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{{Short description|Concept in Stoic philosophy}}
'''Kathēkon''' ({{lang-el|καθῆκον}}) (plural: ''kathēkonta'' {{lang-el|καθήκοντα}}) is a ] concept, forged by the founder of ], ]. It may be translated as "appropriate behaviour", "befitting actions", or "convenient action for nature",<ref name=Poliseno>, interview of A. Poliseno, "Stoicism in Ancient Rome",</ref> or also "proper function".<ref> {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070729001344/http://pressurecooker.phil.cmu.edu/80-130/Packet/80-130-Packet-Part-I-Section-2.doc |date=2007-07-29 }}</ref> ''Kathekon'' has been translated in Latin by ] as '']'', and by ] as ''convenentia''.<ref>, extract on ]</ref> ''Kathēkonta'' are contrasted, in ], with '']'' (κατόρθωμα; plural: ''katorthōmata''), roughly "perfect action". According to Stoic philosophy, man (and all living beings) must act in accordance with Nature, which is the primary sense of ''kathēkon''. '''Kathēkon''' ({{langx|el|καθῆκον}}) (plural: ''kathēkonta'' {{langx|el|καθήκοντα}}) is a ] concept, forged by the founder of ], ]. It may be translated as "appropriate behaviour", "befitting actions", or "convenient action for nature",<ref name=Poliseno>, interview of A. Poliseno, "Stoicism in Ancient Rome",</ref> or also "proper function".<ref> {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070729001344/http://pressurecooker.phil.cmu.edu/80-130/Packet/80-130-Packet-Part-I-Section-2.doc |date=2007-07-29 }}</ref> ''Kathekon'' was translated in Latin by ] as '']'', and by ] as ''convenentia''.<ref>, extract on ]</ref> ''Kathēkonta'' are contrasted, in Stoic ethics, with ''katorthōma'' (κατόρθωμα; plural: ''katorthōmata''), roughly "perfect action"


== In Stoicism ==
== Kathēkonta and katorthōmata ==
According to Stoic philosophy, each being, whether animate or inanimate (plant, animal or human), carries on fitting actions corresponding to its own nature, which is the primary sense of ''kathēkon''. The morality of the act resides not in the act itself, but the way in which it is realized.<ref>], in Long, A. A.; Sedley, D. N. (1987). ''The Hellenistic Philosophers: vol. 1. translations of the principal sources with philosophical commentary'', 59B. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press (SVF III, 494)</ref>


=== Perfect actions ===
According to Stoic philosophy, each being, whether animate or inanimate (plant, animal or human being), carries on fitting actions corresponding to its own nature. They distinguished between "kathēkonta" and "katorthōmata," a perfect action derived from the "orthos ]" (reason) (also "''teleion kathēkon''": a perfect, achieved ''kathēkon''<ref>], in Long, A. A., Sedley, D. N. (1987). ''The Hellenistic Philosophers: vol. 1. translations of the principal sources with philosophical commentary'', 59B. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press (SVF III, 494)</ref>). They said that the wise man necessarily carried out ''katorthōmata'', that is, virtuous ''kathēkon'', and that what distinguished both was not the nature of the act, but the way it was done. Thus, in exceptional circumstances, a wise man (which state of being, in Stoic philosophy, is nearly impossible to achieve) could carry out a katorthōma which, according to ordinary standards, would be deemed monstruous (for example, having sexual intercourse with one's daughter, if the destiny of humanity is at stake, or mutilating oneself<ref>], '']'', VII, 108-109 (SVF III, 495, 496; transl. in Long, A. A., Sedley, D. N. (1987), 59E)</ref>).
While the acts of a layperson are always misguided (ἁμαρτήματα ''hamartēmata'' <ref name="Poliseno" /> "mistakes," or ''peccata''), the acts of the sage are always ''katorthōmata'', perfect actions, because the sage acts in view of the good, while the ordinary being (layperson, animal or plant) acts only in view of its survival. Such a ''katorthōmata'' is done in harmony with all virtues, which the Stoics believed were intertwined,<ref>], ''On Stoic Self-Contradictions'', in '']'', 1046 E–F (SVF III, 299, 243 – see Long & Sedley, 1987, 61F)</ref> while the layperson may only act in accordance with one virtue, but not all of them. Stoics believe that all virtues are intertwined and that the perfect act encompasses all of them. Stoics often referred to these ''katorthōmata'' as ''kathēkonta'' which "possessed all the numbers" (''pantas apechon tous arithmous''),<ref> Keimpe Algra, Jonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld, Malcolm Schofield, ''The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy''. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. pp. xix + 916. {{ISBN|0521250285}}.</ref> a metaphor for perfection referring to all of the virtues being in harmony.<ref>Long & Sedley, 1987, 59K</ref> The sage also ''necessarily'' carries out ''katorthōmata'':<ref>Cicero wrote: "''quod autem ratione est, id officium appellamus; est igitur officium eius generis, quod nec in bonis ponatur nec in contrariis'', in '']'', III, 58.{{clarify|date=January 2023}}</ref> in exceptional circumstances, a sage could carry out a katorthōma which, according to ordinary standards, would be deemed monstruous, such as mutilating oneself.<ref>], '']'', VII, 108–109 (SVF III, 495, 496; transl. in Long, A. A.; Sedley, D. N. (1987), 59E)</ref>


⚫ === Indifferent actions ===
] is complex, and has various hierarchical levels. On the first, lay-man level, one must carry out the action corresponding to his own nature. But, according to the Stoic strict moral ideas, the acts of laymen are always insane (ἁμαρτήματα ''hamartēmata'' <ref name=Poliseno>, interview of A. Poliseno, "Stoicism in Ancient Rome"</ref> "mistakes," or ''peccata''), while the acts of the rare wise-man are always ''katorthōmata'', perfect actions. The wise man acts in view of the good, while the ordinary being (layman, animal or plant) acts only in view of its survival. However, both act according to their own nature.
{{main|adiaphora}}

⚫ Stoic philosophers distinguished another, intermediary level between ''kathēkonta'' and ''katorthōmata'': ''mesa kathēkonta'', or indifferent actions (which are neither appropriate, nor good). A list of ''kathēkonta'' would include: to stay in good health, to respect one's parents, etc. ''Para to kathēkon'', or actions contrary to befitting actions, would be the reverse of this type of actions (to insult one's parents, etc.) Intermediary actions refers to "indifferent things" (ἀδιάφορα – '']''), which are in themselves neither good nor bad, but may be used in a convenient way or not. Such "indifferent things" include wealth, health, etc. These are not excluded from the domain of morality as one might expect: Cicero thus underlined, in '']'' (About the Ends of Goods and Evils, III, 58–59), that when the wise person acts in the sphere of "indifferent things," he still acts conveniently, according to his own nature.
⚫ == Indifferent things ==

⚫ Stoic philosophers distinguished another, intermediary level between ''kathēkonta'' and ''katorthōmata'': ''mesa kathēkonta'', or indifferent actions (which are neither appropriate, nor good). A list of ''kathēkonta'' would include: to stay in good health, to respect one's parents, etc. ''Para to kathēkon'', or actions contrary to befitting actions, would be the reverse of this type of actions (to insult one's parents, etc.) Intermediary actions refers to "indifferent things" (ἀδιάφορα &mdash; '']''), which are in themselves neither good nor bad, but may be used in a convenient way or not. Such "indifferent things" include wealth, health, etc. These are not excluded from the domain of morality as one might expect: Cicero thus underlined, in '']'' (About the Ends of Goods and Evils, III, 58-59), that when the wise man acts in the sphere of "indifferent things," he still acts conveniently, according to his own nature.

== Intentionality and perfection ==

] is crucial in Stoic ethics: the morality of the act resides not in the act itself, but in the intentionality and the way in which it is realized, in other words, in the moral agent itself. ] defined ''kathēkonta'' as probable actions (''probabilis ratio'' in Latin), or everything done for one reason (''eulogos apologia'' in Greek). Cicero wrote: "''quod autem ratione est, id officium appellamus; est igitur officium eius generis, quod nec in bonis ponatur nec in contrariis'', in '']'', III, 58.

Another distinction between ''kathēkon'' and ''katorthōmata'' has been to say that ''katorthōmata'' were ''kathēkonta'' which "possessed all the numbers" (''pantas apechon tous arithmous''),<ref> Keimpe Algra, Jonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld, Malcolm Schofield, ''The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy''. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. xix + 916. {{ISBN|0-521-25028-5}}.</ref> a Stoic expression meaning perfection.<ref>According to Long & Sedley, the origin of this image of containing all numbers should be researched in musical ], Long & Sedley, 1987, 59K</ref> Such a ''katorthōmata'' is done in harmony with all virtues, while the lay-man may only act in accordance with one virtue, but not all of them. Stoics believe that all virtues are intertwined and that the perfect act encompasses all of them.<ref>], ''On Stoic Self-Contradictions'', in '']'', 1046 E-F (SVF III, 299, 243 - see Long & Sedley, 1987, 61F)</ref>


== References == == References ==
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== Bibliography == == Bibliography ==
*Long, A. A., Sedley, D. N. (1987).'' The Hellenistic Philosophers: vol. 1. translations of the principal sources with philosophical commentary'' * Long, A. A.; Sedley, D. N. (1987).'' The Hellenistic Philosophers: vol. 1. translations of the principal sources with philosophical commentary''


{{Stoicism}} {{Stoicism}}


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Latest revision as of 06:52, 23 October 2024

Concept in Stoic philosophy

Kathēkon (Greek: καθῆκον) (plural: kathēkonta Greek: καθήκοντα) is a Greek concept, forged by the founder of Stoicism, Zeno of Citium. It may be translated as "appropriate behaviour", "befitting actions", or "convenient action for nature", or also "proper function". Kathekon was translated in Latin by Cicero as officium, and by Seneca as convenentia. Kathēkonta are contrasted, in Stoic ethics, with katorthōma (κατόρθωμα; plural: katorthōmata), roughly "perfect action"

In Stoicism

According to Stoic philosophy, each being, whether animate or inanimate (plant, animal or human), carries on fitting actions corresponding to its own nature, which is the primary sense of kathēkon. The morality of the act resides not in the act itself, but the way in which it is realized.

Perfect actions

While the acts of a layperson are always misguided (ἁμαρτήματα hamartēmata "mistakes," or peccata), the acts of the sage are always katorthōmata, perfect actions, because the sage acts in view of the good, while the ordinary being (layperson, animal or plant) acts only in view of its survival. Such a katorthōmata is done in harmony with all virtues, which the Stoics believed were intertwined, while the layperson may only act in accordance with one virtue, but not all of them. Stoics believe that all virtues are intertwined and that the perfect act encompasses all of them. Stoics often referred to these katorthōmata as kathēkonta which "possessed all the numbers" (pantas apechon tous arithmous), a metaphor for perfection referring to all of the virtues being in harmony. The sage also necessarily carries out katorthōmata: in exceptional circumstances, a sage could carry out a katorthōma which, according to ordinary standards, would be deemed monstruous, such as mutilating oneself.

Indifferent actions

Main article: adiaphora

Stoic philosophers distinguished another, intermediary level between kathēkonta and katorthōmata: mesa kathēkonta, or indifferent actions (which are neither appropriate, nor good). A list of kathēkonta would include: to stay in good health, to respect one's parents, etc. Para to kathēkon, or actions contrary to befitting actions, would be the reverse of this type of actions (to insult one's parents, etc.) Intermediary actions refers to "indifferent things" (ἀδιάφορα – adiaphora), which are in themselves neither good nor bad, but may be used in a convenient way or not. Such "indifferent things" include wealth, health, etc. These are not excluded from the domain of morality as one might expect: Cicero thus underlined, in De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum (About the Ends of Goods and Evils, III, 58–59), that when the wise person acts in the sphere of "indifferent things," he still acts conveniently, according to his own nature.

References

  1. ^ Nova Roma, interview of A. Poliseno, "Stoicism in Ancient Rome",
  2. Section 2: Hellenistic and Roman Ethics Archived 2007-07-29 at the Wayback Machine
  3. Two Concepts of Morality: A Distinction of Adam Smith's Ethics and its Stoic Origin, extract on Jstor
  4. Stobaeus, in Long, A. A.; Sedley, D. N. (1987). The Hellenistic Philosophers: vol. 1. translations of the principal sources with philosophical commentary, 59B. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press (SVF III, 494)
  5. Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, in Moralia, 1046 E–F (SVF III, 299, 243 – see Long & Sedley, 1987, 61F)
  6. Review of Keimpe Algra, Jonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld, Malcolm Schofield, The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. pp. xix + 916. ISBN 0521250285.
  7. Long & Sedley, 1987, 59K
  8. Cicero wrote: "quod autem ratione est, id officium appellamus; est igitur officium eius generis, quod nec in bonis ponatur nec in contrariis, in De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, III, 58.
  9. Diogenes Laërtius, Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, VII, 108–109 (SVF III, 495, 496; transl. in Long, A. A.; Sedley, D. N. (1987), 59E)

Bibliography

  • Long, A. A.; Sedley, D. N. (1987). The Hellenistic Philosophers: vol. 1. translations of the principal sources with philosophical commentary
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