<p>
	A quick hint of the main ideas involved here can be had by way of analogous ideas that emerged during the 20th century revolutions in physics. One theme that was placed in high relief by this process was the idea that ''all observation is ]'' and thus involves an active relation between the objective world that is being observed and the subjective agent that is doing the observing. This has consequences for the kinds of objectivity that can be achieved and the means by which they can be achieved. It means that invariant laws and objective truths are not obtained by throwing out all relative data, or seeking data that has no shade of subjectivity, but only by using this data, the only kind of data that we ever really have, as the ore from which laws and truths are mined. Likewise, merely including interpretive agents in the transactions among meaning elements and objective realities does not in itself ruin the chances of truths having objective reference to mind-independent realities.
	</blockquote>
			*:God is not a function of Space, Time or Matter-
	JA: The preliminary and transitional material that I added, the stuff that you called "meta-artchitectonic irrelevances", is precisely the sort of field-cultivation that is needed to take up comparative and critical analyses of the Big Five, an independent perspective that the article at present sorely lacks, since it's POV is stuck fast in LA, with a few feeble feelers out toward COR. But the added material is designed to do more than ], and only those. It is intended to open up the space of consideration to many of the topics that are currently relegated to the dags — excuse my Aussian — of the article, mostly on account of the circumstunt that LA has never had anything remotely interesting to say about them. ] 21:04, 8 June 2006 (UTC)
			*:God is Superior to the human mind-
	: Nonsense. that's what the ] article is for. Please keep this mind-poison out of the article on ]...] 22:01, 8 June 2006 (UTC)
			*These attributes apply equally to Truth and God, and only to Truth and God.
	==NPOV Dispute §8. When NPOV means the Gospel according to JA==
			Truth and God are identical. Truth and God are convertible. Truth is God. God is Truth.
			*No created thing possesses the attributes of Truth or God. There can be no True propositions about created entities, including numbers, geometric patterns or so called “laws” of science because they are all dependent on Space, Time or Matter. The only true propositions are about God.
	Fine, leave the POV tag. This is disingenuous, because we just went over these issues very recently. JA decides that because one editor recently made some points above about Kirkham's perspective, the whole level of obscurity and meandering attempts to define the elements slated for the ] article should now be re-imposed on the article on ]. The justification so vehemently given by JA for the ] article was for a place where overarching and meta-analytical terms relating to the subject could be discussed. Why do this?...] 18:32, 8 June 2006 (UTC)
			*In other words, Knowing Truth is Knowing God. Truth is Knowledge of God.
	JA: You know by now that anything I write can be documented in the hard-copy published literatures of those who have addressed the subject matter in question. Or else I will withdraw it. If there is some locus where you suspect me of a ''fiat lux'', then kindly place one of those handy {fact} tags, and that will remind me to go look it up for you. I suspect that the only reason why some people, present company x-cepted, do not do this more often is that their desire is not to know, but not to know. ] 18:42, 8 June 2006 (UTC)
			*<ref>Augustine, Aurelius (354-420): On Free Choice of the Will; Williams, Thomas, Trans., 1998; Bk II (p29-69). {{ISBN|0-87220-188-0}}
	==NPOV Dispute §9. Unwarranted Charges of Original Research==
			Aquinas, Thomas(1225-1274): Truth; Mulligan, R. W., Trans.; Hackett Publishing. Co. 1994; (Vol. I, Q.1, p3-51). {{ISBN|0-87220-267-4}}
			Malebranche, Nicholas (1638-1715): The Search After Truth; Lennon, Thomas, Trans., 1997; (p233-234). {{ISBN|0-521-58995-9}}
			Clark, Gordon (1902-1985): A Christian View of Men and Things; Baker Book House, 1981 (p318-321). {{ISBN|0-8010-2466-8}}
			Nash, Ronald (1937-2006 ): Faith and Reason; Academie Books, 1988; (p161-167). {{ISBN|0-310-29400-2}}</ref> ''END OF REMOVED MATERIAL'' ]
			===Truth in religion should go===
	JA: Kenosis, this is a matter that I take very seriously. There are very, very many insufficiently sourced statements in most WP articles, the article on Truth especially, but the assumption of good faith means that we let most of them pass unless we simply cannot do otherwise, due to conflicts with what we otherwise know. A lack of familiarity with a subject on one person's part does not constitute an excess of originality on another person's part. Do not delete good faith edits and do not charge original research unless you have asked for citations and been steadfastly refused them after a decent interval.
			We need to delete the entire Truth in Religion section. The whole point of theories of truth is to find the common denominator of all truths, regardless of their domain. Otherwise, what's to stop someone from adding dozens of "Truth in blah" sections, where "blah" is replaced by any domain you can think of: biometry, astrology, magic, alchemy, ... etc. --] 03:23, 16 January 2007 (UTC)
	JA: If I meant to allude to the "linguistic turn" that Rorty blazoned, then I would have said precisely that. The term "linguistic-analytic" is one in general use, it is self-explanatory, and it accurately describes a particular approach to meaning and truth that goes back to the dawn of philosophy. If you want a head to include more than that then you have to allow more than that under the head in question. Until then, best practice dictates using heads that fit their contents. ] 22:42, 8 June 2006 (UTC)
			:Dear anon IP 24.16.98.241: This section is intended to accommodate widespread beliefs in truth as argued to be spiritually revealed, or which are otherwise advocated by religions based upon particular kinds of assertions and upon the manner of deducing such concepts that religions may assert to be truth. To date, it appears there's a need in this article to accommodate this point of view in the use of the word "truth". Incidentally, perhaps you might choose to take a username and give other users something with which to associate your edits other than an up-to-12-digit number (and, such a choice would in the future eliminate another potential issue, which is that an IP address usually can easily be geographically located even without any special knowledge other than the address). More importantly, though, I would want to thank you for your well-thought edits, especially to the section on "Types of truth". ... ] 03:37, 16 January 2007 (UTC)
			::I realize that some people think religion has revealed truths, but even assuming there is such a thing, revelation is a method of '''justification''', not a type of '''truth'''. The thing that is being revealed is the same kind of thing that is discovered by science, or proven by deductive logic, or hidden by liars, or seen in the bottom of booze bottles by drunks. Truth is truth regardless of how it is discovered. We should not be letting this article indulge people in the failure to distinguish questions about the nature of truth from questions about how truth is discovered. There are other articles in the wiki for the latter issues. Moreover, it would be wildly non-standard, and thus original research, to include a section about so-called revealed truths in an article about the nature of truth. --] 04:42, 19 January 2007 (UTC)
	::I sure wouldn't want to falsely accuse JA of OR. I sure hope this reshuffling results in a better article. Maybe it will, but this remains to be seen.
			:::FWIW, I agree with 24.16.98.241. ]<sup>]</sup> 04:44, 19 January 2007 (UTC)
			::::Fair enough, KillerChihuahua. As user:24.16.98.241 points out, "revelation" in the context of religion is a "justification" for the belief in such method(s) of discerning what one might regard as truth. Perhaps this section could be replaced with a more explicit analysis of what that means. Assuming the possibility of a reasonably stable consensus on this issue, I certainly would not object. ... ] 06:05, 19 January 2007 (UTC)
			::::<p>As to the additional issue raised by 24.16.98.241 that "ruth is truth regardless of how it is discovered", I would say, as ] previously said in a particularly memorable lyric, "]". See, ], and innumerable related topics such as, for instance, ]. ... ] 06:10, 19 January 2007 (UTC)
			:::::Ah, good catch, yes I was agreeing on the Remove religion bit, not the rest of the comment. Truth is subjective, regardless of how it is characterized. One puppy's opinion. ]<sup>]</sup> 12:17, 19 January 2007 (UTC)
			::::::Well, this issue of "what is truth?" is an extremely tough one for sure, as evidenced by the four or five competing substantive theories and the several "minimalist" theories that essentially dismiss it as a useless term which largely neglects the issue of epistemological justification. And then there's the additional complication that some of the theories attempt to integrate theories of justification into theory of truth, most notably the pragmatic theories. In other words, there's no wide agreement where the study of "truth" ends and where "epistemology" begins (i.e., should the word "truth" only be applied to intentional acts of stating one's knowledge to another--not lying--or is it properly extended into theories of knowledge?, how is it that we might ''know'' a statement to be accurate and useful?, along with other related questions).
			::::::<p>I'm going to take the affirmative step of retitling it to "Religious perspectives on truth" just to tide it over for now. Too often we see WP users adding material of this kind, and I don't at the moment see how it's feasible to put that cork back in the bottle in any stable, long-term way. ... ] 15:48, 19 January 2007 (UTC)
			It seems to me that you are reacting personally to the material on religion. If we are going to have four or five different secular versions of truth, then we should at least respect the religious version, which makes as much sense as at least three of the secular versions. Also, if the Augustine section is not well written, it should be rewritten, not removed. Augustine is a major writer, his views on truth should be respected at least as much as the views of obscure modern academics. ] 14:54, 20 January 2007 (UTC)
	::Among other things newly brought onto the table here, there is still better concision and somewhat better clarity to be sought in the intro to "realist" (substantive) theories. And I still vaguely suspect that when I check the literature we will find that the use of "realist" in truth discourse typically refers to something different than what is currently being referred to in the article on ] when theorists dare to use the term "realist"-- but that remains to be seen also...] 00:33, 9 June 2006 (UTC)
			::I think you may have misunderstood my point. It is not there are religious and secular "versions" of truth and I want to eliminate the religious ones. The problem is that there are no religious versions of truth, not in the sense of "version of truth" that would apply to an encyclopedia article about truth. There are different religious versions about ''what is or isn't true'', and about how truth is obtained/justified; but there are no religious theories of what truth ''is''. There have been religious writers from time-to-time who claimed that they were dealing with the question of "What truth is," but it always turns out on actually reading the works in question that they were answering either "how do we obtain truth?" or "what is true?". What you are calling the "secular versions" are theories that really are ''about'' the nature of truth. Hence, they really belong in an article that is itself about truth. But the religious doctrines mentioned in the article do not belong, not anymore than particular theories of physics or astronomy or astrology; because just as the latter three theories are not about truth, neither are the relgious doctrines. --] 02:57, 29 January 2007 (UTC)
			:I agree, Rick, about the section about religious perspectives on truth. As I see it, there is an ongoing potential for workable balance between excessive presentation of religious POVs on the one hand, and complete exclusion on the other hand, even despite the tendency for users to occasionally introduce awkward volumes of religious material that is essentially proselytizing theology or dogma. This kind of material tends to be relatively difficult to sort through for editing purposes, in part because it is often justified by revelation rather than some more particular set of observations about the world. Yet, it is possible to accommodate it, which the article already does.
	JA: When you do finally dip into the literature(s), be sure to let me know. For my part, been there, read that, got the T-shirt, so do let me continue to continue while I wait. ] 02:40, 9 June 2006 (UTC)
			:As to Augustine, I don't have the time to parse out the theology from the observations about truth and distill it down to a summary of reasonable length. Just because Augustine keeps using the word "truth" doesn't necessarily warrant the inclusion of such arguments in this article either. It's granted that he's a major writer, philosopher and theologian, but he's not really a major commentator on theory of truth. For example, in his dissertation ''on Christian Doctrine'', he has a lengthy analysis of ''things'' and ''symbols'' or ''signs'' (classical semiotics, really), and then turns around and says that the signs and symbols (including words) are "things" too. Then, he basically argues that there are seven steps to wisdom: fear of God, loyal obedience (or faith), scientia (or knowledge), strength, good counsel, purity of heart, and then wisdom. About the issue of ''truth'', he's basically arguing that "God" is truth, and that so are the scriptures. So it's not really an an analysis of truth, but more of an apologetic theology. Nonetheless, his view appears to deserve inclusion in the article, but in much shorter form. I just don't have time at present, nor handy access to the sources, to try to distill the recently donated material and meet WP:VER, and it's quite possible I'd feel the need to start from scatch. Rick, maybe you could throw something together about Augustine's view of truth? and we'll hack away at it as time permits?
	::Like I said, I smell OR here, and I smell it strong. But I'd be happy to be wrong upon consulting relevant sources among the thousands available on the subject...] 03:27, 9 June 2006 (UTC) ... Where I particularly sense OR is in the proposed use of "realist". I'd be willing to bet a nickel at even odds, and also be happy to lose the bet. ... ] 03:40, 9 June 2006 (UTC)
			:Rick, it's nice to see your name here again, incidentally. ... ] 18:33, 20 January 2007 (UTC)
			I don't know enough about Augustine's view of truth to work on that section. From what you say, it sounds as if, in the terms used by the scholastics, he was a realist (words are things) rather than a nominalist (words are merely signs), but an Augustine scholar should write that section of the article. I backed off from Truth because I am a mathematician, not a philosopher. Most recently, I let myself get lured into a cat fight over Philosophy, where there are dozens of reverts and rereverts and it seems like hundreds of pages of argument being written every day. I think I'll be happier over in mathematics...or maybe Star Trek. ] 23:50, 20 January 2007 (UTC)
	JA: ORdure is in the gnosis of the gnosis-be-holder. When it comes to main article pages, I believe I honor the Not-Up-Making-Stuff (NUMS) policy 10 to 20 times better than what's in the breaches of most WifiPu articles that I have on my Snifflist, and that's a lot. There's a standard mechanism for requesting freshness data if you get a whiff of something you think is fish. I won't mind a bit. I'd very much prefer it to having three days worth of tabula rased just because you scent something unfamiliar. But I can't possibly guess in advance all of the things that some folks are e-stranger to. ] 03:46, 9 June 2006 (UTC)
	::Yep, no kidding about the WikiSnifflist. One or more things at the moment, to the extent that I might give a whoot about a "good result" in this article (whatever exactly a "good result" might be): ...] 04:38, 9 June 2006 (UTC)
			I believe the section should stay. ] is the revealing of truth experienced by an individual. ] 07:44, 27 April 2007 (UTC)
	::*1) what I already said about the use of "realist". Like the use of "analytic" and the use of philosophae, it has different meanings in different times and contexts. I'm ascared of it, and would like to see some sourcing on the use of it if possible. Thus far I only see the use of "anti-realist" in some literature....] 04:38, 9 June 2006 (UTC)
			== why... ==
	JA: Wha'happened is fairly easily explained if anybody's really interested, but since I've already explained it several times alright already on this talk page alone, with no apparent recog from you of that fact, my initial assumption of it being a ''bona fide'' question has since been updated to ''probably rhetorical''. ] 05:24, 9 June 2006 (UTC)
			...is this page protected?!--]<small><sup>]</sup></small> 22:29, 14 February 2007 (UTC)
	::*1) I'm also ascared of another JA writing tear which requires a microparsing and teardown to arrive at something like a summary or synopsis of specific slants....] 04:38, 9 June 2006 (UTC)
			:At least someone add ]. Sheesh...--]<small><sup>]</sup></small> 22:30, 14 February 2007 (UTC)
			==Removed and placed here for discussion ==
	::*1) I'm also ascared of using additional original slants to deal with the question of CHARLES PEIRCE again in the context of semiotic approaches, while keeping integrated the basic pragmatic slant. Maybe differentiating in one sentence between Peirce the pragmatist and Peirce the semioticist will be required....] 04:38, 9 June 2006 (UTC)
			I've removed this section, which was placed by an anon IP, and am putting it here to save it just in case. Reasonas are 1) It's not a minimalist or deflationary theory; 2) Risenzweig can't seem to be found on a Google search; 3) it doesn't appear to merit a section based on Rosezweig's name. It may, though, be a useful insight for the future in the article to the extent we can find sourcing for it. ... ] 15:39, 23 February 2007 (UTC)
			:====Rosenzweig's theory of truth====
			:Benjamin D. Rosenzweig contends that truth should not be defined in terms of any of the "theories of truth" but instead left as an ambiguous term that can be better specified by referring to the theory by which a particular instance of reality is being evaluated. For instance one could suggest that according to consensus truth the theory of evolution is not yet proved but coherence truth dictates that it is proved according to the requirements set forth by the scientific community. ... 15:39, 23 February 2007 (UTC)
			Maybe you can't find it cause you can't spell it. It's Benjamin D. Rosenzweig... not "Risenzweig" nor "Rosezweig". He is a distinguished German professor currently teaching epistemology and political science at the University of London.<small>—Preceding ] comment added by ] (]) {{{2|}}}</small><!-- Template:UnsignedIP -->
	JA: Same guy. ] 05:24, 9 June 2006 (UTC)
			:To the contrary, I copied and pasted the name in the Google search, along with the word "truth". Try it, and perhaps show us where he comes up on the search results, if at all. Either way, he's not adequately notable to build a section around his name in an article such as this. If sourcing can be provided, it may make sense to integrate his observation into another place in the article, citing to him. Thank you for the info. ... ] 16:59, 23 February 2007 (UTC)
			::Certainly he's not notable enough for the main article. ] 18:31, 23 February 2007 (UTC)
			Simply because the great google search engine provides no results does not make a man's theory any less valid. I know he has had several books published in Germany. I'll do some research.<small>—Preceding ] comment added by ] (]) {{{2|}}}</small><!-- Template:UnsignedIP -->
			::Some ] perspective on this would be appreciated. See also: ]. Thanks much. ... ] 02:45, 24 February 2007 (UTC)
			"The work must be prescribed as a textbook, a reference work, or required reading in an undergraduate- or graduate- level course; which is not taught, designed, or otherwise overseen by the author; at several independent accredited universities."
	::*1a) I'm also ascared of the current use of "analytic" and "linguistic analytic". It has in it the following problem. Analytic refers to much of what is currently known as philosophy at least from Heraclitus forward....] 04:38, 9 June 2006 (UTC)
			I'm afraid he's not achieved that level of notability. I still believe that the proposal is worth a footnote of some sort.
	JA: On that disheartening note I'll just retire, and probably whimper myself to sleep. ] 05:24, 9 June 2006 (UTC)
			==References==
	::*1b) Then again, it gets wrapped up in the linguistic turn. Then again it gets contorted in the concept of analytic and post-analytic philosophy. Is "post analytic" intended to refer to what? everyone just stops thinking? It's a new one to me. If the article is going to deal with this issue, best we clarify it quickly, source it, and integrate accordingly. ...] 04:38, 9 June 2006 (UTC)
			Sorry, I'm not sure how to add that the ref for 44 is m-w.com.
	JA: Done. ] 21:26, 9 June 2006 (UTC)
			] 19:33, 27 February 2007 (UTC)
			:For now, I simply changed the reference to http://m-w.com/dictionary/truth (see ]).--] 01:29, 28 February 2007 (UTC)
			== Examples please ==
	::*1) "This section is a stub; you can help by expanding it (but not too much, lest this become an article about everything in the world)"...] 04:38, 9 June 2006 (UTC)
			It would be great to show examples of statements which would be true under some of the theories but not true under other(s). '']'' 20:57, 9 March 2007 (UTC)
	==NPOV Dispute §10. Deck Chairs, No Music==
			== Congratulations! ==
	JA: After all that shuffling and gibing, you have basically re-instated the same POSH arangement as before, Port Out, Starboard Home, and everything that isn't T and analytic philosophy in tucked out of sight in steerage. But nobody made you captain on this 3-hour cruise, so I don't need your leave to contribute here, and I'll walk that plank another time, all your cruise direction notwithstanding. ] 02:36, 9 June 2006 (UTC)
			Listen, my friends, who have assembled, nurtured, and protected this gem of an article on ]. I came by here as a user, looking for connections to what all the wonderful women and men of history have written about ]. And what I found here was -- not only incredibly useful in saving me time to dig through to get to all of what you have mined already for me here -- but also very inspiring to me in providing me with a concrete example of a Misplaced Pages page that is perfect. And I know it will evolve. Go forth, thank you. And my congratulations to you. --] 02:00, 24 March 2007 (UTC)
	: See: '']'', especially sections 2 and 3. Earlier, one paragraph about what the deflationists were responding to would have done it. Now it's a complete mess again. In addition to the above concerns, here's another. Correspondence theory is ''the'' historical "realist" theory, and an important cornerstone for pragmatic theory built substantially on the foundation of correspondence. At this point, the attempt to break the whole explanation up according to "analytic" and "post-analytic" contorts virtually everything in the article. Spend $100 to try to save a buck. When previously we had five major theories to introduce to readers, pretty much up front. ...] 19:07, 9 June 2006 (UTC)
			== Validity ==
	JA: You're confusing '']'', a long-established term of art in philosophy, with '']''. It's a common mistake, but no less a misteak for a'that. Long before I washed ashore in Wiki], the Wiki]s had already found it necessary to create a '']'' article so all those <math>\star</math>]s who had just found out about wha'happened to the lost moon ] of the ] homeworld ] would have a guestbook wherein to scribble their graffiti of earnest condolence to ]. It's so hard to please everybody, but you gotta try. ] 20:00, 9 June 2006 (UTC)
			Someone should add a link to ] in the Logic links section. Unfortunately, if I do it, I'll screw up the columns... ] 01:20, 30 March 2007 (UTC)
	: Gotta go. better things to do right now. Curmudgeonry here. By the way, the additional category of Truth in specialized contexts is an excellent idea. Bye....] 20:23, 9 June 2006 (UTC)
			== Baha'i position on Truth ==
	==NPOV Dispute §11. Irrelevant sections==
			I am new to this, so apologies if I am approaching it the wrong way. I was wondering if a ] perspective to truth could be added to this page, as in the faith the founder states that "Truthfulness is the foundation of all human virtues" (Baha'u'llah quoted in Shoghi Effend - Advent of Divine Justice, p. 26) so it may be interesting to add.
	I'm inclined to delete the paragraph, quoted here, because it has no relevance to the paragraphs that precede or follow it. For that matter, it doesn't have any obvious relevance to anything in the article. If anyone wants to keep it, please add something to it so that readers can see what its relevance is. --] 18:49, 4 June 2006 (UTC)
			--] 15:18, 16 April 2007 (UTC)--] 15:17, 16 April 2007 (UTC)
	: "Difficulties in human communication often arise from the fact that persons are capable of taking up different attitudes, called propositional attitudes, toward what they think, say, or write, and may express their different stances in widely different linguistic modalities. Propositions can, for example, be accepted, asserted, believed, commanded, contested, declared, denied, doubted, enjoined, exclaimed, expected, imagined, intended, observed, proven, questioned, suggested, or wished to be true. Differentiating among the various attitudes and modalities a person can take toward a proposition can be critical in evaluating truth. Due to the many factors involved, the analyses can be quite complex, and the philosophical discussions generally reflect this complexity."
			== Revise Buddhist section ==
	: Actually the entire section this paragraph is in "Signs, sentences, and propositions" and the section "Physical symbol systems" don't seem to have any relevance to the the topic of truth. Someone add something to them to show their relevance or I'm going to delete them. --] 22:26, 4 June 2006 (UTC)
			The Buddhist section is pretty weak; all that is discussed is the concept of the "Four Noble Truths". While this does contain the word "truth" in it, the Nobel Truths are really more about psychology than epistemology. However, I do think that the concept of truth and how human beings can discover truth is central to Buddhism. Buddha said that the ultimate source of suffering was ignorance or delusion. I'd like to totally re-write this section to discuss the Buddhist view of the importance of truth and the problem of delusion and self-deception. My sources would be directly from online transcriptions of the Pali Cannon such as www.accesstoinsight.org and maybe a few modern books on Zen.
	:: Yes. And also the section "Approaches independent of analytic philosophy" which is all unsourced original research. Much of the organization of this article into sections does not match any traditional organization of this subject. At best it is a kind of original research proposal for reconceiving the subject. The proposal should be made at an APA convention, not in introductory encyclopedia article. --] 03:41, 11 June 2006 (UTC)
			I've never edited a Misplaced Pages article before so any hints would be welcomed. ] 22:48, 23 April 2007 (UTC)
	JA: An admission of unfamiliarity with the topic on your part does not constitute originality on my part. The standard procedure for addressing doubts about the groundedness of any statement is to request citations for the specific statement that you have questions about, either on the discussion page or by using one of the handy {fact} tags on the statements in question. ] 03:52, 11 June 2006 (UTC)
			Has this interest been gone? I don't see any improvements on this subject.
	: I do know the subject. (And I never said or implied otherwise.) That's how I know that the organization of this article includes subordinate topics that have no connection with the main topic of the article. The original research I'm complaining about is not a statement, it is the idiosyncratic organization of the article. Or perhaps I should say the idiosyncratic inclusion of irrelevant topics. How would you suggest that I "{fact}" the structure of the article? (Put a {fact} on the title?) But now that you mention it, there are a lot of original research statements in this article too. -- ] 04:31, 11 June 2006 (UTC)
			--Gotti 17:30, 19 November 2007 (UTC)
			== Duality of Truth. ==
	JA: You seem to be saying that the inclusion of anything that might fall under the heading of "approaches to the subject of truth that are independent of analytic philosophy" is idiosyncratic and irrelevant to the subject of truth as you so well know it. That is a well-known POV, but that is all it is, a particular POV, and the fact that some people do not accord consideration to alternative POVs is the very reason that the article currently bears a POV tag. To say that any other POV is "irrelevant" is your POV. To say that the alternative POV is "idiosyncratic" is to say nothing more than the moral equivalent of a singular individual shares that alternative POV, and that is simply a false statement. To say that the alternative POV is "original research" is to say that it orginates with the present contributor of it, and that is simply a false statement, as can amply be documented if you so desire. ] 04:52, 11 June 2006 (UTC)
			Duality of Truth.
	: By all means, please cite published discussions of theories of truth that divide the subject into Analytic and non-Analytic theories, and which contain material in the latter section that is substantially the same as what is now in the "Approaches independent of analytic philosophy" section of this article. --] 05:00, 11 June 2006 (UTC)
			Two of the greatest errors in the perception of Truth, is the inability to see two properties. The duality of truth, (original research) and the divisive nature of truth, the Light theory of truth. (orginal research)
	JA: Thank you, I will bring more primary sources to bear on the topics. Please note, however, that I very deliberately avoided casting things as a dichotomy of AP versus Non-AP. Post-AP developments include some that promote or extend AP views and others that more or less sharply depart from them, but they all pretty much stay within the slate of questions that were put on the ballot by AP. No doubt many of the passed on APs would spin in their graves if I mentioned the name of Hegel in this connection, so I will. ] 05:38, 11 June 2006 (UTC)
			The first relates to the second definition of half-truth, circa 1994 whereby a truth is absolute, yet relative to the perseptive of the observer. A classic old story is that of the blind men and the elephant, however, seldom if ever is the appropriate duality of truth conclusion reached.
	: Nice sleight of hand, Jon; but I spotted it. ''Primary'' sources is not what you said you could "amply" document and it is not what you were challenged to do. You said you could show other discussions of truth that divide the subject into Analytic and non-Analytic theories and which contain material in the latter section that is substantially the same as what is now in the "Approaches independent of analytic philosophy" section of this article. It is secondary souces which divide topics into broad schools. No primary source says "here is my analytic theory and in section two below you will find my non-analytic theory." --] 14:45, 11 June 2006 (UTC)
			The second relates to the divisive nature of truth, relating to the rainbow of truth, that is that while The Truth is colorless, a truth is merely part of the whole truth. To understand this concept puts one on the way to understanding the divisive nature of Truth. I would suggest that this was the intended suggestion of the prophet Jesus Christ, who claimed to be the way, the life and the truth, and also the light of the world. What I call the bridge between science and religion.
	::Heh heh. Way to call his bluff Meng! --] 17:03, 11 June 2006 (UTC)
			I hope someone has time to consider the important implications of this original research into expanding the definition of truth.
	I concur with the remarks of Ladd and Meng at the top of this section. The article sections in question are not relevant to the topic and should be removed. --] 17:10, 11 June 2006 (UTC)
			--] 21:13, 1 June 2007 (UTC)
	: Actually, the section titled "signs, sentences and propositions" refers to three very widespread ways in which theorists have dealt with defining their terms (we left "utterance", "symbol" and a few others out), to which has been added the term "truthbearer" in more modern discussion within the last several decades (still a widely debated and often disputed term that seemed to earlier editors of the article to deserve its own brief section). I wouldn't oppose removing the section on "signs, sentences and propositions", but if it were removed I'd want to see pretty much that whole first section including "truthbearers" taken out too. And I'd want to quickly reimpose ''some'' introductory discussion of basics either before or after summarizing the major "substantive" theories and the minimalist theories. Another thing that needs to be made clear to the reader in my estimation, either before or immediately after the major theories, is the importance of the propositional attitude of the person making any kind of statement, utterance, theory, sentence or proposition being assessed for its truth value. This all has to do with explaining the importance of getting beyond the literal interpretation of people's statements and explaining to the reader in some reasonable way why the discussion is so complex and why scholars disagree so heartily about these difficult issues, or at least explaining the reader to watch out because the discussion ''is'' quite complex and diverse in the literally thousands of sources on the subject.
			== 2+2=4 and deduction "truths" ==
	: There are many ways of doing it of course, and it certainly can be done far more effectively so as to allow the "generally educated" reader to leave with some meaningful material without needing to read the entire article. I definitely wouldn't oppose a single, simpler introductory section and moving right into a summary of the major theories. Trying to split up the major theories in the way currently being attempted (according to "analytic philosophy", "post-analytic philosophy" and "independent of analytic philosophy") is in my opinion doomed to failure. The major theories should be summarized high up in the article, and specific more obscure slants should, if mentioned at all, come later in the article in very brief summary form, with appropriate links to the main articles on those slants. Indeed the article on ] was created and justified in a lengthy set of arguments by Jon Awbrey as a way of dealing with such more obscure slants.
			Hello ] - Thanks for recently providing a hotlink reference to "unversalism". However, I've had to revert two examples of "universal truths". 2+2=4 is not a universal truth. While it is true independent of location in space and time (i.e. "everywhere in the universe" as was stated), it is only true in certain mathematical systems. In others, like e.g. a ], this is not true, instead, 2 + 2 = 1 there. Similarily with laws of deduction and inference, which are true in formal ]; nevertheless, logic is a defined framework, relative to which the laws of deduction and inference are true. Thanks, ] 19:05, 5 June 2007 (UTC)
	: Although there can be reasonable disagreement about how to define the "major" theories, there are about five basic theories, or classes of theories: Correspondence, coherence, pragmatic, constructivist and consensus, all of which currently have at least ''reasonable'' summaries already in the article at present. These five classes of theories really do explain to a generally educated reader the basic slants on the subject. There are about three or four identifiable classes of "deflationary" or minimalist theories. The deflationary theories are interesting, and introducing them to the reader is as good a place as any to explain that the deflationists were responding (1) to positivist formulations of truth theory and the widespread use of the "truth predicate" (the words X or Y 'is true' or its equivalent) in philosophical discussions of truth especially in the first half of the 20th century, and (2) reacting to increasing overlap of ] into philosophical discussion of "truth", really a widespread argument about philosophical territory, so to speak. In my estimation all of these basic theories should be accessible to the reader very close to the beginning of the article. It would be quite plausible to reformat the approach to define terms such as "propositions" and "truthbearers", along with important practical issues, in one or more sections ''after'' presenting the basic theories... ] 18:19, 11 June 2006 (UTC)
			I have reverted and rewritten
	I agree with those who say these sections are irrelevant. (Mr. or Ms. Kenosis could you cite someone who "debates" or "disputes" the term "truthbearer? I'm not aware of anyone who does. It has been a term of art for decades.) --] 19:15, 11 June 2006 (UTC)
	::Good to see some fresh perspective here. I would look to see a more accessible and balanced article resulting from your involvement. Here's a reasonable link on "truthbearer", just off the top of my head: .
			1. Such dependence on ] issues does not negate the articles claims about lack of dependence on time and space.
	: Agreed that it has been a term of art for some time, very roughly the same length of time as "utterances", joining with propositions, signs, symbols, etc., that are more longstanding to varying degrees. The debate I referred to is mainly about what is the acceptable range of entities qualifying as a truthbearer. Dispute about the term's use is mainly by default and choice not to use it--perhaps I should have said "not universally accepted" as I did earlier on. As I said just above here, it seems to me if we strike propositions and a general explanation of the range of signs, symbols, etc that are in play in phlosophy of "truth", we should also strike truthbearers. But, in my estimation we should immediately create a place to explain it later in the article after introducing the major theories and giving the reader a perspective on the basic slants. ... ] 20:07, 11 June 2006 (UTC)
			2. It is perverse to remove mathematical examples but leave in economics and ethics.
	: The material you link to does not "debate" or "dispute" the term "truthbearer." It makes some points about truthbearers, but it provides no support for your claim that the very use of that term is controversial. --] 22:29, 11 June 2006 (UTC)
			] 20:59, 5 June 2007 (UTC)
	:: Fair enough. I'm a bit disturbed by the blanket removal of some kind of introduction to the more traditional use of "propositions" in truth studies. If anything can be said about "truth bearer" it is that it does not have a monopoly on the discussion (at least not yet). But it seems to me far more important to bring the article under some level of manageability and readability to a "generally educated" reader. Will put the removed material on the talk page for later parsing and consideration of certain portions of the content. Thanks for your help... ] 15:13, 12 June 2006 (UTC)
			:Your rewrite looks good to me and accomodates my concern I had with the initial post. We need to provide a better reference to who actually holds these believes (individuals, groups, organizations, etc). Reference to ] alone appears a bit too ambiguous. And I also agree that the two examples with economics and ethics appear insufficiently motivated. So, to the least, we're now having examples from mathematics, logic, microeconomics, and ethics. Thanks, ] 00:15, 6 June 2007 (UTC)
	JA: There seems to be a difficulty with the reading and the comprehension of the following statement that I made above:
			==Oi! You! SIMPLIFY!!!!!==
	<blockquote>
			Imagine that you're a semi-literate dude who has a very low comprehension of English. Imagine that you would like a nice, short, workable definition of truth that is 99% correct for most of what you will be doing (kinda like how Newton's laws of Physics are 99% correct unless you travel close to the speed of light, etc....). Anyhow, the point is this. This wiki article is probabably too long to provide a *pragmatic* defintion of truth (which is really what it should do!). Can't we have a simple phrase-based definition of truth so that that may be placed at the introduction to this article?
	JA: You seem to be saying that the inclusion of anything that might fall under the heading of "approaches to the subject of truth that are independent of analytic philosophy" is idiosyncratic and irrelevant to the subject of truth as you so well know it. That is a well-known POV, but that is all it is, a particular POV, and the fact that some people do not accord consideration to alternative POVs is the very reason that the article currently bears a POV tag. To say that any other POV is "irrelevant" is your POV. To say that the alternative POV is "idiosyncratic" is to say nothing more than the moral equivalent of a singular individual shares that alternative POV, and that is simply a false statement. To say that the alternative POV is "original research" is to say that it orginates with the present contributor of it, and that is simply a false statement, as can amply be documented if you so desire. ] 04:52, 11 June 2006 (UTC)
	</blockquote>
			Also, are there any further religious one-liners that people would like to add about truth? Maybe some proverbs and so forth?
	JA: MengTheMagnificent has interpreted this paragraph in the following way:
			Back to work...
	<blockquote>
	You said you could show other discussions of truth that divide the subject into Analytic and non-Analytic theories and which contain material in the latter section that is substantially the same as what is now in the "Approaches independent of analytic philosophy" section of this article.
	</blockquote>
			Perhaps an article on how politicians sometimes (only sometimes?) have an inclination to either distort or misrepresent the truth would improve the livings standards of everyone contributing to this article.
	JA: I do not find the phrase "non-Analytic" in my statement, and I know as a matter of fact that I took some pains to avoid using it in my realignment of topics, so I cannot imagine how any careful reader could read MengTheMagnificent's reading into what I wrote. ] 19:05, 11 June 2006 (UTC)
			] 20:43, 25 June 2007 (UTC)
	: I think you have misunderstood her. The only thing she said about the your quotation of yourself is that it was a sleight of hand. The quote from her that you call her interpretation of your paragraph is actually her summation of ''earlier'' exchanges between you. It seems essentially accurate to me. You did seem to be claiming that your way of organizing this topic and what you include as relevant was not original and that you could amply document it. (And it does now appear that you are trying to weasel out of that.) --] 19:15, 11 June 2006 (UTC)
			:The simple answer to the question in the first paragraph is "No, it's not simple" -- please see the talk page threads and the 14 archives of talk.
	: RE "non-analytic": that's one of the numerous things I was ascared of before: "independent of analytic philosophy" means what? non-positivist? maybe no anlysis necessary?, just presto?, eureka, aha! I got it?, etc. ... ] 19:19, 11 June 2006 (UTC)
			:<p> As to the question in the second paragraph, it's a bit of a balancing act. The worms are already out of the proverbial can, and every once in awhile a participating editor tries to put a few back in the can, so to speak.
			:<p>As to the third paragraph, see, e.g. ], ], ]. Maybe try ] and follow links to see where they go; there are existing articles on ], ] (broken down by country) -- who knows, maybe there's room for a new article on this issue, which would require defining the topic and using ] showing this dimension of politics that the anon IP mentions here. ... ] 22:04, 25 June 2007 (UTC)
			::Don't forget ]. --''best, kevin'' <b>]<b>]]<b>]</b> 22:16, 25 June 2007 (UTC)
			== Split ] ==
	Another thing here: So, what the article is currently saying is that pragmatic theory (perhaps along with constructivist epistemology and consensus theory) is the only place the positivists generally didn't get involved except as critics? What about constructivist views that were ''pre'' - analytic philosophy? What about correspondence views that were ''pre'' - analytic philosophy? How about Aristotle (a pretty good correspondence-mode thinker as I recall)? Aquinas (who used the Latin version of "correspondence" as a descriptor)? How do you explain the continental rationalists (coherent thought systems) that were ''pre'' - analytic philosophy to the reader? maybe by saying "well, the analytic philosophers arrived at coherence theory, but it applied retrospectively to the continental rationalists in describing their thought? (Sure this one's do-able but ought be unnecessary in the summary) This organizational schema is fundamentally unworkable. The major theories are properly presented as a group way up front in the article so the reader can review them and get a basic idea of the major slants, followed by the minimalists. ... ] 19:27, 11 June 2006 (UTC)
			The material on truth in religion should be moved into a separate article. The present article is way too long. The main article should maintain its emphasis on philosophy. Removing the religious material will also give the main article a better chance at stability. ] 23:10, 30 June 2007 (UTC)
	I count 6 people in favor of deleting this material, and no more than 2 who may want to keep it, so I'm going to remove it now. (One or more of the sections may have been renamed or moved around since this part of the discussion page was started.) --] 07:52, 12 June 2006 (UTC)
			There being no objections, I will commence the split. ] 19:12, 6 July 2007 (UTC)
	==NPOV Dispute §12. The Current POV of the Article==
			:I think the article can withstand it either way. But personally, I'd like to see a section on "truth in religion" remain, with a link to a main article. The reason has to do with the important concept called "justification". A brief section noting that "religious truth" typically is justified, in the minds of those asserting it, to scripture, "faith", or other form(s) of religious authority, would be important to this article I would think. This would, if implemented, allow further discussion of these methods of justification to be discussed at greater length in the new "main article" being proposed by Banno. ... ] 02:49, 7 July 2007 (UTC)
			I agree with Kenosis. There should be a short (less than 10 lines) section on religious truth. It should mention the idea of revealed truth, the idea of inspired truth, the "two truths" so popular in the middle ages, and maybe the quote, "The truth shall set you free." All linked to "Main article: religious truth". There are several other sections that could be split off in this way. ] 14:21, 7 July 2007 (UTC)
	JA: I have placed a POV tag on the article. I have tried my level best to work without that device, but my cries for balance have gone unrecognized and my repeated attempts to create a more balanced article have been obstructed by a POV-bound stance so entrenched and unreflective that it cannot even acknowledge that it is a POV. So we are just going to have to work on that. ] 18:30, 8 June 2006 (UTC)
			All good points, and much as is outline in the relevant policy, ]. I'll do the split soon, but will need all your input into what stays and what goes, since I have no strong preferences on the topic. ] 02:01, 8 July 2007 (UTC)
	JA: Since I have made these same objections on a recurring basis since first coming to this article, I will state them more briefly than usual, for ease of assimilation.
			=== Synchronise ===
	JA: The article in its current state presents its subject matter almost entirely from a single POV and it largely ignores any of the traditionally recognized aspects of the subject matter about which that POV has little to say.
			I have simply copied the content of ] to the new article, leaving a copy of the first paragraph here as a lead-in to the new article. Others, especially Rick who seems to have a handle on what is needed, might like to change the paragraph here and the new introduction inthe other article. ] 03:28, 8 July 2007 (UTC)
	JA: The current POV of the article can be recognized as according overwhelming favoritism to a pair of related outlooks on the subject, namely, the "Linguistic-Analytic POV" (LA POV) and the "Correspondence POV" (COR POV).
			Particular care is going to be needed to ensure that ] does not turn into a POV fork, I suggest keeping a close eye on it in relation to this, the main article. ] 04:09, 8 July 2007 (UTC)
	JA: The fact that other POVs are mentioned in the article is no evidence against this charge. It is easy to recognize on examination that the theses of the other POVs are presented almost solely as they are seen from the LA and COR POVs.
			==Truth in art==
	:Yes this is correct to an extent. Most people like some correspondence with reality attached to their notions and discussions of truth. For the dedicated solipsist, there's always some preferred internally coherent version (amazing how internally consistent some schizoprenics can be at times). For the dedicated cynic of social matters there's constructivist theory, which is of course presumed to have some correspondence with the actual social-constructive facts of the matter. So too, consensus can be observed, however difficult it is to quantify and put into a nice neat formula--still, we like to hold our consensus theorists to having some bearing, some correspondence, with the facts of the matter. Yes, that is a reasonably accurate observation. As to the LA POV, this too is correct. If you can't deconstruct and analyze a sentence, and place it in context to argue what its underlying content is intended to say to the rest of the human race, why bother to analyze?.. ] 19:26, 8 June 2006 (UTC)
			*What happened to any attempt to deal with "truth in art"? --] 18:47, 7 July 2007 (UTC)
			:Truth is beauty and beauty truth. That's all I know and all I need to know. ] 14:35, 8 July 2007 (UTC)
			:::Is the statement: "Truth is beauty and beauty truth" a true statement or a beautiful statement?] 15:56, 14 July 2007 (UTC)Lestrade
			== Math and Half-truths ==
	JA: Aside from this, the lopsidedness of the article in favor of this combined POV is evidenced by the fact that it simply fails to address in any responsible or significant way any of the established questions or topics under the heading of ''truth'' that are not commonly treated as worthwhile subjects from the LA and COR POVs. ] 19:06, 8 June 2006 (UTC)
			In the world of truths concerning math, (original research lead) there is the inheret logic of math that suggests a multi-truth solution to a basic algerbraic problem.
	JA: I recognize that even the most parochial of observers can still be honest observers, and that most of the lacks in their POV, the fact that they do not even recognize it as a POV, is simply due to their not getting out of their parish often enough, or not having read widely enough. But these are insufficiencies that can be supplied in a parishioner who truly wants to know.
			1 + 1 = 2
	JA: One of the rational courses for gaining a wider perspective is literally-figuratively to "stand back" a little ways from the familiar illuminations of texts and grindstones of thought, and try to look at the familiar doctrines from a fresh angle, with a field of view that takes in a few new landmarks of comparison. Oh yes, your cohorts in the monasterile gardens may mock what they call your Icharian hubris for its "meta-architectronic" flying buttresses, but that is just one of the many crosses that you'll have to bear for the sake standing on the shoulders of strange new giants. So to speak. ] 19:36, 8 June 2006 (UTC)
			or
			1 + 1 = 1
			The solutions are based on the relative nature of what each 1 represents.
	JA: Since I have never given any indication of thinking that the LA POV or the COR POV should not be given all due exposition in the article, a lot of what you say above is simply unjustified nonsense. The question to which I have time and again tried to draw your attention is the question of what it takes to present a POV with all of its best feet forward, but without stepping all over every other POV in town. That is the question. What does it take? ] 19:48, 8 June 2006 (UTC)
			--] 15:31, 14 July 2007 (UTC)
	JA: One of the "best" ways of *not* achieving a balanced presentation of something that approaches the uncensored wholeness of the subject matter is to use a pet issue of a single POV — namely, the pet issue of the deflatus vociferaries as to whether a particular chunk of syntax can be analyzed away from their pet linguistic contexts — as the main line in the sand for outlining the heart the article. I have said this often enough to recognize that unwitting true believers in the importance of this LA criterion have the greatest difficulty pulling their heads out of the LA POV long enough to recognize what a very tiny umbilicus it truly is to everybody else. ] 20:06, 8 June 2006 (UTC)
			:::"inherent"........"algebraic" ] 15:52, 14 July 2007 (UTC)Lestrade
	JA: In (mediate) summation, it is clear that these very serious problems with the balance of the article simply cannot be addressed without a major restructuring. I realize that any work of real transformation is a task fraught with frustrations, not to be entered lightly, but I see no other way of resolving the stresses that have accumulated on the surface of the article and also here in its pasted-over depths. That is precisely the reason why I took a full week to discuss the issues here ahead of time, and why I have crept foward with incremental baby steps. But there will be a change in the current topology of the article. ] 20:20, 8 June 2006 (UTC)
			Thanks...on the one hand we expect perfect spelling, to an imperfect concept like Truth or Math
	JA: Something there is that does not like a maint, er, custodial tag, and I always remove them as soon as it looks like there's any hope at all. I see that I jumped the gun this time. I thought Kenosis was joking with that ''analytic philosophy is all philosophy'' crack, but I guess he wasn't. At any rate, until the general usership is disdelusioned of that fond but utterly unfounded notion, it looks like we'll have to maintain that darned ole ] POV tag hanging over our otherwise all too sleepy heads. ] 20:52, 9 June 2006 (UTC)
			--] 20:44, 14 July 2007 (UTC)
	:Sure, a misquote (or a mis-italic, just enough to come in under the radar there, eh?) gets my attention again here. The problem, as you might already suspect in some way, is in the contorted use of the terms "post-analytic" and "other than analytic" philosophy. Not only that, "analytic philosophy" is itself a vague enough term to be questionable for use to put in such a predominant scheme without explaining what on earth it ''is''. Moreover, when I placed a reference to "positivist" influence JA quickly removed it, so it's fairly obvious that's too close to home, so to speak. I suppose it is preferable, once again, to intentionally befuddle the reader under the pretense of real pedagogy.
			:Caesar, the Wiki cannot publish ], and the resources used used must be ]. ] 22:43, 14 July 2007 (UTC)
	:Yet another problem here, in addition to the above: although B. Russell appears to have made "correspondence theory" famous by the name "correspondence", this theory is ''not'' the sole domain of positivist or analytic philosophy. Same with coherence theory. Coherence theory may ''describe'' a preferred method of many positiists in approaching truth, but obviously is not the sole domain of positivist philosophy. What the deflationists were responding to, however, ''was'' the excessive use of positivist analytic philosophy in discourse about truth, most particularly the widespread formulations of the problem as a formal logical one using "X is true if-and-only-if Y is not equal to Yada divided by Yada" and the like. This approach of locking certain major theories of truth into the head of "analytic philosophy" in an article far broader than mere analytic vs. "post-analytic" and "non-analytic" is OR, confusing, biased, and quite frankly, fairly typical of the editor who is pushing the approach right now...] 14:43, 10 June 2006 (UTC)
			== dictionary definition ==
	JA: Just for the record, what you actually wrote, modulo the obvious typo, was:
			I wonder if 24.16.98.193 would care to explain why he is so determined to remove this definition of truth. ] 12:39, 26 July 2007 (UTC)
	<blockquote>
			: I am not 24.16.98.193, but I assume that s/he is deleting it because it adds nothing to the article and detracts from the beginning of the article. It adds nothing to the article because the meaning of 'truth' is commonly understood by English language teachers. It detracts from the article because it gives a disjointed, one sentence beginning that does not link into the next paragraphs. ] 00:36, 27 July 2007 (UTC)
	Analytic refers to much of what is currently known as philosophy at least from Heraclitus forward.
	</blockquote>
			I agree that its inclusion results in a disjointed lede. When the first sentence resembled "Most dictionary definitions of truth mention agreement with reality" there was more of a connection to the rest of the lede - making it clearer that defining truth is a task not easily achieved --] 05:16, 27 July 2007 (UTC)
	JA: It being well past the whiching hour at the reading thereof, I naturally gave that statement the more charitable interpretation of a "tongue-in-cheek" e-quipitude, as opposed to the less charitable interpratation that would involve the rather more contortionist juxtaposition of anatomical parts. ] 15:32, 10 June 2006 (UTC)
	:Let's be at least halfway real about this earlier set of exchanges, OK? You already know that "analytic philosophy" is a highly imprecise synonym for "logical-positivist philosophy" (or some close variation) and the attempt to use various prefabricated logical formulations, often mathematically based and since dead by advances in the same often=mathematical sword, to pin down precisely and once-and-for-all what is true and what ain't. And despite vague agreements that the term "analytic philosophy" refers to the positivists, not much else can positively be said about it except to drop the names of a bunch of people who are also widely called "logical positivists". it is, more closely to what I intended to say above (you got my statement accurately this time), as much a misnomer as the current attempt in the article on ] to co-opt the word "realist" to mean certain slants you happen to agree with as corresponding to what you see as "objective reality". The costs here overwhelmingly outweigh the gains. I'm actually inclined to retract the "I smell original research" comment above because the writers who say, as I just did, some version of "let's be ... real" really mean "what I say corresponds to objective reality better than what you say" Understood? And like I also said before: "Whatever!"... ] 05:36, 11 June 2006 (UTC)
	:Oh, another thing here: What are you trying to "say" with the present restructuring of the Categories in the article, that CHARLES PEIRCE came ''before'' "analytic philosophy" but is "independent of analytic philosophy"? That ''all'' Pragmatic theory of truth (god I love that name, sounds so ''practical'', ''realistic'' ''objective'') is ''independent of'' analytic philosophy, but that correspondence and coherence are ''products'' or the ''sole domain'' of "analytic philosophy"?...] 05:48, 11 June 2006 (UTC)
			:I, for one, have no objection to JimWae's formulation of the first sentence. I just don't want the article to begin by giving the impression that nobody knows what "truth" means. I'm a mathematician, not a philosopher, but I believe that everybody knows what "truth" means except for philosophers. I tried to get some sort of common sense notion of "truth" into the article, but was shot down for "original research". Thus the reliance on a dictionary, which is not "original research".
	JA: Of course there is sense in which your statement is an obvious ], namely, that all serious philosophy involves a component of analysis. But you know as well as I do that this has no bearing on the question of whether "All Philosophy" (AP<sub>0</sub>) &equiv; "Analytic Philosophy" (AP<sub>1</sub>), any more than the fact that all chemicals are substances in Nature justifies, in compliance with applicable statutes concerning "Truth In Advertising", the merchandising of any given mix of chemicals on your A&P shelf as "All Natural". So let's get serious here. Or maybe wait till Monday to do so. ] 16:06, 10 June 2006 (UTC)
			:I would like to see the article begin with something like this,
	JA: The term "analytic philosophy" is what it is — that's logic as &forall; good ol' boys from Aristotle to LW<sub>0</sub> knew it — and it is a convenient term for that 1-room school that changed its name so frequently and fervently over the course of its fluorescing in the 1900s. I supplied you with the requested reference to show that "post-analytic philosophy" has been in literate use for &ge; 20 years. There was a &frac12;-line definition-in-passing of their relationship, but that can easily be expanded if you think &exist; some need to do so. ] 16:42, 10 June 2006 (UTC)
			::'''''Truth''''' is language which accurately describes physical reality. Because the correspondence between language and reality is always less than perfect, philosophers have offered a variety of "theories of truth".
	JA: BR famously advertis/zed himself as the prime mover of many things that were already in motion before he happened to happen on the scene, but attentive readers of the '']'' article, to mention but one of many, will know that neither the substance nor the name of the "correspondence theory" are accountable to his paternity. So I don't get where you're coming from there. ] 20:52, 10 June 2006 (UTC)
			:But evidently this constitutes "original research". ] 12:43, 27 July 2007 (UTC)
	JA: The term "post-analytic", which I did not make up — I can tell you that if I had my druthers I would druther have dubbed the developments in question by the name of "epi-analytic-philosophy", so you can thank your Lucky <math>\star</math>'s that I had no hand in its holy water on christening day — refers to all those afterschlocks, echoes, reverbs, shades, or shadows of AP that came after it, but which, whether they say Yeah! or Neigh! to its main thrusts, are still deriven of the impetus that it instigated in the first instunts. But not all philosophy is either Pro-AP or Con-AP, and much there is that is either pre-AP or simply AP-athetic. So that is the sense of the coordinate term "independent of AP". ] 22:08, 10 June 2006 (UTC)
			::It is not a good definition. "truth" is not a kind of langauage in the sense that French is.
	JA: The fact that there are AP and PAP movements in philosophy is well documented. The fact that there are movements in philosophy that precede the formation of the (1+P)AP axis and that proceed largely independent of its attentions and its concerns is also well established. I have done nothing more than remove some of the latter from the prison of the former. If you believe that other inmates of that facility are unjustedly incarcerated, or otherwise deserving of parole from its confines, then there is a due process for commuting their sentences, or propositions, as the case may be. Since I have been saying all along that a classification based on the question of whether a given bit of syntax is redundant in a given assertoric context is hardly the sort of distinction that deserves to be elevated to a Papal Demarcation of a Whole New World, the possibilty of unjust imprisonments in these cases will hardly be news to me. But duly deputed authorities have detained the alleged &perp;'s there, and so it demands a renewed appeal to the courts of common sense before these hopefully remediable errors in judgment can be vacated. ] 03:38, 11 June 2006 (UTC)
			The def. begs the question against non-physical reality (possibly including maths!) ] 13:05, 27 July 2007 (UTC)
			:::Hmmm... 'everyone knows what "truth" means except for philosophers'... A philosophers response: Non-philosophers often think they know what they mean by certain terms, but discover that their understanding is limited or flawed when they probe it (hence, Socrates and the Socratic method). Dictionary definitions are of limited (if any) use when trying to sort out such questions.
	JA: Too late in the day for detail work, so I will just make a general observation that may serve as a bridge between what I begin to see as different cognitive styles. After all these years of hyping the hypergods of hyperlinkosity to the skies, it seems that the natural human tendency is still to seek to order the world into linear, pyramidal, mutually exclusive chambers, compartments, and tombs. I tried to introduce a more cross-cutting overlapping topology the other day, echoing some themes that were emphasized by Polanyi, Rawls, and many others, but it was to no avail. I'm not the one who is saying that Theory X is necessarily bounded by Paradigm Y. I am merely noting the cases where the sample of material that we currently have in the article under Theory X happens to fall quite snugly within Paradigm Y. Why that is, I pretend no hype. ] 06:12, 11 June 2006 (UTC)
			:::The sentences you propose above fail both to give the commonsense understanding of truth and the reasons for philosophers' arguments about the nature of truth. I suspect that what you want to say is that people's commonsense notion of truth is that a statement is 'true' when it corresponds to the way the world actually is. So, to paraphrase Tarski 'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow really is white. If t his is what you mean, then someone should be able to come up with a reference to some generally accepted book where this is said, and the article could begin with some statement resembling my one above. Would that help? (And, yes, you get into debates about the truth of mathematical concepts when you accept teh commonsense view, but that is just part of the reason why there is a 'truth' article.)] 21:13, 27 July 2007 (UTC)
			I respectfully disagree.
	==NPOV Dispute §13. Continuing Insistence on a Single POV for ]==
			First, in response to Peterdjones, I did not say truth was a "kind of" language. I said "Truth is language..." in the same sense that "Cats are animals." Some language is "true", some animals are "cats".
	JA: Creating new section to reduce edit conflicts. Answering the last by Kenosis here:
			In response to Anarchia: you claim dictionary definitions are of limited (or no) use. I claim they are the only definitions that really count. Words are used to communicate. Dictionaries, and only dictionaries, provided common ground. Unless, like some scholastic philosophers (and some mathematicians), you want to prefix everything you say with a long list of definitions of the way you intend to use various words, then you cannot assume the person you are talking to (unless she is a fellow specialist) knows anything but the dictionary definition of a word, if that. To 99 people out of 100, "truth" means correspondence to reality. And the hundredth person will still jump out of the way if he thinks "Here comes a truck!" is a true statement.
	JA: I guess I don't see the problem. "Analytic philosophy" is a generic term that is standardly applied to a broad movement in philosophy that Dummett traces to its infancy in earlier influences but most people know from its puberty with Russell and so on. "Logical positivism" is usually taken in a more specific sense to refer to a particular phase in the life of analytic philosophy. There are many other perspectives in and out of philosophy that have something to say about meaning and truth that developed long prior to analytic philosophy in any of its phases, and there are many other perspectives, which however parallel in time they may be, have always operated independently of any significant influences from analytic philosophy, discussing different questions and evidencing no compulsion to take a position one way or the other on the sorts of problems that analytic philosophers devote so much of their time and energies to. Is this not abundantly clear? ] 19:56, 11 June 2006 (UTC)
			I have absolutely no objection to this article discussing the various philosophical views about truth. Certainly, the article should mention that no correspondence between language and reality is ever complete or perfect. I think a good paragraph or two on the special meaning of mathematical truth is appropriate. Where we differ is that you want to begin with the complex, the specialized, and the esoteric. I've written enough articles on mathematics to be convinced that you begin with the simple, the general, and the commonplace. If we reject dictionaries, then no communication is possible. ] 14:18, 29 July 2007 (UTC)
	: Sorry, I suppose I forgot to include Derrida ''et al''. My mistake. This organizational schema is fundamentally unworkable. Please let us get off the darned experiment and give the reader the major theories up front, with only a brief and accessible introduction first (or in whatever way this turns out to be as reasonably agreeable as possible to the various editors). Then we can carve out a section where the editors can ''summarize'' in accessible language the ''basics'' regarding terminology such as propositions, truthbearers, and the range of entities involved including pictures, symbols, etc. etc. along with some perspective on the range of debate amongs scholars without excess technical language. Assuming of course it's agreeable among new editors that apparently have some prior familiarity with the subject and a desire to make this topic as accessible as possible to the "generally educated". ..] 20:21, 11 June 2006 (UTC)
			== Short lead ==
	JA: You can dismiss whole populations of philosophers and others if you wish. That is a mark of your POV. Heaven knows, I may even agree with you on certain points, but all that means is that our respective POVs have points of agreement. That may render both of us unqualified to present the POVs in question in any fair light, but it does not qualify us to prevent the discussion of those POVs in an article on a subject about which whole populations of philosophers and others have something to say. That is called censorship, and we supposedly don't do that here.
			] says articles of this length should have three or four paragraphs for their lead. Is a two or three-paragraph survey summary of the article feasible? ←] 14:38, 19 August 2007 (UTC)
	JA: After many days of discussion, you still fail to grasp the point that the style of organization that you prefer presents all POVs on meaning and truth from the POV of a single POV. And that is called bias. ] 20:36, 11 June 2006 (UTC)
			:I like what you've done with the introduction. Do you want to try to turn it into a short summary of the article? ] 14:57, 19 August 2007 (UTC)
	: Exactly, you bet there's a POV here. The POV, as you have chosen to call it, is in fact a correspondence POV, and to whatever degree you are trying to replace it with "realist" or "objective" or whatever your next personal preference will be, that "POV" is intractably interwoven in discussions of truth (with the possible exception of a hypothetical "pure" coherence theory sans justification to reality, and even in this case most all persons including most all philosophers look to see if there is a correspondence between what the truth theorist is describing and what the coherence struture in fact ''is'').
	: As to this organizational schema you have forced upon the article at present, it is a far too flawed to stand up for long. Sooner or later a sufficiently knowledgeable combination of editors will succeed in giving the reader something reasonable here. Like I said, correspondence and coherence are not properly categorized under the head of ''any'' widely recognized distinction of analytic philosophy vs. "pre-analytic", "post-analytic" and/or "non-analytic" or "independent of analytic". The involvement of analytic philosophers in the discussion, it is true insofar as true can be pinned down in a categorical way, did develop something of a stranglehold on philosophy of "truth", and on philosophy generally for a time earlier on. But that is not a reasonable way of organizing this material for readers! Correspondence and coherence theory are not properly categorized as falling under analytic philosophy because they extend far beyond the bounds of what we generally refer to as analytic philosophy. Pragmatic theory belongs right up front for readers to see along with constructivist and consensus theory (perhaps these last two grouped together, perhaps not depending on how it's chosen to be presented). The minimalist/deflationary theories are sufficiently prevalent in the truth literature that they need to be given proper accord for the reader right up front in the article too.
	:Also, earlier on we chose to follow Blackburn ''et al'' 's Oxford readings in calling the major theories "substantive" and "robust", and you've chosen to replace it twice with varying alternatives, when in fact "substantive" is as good a descriptor as any for those theories, and "robust" was quite credibly sourced. A one or two sentence offering to the reader of what is meant here by "substantive" would have been quite adequate, and still would be far more reasonable. A one or two sentence explanation of the difference between the scope of truth as originally distinguished from epistemology and how the distinction has come to increasingly be blurred or even eliminated, would have been adequate. And such an explanation still would be helpful to "generally educated" readers in the context of differentiating substantive from deflationary theories. This we can still do, and more, difficult as this subject is. ... ] 21:14, 11 June 2006 (UTC)
	JA: Answering the following comment by Kenosis:
			==Lead==
			I have no objection to the attempted rewrite of the first sentence/paragraph of ]. But, this article was one of the worst tarpits on the wiki until a number of us dug in on it roughly a year ago, and involved extremely time consuming research, point/counterpoint and consensus process to get to its current form. I'll support your proposed rewrite, but please articulate a case for it on ]. Thanks. ... ] 15:34, 27 August 2007 (UTC)
			:you are right. I am not proposing to do anything controversial. Clearly, the "factual" aspect of the word has some preponderance today. It will still not do to distill secondary and tertiary meaning and present it in the lead as "a common dictionary definition", without giving others. The meaning of "truth" is clearly, and according to both dictionaries cited, (1) faithfulness, fidelity, honesty in general, and (2) factuality, agreement with reality. I am not trying to muddy the issue, to the contrary, I insist the semantic facts belong on the table. --] <small>]</small> 15:52, 27 August 2007 (UTC)
			:the problem is that "truth" is both a neurological (mental, psychological) phenomenon, and an abstract empiricist (scientific, logical) concept. My involvement is due to the fact that I noted myth goes completely unmentioned in the article. This is unpardonable, since myth is at a very deep level closely related to the psychological notion of truth (while, ironically, "myth" has a secondary meaning of "untruth"). The dilemma is reflected in the existence of ]. A more valid dichotomy would be ] vs. ], since "truth" in the sense of "fidelity, good faith" goes far beyond religion in particular. Again, I do not intend to unduly mix the logical and the psychologial concepts, to the contrary, I want to make plain their correlations.
			I have inserted the following:
	<blockquote>		<blockquote>
	Another thing here: So, what the article is currently saying is that pragmatic theory (perhaps along with constructivist epistemology and consensus theory) is the only place the positivists generally didn't get involved except as critics? What about constructivist views that were ''pre'' - analytic philosophy? What about correspondence views that were ''pre'' - analytic philosophy? How about Aristotle (a pretty good correspondence-mode thinker as I recall)? Aquinas (who used the Latin version of "correspondence" as a descriptor)? How do you explain the continental rationalists (coherent thought systems) that were ''pre'' - analytic philosophy to the reader? maybe by saying "well, the analytic philosophers arrived at coherence theory, but it applied retrospectively to the continental rationalists in describing their thought? (Sure this one's do-able but ought be unnecessary in the summary) This organizational schema is fundamentally unworkable. The major theories are properly presented as a group way up front in the article so the reader can review them and get a basic idea of the major slants, followed by the minimalists. ... ] 19:27, 11 June 2006 (UTC)
	</blockquote>
			Thus, ''truth'' in its original sense is the quality of "faithfulness, fidelity, loyalty, sincerity, veracity",] on ''true'' has "Steadfast in adherence to a commander or friend, to a principle or cause, to one's promises, faith, etc.; firm in allegiance; faithful, loyal, constant, trusty; Honest, honourable, upright, virtuous, trustworthy; free from deceit, sincere, truthful " besides "Conformity with fact; agreement with reality; accuracy, correctness, verity; Consistent with fact; agreeing with the reality; representing the thing as it is; Real, genuine; rightly answering to the description; properly so called; not counterfeit, spurious, or imaginary."], and the narrowed sense "in agreement with ] or ]" is a secondary development coupled to the process of "]" in ].] in '']'' (5.4) has "If there be truth in sight, you are my daughter."]
	JA: I think that I have already commented on some of this, but things are getting a little dense, so you may have missed it. I initially made some effort to avoid using school-bound terms like "analytic philosophy" (AP) in preference to using terms that described the slants in question in operational terms, like "linguistic analytic" (LA), meaning any approach that focuses on the analysis of linguistic forms, either formal or natural language, though historically speaking progress was first made with very un-natural formal languages. This tactic affords a more cross-cutting classification, as many different approaches may indeed make use of some LA as a part of their mix of methodologies. Any time you want to return to operational definitions like that I will be open to it, but the last time I tried this it seemed to give you fits, so I naturally tried a different "experiment", being by nature an experimental type. ] 21:14, 11 June 2006 (UTC)
	:Well then the use of the term should once again be avoided, at least as an overarching classification for this article. ... ] 21:25, 11 June 2006 (UTC)
	JA: Answering this comment by Kenosis:
	<blockquote>
	: Exactly, you bet there's a POV here. The POV, as you have chosen to call it, is in fact a correspondence POV, and to whatever degree you are trying to replace it with "realist" or "objective" or whatever your next personal preference will be, that "POV" is intractably interwoven in discussions of truth (with the possible exception of a hypothetical "pure" coherence theory sans justification to reality, and even in this case most all persons including most all philosophers look to see if there is a correspondence between what the truth theorist is describing and what the coherence struture in fact ''is''). ] 21:14, 11 June 2006 (UTC)
	</blockquote>		</blockquote>
			this state of affairs needs to be reflected in the lead. To give "a common dictionary definition" in the lead, but picking a ''secondary'' meaning instead of the primary one clearly qualifies as weasling and/or cherry-picking. --] <small>]</small> 16:08, 27 August 2007 (UTC)
			::As I said on Dbachmann (DAB)'s talk page, I support the use of a broader definition in addition to the correspondence-theory-based definition presently included in the article. DAB implemented that proposed change and I reverted, but am prepared to support the inclusion of the broader definition, on the condition that it's very brief and that it immediately moves on to the statement that there are competing theories, none of which have gained complete scholarly agreement about being a definitive description of "truth". If Dbachmann(DAB) adds it again, I'll leave it stand with the provided OED reference and maybe see where it goes from there, what kind of tweaks may be offered by passersby and/or the long-term participants in this article who are familiar with the debates that have attended to the article. ... ] 16:19, 27 August 2007 (UTC)
	JA: Good. This brings us to the heart of the matter. Have to go to dinner though. I'll be back. ] 21:30, 11 June 2006 (UTC)
			:::I am saying everything I wanted to say in the "Etymology" section. I do not demand that the lead is burdened with this over-much. Clearly, etymological (terminological) background was missing from the article, but if people will let my discussion under "Etymology" stand, I'll be content. --] <small>]</small> 16:43, 27 August 2007 (UTC)
			::::I like it, and am interested in seeing whether it'll hold up well. Myself, I'll gladly defend the new first sentence as superior in terms of ], given several past assertions of a correspondence-theory bias in the article. ... ] 17:33, 27 August 2007 (UTC)
			"Semantic field"? ] 23:47, 27 August 2007 (UTC)
	: Like I said, we need to put the major widely acknowledged theories back up front for the reader, ideally right up front before getting caught in the terminological quagmire. This way the reader can get a useful perspective before drowning in the near-certain confusion about the superposition of signifier and signified and other such difficulties, and at least have some perspective on the topic. The limits of correspondence are reasonably explained in the current section on correspondence theory, and perhaps can be improved further. But like it or not, the reader will still look out at the world, and/or review their own experience, and expect this article or any article to present ''some'' correspondence, correlation, connection, or relationship between the various theories the article attempts to explain and what actually happens in "real life" . This is, of course, a difficult subject. Good day. ... ] 21:45, 11 June 2006 (UTC)
			:I have problems with that, too. I hope "meaning" is an acceptable alternative. &larr;] 03:05, 7 September 2007 (UTC)
	JA: Kenosis, I take you to be an honest person, misguided, perhaps, but honest, and I can tell from your manner that you sincerely believe that the Correspondence POV is really the only rational POV. That is fine. But there is a rather long history of philosophical discussion on this issue with which you exhibit no familiarity, to judge from the things that you say. A very efficient way to get misguided in a hurry is to take the statements of one side of a dispute at face value, and to shut your ears to anything except what that one side will no doubt assure you is "The One True Opinion" (TOTO). This is a good way to "Keep It Short And Simple" (KISAS), as they say, but it is not a good way to "Keep It Grounded And Verifiable" (KIGAV). The symptom of taking this path to easy virtue is that of constantly asserting things as facts which anybody who has listened to more than side can tell you are just the story as told from one POV. Of course, some people will just never listen to people who tell them that, perhaps because it would destroy that beautiful simplicity. But I know that you are not like that. So I feel that my persistence will eventually be rewarded. ] 00:30, 12 June 2006 (UTC)
			::fair enough :) --] <small>]</small> 16:00, 12 September 2007 (UTC)
			== solipsistic truth ==
			When you trace out all availible information from science and experiences, they all trace back to one core understanding, namely, that everything perceived is generated by the perceiver and is thus not a completely reliable guide to reality nor truths about reality. What is a dreamer to do? The dreamer explores his dreams and notes consistancies and descrepancies and developes a concept of truth which arises soley from consistancies of experience. There can be consistancies among dream characters which do not match the dreamers experiences. Like when everyone tells the anorexic that she is as skinny as a skeleton but her perception is that she is grossly fat. Most dreamers are unaware that they are dreaming until they awaken and most anorexics will likewise perfer their personal perception over everyone elses and see them as insane or delusional until other expeirences become more difficult to reconcile and ignore. The man of faith accepts the ideal world he has been taught to see over the world he experiences and believes that the experienced world is a delusion. The buddhist is taught that the world of experiences are samsara or delusions of the mind and to seek something beyond expeirences in deep meditation.
			I have concluded that experiences are facts, elief ystems about them are largely BS. and so I live every move as a gamble to some degree and use science as the best odds maker I have discovered so far.] (]) 16:14, 8 February 2008 (UTC)
			:These are beliefs discovered by most people in their sophomore year. ] (]) 18:58, 8 February 2008 (UTC)
	JA: You apparently read somewhere that Aristotle had a correspondence theory of truth. And so you believed it. There is a general problem with all such statements. It is that until people define exactly what they mean by "correspondence" an assertion like that says nothing at all. Having studied what Aristotle wrote, I could I tell you that he did not argue for a correspondence theory of truth, at least not the kind that contemporary writers argue for, when and if they define it at all. I ''could'' tell you that, indeed, I added quotations from Aristotle to illustrate what kind of theory he did suggest, but those were deleted on the grounds that we should not confuse readers with the facts. ] 01:01, 12 June 2006 (UTC)
			== Ratzinger ==
	JA: Widely acknowledged from the POV of what is rather more widely acknowledged to be an exceedingly narrow POV. Yes, the ] always goes that we must not confuse the "generally educated populace" with the details. Which is why, historically speaking, one finds so many "generally educated" and even "enlightened" folks enlightening the night at book-burnings. ] 22:40, 11 June 2006 (UTC)\
			I have just posted this:
	JA: As far as '']'' goes, all I did is refer to the definition of realism that was standard in philosophy right up until the late lamentable "loss of classical knowledge" (LOCK) that affected certain quarters of philosophy, by no means all, beginning in 1900 or so. The thesis of realism asserts the possibility that some general terms, by no means all, can have reference to general properties that are really real and not just figments that the general terms delude us into thinking are real. More recently, solipsism has become such a popular philosophy on the popular front that some people feel the need of a word to say that ordinary things in the world are really real, and so it has become popular to use the word "realism" to declare a faith that there really are any real things at all in the world. But that is an utterly non-technical use of the word, and philosophers of past and present who display any grasp of reality at all would regard that as the waste of a word for a no-brainer position. ] 02:45, 12 June 2006 (UTC)
			:Philosopher and theologian ], before his election as ], explored the relationship of truth with ],<ref name=TT>Ratzinger, ''Truth and Tolerance: Christian Belief And World Religions'', Ignatius Press 2004</ref> ],<ref>Ratzinger, , Dallas, 1991</ref> ],<ref>Ratzinger, , Communio 1996.</ref> and ].<ref name=TT/> In consonance with Aristotle and Aquinas, Ratzinger affirms that human reason has the power to know reality and arrive at the truth, and for this he alludes to the achievement of the ]s. He sees that "the modern self-limitation of reason" rooted in Kant which views itself incapable of knowing religion and the ]s such as ] leads to dangerous pathologies of religion (]) and pathologies of science (] and destruction of humans). He thinks that this self-limitation, which "amputates" the mind's capacity to answer fundamental questions such as man's origin and purpose, dishonors reason and is contradictory to the modern acclamation of science, whose basis is the power of reason.<ref name=TT/><ref>Benedict XVI, </ref> While he states that ] is acceptable in political options,<ref name=TT/> he warned of a relativism without limits, a "dictatorship of relativism," and he traced the past century's violent ideologies to a totalitarianism which "absolutizes what is not absolute but relative," converting partial points of view into absolute guides.<ref></ref>
	JA: Here's yet another thing that you keep saying I said, but that I keep telling you I never said and would not say. I have never said that all of the perspectives currently listed under the (1+Post)AP axis, taken at the full, necessarily fall under that head, just as I never said that I could not imagine both nominal and real flavors of each of them. I am only saying that the ebb-tide, shallow, 2-dimensional renderings of those theories that we currently find in the article ''do'' fall within the strain of nominal and syntactic reductionist preparations of them. It may be possible to flesh out those anorexic frames quite a bit more, but so far the popular hue and cry has been to pare them to the bone. ] 03:18, 12 June 2006 (UTC)
			Ratzinger is one of the most prominent thinkers of today. He is now viewed in Germany (the country of philosophers) as the number one thinker surpassing Gunther Grass, Jurgen Habermas. See . And he has written extensively on the problem of truth as an academic. I believe he should have a place among the notable views. Moreover, as Kant is allowed to critique Aristotle and Aquinas, Ratzinger should be allowed to critique Kant. ] (]) 09:27, 17 February 2008 (UTC)
	:I apologize, but this is nonsense. Lacking significant evidence of one or more other major theories of truth, the five theories (or four if you lump consensus with constructivist, or rule out constructivist as belonging in ] but not ]) belong in a single section appropriately titled. That immediately settles the POV "problem" you allege above. I now feel a bit silly for not having immediately resisted this proposal of yours and trying instead to work with your proposed schema. Unfortunately it does ''not'' "work". ... ] 04:02, 12 June 2006 (UTC)
			*Kant was not a moral relativist. If Ratzinger has an answer to the antimonies, he should have addressed them. Instead we have what amounts to (as summed up above) either an ''ad hominem'' or a disappointment that Kant did not self-censor mentioning them. If this bbelongs anywhere, it is in the religious section, but even there it is little more than a feeble attack on Kant --] (]) 19:34, 10 March 2008 (UTC)
	JA: There are several important perspectives on meaning and truth that cannot be intelligently discussed within the bounds and blinders of the AP, LA, and COR POV that is present in the leading sections of the article. I tried to do that for a long enough time to know that it cannot be done in the way that you and others keep insisting that it must be done. By way of attempting to arrange a ''modus vivendi'', I kept trying to generalize the elementary terms of discussion so that the pragmatic theory of truth could fit into that setting, but people just kept on re-tightening the screws on the ] embedding, and so it became clear that the pragmatic theory simply could not rest there. You may now have your precious "substantive" all to yourself, and feel free to make up whatever meaning you want for it, as there is no longer any need to try and stuff the pragmatic theory full of that uncontrolled substance, which kept forcing a backassward anachronism on Peirce, just for starters. ] 04:15, 12 June 2006 (UTC)
			::Thanks, Jim Wae. :) I hope I can answer your concerns. Let me go through them one by one.
	JA: I am going to say this even though I know in advance that it is totally WikiPerishable, as WP is not the sort of place where WikiPeople give a F<sup>2</sup> about anybody who actually knows anything. I have studied Peirce's work for 40 years. When it comes to your opinions about Peirce, you don't know ]. I have a lot of respect for people who want to learn more, and that is what I used to think WP was for. People who don't want to learn more, that's okay, I'm pretty indifferent either way. But people who block inquiry and prevent others from learning more I take great exception to. I am beginning to take great exception to you, Kenosis. ] 06:24, 12 June 2006 (UTC)
			::"Kant was not a moral relativist. If Ratzinger has an answer to the antimonies, he should have addressed them." What we have here is what Ratzinger thinks about truth, and that is what Misplaced Pages looks for. Misplaced Pages is not asking for what an author should have written or not, or whether what he wrote is true or false. The basic criteria why an author is included are notability and verifiability. Since this is a "fact about an opinion", the neutrality aspect is also covered.
	:Inquiry is one "Thing," "Category," or whatever the H<sup>2</sup> you prefer to call it depending on who in the world appears to be confusing what with what else at this conceptual point in time. Explanation to "generally educated" readers is another. ... ] 06:59, 12 June 2006 (UTC)
			::"Instead we have what amounts to (as summed up above) either an ''ad hominem'' or a disappointment that Kant did not self-censor mentioning them." I am sorry but I do not see any attack on the person of Kant. Ratzinger's view is a philosophical and historical critique of ideas.
	JA: Considering the audience is a good thing. WP is supposedly trying to be a Premier Internet Resource (PIR), and so it's audience is everybody on the Internet. Think about that audience. Since most folks here have no data on their average reader, and I've never seen any interest in gathering any, I'm guessing that most folks assume that the generally educated reader is somebody just like them, only slightly less experienced. So most folks are talking to one of their former selves, I guess. Frankly, I'd prefer talking to one of my future selves. Adding sourced data to articles should be a fairly straightforward and enjoyable process, because you get to learn new stuff yourself in the process, even when it's revisiting stuff you thought you knew. But it's not progressive and it's not fun anymore, largely because of all the WikiPeople who are constantly screaming "LA-LA-LA-LA-LA, I don't want to know anymore". I hope WP survives, but if it dies, that'll be a Big Why. ] 07:15, 12 June 2006 (UTC)
			::"If this belongs anywhere, it is in the religious section, but even there it is little more than a feeble attack on Kant." Ratzinger's words are all in the philosophical realm as he does not quote the bible nor church teachings. And his ideas are not limited to religion since he talks about human sciences and natural sciences, about pathologies, terrorism and ecological disasters -- basically, secular matters.
	==NPOV Dispute §14. Removed material==
			::I hope the relevance of Ratzinger in this article and section has been addressed. ] (]) 06:51, 11 March 2008 (UTC)
	* This material started out as an example of the ancient conundrum "I am an initiate", Nate Ladd changed it to "I am a football player" and, in either form, it appears to explain little that a first grader today doesn't already know. ... ] 04:29, 12 June 2006 (UTC)
			*I'm not sure that "Kant was wrong because people have used some of his reasonings to justify a dangerous moral relativism" counts as a noteworthy theory of truth. Most of the section is not even "about" truth, but about the dangers of moral relativism --] (]) 07:05, 11 March 2008 (UTC)
	: Sentences with '']'' terms and '']'' pronouns, words such as "I", "it", "now", "here", "this", "that", and so forth, can be true when uttered by one person but false when uttered by another, or even by the same person in a different place and time. For example, "I am a football fan", is true for some persons in some contexts and false for others. ... 04:29, 12 June 2006 (UTC)
			::I believe (1) the theory is noteworthy per se if it explains many contemporary problems, and (2) the thinker himself and his works are noteworthy. I suppose googling Ratzinger or Benedict XVI would produce more hits than some of the other thinkers mentioned. His book ''Truth and Tolerance'' is an important book.
	*This paragraph removed and placed here for future reference and possible use in a non-introductory context. ... ] 05:11, 12 June 2006 (UTC)
	::"The treatment of meaning and truth in analytic philosophy, along with the post-analytic perspectives for which it sets the agenda, begins with a focus on meaning and truth as expressed in ]s and ]s, in some of its branches continuing through a series of ]s that attempt to expand the use of ] to ]s." 05:11, 12 June 2006 (UTC)
			::I think the theory of truth that he is expounding hinges on the capability of reason to know reality, which he supports through a positive route (the achievement of the natural sciences) and a negative route. By showing the dangers of affirming the contrary of his theory, he strengthens his theory. And I would say that the paragraph corresponds in length to the paragraph quoting Kant's critique. ] (]) 08:29, 11 March 2008 (UTC)
	*Section removed by Wylie Ali, placed here for future reference: ... ] 15:51, 12 June 2006 (UTC)
	::====Signs, sentences, and propositions====
	::In some branches of philosophy and fields of science, the set of potentially meaningful entities may include almost any kind of informative or significant element, described by the generic terms '']'' or '']''. Such entities may include words, pictoral representations, logical or mathematical symbols, etc., and also may include a wide variety of meaningful combinations or clusters of signs. ], which exerted a dominant influence on philosophical discussion of truth throughout the 20th century, commonly begins with a focus on the words and syntax of a '']'', from which an attempt is made to determine its meaningful content, referred to as the corresponding ''proposition''. A ] is the content expressed by a sentence, held in a belief, or affirmed in an assertion or judgment. For example, it is not the literally interpreted sentence to which truth and falsity apply but what the sentence expresses, the proposition that it states. ... 15:51, 12 June 2006 (UTC)
	::Many different attitudes, called '']s'', can be used by persons toward what they think, say, or write, which also can be expressed widely different '']''. Propositions can, to give a few examples, be accepted, asserted, believed, commanded, contested, declared, denied, doubted, enjoined, exclaimed, expected, imagined, intended, observed, proven, questioned, suggested, speculated, said with sarcasm, or wished to be true. Differentiating among the many attitudes and modalities that persons are capable of taking toward a proposition can be critical in evaluating truth. Due to the many factors involved, the analyses can be quite complex, and the philosophical discussions generally reflect this complexity. ... 15:51, 12 June 2006 (UTC)
			----
	*This sentence removed from section intro (currently Basic concepts) as it appears unnecessary in light of the above removal along with several other recent removals. ... ] 03:04, 13 June 2006 (UTC)
	::"Most of the modern terms introduced immediately below are characteristic of what may be termed the "linguistic-analytic" school that is predominant in modern philosophical discussion." 03:04, 13 June 2006 (UTC)
			*If any of this is to stay, the part that is a theory of truth needs to be more clearly & concisely outlined. His theory seems to be that religious truths are facts (and facts not different in KIND from facts of science) which are directly ascertainable by some inner process - some intuition. This, however, is NOT the process by which scientific facts are arrived at (even though he compares religious truths to scientific facts)
	==NPOV Dispute §15. Do Not Remove Custodial Tags==
			**This is not a view original to Ratzinger, and it is misleading to present it as "his" view. Ratzinger is a notable person - but he has NOT made any notable contribution to theories of truth - he has summarized an ancient view - an ancient pre-Socratic view.
			*All the stuff about the "dangers of moral relativism" points to a principle sometimes summarized as "by their fruits you shall know them" - a principle that would tell us a lot negative about organized religion as well. This criteria is similar to ] - a criteria that Catholicism elsewhere teaches is wrong
			*--] (]) 19:56, 21 March 2008 (UTC)
			*As so muddily presented, this view is not so much a theory of truth as it is a theory of falsehood - as in "Kant MUST be wrong because...., and he COULDN'T be right because...., and he HAS to be wrong because..." From what I have seen so far here, its underlying principle (intuitive truth?) is obscured by its main focus on criticizing Kant, and there is little to NO exposition of how "truth" might be determined. --] (]) 20:55, 21 March 2008 (UTC)
	JA: Do not renove either the ] or the ] tags. The current state of this article is quite literally far worse with respect to both of these issues than when I initially placed them. The situation on the ] and ] pages at the present juncture is such that there can be no meaningful assumption of either ], ], or ] about anything. ] 14:22, 14 June 2006 (UTC)
			*This view ultimately rests on a subjective determination of truth (intuitive subjectivity ''a la'' Kierkegaard) - inescapably leading to the very relativism that Ratzinger is trying to avoid. It seems to be little more than muddled word-play to convince himself and followers that tolerance for other religions does not lead to accepting the relative truth of other religions, and thereby the relative truth of one's own religion.
	==NPOV Dispute §16. Disputed replacement of POV tag==
			*Perhaps this section demonstrates the need for a Keats theory of truth. Is "Ratzinger's" theory discussed by other non-partisan theorists? -- and attributed to Ratzinger? If not, we have yet another reason to move this to the religious truths section -- if indeed it even belongs there --] (]) 22:03, 21 March 2008 (UTC)
			:Thanks again, JimWae. :) Since I see that you are analyzing for the most part Ratzinger's ideas, let me copy here what I wrote above: "What we have here is what Ratzinger thinks about truth, and that is what Misplaced Pages looks for. Misplaced Pages is not asking for what an author should have written or not, or whether what he wrote is true or false. The basic criteria why an author is included are notability and verifiability. Since this is a "fact about an opinion", the neutrality aspect is also covered."
	So what's the problem now? There apparently are two issues here. (1) An alleged sockpuppet issue involving Rick Norwood and several new usernames currently being analyzed on ], which same usernames were involved in some kind of vote to remove material against my stated preference. (2) An alleged POV issue in the article on ]. The POV was alleged to be (2a) a Correspondence theory POV. This was resolved by putting the five major theories including Coherence, Correspondence, Constructivist, Consensus, and Pragmatic into a section together. The longest section there is only the longest because Jon Awbrey, the complainant, made it so two days ago with the insertion of a lengthy blockquote from Immanual Kant, which I have already stated to be arguably too lengthy. Without Jon's last addition to that section, Pragmatic theory (including Charles Peirce) is the lengthiest, followed by Consensus and Correspondence theory. (2b) Jon also alleged there was a linguistic-analytic POV, and references to this POV were since removed. What is left is a balanced, plain English summary of the prominent theories of truth and an introduction to some commonly used concepts in the literature on truth. One editor has no more right to keep such a tag in place, after having been addressed and responded to, than another has to remove such a tag. Nonetheless I will leave the tag and instead consider a request for arbitration on Jon's continuing insistence to clog up this article with technical obscurities far beyond what is necessary to lay out the basic theories for reasonably intelligent readers. ... ] 14:37, 14 June 2006 (UTC)
			:"there is little to NO exposition of how "truth" might be determined" The exposition on Whitehead also does not determine the how. This illustrates what I wrote above: "Misplaced Pages is not asking for what an author should have written or not, or whether what he wrote is true or false." I believe that Misplaced Pages merely presents what a writer wrote, and takes very special care that Misplaced Pages editors do not tinge the exposition with their own demands and requirements. Please keep in mind that the title of the section where this falls under is "Notable philosopher's views". It does not say theories on how truth is determined. The title is general enough to include how truth relates with other things, and other general issues on truth.
	JA: I have made no allegations, as it is a complex issue that I am still investigating, and I certainly did not mention Rick Norwood's name (do you know something I don't know?). I am beginning to suspect, however, that some other person may be impersonating ], as he/she appears so rational and sensitive at times, and at other times appears quite otherwise. But there are far too many ] for me to sort out within my current ], and so I will defer, not block, inquiry into these anomalies until some future opportunity. ] 15:20, 14 June 2006 (UTC)
			:"From what I have seen so far here, its underlying principle (intuitive truth?) is obscured by its main focus on criticizing Kant". The section on Kant right now merely describes his critique of Aquinas and Aristotle. Again, this shows that what is important for Misplaced Pages is an exposition of what is important for an author.
	: Well pardon me for daring to argue with Jon Awbrey after numerous attempts at concilation and reconciliation, but there are some genuine issues on the table here. ... ] 16:25, 14 June 2006 (UTC)
			:"he has summarized an ancient view - an ancient pre-Socratic view". As written, Ratzinger's ideas, are in consonance with Aristotle and Aquinas (who are post-Socratic), but more importantly he discussed terrorism and ecological disasters which were hardly there during pre-socratic times, and are mostly modern problems.
	: RE "I have made no allegations": What Jon says here is disingenuous and completely misleading. Jon is in fact rendering a sockpuppetry argument on ]. Among other things:
			:"directly ascertainable by some inner process - some intuition". Ratzinger does not use the term intuition but reason. The Misplaced Pages article on ] might be able to shed a bit of light on this issue. Or the .
	*(1) In fact Jon provided on ] a direct link to Rick Norwood's contribution with consistent misspelling of the word "consensus" every time it was used by him.
			:"muddy". I would beg to disagree on the use of this qualifier. Clear thinking and Ratzinger are almost synonymous in discussions about Ratzinger. Many writers refer to "clarity" as one of the best ways to describe Ratzinger.
	*(2) Jon used the words "A week ago I couldn't even spell "concensus: and now I are one"
			:What I can do is to describe in more detail what Aquinas meant by truth. How it is arrived at. This would be interesting for Misplaced Pages readers. Thanks. ] (]) 04:17, 24 March 2008 (UTC)
	*(3) Jon has provided in consecutive order the names of at least four new usernames that immediately and simultaneously descended on disputed areas of Jon's editing and contribution in both ] and ].
			*The reason there are no sources that can be used to show the unoriginality & lack of focus in Ratzinger's presentation is that only his supporters take him seriously. The section, besides wandering off-topic, appears to be little more than a cheering section to get his name to appear in the article. While HE may be notable, his views are not notable except among his supporters and they do not form anything new in the history of discussion on the topic. The focus on personality (getting HIS name & HIS picture in the article) detracts from whatever relevant (repackaged) points that might be worth adding to the article. His notabilty is based on his position, not on any contribution to the topic --JimWae (talk) 08:31, 13 April 2008 (UTC)
	*(4) Immediately above this information provided by Jon in ] was a conspicuous use of the same misspelling by user "AnnMBake". If Jon believes this was pure coincidence (which of itself is possible, of course) then why state these things?.
			I believe this was a good-faith addition, but it is perfectly clear that the Ratzinger/church publications are not <s>third-party</s> ''secondary'' sources about either him or his views. Reliable <s>''third-party''</s>secondary(preferably philosophical) sources are essential in establishing a notable view. Thus, I removed it. ] (]) 21:04, 3 May 2008 (UTC)
	*(5) These parties, appearing at first to be independent, have since been said by Rick Norwood to ''know'' one another personally and we are already told by Rick to expect them to come from the same IP address. So it gets interesting, and the evidence continues to build, and of course we all continue to assume good faith.
			:Thanks for bringing up this point, Modocc. My apologies for reverting your edit. I tried to check ] and ] and I did not really see any prohibition in using church publications in citing a church figure talking about a philosophical, non-church issue. I believe it would be consistent with the sourcing of this article and other articles which follow Misplaced Pages policies to allow sourcing of materials on Ratzinger from publications which may be church related.
	: Either way the current situation is, so to speak, quote oderiferous, because I happen to believe that as a general thrust the assertions of these users is by far the more correct approach despite many quibbles with his/their position. Yet it would be quite disturbing if what Jon is is ]. Because if these implications/allegations/arguments/investigations have any merit, it would certainly be a very wrong way to achieve what I seek vis-a-vis Jon Awbrey's highly obscure verbosity, which is an article that is ''readable'' and ''understandable'' without excess technical jargon, lengthy digressions, and various other unnecessary challenges to the reader of this or any other article on a subject of common interest. (] is not to be expected to be of the same level of technical obscurity as ] or ], for instance.) Thus, either way I am justifiably displeased by this turn of events here.
			:Perhaps I might have misunderstood your point as you might have been referring to additional third party sources in order to boost the claim that the work of Ratzinger is notable enough to be cited. I have found which features an article about the book ''Truth and Tolerance'' of Ratzinger. The writer is Paul Griffiths of the ]. He is Schmitt Professor of Catholic Studies in that university. There is this other site from the prestigious which also reviews the book. I have also recently read a series of articles in one of the latest issues of the academic journal ''Scripta Theologica'' of the ] analyzing Ratzinger's famous Regensburg Address which discusses the self-limitation of reason, truth and Kant. I hope this helps to clarify this issue.
	: But for JA to try to tell me that Rick Norwood was not part of his "investigating" from the getgo? Gimme abreak here. How strange this all is, incidentally, is what I was attempting to parody on that talk page with my own remarks, in case it wasn't obvious. ... ] 16:25, 14 June 2006 (UTC)
			:As regards the issue raised by Jim on how self-limitation of reason leads to pathologies of religion and science: First, before directly replying to this, let me repeat what I have said twice before: Misplaced Pages is interested in verifiability more than truth. I can assure you that I read this part in Truth and Tolerance and therefore this is verifiable and thus I would highly recommend that you read the book. :) As to the logic behind Ratzinger's ideas, I would say this: the self-limitation of reason is a sort of prohibition for the human intelligence to delve into the rational basis for ethics and discussion on religious issues. This leads therefore to irrational pursuit of what religious scriptures might say to the believer, as what happens to terrorists or to a moslem prohibiting Christians to have churches in moslem lands, thus infringing on rational idea of respecting the basic human right of exercising one's religious beliefs. It can also lead to lack of rational reasoning on ethical issues surrounding the use of science (eg what the Soviet Union did in Chernobyl) because ethics is not in the realm of empirical sciences. I also hope this helps to settle this issue. ] (]) 09:20, 6 May 2008 (UTC)
	JA: This is too bizarre. My suspicions of someone impersonating Kenosis are gaining weight. Unless my <find on page> is broken, "Rick Norwood" does not even appear on ]. For my part, I'm going to defer further discussion until the real Kenosis comes back. Boy! Is he or she going to be PO'd !!! ] 16:36, 14 June 2006 (UTC)
			::You can also verify another version of these statements in the which is among the footnotes:
	: I haven't ruled out future attempts at reconcilation either. But you bet i'm PO'd right now. ... ] 16:44, 14 June 2006 (UTC)
			:::this method excludes the question of God, making it appear an unscientific or pre-scientific question. Consequently, we are faced with a reduction of the radius of science and reason, one which needs to be questioned. I will return to this problem later. In the meantime, it must be observed that from this standpoint any attempt to maintain theology's claim to be "scientific" would end up reducing Christianity to a mere fragment of its former self. But we must say more: if science as a whole is this and this alone, then it is man himself who ends up being reduced, for the specifically human questions about our origin and destiny, the questions raised by religion and ethics, then have no place within the purview of collective reason as defined by "science", so understood, and must thus be relegated to the realm of the subjective. The subject then decides, on the basis of his experiences, what he considers tenable in matters of religion, and the subjective "conscience" becomes the sole arbiter of what is ethical. In this way, though, ethics and religion lose their power to create a community and become a completely personal matter. This is a dangerous state of affairs for humanity, as we see from the disturbing pathologies of religion and reason which necessarily erupt when reason is so reduced that questions of religion and ethics no longer concern it. Attempts to construct an ethic from the rules of evolution or from psychology and sociology, end up being simply inadequate.
	JA: I am &bull;ing K's points for later discussion. ] 15:25, 14 June 2006 (UTC)
			::*] (]) 09:27, 6 May 2008 (UTC)
	* (1) An alleged sockpuppet issue involving Rick Norwood and several new usernames currently being analyzed on ], which same usernames were involved in some kind of vote to remove material against my stated preference.
			:::MY BAD, I should have said that secondary sources are needed and not third-party. See my discussion on sourcing Ratzinger's views on the agnosticism talk page. In light of this being a somewhat different subject, I need to take a wiki break for a couple of days before I can assess the significance of your secondary sources. Best. ] (]) 22:31, 6 May 2008 (UTC)
	JA: I believe that the customary phrases are: (a) "Rick Norwood is not currently a ''person of interest''" — apologies, Rick, it is of course intended in the most innocent of possible senses — and (b) "I cannot comment on an ongoing investigation".
			::::As for the points inserted of Pius IX, an article by Edmund Shahanan, etc, I believe these should be in a section on Pius IX or Edmund Shahanan not a section on Ratzinger. Moreoever, I see that these statements are more about knowledge of God and not about truth per se. Also some portions of the insertion sound like original research. I have therefore removed them, based on these considerations. ] (]) 02:59, 10 May 2008 (UTC)
	JA: I believe that it is customary to replicate these phrases as often as necessary, until such time as it may become possible to update them. Consider them replicated. ] 17:30, 14 June 2006 (UTC)
			== Section consistency and NPOV ==
	* (2) An alleged POV issue in the article on ]. The POV was alleged to be:
			I just removed a Word to Avoid (claim) that was used for the correspondence theory, a word that is hardly used in other theories in this article. The word "claim", seen at the very beginning of the section, weakens the credibility of the theory and forewarns the reader that what he is about to read can be dubious. This may imply a problem of NPOV or neutrality.
	JA: I will make a few generic comments here and then respond to the more specific points below. Many readers who are generally familiar with this page, and its last few archives — by "reader" I always mean a person who has a sufficient level of reading comprehension that he or she can ] what he or she read a few minutes, hours, or even days ago — will find these remarks utterly familiar, and suitable for skipping. So I address these remarks mainly to Kenosis and other actual or virtual newcomers. ] 15:48, 14 June 2006 (UTC)
			I also find the two paragraph criticism of correspondence theory within its own section unusual in the whole article. It is, I believe, one of the few instances, if not the only one, where there is a disproportionately big amount of criticism found in the same section. I believe that this has to resolved, for it shows an inconsistency in the article.
	JA: The number of typos that I'm making at this time tells me that I need more coffee. While I'm taking a short break, perhaps Kenosis and other readers who are generally unfamiliar with their contents would like to review the Policy and Guideline pages that I noted above, namely, ], ], ], ], and ], exercising due care in the reading, of course, to discern the differential weights of emphasis attaching to the official Policies versus the more informal Guidelines. ] 16:06, 14 June 2006 (UTC)
			It seems to me strange as well, that Alfred Tarski's theory is mentioned here with this special phrase: "whose semantic theory is summarized further below in this article." ] (]) 09:30, 7 April 2008 (UTC)
	* (2a) a Correspondence theory POV. This was resolved by putting the five major theories including Coherence, Correspondence, Constructivist, Consensus, and Pragmatic into a section together. The longest section there is only the longest because Jon Awbrey, the complainant, made it so two days ago with the insertion of a lengthy blockquote from Immanual Kant, which I have already stated to be arguably too lengthy. Without Jon's last addition to that section, Pragmatic theory (including Charles Peirce) is the lengthiest, followed by Consensus and Correspondence theory.
			== Removed first sentence ==
	JA: This statement, too, is so bizarre that I have trouble comprehending how any-1 could assert it with a straight face — and you can minimize the physiognomic predicate qualifier "with a straight face" if you so wish, but I for 1 intend it with a full-blooded, real, robust, ruddy, and substantive mien. You have basically returned the article to the same organization that it had before I was compelled so reluctantly to tag it, except for a whole host of necessary qualifications that have in the meantime been deleted by who knows who, or by who knows how many persons unknown. ] 02:06, 15 June 2006 (UTC)
			I have removed the following NEW sentence from the very top of the article:
	JA: The main complaint has nothing to do with the comparative length of the sections, as I have said many, many, many times already. All of these sections have been pared to the bone by an editorially syndicated philosophy that mistakenly believes that laconicity is next to clarity in virtue. Far from it, as any votary of the Oracle at Delphi would elect to tell you, that is, if any such a votary were voting here today. Then again, who's to say? Indeed, since a responsible scholarly treatment of the various and sundry approaches to truth would no doubt result in statements that weigh both pro and con on the pans of each perspective, the length of the corresponding text, so long as it is balanced, carries no onus of favoritism. ] 03:30, 15 June 2006 (UTC)
			:The word '''truth''' labels or describes particular arguments or statements as being in accord with ] &mdash;in opposition to statements which are ].
			One reason I did so wass because it appears to give a preferential treatment to the correspondence theory of truth. The language/syntax also has problems. I do not see that it contributes anything new (that is not also contentious) to the article. --] (]) 04:19, 17 April 2008 (UTC)
			== ] ==
	* (2b) Jon also alleged there was a linguistic-analytic POV, and references to this POV were since removed. What is left is a balanced, plain English summary of the prominent theories of truth and an introduction to some commonly used concepts in the literature on truth. One editor has no more right to keep such a tag in place, after having been addressed and responded to, than another has to remove such a tag. Nonetheless I will leave the tag and instead consider a request for arbitration on Jon's continuing insistence to clog up this article with technical obscurities far beyond what is necessary to lay out the basic theories for reasonably intelligent readers. ... ] 14:37, 14 June 2006 (UTC)
	==NPOV Dispute §17. Resubmission of assertions about POV issue==
	Let's try it again with the correct username. Rick Norwood you have my sincere apology for the mistake above.... ] 17:14, 14 June 2006 (UTC)
	So what's the problem now? There apparently are two issues here. (1) An alleged sockpuppet issue involving Nathan Ladd and several new usernames currently being analyzed on ], which same usernames were involved in some kind of vote to remove material against my stated preference. (2) An alleged POV issue in the article on ]. The POV was alleged to be (2a) a Correspondence theory POV. This was resolved by putting the five major theories including Coherence, Correspondence, Constructivist, Consensus, and Pragmatic into a section together. The longest section there is only the longest because Jon Awbrey, the complainant, made it so two days ago with the insertion of a lengthy blockquote from Immanual Kant, which I have already stated to be arguably too lengthy. Without Jon's last addition to that section, Pragmatic theory (including Charles Peirce) is the lengthiest, followed by Consensus and Correspondence theory. (2b) Jon also alleged there was a linguistic-analytic POV, and references to this POV were since removed. What is left is a balanced, plain English summary of the prominent theories of truth and an introduction to some commonly used concepts in the literature on truth. One editor has no more right to keep such a tag in place, after having been addressed and responded to, than another has to remove such a tag. Nonetheless I will leave the tag and instead consider a request for arbitration on Jon's continuing insistence to clog up this article with technical obscurities far beyond what is necessary to lay out the basic theories for reasonably intelligent readers. ... ] 17:14, 14 June 2006 (UTC)
	In response to Jon's assertions above: "JA: I have made no allegations, as it is a complex issue that I am still investigating, and I certainly did not mention Rick Norwood's name (do you know something I don't know?). I am beginning to suspect, however, that some other person may be impersonating ], as he/she appears so rational and sensitive at times, and at other times appears quite otherwise. But there are far too many ] for me to sort out within my current ], and so I will defer, not block, inquiry into these anomalies until some future opportunity. ] 15:20, 14 June 2006 (UTC)":
	::Well pardon me for daring to argue with Jon Awbrey after numerous attempts at concilation and reconciliation, but there are some genuine issues on the table here. ... ] ... ] 17:14, 14 June 2006 (UTC)
	::RE "I have made no allegations": What Jon says here is disingenuous and completely misleading. Jon is in fact rendering a sockpuppetry argument on ]. Among other things:
	::*(1) In fact Jon provided on ] a direct link to Nate Ladd's contribution with consistent misspelling of the word "consensus" every time it was used by him.
	::*(2) Jon used the words "A week ago I couldn't even spell "concensus: and now I are one"
	::*(3) Jon has provided in consecutive order the names of at least four new usernames that immediately and simultaneously descended on disputed areas of Jon's editing and contribution in both ] and ].
	::*(4) Immediately above this information provided by Jon in ] was a conspicuous use of the same misspelling by user "AnnMBake". If Jon believes this was pure coincidence (which of itself is possible, of course) then why state these things?.
	::*(5) These parties, appearing at first to be independent, have since been said by Nathan Ladd to ''know'' one another personally and we are already told by Nate to expect them to come from the same IP address. So it gets interesting, and the evidence continues to build, and of course we all continue to assume good faith.
	::Either way the current situation is, so to speak, quote oderiferous, because I happen to believe that as a general thrust the assertions of these users is by far the more correct approach despite many quibbles with his/their position. Yet it would be quite disturbing if what Jon is is ]. Because if these implications/allegations/arguments/investigations have any merit, it would certainly be a very wrong way to achieve what I seek vis-a-vis Jon Awbrey's highly obscure verbosity, which is an article that is ''readable'' and ''understandable'' without excess technical jargon, lengthy digressions, and various other unnecessary challenges to the reader of this or any other article on a subject of common interest. (] is not to be expected to be of the same level of technical obscurity as ] or ], for instance.) Thus, either way I am justifiably displeased by this turn of events here.
	::But for JA to try to tell me that Nathan Ladd was not part of his "investigating" from the getgo? Gimme abreak here. How strange this all is, incidentally, is what I was attempting to parody on that talk page with my own remarks, in case it wasn't obvious. ... ] 17:14, 14 June 2006 (UTC)
	JA: Just a brief generic remark. As of this writing, I honestly do not know whether the BrownSock (BS) issue is on-topic for this page. I can see how it might become so, but I just don't know for sure at present. On the ] I presented it as an exercise in ], and that subject is very much on-topic in that setting. So I'd have much less in the way of topicality qualms about discussing it there, but only as a speculative illustration, at least for the time being. ] 20:24, 14 June 2006 (UTC)
	==Rewriting History==
	JA: Due to multiple edit conflicts on this large a page, there was some difficulty reverting to the point before Kenosis began his no doubt unintentionally deceptive alterations to my remarks on the talk page. I think we have a ''tabula'', er, ''bona fide'' now. ] 17:15, 14 June 2006 (UTC)
	:Sure, so much for attempts at reconciliation in the midst of contentious argument, at least for now. Fine, if the mistake can't be corrected, it is resubmitted immediately below. ... ] 17:33, 14 June 2006 (UTC)
	JA: Dab Note. Reconciling people is one thing. Reconciling accounts is another. Either way, keeping a double set of books is a practice to be sensured. ] 17:52, 14 June 2006 (UTC)
	: See it however you like. If you refuse to acknowledge the intended point and allow the correction, I resubmit. The edit history stands ''ad infinitum'' either way.. ] 20:03, 14 June 2006 (UTC)
	JA: I still regard you as an honest person, more misguided in your missals than ever, but honest for a'that. I'm sure that if you had thought ahead, or thought twice, about it, you would've thought of all the reasons why that sort of, er, "substantive" alteration is not a good idea. But I'm just as sure, well, relatively sure, that the next time you think of doing that you will think again, and think more otherwisely. ] 20:14, 14 June 2006 (UTC)
	==NPOV Dispute §18. Resubmission of points Re: Disputed replacement of POV tag==
	Submission as above with correct username. My sincere apology to Rick Norwood for confusing his username above with that of Nathan Ladd. My points are the same with the exception of that error which is duly noted. ... ] 17:31, 14 June 2006 (UTC)
	RE: the POV tag:
	So what's the problem now? There apparently are two issues here. (1) An alleged sockpuppet issue involving Nathan Ladd and several new usernames currently being analyzed on ], which same usernames were involved in some kind of vote to remove material against my stated preference. (2) An alleged POV issue in the article on ]. The POV was alleged to be (2a) a Correspondence theory POV. This was resolved by putting the five major theories including Coherence, Correspondence, Constructivist, Consensus, and Pragmatic into a section together. The longest section there is only the longest because Jon Awbrey, the complainant, made it so two days ago with the insertion of a lengthy blockquote from Immanual Kant, which I have already stated to be arguably too lengthy. Without Jon's last addition to that section, Pragmatic theory (including Charles Peirce) is the lengthiest, followed by Consensus and Correspondence theory. (2b) Jon also alleged there was a linguistic-analytic POV, and references to this POV were since removed. What is left is a balanced, plain English summary of the prominent theories of truth and an introduction to some commonly used concepts in the literature on truth. One editor has no more right to keep such a tag in place, after having been addressed and responded to, than another has to remove such a tag. Nonetheless I will leave the tag and instead consider a request for arbitration on Jon's continuing insistence to clog up this article with technical obscurities far beyond what is necessary to lay out the basic theories for reasonably intelligent readers. ... ] 14:37, 14 June 2006 (UTC)
	::RE: "I have made no allegations": What Jon says above is disingenuous and completely misleading. Jon is in fact rendering a sockpuppetry argument on ]. Among other things:
	::*(1) In fact Jon provided on ] a direct link to Nathan Ladd's contribution with consistent misspelling of the word "consensus" every time it was used by him.
	::*(2) Jon used the words "A week ago I couldn't even spell "concensus: and now I are one"
	::*(3) Jon has provided in consecutive order the names of at least four new usernames that immediately and simultaneously descended on disputed areas of Jon's editing and contribution in both ] and ].
	::*(4) Immediately above this information provided by Jon in ] was a conspicuous use of the same misspelling by user "AnnMBake". If Jon believes this was pure coincidence (which of itself is possible, of course) then why state these things?.
	::*(5) These parties, appearing at first to be independent, have since been said by Nathan Ladd to ''know'' one another personally and we are already told by Nate Ladd to expect them to come from the same IP address. So it gets interesting, and the evidence continues to build, and of course we all continue to assume good faith.
	::Either way the current situation is, so to speak, quote oderiferous, because I happen to believe that as a general thrust the assertions of these users is by far the more correct approach despite many quibbles with his/their position. Yet it would be quite disturbing if what Jon is is ]. Because if these implications/allegations/arguments/investigations have any merit, it would certainly be a very wrong way to achieve what I seek vis-a-vis Jon Awbrey's highly obscure verbosity, which is an article that is ''readable'' and ''understandable'' without excess technical jargon, lengthy digressions, and various other unnecessary challenges to the reader of this or any other article on a subject of common interest. (] is not to be expected to be of the same level of technical obscurity as ] or ], for instance.) Thus, either way I am justifiably displeased by this turn of events here.
	::But for JA to try to tell me that Nathan Ladd was not part of his "investigating" from the getgo? Gimme abreak here. How strange this all is, incidentally, is what I was attempting to parody on that talk page with my own remarks, in case it wasn't obvious. ... ] 16:25, 14 June 2006 (UTC)
	==NPOV Dispute §19. Policies, guidelines, essays, and personal agendas==
	JA: One component of the dispute that currently invests the article '']'' is the extent to which recent editorial proceedings have been in compliance with the principal policies that define positive participation in WikiPedia. The pages on ] identify the three defining and non-negotiable policies as ], ], and ], reiterating three times over on each of their dedicated pages, with no substantive variance, the following norm of legitimate participation in WikiPedia:
	<blockquote>
	These three policies are non-negotiable and cannot be superseded by other policies or guidelines, or by editors' consensus.
	</blockquote>
	JA: This triple ultimatum has practical consequences that cannot be set aside by those who affect to be editors in good standing with WP. I ask the participants on this article in particular to review the contents of the above three pages so that we may proceed to deduce a few of their more salient consequences, and by that deduction I do not mean to imply a purely theoretical interest, but a very real concern to apply those principles in practice. ] 12:00, 15 June 2006 (UTC)
	JA: Another statement occurring in all three ] that determine content is this:
	<blockquote>
	Jointly, these policies determine the type and quality of material that is acceptable in the main ]. Because the three policies are complementary, they should not be interpreted in isolation from one another, and editors should therefore try to familiarize themselves with all three.
	</blockquote>
	JA: I think that these policies reflect the innate or inured intuitions of all responsible scholars and accurate reporters, and in a sense they are really just three facets of the very same rule, what I grok and express purely for the sake of euphony as the maxaim of "Not Up Making Stuff" (NUMS), if you'll excuse me making up a neo-acronymism to express it. Probably not. At any rate, the idea behind grounded or sourced research is that statements have to be grounded in sources that are commonly accessible to anybody who wants to check what we say. We all have practical limits in regard to the journals and the libraries that we can access, of course, but this is becoming less and less of a problem every day. ] 21:50, 16 June 2006 (UTC)
	::Re: "The three policies are non-negotiable and cannot be superseded by any other guidelines or by editors' consensus.": Uh... Well, yes. The current assertion that the article violates WP:NPOV is based on original research and one editor's opinion that does not meet reasonable interpretations of WP:VER . Most or all of the relevant major POV's (theories) are already included and reasonably well summarized at present. No doubt there's also a place in the article for Heidegger's assertion below. Same with other relevant slants, assuming they are notable, significant, relevant, reasonably verifiable and ''concisely summarized'' with links to the relevant main articles. The only POV under any longstanding dispute is JA's POV at present. .. ] 23:40, 15 June 2006 (UTC)
	==Heidegerrian Truth?==
	The definition of truth according to one extremely famous and celebrated '''non-analytic''' philosopher:
	:"truth is the revelation of that which makes a people certain, clear, and strong in its action and knowledge"...........from a pro-Nazi speech at Heidelburg University. --] 13:14, 15 June 2006 (UTC)
	==NPOV Dispute §20. Synopsis==
	JA: I will collect in this section brief statements as to what I believe are still the most serious aberrations of the article on Truth with respect to achieving a neutral point of view. ] 04:04, 16 June 2006 (UTC)
	JA: It might help to explain to heart of the problem by thinking of the following analogy. Suppose that you are trying to write an article for the English Misplaced Pages on the Theory of Poetry. One of the first things you have to decide is whether its coverage will be limited to English poetry, or whether you want a synoptic theory that speaks of poetry in many languages. If you decide to try and tackle the more generic task, then you will naturally have difficulties at any point where you have to work with translations of non-English poems into English. You can take a French poem and find or make a good translation of it into English. You can talk about the virtues of the French original as a French poem, you can talk about the fidelity of the translation and the felicity of the English translation as an English poem in its own write, but if you try to judge the virtues of the French original in any definitive or final way based on the English translation, literati on both sides of the Channel are just going to laugh at the sheer presumption of it. There's a lesson in that. ] 04:18, 16 June 2006 (UTC)
	==VERIFY §1. Improving the Verifiability of ''Truth''==
	JA: I am creating this section as a place for discussing the continuing need to improve the status of the current article on ] with respect to the ] of ]. ] 11:56, 16 June 2006 (UTC)
	==FAITH §1. Actions that Contribute to a Crisis of WP:Faith==
	JA: I am creating this section as a place for discussing issues that are pertinent to the ] of ].
	JA: My present take on it. I think that any mature person who reads the WikiPage on ''Assume Good Faith'' cannot help but to be inspired by the intuitive wisdom recounted there, and yet living up to this maxim of theoretical wisdom in practice, without being exploited by unscrupulous persons unknown, is no ] or ] task in these times that load one odious fardel after another ]. For that reason, I am personally putting the issue on the back burner for just a few more days, but I do need to memorandize the fact that it keeps coming up.
	JA: In particular, the current last paragraph of ] states the following:
	<blockquote>
	This policy does not require that editors continue to assume good faith in the presence of evidence to the contrary. Things which can cause the loss of good faith include vandalism, personal attacks, sockpuppetry and edit warring. Assuming good faith also does not mean that no action by editors should be criticized, it only means that one should not ascribe said action to malice. Automatically accusing the other side in a conflict of not assuming good faith regardless of their motivation is failing to assume good faith in itself.
	</blockquote>
			As it is the bridge between the mathematical and philosophical concepts and that held by most modern scientists and mathematicians. ] (]) 21:51, 22 April 2008 (UTC)
	JA: I am by no means certain that this can remain the last paragraph forever. ] 12:02, 16 June 2006 (UTC)

---

Latest revision as of 03:05, 21 June 2024

This is an archive of past discussions about Truth. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page.

Archive 10

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Archive 13

Archive 14

Archive 15

Archive 16

Weird Section

Alright, I know I'm not the only one who found this section weird and unhelpful. I leave it here on the off-chance there is anything of value in it. Feel free to revert... _talk 06:40, 30 June 2006 (UTC)

==Additional observations about truth==

Honest intentions play a unique role in the ethics of epistemology. Jurgen Habermas understands truthfulness to be one of the dimensions of valid speech. The moral importance of honest intent is underscored by the remarks of Buddha: “Herein someone avoids false speech and abstains from it. He speaks the truth, is devoted to truth, reliable, worthy of confidence, not a deceiver of people. Being at a meeting, or amongst people, or in the midst of his relatives, or in a society, or in the king's court, and called upon and asked as witness to tell what he knows, he answers, if he knows nothing: "I know nothing," and if he knows, he answers: "I know"; if he has seen nothing, he answers: "I have seen nothing," and if he has seen, he answers: "I have seen." Thus he never knowingly speaks a lie, either for the sake of his own advantage, or for the sake of another person's advantage, or for the sake of any advantage whatsoever.” In its most extreme form, the obligation to tell the truth may manifest itself as a strong form of evidentialism, which holds that "It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything on insufficient evidence".

It reads like an elephant took a rather large dump. &#0149;Jim62sch&#0149; 00:16, 2 July 2006 (UTC)

Correspondence theory

Is this sentence related to some form of new-age mysticism? "Correspondence theory traditionally operates on the assumption that there is an objective truth with which humans are capable of being properly aligned." Properly aligned? What role does astrology and pyramid power play? OK seriously, this sentence and those that follow will not be of any help to most of our audience. In addition, parts of it seem to be OR. I think the best approach may be to start over -- put each section in talk and let the group of us discuss the best way to get the point across, and, frankly, forget about what is already written.
As part of my job, I edit the work of others -- this section would be one I'd delete and send back for a major rewrite. &#0149;Jim62sch&#0149; 17:01, 30 June 2006 (UTC)

OK, let's get started. ... Kenosis 17:07, 30 June 2006 (UTC)

Made a minor change in first paragraph. First sentence of second paragraph now reads like this:

• Correspondence theory traditionally operates on the assumption that truth is a matter of accurately copying "objective reality" and then representing it in thoughts, words and other symbols. ... The footnote cites to:See, e.g., Bradley, F.H., "On Truth and Copying", in Blackburn, et al (eds., 1999),Truth, 31-45.

The last sentence of the second paragraph refers to proponents of constructivist, consensus and pragmatic theory, all of which focus on the human role in forming conceptions of truth. Correspondence theory does not make these points of emphasis. Though some versions no doubt try to incorporate them, that is not the view of correspondence theory. (That was the point of the part of the paragraph about language translation too--if the translations are not exact, we get different so-called "objective" relationships.) Will try to find a cite for that.

Anything else? ... Kenosis 17:22, 30 June 2006 (UTC)

The first paragraph looks great! I just edited the second -- revert it if you hate it.
One thing, I don't know what to do with this, it doesn't really fit: Commentators and proponents of several of the other theories introduced below also have asserted that correspondence theory neglects the role of the persons involved in the "truth relation."
Also, Kant has to go: synthesize it and use it (the whole quote) as a ref (footnote). &#0149;Jim62sch&#0149; 17:30, 30 June 2006 (UTC)

How about something like: "Proponents of several of the additional theories below have gone farther to assert that there are yet additional issues, such as interpersonal power struggles and other factors involved in deciding what is seen as truth." ... Kenosis 17:43, 30 June 2006 (UTC)

Will get to Kant. Need some time to synthesize without sacrificing the basic observations about circularity, if at all possible. That helps to set the reader up for Pragmatic theory, among others. ... Kenosis 17:43, 30 June 2006 (UTC) ... Jim (and anyone else), I'm forced to break from this for now and will get back to the task of synthesizing Kant blockquote a bit later, along with any other relevant issues. Kudos; thanks boss. ... Kenosis 17:48, 30 June 2006 (UTC)

Yes, that's a great rewrite. Should we include "personal bias" in there as one of the other factors?

Synthesising Kant might be the biggest challenge of this entire article...it should be all downhill from there (of course, there's still Pierce to contend with!) &#0149;Jim62sch&#0149; 17:55, 30 June 2006 (UTC)

I like the illustration of "geist" even better (Is it "mind" or "spirit"), but that one will work quite well. Gottago for now... Kenosis 18:08, 30 June 2006 (UTC)

Thanks. Well, I tackled Kant - I hope I didn't bruise him too much. Feel free to comment, change it, take it out and shoot it, etc. &#0149;Jim62sch&#0149; 19:26, 30 June 2006 (UTC)

Back briefly. I should pull that stuff about Kant's view for the present. The way I see it, the real purpose of that paragraph's insertion was to prove to readers why philosophers have so often not been content to rest with correspondence theory, maybe to set up for explaining just how complicated it got a century after Kant. Trust me, it got so complicated that this section is not the place to present that material. It can be done in a separate section such as, say, "More on correspondence theory". You should also know that Correspondence theory includes Tarski's semantic theory and other notable slants, and Tarski was one of the ones seeking a language-independent truth predicate--it's an acknowledged classic among philosophers. Making this and other things understandable will be a challenge that will last for awhile, but it can be done in the end, or at least reasonably summarized in plain English with "main article" links as we do around here with highly complex slants on subjects of common interest. Some of these are soooo complicated they should be left out of the article on truth for sure, since we're not writing for professional philosophers here... Kenosis 20:04, 30 June 2006 (UTC) I should add a qualifier to what I just said, lest a troll happen by and notice a fine detail. Tarski has traditionally been classed under correspondence theory discussions, but since deflationary theory became known as deflationary theory, he has one leg in each camp (posthumously--rolling over until each leg gets its own tombstone). That's one reason (in addition to readability) why it's quite sensible that his theory goes after the deflationary theories are introduced. Could be done differently, but that's a sensible way of organizing. ... Kenosis 20:22, 30 June 2006 (UTC)

Looks and sounds good to me. &#0149;Jim62sch&#0149; 00:17, 2 July 2006 (UTC)

Forgive me for my impudence in this matter, but reference to the distance to the moon is a Pragmatic approach to correspondence and does not necessarily represent the correspondence theory. My reasoning for this comes from my personal understanding that correspondence theory lends to an objective truth outside and regardless of any use-value of the proposition, whereas within a Pragmatic approach truth is oft cashed out strictly in use-value. My suggestion then would be to relocate this part “For example, there is a true distance to the moon when we humans attempt to go there, and this true distance is necessary to know so that the journey can be successfully made.” to the section on Pragmatic truth theory, or do away with it altogether. Thank you for you time. --18:31, 20 February 2008 (UTC)Lasttruth (talk)

Section 1.2: Truth as expressed more generally

This section appears to be the source of the OR problem. It rambles quite a bit, and contains no citations. Semeiotic is specific to Charles Sanders Peirce; but the links to Hermeneutics and Semiotics could be re-worked into another section - the part of the intro that talks about truth and meaning, perhaps? Cybernetics (the article) says nothing about truth; Physical symbol system is a stub, and again says nothing about truth.

Is there anything worth keeping here? Banno 23:38, 1 July 2006 (UTC)

Certainly not the way it's currently written. &#0149;Jim62sch&#0149; 00:24, 2 July 2006 (UTC)

Indeed this section does seem to constitute OR, but it raises the question of how to integrate philosophical notions of truth that do not fit well into the pre-given categories (thinking here particularly of thinkers like Nietzsche, Foucault, Heidegger, and Nishida) — and indeed, earlier theories of truth (particularly Aquinas whose verum est adaequatio intellectus et rei which is only formally similar to correspondence theory). Any thoughts? _talk 03:30, 2 July 2006 (UTC)

Aquinas actually did use the Latin word correspondentia to refer to a relationship between thought and reality, at least in one place. Although, as I indicated already within the various protracted discussions now archived, Russell was responsible for making the term widely known as such in the context of establishing correspondence and coherence as competing tensions. Kant did use a term readily translatable as "correspondence" too, though was not exactly, shall we say, popular reading. There's a place for all of this if priorities are kept in a reasonable sequence for the article. I suspect someday it'll be either a fairly lengthy article and/or have many linked offshoots and a reasonable way of giving readers a pathway to their particular foci. The section currently being discussed (Truth#Truth as expressed more generally) might be a reasonable place to start with such views as just mentioned by lg0774 (and Banno in next talk section below). Just vaguely hypothesizing here, perhaps Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre, Derrida could be one thread. For now, how about starting by slightly retitling this section and begin briefly summarizing some of these views subsectioned by author, then see where it goes? ... Kenosis 04:26, 2 July 2006 (UTC)

And yes, I am in favor of jettisoning that whole meandering beginning to "Truth as expressed more generally". There are plenty of ways of summarizing the "realist" vs. "anti-realist" distinction without getting bogged down in it. ... Kenosis 07:30, 2 July 2006 (UTC)

My point about Aquinas is not so much about the particular words used as the meaning of those particular words within context — for example, Aquinas admits something like revelation as a basis of truth (as opposed to the expression of correspondence theory on this page — the correspondence with fact). That said, I would favor eliminating the section under question, as it is just as much a straight-jacket on notions of truth currently not included in the "Major theories of truth", as, (1) it focuses exclusively on truth in sign relations and (2) it seems to develop no new ideas of what truth is itself. As to the single thread, I am not so sure how well that would work. For example, Heidegger takes one notion of truth from Aristotle and applies it to Nietzsche; Foucault takes Nietzschean truth in a different direction. _talk 04:18, 4 July 2006 (UTC)

Agreed lg, yes Aquinas was variously on both sides of that "fence". Personally I think it's time to begin including some of these views you just mentioned, And this section seems a reasonable place to add this type of material, organizing as necessary along the way. ... Kenosis 16:48, 4 July 2006 (UTC)

Removal

I've deleted the section. Here is the dif: . Banno 21:44, 4 July 2006 (UTC)

• The discussion of "realist" theories is unsupported by citations, and appears to cross over with the previous discussion of the distinction between substantive and robust theories.
• Much of the writing is confused - for example, "meaning-bearing element" is unexplained, and precedes the introduction of signs in the section Approaches relating to signs in general
• look, I could go on, and will if need be; but basically the whole section sucks.

My recommendation is to re-insert anything of use into other parts of the article. Banno 21:51, 4 July 2006 (UTC)

This removed from first paragraph of Pragmatic theory:

• The most critical differences involve the role of rationalism and realism within pragmatism. ... 04:19, 5 July 2006 (UTC)

The link to rationalism directs the reader to a poorly developed article, and the idea of summarizing "realist" approaches to truth is at least postponed for the present. I assume at some point we'll get back to a brief synopsis of how this concept of "realist" cuts across the various theories according to a number of writers, but for now it's here for future reference. Or, with a rewrite, this whole discussion of "realism" could very reasonably be worked into the article on truth theory. For now, in my estimation of it, the current article reasonably covers the basic concept with its references to "objective", especially with respect to correspondence and pragmatic theory. ... Kenosis 04:19, 5 July 2006 (UTC)

Truth and Power

A section is needed on Nietzsche and Foucault (at the least). Banno 23:44, 1 July 2006 (UTC)

Nietzsche! Nietzsche! Nietzsche! (OK, he's one of my favourites.  ;) [[User:Jim62sch|<font

Truth in Jurisprudence

I just noticed that this section of the article (in Truth#Truth_in_specialized_contexts) might violate NPOV because it says nothing about Klingon or Ferenghi jurisprudence. More seriously, this section is written about common law jurisdictions (UK, US, etc.). Should this be qualified in some way? I believe it's quite possible some jurisdictions might actually refer to their courts as, for instance, "finders of truth", but don't know for sure. The idea of referring to a court as a "finder of truth" gives me the willies-- not completely sure why at the moment; maybe it reminds me of Orwell, or maybe of recent events in the US. ... Kenosis 17:06, 7 July 2006 (UTC)

In German criminal procedure, which is an inquisitorial system, the evidence phase of the court proceedings is often referred to as Wahrheitsermittlung, which means something like "determining the truth", or "investigation of the truth". --Lambiam 22:12, 31 July 2006 (UTC)

A great example of a true statement in court is simply having many pictures of a crime scene, many witnesses that all have enough consistent statements about who was there and what was done. True statements about the past are very common and often very consistent among any witnesses that were there, and what can be determined with photos, science, and qualified experts. This is some food for thought.

--joseph 06:16, 16 August 2006 (UTC)

Order of presentation of notable philosophers' views

I have no extremely strong opinion on the order of presentation of the views of notable philosophers on "truth". I do, though, happen to think the historical order of presentation (chronological) is a more relevant way of presenting these views. This is because each of these philosophers was building in various ways on the work of those that came before. ... Kenosis 19:24, 31 July 2006 (UTC)

I agree, and suggest to use the date of birth for ordering, while also indicating for each the life period, such as "Aquinas (c. 1225 – 1274) and the scholastics" and "Baudrillard (b. 1929)".  --Lambiam 21:54, 31 July 2006 (UTC)

Agreed. Chronological ordering makes the most sense as one can follow the flow of the philisophical discussion. &#0149;Jim62sch&#0149; 22:14, 31 July 2006 (UTC)

Pic

I care little for puritanical views, thus I have restored La Vérité as an appropriately stylised representation of Truth (unless, of course, one is a fan of that priggish jackanapes John Ashcroft who draped various nude statues in cloth). Also, since the likelihood of Jesus and Pilate ever having had any conversation is slim to nil a picture of such an imaginary event is hardly fitting as a depiction of "truth". &#0149;Jim62sch&#0149; 22:24, 31 July 2006 (UTC)

I well remember my trip to the Louvre, and seeing small French schoolchildren sitting in front of a huge nude painting, while their teacher lectured on the subject of art. That the picture of truth should raise even an eyebrow, much less a protest, just shows how far removed from reality some Americans are. Rick Norwood 22:59, 31 July 2006 (UTC)

Some? It's our national gift to the world. ;| &#0149;Jim62sch&#0149; 08:24, 1 August 2006 (UTC)

Truth is usually held as being something of such holy value (even to those who have no belief in God) as to not be mocked by pictures of naked women (not that I hold all such picutres to necessarily be in any way pornographic - though many times they are insulting to human sensibilities).

I do not mean to show how much of a philistine that I am by requesting the removal of this undoubtedly great piece of art. I propose a culturally unbiased view of truth (ie: one that's not French, or affiliated to any nation's work). Perhaps a mathematical depiction? I think that many individuals look upon Euler's formula as being true in its beautiful simplicity. Surely this is only a small request for such an important article. If wikipedia can't get the Truth right - what can it do?

Nukemason 14:59, 8 August 2006 (UTC)

As much as I don't want to give into prudery or priggishness, it does seem like this painting raises more eyebrows than necessary -- and that the painting does not add to the informational nature of the article. I at least think that it should be father down in the article rather than the first thing one sees -- perhaps in Truth#Classical_philosophers. Also, I think that it's a rather male perspectve that a naked woman represents truth or virture, and a naked man represents strength or power -- a somewhat biased view (both culturally and in terms of gender). Thanks, BCorr|Брайен 14:59, 12 August 2006 (UTC)

Note: La Vérité ("Truth") by Jules Joseph Lefebvre is a suitable illustration for the article Truth. It would be contrary to Misplaced Pages's policy on censorship to remove it without a compelling reason. Please refer to WP:NOT#Misplaced Pages is not censored. In other words, my dear followers of the John Ashcroft principles regarding art, the picture stays. &#0149;Jim62sch&#0149; 15:15, 12 August 2006 (UTC)

I agree with the above, it seems however, that someone keeps moving it to a place further down the article and without coming to any agreement about moving it here on the talk page. Since most people I've read above seem to want to leave it on the first page and not move it, I tried moving it back, however, last time I tried fixing unauthorised changes, I was blocked from the system.--Lucaas 23:31, 17 August 2006 (UTC)

I agree with Jim and Rick as well; I'm just tired of arguing about it, or even reading others arguing about it. There's no compelling reason to remove it, nor is there a compelling reason to keep it either. Someone (I think it was Stevertigo) moved it down in the article a couple weeks ago; I moved his preferred pic farther down in the article, added a few more pics, and there they've sat until now. i frankly don't see the need to have any images up front in an article like this; they're nice little touches, but really don't explain anything anyway.

I should also say, though, it'd be nice to have a better photo of Habermas... Kenosis 00:01, 18 August 2006 (UTC)

Image:Epistemology-x.gif

I can't see what this adds to the article. Nor is it particularly clear what it is supposed to show. Banno 20:24, 1 August 2006 (UTC)

Frankly, I'd like to see every single one of the pics gone from the article. La verite doesn't explain anything, the Pilate/Jesus pic doesn't explain anything, and none of the others do either. The only one that explains anything at all is the diagram, however simplistic and limited it is. Is it possible to get a consensus to remove all images from this article?... Kenosis 22:30, 1 August 2006 (UTC)

I think this diagram is misleading and only refers possible to Plato's view of truth as justified true belief. Yet even he thought that the fiction of a Final Judgment would serve society well (see The Republic). The other images give artistic expression to something, ie, truth, that is hard to describe. I think Lefebre's painting expresses both the idealism of the shining globe and the pragmatism or realism of the beautiful woman; wasn't the Trojan war fought over Helen? tercorss 23:30, 1 August 2006 (UTC)

In fact, the description given in the wikicommons for that diagram is not even close to the whole story. I don't even want to go into it right now, but justification and refutation of belief is one of the most central problems of epistemology and "philosophy of truth" right up until today. After you get past that, it's all constructivist in one form or another, including the concept of episteme. (And by the way, constructivism and pragmatic theory are not analytic philosophy by any reasonable characterization of what is ordinarily meant by analytic philosophy).

Either way, I'd like to see all of the pics out of there myself, because they are more of a source of dispute than the damn article itself, and they explain absolutely nothing--squat, to the readers. I don't mind them being there, but the frequent arguments over them outweigh what they add to the article in my opinion. ... Kenosis 01:18, 2 August 2006 (UTC)

Sorry was not aware of these disputes about the pictures, but I think my explanation of the symbolism might help, no?

Yes, I was mistaken about constructivism being analytic but it is not a term I'm aware of these philosophers using or being easily categorised as, let us say it is at least an Anglophone term. That pragmatism and contructivism flow from Hegel is undisputed but I think both fail to capture Nietzsche's point of view, he held against pragmatism by suggesting that the answer to what was useful was itself problematic, his ideas of the Genealogy of truth are closer to the mark. tercross 23:30, 2 August 2006 (UTC)

Recent attempts to rewrite intro

The intro was hashed over and over by many editors some months ago. The longstanding version introduces the subject properly. Contrary to recent attempts to qualify the disagreements of definition of truth as limited to philosophy, after much research by many editors it was quite clear that even dictionaries differ widely in how to define it. Please do not change it into a personal POV about the subject. ... Kenosis 15:47, 2 August 2006 (UTC)

I agree that the intro is good overall, but it needs some mention of the many fields of knowledge that have great agreement about what true statements are and what they mean. To enter the whole debate with the idea of mere perspectives and only disagreement is quite misleading.

I hope you will reconsider. At least edit it better, and do not just delete it all over and over. Thanks for your consideration and all the excellent work you do. I mean no harm. I want to help edit this to include a better explanation about those who claim a very clear and precise idea of correspondence theory.

--joseph 06:10, 16 August 2006 (UTC)

Hi Joseph. I appreciate the comments. The added material did not belong in the section on Correspondence theory. It may have a place in other sections. I also think you may have a point about the intro, and the idea that there are certain agreements within limited fields about the idea of true/false propositions in limited realms such as the digital data realm, logic and math. Once of the problems is a lack of sourcing (WP:VER, WP:OR). Also, the added material needs some more work on the writing to make better sense and not be "all over the place" in its meaning. A great deal of debate went into arriving at that brief intro, by at least seven or eight editors. ... Kenosis 06:24, 16 August 2006 (UTC)

Malaprop Lead & XS Reverts

JA: I count 3 reverts by User:Stevertigo since this one:

15:14, 2 August 2006 Stevertigo (Talk | contribs) m (restoring my lede reverted by Kenosis - not an anon - not "vandalism" of course - just a clarification to make a sad theoreticist intro a more balanced and happy one)

JA: More importantly, the lead he/she keeps insisting on is not even grammatical. Jon Awbrey 17:01, 2 August 2006 (UTC)

Lede

You can gang up and count reverts all you want to. It would be easier if newbie editors such as yourselves would simply edit the material rather than revert it. -Ste|vertigo 19:01, 2 August 2006 (UTC)

See WP:CIVIL and WP:NPA, and not that you're biting the right people, but also WP:BITE. With the type of attitude you've displayed here over the course of the past few days, it will become increasingly difficult to assume good faith re your edits (see WP:AGF -- "This policy does not require that editors continue to assume good faith in the presence of evidence to the contrary. Actions inconsistent with good faith include vandalism, personal attacks, sockpuppetry and edit warring). In addition, in looking over your failed self-nom for Admin, you are exhibiting the same behaviours presently that caused your nom to be voted down 38-16-5.

Your rewrite of the LEAD brings nothing to the article except more words that don't really say anything. Your removal of La Vérité, obviously without having read this discussion page, was inexcusable and just this side of vandalism. I'd suggest you rethink the position you wish to take on this article -- the intro took much work, and much time by very seasoned editors to get it to a neutral definition. Obviously, anything that does not help to move the article forward in the same vein will be problematic. (i.e., POV edits like the removal of La Vérité will be reverted as NPOV vios.). &#0149;Jim62sch&#0149; 10:19, 4 August 2006 (UTC)

I don't particularly think I've actually done anything that should justifiably be the target of Stevertigo's anger. But I felt the need to request sanctions for the four reverts today, so now he has a reason if he insists on it. Three reverts, notification given, then a fourth, should be known to be OB on the WP. It is nonetheless heartening to see some kind of comment on the talk page. As indicated above, this intro was hashed over many times by many editors, and the longstanding version tells the reader like it is. The article then proceeds to introduce the various perspectives. May I suggest reading the various perspectives, then checking several dictionaries to confirm the legitimacy of the longstanding lead in this article? ... Kenosis 19:36, 2 August 2006 (UTC)

No anger. I simply dislike having my work undone for sake of some notion of preservationism --particularly for a lede which I myself largely defined and had made some arguably strong improvements to. All of which led to this version, which forms the basis for a consensus formulation upon which others can work from. My recent edits were thus inline and limited to the consensus form, and only clarified some ambiguities and biases implied in the current minimalist version. Further, this version does not adequately approach the basic requirements that a lede be descriptive enough to stand as an article. Some of us use navpops to preview linked articles from within articles we are reading, and this, along with other factors ("Misplaced Pages 1.0," readability) shapes our view that ledes need to be substantive and not excessively terse. Apologies for the reverts - I should have gone straight to talk. But then, so indeed should have you. -Ste|vertigo 20:33, 3 August 2006 (UTC)

That you were reverted by several different editors should tell you something regarding the edits, I would think. &#0149;Jim62sch&#0149; 10:22, 4 August 2006 (UTC)

Truth
Kenosis	SV
Common dictionary definitions of truth mention some form of accord with fact or reality. There is, however, no single definition of truth about which scholars agree, and numerous theories of truth continue to be widely debated. Differing opinions exist on such questions as what constitutes truth, how to define and identify truth, what roles do revealed and acquired knowledge play, and whether truth is subjective, relative, objective, or absolute. This article introduces the various perspectives.	The word truth, according to common dictionary definitions, has some form of accord with fact or reality, and is strongly tied to the concept of "veracity." However, "truth" is often used within the context of philosophical arguments, as well as within particular conceptual frameworks, which attempt to expand or redefine its definition according to the view from within those frameworks. There is no single definition of "truth" about which people can agree, and numerous views, beliefs, and theories about the nature of truth continue to be widely debated. As such, there is a great variance of opinion with respect to such questions as, what constitutes truth, how to define and identify truth, what roles do 'revealed' and 'acquired knowledge' play, and whether truth is best defined as subjective, relative, objective, or absolute.

This has already been repeatedly discussed on talk by numerous editors, and I properly summarized the results above. Read the article, familarize youself with the fundamental problems the subject presents to phiilosophers and other commentators, and read the archives. It took a great deal of work and discussion to arrive at the longstanding intro. ... Kenosis 00:20, 4 August 2006 (UTC)

Getting the Lead Out

JA: SV, some history. Up until 12 May 2006 or so, this editorship was operating on a consensus basis, and every line in the article had been gone over multiple times by multiple editors until there was a genuine if somewhat grudging consensus about it among those with the intestinal fortitude to stick around. That is no longer the case with the article at large, which remains under the ban of a NPOV Dispute so severe that the present stick-arounders are not even capable of the minimal respect for other POVs that would be tokenized by their leaving the maintainance tag on the article. It is not even strictly true that the present lead is the consensus version, as we quit having consensus when a couple of admins got into the fray, and simply imposed their preferences by fiat without going through all the bother of the incremental, iterative process that had been the rule before the not so happy Fall. Still, the present lead does retain some ragged remnant of the consensus that once existed, and so I maintain a certain nostalgia for it. Jon Awbrey 14:36, 4 August 2006 (UTC)

JA: FYI, the last actual consensus version read like this:

Common dictionary definitions of truth mention some form of accord with fact or reality. There is, however, no single definition of truth about which scholars agree. Numerous theories of truth continue to be widely debated. What sorts of things can properly be called true or false? What tests can establish a claim as being true? How do we know something to be true? Which truths, if any, are subjective, relative, objective, or absolute? Does truth, as a concept, have a rigorous definition, or is it unavoidably imprecise?

As I recall, additional consensus had been reached to remove the question marks and syntax them as affirmative statements. This was done in order to avoid the repeated insistence by passersby to try to answer the questions right in the intro. More, the slight move towards standard Wiki lead format was hard to object to, since it seemed to represent an improvement. The brief last sentence tacked onto the end of the current intro was added by me just a couple days ago. ... Kenosis 16:01, 4 August 2006 (UTC)

1) Jim's cut in was improper, and his complaint about biting the newbies is misplaced - that policy applied only to very new people who dont understand the process. Older newbies that should know better should at least be reasonable. The intro is still terrible and does not meet Wikipedias standards. What to do about it? -Ste|vertigo 00:36, 5 August 2006 (UTC)

Mea maxima ultima altima culpa, sed dixisti "It would be easier if newbie editors such as yourselves..." ergo quem dixerim? &#0149;Jim62sch&#0149; 00:15, 6 August 2006 (UTC)

Look, I'm so sorry, very apologetic, like mea culpa mea maxima culpa. But the "standards" here are in fact "guidelines" and not a homogenous formula that editors can't override for any given article if they see good reason to within the local expression of the consensus process. In the context of intense disagreements that have come across the talk page and edit history, we've learned that several of the editors of this article know this subject as well as nearly anyone around, at least a couple know it better than most college philosophy professors, and many more participating editors have at least looked at the subject more deeply than the vast majority of people. The current intro properly reflects the consensus we'all came to, thus requiring some very persuasive and specific arguments to merit even looking at it in detail again, and also requiring a reasonable new consensus in order to implement major changes to it. ... Kenosis 04:31, 5 August 2006 (UTC)

JA: What's an oldie to do? I would suggest trying to make your criticisms both constructive and explicit. It would also help if your "improvements" were grammatical and exhibited a grasp of the subject matter, which they do not currently do. Just to be explicit, the sentence, The word truth, according to common dictionary definitions, has some form of accord with fact or reality, and is strongly tied to the concept of "veracity", makes no sense at all. Jon Awbrey 01:32, 5 August 2006 (UTC)

JA: Question marks considered beneficial. And here I should have thought that stimulating passers-by to try and answer a philosophical question was the very mark of success in this endeavor. Silly me ... Jon Awbrey 04:00, 5 August 2006 (UTC)

Ken: I understand that there is some protectionism associated with this article, and that its due to trying to keep things from falling apart. But philosophy is ultimately dependent on words, and so our descriptions of philosophical concepts are not just about philosophy, but our use of language. So while the guidelines are not homogenous, they do point to a methodology and a basic standard for what the intro should contain, and that trancends any protectionism associated with a particular article. I understand that there is some fear that any changes will only cause things to fall apart. Thats not a fear I share. JA: the addition of "veracity" was simply to denote, according to a basic rule of disambiguating related terms, a difference between "truth" as the word is used philosophically, and "veracity" which is generally applied to particular arguments. Hence, looking at the basis of any philosophical (including religious) concept of truth, we must define the underlying logic which applies to the word -ie. its definition. From there we can talk about how controversial truth is. This version, while somewhat more subtle, is not much better that Rick Norwoods' version: "truth is a statement that corresponds with reality. If someone says, "It is raining," and it is raining, then the statement is the truth. If it is not raining, then the statement is a falsehood." -Ste|vertigo 12:08, 5 August 2006 (UTC)

Cool. Yep. That's where it all started, repeatedly in fact. What you're referring to is Bertrand Russell's definition from Problems of Philosophy in the early 20th Century, and it's a classic definition ("Truth consists in some form of accord with reality").. I briefly had advocated in support of Rick Norwood's preference to include that definition or a close variation thereof in the introduction, and some knowledgeable editors raised POV hell about it. Fact is, it's not so simple as just "correspondence with reality". ... Kenosis 15:22, 5 August 2006 (UTC)

Truth
Kenosis	SV
Common dictionary definitions of truth mention some form of accord with fact or reality. There is, however, no single definition of truth about which scholars agree, and numerous theories of truth continue to be widely debated. Differing opinions exist on such questions as what constitutes truth, how to define and identify truth, what roles do revealed and acquired knowledge play, and whether truth is subjective, relative, objective, or absolute. This article introduces the various perspectives.	The word truth, according to common dictionary definitions, has some form of accord with fact or reality, and is strongly tied to the concept of "veracity." However, "truth" is often used within the context of philosophical arguments, as well as within particular conceptual frameworks, which attempt to expand or redefine its definition according to the view from within those frameworks. There is no single definition of "truth" about which people can agree, and numerous views, beliefs, and theories about the nature of truth continue to be widely debated. As such, there is a great variance of opinion with respect to such questions as, what constitutes truth, how to define and identify truth, what roles do 'revealed' and 'acquired knowledge' play, and whether truth is best defined as subjective, relative, objective, or absolute.

Back to Webster

JA: I'm warning ya — don't make me turn this car around ... Jon Awbrey 15:32, 5 August 2006 (UTC)

SV: Im warning you, dont make me quote Mencken on philosphy. -Ste|vertigo 21:19, 5 August 2006 (UTC)

This article is part of the Philosophy WikiProject, if someone wanted a dictionary definition they would go to a dictionary. It sounds like a school essay beginning with a dicitonary definition. I suggest it goes staight to the point of what someone might be looking for looking it up. I also think the image on the top is so narrow that it is hard to make out what it means.--Lucas 23:21, 5 August 2006 (UTC) here]]

Well, here's what the Wiktionary says, not that it's anything but a brief statement of correspondence theory:

• truth (plural: truths)

1. That which conforms to reality.
2. The degree of correspondence between a representation and what is being represented.

Suggestions? ... Kenosis 23:37, 5 August 2006 (UTC)

Actually I'm sorry I asked already. As I reread the above, the statement "...staight to the point of what someone might be looking for looking it up" obviously means "... straight to my preferred theory rather than summarizing the various theories below..." ... Kenosis 23:54, 5 August 2006 (UTC)

No, straight to the point of an encyclopedic explanation or summary of expertise, rather than a dictionary definition 84.203.59.103 20:11, 16 August 2006 (UTC)

Which, with eight or nine editors participating in the formation it, leads the intro to where it is at present. ... Kenosis 20:23, 16 August 2006 (UTC) ... There are actually also about eight or nine major theories of truth, each of which involve their own slant on the topic, and a whole slew of minor slants which often don't bear any resemblance to one another. The decision was made to keep'm separated, and just tell it like it is. ... Kenosis 20:31, 16 August 2006 (UTC)

I wouldn't suggest that it'd be easy but it is a valid criticism. Perhaps some general information placing the article within the main areas, philosophy, epistemology. Thus avoiding those recent mistaken additions I dont think the defintion at the moment actually adds anything since most people already have at least a rough idea of what truth is to them and in my opinon the naivety of the dictionary definition is misleading. Perhaps some etymology of the word and related words? Lucaas 20:55, 16 August 2006 (UTC)

Fine: Truth < ME treue < OE treow(e) (faith) < IE *dree- <*deru > TREE, (firm (as a tree)). This etymology only works for some Gmc languages, indicating that the concept is somewhat newer than the break-up of PIE and PGmc into separate languages. &#0149;Jim62sch&#0149; 23:13, 16 August 2006 (UTC)

I get:

The stem forms perhaps show a different ablaut grade, u beside eu, eo, whence OE. trúwa, trúa, faith, good faith (see TRUCE), trúwian to TROW, trust, confide, and ON. trúr true; but, as tr does not appear before the 13th c., when u and eu (ew) in other words had phonetically fallen together, it is possible that ME. truthe really comes from OE. treowe. See also TROTH

Good point about the languages, we could also look at veritas and aletheia.

--Lucaas 00:55, 17 August 2006 (UTC)

Alethia is simple: alpha-privative plus lethe (forgetfulness), so, not forgetful (< PIE *laidh-, root *la, hidden). Psychologically, that's a very interesting constuction.

Veritas <PIE *weros, to be friendly, to be true. > Ger, wahr true, OE waer, a compact.

Bodha (Sanskrit)<PIE *bheudh- to be alert. ("to bid" is a cognate)

Pravda (Russian) <PIE *reg- right (we get rule, regulate, reign, raj, etc from this root).

Unforunately, I don't know the Persian word for truth, but if I can find it, I'll pass it along. &#0149;Jim62sch&#0149; 01:28, 18 August 2006 (UTC)

That is interesting Jim, just by the etymologies we include almost all the overwrought theories of philosophy, English:truth as certainty, Slavic: truth as power, Greek: truth as revelation, etc. What about Hebrew?

This is one argument not to use the opening line giving the English dictionary's Victorian prejudice toward truth as correspondence.

--Lucaas 23:21, 23 August 2006 (UTC)

Sorry, I stop at Indo-European languages, I've never taken more than a cursory glance at Semitic languages. Although you do raise a good question. It'd be interesting to see what the tri-literal is to determine to what other Semitic words (Hebrew, Arabic, Aramaic, etc.) it is related. &#0149;Jim62sch&#0149; 23:47, 23 August 2006 (UTC)

The Devil and Noah Webster

JA: Da capo al infinito ... In a case like this, it's perfectly acceptable, and perhaps even preferable, to begin an article with a synopticon of dictionary definitions. I wrote five or six of these myself just last winter. The array of meaning is actually quite rich in all of the customary connotations of the word, both salient and silent, and, no, despite some opinions to the contrary, none of these nuances boil down to "the correspondence theory of truth", partly because they encompass such a diversity of senses and partly because there is no such thing as "the" X theory of truth, in particular, where X = correspondence. And starting with dictionary entries is a perfectly good way of reminding readers of this fact, since all intelligent readers are used to the idea that dictionary entries are not "real" definitions, but only tell us about the customary linkages among largely undefined words, pointing for instance to further undefineds like accord and correspondence in the case at hand. And intelligent readers understand what a far cry dictionary entries are from any brand of theoretical definition of a concept. But at least a competent synopsis of lexical glosses serves to get the article off ${\displaystyle \square 1}$. Jon Awbrey 02:00, 6 August 2006 (UTC)

See New essay Misplaced Pages:You Are Probably Not a Lexicologist or a Lexicographer (WP:NOTLEX). Please feel free to have it out there once and for all. MPS 15:48, 22 November 2006 (UTC)

Added subsection

I just added a subsection on Mencken. Seems to me he had a great deal to say about truth that, while perhaps not suitable for the introduction of the article, might perhaps be worth quoting a few of his often-insightful aphorisms. ... Kenosis 03:50, 6 August 2006 (UTC)

JA: Yes, the line between journalism and philosophy having been erased of late, let me put in a word for Mark Twain. No doubt others will have their favorites. Jon Awbrey 04:00, 6 August 2006 (UTC)

Well, maybe there's a mathematico-logical solution to the editorial quagmire that might inevitably result. Perhaps ultimately a section on Tony Soprano's views? ... Kenosis 04:26, 6 August 2006 (UTC)

JA: Ha! I'm glad somebody got the one about "da capo". Jon Awbrey 04:50, 6 August 2006 (UTC)

Mencken and Twain sound like good choices. George Bernard Shaw might be good, even Oscar Wilde (although he was a bit odd). Actually, something on Eric Blair's writings, not just 1984 but his essays, as well as Huxley's novels (especially A Brave New World and Point Counter Point) and his essays could work. Maybe a Clockword Orange, too. Wait, this sound like a new spinoff article -- Truth in Novels.

And yes, this article sometimes seems like it has an infinite loop. To score it as an opera beyond Wagnerian proportions da capo al infinito might be appropriate, with a parenthetical ad libitum added in for good measure. Talk page might need fortissimo added. &#0149;Jim62sch&#0149; 11:07, 6 August 2006 (UTC)

Actually I think Jim may have meant Wignerian, as in Wigner's friend ("n'n'nice kitty").;-) ... Kenosis 12:47, 6 August 2006 (UTC)

The solution for infinite loops is to fork when there is enough material: "Truth in fiction" maybe. :} -Ste|vertigo 20:00, 7 August 2006 (UTC)

JA: I haven't checked lately — who can keep up wit da sooth'o'da'week? — but we used to have sections on truth in art, truth in fic, truth in lit, and so on, and these are perfectly acceptable topics, but not everybody who draw(l)s a truth is able to say zactly how he or she or it manged to do that. Jon Awbrey 16:06, 6 August 2006 (UTC)

Ah - John beat me to it. -Ste|vertigo 20:03, 7 August 2006 (UTC)

Cant

A careful analysis of what Kant is saying here can help to explain why there are so many theories of truth on the contemporary scene

Who says it does? Banno 20:17, 8 August 2006 (UTC)

JA: That was a rhetorical segue. Feel free to write your own. Jon Awbrey 20:20, 8 August 2006 (UTC)

I think what Banno means is where's your source - an often used diatribe. -Ste|vertigo 01:53, 9 August 2006 (UTC)

JA: The purpose of that segue was simply to introduce the quotation from Kant, and the source was given for that. What I wrote by way of introduction seemed like common sense to me at the time, but what's common is common for everyone, to adapt a line of mother wit. At any rate, the rewrite has rendered the issue moot. Jon Awbrey 02:04, 9 August 2006 (UTC)

Half-truth; Truths Paradox

(I was in the process of modifying this posting when I noticed too late that it was linked to another site...please advise...)

In the bible is this remarkable story of Adam and Eve in the garden, opening this 'pandora's box' by taking of the tree of knowledge and believing that they would be like God to know the Truth, as God would.

Having discovered the negative dimension to Truth back in 1994, it is with great priviledge that I make this entry concerning Truth.

There are several new dimensions to the concept of half-truths. Several new types have been recently identified and presented to wikdictionary.org. with corresponding changes to the definitions to the concepts of 'truth' and 'lie'.

One particular type of half-truth is the statment that is part of a greater truth. This suggests the half-truth is in fact a truth, yet it may form a deceptive lie; the paradoxical nature of truth.

This phenomena also allows for truths, minor or half-truths to be both aboslute and relative; a duality of truth. ( Source: The Jesus Christ Code. ) The classic example is the two opposite sides to a coin, each representing an absolute truth, both relative to the frame of reference. It is also important to appreciate that a coin has three sides, and the third is not visible from either side, the depth of truth; which raises the question who knows The Truth in the infinite sense ?

The philosopher, Alfred North Whitehead, is quoted as saying, "There are no whole truths; all truths are half-truths. It is trying to treat them as whole truths that plays the devil." So Mr. Whitehead comes close to suggesting that all truths are half-truths, yet does not label them as potential lies. While Mr. Whitehead does mention the devil he may be closer to the truth of this matter than he may have ever believed.

Truth appears dimensional, that is it exists in true nature on different levels, within certain 'boxes' of philosophy. The challenge of connecting truths within different levels is the challenge of logic.

When one views the hidden and deceptive world of half-truths, in reference to the original sin and the garden of eden, the potential origin of this inability to see this negative side to truth may be explained.

A scientific model for Truth can be found in LIGHT. The refracted colors of colorless forming the political half-truths of Truth.

In the matter of intentional lies, it is a fact the current definition of 'truth' makes no mention of 'half-truths', the bible says that the devil lied to us, ie Adam and Eve...so would this be considered an intentional lie to us by the devil ?

(Source: The Jesus Christ Code. Caesar J. B. Squitti )

--Son of Maryann Rosso and Arthur Natale Squitti 17:32, 15 August 2006 (UTC)

This is intereseting, perhaps you could add a section to the main article "truth in politics" and read some history on it, add a paragraph on that history and then you'll have plenty of scope for saying "half truths" (of which, luckily, I've never been told).--Lucaas 03:10, 16 August 2006 (UTC)

NB to contributor: Please remove the copyright symbol from this page, along with all material for which copyright is claimed. Thank you, Jon Awbrey 17:54, 15 August 2006 (UTC)

Thanks ! CS

Of course, there's just one problem: see WP:NOR &#0149;Jim62sch&#0149; 01:32, 18 August 2006 (UTC)

The work has been published in various media forms for the past 17 years, and on a website.

--Son of Maryann Rosso and Arthur Natale Squitti 19:13, 19 August 2006 (UTC)

The website fails WP:RS. As for the rest, he who asserts must prove. &#0149;Jim62sch&#0149; 21:39, 19 August 2006 (UTC)

Jesus

Any reference to Truth should include a mention of Jesus Christ considered the son of God by some, a prophet by others, but no doubt a philosopher of sorts.

Most notable claim involving truth, is the quotation, " "I am the way, the truth, and the life" (John 14:6)

More directly was the claim by Jesus Christ to be "The Light of the World".

The first chapter of the Gospel of John can be divided in two parts :

The first part (v. 1-18) is an introduction to the Gospel as a whole, stating that the Logos is "God" (divine, god-like, a god according to other translations) and acts as the mouthpiece (Word) of God "made flesh", i.e. sent to the world in order to be able to intercede for man and forgive him his sins (The Good News of the Gospel). This portion of John's gospel is of central significance to the development of the Christian doctrine of Incarnation. Comparisons can easily be drawn from this part to Genesis 1 where the same phrase In the beginning first occurs along with the emphasis on the difference between the darkness (such as the earth was formless and void, Genesis 1:2) vs light (the ability to see things not understood/hidden by the darkness, John 1:5). The summation of this comparison occurs in the statement, the law given through Moses...grace and truth came through Jesus Christ (v. 17, NIV). Here John successfully bridges the gap for the reader -- including Jewish readers well-versed in the Torah -- from the Law to the One who would fulfill the Law (such as the requirement of animal sacrifice for the forgiveness of sins, Hebrews 9:22), Jesus.

The second used light to provide us with a concept as a gateway to a deeper understanding to Truth, as Jesus himself had said, the life, the truth and the way, to it.

Uh, no. &#0149;Jim62sch&#0149; 23:47, 23 August 2006 (UTC)

Removed material

I've removed the following sentence from the intro to the section on "Philosophy of truth". The reason I removed it is in the edit summary. ... Kenosis 04:52, 15 August 2006 (UTC)

• The basic rule of non-contradiction is applied in logic and math to determine whether statements contradict, and therefore one or both statemnts must be false. ... 04:52, 15 August 2006 (UTC)

Just a note: Contradiction, may involve two seperate dimensional half-truths, where both are true, merely different dimensions, or relative views...both involve minor truths. IE square root of 9 is +3 and -3 ....

--Son of Maryann Rosso and Arthur Natale Squitti 18:48, 24 August 2006 (UTC)

This just removed from the section on "Correspondence theory", for reasons given in the edit summary: ... Kenosis 04:58, 16 August 2006 (UTC)

• In logic and with the scientific method the notion of true and false statements is widely accepted because of specific and clear evidence. The most primitive definition is by demonstration, such as pointing to the real, universal, existing sun or moon and giving it an etymological, common, or even a new name. The statement that the sun exists is true, just as many other natural facts, sensory observations, can be proven by anyone, at anytime in history, and anywhere. There is the true existence of the sun even with a variety of more specific definitions about the changing sun. Universal facts and claims of knowledge are widely accepted and agreed upon by many in all nations, and throughout history, because of the universal nature of giving evidence and proof for one's claims that are not mere opinions or superstitions. The scientific method that uses true or probable statements, induction, and deduction has discovered true and probable conclusions about the world around us that very few can deny. ... 04:58, 16 August 2006 (UTC)

The statement that the sun exists is not true. All we can say is that it existed 8 minutes and 20 seconds ago (roughly). If it blinked out at the moment you read this, you'd be oblivious to its demise for 8 minutes and 20 seconds. Thus, we assume that it exists at this particular moment based on experience and an expectation of continuity. &#0149;Jim62sch&#0149; 23:39, 24 August 2006 (UTC)

It is, of course, possible to assume that something is true and for it to actually be true. It is also possible to assert something without actually knowing it. For instance, when people lie. Also, when people make mistakes (a phenomenon which has been known to occur from time to time). Jim62sch, the third and fourth sentences you wrote in the above do not support the first two sentences. Sententiae tuae prima secundaque non sequuntur. Suppose someone says "the sun exists", and eight minutes, twenty seconds later you find out that it, in fact, did exist at the time the statement was made, what you find out is that the statement was true when it was made. (Assuming some reasonable choice of intertial frame of reference). 71.154.210.175 06:31, 8 December 2006 (UTC)

Taking the idea of truth and true statements in math, logic, and science seriously

The introduction needs some impartial and open minded editing.

That there are some true statements about some subjects and things is widely accepted and universal in math, science, law, and logic. Even in the subject of history all will agree, based on clear evidence, that Hitler existed. It is not just about mere perspectives, and in some branches of learning there is no great disagreements about what the ideas of true and truth means. The introduction needs to mention the common and ancient definition of true statements and propositions. There is no justice in rewriting such an ancient idea in such a relativistic way. Who gave some of you the great authority to redefine such an important and ancient etymologically defined word? To claim that there are no true statements and no partially agreed upon ideas of true statements is the most dogmatic and imposed idea that I have ever heard of. The introduction as it is now is scary, not very open minded, and makes a great and final universal claim that there are no great agreements and proof about some well defined and clearly argued for true statements, only disagreement and mere perspectives about the ancient idea of truth and true.

Thanks for listening and considering my argument seriously, with no personal attacks please. Thanks for all the great work that you do on Misplaced Pages. I acknowledge that a lot of great work has been done already. I ask for some minor edits based on good arguments and persuasive evidence. Where do you see the failure of what I am saying. I would love to know. Assuming that you agree that we can know about some things.

--joseph 06:39, 16 August 2006 (UTC)

Interesting and thank you. What can we conclude from the above?

First, that the writer has an absolutist sense of truth, at least judging from his question regarding "redefining" the word. And yet, he qualifies what appears to be a belief in the absolute by citing on the one hand "there are some true statements about some subjects and things is widely accepted and universal" and on the other, a requirement that truth be "based on clear evidence". In the first case, wide acceptance does not make something true in the absolutist sense, it merely means that it is widely accepted, thus its truth is relativistic. After all, for many years, it was widely accepted that the sun went round the earth. Did that acceptance make it true? If wide-acceptance is our criterion, then yes, it was true. In the second case, using the same model, if "clear evidence" is the criterion, then yes, based on the knowledge of the time it was true, although today, based on both wide-acceptance and clear evidence it is false.

Second, the author makes a statement requesting, "no personal attacks please", implying that he sees as a truism that personal attacks are bad. But, does he see this as an absolute? His other statements would seem to indicate that he sees this as a qualified truism, after all how else could one reconcile his request with, "Who gave some of you the great authority to redefine such an important and ancient etymologically defined word?" So then, is the author more interested in absolute truth, or relative truth?

Thus, the article is written as it is written. &#0149;Jim62sch&#0149; 17:03, 16 August 2006 (UTC)

In response to the above, it is difficult to label anyone as absolutist or relativistic. Depending on the specific issue and statements made, one might have made either kinds of statements, or perhaps there are other possibilities. A human is not some label we put on them, but a great mix of opinions, knowledge, and statements both true and false can come from the same person. It is also possible to have both correspondence theory and wide acceptance working together in some way because they are not necessarily exclusive and contrary. As for the question of authority, it was perhaps too leading. Sorry, my mistake. There are authoritative claims made on Misplaced Pages, and there are problems that can arise from this, and perhaps a more general question is about who has the last words on any specific claim? There is editing that goes on, but there can be the rule of the majority, or the rule of those who can delete faster and more often. It really is ironic that we all use computers that are built because so many have true knowledge about how to program and build them. Again, it seems to me that one of the most absolute statements that anyone can make is that there are no true statements anywhere, at anytime, by anyone that is based on correspondence theory and wide agreement because correspondence actually works. The claim that there is no truth cannot be true, yet it can be imposed by the majority or by the most willful. Perhaps we are being armchair philosophers while some scientists and others who have truth claims are building these computers for us to use, and cars that work for us to drive. This is an interesting debate, thanks for the comments and criticism. This ancient debate will not go away anytime soon. In fact, some extreme and radical Muslims, who often think thoughts that we are not used to, would call most of us the great Satan and prefer to chop off our heads. Perhaps it would be more fun to debate if God exists or not, then we can decide if true statements exist or not.

--joseph 03:31, 17 August 2006 (UTC)

There are at least four major substantive theories of truth (the article stretches it to five, separating out consensus from constructivist theory). Here's a simple fast-and-loose description of a few of the issues that make it not-so-simple as we'd sometimes like to believe. Correspondence theory is very often taken as the initial view. Problem with correspondence theory is that it quickly arrives at a point where most people will say, essentially "well, OK, so how do ya' explain this or that?" Fact is, it turns out there's no such thing as a pure correspondence, and that it's a social process wherein ideas are exchanged and folks develop mutually shared exchanges of words and, presumably, of the concepts involved. Those concepts are never exactly alike between two individuals, let alone all humankind. Enter constructivist theory. Not only do people mutually shape ideas of truth ("Is dat true, Clem?" "Yep, Festus, y'kin take that one to the bank,"). it turns out that even the "authorities" on the subject, the dictionaries, textbooks, encyclopedias, etc., help to shape what is held to be "truth". In Turkmenistan today, for instance, there is only one set of truths--those of Turkmenbashi. Turkmen today have very good reason to believe in constructivist theory, and to varying degrees most humans have some degree of reason to sense the constructivists have something constructive to say about the issue in even the most free-thinking societies. Coherence theory is about, in part, how truth "hangs together", about that funny feeling one gets when something doesn't fit into the body of thought or belief each of us develops as we progress through life. It's also about logical and mathematical coherence. ("If it doesn't fit, you must acquit"; or, "Run JavaScript = False"). Sometimes logically coherent systems do not necessarily have anything to to with reality, and at the very least require a method of justification, which both scholars and people in general don't always agree how to do. Pragmatic theory is a synthesis of sorts, involving elements of correspondence, coherence and constructivist, with a central premise that truth is verified, in the end, by applying it rather than merely by thinking about it. There you also run into the problem of "well, I tried it and it didn't work that way for me"; "are you sure we're talking about the same thing?", etc. etc.

Then there are the "deflationary theories", which assert that when Clem tells Festus he kin take that one to the bank, he's doing nothing more than expressing agreement with the idea Festus put forward. And that is all that need be said about the word "truth", leaving the rest of the analysis to the separate issue of epistemological justification (how to prove, verify, or otherwise gain agreement that the word "true" is properly applied to something, ideally beyond merely agreeing to call it truth).

This very fast-and-loose sampling of issues merely touches the surface of why there is no one view or definition of truth. Certainly the intro could read differently, but the numerous editors that were involved chose to write the intro to keep it simple and to the point, and leave all the complicated and often contradictory stuff in the individual sections. ... Kenosis 01:49, 17 August 2006 (UTC)

One thing that should come out of this discussion is an attempt to have all Misplaced Pages articles indicate what paradigm they are using for the article to write it.

I notice that some such articles do that, witness "Evidence (legal).

The point is that it makes a big difference in what area you are discussing the topic.

There is logic and truth in various areas, but often they have nothing to do with each other, except peripherally.

A scientific truth is different than a logical truth or a legal truth or a philosophical one. I find the articles on Misplaced Pages often do not indicate which of these perspectives they are using for the article. That makes the article almost useless or even worse than useless, due to one being unable to separate out which perspective is being explained.

69.181.191.212 —The preceding signed but undated comment was added at 00:46, August 24, 2007 (UTC).

correspondence theory

In logic and with the scientific method the notion of true and false statements is widely accepted because of specific and clear evidence. The most primitive definition is by demonstration, such as pointing to the real, universal, existing sun or moon and giving it an etymological, common, or even a new name. The statement that the sun exists is true, just as many other natural facts, sensory observations, can be proven by anyone, at anytime in history, and anywhere. There is the true existence of the sun even with a variety of more specific definitions about the changing sun. Universal facts and claims of knowledge are widely accepted and agreed upon by many in all nations, and throughout history, because of the universal nature of giving evidence and proof for one's claims that are not mere opinions or superstitions. The scientific method that uses true or probable statements, induction, and deduction has discovered true and probable conclusions about the world around us that very few can deny.

Correspondence theory is used by all of us, and used very often. You cannot walk down the street with dangerous cars passing by if you do not have any correspondence theory that works because it actually does accurately describe some of what exists.

--joseph 06:39, 16 August 2006 (UTC)

Truth definition from Objectivism

How come the article does not mention Objectivist_epistemology? Here is a possible start: "Truth is an epistemological unit: the recognition of a fact." There is not a single word 'recognition' in the entire article. I propose to start a section on Objectivist view on 'truth'. Oleksandr 18:47, 16 August 2006 (UTC)

Given the current organization of the article, which took very extensive work by many editors and countless person-hours, I'd suggest putting Ayn Rand in the notable philosophers section, and proceeding from there. What you've pointed out also anticipates the need for a future section on epistemology generally, with one or more "main article" links to the appropriate topic fork(s). ... Kenosis 18:59, 16 August 2006 (UTC)

The Objectivist view of truth isn't notably different from the garden variety correspondence theory as presented here and in its own article, as your quote indicates. --Christofurio 23:40, 23 August 2006 (UTC)

Pic again

I'm tired'a arguing about this pic every two weeks. We compromised a couple weeks back the last time editors were moving images back and forth, and ended up with no images up in the intro. Now La Verite is in the article twice, once in the intro and once farther down. This is not an issue of censorship or defending anything; the image doesn't explain anything about truth and neither do any of the other ones, so there's no need to have La Verite, or any of them, up front in the article. ... Kenosis 23:19, 17 August 2006 (UTC)

Yep, trying to provide tangibility to an abstact is perty near impossible. And you kin take that to the bank.  ;) &#0149;Jim62sch&#0149; 01:36, 18 August 2006 (UTC)

Well Keno, I dont think president Bush will be looking in at it, in his own immortal words: "One of the great things about books is sometimes there are some fantastic pictures." Lucaas 01:02, 18 August 2006 (UTC)

Whitehead

Unsure about this new section on Whitehead, quote is out of context. At least with the earliar Adam/Eve story, it was intersting; "Mythology about Truth" might be an interesting section to add.

On Whitehead: What is truth for "process philosophy"? Not sure what the point of existing paragraph on him is. Should we also include all other quotes, Shakespeare, plus anyone vaguely witty, whenever they use the word "truth"?

Much better to remove this section and update the Hegel section, wherefrom Whitehead got his ideas on truth (as something that moves, is realised/revealed, and NOT 'constructed' as it hints earliar) and is more interesting.Lucaas 23:24, 23 August 2006 (UTC)

Truth in Science

This may be a silly point - but would it not make sense to hold truth in science to be *the* truth according to which humans live?

Yes, it would not. Banno 22:19, 10 September 2006 (UTC)

It would be an extremely controversial point, at the least. Just for example: I don't know how my life is changed by whether physicists discover proton decay in one of those big underground tanks where they've been waiting on that discovery for twenty years now. Certain models as to the unification of forces will change, and that may or may not indirectly affect my life or that of later generations if I don't live long enough. In the meantime, the truth according to which I live is the truth of the phenomenal world, where tables are solid brown objects and my body is another solid object which might bump into the table if I'm not careful. --Christofurio 20:40, 12 September 2006 (UTC)

I don't think thtat this is a silly point, though it needs some development and disambiguation. It is controversial, but certainly there are contemporary philosophers who hold the view that truth in science is the same as truth in our everyday lives. But there are variations which you don't distinguish. One might think that it's correspondence in both. Or constuctivist. Or pragmatist. -Christofurio, consider the difference between what is known and what is true but unknown.71.154.210.175 11:47, 7 December 2006 (UTC)

We can consider that difference if you like, but the anonymous editor above spoke of scientific truth as the truth "according to which humans live." Known truth is that according to which we live. At any rate, I didn't say that the observation was necessarily wrong, only that it was "extremely controversial." You said the same, without the adjective. --Christofurio 13:20, 17 April 2007 (UTC)

Proposed correspondence-theory material

I have removed the following newly added material from the section on "Correspondence theory" for discussion and sourcing.

• Philosophers who adhere to this theory state that underlying this theory is the notion that the human being's intelligence and sense perception are capable of capturing the essence of the known object. Most of these philosophers also warn that to deny this capability risks falling into relativism, whereby each person constructs his own truth, and thus lives egoistically, out of touch with the demands of reality. .... 16:45, 16 September 2006 (UTC)

The first sentence presumes an "essence" of known objects. The term "essence" is traditionally a troublesome one in philosophy in the context of both ontology and epistemology. The second sentence, in my estimation, would need to be (1) properly sourced as to who or which group of philosophers holds such a view, and (2) placed elsewhere because it is a counterargument which appears to involve some kind of broad psychospiritual slant, using as it does "constructs", "egoistically", "out of touch with the demands of reality", etc. And the assertion "to deny this capability risks falling into relativism" is a whole argumentative line of thinking that sounds, offhand, like a form of essentialism overlayed with a Jungian POV. ... Kenosis 16:45, 16 September 2006 (UTC)

I would have just taken it out and shot it. &#0149;Jim62sch&#0149; 20:36, 16 September 2006 (UTC)

"Notable Philosophers"

What criterion are being used for inclusion in this list? Can anyone add their favourite? Perhaps those that consist of a quote should be removed? Banno 01:50, 5 October 2006 (UTC)

Personally I have no objection to Bohr and Whitehead being included for now. If it gets out of hand, there'll be a stronger basis for removing some of the less "notable" views. Maybe I'll defer to Jim62sch; if he really wants he can take a couple out and "shoot them", as he said above. As long as there are no serious objections by other editors to such a removal, I'll support it. ... Kenosis 02:26, 5 October 2006 (UTC)

Correction to 'Philosophy of truth' opening paragraph needed

The opening paragraph of 'Philosophy of Truth' reads: "Questions about what is a proper basis on which to decide whether and to what extent words, symbols, ideas and beliefs may be said to be true, whether for a single person or an entire community or society, are among the many important questions addressed by the theories introduced below." This is misleading, because words and symbols might refer or represent but it is never appropriate to describe them as true or false. This is also the case for most ideas, e.g. "Let's go to the shops." Surely it is more appropriate to list the entities that the theories consider to be truth bearing?

I suggest "Questions about what is a proper basis on which to decide whether and to what extent claims, propositions, and beliefs may be said to be true..." Comments please.

(Thanks, Kenosis, for fixing my erroneous edits - in both cases I misunderstood the established text.) Inabyssian 19:13, 6 October 2006 (UTC)

Inabyssian, I appreciated seeing the obvious thought that went into your edits yesterday.

The editors here have been through this essential discussion at least a couple of times before (now viewable in the lengthy archived discussions from earlier in 2006). The current wording arose as an NPOV way to try to avoid unnecessary disputes over the article being biased towards "correspondence theory", and also several other issues involved in this inherently broad topic. Perhaps Banno, Jim62sch and others recall the lengthy wrangling and the long, unweildy list of "entities" that the article ended up with in addition to claims/propositions and ideas/beliefs. Others argued for "sentences", "signs", "truthbearers" and a host of other "entities" along the way, and it ended up wildly out of control and highly unstable. The introductory paragraph currently introduces the broad topic, with sections for each of the four basic classes ot theory (five with "consensus theory", which is arguably a subset of "constructivist epistemology"). Correspondence theory has a main-article link in its respective section, and that article still needs a great deal of work. That article on correspondence theory appears a reasonable place (one of at least several possible reasonable approaches) to summarize or discuss more specifically the issues that surround the concepts of "truth-bearers" signs, symbols, propositions (communicative entities) as well as ideas, concepts, beliefs (mental entities) as they are argued to "correspond" to a hypothetical "objective" reality. Similarly, to the extent that propositions may be said to "cohere" within a consistent system of some kind, coherence theory of truth would be a reasonable place to discuss this aspect as it relates to the kinds of entities under consideration for their possible "truth value", as well as as it relates to consideration of an entire internally consistent schema or system.

As to the current introductory paragraph, "words" and "symbols" are already mentioned, so there is no need to begin adding additional terms applied to various types of groups of words at that initial stage of introducing the section to the reader of the article, at least in my view. .. Kenosis 01:08, 7 October 2006 (UTC)

Thanks for the history of this discussion - I can see this issue would have been quite a slog! It certainly makes good sense to discuss 'truth-bearers' in more detail elsewhere, but nevertheless it seems a mistake that this opening sentence mentions candidates for truth-bearers, namely words and symbols, that can't be and aren't said to be, true by any of the theories described, or indeed by any theory of truth. Of course they play a role in all of the theories, as do beliefs, claims, propositions, etc, but since words and symbols are never 'true,' (they may or may not correspond or represent, etc, which is a different matter) their prominence in the introduction seems misleading (at least to me). Anyway, thanks for the response. Inabyssian 08:19, 7 October 2006 (UTC)

Yep, understood, sort of. Whether words and symbols are of necessity properly termed truth-bearers tends to be a product of correspondence theory analysis (see, for one instance, the article on "Correspondence Theory of Truth" in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy online). Over the course of the 20th century, correspondence theorists as a group have had a tendency to get tangled up better'n a darned frantic cat with an infinintely long ball of yarn. Perhaps the articles on truthbearer and correspondence theory are more appropriate places for that material. ... Kenosis 09:56, 7 October 2006 (UTC)

The Stanford Encyclopedia article indicates only that truth-bearers may be understood as composed of words, at least for the Correspondence as Isomorphism approach - this does not support the sentence as it stands. I seem to have been pigeon-holed as a correspondence theorist (nothing could be further from the truth (!)) - this is the only reason I can think of as to why I don't seem to be able to make clear my objection to the sentence as it stands. Yet my point has nothing to do with the correspondence theory; as I tried to point out in my last comment, no theory of truth treats words or symbols as truth-bearers, so a sentence that suggests that they do is misleading. Words and symbols should not be mentioned in this sentence. Oh well, I seem to be repeating myself/labouring the point - perhaps I am so far wrong that I'm lucky I've been treated politely. Enough from me - thanks for responding :-) Inabyssian 12:06, 7 October 2006 (UTC)

As I understand Inabyssian's point, it can as it were be split into two parts. Allow me to explain it in a silly way. Part 1. Imagine that this opening para contained this: "... to decide whether and to what extent articulated sounds, graven images, ideas and beliefs may be said to be true, ...". Wouldn't you think then: What? Sounds, images..., what has that to do with anything? Without going into a discussion as to the ability of sounds and images to function as bearers, it ought to be clear that these are not appropriate notions for being listed here. So OK, let's leave them out. Then we have: "... to decide whether and to what extent ideas and beliefs may be said to be true, ...". Part 2. Now you think: Hmm. Ideas and beliefs... a bit thin. Indeed, something is missing. What should we add back in? Maybe "phonemes, graphemes"? No, not quite right. Then "syllables, signs"? Nope. What about "words, symbols"? Same problem: not appropriate. Last try: "claims, statements, propositions". Well, yes, appropriate, but it gets a bit long. So let us remove some from the list "claims, statements, propositions, ideas and beliefs" that are redundant.  --Lambiam 19:17, 7 October 2006 (UTC)

Hold up a second please. This analysis, in saying "What about "words, symbols"? Same problem: not appropriate." just ran by the already existing language in the article at about 70 miles an hour. "Words" includes truthbearers, propositions, sentences, clauses, pharases, etc., etc., anything linguistic that carries meaning with the intent to convey a concept or image to another person. "Symbols" readily includes a variety of additional forms that are capable of having communicative value, including math symbols, pictoral images and can even include metaphors and other analogies. The last time around we had an absolute quagmire, in part because "truthbearer" is a categorical term that includes a number of communicative entities, with disagreement among different published writers about the range of entities that are properly termed truth-bearers. There also has never been full accord on the meaning of "propositions" ever since it was first proposed in the early 20th Century, in part because of the confusion about whether it is the sentence, phrase, clause, etc. which is the proposition, or does it need to be interpreted and argued what is the underlying meaning that is the actual proposition, so there is a whole tangled mess of debate right with that set of issues alone. For one thing, each word of a concise phrase or sentence tends to have a truth value or a meaning involved; there's a big difference between the conjunctions "and" and "or", and between the articles "the" and "a", etc., etc. Additionally, there is lack of agreement across the disciplines (notably semiotics, liguistics and philosophy) about the words "sign", "symbol", "signal" and a few others. A word can be a signal, and so can a nod of the head. The existing language accommodates these and many other points of great confusion adequately by the use of "words, symbols, ideas and beliefs". Admittedly it is a bit of a stretch to shoehorn physical gestures such as a nod of the head, into the existing language in the article ("words, symbols, ideas and beliefs"). A physical gesture certainly is covered by the concept truth-bearers; but truth-bearers is a confusing concept for the uninitiated, and tends to be specific to correspondence theory, while the words "words, symbols, ideas and beliefs" run across all five of the major theories that the section proceeds to introduce to the reader. This is an introductory sentence to a long, long, section, and as such is not, in my opinion, the place to get bogged down in this whole quagmire or give a long laundry list of specific terms. ... Kenosis 19:52, 7 October 2006 (UTC)

Examples of words include 'cat', 'dog,' etc - no truthbearers, propositions, sentences, clauses, or phrases, can be found in this list. Symbols are forms with communicative value, but communicative value is not truth. Words and symbols carry meaning but can never be said to be true. It is a mistake to use these terms instead of terms like proposition and claim, however problematic they are; to do so is to replace a problematic term with one used incorrectly.Inabyssian 22:22, 7 October 2006 (UTC)

Of course it's true that a single word generally does not of itself have a truth value when held out in isolation from a "statement" of some kind ("statement" being yet another candidate for the laundry list of possible entities to be subjected to consideration for their possible truth value). The word "words" includes all linguistic strings, including all of the above and much, much more. As I said, I don't believe this is the place for a laundry list. Incidentally, "utterance" is one of the commonly offered candidates too.

What is being suggested for that introductory sentence of the "Philosophy of truth" section? To replace "words, symbols, ideas, and beliefs" with what? ... "strings of words"?... Kenosis 02:43, 8 October 2006 (UTC)

For simplicity, my preference is "statements and beliefs", not really a laundry list. I see "proposition" as essentially a synonym for "statement", while "claim" is subsumed by "statement" (a claim is a statement put forward as being true). The problem with "utterance" is the same as for "word" or "string of words", namely that many utterances, such as "gosh" and "my o my", cannot meaningfully be subjected to a truth examination. We need noun phrases that cover such things as "Water is wet" and "The Moon consists of Emmenthaler cheese" while excluding "Come here!", "pflrfllpl", and "ɮɥʡʉʲ_ɽЋ".  --Lambiam 04:19, 8 October 2006 (UTC)

Among the limitations of using "statements and beliefs", to name just a couple: ideas under investigation or held in suspension without necessary belief as to their truth value; math and logic symbols or sets of symbols in the setting of correspondence, coherence and/or pragmatic theory. Believe it or not, a great deal of thought went into picking those four nouns in order to avoid a POV coming primarily from correspondence theory analysis. ... Kenosis 05:16, 8 October 2006 (UTC)

If the terms 'words' and 'symbols' include strings of words or sets of symbols (which I don't agree that they do - else the opening sentence could be understood as referring to 'strings of ideas' or 'sets of beliefs'), then they are too broad, because such strings or sets include many things that have no truth value. The term 'ideas' has the same problem. I feel it is best to limit this list to things that do have truth value, but I also don't see how the suggested terms have any POV problem - the suggested terms are used by all theories of truth.Inabyssian 06:47, 8 October 2006 (UTC)

The exsiting words were intended to be broad enough to accommodate the entire range of entities that could potentially be subjected to consideration under any of the five major theories (conspicuously absent are "things", including "things-in-themselves", i.e. noumena). These four words ("words, symbols, ideas and beliefs") do in fact cover the broad sphere of linguistic and symbolic communicative entities, as well as the broad sphere of mental entities. Note very carefully that the language does not say "a word, symbol" but uses the plural form to accommodate the extremely wide range of entities that can readily come into play across the five theories. This includes literal statements, figurative statements, jokes, stories, movies, paintings, totem poles, masks, photographs, mathematical and logical symbols, phrases, propositions, cynical statements, questions, answers, evasive answers, sarcastic statements, inadvertent mistakes, intentional deceptions, half-truths whether literal or pictorial, physical evocations intended or interpreted as having a meaning, groupings of varying kinds of communicative entites such as truth-bearers, utterances, sentences, groups of sentences taken in context both with one another and in context with the wider setting in which they're placed, provisional propositions, assertions, hypothetical questions, hypothetical answers, fictional material, memoirs, and non-fiction, , and mental entities such as thoughts, mental images, ideas generally, mild intentions, firm intentions, musings, firm beliefs, tentative beliefs, symbolic thought, categorical thinking, stream of consciousness, hallucinations, fear-based avoidance thinking, groupthink, zeitgeist, individual geist, shared mentality, etc., etc., etc. ... Kenosis 17:30, 8 October 2006 (UTC)

While I believe that a great deal of thought went into picking those four nouns, which were introduced in this edit, I do not see that the particular formulation was the result of a consensus process; at least, I can't find it discussed on the talk page. I do not blame Kenosis for that; at around the same time I posted this comment. It was quite impossible then to have a meaningful discussion, thanks to the prolixity of one now permablocked editor. I find myself in agreement with Inabyssian on this (in my opinion minor) issue. I too fail to see a POV risk.  --Lambiam 13:15, 8 October 2006 (UTC)

The sentence currently under discussion was initially introduced in April, roughly 1700 edits ago. April 20th-23rd were very busy days for this article. At the beginning of April 20, the article looked like this. By the end of the April 22 it looked like this. In between, the initial form of the sentence now under discussion was introduced as a lead-in prior to the beginning of the then-section "Major theories of truth" here. Then, on April 23 I introduced the sentence as a beginning of that section here in a slightly different form than it exists presently. As sections were changed and moved around by various editors including myself, the sentence was moved around accordingly and also removed for awhile. I reintroduced it on June 18 here with roughly the current phrasing. On June 25 I moved it here. Then on June 29 found its way to the beginning of the section, then later the same day I moved it to its existing position as a lead for the section on Philosophy of truth, with the current wording put in place to avoid the repeated problems involved in using more specific language of what the five major theories were assessing as having some potential relationship to the word "truth". That language has been fairly stable since then. If it needs to be more explicitly consensused or changed, that's certainly OK with me. ... Kenosis 18:10, 8 October 2006 (UTC)

Multi-dimensional truths

Multi-dimensional truths.

In the arena of mathematical truths, one plus one equals two, but only within certain dimensions.

In the pure concrete world 1 + 1 = 11, in the pure abstract world 1(a) + 1(b) = 1(c) where 1(c) is greater than the other two. Example the amalgamation of one city with one city is still one city.

What i call 'thinking outside books'

We must appreciate that many truths are based on the relative position of reality subject to the realities of position.

The Jesus Christ Code.

While this may be (original research that I cannot quote, someone else can quote it, as it is not their original research)

--Son of Maryann Rosso and Arthur Natale Squitti 09:24, 19 October 2006 (UTC)

Foucault

This section seems to me to be too brief. My recollection is that he describes truth an power as two sides of the same coin; bringing to the fore the difference between the analytic approach and the continental approach by emphasising the political impact of what is true and what isn't. I;m sure that his writing should have more prominence, but not being that interested in continental philosophy, I don;t have the citations at hand. Someone must. Banno 22:11, 28 October 2006 (UTC)

re-structure

I've substantially re-structured the article. The aim was to bring disparate sections together in the hope that they can be linked by some sort of narrative. Comments? Banno 00:06, 29 October 2006 (UTC)

Interesting approach. Among other things in the way here is that the scholastics, if the editors ever get around to developing that little section, are not properly sectioned under classical philosophy. Alfred North Whitehead isn't continental, and Fromm very arguably doesn't belong in that grouping either. I'm a bit disappointed that the trio of "Truth in Mathematics", "Truth in law" and "Truth in science" never came to fruition to round out the perspectives, but personally can live with what you've done, so long as the basic presentation of the four or five major "substantive" theories and the deflationary theories remains fundamentally intact. (I also wonder how long it will take before someone comes in and says essentially, "well, technically the "Formal theories section aren't formal, but rather are yada-yada..."? I think I can hear it already: "The mathematics section is actually composed of arguments about formal proofs rather than formal theories of mathematical proofs", and "Tarski's semantic theory is a metaproposition, not a formal theory." or whatever.) Overall I have no objection to attempting this approach. ... Kenosis 00:55, 29 October 2006 (UTC)

Then replace Classical with historical or ''antiquated and remove Whitehead (which doesn't add much anyway). I think we can get away with leaving Fromm where he is. I'd like to fill out the formal maths section more, which contains the proto-"Truth in Mathematics" stuff. Perhaps we can work on it together. Glad the changes didn't meet with outright rejection - thanks. Banno 04:12, 29 October 2006 (UTC)

Kripke

I believe I started the inclusion of Kripke ; as I recall Nathan Ladd placed the present version, after some discussion (see archive 4); it of course is quite different from what is in the actual Kripke article. Nathan appears to be inactive at present. Banno 20:52, 5 November 2006 (UTC) Kenosis, is the reference I provided sufficient? Banno

The Truth

If something has arguments on whether it is true or false, then it is in fact not true. The only thing that can be true is something universally accepted, such as this statement "The sky of the planet Earth appears to be the color blue to those who do not suffer from color blindess". Everyone agrees on that being true I'm sure. Anyway this article makes truth seem as if it's an opinion. The Truth is what is. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 71.33.224.106 (talk) 20:46, 20 December 2006 (UTC).

Truth and The Truth

The article might want to distinguish truth from the Truth or Truths. Examples of the latter are commonly found in religious texts eg John 18:37, 'witness to the Truth', and the Buddhist Noble Truths. m.e. (talk) 10:11, 21 April 2008 (UTC)

Universally Accepted?

There are no Universally Accepted propositions.

Is the sensation which I call blue really the same as that which my neighbor calls blue? Is it possible that a blue object may arouse in him the same sensation that a red object does in me and vice versa? (Bridgman, P. W. - Logic of Modern Physics - p30 - Nobel prize winner in 1946)

"The Truth is what is" smacks of the Correspondence Theory, which has been Discredited.

According to this theory (correspondence), truth consists in the agreement of our thought with reality. This view ... seems to conform rather closely to our ordinary common sense usage when we speak of truth. The flaws in the definition arise when we ask what is meant by "agreement" or "correspondence" of ideas and objects, beliefs and facts, thought and reality. In order to test the truth of an idea or belief we must presumably compare it with the reality in some sense. In order to make the comparison, we must know what it is that we are comparing, namely, the belief on the one hand and the reality on the other. But if we already know the reality, why do we need to make a comparison? And if we don't know the reality, how can we make a comparison? (Randall, J. & Buchler, J.; Philosophy: An Introduction. p133)

The Randall book is an excellent introduction to philospophy.

--Berjm 16:49, 31 December 2006 (UTC)Berjm

Augustine's contradiction

There is an explicit contradiction in Augustine's definition. He first says: "Even if every created thing ceases to exist, Truth will continue to exist.", and then "Without a mind, truth could not exist." Does anybody know of some author who has pointed to this specific contradiction?

Didn't Augustine believe in the existence of One mind that was not a "created thing"? I'm not sure I see the alleged contradiction. --Christofurio 20:27, 3 February 2007 (UTC)

There is no contradiction. Truth exists in the mind of God. Rick Norwood 14:58, 5 February 2007 (UTC)

Statement; is it possible, that truth may be an "unconscious object"? (an attempt to define a model of Truth?)

Is it possible that truth may be an "unconscious object" common to all? unconscious = Truth", "My" definition of Truth - the degree of best fit, of data coming in from the reality, super-imposed on an "unconscious" philosophical model of reality and interpreted as a feeling. Example I point at an "object" a person is sitting on and call the "object" a "chair", other people in the vicinity of the object have the same model which they call a "chair”. In this case the object "chair" is a truth for all the people perceiving the object. (This truth is this case, is limited by the experience of the reality, these viewers have had i.e. how evolved is their conscious model of reality?) Absolute truth is an unconscious (objective) model, which describes all objects, events, perceptions, nothing is left out of this model. This model is common to all in this reality, though only part of the model is conscious, i.e. accessible to any one individual’s conscious mind, at any given point of time.Allan52 08:40, 4 January 2007 (UTC) Alan

" truth is verified and confirmed by the results of putting one's concepts into practice."

Pragmatic theory

Main article: Pragmatic theory of truth

The three most influential forms of the pragmatic theory of truth were introduced around the turn of the 20th century by Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. Although there are wide differences in viewpoint among these and other proponents of pragmatic theory, they hold in common that truth is verified and confirmed by the results of putting one's concepts into practice.

Removed section on Augustine of Hippo

I've removed this subsection, which was among "notable philosphers' views of truth", and am placing it here for now. The main reason is that this presentation of Augustine is more theology than it is philosophy of the concept of truth. and, it is excessively lengthy and was in drastic need of being more concise and organized to fit the article on truth ... Kenosis 04:04, 16 January 2007 (UTC)

• ===Augustine of Hippo===

Augustine’s definition of Truth.

• 1. Truth Exists:-

It is self-defeating to deny the existence of truth. If someone claims that “Truth does not exist”, then we can counter by asking if the claim is True or False. If the claim is False, then Truth Exists, and if the claim is True, then Truth Exists.

• 2. Truth is Unchangeable:-

It is impossible for truth to change. What is true today always has been and always will be true. All true propositions are immutable truths. Pragmatic views of truth that imply that what is true today may be false tomorrow are untrue. If truth changes, then pragmatism will be untrue tomorrow, if indeed it could ever be true.

• 3. Truth is Eternal:-

By extension of its Unchangeable nature, Truth must be Eternal. Even if every created thing ceases to exist, Truth will continue to exist. But suppose someone asks, “What if truth itself should someday perish?” Then the truth that “Truth has perished” would still exist eternally. Any denial of the eternity of truth turns out to be an affirmation of its eternity.

• 4. Truth is Spiritual:-

The existence of truth presupposes the existence of minds. Without a mind, truth could not exist. The object of knowledge is a meaningful thought which resides in one or more minds.

• a. Truth is Not a function of Matter:-

  The existence of truth is incompatible with any materialistic view of man. Materialists believe that all thinking and reasoning is merely the result of the motion of particles in the brain. But one set of relative physical motions is not truer than another set. Therefore, if there is no mind, there can be no truth; and if there is no truth, materialism cannot be true. Truth cannot be a function of the position of material objects because if a thought was the result of some physical motion in the brain, no two persons could have the same thought. A physical motion is a fleeting event different from every other motion. Two persons could not have the same random motion, nor could one person have the same random motion twice.

• b. Truth is Not a function of Time:-

  If thoughts were the result of physical motions in the brain, memory and communication would be impossible. We are able to recall the past because we have minds and not because of the motion of particles in our brains. Thus, if one is able to think the same thought twice, truth must be independent of time.

• c. Truth is Not a function of Space:-

  Truth is independent of Space as well. Not only does truth defy time and matter; it defies space as well. For communication to be possible between two or more people, the identical truth must be in two or more minds at the same time. If, in opposition, anyone wished to deny that an immaterial idea can exist in two different minds at the same time, his denial must be conceived to exist in his own mind only; and since it has not registered in any other mind, it does not occur to us to refute it!

• 5. Truth is Superior to the human mind:-By its very nature, truth cannot be subjective and individualistic. Truth is immutable, but the human mind is changeable. Even though beliefs vary from one person to another, truth itself cannot change. Moreover, the human mind does not stand in judgment of truth; rather truth judges our reason. While we sometimes judge other human minds (as when we say, for example, that someone’s mind is not as keen as it should be), we do not judge truth. If truth and the human mind were equal, truth could not be eternal and immutable since the human mind is finite, mutable, and subject to error. Therefore, truth must transcend human reason; truth must be superior to any individual human mind as well as to the sum total of human minds. From this it follows that there must be a mind higher than the human mind in which truth resides.

• 6. Truth is God:-We have seen that Truth exists, is unchangeable, eternal, spiritual, and is superior to the human mind. But only God possesses these attributes. If we substitute the word “God” for the word “Truth” in the list of attributes, we see that:

• God Exists-

• God is Unchangeable-

• God is Eternal-

• God is Spiritual-

• God is not a function of Space, Time or Matter-

• God is Superior to the human mind-

• These attributes apply equally to Truth and God, and only to Truth and God.

Truth and God are identical. Truth and God are convertible. Truth is God. God is Truth.

• No created thing possesses the attributes of Truth or God. There can be no True propositions about created entities, including numbers, geometric patterns or so called “laws” of science because they are all dependent on Space, Time or Matter. The only true propositions are about God.

• In other words, Knowing Truth is Knowing God. Truth is Knowledge of God.

• END OF REMOVED MATERIAL Kenosis

Truth in religion should go

We need to delete the entire Truth in Religion section. The whole point of theories of truth is to find the common denominator of all truths, regardless of their domain. Otherwise, what's to stop someone from adding dozens of "Truth in blah" sections, where "blah" is replaced by any domain you can think of: biometry, astrology, magic, alchemy, ... etc. --24.16.98.241 03:23, 16 January 2007 (UTC)

Dear anon IP 24.16.98.241: This section is intended to accommodate widespread beliefs in truth as argued to be spiritually revealed, or which are otherwise advocated by religions based upon particular kinds of assertions and upon the manner of deducing such concepts that religions may assert to be truth. To date, it appears there's a need in this article to accommodate this point of view in the use of the word "truth". Incidentally, perhaps you might choose to take a username and give other users something with which to associate your edits other than an up-to-12-digit number (and, such a choice would in the future eliminate another potential issue, which is that an IP address usually can easily be geographically located even without any special knowledge other than the address). More importantly, though, I would want to thank you for your well-thought edits, especially to the section on "Types of truth". ... Kenosis 03:37, 16 January 2007 (UTC)

I realize that some people think religion has revealed truths, but even assuming there is such a thing, revelation is a method of justification, not a type of truth. The thing that is being revealed is the same kind of thing that is discovered by science, or proven by deductive logic, or hidden by liars, or seen in the bottom of booze bottles by drunks. Truth is truth regardless of how it is discovered. We should not be letting this article indulge people in the failure to distinguish questions about the nature of truth from questions about how truth is discovered. There are other articles in the wiki for the latter issues. Moreover, it would be wildly non-standard, and thus original research, to include a section about so-called revealed truths in an article about the nature of truth. --24.16.98.241 04:42, 19 January 2007 (UTC)

FWIW, I agree with 24.16.98.241. KillerChihuahua 04:44, 19 January 2007 (UTC)

Fair enough, KillerChihuahua. As user:24.16.98.241 points out, "revelation" in the context of religion is a "justification" for the belief in such method(s) of discerning what one might regard as truth. Perhaps this section could be replaced with a more explicit analysis of what that means. Assuming the possibility of a reasonably stable consensus on this issue, I certainly would not object. ... Kenosis 06:05, 19 January 2007 (UTC)

As to the additional issue raised by 24.16.98.241 that "ruth is truth regardless of how it is discovered", I would say, as Pink Floyd previously said in a particularly memorable lyric, "welcome to the machine". See, circular argument, and innumerable related topics such as, for instance, Truth#Truth in religion. ... Kenosis 06:10, 19 January 2007 (UTC)

Ah, good catch, yes I was agreeing on the Remove religion bit, not the rest of the comment. Truth is subjective, regardless of how it is characterized. One puppy's opinion. KillerChihuahua 12:17, 19 January 2007 (UTC)

Well, this issue of "what is truth?" is an extremely tough one for sure, as evidenced by the four or five competing substantive theories and the several "minimalist" theories that essentially dismiss it as a useless term which largely neglects the issue of epistemological justification. And then there's the additional complication that some of the theories attempt to integrate theories of justification into theory of truth, most notably the pragmatic theories. In other words, there's no wide agreement where the study of "truth" ends and where "epistemology" begins (i.e., should the word "truth" only be applied to intentional acts of stating one's knowledge to another--not lying--or is it properly extended into theories of knowledge?, how is it that we might know a statement to be accurate and useful?, along with other related questions).

I'm going to take the affirmative step of retitling it to "Religious perspectives on truth" just to tide it over for now. Too often we see WP users adding material of this kind, and I don't at the moment see how it's feasible to put that cork back in the bottle in any stable, long-term way. ... Kenosis 15:48, 19 January 2007 (UTC)

It seems to me that you are reacting personally to the material on religion. If we are going to have four or five different secular versions of truth, then we should at least respect the religious version, which makes as much sense as at least three of the secular versions. Also, if the Augustine section is not well written, it should be rewritten, not removed. Augustine is a major writer, his views on truth should be respected at least as much as the views of obscure modern academics. Rick Norwood 14:54, 20 January 2007 (UTC)

I think you may have misunderstood my point. It is not there are religious and secular "versions" of truth and I want to eliminate the religious ones. The problem is that there are no religious versions of truth, not in the sense of "version of truth" that would apply to an encyclopedia article about truth. There are different religious versions about what is or isn't true, and about how truth is obtained/justified; but there are no religious theories of what truth is. There have been religious writers from time-to-time who claimed that they were dealing with the question of "What truth is," but it always turns out on actually reading the works in question that they were answering either "how do we obtain truth?" or "what is true?". What you are calling the "secular versions" are theories that really are about the nature of truth. Hence, they really belong in an article that is itself about truth. But the religious doctrines mentioned in the article do not belong, not anymore than particular theories of physics or astronomy or astrology; because just as the latter three theories are not about truth, neither are the relgious doctrines. --24.16.98.241 02:57, 29 January 2007 (UTC)

I agree, Rick, about the section about religious perspectives on truth. As I see it, there is an ongoing potential for workable balance between excessive presentation of religious POVs on the one hand, and complete exclusion on the other hand, even despite the tendency for users to occasionally introduce awkward volumes of religious material that is essentially proselytizing theology or dogma. This kind of material tends to be relatively difficult to sort through for editing purposes, in part because it is often justified by revelation rather than some more particular set of observations about the world. Yet, it is possible to accommodate it, which the article already does.

As to Augustine, I don't have the time to parse out the theology from the observations about truth and distill it down to a summary of reasonable length. Just because Augustine keeps using the word "truth" doesn't necessarily warrant the inclusion of such arguments in this article either. It's granted that he's a major writer, philosopher and theologian, but he's not really a major commentator on theory of truth. For example, in his dissertation on Christian Doctrine, he has a lengthy analysis of things and symbols or signs (classical semiotics, really), and then turns around and says that the signs and symbols (including words) are "things" too. Then, he basically argues that there are seven steps to wisdom: fear of God, loyal obedience (or faith), scientia (or knowledge), strength, good counsel, purity of heart, and then wisdom. About the issue of truth, he's basically arguing that "God" is truth, and that so are the scriptures. So it's not really an an analysis of truth, but more of an apologetic theology. Nonetheless, his view appears to deserve inclusion in the article, but in much shorter form. I just don't have time at present, nor handy access to the sources, to try to distill the recently donated material and meet WP:VER, and it's quite possible I'd feel the need to start from scatch. Rick, maybe you could throw something together about Augustine's view of truth? and we'll hack away at it as time permits?

Rick, it's nice to see your name here again, incidentally. ... Kenosis 18:33, 20 January 2007 (UTC)

I don't know enough about Augustine's view of truth to work on that section. From what you say, it sounds as if, in the terms used by the scholastics, he was a realist (words are things) rather than a nominalist (words are merely signs), but an Augustine scholar should write that section of the article. I backed off from Truth because I am a mathematician, not a philosopher. Most recently, I let myself get lured into a cat fight over Philosophy, where there are dozens of reverts and rereverts and it seems like hundreds of pages of argument being written every day. I think I'll be happier over in mathematics...or maybe Star Trek. Rick Norwood 23:50, 20 January 2007 (UTC)

I believe the section should stay. Enlightenment is the revealing of truth experienced by an individual. nirvana2013 07:44, 27 April 2007 (UTC)

why...

...is this page protected?!--Ioshus 22:29, 14 February 2007 (UTC)

At least someone add la:Veritas. Sheesh...--Ioshus 22:30, 14 February 2007 (UTC)

Removed and placed here for discussion

I've removed this section, which was placed by an anon IP, and am putting it here to save it just in case. Reasonas are 1) It's not a minimalist or deflationary theory; 2) Risenzweig can't seem to be found on a Google search; 3) it doesn't appear to merit a section based on Rosezweig's name. It may, though, be a useful insight for the future in the article to the extent we can find sourcing for it. ... Kenosis 15:39, 23 February 2007 (UTC)

====Rosenzweig's theory of truth====

Benjamin D. Rosenzweig contends that truth should not be defined in terms of any of the "theories of truth" but instead left as an ambiguous term that can be better specified by referring to the theory by which a particular instance of reality is being evaluated. For instance one could suggest that according to consensus truth the theory of evolution is not yet proved but coherence truth dictates that it is proved according to the requirements set forth by the scientific community. ... 15:39, 23 February 2007 (UTC)

Maybe you can't find it cause you can't spell it. It's Benjamin D. Rosenzweig... not "Risenzweig" nor "Rosezweig". He is a distinguished German professor currently teaching epistemology and political science at the University of London.—Preceding unsigned comment added by 68.81.110.224 (talk)

To the contrary, I copied and pasted the name in the Google search, along with the word "truth". Try it, and perhaps show us where he comes up on the search results, if at all. Either way, he's not adequately notable to build a section around his name in an article such as this. If sourcing can be provided, it may make sense to integrate his observation into another place in the article, citing to him. Thank you for the info. ... Kenosis 16:59, 23 February 2007 (UTC)

Certainly he's not notable enough for the main article. Banno 18:31, 23 February 2007 (UTC)

Simply because the great google search engine provides no results does not make a man's theory any less valid. I know he has had several books published in Germany. I'll do some research.—Preceding unsigned comment added by 68.81.110.224 (talk)

Some verifiable perspective on this would be appreciated. See also: WP:Notability. Thanks much. ... Kenosis 02:45, 24 February 2007 (UTC)

"The work must be prescribed as a textbook, a reference work, or required reading in an undergraduate- or graduate- level course; which is not taught, designed, or otherwise overseen by the author; at several independent accredited universities."

I'm afraid he's not achieved that level of notability. I still believe that the proposal is worth a footnote of some sort.

References

Sorry, I'm not sure how to add that the ref for 44 is m-w.com. Simplywater 19:33, 27 February 2007 (UTC)

For now, I simply changed the reference to http://m-w.com/dictionary/truth (see plain links without square brackets).--Kevinkor2 01:29, 28 February 2007 (UTC)

Examples please

It would be great to show examples of statements which would be true under some of the theories but not true under other(s). James S. 20:57, 9 March 2007 (UTC)

Congratulations!

Listen, my friends, who have assembled, nurtured, and protected this gem of an article on truth. I came by here as a user, looking for connections to what all the wonderful women and men of history have written about truth. And what I found here was -- not only incredibly useful in saving me time to dig through to get to all of what you have mined already for me here -- but also very inspiring to me in providing me with a concrete example of a Misplaced Pages page that is perfect. And I know it will evolve. Go forth, thank you. And my congratulations to you. --Rednblu 02:00, 24 March 2007 (UTC)

Validity

Someone should add a link to Validity in the Logic links section. Unfortunately, if I do it, I'll screw up the columns... FerralMoonrender 01:20, 30 March 2007 (UTC)

Baha'i position on Truth

I am new to this, so apologies if I am approaching it the wrong way. I was wondering if a Baha'i perspective to truth could be added to this page, as in the faith the founder states that "Truthfulness is the foundation of all human virtues" (Baha'u'llah quoted in Shoghi Effend - Advent of Divine Justice, p. 26) so it may be interesting to add.

--Shinshin 15:18, 16 April 2007 (UTC)--Shinshin 15:17, 16 April 2007 (UTC)

Revise Buddhist section

The Buddhist section is pretty weak; all that is discussed is the concept of the "Four Noble Truths". While this does contain the word "truth" in it, the Nobel Truths are really more about psychology than epistemology. However, I do think that the concept of truth and how human beings can discover truth is central to Buddhism. Buddha said that the ultimate source of suffering was ignorance or delusion. I'd like to totally re-write this section to discuss the Buddhist view of the importance of truth and the problem of delusion and self-deception. My sources would be directly from online transcriptions of the Pali Cannon such as www.accesstoinsight.org and maybe a few modern books on Zen.

I've never edited a Misplaced Pages article before so any hints would be welcomed. Mattcool97 22:48, 23 April 2007 (UTC)

Has this interest been gone? I don't see any improvements on this subject. --Gotti 17:30, 19 November 2007 (UTC)

Duality of Truth.

Duality of Truth.

Two of the greatest errors in the perception of Truth, is the inability to see two properties. The duality of truth, (original research) and the divisive nature of truth, the Light theory of truth. (orginal research)

The first relates to the second definition of half-truth, circa 1994 whereby a truth is absolute, yet relative to the perseptive of the observer. A classic old story is that of the blind men and the elephant, however, seldom if ever is the appropriate duality of truth conclusion reached.

The second relates to the divisive nature of truth, relating to the rainbow of truth, that is that while The Truth is colorless, a truth is merely part of the whole truth. To understand this concept puts one on the way to understanding the divisive nature of Truth. I would suggest that this was the intended suggestion of the prophet Jesus Christ, who claimed to be the way, the life and the truth, and also the light of the world. What I call the bridge between science and religion.

I hope someone has time to consider the important implications of this original research into expanding the definition of truth.

--Caesar J. B. Squitti  : Son of Maryann Rosso and Arthur Natale Squitti 21:13, 1 June 2007 (UTC)

2+2=4 and deduction "truths"

Hello User:Transitioner - Thanks for recently providing a hotlink reference to "unversalism". However, I've had to revert two examples of "universal truths". 2+2=4 is not a universal truth. While it is true independent of location in space and time (i.e. "everywhere in the universe" as was stated), it is only true in certain mathematical systems. In others, like e.g. a modulo 3 ring, this is not true, instead, 2 + 2 = 1 there. Similarily with laws of deduction and inference, which are true in formal Logic; nevertheless, logic is a defined framework, relative to which the laws of deduction and inference are true. Thanks, One4OneWorld 19:05, 5 June 2007 (UTC)

I have reverted and rewritten

1. Such dependence on abstract issues does not negate the articles claims about lack of dependence on time and space.

2. It is perverse to remove mathematical examples but leave in economics and ethics.

1Z 20:59, 5 June 2007 (UTC)

Your rewrite looks good to me and accomodates my concern I had with the initial post. We need to provide a better reference to who actually holds these believes (individuals, groups, organizations, etc). Reference to universalism alone appears a bit too ambiguous. And I also agree that the two examples with economics and ethics appear insufficiently motivated. So, to the least, we're now having examples from mathematics, logic, microeconomics, and ethics. Thanks, One4OneWorld 00:15, 6 June 2007 (UTC)

Oi! You! SIMPLIFY!!!!!

Imagine that you're a semi-literate dude who has a very low comprehension of English. Imagine that you would like a nice, short, workable definition of truth that is 99% correct for most of what you will be doing (kinda like how Newton's laws of Physics are 99% correct unless you travel close to the speed of light, etc....). Anyhow, the point is this. This wiki article is probabably too long to provide a *pragmatic* defintion of truth (which is really what it should do!). Can't we have a simple phrase-based definition of truth so that that may be placed at the introduction to this article?

Also, are there any further religious one-liners that people would like to add about truth? Maybe some proverbs and so forth?

Back to work...

Perhaps an article on how politicians sometimes (only sometimes?) have an inclination to either distort or misrepresent the truth would improve the livings standards of everyone contributing to this article.

194.81.199.57 20:43, 25 June 2007 (UTC)

The simple answer to the question in the first paragraph is "No, it's not simple" -- please see the talk page threads and the 14 archives of talk.

As to the question in the second paragraph, it's a bit of a balancing act. The worms are already out of the proverbial can, and every once in awhile a participating editor tries to put a few back in the can, so to speak.

As to the third paragraph, see, e.g. lie, bullshit, half-truth. Maybe try politics and follow links to see where they go; there are existing articles on political corruption, political scandal (broken down by country) -- who knows, maybe there's room for a new article on this issue, which would require defining the topic and using WP:reliable sources showing this dimension of politics that the anon IP mentions here. ... Kenosis 22:04, 25 June 2007 (UTC)

Don't forget truthiness. --best, kevin 22:16, 25 June 2007 (UTC)

Split Truth (religious)

The material on truth in religion should be moved into a separate article. The present article is way too long. The main article should maintain its emphasis on philosophy. Removing the religious material will also give the main article a better chance at stability. Banno 23:10, 30 June 2007 (UTC)

There being no objections, I will commence the split. Banno 19:12, 6 July 2007 (UTC)

I think the article can withstand it either way. But personally, I'd like to see a section on "truth in religion" remain, with a link to a main article. The reason has to do with the important concept called "justification". A brief section noting that "religious truth" typically is justified, in the minds of those asserting it, to scripture, "faith", or other form(s) of religious authority, would be important to this article I would think. This would, if implemented, allow further discussion of these methods of justification to be discussed at greater length in the new "main article" being proposed by Banno. ... Kenosis 02:49, 7 July 2007 (UTC)

I agree with Kenosis. There should be a short (less than 10 lines) section on religious truth. It should mention the idea of revealed truth, the idea of inspired truth, the "two truths" so popular in the middle ages, and maybe the quote, "The truth shall set you free." All linked to "Main article: religious truth". There are several other sections that could be split off in this way. Rick Norwood 14:21, 7 July 2007 (UTC)

All good points, and much as is outline in the relevant policy, Misplaced Pages:Summary style. I'll do the split soon, but will need all your input into what stays and what goes, since I have no strong preferences on the topic. Banno 02:01, 8 July 2007 (UTC)

Synchronise

I have simply copied the content of Truth#Religious views to the new article, leaving a copy of the first paragraph here as a lead-in to the new article. Others, especially Rick who seems to have a handle on what is needed, might like to change the paragraph here and the new introduction inthe other article. Banno 03:28, 8 July 2007 (UTC)

Particular care is going to be needed to ensure that Truth (religious) does not turn into a POV fork, I suggest keeping a close eye on it in relation to this, the main article. FeloniousMonk 04:09, 8 July 2007 (UTC)

Truth in art

• What happened to any attempt to deal with "truth in art"? --JimWae 18:47, 7 July 2007 (UTC)

Truth is beauty and beauty truth. That's all I know and all I need to know. Rick Norwood 14:35, 8 July 2007 (UTC)

Is the statement: "Truth is beauty and beauty truth" a true statement or a beautiful statement?Lestrade 15:56, 14 July 2007 (UTC)Lestrade

Math and Half-truths

In the world of truths concerning math, (original research lead) there is the inheret logic of math that suggests a multi-truth solution to a basic algerbraic problem.

1 + 1 = 2 or 1 + 1 = 1

The solutions are based on the relative nature of what each 1 represents.

--Caesar J. B. Squitti  : Son of Maryann Rosso and Arthur Natale Squitti 15:31, 14 July 2007 (UTC)

"inherent"........"algebraic" Lestrade 15:52, 14 July 2007 (UTC)Lestrade

Thanks...on the one hand we expect perfect spelling, to an imperfect concept like Truth or Math

--Caesar J. B. Squitti  : Son of Maryann Rosso and Arthur Natale Squitti 20:44, 14 July 2007 (UTC)

Caesar, the Wiki cannot publish original research, and the resources used used must be reliable. Banno 22:43, 14 July 2007 (UTC)

dictionary definition

I wonder if 24.16.98.193 would care to explain why he is so determined to remove this definition of truth. Rick Norwood 12:39, 26 July 2007 (UTC)

I am not 24.16.98.193, but I assume that s/he is deleting it because it adds nothing to the article and detracts from the beginning of the article. It adds nothing to the article because the meaning of 'truth' is commonly understood by English language teachers. It detracts from the article because it gives a disjointed, one sentence beginning that does not link into the next paragraphs. Anarchia 00:36, 27 July 2007 (UTC)

I agree that its inclusion results in a disjointed lede. When the first sentence resembled "Most dictionary definitions of truth mention agreement with reality" there was more of a connection to the rest of the lede - making it clearer that defining truth is a task not easily achieved --JimWae 05:16, 27 July 2007 (UTC)

I, for one, have no objection to JimWae's formulation of the first sentence. I just don't want the article to begin by giving the impression that nobody knows what "truth" means. I'm a mathematician, not a philosopher, but I believe that everybody knows what "truth" means except for philosophers. I tried to get some sort of common sense notion of "truth" into the article, but was shot down for "original research". Thus the reliance on a dictionary, which is not "original research".

I would like to see the article begin with something like this,

Truth is language which accurately describes physical reality. Because the correspondence between language and reality is always less than perfect, philosophers have offered a variety of "theories of truth".

But evidently this constitutes "original research". Rick Norwood 12:43, 27 July 2007 (UTC)

It is not a good definition. "truth" is not a kind of langauage in the sense that French is.

The def. begs the question against non-physical reality (possibly including maths!) 1Z 13:05, 27 July 2007 (UTC)

Hmmm... 'everyone knows what "truth" means except for philosophers'... A philosophers response: Non-philosophers often think they know what they mean by certain terms, but discover that their understanding is limited or flawed when they probe it (hence, Socrates and the Socratic method). Dictionary definitions are of limited (if any) use when trying to sort out such questions.

The sentences you propose above fail both to give the commonsense understanding of truth and the reasons for philosophers' arguments about the nature of truth. I suspect that what you want to say is that people's commonsense notion of truth is that a statement is 'true' when it corresponds to the way the world actually is. So, to paraphrase Tarski 'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow really is white. If t his is what you mean, then someone should be able to come up with a reference to some generally accepted book where this is said, and the article could begin with some statement resembling my one above. Would that help? (And, yes, you get into debates about the truth of mathematical concepts when you accept teh commonsense view, but that is just part of the reason why there is a 'truth' article.)Anarchia 21:13, 27 July 2007 (UTC)

I respectfully disagree.

First, in response to Peterdjones, I did not say truth was a "kind of" language. I said "Truth is language..." in the same sense that "Cats are animals." Some language is "true", some animals are "cats".

In response to Anarchia: you claim dictionary definitions are of limited (or no) use. I claim they are the only definitions that really count. Words are used to communicate. Dictionaries, and only dictionaries, provided common ground. Unless, like some scholastic philosophers (and some mathematicians), you want to prefix everything you say with a long list of definitions of the way you intend to use various words, then you cannot assume the person you are talking to (unless she is a fellow specialist) knows anything but the dictionary definition of a word, if that. To 99 people out of 100, "truth" means correspondence to reality. And the hundredth person will still jump out of the way if he thinks "Here comes a truck!" is a true statement.

I have absolutely no objection to this article discussing the various philosophical views about truth. Certainly, the article should mention that no correspondence between language and reality is ever complete or perfect. I think a good paragraph or two on the special meaning of mathematical truth is appropriate. Where we differ is that you want to begin with the complex, the specialized, and the esoteric. I've written enough articles on mathematics to be convinced that you begin with the simple, the general, and the commonplace. If we reject dictionaries, then no communication is possible. Rick Norwood 14:18, 29 July 2007 (UTC)

Short lead

WP:LEAD says articles of this length should have three or four paragraphs for their lead. Is a two or three-paragraph survey summary of the article feasible? ←Ben 14:38, 19 August 2007 (UTC)

I like what you've done with the introduction. Do you want to try to turn it into a short summary of the article? Rick Norwood 14:57, 19 August 2007 (UTC)

Lead

I have no objection to the attempted rewrite of the first sentence/paragraph of truth. But, this article was one of the worst tarpits on the wiki until a number of us dug in on it roughly a year ago, and involved extremely time consuming research, point/counterpoint and consensus process to get to its current form. I'll support your proposed rewrite, but please articulate a case for it on Talk:Truth. Thanks. ... Kenosis 15:34, 27 August 2007 (UTC)

you are right. I am not proposing to do anything controversial. Clearly, the "factual" aspect of the word has some preponderance today. It will still not do to distill secondary and tertiary meaning and present it in the lead as "a common dictionary definition", without giving others. The meaning of "truth" is clearly, and according to both dictionaries cited, (1) faithfulness, fidelity, honesty in general, and (2) factuality, agreement with reality. I am not trying to muddy the issue, to the contrary, I insist the semantic facts belong on the table. --dab (𒁳) 15:52, 27 August 2007 (UTC)

the problem is that "truth" is both a neurological (mental, psychological) phenomenon, and an abstract empiricist (scientific, logical) concept. My involvement is due to the fact that I noted myth goes completely unmentioned in the article. This is unpardonable, since myth is at a very deep level closely related to the psychological notion of truth (while, ironically, "myth" has a secondary meaning of "untruth"). The dilemma is reflected in the existence of truth (religious). A more valid dichotomy would be truth (psychology) vs. truth (logics), since "truth" in the sense of "fidelity, good faith" goes far beyond religion in particular. Again, I do not intend to unduly mix the logical and the psychologial concepts, to the contrary, I want to make plain their correlations.

I have inserted the following:

Thus, truth in its original sense is the quality of "faithfulness, fidelity, loyalty, sincerity, veracity",, and the narrowed sense "in agreement with fact or reality" is a secondary development coupled to the process of "Enlightenment" in 17th century philosophy.

this state of affairs needs to be reflected in the lead. To give "a common dictionary definition" in the lead, but picking a secondary meaning instead of the primary one clearly qualifies as weasling and/or cherry-picking. --dab (𒁳) 16:08, 27 August 2007 (UTC)

As I said on Dbachmann (DAB)'s talk page, I support the use of a broader definition in addition to the correspondence-theory-based definition presently included in the article. DAB implemented that proposed change here and I reverted, but am prepared to support the inclusion of the broader definition, on the condition that it's very brief and that it immediately moves on to the statement that there are competing theories, none of which have gained complete scholarly agreement about being a definitive description of "truth". If Dbachmann(DAB) adds it again, I'll leave it stand with the provided OED reference and maybe see where it goes from there, what kind of tweaks may be offered by passersby and/or the long-term participants in this article who are familiar with the debates that have attended to the article. ... Kenosis 16:19, 27 August 2007 (UTC)

I am saying everything I wanted to say in the "Etymology" section. I do not demand that the lead is burdened with this over-much. Clearly, etymological (terminological) background was missing from the article, but if people will let my discussion under "Etymology" stand, I'll be content. --dab (𒁳) 16:43, 27 August 2007 (UTC)

I like it, and am interested in seeing whether it'll hold up well. Myself, I'll gladly defend the new first sentence as superior in terms of WP:NPOV, given several past assertions of a correspondence-theory bias in the article. ... Kenosis 17:33, 27 August 2007 (UTC)

"Semantic field"? Banno 23:47, 27 August 2007 (UTC)

I have problems with that, too. I hope "meaning" is an acceptable alternative. ←Ben 03:05, 7 September 2007 (UTC)

fair enough :) --dab (𒁳) 16:00, 12 September 2007 (UTC)

solipsistic truth

When you trace out all availible information from science and experiences, they all trace back to one core understanding, namely, that everything perceived is generated by the perceiver and is thus not a completely reliable guide to reality nor truths about reality. What is a dreamer to do? The dreamer explores his dreams and notes consistancies and descrepancies and developes a concept of truth which arises soley from consistancies of experience. There can be consistancies among dream characters which do not match the dreamers experiences. Like when everyone tells the anorexic that she is as skinny as a skeleton but her perception is that she is grossly fat. Most dreamers are unaware that they are dreaming until they awaken and most anorexics will likewise perfer their personal perception over everyone elses and see them as insane or delusional until other expeirences become more difficult to reconcile and ignore. The man of faith accepts the ideal world he has been taught to see over the world he experiences and believes that the experienced world is a delusion. The buddhist is taught that the world of experiences are samsara or delusions of the mind and to seek something beyond expeirences in deep meditation. I have concluded that experiences are facts, elief ystems about them are largely BS. and so I live every move as a gamble to some degree and use science as the best odds maker I have discovered so far.Jiohdi (talk) 16:14, 8 February 2008 (UTC)

These are beliefs discovered by most people in their sophomore year. Rick Norwood (talk) 18:58, 8 February 2008 (UTC)

Ratzinger

I have just posted this:

Philosopher and theologian Joseph Ratzinger, before his election as Benedict XVI, explored the relationship of truth with tolerance, conscience, Freedom, and religion. In consonance with Aristotle and Aquinas, Ratzinger affirms that human reason has the power to know reality and arrive at the truth, and for this he alludes to the achievement of the natural sciences. He sees that "the modern self-limitation of reason" rooted in Kant which views itself incapable of knowing religion and the human sciences such as ethics leads to dangerous pathologies of religion (terrorism) and pathologies of science (ecological disasters and destruction of humans). He thinks that this self-limitation, which "amputates" the mind's capacity to answer fundamental questions such as man's origin and purpose, dishonors reason and is contradictory to the modern acclamation of science, whose basis is the power of reason. While he states that relativism is acceptable in political options, he warned of a relativism without limits, a "dictatorship of relativism," and he traced the past century's violent ideologies to a totalitarianism which "absolutizes what is not absolute but relative," converting partial points of view into absolute guides.

Ratzinger is one of the most prominent thinkers of today. He is now viewed in Germany (the country of philosophers) as the number one thinker surpassing Gunther Grass, Jurgen Habermas. See here. And he has written extensively on the problem of truth as an academic. I believe he should have a place among the notable views. Moreover, as Kant is allowed to critique Aristotle and Aquinas, Ratzinger should be allowed to critique Kant. Marax (talk) 09:27, 17 February 2008 (UTC)

• Kant was not a moral relativist. If Ratzinger has an answer to the antimonies, he should have addressed them. Instead we have what amounts to (as summed up above) either an ad hominem or a disappointment that Kant did not self-censor mentioning them. If this bbelongs anywhere, it is in the religious section, but even there it is little more than a feeble attack on Kant --JimWae (talk) 19:34, 10 March 2008 (UTC)

Thanks, Jim Wae. :) I hope I can answer your concerns. Let me go through them one by one.

"Kant was not a moral relativist. If Ratzinger has an answer to the antimonies, he should have addressed them." What we have here is what Ratzinger thinks about truth, and that is what Misplaced Pages looks for. Misplaced Pages is not asking for what an author should have written or not, or whether what he wrote is true or false. The basic criteria why an author is included are notability and verifiability. Since this is a "fact about an opinion", the neutrality aspect is also covered.

"Instead we have what amounts to (as summed up above) either an ad hominem or a disappointment that Kant did not self-censor mentioning them." I am sorry but I do not see any attack on the person of Kant. Ratzinger's view is a philosophical and historical critique of ideas.

"If this belongs anywhere, it is in the religious section, but even there it is little more than a feeble attack on Kant." Ratzinger's words are all in the philosophical realm as he does not quote the bible nor church teachings. And his ideas are not limited to religion since he talks about human sciences and natural sciences, about pathologies, terrorism and ecological disasters -- basically, secular matters.

I hope the relevance of Ratzinger in this article and section has been addressed. Marax (talk) 06:51, 11 March 2008 (UTC)

• I'm not sure that "Kant was wrong because people have used some of his reasonings to justify a dangerous moral relativism" counts as a noteworthy theory of truth. Most of the section is not even "about" truth, but about the dangers of moral relativism --JimWae (talk) 07:05, 11 March 2008 (UTC)

I believe (1) the theory is noteworthy per se if it explains many contemporary problems, and (2) the thinker himself and his works are noteworthy. I suppose googling Ratzinger or Benedict XVI would produce more hits than some of the other thinkers mentioned. His book Truth and Tolerance is an important book.

I think the theory of truth that he is expounding hinges on the capability of reason to know reality, which he supports through a positive route (the achievement of the natural sciences) and a negative route. By showing the dangers of affirming the contrary of his theory, he strengthens his theory. And I would say that the paragraph corresponds in length to the paragraph quoting Kant's critique. Marax (talk) 08:29, 11 March 2008 (UTC)

---

• If any of this is to stay, the part that is a theory of truth needs to be more clearly & concisely outlined. His theory seems to be that religious truths are facts (and facts not different in KIND from facts of science) which are directly ascertainable by some inner process - some intuition. This, however, is NOT the process by which scientific facts are arrived at (even though he compares religious truths to scientific facts)
  • This is not a view original to Ratzinger, and it is misleading to present it as "his" view. Ratzinger is a notable person - but he has NOT made any notable contribution to theories of truth - he has summarized an ancient view - an ancient pre-Socratic view.
• All the stuff about the "dangers of moral relativism" points to a principle sometimes summarized as "by their fruits you shall know them" - a principle that would tell us a lot negative about organized religion as well. This criteria is similar to consequentialism - a criteria that Catholicism elsewhere teaches is wrong
• --JimWae (talk) 19:56, 21 March 2008 (UTC)

• As so muddily presented, this view is not so much a theory of truth as it is a theory of falsehood - as in "Kant MUST be wrong because...., and he COULDN'T be right because...., and he HAS to be wrong because..." From what I have seen so far here, its underlying principle (intuitive truth?) is obscured by its main focus on criticizing Kant, and there is little to NO exposition of how "truth" might be determined. --JimWae (talk) 20:55, 21 March 2008 (UTC)

• This view ultimately rests on a subjective determination of truth (intuitive subjectivity a la Kierkegaard) - inescapably leading to the very relativism that Ratzinger is trying to avoid. It seems to be little more than muddled word-play to convince himself and followers that tolerance for other religions does not lead to accepting the relative truth of other religions, and thereby the relative truth of one's own religion.
• Perhaps this section demonstrates the need for a Keats theory of truth. Is "Ratzinger's" theory discussed by other non-partisan theorists? -- and attributed to Ratzinger? If not, we have yet another reason to move this to the religious truths section -- if indeed it even belongs there --JimWae (talk) 22:03, 21 March 2008 (UTC)

Thanks again, JimWae. :) Since I see that you are analyzing for the most part Ratzinger's ideas, let me copy here what I wrote above: "What we have here is what Ratzinger thinks about truth, and that is what Misplaced Pages looks for. Misplaced Pages is not asking for what an author should have written or not, or whether what he wrote is true or false. The basic criteria why an author is included are notability and verifiability. Since this is a "fact about an opinion", the neutrality aspect is also covered."

"there is little to NO exposition of how "truth" might be determined" The exposition on Whitehead also does not determine the how. This illustrates what I wrote above: "Misplaced Pages is not asking for what an author should have written or not, or whether what he wrote is true or false." I believe that Misplaced Pages merely presents what a writer wrote, and takes very special care that Misplaced Pages editors do not tinge the exposition with their own demands and requirements. Please keep in mind that the title of the section where this falls under is "Notable philosopher's views". It does not say theories on how truth is determined. The title is general enough to include how truth relates with other things, and other general issues on truth.

"From what I have seen so far here, its underlying principle (intuitive truth?) is obscured by its main focus on criticizing Kant". The section on Kant right now merely describes his critique of Aquinas and Aristotle. Again, this shows that what is important for Misplaced Pages is an exposition of what is important for an author.

"he has summarized an ancient view - an ancient pre-Socratic view". As written, Ratzinger's ideas, are in consonance with Aristotle and Aquinas (who are post-Socratic), but more importantly he discussed terrorism and ecological disasters which were hardly there during pre-socratic times, and are mostly modern problems.

"directly ascertainable by some inner process - some intuition". Ratzinger does not use the term intuition but reason. The Misplaced Pages article on reason might be able to shed a bit of light on this issue. Or the Catholic Encyclopedia article.

"muddy". I would beg to disagree on the use of this qualifier. Clear thinking and Ratzinger are almost synonymous in discussions about Ratzinger. Many writers refer to "clarity" as one of the best ways to describe Ratzinger.

What I can do is to describe in more detail what Aquinas meant by truth. How it is arrived at. This would be interesting for Misplaced Pages readers. Thanks. Marax (talk) 04:17, 24 March 2008 (UTC)

• The reason there are no sources that can be used to show the unoriginality & lack of focus in Ratzinger's presentation is that only his supporters take him seriously. The section, besides wandering off-topic, appears to be little more than a cheering section to get his name to appear in the article. While HE may be notable, his views are not notable except among his supporters and they do not form anything new in the history of discussion on the topic. The focus on personality (getting HIS name & HIS picture in the article) detracts from whatever relevant (repackaged) points that might be worth adding to the article. His notabilty is based on his position, not on any contribution to the topic --JimWae (talk) 08:31, 13 April 2008 (UTC)

I believe this was a good-faith addition, but it is perfectly clear that the Ratzinger/church publications are not third-party secondary sources about either him or his views. Reliable third-partysecondary(preferably philosophical) sources are essential in establishing a notable view. Thus, I removed it. Modocc (talk) 21:04, 3 May 2008 (UTC)

Thanks for bringing up this point, Modocc. My apologies for reverting your edit. I tried to check WP:NOR and WP:Notability and I did not really see any prohibition in using church publications in citing a church figure talking about a philosophical, non-church issue. I believe it would be consistent with the sourcing of this article and other articles which follow Misplaced Pages policies to allow sourcing of materials on Ratzinger from publications which may be church related.

Perhaps I might have misunderstood your point as you might have been referring to additional third party sources in order to boost the claim that the work of Ratzinger is notable enough to be cited. I have found this site of First Things which features an article about the book Truth and Tolerance of Ratzinger. The writer is Paul Griffiths of the University of Illinois. He is Schmitt Professor of Catholic Studies in that university. There is this other site from the prestigious Acton Institute which also reviews the book. I have also recently read a series of articles in one of the latest issues of the academic journal Scripta Theologica of the University of Navarra analyzing Ratzinger's famous Regensburg Address which discusses the self-limitation of reason, truth and Kant. I hope this helps to clarify this issue.

As regards the issue raised by Jim on how self-limitation of reason leads to pathologies of religion and science: First, before directly replying to this, let me repeat what I have said twice before: Misplaced Pages is interested in verifiability more than truth. I can assure you that I read this part in Truth and Tolerance and therefore this is verifiable and thus I would highly recommend that you read the book. :) As to the logic behind Ratzinger's ideas, I would say this: the self-limitation of reason is a sort of prohibition for the human intelligence to delve into the rational basis for ethics and discussion on religious issues. This leads therefore to irrational pursuit of what religious scriptures might say to the believer, as what happens to terrorists or to a moslem prohibiting Christians to have churches in moslem lands, thus infringing on rational idea of respecting the basic human right of exercising one's religious beliefs. It can also lead to lack of rational reasoning on ethical issues surrounding the use of science (eg what the Soviet Union did in Chernobyl) because ethics is not in the realm of empirical sciences. I also hope this helps to settle this issue. Marax (talk) 09:20, 6 May 2008 (UTC)

You can also verify another version of these statements in the Regensburg Address which is among the footnotes:

this method excludes the question of God, making it appear an unscientific or pre-scientific question. Consequently, we are faced with a reduction of the radius of science and reason, one which needs to be questioned. I will return to this problem later. In the meantime, it must be observed that from this standpoint any attempt to maintain theology's claim to be "scientific" would end up reducing Christianity to a mere fragment of its former self. But we must say more: if science as a whole is this and this alone, then it is man himself who ends up being reduced, for the specifically human questions about our origin and destiny, the questions raised by religion and ethics, then have no place within the purview of collective reason as defined by "science", so understood, and must thus be relegated to the realm of the subjective. The subject then decides, on the basis of his experiences, what he considers tenable in matters of religion, and the subjective "conscience" becomes the sole arbiter of what is ethical. In this way, though, ethics and religion lose their power to create a community and become a completely personal matter. This is a dangerous state of affairs for humanity, as we see from the disturbing pathologies of religion and reason which necessarily erupt when reason is so reduced that questions of religion and ethics no longer concern it. Attempts to construct an ethic from the rules of evolution or from psychology and sociology, end up being simply inadequate.

• Marax (talk) 09:27, 6 May 2008 (UTC)

MY BAD, I should have said that secondary sources are needed and not third-party. See my discussion on sourcing Ratzinger's views on the agnosticism talk page. In light of this being a somewhat different subject, I need to take a wiki break for a couple of days before I can assess the significance of your secondary sources. Best. Modocc (talk) 22:31, 6 May 2008 (UTC)

As for the points inserted of Pius IX, an article by Edmund Shahanan, etc, I believe these should be in a section on Pius IX or Edmund Shahanan not a section on Ratzinger. Moreoever, I see that these statements are more about knowledge of God and not about truth per se. Also some portions of the insertion sound like original research. I have therefore removed them, based on these considerations. Marax (talk) 02:59, 10 May 2008 (UTC)

Section consistency and NPOV

I just removed a Word to Avoid (claim) that was used for the correspondence theory, a word that is hardly used in other theories in this article. The word "claim", seen at the very beginning of the section, weakens the credibility of the theory and forewarns the reader that what he is about to read can be dubious. This may imply a problem of NPOV or neutrality.

I also find the two paragraph criticism of correspondence theory within its own section unusual in the whole article. It is, I believe, one of the few instances, if not the only one, where there is a disproportionately big amount of criticism found in the same section. I believe that this has to resolved, for it shows an inconsistency in the article.

It seems to me strange as well, that Alfred Tarski's theory is mentioned here with this special phrase: "whose semantic theory is summarized further below in this article." Marax (talk) 09:30, 7 April 2008 (UTC)

Removed first sentence

I have removed the following NEW sentence from the very top of the article:

The word truth labels or describes particular arguments or statements as being in accord with reality —in opposition to statements which are false.

One reason I did so wass because it appears to give a preferential treatment to the correspondence theory of truth. The language/syntax also has problems. I do not see that it contributes anything new (that is not also contentious) to the article. --JimWae (talk) 04:19, 17 April 2008 (UTC)

Tarski's formulation not given sufficient weight

As it is the bridge between the mathematical and philosophical concepts and that held by most modern scientists and mathematicians. Lycurgus (talk) 21:51, 22 April 2008 (UTC)

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