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UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (II)
UNSCOP (3 September 1947; see green line) and UN Ad Hoc Committee (25 November 1947) partition plans. The UN Ad Hoc Committee proposal was voted on in the resolution.
Date	29 November 1947
Meeting no.	128
Code	A/RES/181(II) (Document)
Voting summary	33 voted for 13 voted against 10 abstained
Result	Adopted

The United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine was a proposal by the United Nations to partition Mandatory Palestine at the end of the British Mandate. Drafted by the U.N. Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) on 3 September 1947, the Plan was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 29 November 1947 as Resolution 181 (II). The resolution recommended the creation of independent but economically linked Arab and Jewish States and an extraterritorial "Special International Regime" for the city of Jerusalem and its surroundings.

The Partition Plan, a four-part document attached to the resolution, provided for the termination of the Mandate; the gradual withdrawal of British armed forces by no later than 1 August 1948; and the delineation of boundaries between the two States and Jerusalem at least two months after the withdrawal, but no later than 1 October 1948. The Arab state was to have a territory of 11,592 square kilometres, or 42.88 percent of the Mandate's territory, and the Jewish state a territory of 15,264 square kilometres, or 56.47 percent; the remaining 0.65 percent or 176 square kilometres—comprising Jerusalem, Bethlehem and the adjoining area—would become an international zone. The Plan also called for an economic union between the proposed states and for the protection of religious and minority rights.

The Plan sought to address the conflicting objectives and claims of two competing movements: Palestinian nationalism and Jewish nationalism in the form of Zionism. Jewish organizations collaborated with UNSCOP during the deliberations, while Palestinian Arab leadership boycotted it. The Plan's detractors considered the proposal to be pro-Zionist, as it allocated most land to the Jewish state despite Palestinian Arabs numbering twice the Jewish population. The Plan was celebrated by most Jews in Palestine and reluctantly accepted by the Jewish Agency for Palestine with misgivings. Zionist leaders, in particular David Ben-Gurion, viewed the acceptance of the plan as a tactical step and a steppingstone to future territorial expansion over all of Palestine.

The Arab Higher Committee, the Arab League and other Arab leaders and governments rejected the Plan, as aside from Arabs forming a two-thirds majority, they owned most of the territory. They also indicated an unwillingness to accept any form of territorial division, arguing that it violated the principles of national self-determination in the UN Charter that granted people the right to decide their own destiny. They announced their intention to take all necessary measures to prevent the implementation of the resolution. A civil war broke out in Palestine, and the plan was not implemented. In 1948, 85% of the Palestinians living in the areas that became the state of Israel became refugees.

Background

The British administration was formalized by the League of Nations under the Palestine Mandate in 1923, as part of the Partitioning of the Ottoman Empire following World War I. The Mandate reaffirmed the 1917 British commitment to the Balfour Declaration, for the establishment in Palestine of a "National Home" for the Jewish people, with the prerogative to carry it out. A British census of 1918 estimated 700,000 Arabs and 56,000 Jews.

In 1937, following a six-month-long Arab General Strike and armed insurrection which aimed to pursue national independence and secure the country from foreign control, the British established the Peel Commission. The Commission concluded that the Mandate had become unworkable, and recommended partition into an Arab state linked to Transjordan; a small Jewish state; and a mandatory zone. To address problems arising from the presence of national minorities in each area, it suggested a land and population transfer involving the transfer of some 225,000 Arabs living in the envisaged Jewish state and 1,250 Jews living in a future Arab state, a measure deemed compulsory "in the last resort". To address any economic problems, the Plan proposed avoiding interfering with Jewish immigration, since any interference would be liable to produce an "economic crisis", most of Palestine's wealth coming from the Jewish community. To solve the predicted annual budget deficit of the Arab State and reduction in public services due to loss of tax from the Jewish state, it was proposed that the Jewish state pay an annual subsidy to the Arab state and take on half of the latter's deficit. The Palestinian Arab leadership rejected partition as unacceptable, given the inequality in the proposed population exchange and the transfer of one-third of Palestine, including most of its best agricultural land, to recent immigrants. The Jewish leaders, Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion, persuaded the Zionist Congress to lend provisional approval to the Peel recommendations as a basis for further negotiations. In a letter to his son in October 1937, Ben-Gurion explained that partition would be a first step to "possession of the land as a whole". The same sentiment, that acceptance of partition was a temporary measure beyond which the Palestine would be "redeemed ... in its entirety," was recorded by Ben-Gurion on other occasions, such as at a meeting of the Jewish Agency executive in June 1938, as well as by Chaim Weizmann.

The British Woodhead Commission was set up to examine the practicality of partition. The Peel plan was rejected and two possible alternatives were considered. In 1938, the British government issued a policy statement declaring that "the political, administrative and financial difficulties involved in the proposal to create independent Arab and Jewish States inside Palestine are so great that this solution of the problem is impracticable". Representatives of Arabs and Jews were invited to London for the St. James Conference, which proved unsuccessful.

With World War II looming, British policies were influenced by a desire to win Arab world support and could ill afford to engage with another Arab uprising. The MacDonald White Paper of May 1939 declared that it was "not part of policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State", sought to limit Jewish immigration to Palestine and restricted Arab land sales to Jews. However, the League of Nations commission held that the White Paper was in conflict with the terms of the Mandate as put forth in the past. The outbreak of the Second World War suspended any further deliberations. The Jewish Agency hoped to persuade the British to restore Jewish immigration rights, and cooperated with the British in the war against Fascism. Aliyah Bet was organized to spirit Jews out of Nazi controlled Europe, despite the British prohibitions. The White Paper also led to the formation of Lehi, a small Jewish organization which opposed the British.

After World War II, in August 1945 President Truman asked for the admission of 100,000 Holocaust survivors into Palestine but the British maintained limits on Jewish immigration in line with the 1939 White Paper. The Jewish community rejected the restriction on immigration and organized an armed resistance. These actions and United States pressure to end the anti-immigration policy led to the establishment of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. In April 1946, the Committee reached a unanimous decision for the immediate admission of 100,000 Jewish refugees from Europe into Palestine, rescission of the White Paper restrictions of land sale to Jews, that the country be neither Arab nor Jewish, and the extension of U.N. Trusteeship. The U.S. endorsed the Commission's findings concerning Jewish immigration and land purchase restrictions, while the British made their agreement to implementation conditional on U.S. assistance in case of another Arab revolt. In effect, the British continued to carry out their White Paper policy. The recommendations triggered violent demonstrations in the Arab states, and calls for a Jihad and an annihilation of all European Jews in Palestine.

United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP)

Under the terms of League of Nations A-class mandates each such mandatory territory was to become a sovereign state on termination of its mandate. By the end of World War II, this occurred with all such mandates except Palestine; however, the League of Nations itself lapsed in 1946, leading to a legal quandary. In February 1947, Britain announced its intent to terminate the Mandate for Palestine, referring the matter of the future of Palestine to the United Nations. According to William Roger Louis, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin's policy was premised on the idea that an Arab majority would carry the day, which met difficulties with Harry S. Truman who, sensitive to Zionist electoral pressures in the United States, pressed for a British-Zionist compromise. In May, the UN formed the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) to prepare a report on recommendations for Palestine. The Jewish Agency pressed for Jewish representation and the exclusion of both Britain and Arab countries on the Committee, sought visits to camps where Holocaust survivors were interned in Europe as part of UNSCOP's brief, and in May won representation on the Political Committee. The Arab states, convinced statehood had been subverted, and that the transition of authority from the League of Nations to the UN was questionable in law, wished the issues to be brought before an International Court, and refused to collaborate with UNSCOP, which had extended an invitation for liaison also to the Arab Higher Committee. In August, after three months of conducting hearings and a general survey of the situation in Palestine, a majority report of the committee recommended that the region be partitioned into an Arab state and a Jewish state, which should retain an economic union. An international regime was envisioned for Jerusalem.

The Arab delegations at the UN had sought to keep separate the issue of Palestine from the issue of Jewish refugees in Europe. During their visit, UNSCOP members were shocked by the extent of Lehi and Irgun violence, then at its apogee, and by the elaborate military presence attested by endemic barb-wire, searchlights, and armoured-car patrols. Committee members also witnessed the SS Exodus affair in Haifa and could hardly have remained unaffected by it. On concluding their mission, they dispatched a subcommittee to investigate Jewish refugee camps in Europe. The incident is mentioned in the report in relation to Jewish distrust and resentment concerning the British enforcement of the 1939 White Paper.

UNSCOP report

On 3 September 1947, the Committee reported to the General Assembly. CHAPTER V: PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS (I), Section A of the Report contained eleven proposed recommendations (I – XI) approved unanimously. Section B contained one proposed recommendation approved by a substantial majority dealing with the Jewish problem in general (XI). CHAPTER VI: PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS (II) contained a Plan of Partition with Economic Union to which seven members of the Committee (Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay), expressed themselves in favour. CHAPTER VII RECOMMENDATIONS (III) contained a comprehensive proposal that was voted upon and supported by three members (India, Iran, and Yugoslavia) for a Federal State of Palestine. Australia abstained. In CHAPTER VIII a number of members of the Committee expressed certain reservations and observations.

Proposed partition

The report of the majority of the Committee (CHAPTER VI) envisaged the division of Palestine into three parts: an Arab State, a Jewish State and the City of Jerusalem, linked by extraterritorial crossroads. The proposed Arab State would include the central and part of western Galilee, with the town of Acre, the hill country of Samaria and Judea, an enclave at Jaffa, and the southern coast stretching from north of Isdud (now Ashdod) and encompassing what is now the Gaza Strip, with a section of desert along the Egyptian border. The proposed Jewish State would include the fertile Eastern Galilee, the Coastal Plain, stretching from Haifa to Rehovot and most of the Negev desert, including the southern outpost of Umm Rashrash (now Eilat). The Jerusalem Corpus Separatum included Bethlehem and the surrounding areas.

The primary objectives of the majority of the Committee were political division and economic unity between the two groups. The Plan tried its best to accommodate as many Jews as possible into the Jewish State. In many specific cases, this meant including areas of Arab majority (but with a significant Jewish minority) in the Jewish state. Thus the Jewish State would have an overall large Arab minority. Areas that were sparsely populated (like the Negev desert), were also included in the Jewish state to create room for immigration. According to the plan, Jews and Arabs living in the Jewish state would become citizens of the Jewish state and Jews and Arabs living in the Arab state would become citizens of the Arab state.

By virtue of Chapter 3, Palestinian citizens residing in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem, as well as Arabs and Jews who, not holding Palestinian citizenship, resided in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem would, upon the recognition of independence, become citizens of the State in which they were resident and enjoy full civil and political rights.

Population of Palestine by religions in 1946: Moslems — 1,076,783; Jews — 608,225; Christians — 145,063; Others — 15,488; Total — 1,845,559.

On this basis, the population at the end of 1946 was estimated as follows: Arabs — 1,203,000; Jews — 608,000; others — 35,000; Total — 1,846,000.

At the time the UN passed its decision to partition the country, the arable land was owned as follows: 93 per cent by Arabs, and 7 per cent by Jews.

The Plan would have had the following demographics (data based on 1945).

In addition there would be in the Jewish State about 90,000 Bedouins, cultivators and stock owners who seek grazing further afield in dry seasons.

The land allocated to the Arab State in the final plan included about 43% of Mandatory Palestine and consisted of all of the highlands, except for Jerusalem, plus one-third of the coastline. The highlands contain the major aquifers of Palestine, which supplied water to the coastal cities of central Palestine, including Tel Aviv. The Jewish State allocated to the Jews, who constituted a third of the population and owned about 7% of the land, was to receive 56% of Mandatory Palestine, a slightly larger area to accommodate the increasing numbers of Jews who would immigrate there. The Jewish State included three fertile lowland plains – the Sharon on the coast, the Jezreel Valley and the upper Jordan Valley. The bulk of the proposed Jewish State's territory, however, consisted of the Negev Desert, which was mostly not suitable for agriculture, nor for urban development at that time. The Jewish State would also be given sole access to the Sea of Galilee, crucial for its water supply, and the economically important Red Sea.

The committee voted for the plan, 25 to 13 (with 17 abstentions and 2 absentees) on 25 November 1947 and the General Assembly was called back into a special session to vote on the proposal. Various sources noted that this was one vote short of the two-thirds majority required in the General Assembly.

Ad hoc Committee

On 23 September 1947 the General Assembly established the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question to consider the UNSCOP report. Representatives of the Arab Higher Committee and Jewish Agency were invited and attended.

During the committee's deliberations, the British government endorsed the report's recommendations concerning the end of the mandate, independence, and Jewish immigration. However, the British did "not feel able to implement" any agreement unless it was acceptable to both the Arabs and the Jews, and asked that the General Assembly provide an alternative implementing authority if that proved to be the case.

The Arab Higher Committee rejected both the majority and minority recommendations within the UNSCOP report. They "concluded from a survey of Palestine history that Zionist claims to that country had no legal or moral basis". The Arab Higher Committee argued that only an Arab State in the whole of Palestine would be consistent with the UN Charter.

The Jewish Agency expressed support for most of the UNSCOP recommendations, but emphasized the "intense urge" of the overwhelming majority of Jewish displaced persons to proceed to Palestine. The Jewish Agency criticized the proposed boundaries, especially in the Western Galilee and Western Jerusalem (outside of the old city), arguing that these should be included in the Jewish state. However, they agreed to accept the plan if "it would make possible the immediate re-establishment of the Jewish State with sovereign control of its own immigration."

Arab states requested representation on the UN ad hoc subcommittees of October 1947, but were excluded from Subcommittee One, which had been delegated the specific task of studying and, if thought necessary, modifying the boundaries of the proposed partition.

Sub-Committee 2

The Sub-Committee 2, set up on 23 October 1947 to draw up a detailed plan based on proposals of Arab states presented its report within a few weeks.

Based on a reproduced British report, the Sub-Committee 2 criticised the UNSCOP report for using inaccurate population figures, especially concerning the Bedouin population. The British report, dated 1 November 1947, used the results of a new census in Beersheba in 1946 with additional use of aerial photographs, and an estimate of the population in other districts. It found that the size of the Bedouin population was greatly understated in former enumerations. In Beersheba, 3,389 Bedouin houses and 8,722 tents were counted. The total Bedouin population was estimated at approximately 127,000; only 22,000 of them normally resident in the Arab state under the UNSCOP majority plan. The British report stated:

the term Beersheba Bedouin has a meaning more definite than one would expect in the case of a nomad population. These tribes, wherever they are found in Palestine, will always describe themselves as Beersheba tribes. Their attachment to the area arises from their land rights there and their historic association with it.

In respect of the UNSCOP report, the Sub-Committee concluded that the earlier population "estimates must, however, be corrected in the light of the information furnished to the Sub-Committee by the representative of the United Kingdom regarding the Bedouin population. According to the statement, 22,000 Bedouins may be taken as normally residing in the areas allocated to the Arab State under the UNSCOP's majority plan, and the balance of 105,000 as resident in the proposed Jewish State. It will thus be seen that the proposed Jewish State will contain a total population of 1,008,800, consisting of 509,780 Arabs and 499,020 Jews. In other words, at the outset, the Arabs will have a majority in the proposed Jewish State."

The Sub-Committee 2 recommended to put the question of the Partition Plan before the International Court of Justice (Resolution No. I ). In respect of the Jewish refugees due to World War II, the Sub-Committee recommended to request the countries of which the refugees belonged to take them back as much as possible (Resolution No. II). The Sub-Committee proposed to establish a unitary state (Resolution No. III).

Boundary changes

The ad hoc committee made a number of boundary changes to the UNSCOP recommendations before they were voted on by the General Assembly.

The predominantly Arab city of Jaffa, previously located within the Jewish state, was constituted as an enclave of the Arab State. The boundary of the Arab state was modified to include Beersheba and a strip of the Negev desert along the Egyptian border, while a section of the Dead Sea shore and other additions were made to the Jewish State. The Jewish population in the revised Jewish State would be about half a million, compared to 450,000 Arabs.

The proposed boundaries would also have placed 54 Arab villages on the opposite side of the border from their farm land. In response, the United Nations Palestine Commission established in 1948 was empowered to modify the boundaries "in such a way that village areas as a rule will not be divided by state boundaries unless pressing reasons make that necessary". These modifications never occurred.

The vote

Passage of the resolution required a two-thirds majority of the valid votes, not counting abstaining and absent members, of the UN's then 57 member states. On 26 November, after filibustering by the Zionist delegation, the vote was postponed by three days. According to multiple sources, had the vote been held on the original set date, it would have received a majority, but less than the required two-thirds. Various compromise proposals and variations on a single state, including federations and cantonal systems were debated (including those previously rejected in committee). The delay was used by supporters of Zionism in New York to put extra pressure on states not supporting the resolution.

Reports of pressure for and against the Plan

Reports of pressure for the Plan

Zionists launched an intense White House lobby to have the UNSCOP plan endorsed, and the effects were not trivial. The Democratic Party, a large part of whose contributions came from Jews, informed Truman that failure to live up to promises to support the Jews in Palestine would constitute a danger to the party. The defection of Jewish votes in congressional elections in 1946 had contributed to electoral losses. Truman was, according to Roger Cohen, embittered by feelings of being a hostage to the lobby and its 'unwarranted interference', which he blamed for the contemporary impasse. When a formal American declaration in favour of partition was given on 11 October, a public relations authority declared to the Zionist Emergency Council in a closed meeting: 'under no circumstances should any of us believe or think we had won because of the devotion of the American Government to our cause. We had won because of the sheer pressure of political logistics that was applied by the Jewish leadership in the United States'. State Department advice critical of the controversial UNSCOP recommendation to give the overwhelmingly Arab town of Jaffa, and the Negev, to the Jews was overturned by an urgent and secret late meeting organized for Chaim Weizman with Truman, which immediately countermanded the recommendation. The United States initially refrained from pressuring smaller states to vote either way, but Robert A. Lovett reported that America's U.N. delegation's case suffered impediments from high pressure by Jewish groups, and that indications existed that bribes and threats were being used, even of American sanctions against Liberia and Nicaragua. When the UNSCOP plan failed to achieve the necessary majority on 25 November, the lobby 'moved into high gear' and induced the President to overrule the State Department, and let wavering governments know that the U.S. strongly desired partition.

Proponents of the Plan reportedly put pressure on nations to vote yes to the Partition Plan. A telegram signed by 26 US Senators with influence on foreign aid bills was sent to wavering countries, seeking their support for the partition plan. The US Senate was considering a large aid package at the time, including 60 million dollars to China. Many nations reported pressure directed specifically at them:

•  United States (Vote: For): President Truman later noted, "The facts were that not only were there pressure movements around the United Nations unlike anything that had been seen there before, but that the White House, too, was subjected to a constant barrage. I do not think I ever had as much pressure and propaganda aimed at the White House as I had in this instance. The persistence of a few of the extreme Zionist leaders—actuated by political motives and engaging in political threats—disturbed and annoyed me."
•  India (Vote: Against): Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru spoke with anger and contempt for the way the UN vote had been lined up. He said the Zionists had tried to bribe India with millions and at the same time his sister, Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, the Indian ambassador to the UN, had received daily warnings that her life was in danger unless "she voted right". Pandit occasionally hinted that something might change in favour of the Zionists. But another Indian delegate, Kavallam Pannikar, said that India would vote for the Arab side, because of their large Muslim minority, although they knew that the Jews had a case.
•  Liberia (Vote: For): Liberia's Ambassador to the United States complained that the US delegation threatened aid cuts to several countries. Harvey S. Firestone Jr., President of Firestone Natural Rubber Company, with major holdings in the country, also pressured the Liberian government
• Philippines (Vote: For): In the days before the vote, Philippines representative General Carlos P. Romulo stated "We hold that the issue is primarily moral. The issue is whether the United Nations should accept responsibility for the enforcement of a policy which is clearly repugnant to the valid nationalist aspirations of the people of Palestine. The Philippines Government holds that the United Nations ought not to accept such responsibility." After a phone call from Washington, the representative was recalled and the Philippines' vote changed.
•  Haiti (Vote: For): The promise of a five million dollar loan may or may not have secured Haiti's vote for partition.
•  France (Vote: For): Shortly before the vote, France's delegate to the United Nations was visited by Bernard Baruch, a long-term Jewish supporter of the Democratic Party who, during the recent world war, had been an economic adviser to President Roosevelt, and had latterly been appointed by President Truman as United States ambassador to the newly created UN Atomic Energy Commission. He was, privately, a supporter of the Irgun and its front organization, the American League for a Free Palestine. Baruch implied that a French failure to support the resolution might block planned American aid to France, which was badly needed for reconstruction, French currency reserves being exhausted and its balance of payments heavily in deficit. Previously, to avoid antagonising its Arab colonies, France had not publicly supported the resolution. After considering the danger of American aid being withheld, France finally voted in favour of it. So, too, did France's neighbours, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
• Venezuela (Vote: For): Carlos Eduardo Stolk, Chairman of the Delegation of Venezuela, voted in favor of Resolution 181 .
•  Cuba (Vote: Against): The Cuban delegation stated they would vote against partition "in spite of pressure being brought to bear against us" because they could not be party to coercing the majority in Palestine.
•  Siam (Absent): The credentials of the Siamese delegations were cancelled after Siam voted against partition in committee on 25 November.

There is also some evidence that Sam Zemurray put pressure on several "banana republics" to change their votes.

Reports of pressure against the Plan

According to Benny Morris, Wasif Kamal, an Arab Higher Committee official, tried to bribe a delegate to the United Nations, perhaps a Russian.

A number of Arab leaders argued against the partition proposal on the grounds that it endangered the Jews of Arab countries.

• A few months before the UN vote on partition of Palestine, Iraq's prime minister Nuri al-Said told British diplomat Douglas Busk that he had nothing against the Iraqi Jews, who were a long established and useful community. However, if the United Nations solution was not satisfactory, the Arab League might decide on severe measures against the Jews in Arab countries, and he would be unable to resist the proposal.

• At the 30th Meeting of the UN Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine on 24 November 1947, the head of the Egyptian delegate, Heykal Pasha, said that although there was no animosity against the Jews in Arab countries, nobody could prevent disorders if a Jewish state was established. Riots could break out which governments could not control, endangering the lives of Jews and creating an antisemitism difficult to root out. The UN, in Heykal's view, should consider the welfare of all Jews and not just the wishes of the Zionists.

• In a speech at the General Assembly Hall at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Friday, 28 November 1947, Iraq’s Foreign Minister, Fadel Jamall, included the following statement: "Partition imposed against the will of the majority of the people will jeopardize peace and harmony in the Middle East. Not only the uprising of the Arabs of Palestine is to be expected, but the masses in the Arab world cannot be restrained. The Arab-Jewish relationship in the Arab world will greatly deteriorate. There are more Jews in the Arab world outside of Palestine than there are in Palestine. In Iraq alone, we have about one hundred and fifty thousand Jews who share with Moslems and Christians all the advantages of political and economic rights. Harmony prevails among Moslems, Christians and Jews. But any injustice imposed upon the Arabs of Palestine will disturb the harmony among Jews and non-Jews in Iraq; it will breed inter-religious prejudice and hatred."

The Arab states warned the Western Powers that endorsement of the partition plan might be met by either or both an oil embargo and realignment of the Arab states with the Soviet Bloc.

Final vote

On 29 November 1947, the United Nations General Assembly voted 33 to 13, with 10 abstentions and 1 absent, in favour of the modified Partition Plan. The final vote, consolidated here by modern United Nations Regional Groups rather than contemporary groupings, was as follows:

In favour (33 countries, 72% of total votes)

Latin American and Caribbean (13 countries):

•  Bolivia
•  Brazil
•  Costa Rica
•  Dominican Republic
•  Ecuador
•  Guatemala
•  Haiti
•  Nicaragua
•  Panama
•  Paraguay
•  Peru
•  Uruguay
•  Venezuela

Western European and Others (8 countries):

•  Belgium
•  Denmark
•  France
•  Iceland
•  Luxembourg
•  Netherlands
•  Norway
•  Sweden

Eastern European (5 countries):

•  Byelorussian SSR
•  Czechoslovakia
•  Poland
•  Ukrainian SSR
•  Soviet Union

African (2 countries):

•  Liberia
•  South Africa

Asia-Pacific (3 countries)

•  Australia
•  New Zealand
•  Philippines

North America (2 countries)

•  Canada
•  United States

Against (13 countries, 28% of total votes)

Asia-Pacific (9 countries, primarily Middle East sub-area):

•  Afghanistan
•  India
•  Iran
•  Iraq
•  Lebanon
•  Pakistan
•  Saudi Arabia
•  Syria
•  Yemen

Western European and Others (2 countries):

•  Greece
•  Turkey

African (1 country):

•  Egypt

Latin American and Caribbean (1 country):

•  Cuba

Abstentions (10 countries)

Latin American and Caribbean (6 countries):

•  Argentina
•  Chile
•  Colombia
•  El Salvador
•  Honduras
•  Mexico

Asia-Pacific (1 country):

•  China

African (1 country):

•  Ethiopia

Western European and Others (1 country):

•  United Kingdom

Eastern European (1 country):

•  Yugoslavia

Absent (1 country)

Asia-Pacific (1 country):

•  Thailand

Votes by modern region

If analysed by the modern composition of what later came to be known as the United Nations Regional Groups showed relatively aligned voting styles in the final vote. This, however, does not reflect the regional grouping at the time, as a major reshuffle of regional grouping occurred in 1966. All Western nations voted for the resolution, with the exception of the United Kingdom (the Mandate holder), Greece and Turkey. The Soviet bloc also voted for partition, with the exception of Yugoslavia, which was to be expelled from Cominform the following year. The majority of Latin American nations following Brazilian leadership, voted for partition, with a sizeable minority abstaining. Asian countries (primarily Middle Eastern countries) voted against partition, with the exception of the Philippines.

Reactions

Jews

Jews gathered in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem to celebrate the U.N. resolution during the whole night after the vote. Great bonfires blazed at Jewish collective farms in the north. Many big cafes in Tel Aviv served free champagne. Mainstream Zionist leaders emphasized the "heavy responsibility" of building a modern Jewish State, and committed to working towards a peaceful coexistence with the region's other inhabitants: Jewish groups in the United States hailed the action by the United Nations. Most welcomed the Palestine Plan but some felt it did not settle the problem.

Some Revisionist Zionists rejected the partition plan as a renunciation of legitimately Jewish national territory. The Irgun Tsvai Leumi, led by Menachem Begin, and the Lehi (also known as the Stern Group or Gang), the two Revisionist-affiliated underground organisations which had been fighting against both the British and Arabs, stated their opposition. Begin warned that the partition would not bring peace because the Arabs would also attack the small state and that "in the war ahead we'll have to stand on our own, it will be a war on our existence and future." He also stated that "the bisection of our homeland is illegal. It will never be recognized." Begin was sure that the creation of a Jewish state would make territorial expansion possible, "after the shedding of much blood."

Some Post-Zionist scholars endorse Simha Flapan's view that it is a myth that Zionists accepted the partition as a compromise by which the Jewish community abandoned ambitions for the whole of Palestine and recognized the rights of the Arab Palestinians to their own state. Rather, Flapan argued, acceptance was only a tactical move that aimed to thwart the creation of an Arab Palestinian state and, concomitantly, expand the territory that had been assigned by the UN to the Jewish state. Baruch Kimmerling has said that Zionists "officially accepted the partition plan, but invested all their efforts towards improving its terms and maximally expanding their boundaries while reducing the number of Arabs in them." Many Zionist leaders viewed the acceptance of the plan as a tactical step and a stepping stone to future territorial expansion over all of Palestine.

Addressing the Central Committee of the Histadrut (the Eretz Israel Workers Party) days after the UN vote to partition Palestine, Ben-Gurion expressed his apprehension, stating:

the total population of the Jewish State at the time of its establishment will be about one million, including almost 40% non-Jews. Such a composition does not provide a stable basis for a Jewish State. This fact must be viewed in all its clarity and acuteness. With such a composition, there cannot even be absolute certainty that control will remain in the hands of the Jewish majority... There can be no stable and strong Jewish state so long as it has a Jewish majority of only 60%.

Despite these reservations, Ben-Gurion also recognized the plan's many accomplishments, stating "I know of no greater achievement by the Jewish people ... in its long history since it became a people."

Arabs

Arab leaders and governments rejected the plan of partition in the resolution and indicated that they would reject any other plan of partition. The Arab states' delegations declared immediately after the vote for partition that they would not be bound by the decision, and walked out accompanied by the Indian and Pakistani delegates.

They argued that it violated the principles of national self-determination in the UN charter which granted people the right to decide their own destiny. The Arab delegations to the UN issued a joint statement the day after that vote that stated: "the vote in regard to the Partition of Palestine has been given under great pressure and duress, and that this makes it doubly invalid."

On 16 February 1948, the UN Palestine Commission reported to the Security Council that: "Powerful Arab interests, both inside and outside Palestine, are defying the resolution of the General Assembly and are engaged in a deliberate effort to alter by force the settlement envisaged therein."

Arab states

A few weeks after UNSCOP released its report, Azzam Pasha, the General Secretary of the Arab League, told an Egyptian newspaper "Personally I hope the Jews do not force us into this war because it will be a war of elimination and it will be a dangerous massacre which history will record similarly to the Mongol massacre or the wars of the Crusades." (This statement from October 1947 has often been incorrectly reported as having been made much later on 15 May 1948.) Azzam told Alec Kirkbride "We will sweep them into the sea." Syrian president Shukri al-Quwatli told his people: "We shall eradicate Zionism."

King Farouk of Egypt told the American ambassador to Egypt that in the long run the Arabs would soundly defeat the Jews and drive them out of Palestine.

While Azzam Pasha repeated his threats of forceful prevention of partition, the first important Arab voice to support partition was the influential Egyptian daily Al Mokattam [d]: "We stand for partition because we believe that it is the best final solution for the problem of Palestine... rejection of partition... will lead to further complications and will give the Zionists another space of time to complete their plans of defense and attack... a delay of one more year which would not benefit the Arabs but would benefit the Jews, especially after the British evacuation."

On 20 May 1948, Azzam told reporters "We are fighting for an Arab Palestine. Whatever the outcome the Arabs will stick to their offer of equal citizenship for Jews in Arab Palestine and let them be as Jewish as they like. In areas where they predominate they will have complete autonomy." He reportedly said that the armies of the Arab League states had entered Palestine “not only to protect Arab territory, but to fight the Jewish state”.

The Arab League said that some of the Jews would have to be expelled from a Palestinian Arab state.

Abdullah appointed Ibrahim Hashem Pasha as Military Governor of the Arab areas occupied by troops of the Transjordan Army. He was a former prime minister of Transjordan who supported partition of Palestine as proposed by the Peel Commission and the United Nations.

Arabs in Palestine

Haj Amin al-Husseini said in March 1948 to an interviewer from the Jaffa daily Al Sarih that the Arabs did not intend merely to prevent partition but "would continue fighting until the Zionists were annihilated." Jamal al-Husayni warned the Jews that "The blood will flow like rivers in the Middle East".

Zionists attributed Arab rejection of the plan to mere intransigence. Palestinian Arabs opposed the very idea of partition but reiterated that this partition plan was unfair: the majority of the land (56%) would go to a Jewish state, when Jews at that stage legally owned only 6–7% of it and remained a minority of the population (33% in 1946). There were also disproportionate allocations under the plan and the area under Jewish control contained 45% of the Palestinian population. The proposed Arab state was only given 45% of the land, much of which was unfit for agriculture. Jaffa, though geographically separated, was to be part of the Arab state. However, most of the proposed Jewish state was the Negev desert. The plan allocated to the Jewish State most of the Negev desert that was sparsely populated and unsuitable for agriculture but also a "vital land bridge protecting British interests from the Suez Canal to Iraq"

Few Palestinian Arabs joined the Arab Liberation Army because they suspected that the other Arab States did not plan on an independent Palestinian state. According to Ian Bickerton, for that reason many of them favored partition and indicated a willingness to live alongside a Jewish state. He also mentions that the Nashashibi family backed King Abdullah and union with Transjordan.

The Arab Higher Committee demanded that in a Palestinian Arab state, the majority of the Jews should not be citizens (those who had not lived in Palestine before the British Mandate).

According to Musa Alami, the mufti would agree to partition if he were promised that he would rule the future Arab state.

The Arab Higher Committee responded to the partition resolution and declared a three-day general strike in Palestine to begin the following day.

British government

When Bevin received the partition proposal, he promptly ordered for it not to be imposed on the Arabs. The plan was vigorously debated in the British parliament.

In a British cabinet meeting at 4 December 1947, it was decided that the Mandate would end at midnight 14 May 1948, the complete withdrawal by 1 August 1948, and Britain would not enforce the UN partition plan. On 11 December 1947, the British government publicly announced these plans. During the period in which the British withdrawal was completed, Britain refused to share the administration of Palestine with a proposed UN transition regime, to allow the UN Palestine Commission to establish a presence in Palestine earlier than a fortnight before the end of the Mandate, to allow the creation of official Jewish and Arab militias or to assist in smoothly handing over territory or authority to any successor.

United States government

The United States declined to recognize the All-Palestine government in Gaza by explaining that it had accepted the UN Mediator's proposal. The Mediator had recommended that Palestine, as defined in the original Mandate including Transjordan, might form a union. Bernadotte's diary said the Mufti had lost credibility on account of his unrealistic predictions regarding the defeat of the Jewish militias. Bernadotte noted "It would seem as though in existing circumstances most of the Palestinian Arabs would be quite content to be incorporated in Transjordan."

Subsequent events

The Partition Plan with Economic Union was not realized in the days following 29 November 1947 resolution as envisaged by the General Assembly. It was followed by outbreaks of violence in Mandatory Palestine between Palestinian Jews and Arabs known as the 1947–48 Civil War. After Alan Cunningham, the High Commissioner of Palestine, left Jerusalem, on the morning of 14 May the British army left the city as well. The British left a power vacuum in Jerusalem and made no measures to establish the international regime in Jerusalem. At midnight on 14 May 1948, the British Mandate expired, and Britain disengaged its forces. Earlier in the evening, the Jewish People's Council had gathered at the Tel Aviv Museum (today known as Independence Hall), and approved a proclamation, declaring "the establishment of a Jewish state in Eretz Israel, to be known as the State of Israel". The 1948 Arab–Israeli War began with the invasion of, or intervention in, Palestine by the Arab States on 15 May 1948.

Resolution 181 as a legal basis for Palestinian statehood

In 1988, the Palestine Liberation Organization published the Palestinian Declaration of Independence relying on Resolution 181, arguing that the resolution continues to provide international legitimacy for the right of the Palestinian people to sovereignty and national independence. A number of scholars have written in support of this view.

A General Assembly request for an advisory opinion, Resolution ES-10/14 (2004), specifically cited resolution 181(II) as a "relevant resolution", and asked the International Court of Justice (ICJ) what are the legal consequences of the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. Judge Abdul Koroma explained the majority opinion: "The Court has also held that the right of self-determination as an established and recognized right under international law applies to the territory and to the Palestinian people. Accordingly, the exercise of such right entitles the Palestinian people to a State of their own as originally envisaged in resolution 181 (II) and subsequently confirmed." In response, Prof. Paul De Waart said that the Court put the legality of the 1922 League of Nations Palestine Mandate and the 1947 UN Plan of Partition beyond doubt once and for all.

Retrospect

In 2011, Mahmoud Abbas stated that the 1947 Arab rejection of United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine was a mistake he hoped to rectify.

Commemoration

A street in the Katamon neighborhood of Jerusalem is named Kaf-tet benovember (29 November Street). On 29 November 2022, a monument designed and executed by sculptor Sam Philipe was unveiled on a hilltop in Netanya to mark the 75th anniversary of the UN Partition Plan for Palestine. The date also marks the annual International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People.

See also

• Faisal–Weizmann Agreement
• History of the State of Palestine
• Israeli Declaration of Independence
• Israeli–Palestinian conflict
• Lausanne Conference of 1949
• Minority Treaties
• Sykes–Picot Agreement
• Two-state solution
• United Nations Division for Palestinian Rights
• United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine
• Partition of India

References

1. "A/RES/181(II) of 29 November 1947". United Nations General Assembly. Archived from the original on 10 October 2017. Retrieved 4 January 2018.
2. "UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (II)" (PDF) (in English and French).
3. Galina Nikitina, The State of Israel: A Historical, Economic and Political Study / By Galina Nikitina / 1973, Progress Publishers / p. 50.
4. ^ Nikitana, Galina Stepanovna (1973). The State of Israel; a Historical Economic and Political Study. Moscow: Progress Publishers. p. 56.
5. Asadi, Fawzi (1 October 1976). "Some Geographic Elements in The Arab-Israeli Conflict". Journal of Palestine Studies. 6 (1): 79–91. doi:10.2307/2535720. ISSN 0377-919X. JSTOR 2535720.
6. Палестина / Л. А. Беляев, С. Б. Григорян, П. А. Рассадин (с 1939), М. Ю. Рощин // Большая российская энциклопедия : (в 35 т.) / гл. ред. Ю. С. Осипов. – М. : Большая российская энциклопедия, 2004–2017.
7. ^ "United Nations Special Committee on Palestine: Report to the General Assembly: Volume 1". 3 September 1947. p. 51. A/364(SUPP). Retrieved 20 April 2017. The primary objectives sought in the foregoing scheme were, in short, political division and economic unity: to confer upon each group, Arab and Jew, in its own territory, the power to make its own laws, while preserving both, throughout Palestine, a single integrated economy, admittedly essential to the well-being of each, and the same territorial freedom of movement to individuals as is enjoyed today.
8. Quandt, William Baver; Quandt, William B.; Jabber, Fuad; Jabber, Paul; Lesch, Ann Mosely (1 January 1973). The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism. University of California Press. p. 7. ISBN 978-0-520-02372-7.
9. Molinaro, Enrico (1 April 2009). Holy Places of Jerusalem in Middle East Peace Agreements: The Conflict Between Global and State Identities. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. p. 78. ISBN 978-1845193355.
10. ^ The Question of Palestine and the UN, "The Jewish Agency accepted the resolution despite its dissatisfaction over such matters as Jewish emigration from Europe and the territorial limits set on the proposed Jewish State."
11. "BBC News". news.bbc.co.uk. Retrieved 23 October 2023.
12. Ben-Dror 2007, pp. 259–7260: "The Arabs overwhelmingly rejected UNSCOP’s recommendations. The Arabs’ list of arguments against the majority’s conclusions was indeed a long one. A Palestinian historian summarized it by saying ‘Everything about it was Zionist’. When one takes into consideration the majority’s recommendations and the enthusiasm with which these recommendations were accepted by the Zionist leadership, then one can indeed affirm that claim. UNSCOP recommended an independent Jewish state, although the Arabs firmly objected to the principle of independence for the Jews, and did so in a way very generous to the Jews. More than half of the area of Palestine (62 percent) was allocated to be a Jewish state and the Arab state was supposed to make do with the remaining area, although the Palestinian Arab population numbered as much as twice the Jewish population in the land. The pro-Zionist results from UNSCOP confirmed the Arabs’ basic suspicions towards the committee. Even before the onset of its inquiry in Palestine, argued the Arabs, most of its members took a pro-Zionist stand. In addition, according to the Arabs, the committee’s final object – the partition – was pre-decided by the Americans. According to this opinion, the outcome of the UNSCOP inquiry was a foregone conclusion. This perception, which led the Palestinian Arabs to boycott the committee, is shared by some modern studies as well."
13. ^ "U.N.O. PASSES PALESTINE PARTITION PLAN". Newcastle Morning Herald and Miners' Advocate (NSW : 1876 – 1954). NSW: National Library of Australia. 1 December 1947. p. 1. Retrieved 24 October 2014. Semi-hysterical Jewish crowds in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem were still celebrating the U.N.O. partition vote at dawn to-day. Great bonfires at Jewish collective farms in the north were still blazing. Many big cafes in Tel Aviv served free champagne. A brewery threw open its doors to the crowd. Jews jeered some British troops who were patrolling Tel Aviv streets but others handed them wine. In Jerusalem crowds mobbed armoured cars and drove through the streets on them. The Chief Rabbi in Jerusalem (Dr Isaac Herzog) said: "After the darkness of 2000 years, the dawn of redemption has broken. The decision marks at epoch not only in Jewish history, but in world history." The Jewish terrorist organisation, Irgun Zvai Leumi, announced from its headquarters that it would "cease to exist in the new Jewish state.
14. "1923–1948: Nationalism, immigration, and "economic absorptive capacity"".
15. Sabel, Robbie, ed. (2022), "The 1947 Partition Plan", International Law and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 93–101, doi:10.1017/9781108762670.006, ISBN 978-1-108-48684-2, retrieved 31 October 2023
16. ^ David McDowall (1990). Palestine and Israel: The Uprising and Beyond. I.B. Tauris. p. 193. ISBN 9780755612581. Although the Jewish Agency accepted the partition plan, it did not accept the proposed borders as final and Israel's declaration of independence avoided the mention of any boundaries. A state in part of Palestine was seen as a stage towards a larger state when opportunity allowed. Although the borders were 'bad from a military and political point of view,' Ben Gurion urged fellow Jews to accept the UN Partition Plan, pointing out that arrangements are never final, 'not with regard to the regime, not with regard to borders, and not with regard to international agreements'. The idea of partition being a temporary expedient dated back to the Peel Partition proposal of 1937. When the Zionist Congress had rejected partition on the grounds that the Jews had an inalienable right to settle anywhere in Palestine, Ben Gurion had argued in favour of acceptance, 'I see in the realisation of this plan practically the decisive stage in the beginning of full redemption and the most wonderful lever for the gradual conquest of all of Palestine.
17. Sean F. McMahon, The Discourse of Palestinian-Israeli Relations, Routledge 2010 p. 40. "The Zionist movement also accepted the UN partition plan of 1947 tactically. Palumbo notes that “he Zionists accepted this scheme since they hoped to use their state as a base to conquer the whole country.” Similarly, Flapan states that “ acceptance of the resolution in no way diminished the belief of all the Zionist parties in their right to the whole of the country ”; and that “acceptance of the UN Partition Resolution was an example of Zionist pragmatism par excellence. It was a tactical acceptance, a vital step in the right direction – a springboard for expansion when circumstances proved more judicious.”
18. Michael Palumbo (1990). Imperial Israel : the history of the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. Bloomsbury. p. 19. ISBN 9780747504894. The Zionists accepted this scheme since they hoped to use their state as a base to conquer the whole country
19. ^ Simha Flapan, The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities, Pantheon, 1988, ISBN 978-0-679-72098-0, Ch. 1 Myth One : Zionists Accepted the UN Partition and Planned for Peace, pages 13-53 "Every school child knows that there is no such thing in history as a final arrangement— not with regard to the regime, not with regard to borders, and not with regard to international agreements. History, like nature, is full of alterations and change. David Ben-Gurion, War Diaries, Dec. 3, 1947"
20. ^ "Benny Morris's Shocking Interview". History News Network. officially accepted the partition plan, but invested all their efforts towards improving its terms and maximally expanding their boundaries while reducing the number of Arabs in them.
21. ^ Benny Morris (2008). 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. Yale University Press. p. 75. ISBN 978-0-300-12696-9. Retrieved 24 July 2013. " p. 75 The night of 29–30 November passed in the Yishuv's settlements in noisy public rejoicing. Most had sat glued to their radio sets broadcasting live from Flushing Meadow. A collective cry of joy went up when the two-thirds mark was achieved: a state had been sanctioned by the international community.  ; p. 396 The immediate trigger of the 1948 War was the November 1947 UN partition resolution. "The Zionist movement, except for its fringes, accepted the proposal. Most lamented the imperative of giving up the historic heartland of Judaism, Judea and Samaria (the West Bank), with East Jerusalem's Old City and Temple Mount at its core; and many were troubled by the inclusion in the prospective Jewish state of a large Arab minority. But the movement, with Ben-Gurion and Weizmann at the helm, said "yes""; p.101 ... mainstream Zionist leaders, from the first, began to think of expanding the Jewish state beyond the 29 November partition resolution borders.
22. Eugene Rogan (2012). The Arabs: A History (3rd ed.). Penguin. p. 321. ISBN 978-0-7181-9683-7.
23. ^ Benny Morris (2008). 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. Yale University Press. pp. 66, 67, 72. ISBN 978-0-300-12696-9. Retrieved 24 July 2013. p.66, at 1946 "The League demanded independence for Palestine as a "unitary" state, with an Arab majority and minority rights for the Jews." ; p.67, at 1947 "The League's Political Committee met in Sofar, Lebanon, on 16–19 September, and urged the Palestine Arabs to fight partition, which it called "aggression", "without mercy". The League promised them, in line with Bludan, assistance "in manpower, money and equipment" should the United Nations endorse partition." ; p. 72, at December 1947 "The League vowed, in very general language, "to try to stymie the partition plan and prevent the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine
24. Benny Morris (2008). 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. Yale University Press. p. 73. ISBN 978-0-300-12696-9. Retrieved 24 July 2013. "p73 All paid lip service to Arab unity and the Palestine Arab cause, and all opposed partition... p. 396 The immediate trigger of the 1948 War was the November 1947 UN partition resolution. … The Palestinian Arabs, along with the rest of the Arab world, said a flat "no"… The Arabs refused to accept the establishment of a Jewish state in any part of Palestine. And, consistently with that "no", the Palestinian Arabs, in November–December 1947, and the Arab states in May 1948, launched hostilities to scupper the resolution's implementation ; p. 409 The mindset characterized both the public and the ruling elites. All vilified the Yishuv and opposed the existence of a Jewish state on "their" (sacred Islamic) soil, and all sought its extirpation, albeit with varying degrees of bloody-mindedness. Shouts of "Idbah al Yahud" (slaughter the Jews) characterized equally street demonstrations in Jaffa, Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad both before and during the war and were, in essence, echoed, usually in tamer language, by most Arab leaders. "
25. ^ Hadawi, Sami (1991). Bitter Harvest: A Modern History of Palestine. Olive Branch Press. ISBN 978-0-940793-76-7.
26. Perkins, Kenneth J.; Gilbert, Martin (1999). "Israel: A History". The Journal of Military History. 63 (3): 149. doi:10.2307/120539. ISSN 0899-3718. JSTOR 120539.
27. Best, Antony (2004), International History of the Twentieth Century and beyond, Routledge, p. 531, doi:10.4324/9781315739717-1, ISBN 978-1-315-73971-7, retrieved 29 June 2022
28. Rothrock, James (12 October 2021). Live by the Sword: Israel's Struggle for Existence in the Holy Land. Bloomington: WestBow Press. p. 14. ISBN 9781449725198.
29. Lenczowski, G. (1962). The Middle East in World Affairs (3rd Edition). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. p. 723
30. ^ Article "History of Palestine", Encyclopædia Britannica (2002 edition), article section written by Walid Ahmed Khalidi and Ian J. Bickerton.
31. ^ Itzhak Galnoor (1995). The Partition of Palestine: Decision Crossroads in the Zionist Movement. SUNY Press. pp. 289–. ISBN 978-0-7914-2193-2. Retrieved 3 July 2012.
32. Pappe, Ilan (2011). The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine. Oneworld Publications Limited. p. 213. ISBN 9781780740560.
33. ^ Mansfield, Peter (1992), The Arabs, Penguin Books, pp. 172–175, ISBN 978-0-14-014768-1
34. The Palestine Mandate "the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2nd, 1917"
35. Rashid Khalidi (1 September 2006). The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood. Beacon Press. pp. 181–. ISBN 978-0-8070-0315-2.
36. ^ Palestine Royal Commission report, 1937, 389–391
37. ^ Benny Morris. Righteous Victims. p. 139.
38. ^ Sumantra Bose (30 June 2009). Contested lands: Israel-Palestine, Kashmir, Bosnia, Cyprus, and Sri Lanka. Harvard University Press. p. 223. ISBN 978-0-674-02856-2.
39. Mandated Landscape: British Imperial Rule in Palestine 1929–1948
40. William Roger Louis, Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez, and Decolonization, 2006, p.391
41. Benny Morris, One state, two states: resolving the Israel/Palestine conflict, 2009, p. 66
42. Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, p. 48; p. 11 "while the Zionist movement, after much agonising, accepted the principle of partition and the proposals as a basis for negotiation"; p. 49 "In the end, after bitter debate, the Congress equivocally approved –by a vote of 299 to 160 – the Peel recommendations as a basis for further negotiation."
43. Partner to Partition: The Jewish Agency's Partition Plan in the Mandate Era, Yosef Kats, Chapter 4, 1998 Edition, Routledge, ISBN 978-0-7146-4846-0
44. Letter from David Ben-Gurion to his son Amos, written 5 October 1937, Obtained from the Ben-Gurion Archives in Hebrew, and translated into English by the Institute of Palestine Studies, Beirut
45. Morris, Benny (2011), Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881–1998, Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, p. 138, ISBN 978-0-307-78805-4 Quote: "No Zionist can forgo the smallest portion of the Land of Israel. Jewish state in part is not an end, but a beginning ….. Our possession is important not only for itself … through this we increase our power, and every increase in power facilitates getting hold of the country in its entirety. Establishing a state …. will serve as a very potent lever in our historical effort to redeem the whole country"
46. ^ Finkelstein, Norman (2005), Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of Anti-semitism and the Abuse of History, University of California Press, p. 280, ISBN 978-0-520-24598-3
47. Jerome Slater, 'The Significance of Israeli Historical revisionism' in Russell A. Stone, Walter P. Zenner(eds.) Critical Essays on Israeli Social Issues and Scholarship, Vol.3 SUNY Press, 1994 pp.179–199 p.182.
48. Quote from a meeting of the Jewish Agency executive in June 1938: " satisfied with part of the country, but on the basis of the assumption that after we build up a strong force following the establishment of the state, we will abolish the partition of the country and we will expand to the whole Land of Israel." in
    Masalha, Nur (1992), Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of "Transfer" in Zionist Political Thought, 1882–1948, Inst for Palestine Studies, p. 107, ISBN 978-0-88728-235-5; and
    Segev, Tom (2000), One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs Under the British Mandate, Henry Holt and Company, p. 403, ISBN 978-0-8050-4848-3
49. From a letter from Chaim Weizmann to Arthur Grenfell Wauchope, High Commissioner for Palestine, while the Peel Commission was convening in 1937: "We shall spread in the whole country in the course of time ….. this is only an arrangement for the next 25 to 30 years." Masalha, Nur (1992), Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of "Transfer" in Zionist Political Thought, 1882–1948, Inst for Palestine Studies, p. 62, ISBN 978-0-88728-235-5
50. Palestine. Statement by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament by Command of His Majesty. November 1938. Cmd. 5893. "Policy statement/ Advice against partition - UK Secretary of State for the Colonies - UK documentation CMD. 5893/Non-UN document (11 November 1938)". Archived from the original on 3 November 2013. Retrieved 11 November 2014.
51. Hilberg, Raul, The Destruction of the European Jews, (1961) New Viewpoints, New York 1973 p.716
52. Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry – Appendix IV Palestine: Historical Background
53. Benny Morris (25 May 2011). "chp. 4". Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881–1998 (Hebrew ed.). Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. p. 159. ISBN 978-0-307-78805-4. Capping it all, the Permanent Mandates Commission of the Council of the League of Nations rejected the White Paper as inconsistent with the terms of the Mandate.
54. William roger louis, 1985, p.386
55. ^ Morris, 2008, p.34
56. Gurock, Jeffrey S. American Jewish History American Jewish Historical Society, page 243
57. Morris, 2008, p.35
58. Michael R. Fischbach (13 August 2013). Jewish Property Claims Against Arab Countries. Columbia University Press. p. 24. ISBN 978-0-231-51781-2. By 1948, after several decades of Jewish immigration, the Jewish population of Palestine had risen to about one third of the total, and Jews and Jewish companies owned 20 percent of all cultivable land in the country.
59. "Land Registration in Palestine before 1948 (Nakba): Table 2 showing Holdings of Large Jewish Lands Owners as of December 31st, 1945, British Mandate: A Survey of Palestine: Volume I – Page 245. Chapter VIII: Land: Section 3. – Palestine Remembered". palestineremembered.com.
60. Nele Matz, 'Civilization and the Mandate System under the League of Nations,' in Armin Von Bogdandy, Rüdiger Wolfrum, Christiane E. Philipp (eds.) Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law . Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2005 pp.47–96, p.87

    'those mandated territories that had been classified as A mandates, with the exception of Palestine, were finally granted full independence in addition to the already established structures for provisional self-governance,'

61. ^ Baylis Thomas, How Israel was Won: A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Lexington Books 1999 p.47.
62. David D. Newsom, The Imperial Mantle: The United States, Decolonization, and the Third World. Indiana University Press, p.77.
63. "The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem Part II: 1947-1977 - Study (30 June 1979)". unispal.un.org.
64. William Roger Louis, Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez, and Decolonization. Palgrave/Macmillan 2006, pp.404,429–437.
65. Daniel Mandel, H V Evatt and the Establishment of Israel: The Undercover Zionist. Routledge 2004 pp.73,81. The liaison officers with Aubrey Eban and David Horowitz.(p.83)
66. Mandel, p.88.
67. Morris, 2008, p. 43
68. Howard M. Sachar, A History of the Jews in the Modern World. Random House, 2007 p.671.
69. "United Nations Special Committee on Palestine: Report to the General Assembly: Volume 1". 3 September 1947. Chapter 2, para. 119, p. 28. A/364(SUPP). Retrieved 20 April 2017. There can be no doubt that the enforcement of the White Paper of 1939, subject to the permitted entry since December 1945 of 1,500 Jewish immigrants monthly, has created throughout the Jewish community a deep-seated distrust and resentment against the mandatory Power. This feeling is most sharply expressed in regard to the Administration's attempts to prevent the landing of illegal immigrants. During its stay in Palestine, the Committee heard from certain of its members an eyewitness account of the incidents relative to the bringing into the port of Haifa, under British naval escort, of the illegal immigrant ship, Exodus 1947.
70. ^ "United Nations Special Committee on Palestine: Report to the General Assembly: Volume 1". 3 September 1947. A/364(SUPP). Retrieved 20 April 2017.
71. ^ Benny Morris (2008). 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. Yale University Press. p. 47. ISBN 978-0-300-12696-9. Retrieved 13 July 2013. The Jews were to get 62 percent of Palestine (most of it desert), consisting of the Negev
72. Official Records the Second Session the General Assembly. Supplement No 11. United Nations Special Committee on Palestine. Report to the General Assembly. Volume 1. Lake Success. New York. 1947. / p. 11
73. Official Records the Second Session the General Assembly. Supplement No 11. United Nations Special Committee on Palestine. Report to the General Assembly. Volume 1. Lake Success. New York. 1947. / p. 11
74. Galina Nikitina, The State of Israel: A Historical, Economic and Political Study / By Galina Nikitina / 1973, Progress Publishers / p. 50.
75. Official Records the Second Session the General Assembly. Supplement No 11. United Nations Special Committee on Palestine. Report to the General Assembly. Volume 1. Lake Success. New York. 1947. / p. 54
76. UN Partition Plan Archived 7 August 2013 at the Wayback Machine at Merip.
77. ^ Colbert C. Held, John Thomas Cummings, https://books.google.com/books?id=vcxVDgAAQBAJ&pg=PT287 Middle East Patterns: Places, People, and Politics, 6th ed. Hachette UK, 2013 p.255: It called for three entities: a Jewish state with 56 percent of Mandate Palestine; an Arab state, 43 percent.'
78. ^ Abdel Monem Said Aly, Shai Feldman, Khalil Shikaki, Arabs and Israelis: Conflict and Peacemaking in the Middle East, PalgraveMacmillan 2013 p.50: 'a year before the UN adoption of the Resolution, the Arab population of Palestine comprised 68 percent of the total and owned about 85 percent of the land; the Jewish population comprised about one-third of the total and owned about 7 percent of the land.
79. ^ Palestine Division Wins in Committee 25 to 13, 17 Abstain, NY Times, 26 November 1947
80. "1949.I.13 of 31 December 1948". unispal.un.org.
81. Baylis Thomas, How Israel was Won: A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Lexington Books 1999 p.57 n.6.
82. Report of Sub-Committee 2 (doc.nr. A/AC.14/32). 10 November 1947; on Archived 30 March 2019 at the Wayback Machine
    For the Bedouin issue, see par. 61–73 on pp. 39–46 and Appendix 3: Note on the Bedouin population of Palestine presented by the representative of the United Kingdom d.d. 1 November 1947 on pp. 65–66
83. Sub-Committee 2 of the Ad hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question of the 2nd UN General Assembly 1947 (10 November 1947). "Report: Appendix III: Note dated 1 November 1947 on the Bedouin Population of Palestine Presented by the Representative of The United Kingdom". mlwerke.de. Retrieved 1 March 2016.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
84. Sub-Committee 2 of the Ad hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question of the 2nd UN General Assembly 1947 (10 November 1947). "Report of Sub-Committee 2: Chapter III: Proposals for the constitution and future government of Palestine – Sec.4 Objections to partition on grounds of distribution of population". mlwerke.de. Retrieved 1 March 2016.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
85. Sub-Committee 2 of the Ad hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question of the 2nd UN General Assembly 1947 (10 November 1947). "Report of Sub-Committee 2: Chapter 4: Conclusions, I: Draft Resolution Referring Certain Legal Questions to The International Court of Justice". mlwerke.de. Retrieved 1 March 2016.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
86. Sub-Committee 2 of the Ad hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question of the 2nd UN General Assembly 1947 (10 November 1947). "Report of Sub-Committee 2: Chapter 4: Conclusions, II: Draft Resolution on Jewish Refugees and Displaced Persons". mlwerke.de. Retrieved 1 March 2016.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
87. Sub-Committee 2 of the Ad hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question of the 2nd UN General Assembly 1947 (10 November 1947). "Report of Sub-Committee 2: Chapter 4: Conclusions, III: Draft Resolution on the Constitution and Future Government of Palestine". mlwerke.de. Retrieved 1 March 2016.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
88. ^ Benny Morris (2008). 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. Yale University Press. p. 53. ISBN 978-0-300-12696-9.
89. A/PV.128 Minutes of the 128th meeting, page 1424, "We shall now proceed to vote by roll-call on the report of the Ad Hoc Committee (document A/516). A vote was taken by roll-call... The report was adopted by 33 votes to 13, with 10 abstentions."
90. ^ Barr, James (2012). A Line in the Sand: Britain, France and the Struggle that Shaped the Middle East. London: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 978-1-84739-457-6.
91. ^ Assembly Delays Vote on Palestine, NY Times, 27 November 1947
92. ^ "PALESTINE". Parliamentary Debates (Hansard). 11 December 1947.
93. "Servant of God". google.co.uk. 1983.
94. U.N. Puts off Vote on Palestine a Day: Compromise is Aim, NY Times, 29 November 1947
95. Unitary Palestine Fails in Committee, NY Times, 25 November 1947
96. John J. Mearsheimer, Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy,(2007) Penguin Books 2008 p.371, n.8. Truman also remarked:'In all of my political experience I don't ever recall the Arab vote swinging a close election'.(p.142).
97. Michael Joseph Cohen, Truman and Israel, University of California Press 1990 p.162.
98. Michael Joseph Cohen, Truman and Israel, University of California Press 1990 161–163
99. Michael Joseph Cohen (1990) Truman and Israel University of California Press. pp.163–154: "Greece, the Philippines, and Haiti – three countries utterly dependent on Washington – suddenly came out one after another against its declared policy ...Abba Hillel Silver reported to the American Zionist Emergency Council: 'During this time, we marshalled our forces, Jewish and non-Jewish opinion, leaders and masses alike, converged on the Government and induced the President to assert the authority of his Administration to overcome the negative attitude of the State Department which persisted to the end, and persists today. The result was that our Government made its intense desire for the adoption of the partition plan nown [sic] to the wavering governments."'
100. ^ Bennis, Phyllis (2003). Before and After. Interlink Publishing Group Incorporated. ISBN 978-1-56656-462-5.
101. Chinese Put Needs at Several Billion, New York Times, 30 November 2015
102. House, Debating Aid, Veers to Attacks on U.S. Policies, NY Times, 5 December 1947
103. Lenczowski, George (1990). American Presidents and the Middle East. Duke University Press. p. 157. ISBN 978-0-8223-0972-7., p. 28, cite, Harry S. Truman, Memoirs 2, p. 158.
104. Heptulla, Najma (1991). Indo-West Asian relations: the Nehru era. Allied Publishers. p. 158. ISBN 978-81-7023-340-4.
105. Benny Morris (2008). 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. Yale University Press. p. 56. ISBN 978-0-300-12696-9. Retrieved 13 July 2013. Vijayalakshmi Pandit, Nehru's sister, who headed the delegation, occasionally threw out hints that something might change. But Shertok was brought down to earth by historian Kavalam Panikkar, another member of the Indian delegation: "It is idle for you to try to convince us that the Jews have a case. . . . We know it. . . . But the point is simply this: For us to vote for the Jews means to vote against the Moslems. This is a conflict in which Islam is involved. . . . We have 13 million Moslems in our midst. . . . Therefore, we cannot do it.
106. Quigley, John B. (1990). Palestine and Israel: a challenge to justice. Duke University Press. p. 37. ISBN 978-0-8223-1023-5.
107. Ahron Bregman; Jihan El-Tahri (1998). The fifty years war: Israel and the Arabs. Penguin Books. p. 25. ISBN 978-0-14-026827-0. Retrieved 29 November 2011.
108. Benton Harbor News-Palladium, Friday, 25 October 1946, p. 6.
109. Palestine Vote Delayed Times of London, 29 November 1947
110. Political Issues Delay Asia Talks, NY Times, 27 November 1947
111. Rich Cohen. The Fish That Ate the Whale. New York, NY: Farrar Straus Giroux, 2012.
112. Morris, Benny (2008). 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. Yale University Press. p. 61. ISBN 978-0-300-12696-9. Retrieved 13 July 2013. The Arabs had failed to understand the tremendous impact of the Holocaust on the international community—and, in any event, appear to have used the selfsame methods, but with poor results. Wasif Kamal, an AHC official, for example, offered one delegate—perhaps the Russian—a "huge, huge sum of money to vote for the Arabs" (the Russian declined, saying, "You want me to hang myself?"). But the Arabs' main tactic, amounting to blackmail, was the promise or threat of war should the assembly endorse partition. As early as mid-August 1947, Fawzi al-Qawuqji—soon to be named the head of the Arab League's volunteer army in Palestine, the Arab Liberation Army (ALA)—threatened that, should the vote go the wrong way, "we will have to initiate total war. We will murder, wreck and ruin everything standing in our way, be it English, American or Jewish". It would be a "holy war", the Arabs suggested, which might even evolve into "World War III". Cables to this effect poured in from Damascus, Beirut, Amman, and Baghdad during the Ad Hoc Committee deliberations, becoming "more lurid", according to Zionist officials, as the General Assembly vote drew near. The Arab states generally made no bones about their intention to support the Palestinians with "men, money and arms", and sometimes hinted at an eventual invasion by their armies. They also threatened the Western Powers, their traditional allies, with an oil embargo and/or abandonment and realignment with the Soviet Bloc
113. Burdett, Anita L. P.; Great Britain. Foreign Office; Great Britain. Colonial Office (1995). The Arab League: 1946-1947. The Arab League: British Documentary Sources 1943-1963. Archive Editions. p. 519. ISBN 978-1-85207-610-8. LCCN 95130580.
114. Telegram 804, Busk to Foreign Office, 12 September 1947 .
115. UN Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine (24 November 1947). "Thirtieth Meeting". Retrieved 18 April 2024.
116. U.N General Assembly, A/PV.126, 28 November 1947, discussion on the Palestinian question, archived from the original on 16 October 2013, retrieved 15 October 2013
117. Benny Morris (2008). 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. Yale University Press. p. 61. ISBN 978-0-300-12696-9. Retrieved 13 July 2013. The Arabs had failed to understand the tremendous impact of the Holocaust on the international community—and, in any event, appear to have used the selfsame methods, but with poor results. Wasif Kamal, an AHC official, for example, offered one delegate—perhaps the Russian—a "huge, huge sum of money to vote for the Arabs" (the Russian declined, saying, "You want me to hang myself?"). But the Arabs' main tactic, amounting to blackmail, was the promise or threat of war should the assembly endorse partition. As early as mid-August 1947, Fawzi al-Qawuqji—soon to be named the head of the Arab League's volunteer army in Palestine, the Arab Liberation Army (ALA)—threatened that, should the vote go the wrong way, "we will have to initiate total war. We will murder, wreck and ruin everything standing in our way, be it English, American or Jewish". It would be a "holy war", the Arabs suggested, which might even evolve into "World War III". Cables to this effect poured in from Damascus, Beirut, Amman, and Baghdad during the Ad Hoc Committee deliberations, becoming "more lurid", according to Zionist officials, as the General Assembly vote drew near. The Arab states generally made no bones about their intention to support the Palestinians with "men, money and arms", and sometimes hinted at an eventual invasion by their armies. They also threatened the Western Powers, their traditional allies, with an oil embargo and/or abandonment and realignment with the Soviet Bloc
118. "1947–1977". The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: 1917–1988. United Nations. 1990.
119. Friedman, Saul S. (10 January 2014). A History of the Middle East. McFarland. ISBN 978-0-7864-5134-0.
120. "Palestine Jewry Joyous at News; Ben-Gurion Voices Attitude of Grateful Responsibility – Jerusalem Arabs Silent". The New York Times. 30 November 1947. p. 58. Retrieved 9 January 2012.
121. "Vote On Palestine Cheered by Crowd". The New York Times. 30 November 1947. Retrieved 9 January 2012.
122. ^ "Jewish Units Here Hail Action by U.N." The New York Times. 30 November 1947. Retrieved 9 January 2012.
123. Begin, Menachem (1978) The Revolt. p. 412.
124. Begin, Menachem (1977) In The Underground: Writings and Documents. Vol 4, p. 70.
125. Aviezer Golan and Shlomo Nakdimon (1978) Begin p. 172, cited in Simha Flapan, The Birth of Israel, Pantheon Books, New York, 1988. p. 32
126. Sean F. McMahon, The Discourse of Palestinian-Israeli Relations, Routledge 2010 p. 40.
127. P. J. I. M. De Waart, Dynamics of Self-determination in Palestine, BRILL 1994 p. 138
128. Mehran Kamrava, The Modern Middle East: A Political History since the First World War, 2nd edition University of California Press 2011 p. 83
129. Shourideh C. Molavi, Stateless Citizenship: The Palestinian-Arab Citizens of Israel, BRILL 2014 p. 126
130. Pappe, Ilan (2022) . A History of Modern Palestine (3rd ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 116. ISBN 978-1-108-24416-9. In fact, the Yishuv's leaders felt confident enough to contemplate a takeover of fertile areas within the designated Arab state. This could be achieved in the event of an overall war without losing the international legitimacy of their new state.
131. Slater, Jerome (2020). Mythologies Without End: The US, Israel, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1917-2020. Oxford University Press. pp. 64–65, 75. ISBN 978-0-19-045908-6. ... the evidence is overwhelming that the Zionist leaders had no intention of accepting partition as a necessary and just compromise with the Palestinians. Rather, their reluctant acceptance of the UN plan was only tactical; their true goals were to gain time, establish the Jewish state, build up its armed forces, and then expand to incorporate into Israel as much of ancient or biblical Palestine as they could.
132. Kanj, Jamal Krayem (2010). Children of Catastrophe: Journey from a Palestinian Refugee Camp to America. Reading: Garnet. ISBN 978-1-85964-262-7.
133. Morris 2008, p. 65
134. "Palestine Partition Approved by U.N.", Times of India, 1 December 1947
135. "Arab Leaders Call Palestine Vote 'Invalid'; Delegates Reaffirm Challenge to U.N. Action". The New York Times. 30 November 1947. p. 54. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 1 August 2024.
136. United Nations Palestine Commission Archived 3 October 2010 at the Wayback Machine First Special Report to the Security Council
137. Akhbar el-Yom, 11 October 2011, p9. The literal English translation is somewhat ambiguous, but the overall meaning is that the coming Arab defeat of the Jews will be remembered in the same way as the past Arab defeats of the Mongols and Crusaders are remembered.
138. Tom Segev (21 October 2011). "The makings of history / The blind misleading the blind". Haaretz.
139. ^ Benny Morris (2008). 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. Yale University Press. p. 187. ISBN 978-0-300-12696-9. Retrieved 13 July 2013. p. 187 ." Azzam told Kirkbride:... we will sweep them into the sea". Al Quwwatli told his people:"…we shall eradicate Zionism"; p. 409 "Al Husseini…In March 1948 he told an interviewer in a Jaffa daily Al Sarih that the Arabs did not intend merely to prevent partition but "would continue fighting until the Zionist were Annihilated"
140. Morris 2008, p. 410
141. "The Egyptian daily "Al Mokattam" supported the partition". The Jerusalem Post. 30 November 1947. the influential daily "Al Mokattam"... supporting partition... this is the first time that any important Arab voice in the middle east has pronounced publicly for partition and Arab circles in Cairo are reported to be amazed at the article... We stand for partition because we believe that it is the best final solution for the problem of Palestine... rejection of partition... will lead to further complications and will give the Zionists another space of time to complete their plans of defense and attack... a delay of one more year which would not benefit the Arabs but would benefit the Jews, especially after the British evacuation.
142. "Azzam Wants UN To Sanction Arab War". The Palestine Post. 21 May 1948. p. 3. Retrieved 1 August 2024.
143. Benny Morris (2008). 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. Yale University Press. p. 45. ISBN 978-0-300-12696-9. Retrieved 24 July 2013. "On 23 July, at Sofar, the Arab representatives completed their testimony before UNSCOP. Faranjieh, speaking for the Arab League, said that Jews "illegally" in Palestine would be expelled and that the future of many of those "legally" in the country but without Palestine citizenship would need to be resolved "by the future Arab government "
144. Dinstein, Yoram; Domb, Fania (11 November 2011). The Progression of International Law: Four Decades of the Israel Yearbook on Human Rights – An Anniversary Volume. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. p. 431. ISBN 978-90-04-21911-3.
145. ^ Benny Morris (2008). 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. Yale University Press. pp. 50, 66. ISBN 978-0-300-12696-9. Retrieved 24 July 2013. p. 50,"The Arab reaction was just as predictable: "The blood will flow like rivers in the Middle East", promised Jamal Husseini.; at 1947 "Haj Amin al-Husseini went one better: he denounced also the minority report, which, in his view, legitimized the Jewish foothold in Palestine, a "partition in disguise", as he put it." ; p.66, at 1946 "The AHC ... insisted that the proportion of Jews to Arabs in the unitary state should stand at one to six, meaning that only Jews who lived in Palestine before the British Mandate be eligible for citizenship
146. Yakobson, Alexander; Rubinstein, Amnon (2009). Israel and the Family of Nations: The Jewish Nation-state and Human Rights – Alexander Yakobson, Amnon Rubinstein. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-0-415-46441-3. Retrieved 20 May 2015.
147. John Quigley, The Six Day War and Israeli Self-Defense: Questioning the Legal Basis for Preventive War, Cambridge University Press, 2012 p.7:'This proposed partition was seen as unfair by the Palestine Arabs, both because they sought a government for the entirety of Palestine and because they found the particular territorial division unfair for allocating the bulk of the territory to the projected Jewish state, even though Jews were less numerous than Arabs.'
148. Fred J. Khoury, 'United States Peace Efforts', in Malcolm H. Kerr (ed.) Elusive Peace in the Middle East, SUNY Press 1975 pp.21–22:'The Arabs attacked the partition resolution as being unfair and contrary to the UN Charter. They contended that the UN had disregarded the rights of the Arab majority in Palestine by giving the Palestine Jews, then representing one-third of the total population, more territory and resources than those allotted to the Arab state and by relegating well over 400,000 Arabs to minority status in the Jewish State.'
149. McMahon, Sean F. (15 April 2010). The Discourse of Palestinian-Israeli Relations: Persistent Analytics and Practices. Routledge. p. 90. ISBN 978-1-135-20203-3.
150. Choueiri, Youssef M. (15 April 2008). A Companion to the History of the Middle East. John Wiley & Sons. p. 281. ISBN 978-1-4051-5204-4.
151. Ahmad H. Sa'di, Lila Abu-Lughod, Nakba: Palestine, 1948, and the Claims of Memory, Columbia University Press, 2013 pp291-292. 'The Palestinians' position remained unchanged from the beginning of the British mandate to its end: they opposed partition and supported the establishment of a political system that would reflect the wishes of the majority.'
152. Quandt, William Baver; Quandt, William B.; Jabber, Fuad; Jabber, Paul; Lesch, Ann Mosely (1 January 1973). The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism. University of California Press. pp. 46–47. ISBN 978-0-520-02372-7.
153. Quigley, John B. (2005). The Case for Palestine: An International Law Perspective. Duke University Press. p. 36. ISBN 978-0-8223-3539-9.
154. ^ Wolffe, John (2005). Religion in History: Conflict, Conversion and Coexistence. Manchester University Press. p. 265. ISBN 978-0-7190-7107-2.
155. Shapira, Anita; Abel, Evelyn (2008). Yigal Allon, Native Son: A Biography. Jewish culture and contexts. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. p. 239. ISBN 978-0-8122-4028-3. OCLC 154800576.
156. Galnoor, Itzhak (1995). The Partition of Palestine: Decision Crossroads in the Zionist Movement. SUNY series in Israeli studies. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. p. 195. ISBN 978-0-7914-2194-9.
157. Bickerton, Ian J.; Klausner, Carla L. (2002). A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (4th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. p. 88. ISBN 978-0-13-090303-7.
158. Bickerton & Klausner (2001), page 103
159. Hillel Cohen (3 January 2008). Army of Shadows: Palestinian Collaboration with Zionism, 1917–1948. University of California Press. p. 236. ISBN 978-0-520-93398-9. ... Musa al-alami surmised that the mufti would agree to partition if he were promised that he would rule the Arab state
160. Morris, 2008, p. 76, 77
161. Morris 2008, p. 73
162. Louis 2006, p. 419
163. Morris, Benny (2008). 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War. Yale University Press. p. 74. ISBN 978-0-300-12696-9.
164. Roza El-Eini (2006). Mandated landscape: British imperial rule in Palestine, 1929–1948. History. Routledge. p. 367. ISBN 978-0-7146-5426-3. They accordingly announced on 11 December 1947, that the Mandate would end on 15 May 1948, from which date the sole task ... would be to ... withdrawal by 1 August 1948.
165. Arthur Koestler (March 2007). Promise and Fulfilment – Palestine 1917–1949. READ BOOKS. pp. 163–168. ISBN 978-1-4067-4723-2. Retrieved 13 October 2011.
166. Benny Morris (2008). 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. Yale University Press. p. 73. ISBN 978-0-300-12696-9. Retrieved 13 July 2013. Bevin regarded the UNSCOP majority report of 1 September 1947 as unjust and immoral. He promptly decided that Britain would not attempt to im- pose it on the Arabs; indeed, he expected them to resist its implementation… The British cabinet...: in the meeting on 4 December 1947... It decided, in a sop to the Arabs, to refrain from aiding the enforcement of the UN resolution, meaning the partition of Palestine. And in an important secret corollary... it agreed that Britain would do all in its power to delay until early May the arrival in Palestine of the UN (Implementation) Commission. The Foreign Office immediately informed the commission "that it would be intolerable for the Commission to begin to exercise its authority while the Palestine Government was still administratively responsible for Palestine"... This... nullified any possibility of an orderly implementation of the partition resolution.
167. See memo from Acting Secretary Lovett to Certain Diplomatic Offices, Foreign relations of the United States, 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI, pages 1447–48
168. See Folke Bernadotte, "To Jerusalem", Hodder and Stoughton, 1951, pages 112–13
169. Yoav Gelber, Independence Versus Nakba; Kinneret–Zmora-Bitan–Dvir Publishing, 2004, ISBN 978-965-517-190-7, p.104
170. "Web – Termination of British mandate in Plaestine 14/15 May". nation.com. Archived from the original on 12 October 2017.
171. Declaration of Establishment of State of Israel: 14 May 1948
172. Cablegram from the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States to the Secretary-General of the United Nations 15 May 1948: Retrieved 4 May 2012
173. See "Request for the admission of the State of Palestine to Unesco as a Member State" (PDF). UNESCO. 12 May 1989.
174. See The Palestine Declaration to the International Criminal Court: The Statehood Issue "Archived copy" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 16 July 2011. Retrieved 19 July 2009.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link) and Silverburg, Sanford R. (2002), "Palestine and International Law: Essays on Politics and Economics", Jefferson, N.C: McFarland & Co, ISBN 978-0-7864-1191-7, pages 37–54
175. See Chapter 5 "Israel (1948–1949) and Palestine (1998–1999): Two Studies in the Creation of States", in Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, and Stefan Talmon, eds., The Reality of International Law: Essays in Honour of Ian Brownlie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999)
176. Sourcebook on public international law, by Tim Hillier, Routledge, 1998, ISBN 978-1-85941-050-9, page 217; and Prof. Vera Gowlland-Debbas, "Collective Responses to the Unilateral Declarations of Independence of Southern Rhodesia and Palestine, An Application of the Legitimizing Function of the United Nations", The British Yearbook of International Law, 1990, pp. 135–153
177. "See paragraph 5, Separate opinion of Judge Koroma" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 4 June 2011.
178. See De Waart, Paul J.I.M., "International Court of Justice Firmly Walled in the Law of Power in the Israeli–Palestinian Peace Process", Leiden Journal of International Law, 18 (2005), pp. 467–487
179. "Abbas should change his locks before next wave of Palestinian prisoners freed". Haaretz. 6 December 2011.
180. אנדרטת שופר החירות בנתניה: 75 שנה להחלטת האו"ם ההיסטורית
181. On This Day: 75 years since UN vote to turn Palestine into Jewish, Arab states, Jerusalem Post

Bibliography

• Ben-Dror, Elad (2007). "The Arab Struggle against Partition: The International Arena of Summer 1947". Middle Eastern Studies. 43 (2). Taylor & Francis, Ltd.: 259–293. doi:10.1080/00263200601114117. ISSN 0026-3206. JSTOR 4284540. S2CID 143853008. Retrieved 20 January 2023.
• Benny Morris (2008). 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-14524-3. Retrieved 14 July 2013.
• William Roger Louis (2006). Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez, and Decolonization. I.B. Tauris. ISBN 978-1-84511-347-6. Retrieved 16 August 2013.
• William Roger Louis (1985). The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945–1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-822960-5.

Further reading

• Bregman, Ahron (2002). Israel's Wars: A History Since 1947. London ; New York: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-28715-9.
• Avneri, Aryeh L. (1984). The Claim of Dispossession: Jewish Land-settlement and the Arabs, 1878-1948. Middle East Studies. New Brunswick, USA: Transaction Books. ISBN 978-0-87855-964-0.
• Fischbach, Michael R. (2003). Records of Dispossession: Palestinian Refugee Property and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. The Institute for Palestine Studies series. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0-231-12978-7.
• Gelber, Yoav (1997). Jewish-Transjordanian Relations 1921-1948: Alliance of Bars Sinister. London: Frank Cass. ISBN 978-0-7146-4675-6.
• Khalaf, Issa (1991). Politics in Palestine: Arab Factionalism and Social Disintegration, 1939-1948. SUNY series in the social and economic history of the Middle East. Albany: State University of New York Press. ISBN 978-0-7914-0707-3.
• Louis, William Roger (1984). The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism. Oxford (GB): Clarendon Press. ISBN 978-0-19-822489-1.
• Sicker, Martin (1999). Reshaping Palestine: from Muhammad Ali to the British Mandate, 1831-1922. Westport, Conn: Praeger. ISBN 978-0-275-96639-3.
• "Palestine". Encyclopædia Britannica.

External links

• UN Resolution 181 (II) A: Future government of Palestine. On www.un.org.
• Text of the Resolution at undocs.org
• Full text of report of Sub-Committee 2 with all appendices, tables and maps
• JFK in Support of Partition, 1948 Shapell Manuscript Foundation
• Maps of Palestine Archived 27 April 2015 at the Wayback Machine
• Ivan Rand and the UNSCOP Papers
• Official Map prepared by UNSCOP
• 29 November Quiz
• Firsthand testimonies from the men and women who helped found the State of Israel on YouTube

v t e Key documents of Mandatory Palestine
1910s	Damascus Protocol The Future of Palestine McMahon–Hussein correspondence Sykes–Picot agreement Balfour Declaration Hogarth message Bassett letter Declaration to the Seven Anglo-French Modus Vivendi Anglo-French Declaration Faisal–Weizmann agreement King–Crane Commission report
1920s	San Remo Resolution Palin Commission report Paulet–Newcombe Agreement Haycraft Commission report Churchill White Paper League of Nations mandate Constitution Palestinian citizenship order
1930s	Shaw Commission report Western Wall Commission report Hope Simpson report Passfield white paper MacDonald letter Peel Commission report Woodhead Commission report White Paper of 1939
1940s	Biltmore Programme Harrison Report Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry report (Survey of Palestine) Statement of Information Relating to Acts of Violence Morrison–Grady Plan Bevin Plan UNSCOP Ad Hoc Committee UN Partition Plan American trusteeship proposal for Palestine Israeli Declaration of Independence
History Timeline Aftermath