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{{Short description|Historical periods for the Chinese Communist Party and military officials}}
{{Politics of the People's Republic of China}}
{{refimprove|date=March 2013}} {{more citations needed|date=March 2013}}

{{Chinese
{{Infobox Chinese
|s=中国共产党领导集体 |s=中国共产党领导集体
|t=中國共産黨領導集體 |t=中國共産黨領導集體
|p=Zhōngguó Gòngchǎndǎng lǐngdǎo jítǐ |p=Zhōngguó Gòngchǎndǎng lǐngdǎo jítǐ
|l=Leadership collectives of the Communist Party of China |l=Leadership collectives of the Chinese Communist Party
|order=st}} |order=st
}}
{{Politics of China |expanded = Leadership }}


Since both the ] and the ] promote according to seniority, it is possible to discern distinct '''generations of Chinese leadership'''.<ref>The landmark study of military generations and factions is William Whitson's ''The Chinese High Command,'' Praeger, 1973</ref> In official discourse, each group of leadership is identified with a distinct extension of the ideology of the party. Historians have studied various periods in the development of the government of the ] by reference to these "generations". '''Generations of Chinese leadership''' is a term historians use to characterize distinct periods of the leadership of the ] (CCP) and, by extension, successive changes in the ]. Historians have studied various periods in the development of the ] of the ] (PRC) by reference to these "generations".<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Whitson |first1=William W. |url=https://archive.org/details/chinesehighcomma0000whit |title=The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927-71 |last2=Huang |first2=Chên-hsia |date=1973 |publisher=Praeger |isbn=9780333150535 |language=en |oclc=695214130}}</ref>


==Origins and terminology==
==Terminology==
Shortly after the ], ] gave a speech which referred to ], himself, and ] as the respective "]" of the first, second, and third generations of leadership. This method of dividing Chinese leadership generations became popular. Political scientist Joseph Fewsmith says that this division "distorts history" as Mao and Deng belonged to the same generation, both being veterans of the ], and that Jiang could be regarded as being from the ''second'' generation.{{sfn|Fewsmith|2002|p=35}}
While in English the chronological leadership groups are commonly referred to as "generations of Chinese leadership", there is no exact equivalent expression in Chinese. The usual term in official discourse for such a group is a "leadership collective", which are counted in generations. Thus, for example, the "first generation" of leaders identified below are labelled as "the first generation leadership collective". In official discourse, they are also not viewed as leaders of the ''state'' (the ]), but rather leaders of the ''party'' (the ]).<ref>See, e.g. {{cite web |url= http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/17039979.html|title= Formation of the First Generation Central Leadership Collective - and also on how Mao Zedong's core status was determined (第一代中央领导集体形成——兼谈毛泽东核心地位怎样确立)|last1= Liao (廖)|first1= Xinwen (心文)|last2= |first2= |date= 2012-02-07|work= Communist Party of China News|publisher= People.com.cn|accessdate=12 March 2012}}</ref>


The closest equivalent to the term "leadership generation" used officially in China is "leadership collective" (for example: "first generation leadership collective"). The collective is viewed as leaders of the ''party'' (the CCP) rather than of the ''state'' (the PRC).<ref>See, e.g. {{cite web |last1=Liao (廖) |first1=Xinwen (心文) |date=2012-02-07 |title=Formation of the First Generation Central Leadership Collective - and also on how Mao Zedong's core status was determined (第一代中央领导集体形成——兼谈毛泽东核心地位怎样确立) |url=http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/17039979.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120213163959/http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/17039979.html |archive-date=13 February 2012 |access-date=12 March 2012 |work=] |publisher=}}</ref> Deng used the term "core" to legitimize Jiang's unexpected appointment to general secretary and to emphasize the collective nature of the leadership;{{sfn|Teiwes|2018|p=2}} ] says that Deng's application of the concept of collective leadership to the first and second generations was historically inaccurate.{{sfn|Teiwes|2018|p=3}}
In the Communist Party's official discourse, the "generational" division and identification of the "core leader" for each of the first, second and third generations was set down during the leadership of ] and first publicised in 1999. This division and identification was not uncontroversial at the time, since the party had hitherto regarded his immediate predecessors as the party's general secretary, ] and ], as its leaders, and regarded ] as the "power behind the throne" rather than a formal leader. The revision of party history into "generations" helped to secure Jiang's position as "core" and anointed heir. Through the invention of the concept of the "core", it also helped to de-legitimise Jiang's deposed predecessors (such as Hu and Zhao), by relegating them from party leader to mere "membership" of a "leadership collective", which also conveniently helped to legitimise their deposition.


Transitions between generations and core leaders is not always clear when authority is divided across generations. When Jiang became General Secretary in 1989, Deng - through enormous prestige - continued to hold unchallenged ultimate authority.{{sfn|Fewsmith|2002|p=28}} Jiang, in turn, remained chairman of the ] after being succeeded as General Secretary by "fourth" generation" ].<ref>{{cite web |last1=Watts |first1=Jonathan |title=Jiang quits in peaceful transition of power |website=The Guardian |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/20/china.jonathanwatts |date=2004-09-20 |access-date=2024-02-18}}</ref> Official generational labels are not always used. The term "fourth generation of leaders" stopped being used officially in the summer of 2002 shortly before that generation assumed power. Similarly, "fifth generation of leaders" was not used officially through 2003.{{sfn|Li|2003|p=76}}
Jiang's successors have maintained this generational division, but have retreated from identifying a "core leader" in the fourth generation, and the succeeding general secretary ] has never been identified in official announcements as the "core" of the fourth generation, preferring to be simply called by his title "General Secretary". ] did continue this practice until October 2016 when the 6th Plenary of the 18th Central Committee named him as the "core leader" in a document.<ref>Chen Heying., in: Global Times, 28. October 2016</ref>


The ] (the General Secretary, and formerly ]) leads the collective, which typically includes the ].{{citation needed|date=February 2023}}
The "leadership collective" at any one time usually, but not always, correlates with the members of the ], with the leader of the party (the Chairman or, after 1983, the General Secretary) often, but not always, the leader of this leadership collective.

{| class="wikitable"
|+ Generations of Chinese leadership
! Generation
! Paramount Leader
! Start
! End
! Ideology Raised
|-
| ]
| ]<br/>'']''
| 1949
| 1978
| ]
|-
| ]
| ]
| 1978
| 1989
| ]
|-
| ]
| ]
| 1989
| 2002
| ]
|-
| ]
| ]
| 2002
| 2012
| ]
|-
| ]
| ]
| 2012
|
| ]
|}


==First generation== ==First generation==
{{Main|History of the People's Republic of China (1949–1976)}}
], ], ] and ] in ] in 1954.]]
The first generation was drawn from the veterans of the revolutionary period, where most had either worked closely with or been in the armed forces. The close relationships and shared political-military experience made it easy for civilian leaders to intervene in military matters and vice versa, so the line between civilian and military leader was blurred even as greater specialization evolved.{{sfn|Kiselycznyk|Saunders|2010|pp=5-6}}
Although the first generation of leaders ruled collectively for only part of the period, and ] was to a large extent a paramount, autocratic leader for most of the period, the successive leaders from the founding of the People's Republic in 1949 until Mao's death and the dismantling of the power of his closest deputies in 1976 are now referred to retrospectively as the "first generation" of leaders in official discourse.


Mao was the ] from the founding of the PRC in 1949 until his death in 1976. His rule was unfettered by collective leadership. Mao exercised undisputed power over the party-state, including unilateral authority to decide policy,{{sfn|Li|2016|loc=Chapter 1, section "Absence of Legendary Revolution or War Experience"}} law,{{sfn|Li|2016|loc=Chapter 5, section "The Chinese Communist Party's Changing View of and Ambivalent Stance toward Legal Development"}} and political appointments.{{sfn|Teiwes|2018|p=9}}{{sfn|Li|2016|loc=Chapter 1, section "Absence of Legendary Revolution or War Experience"}} Teiwes suggests that Mao's position was secured by being a revolutionary symbol; the other leaders could not oppose Mao without undermining their own self-image as revolutionaries.{{sfn|Teiwes|2018|pp=9-10}}
Thus, the first generation, from 1949 to 1976, consisted of Mao Zedong as core, along with ], ] (as informal ]),<ref>http://archive.lib.msu.edu/DMC/African%20Journals/pdfs/Journal%20of%20the%20University%20of%20Zimbabwe/vol16n2/juz016002002.pdf</ref> ], ], ], and later ] and the ] (neither Lin nor the Gang are today considered by official discourse to be part of this generation because of political antagonism resulting from the ]). These were the leaders that founded the ] after the Communist victory in the ]. They were born between 1886 and 1907, although the Gang of Four were a distinct subgroup born 1914 to 1935. Most were born before the demise of the ] (not including the Gang) and thus lived to see both the birth and, on ], the end of the ]. One characteristic of these leaders were that they tended to be both political and military leaders. Most had some education outside ], and their formative experiences included the ], the ], and the ]. The guiding political ideology from the first generations were general principles of ] and '']''.


Senior offices were predominantly held by Mao's associates from the ] and other civil war veterans.{{sfn|Li|2016|loc=Chapter 1, section "Absence of Legendary Revolution or War Experience"}} These included - at various times - ], ], ], ], ], ], and ].
Of this group, Mao, Zhou, Zhu and Liu were the four original members of the collective leadership from 1949 until the political turmoil of the late 1950s and early 1960s, which resulted in Mao gaining paramount autocratic power. Liu, then the President (or "Chairman of the State"), was removed from his party position in 1966, placed under house arrest in 1967, and died from torture and maltreatment in 1969.{{citation needed|date=March 2013}} Mao, Zhou and Zhu were the only three original members of the ] who remained in the Politburo from 1945 until their deaths in 1976 (though Zhu temporarily lost his membership between 1969-1973) and died while holding the highest party and state offices ] (Mao), ] (Zhou) and ], the nominal ] (Zhu).


With the demise of Liu, Mao promoted Lin Biao as his deputy, and the "Gang of Four" to fill the role of his trusted henchmen. Lin fell out of favour, however, and died in 1971 while attempting to escape to the ]. The Gang of Four, which consisted of Jiang Qing (Madame Mao), and three other members meteorically promoted in the late 1960s, were the only members of the first generation of leadership to remain after Mao's death in 1976. Their demise came shortly afterwards in a political coup managed by what become the second generation of leaders.{{citation needed|date=March 2013}} With the demise of Liu, Mao promoted Lin Biao as his deputy, and the "Gang of Four" to fill the role of his trusted allies. Lin fell out of favour, however, and died in 1971 while attempting to escape to the ]. The Gang of Four, which consisted of ] (Madame Mao), and three other members meteorically promoted in the late 1960s, were the only members of the first generation of leadership to remain after Mao's death in 1976. Their demise came shortly afterwards in a political coup managed by what became the second generation of leaders.{{citation needed|date=March 2013}}


Of the other members identified above, Chen Yun was sidelined from the early 1960s, lost his party position in 1969, but survived to play an influential role in the second generation of leadership. Peng Dehuai was denounced in 1959, made a brief return to government in 1965, but was detained by ] from 1966 and died in prison from torture and maltreatment in 1974. While not named above, ], the core of the second generation of leadership, also played a key role in the first generation at various times, mainly as an ally of Zhou and Peng, but was purged from government in 1976 and remained sidelined at the time of Mao's death. Of the other members identified above, Chen Yun was sidelined from the early 1960s, lost his party position in 1969, but survived to play an influential role in the second generation of leadership. Peng Dehuai was denounced in 1959, made a brief return to government in 1965, but was detained by ] from 1966 and died in prison from torture and maltreatment in 1974. Deng Xiaoping, the core of the second generation of leadership, also played a key role in the first generation at various times, mainly as an ally of Zhou and Peng, but was purged from government in 1976 and remained sidelined at the time of Mao's death.


==Second generation== ==Second generation==
{{Main|History of the People's Republic of China (1976–1989)}}


The death of Mao, Zhou and Zhu in 1976, and soon afterwards the coup that resulted in the arrest of the ], ushered in the era now identified as the "second generation" of leaders. The era began with ] as the successor to Mao, but his position was soon eclipsed by the ascendancy of ] as the paramount leader, in which position he remained at least until 1992 when he resigned from his leadership positions. During this period the most power and influence had a group of old party veterans, known as the ], whose main members were ] and ], together with Deng. All of them had more than 40 years of political experience.<ref>China's Great Economic Transformation,"These two individuals had a more direct influence on economic policy than did Deng"</ref> The death of Mao, Zhou and Zhu in 1976, and soon afterwards the coup that resulted in the arrest of the ], ushered in the era now identified as the "second generation" of leaders. The era began with Hua Guofeng as the successor to Mao, but his position was soon eclipsed by the ascendancy of Deng Xiaoping as the paramount leader, in which position he remained at least until 1989 when he resigned from his leadership positions. During this period the most power and influence was held by a group of old party veterans, known as the ], whose main members were ] and ], together with Deng. All of them had more than 40 years of political experience.<ref>{{Cite book |title=China's Great Economic Transformation |date=2008-04-14 |publisher=] |isbn=978-0-521-88557-7 |editor-last=Brandt |editor-first=Loren |edition=1 |doi=10.1017/cbo9780511754234 |editor-last2=Rawski |editor-first2=Thomas G.}}</ref>{{Page needed|date=June 2023}}


Thus, in official discourse, the second generation of leadership lasted from 1976 to 1992. The official discourse of the Communist Party today identifies ] as the "core" of this second generation, but Deng was never formally the leader of the party during this period. Instead, the formal party leaders during this time were, successively, ], ], ] and ]. Other prominent leaders of this generation were ], ], ], ] and ]. These leaders were also involved in the Chinese revolution, but with the exception of Deng Xiaoping, served in more junior roles, as they were all born from 1897 to 1921 (that is, some were born after the demise of the ] in the ]). Like the first generation, many were educated overseas, particularly in ].{{citation needed|date=March 2013}} Their young formative experiences were similar to the first generation. Most had some position of authority during the ], although as a rule those that held power after the 1980s were purged during that decade. This generation turned the focus from class struggle and political movements to economic development, pioneering ]. Thus, in official discourse, the second generation of leadership lasted from 1976 to 1992. The official discourse of the CCP today identifies Deng Xiaoping as the "core" of this second generation, but Deng was never formally the leader of the party during this period. Instead, the formal party leaders during this time were, successively, ], ], ] and ]. Other prominent leaders of this generation were ], ], ], ] and ]. These leaders were also involved in the Chinese revolution, but with the exception of Deng Xiaoping, served in more junior roles, as they were all born from 1897 to 1921 (that is, some were born after the demise of the ] in the ]). Like the first generation, many were educated overseas, particularly in ].{{citation needed|date=March 2013}} Their young formative experiences were similar to the first generation. Most had some position of authority during the Cultural Revolution, although as a rule those that held power after the 1980s were purged during that decade. This generation turned the focus from class struggle and political movements to economic development and pioneering ].{{citation needed|date=November 2023}} The dominant political ideology of the era was ].


The transition towards the third generation of leadership began with the ]. The purges that followed led to the promotion of what became the third generation of leadership. Soon afterwards, Deng resigned his last major party post, as chairman of the central military committee, although he remained influential behind the scenes until his death in 1997.{{citation needed|date=November 2023}}
The dominant political ideology of the era was ], which was accepted by the party in 1978, and he served in various leadership positions, although his paramount power was not overtly reflected in his formal titles. (He never served after 1976 as head of the party, state or government.) Instead, the formal leaders of the party were a series of younger leaders promoted (and then demoted) by Deng and other influential elders. The most prominent of these were ] (leader from 1981, demoted 1987, died 1989), and Zhao Ziyang (leader from 1987, demoted and place under house arrest in 1989). They were replaced by ] and ], who would go on to become prominent members of the third generation of leaders.

Consistently influential behind the scenes during Deng's time as paramount leader were fellow elder statesmen Chen Yun and Li Xiannian. Other prominent elders were Ye Jianying (until his death in 1986), Deng Yingchao (Zhou Enlai's widow, until her death in 1992) and Peng Zhen (who retired in 1988). ] played a brief but important role in the period between 1989 and 1992, when as President he subverted the existing constitutional convention and turned the office of President from a symbolic role into an executive one.{{citation needed|date=March 2013}}

The transition towards the third generation of leadership began with the ]. The purges that followed led to the promotion of what became the third generation of leadership. Soon afterwards, Deng resigned his last major party post, as chairman of the central military committee, although he remained influential behind the scenes until his death in 1997.


==Third generation== ==Third generation==
{{Unreferenced section|date=November 2022}}
Between 1989 and 1992, Jiang was believed to be simply a transitional figure to protect the party from a power vacuum (or even an Eastern Bloc style collapse) until a more stable successor government to Deng could be put in place. Because of this, the era of the "third generation" is not regarded to have begun until 1992, with the election of the new ] standing committee and Jiang consolidating his power without Deng.
{{Main|History of the People's Republic of China (1989–2002)}}
Between 1989 and 1992, Jiang was believed to be simply a transitional figure to protect the party from a power vacuum (or even an Eastern Bloc style collapse) until a more stable successor government to Deng Xiaoping could be put in place. Because of this, the era of the "third generation" is not regarded to have begun until 1992, with the election of the new ] standing committee and Jiang consolidating his power without Deng. ] ] played an important role in the period between 1989 and 2002, when as ] he subverted the existing ] and turned the presidency from a symbolic role into an executive one by his power of general secretary.


Thus, the "third generation" lasted from 1992 to 2002, with ] as core, and other leaders including ], ], ], ]. These leaders were born before the revolution from 1924 to 1934 but were educated afterwards before the ]. Most of them received education in the ] as engineers and entered the party initially as factory managers. As a result, many of them did not wield any significant political power prior to the 1980s, spending their time during the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath working for the Civil infrastructure of the state and were protected from the purges, as opposed to their predecessors. Unlike their predecessors, there is a split between the political and military leadership. Their formative experiences included the ] and the ]. This generation continued economic development while China saw the emergence of various serious social issues. The political ideological innovation officially associated with this period was Jiang's "]". Thus, the "third generation" lasted from 1992 to 2002, with Jiang Zemin as core, and other leaders including Li Peng, ], ], ], ], ], ], and ]. These leaders were born before the revolution from 1924 to 1934 but were educated afterwards before the ]. Most of them received education in the ] as engineers and entered the party initially as factory managers. As a result, many of them did not wield any significant political power prior to the 1980s, spending their time during the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath working for the civil infrastructure of the state and were protected from the purges, as opposed to their predecessors. Unlike their predecessors, there is a split between the political and military leadership. Their formative experiences included the ] and the ]. This generation continued economic development while China saw the emergence of various serious social issues. The political ideological innovation officially associated with this period was Jiang's "]".


The initial members of the third generation were mostly survivors from before 1989, including ], ] (who continued as premier), ] and ]. Notable changes to the leadership were the elevation of ] in place of ] as premier in 1998 and the elevation of ] as vice president. For the first time since 1982, the three centres of power of the presidency, the party general secretaryship and the chairmanship of the central military commission were concentrated in a single person, Jiang Zemin. This enabled him to declare himself the "core" of the third generation of leadership.{{citation needed|date=March 2013}} The initial members of the third generation were mostly survivors from before 1989, including ], ] (who continued as premier), ] and ]. Notable changes to the leadership were the elevation of ] in place of ] as premier in 1998 and the elevation of Hu Jintao as vice president. For the first time since 1982, the three centres of power of the presidency, the party general secretaryship and the chairmanship of the central military commission were concentrated in a single person, Jiang Zemin. This enabled him to declare himself the "core" of the third generation of leadership.{{citation needed|date=March 2013}}


During this period, while Deng Xiaoping had retired from all leadership positions, he remained influential. In 1992, Deng's informal intervention ensured that market-orientated reforms were not halted by resurgent conservative elements. Deng also played an important role in nominating ] as Jiang's successor as party secretary. During this period, while Deng Xiaoping had retired from all leadership positions, he remained influential. In 1992, Deng's informal intervention ensured that market-orientated reforms were not halted by resurgent conservative elements. (See also ]) Deng also played an important role in nominating Hu Jintao as Jiang's successor as party secretary.


==Fourth generation== ==Fourth generation==
{{main article|Hu–Wen Administration}} {{main article|Hu–Wen Administration}}
2002 saw the first orderly transition of power in the Communist Party of China in accordance with rules on term limits. The new leaders were elected to the Communist Party's Politburo in 2002, and took up their governmental positions in 2003, while the most prominent of their "third generation" predecessors stepped down at the same time.


2002 saw the first ] in the Chinese Communist Party in accordance with rules on term limits. The new leaders were elected to the Communist Party's Politburo in November 2002, and took up their governmental positions in March 2003, while the most prominent of their "third generation" predecessors stepped down at the same time. But Hu Jintao did not become the chairman of the Central Military Commission until September 2004.
Thus, the era of the "fourth generation" is officially regarded to have begun in 2002, and lasted until 2012, when the next election for the party leadership occurred. The prominent leaders included ] (as ]), ], ], ], ] and ]. It is also known as the "republican generation" or the ].{{citation needed|date=March 2013}} These were promoted to top leadership at the ] and remained in power until the ] in 2012. This generation of leaders, born mainly in the ] years from 1939 to 1944, represented a new ] style governance and a less centralized political structure. The majority of this generation of leaders were engineers whose academic lives were disrupted by the ] and, unlike both their predecessors and likely successors, have spent very little time overseas. The dominant political ideology of this era was Hu's ] and a goal for a ].

The Chinese Government considers the Hu-Wen administration to be a continuation of the Third generation, and the Xi-Li administration to be the start of the Fourth generation.<ref>{{Cite book|title=The Governance of China|last=Jinping|first=Xi|publisher=Foreign Languages Press Co. Ltd.|year=2014|isbn=978-7-119-11394-4|pages=8}}</ref>{{Primary source inline|date=June 2023}}

Thus, the era of the "fourth generation" is officially regarded to have begun in 2002, and lasted until 2012, when the next election for the party leadership occurred. The prominent leaders included Hu Jintao (as ]), ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], Xi Jinping, ], ], and ]. It is also known as the "republican generation" or the ].{{citation needed|date=March 2013}} These were promoted to top leadership at the ] and remained in power until the ] in 2012. This generation of leaders, born mainly in the ] years from 1939 to 1944, represented a new ] style governance and a less centralized political structure. The majority of this generation of leaders were engineers whose academic lives were disrupted by the Cultural Revolution and, unlike both their predecessors and likely successors, have spent very little time overseas. The dominant political ideology of this era was Hu's ] and a goal for a ].


==Fifth generation (current)== ==Fifth generation (current)==
{{main article|Xi–Li Administration}} {{main article|Xi–Li Administration|Xi Jinping Administration}}
The fifth generation came to power at the ] in 2012, when ] stepped down as Party ]. In the fifth generation, one sees fewer engineers and more management and finance majors, including successful entrepreneurs. Most of the fifth generation of civilian leadership, born in the ] years 1945 to 1955, were educated at top Chinese universities. Hu Jintao's ] faction, and the ] (or "Princelings") are seen to be the two dominant factions within the leadership.<ref>]. , ], January 1, 2003</ref><ref>Arpi, Claude (October 18, 2010). , Sify</ref> The fifth generation came to power at the ] in 2012, when Hu Jintao stepped down as CCP General Secretary and ]. In the fifth generation, one sees fewer engineers and more management and finance majors, including successful entrepreneurs. Most of the fifth generation of civilian leadership, born in the ] years 1945 to 1955, were educated at top Chinese universities. Former leader Hu Jintao's ] faction, and the ] (or "Princelings") are seen to be the two dominant factions within the leadership.<ref>{{Cite web |date=January 1, 2003 |title=China's 5th generation comes of age |url=http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/12/31/china.fifth/ |access-date=2023-06-12 |website=]}}</ref><ref>Arpi, Claude (October 18, 2010). {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160412012700/http://www.sify.com/news/why-beijing-seethes-over-the-nobel-for-liu-news-columns-kksoVnciihi.html |date=2016-04-12 }}, Sify</ref>


Following his elevation to ] and ], which oversees the ], the Princeling and current General Secretary ] succeeded Hu Jintao as the ] of this generation.<ref name="demick">{{cite web|last=Demick|first=Barbara |date=19 October 2010|title=Xi Jinping on track to become China's next president|url=http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-china-xi-20101019,0,604801.story|publisher=Los Angeles Times|accessdate=19 October 2010}}</ref> Premier ] took the place of former Premier ]. Other prominent figures that are top figures in the 5th generation as it develops include Congress Chairman ], Conference Chairman ], Secretariat Secretary ], Discipline Secretary ], first Vice Premier ] and Vice President ], Vice Premier ], and Vice Premier ]. Following his elevation to General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, which oversees the Chinese Communist Party and the ], the Princeling and current CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping succeeded Hu Jintao as the paramount leader of this generation.<ref name="demick">{{cite web |last=Demick |first=Barbara |date=19 October 2010 |title=Xi Jinping on track to become China's next president |url=http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-china-xi-20101019,0,604801.story |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101027085237/http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-china-xi-20101019,0,604801.story |archive-date=27 October 2010 |access-date=19 October 2010 |work=]}}</ref> Premier Li Keqiang took the place of former Premier Wen Jiabao and served until 2023. Others who have been top figures in the 5th generation include former Congress Chairmen ] and ], Conference Chairmen ] and ], Secretariat First Secretaries ] and ], former vice president and Discipline Secretary ], former Discipline Secretary and current Congress Chairman ], first Vice Premiers ] and current Vice President ], former Vice President ], and its leading females, former Vice Premiers ] and ].{{citation needed|date=May 2023}}


After the ] in 2022, the prominent leaders included Xi Jinping, ], Zhao Leji, Wang Huning, ], and ].{{citation needed|date=March 2023}}
==Sixth generation==

The sixth generation of leaders will come to power at the 20th Party Congress in 2022. Under current unspoken Chinese political conventions the leaders of this generation would be mostly born in the 1960s,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/Vol2No1_BoZhiyue.pdf |title=eai.nus.edu |publisher= |date= |accessdate=2011-09-28 |deadurl=yes |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20111006004033/http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/Vol2No1_BoZhiyue.pdf |archivedate=2011-10-06 |df= }}</ref> and speculated future leaders were born from 1960 to 1967. Current speculation places former ] head and current ]<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/19/world/asia/a-rising-party-leader-in-china-is-elevated-yet-again.html |title=China: A Rising Party Leader Is Elevated Yet Again |publisher=The New York Times |date=2012-12-18 |accessdate=2012-12-19}}</ref> party chief ] as a possible core figure. ] party chief ] has also been named (since then fallen from grace and no longer a party member). Hu and Sun were the only Politburo members named at the 18th Party Congress in 2012 who were born after 1960, making their further advancement a near certainty. U.S.-based newspaper '']'' also listed ] Governor ] (since then fallen from grace), President of the ] ], Hebei Governor ], and Heilongjiang Governor ] as other potential figures in this generation of leadership.<ref name=DW>{{cite news|last=Chen|first=Feng|title=中国政坛"第六代新星"开始崭露头角|url=http://china.dwnews.com/news/2011-03-23/57531330.html|accessdate=2011-03-23|newspaper=Duowei|date=2011-03-23}}</ref> Others in this rough age group ascending in the ranks include ] and ].
==Possible sixth generation==
{{Wide image|1.3.2.中共党史.首脑.jpg|1172px|dir=rtl|Simplified Chinese graphic timeline of Communist Party leadership. The red bar indicates ], the yellow indicating the ]. The gray bar delineates particular periods of mainland Chinese history from a CPC perspective.}}
The sixth generation of leaders had been expected to come to power at the 20th Party Congress in 2022. However, following Xi Jinping's consolidation of power at the ], the future of the "sixth generation" was cast into doubt as clear successor figures failed to be named to senior leadership posts, particularly the Politburo Standing Committee.{{citation needed|date=May 2023}} Xi Jinping was re-elected as the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2022.

In preceding years, ] (a Vice-Premier from 2018 to 2023) was seen{{By whom|date=May 2023}} as a possible core figure.{{citation needed|date=May 2023}} Hu and ] were the only Politburo members named at the 18th Party Congress in 2012 who were born after 1960, making their further advancement seem like a certainty, but Sun was purged before the 19th Party Congress and Hu was dropped from the Politburo at the 20th.{{citation needed|date=May 2023}} U.S.-based newspaper '']'' also listed four figures who have since fallen from grace, former ] Governor ], former President of the ] ], former Heilongjiang Party Secretary ], and former ] ], as other potential figures in this generation of leadership. Others in this rough age group ascending in the ranks include ] (now a Vice-Premier) and ] (party secretary of Chongqing and then Tianjin).<ref name="DW">{{cite news |last=Chen |first=Feng |date=2011-03-23 |title=中国政坛"第六代新星"开始崭露头角 |language=zh |newspaper=] |url=http://china.dwnews.com/news/2011-03-23/57531330.html |url-status=dead |access-date=2011-03-23 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110822143237/http://china.dwnews.com/news/2011-03-23/57531330.html |archive-date=2011-08-22}}</ref>

] is the only person from this age bracket to have reached the Standing Committee, but the ] includes eight other members born between 1960 and 1964.{{citation needed|date=May 2023}}

==Possible seventh generation==
Born in the 1970s (or in the late 1960s if loosely defined), the seventh generation of leaders includes ], Mayor of ]; ], Director of the ]; ], Deputy Party Secretary of ]; {{ill|Liu Hongjian|zh|刘洪建}}, Party Secretary of ], the provincial capital of ]; and ], Party Secretary of ], the provincial capital of ] and Executive Vice Governor of ].<ref>{{cite news |last1=Zhai |first1=Keith |last2=Wong |first2=Chun Han |date=23 October 2022 |title=Who's Next? A Look at the Chinese Communist Party's Rising Political Stars |work=] |url=https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/china-xi-jinping-communist-party-congress/card/who-s-next-a-look-at-the-chinese-communist-party-s-rising-political-stars-D3Ti8SkkUd035BFlfPuj |url-access=subscription |access-date=9 June 2023}}</ref>

No leader born in the 1970s has served as a full member of the ]. As of mid-2023, most leaders born in the 1970s served in positions at the deputy provincial-ministerial level. Only two were full provincial-ministerial leaders: ], Director of the ],<ref>{{cite news |date=10 May 2023 |title=China Names Li Top Financial Regulator in Surprise Move |work=] |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-05-10/china-names-li-yunze-top-financial-regulator-in-surprise-move |access-date=9 June 2023}}</ref> and ] <small>&#91;]&#93;</small>, First Secretary of the ].<ref>{{cite news |last1=Cai |first1=Jane |last2=Zheng |first2=William |date=6 June 2023 |title=China's Communist Youth League gets new leader, aged 52, but role is 'no longer fast track to the top' |work=] |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3223127/chinas-communist-youth-league-gets-new-leader-aged-52-role-no-longer-fast-track-top |access-date=9 June 2023}}</ref>

==Timeline==
{{Wide image|1.3.2.中共党史.首脑.jpg|1172px|dir=rtl|Simplified Chinese graphic timeline of CCP leadership to 2012. The red bar indicates ], the yellow indicating the ]. The gray bar delineates particular periods of mainland Chinese history from a CCP perspective.}}


== See also == == See also ==
Line 77: Line 134:


== References == == References ==
=== Citations ===
{{Reflist}} {{Reflist}}

=== Sources ===
{{refbegin}}

* {{cite magazine |last1=Fewsmith |first1=Joseph |date=2002 |title=Generational Transition in China |url=http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/7288181 |magazine=Washington Quarterly |publisher=Elliott School of International Affairs |volume=25 |issue=4 |pages=23–35 |doi=10.1162/016366002760252518 |access-date= |via=EBOSCOhost}}
* {{cite report |last1=Kiselycznyk |first1=Michael |last2=Saunders |first2=Phillip C. |date=August 2010 |title=Civil-Military Relations in China: Assessing the PLA's Role in Elite Politics |url=https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Publications/Article/717802/civil-military-relations-in-china-assessing-the-plas-role-in-elite-politics/ |series=China Strategic Perspectives |publisher=National Defense University Press |number=2 |page= |docket= |access-date= |quote=}}
* {{cite book |last1=Li |first1=Cheng |date=2016 |title=Chinese Politics in the Xi Jinping Era: Reassessing Collective Leadership |publisher=Brooklings Institution Press |location=Washington D.C. |isbn=9780815726937 }}
* {{cite magazine |last1=Li |first1=Cheng |date=2003 |title=The Emergence of the Fifth Generation in the Provincial Leadership |url=https://www.hoover.org/research/emergence-fifth-generation-provincial-leadership |magazine=China Leadership Monitor |publisher=Hoover Institution |volume=6 |issue=6 |pages=75–90 |doi= |access-date= }}
* {{cite web |last1=Teiwes |first1=Frederick C. |date=2018-07-30 |title=Politics At the "Core": The Political Circumstances of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin |url=https://core.ac.uk/display/160609269 |publisher=Australian National University |access-date= |via=CORE }}
{{refend}}


{{DEFAULTSORT:Generations Of Chinese Leadership}} {{DEFAULTSORT:Generations Of Chinese Leadership}}
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Latest revision as of 15:15, 19 November 2024

Historical periods for the Chinese Communist Party and military officials
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Generations of Chinese leadership
Simplified Chinese中国共产党领导集体
Traditional Chinese中國共産黨領導集體
Literal meaningLeadership collectives of the Chinese Communist Party
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Hanyu PinyinZhōngguó Gòngchǎndǎng lǐngdǎo jítǐ
Politics of China
Leadership
Leadership generations
Succession of power
Party and state leaders
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Generations of Chinese leadership is a term historians use to characterize distinct periods of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and, by extension, successive changes in the ideology of the CCP. Historians have studied various periods in the development of the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) by reference to these "generations".

Origins and terminology

Shortly after the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre, Deng Xiaoping gave a speech which referred to Mao Zedong, himself, and Jiang Zemin as the respective "core" of the first, second, and third generations of leadership. This method of dividing Chinese leadership generations became popular. Political scientist Joseph Fewsmith says that this division "distorts history" as Mao and Deng belonged to the same generation, both being veterans of the Chinese Civil War, and that Jiang could be regarded as being from the second generation.

The closest equivalent to the term "leadership generation" used officially in China is "leadership collective" (for example: "first generation leadership collective"). The collective is viewed as leaders of the party (the CCP) rather than of the state (the PRC). Deng used the term "core" to legitimize Jiang's unexpected appointment to general secretary and to emphasize the collective nature of the leadership; Frederick Teiwes says that Deng's application of the concept of collective leadership to the first and second generations was historically inaccurate.

Transitions between generations and core leaders is not always clear when authority is divided across generations. When Jiang became General Secretary in 1989, Deng - through enormous prestige - continued to hold unchallenged ultimate authority. Jiang, in turn, remained chairman of the Central Military Commission after being succeeded as General Secretary by "fourth" generation" Hu Jintao. Official generational labels are not always used. The term "fourth generation of leaders" stopped being used officially in the summer of 2002 shortly before that generation assumed power. Similarly, "fifth generation of leaders" was not used officially through 2003.

The party leader (the General Secretary, and formerly Chairman) leads the collective, which typically includes the Politburo Standing Committee.

Generations of Chinese leadership
Generation Paramount Leader Start End Ideology Raised
First Mao Zedong
Hua Guofeng 		1949 1978 Mao Zedong Thought
Second Deng Xiaoping 1978 1989 Deng Xiaoping Theory
Third Jiang Zemin 1989 2002 Three Represents
Fourth Hu Jintao 2002 2012 Scientific Outlook on Development
Fifth Xi Jinping 2012 Xi Jinping Thought

First generation

Main article: History of the People's Republic of China (1949–1976)

The first generation was drawn from the veterans of the revolutionary period, where most had either worked closely with or been in the armed forces. The close relationships and shared political-military experience made it easy for civilian leaders to intervene in military matters and vice versa, so the line between civilian and military leader was blurred even as greater specialization evolved.

Mao was the paramount leader from the founding of the PRC in 1949 until his death in 1976. His rule was unfettered by collective leadership. Mao exercised undisputed power over the party-state, including unilateral authority to decide policy, law, and political appointments. Teiwes suggests that Mao's position was secured by being a revolutionary symbol; the other leaders could not oppose Mao without undermining their own self-image as revolutionaries.

Senior offices were predominantly held by Mao's associates from the Long March and other civil war veterans. These included - at various times - Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi, Chen Yun, Deng Xiaoping, Peng Dehuai, and Lin Biao.

With the demise of Liu, Mao promoted Lin Biao as his deputy, and the "Gang of Four" to fill the role of his trusted allies. Lin fell out of favour, however, and died in 1971 while attempting to escape to the Soviet Union. The Gang of Four, which consisted of Jiang Qing (Madame Mao), and three other members meteorically promoted in the late 1960s, were the only members of the first generation of leadership to remain after Mao's death in 1976. Their demise came shortly afterwards in a political coup managed by what became the second generation of leaders.

Of the other members identified above, Chen Yun was sidelined from the early 1960s, lost his party position in 1969, but survived to play an influential role in the second generation of leadership. Peng Dehuai was denounced in 1959, made a brief return to government in 1965, but was detained by Red Guards from 1966 and died in prison from torture and maltreatment in 1974. Deng Xiaoping, the core of the second generation of leadership, also played a key role in the first generation at various times, mainly as an ally of Zhou and Peng, but was purged from government in 1976 and remained sidelined at the time of Mao's death.

Second generation

Main article: History of the People's Republic of China (1976–1989)

The death of Mao, Zhou and Zhu in 1976, and soon afterwards the coup that resulted in the arrest of the Gang of Four, ushered in the era now identified as the "second generation" of leaders. The era began with Hua Guofeng as the successor to Mao, but his position was soon eclipsed by the ascendancy of Deng Xiaoping as the paramount leader, in which position he remained at least until 1989 when he resigned from his leadership positions. During this period the most power and influence was held by a group of old party veterans, known as the Eight Elders, whose main members were Li Xiannian and Chen Yun, together with Deng. All of them had more than 40 years of political experience.

Thus, in official discourse, the second generation of leadership lasted from 1976 to 1992. The official discourse of the CCP today identifies Deng Xiaoping as the "core" of this second generation, but Deng was never formally the leader of the party during this period. Instead, the formal party leaders during this time were, successively, Hua Guofeng, Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang and Jiang Zemin. Other prominent leaders of this generation were Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, Ye Jianying, Peng Zhen and Wang Zhen. These leaders were also involved in the Chinese revolution, but with the exception of Deng Xiaoping, served in more junior roles, as they were all born from 1897 to 1921 (that is, some were born after the demise of the Qing Empire in the Xinhai Revolution). Like the first generation, many were educated overseas, particularly in France. Their young formative experiences were similar to the first generation. Most had some position of authority during the Cultural Revolution, although as a rule those that held power after the 1980s were purged during that decade. This generation turned the focus from class struggle and political movements to economic development and pioneering Chinese economic reform. The dominant political ideology of the era was Deng Xiaoping Theory.

The transition towards the third generation of leadership began with the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre. The purges that followed led to the promotion of what became the third generation of leadership. Soon afterwards, Deng resigned his last major party post, as chairman of the central military committee, although he remained influential behind the scenes until his death in 1997.

Third generation

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Main article: History of the People's Republic of China (1989–2002)

Between 1989 and 1992, Jiang was believed to be simply a transitional figure to protect the party from a power vacuum (or even an Eastern Bloc style collapse) until a more stable successor government to Deng Xiaoping could be put in place. Because of this, the era of the "third generation" is not regarded to have begun until 1992, with the election of the new CCP Politburo standing committee and Jiang consolidating his power without Deng. CCP general secretary Jiang Zemin played an important role in the period between 1989 and 2002, when as Chinese president he subverted the existing constitution and turned the presidency from a symbolic role into an executive one by his power of general secretary.

Thus, the "third generation" lasted from 1992 to 2002, with Jiang Zemin as core, and other leaders including Li Peng, Zhu Rongji, Qiao Shi, Li Ruihuan, Liu Huaqing, Hu Jintao, Wei Jianxing, and Li Lanqing. These leaders were born before the revolution from 1924 to 1934 but were educated afterwards before the Sino-Soviet split. Most of them received education in the Soviet Union as engineers and entered the party initially as factory managers. As a result, many of them did not wield any significant political power prior to the 1980s, spending their time during the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath working for the civil infrastructure of the state and were protected from the purges, as opposed to their predecessors. Unlike their predecessors, there is a split between the political and military leadership. Their formative experiences included the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Korean War. This generation continued economic development while China saw the emergence of various serious social issues. The political ideological innovation officially associated with this period was Jiang's "Three Represents".

The initial members of the third generation were mostly survivors from before 1989, including Jiang Zemin, Li Peng (who continued as premier), Qiao Shi and Li Ruihuan. Notable changes to the leadership were the elevation of Zhu Rongji in place of Li Peng as premier in 1998 and the elevation of Hu Jintao as vice president. For the first time since 1982, the three centres of power of the presidency, the party general secretaryship and the chairmanship of the central military commission were concentrated in a single person, Jiang Zemin. This enabled him to declare himself the "core" of the third generation of leadership.

During this period, while Deng Xiaoping had retired from all leadership positions, he remained influential. In 1992, Deng's informal intervention ensured that market-orientated reforms were not halted by resurgent conservative elements. (See also Deng Xiaoping's southern tour) Deng also played an important role in nominating Hu Jintao as Jiang's successor as party secretary.

Fourth generation

Main article: Hu–Wen Administration

2002 saw the first orderly transition of power in the Chinese Communist Party in accordance with rules on term limits. The new leaders were elected to the Communist Party's Politburo in November 2002, and took up their governmental positions in March 2003, while the most prominent of their "third generation" predecessors stepped down at the same time. But Hu Jintao did not become the chairman of the Central Military Commission until September 2004.

The Chinese Government considers the Hu-Wen administration to be a continuation of the Third generation, and the Xi-Li administration to be the start of the Fourth generation.

Thus, the era of the "fourth generation" is officially regarded to have begun in 2002, and lasted until 2012, when the next election for the party leadership occurred. The prominent leaders included Hu Jintao (as General Secretary), Wu Bangguo, Wen Jiabao, Jia Qinglin, Zeng Qinghong, Huang Ju, Wu Guanzheng, Li Changchun, Luo Gan, Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, He Guoqiang, and Zhou Yongkang. It is also known as the "republican generation" or the Hu-Wen Administration. These were promoted to top leadership at the 16th Party Congress and remained in power until the 18th Party Congress in 2012. This generation of leaders, born mainly in the World War II years from 1939 to 1944, represented a new technocratic style governance and a less centralized political structure. The majority of this generation of leaders were engineers whose academic lives were disrupted by the Cultural Revolution and, unlike both their predecessors and likely successors, have spent very little time overseas. The dominant political ideology of this era was Hu's Scientific Development Concept and a goal for a Socialist Harmonious Society.

Fifth generation (current)

Main articles: Xi–Li Administration and Xi Jinping Administration

The fifth generation came to power at the 18th Party Congress in 2012, when Hu Jintao stepped down as CCP General Secretary and CMC Chairman. In the fifth generation, one sees fewer engineers and more management and finance majors, including successful entrepreneurs. Most of the fifth generation of civilian leadership, born in the postwar years 1945 to 1955, were educated at top Chinese universities. Former leader Hu Jintao's Communist Youth League faction, and the Crown Prince Party (or "Princelings") are seen to be the two dominant factions within the leadership.

Following his elevation to General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, which oversees the Chinese Communist Party and the People's Liberation Army, the Princeling and current CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping succeeded Hu Jintao as the paramount leader of this generation. Premier Li Keqiang took the place of former Premier Wen Jiabao and served until 2023. Others who have been top figures in the 5th generation include former Congress Chairmen Zhang Dejiang and Li Zhanshu, Conference Chairmen Yu Zhengsheng and Wang Yang, Secretariat First Secretaries Liu Yunshan and Wang Huning, former vice president and Discipline Secretary Wang Qishan, former Discipline Secretary and current Congress Chairman Zhao Leji, first Vice Premiers Zhang Gaoli and current Vice President Han Zheng, former Vice President Li Yuanchao, and its leading females, former Vice Premiers Liu Yandong and Sun Chunlan.

After the 20th National Congress in 2022, the prominent leaders included Xi Jinping, Li Qiang, Zhao Leji, Wang Huning, Cai Qi, and Li Xi.

Possible sixth generation

The sixth generation of leaders had been expected to come to power at the 20th Party Congress in 2022. However, following Xi Jinping's consolidation of power at the 19th Party Congress, the future of the "sixth generation" was cast into doubt as clear successor figures failed to be named to senior leadership posts, particularly the Politburo Standing Committee. Xi Jinping was re-elected as the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2022.

In preceding years, Hu Chunhua (a Vice-Premier from 2018 to 2023) was seen as a possible core figure. Hu and Sun Zhengcai were the only Politburo members named at the 18th Party Congress in 2012 who were born after 1960, making their further advancement seem like a certainty, but Sun was purged before the 19th Party Congress and Hu was dropped from the Politburo at the 20th. U.S.-based newspaper Duo Wei Times also listed four figures who have since fallen from grace, former Fujian Governor Su Shulin, former President of the Supreme People's Court Zhou Qiang, former Heilongjiang Party Secretary Zhang Qingwei, and former Minister of Natural Resources Lu Hao, as other potential figures in this generation of leadership. Others in this rough age group ascending in the ranks include Zhang Guoqing (now a Vice-Premier) and Chen Min'er (party secretary of Chongqing and then Tianjin).

Ding Xuexiang is the only person from this age bracket to have reached the Standing Committee, but the 20th Politburo includes eight other members born between 1960 and 1964.

Possible seventh generation

Born in the 1970s (or in the late 1960s if loosely defined), the seventh generation of leaders includes Yin Yong, Mayor of Beijing; Zhong Shaojun, Director of the General Office of the Central Military Commission; Zhuge Yujie, Deputy Party Secretary of Hubei; Liu Hongjian [zh], Party Secretary of Kunming, the provincial capital of Yunnan; and Guo Ningning, Party Secretary of Fuzhou, the provincial capital of Fujian and Executive Vice Governor of Fujian.

No leader born in the 1970s has served as a full member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. As of mid-2023, most leaders born in the 1970s served in positions at the deputy provincial-ministerial level. Only two were full provincial-ministerial leaders: Li Yunze, Director of the National Administration of Financial Regulation, and A Dong [zh], First Secretary of the Communist Youth League of China.

Timeline

Simplified Chinese graphic timeline of CCP leadership to 2012. The red bar indicates CCP General Secretaries, the yellow indicating the Premiers. The gray bar delineates particular periods of mainland Chinese history from a CCP perspective.

See also

References

Citations

  1. Whitson, William W.; Huang, Chên-hsia (1973). The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927-71. Praeger. ISBN 9780333150535. OCLC 695214130.
  2. Fewsmith 2002, p. 35.
  3. See, e.g. Liao (廖), Xinwen (心文) (2012-02-07). "Formation of the First Generation Central Leadership Collective - and also on how Mao Zedong's core status was determined (第一代中央领导集体形成——兼谈毛泽东核心地位怎样确立)". People's Daily. Archived from the original on 13 February 2012. Retrieved 12 March 2012.
  4. Teiwes 2018, p. 2.
  5. Teiwes 2018, p. 3.
  6. Fewsmith 2002, p. 28.
  7. Watts, Jonathan (2004-09-20). "Jiang quits in peaceful transition of power". The Guardian. Retrieved 2024-02-18.
  8. Li 2003, p. 76.
  9. Kiselycznyk & Saunders 2010, pp. 5–6.
  10. ^ Li 2016, Chapter 1, section "Absence of Legendary Revolution or War Experience".
  11. Li 2016, Chapter 5, section "The Chinese Communist Party's Changing View of and Ambivalent Stance toward Legal Development".
  12. Teiwes 2018, p. 9.
  13. Teiwes 2018, pp. 9–10.
  14. Brandt, Loren; Rawski, Thomas G., eds. (2008-04-14). China's Great Economic Transformation (1 ed.). Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511754234. ISBN 978-0-521-88557-7.
  15. Jinping, Xi (2014). The Governance of China. Foreign Languages Press Co. Ltd. p. 8. ISBN 978-7-119-11394-4.
  16. "China's 5th generation comes of age". CNN. January 1, 2003. Retrieved 2023-06-12.
  17. Arpi, Claude (October 18, 2010). "Why Beijing seethes over the Nobel for Liu" Archived 2016-04-12 at the Wayback Machine, Sify
  18. Demick, Barbara (19 October 2010). "Xi Jinping on track to become China's next president". Los Angeles Times. Archived from the original on 27 October 2010. Retrieved 19 October 2010.
  19. Chen, Feng (2011-03-23). "中国政坛"第六代新星"开始崭露头角". Duowei News (in Chinese). Archived from the original on 2011-08-22. Retrieved 2011-03-23.
  20. Zhai, Keith; Wong, Chun Han (23 October 2022). "Who's Next? A Look at the Chinese Communist Party's Rising Political Stars". The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 9 June 2023.
  21. "China Names Li Top Financial Regulator in Surprise Move". Bloomberg News. 10 May 2023. Retrieved 9 June 2023.
  22. Cai, Jane; Zheng, William (6 June 2023). "China's Communist Youth League gets new leader, aged 52, but role is 'no longer fast track to the top'". South China Morning Post. Retrieved 9 June 2023.

Sources

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