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{{Short description|Period of sociopolitical turmoil in China (1966–1976)}}
{{pp-semi-indef}}
{{about|the movement in China|events elsewhere also called the "Cultural Revolution"|Cultural Revolution (disambiguation)|revolutions in culture generally|List of cultural, intellectual, philosophical and technological revolutions}}
{{pp-move-indef|small=yes}}
{{pp-move|small=yes}}
{{short description|Maoist sociopolitical movement intended to strengthen Chinese Communism}}
{{Use mdy dates|date=January 2013}} {{Use dmy dates|date=July 2021}}
{{Very long|words=16,483|date=October 2024}}
{{Infobox Chinese
{{Infobox event
|pic=Cultural Revolution poster.jpg
| duration = {{start and end dates|1966|5|16|1976|10|6|df=y}} ({{Age in years and days|16 May 1966|6 October 1976|sep=and}})
|piccap=Cultural Revolution propaganda poster. It depicts ], above a group of soldiers from the ]. The caption reads, "The Chinese People's Liberation Army is the great school of ]."
| location = ]
|picsize=250px
| deaths = Estimates vary from hundreds of thousands to millions (see {{Section link|#Death toll}})
|c={{linktext|lang=zh|文化大革命}}
| organizers = ]
|l="Great Cultural Revolution"
| injuries =
|p=Wénhuà dàgémìng
| image = Cultural Revolution poster.jpg
|w=Wen<sup>2</sup>-hua<sup>4</sup> ta<sup>4</sup>-ko<sup>2</sup>-ming<sup>4</sup>
| caption = Propaganda poster depicting ], above a group of soldiers from the ]. The caption reads, "The Chinese People's Liberation Army is the great school of ]".
|mi={{IPAc-cmn|wen|2|h|ua|4|-|d|a|4|g|e|2|m|ing|4}}
| title = Cultural Revolution
|gr=Wenhuah dahgerminq
| image_size = 250px
|wuu=Ven<sup>平</sup>ho<sup>去</sup> du<sup>去</sup> keh<sup>入</sup>min<sup>去</sup>
| cause =
|j=Man<sup>4</sup>-faa<sup>3</sup> daai<sup>6</sup>-gaak<sup>3</sup>-ming<sup>6</sup>
| result = Economic activity impaired, historical and cultural material destroyed.
|y=Màhn-faa daaih-gaak-mihng
| motive = Preservation of communism by purging capitalist and traditional elements, and power struggle between Maoists and pragmatists.
|poj=Bûn-hoà tāi-kek-bēng
| property damage = ], ], ]
|altname=Formal name
| arrests = ], ], ], and ]
|s2={{nowrap|{{linktext|无产阶级}}文化大革命}}
| reported injuries =
|t2=無產階級文化大革命
}}{{Infobox Chinese
|l2="Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution"
| picsize = 250px
|p2=Wúchǎnjiējí wénhuà dàgémìng
| c = {{linktext|lang=zh|文化大革命}}
|j2=Mou<sup>4</sup>-caan<sup>2</sup> gaai<sup>1</sup>-kap<sup>1</sup> man<sup>4</sup>-faa<sup>3</sup> daai<sup>6</sup> gaak<sup>3</sup>-ming<sup>6</sup>
| l = "Great Cultural Revolution"
|wuu2=Vu<sup>平</sup>tshae<sup>上</sup>cia<sup>平</sup>cih<sup>入</sup> ven<sup>平</sup>ho<sup>去</sup> du<sup>去</sup> keh<sup>入</sup>min<sup>去</sup>
| p = Wénhuà dàgémìng
|poj2=Bô-sán-kai-kip bûn-huà tuā kik-miā
| bpmf = ㄨㄣˊ ㄏㄨㄚˋ ㄉㄚˋ ㄍㄜˊ ㄇㄧㄥˋ
|order=st}}
| w = {{tone superscript|Wen2-hua4 ta4-ko2-ming4}}
| mi = {{IPAc-cmn|wen|2|.|h|ua|4|-|d|a|4|.|g|e|2|.|m|ing|4}}
| gr = Wenhuah dahgerminq
| wuu = Ven<sup>平</sup>ho<sup>去</sup> du<sup>去</sup> keh<sup>入</sup>min<sup>去</sup>
| j = man4 faa3 daai6 gaak3 ming6
| y = Màhn-faa daaih-gaak-mihng
| poj = Bûn-hoà tāi-kek-bēng
| buc = Ùng-huá dâi gáik-mêng
| phfs = Vùn-fa thai-kiet-min
| altname = Formal name
| s2 = {{nowrap|无产阶级文化大革命}}
| t2 = 無產階級文化大革命
| l2 = "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution"
| p2 = Wúchǎnjiējí wénhuà dàgémìng
| bpmf2 = ㄨˊ ㄔㄢˇ ㄐㄧㄝ ㄐㄧˊ ㄨㄣˊ ㄏㄨㄚˋ ㄉㄚˋ ㄍㄜˊ ㄇㄧㄥˋ
| w2 = {{tone superscript|Wu2-ch}}{{wg-apos}}{{tone superscript|an2-chieh1-chi2 wen2-hua4 ta4-ko2-ming4}}
| mi2 = {{IPAc-cmn|wu|2|.|ch|an|3|.|j|ie|1|.|j|i|2|-|wen|2|.|h|ua|4|-|d|a|4|.|g|e|2|.|m|ing|4}}
| j2 = mou4 caan2 gaai1 kap1 man4 faa3 daai6 gaak3 ming6
| wuu2 = Vu<sup>平</sup>tshae<sup>上</sup>cia<sup>平</sup>cih<sup>入</sup> ven<sup>平</sup>ho<sup>去</sup> du<sup>去</sup> keh<sup>入</sup>min<sup>去</sup>
| poj2 = Bû-sán-kai-kip bûn-hòa tōa kek-bēng
| buc2 = Ù-sāng-găi-ngék ùng-huá dâi gáik-mêng
| phfs2 = Vû-sán-kiê-kip vùn-fa thai-kiet-min
| order = st
| t =
| s =
| ci = {{IPAc-yue|m|an|4|-|f|aa|3|-|d|aai|6|-|g|aak|3|-|m|ing|6}}
| tp = Wún-huà dà-gé-mìng
| tp2 = Wú-chǎn-jie-jí wún-huà dà-gé-mìng
| ci2 = {{IPAc-yue|m|ou|4|-|c|aan|2|-|g|aai|1|-|k|ap|1|-|m|an|4|-|f|aa|3|-|d|aai|6|-|g|aak|3|-|m|ing|6}}
}}
{{History of the People's Republic of China}} {{History of the People's Republic of China}}
{{Revolution sidebar}} {{Revolution sidebar}}
The '''Cultural Revolution''', formally the '''Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution''', was a sociopolitical ] in ] from 1966 until 1976. Launched by ], ] (]), its stated goal was to preserve ] by ] remnants of ] and ] elements from ], and to re-impose Mao Zedong Thought (known outside China as '']'') as the ] in the CPC. The Revolution marked Mao's return to the central position of power in China after a period of ] to recover from the failures of the ], which led to approximately 30&nbsp;million deaths in the ] only five years prior. The '''Cultural Revolution''', formally known as the '''Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution''', was a ] in the ] (PRC). It was launched by ] in 1966 and lasted until ] in 1976. Its stated goal was to preserve ] by purging remnants of ] and traditional elements from ]. Though it failed to achieve its main objectives, the Cultural Revolution marked the effective return of Mao to the center of power in China after ], in the aftermath of the ] and the ].


Launching the movement in May 1966 with the help of the ], Mao soon called on young people to "]", and proclaimed that "to rebel is justified". In order to eliminate his rivals within the CPC and in schools, factories, and government institutions, Mao charged that ] elements had infiltrated the government and society with the aim of restoring capitalism. He insisted that ] be removed through violent ], to which China's youth, as well as urban workers, responded by forming ] and "]" around the country. They would begin to hold ] regularly, and ] from local governments and CPC branches, eventually establishing the ] in 1967. The groups often split into rival factions, however, becoming involved in ']' ({{Lang-zh|t=武鬥|s=武斗|p=wǔdòu}}), to which the ] had to be sent to restore order. In May 1966, with the help of the ], Mao launched the Revolution and said that ] had infiltrated the government and society with the aim of restoring capitalism. Mao called on young people to ], and proclaimed that "to rebel is justified". Mass upheaval began in ] with ] in 1966. Many young people, mainly students, responded by forming ] of ] throughout the country. A selection of Mao's sayings were compiled into the ], which became revered within ]. In 1967, emboldened radicals began ] from local governments and party branches, establishing new ] in their place. These committees often split into rival factions, precipitating ]. After the ] in 1971, the ] became influential in 1972, and the Revolution continued until Mao's death in 1976, soon followed by the arrest of the Gang of Four.


The Cultural Revolution was characterized by violence and chaos across Chinese society, including ] that included acts of ], as well as massacres in Beijing, ], ], ], and ].<ref name="Song-2011a" /> Estimates of the death toll vary widely, typically ranging from 1–2 million. Red Guards sought to destroy the ] (old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits), which often took the form of destroying historical artifacts, cultural and religious sites, and targeting others deemed to be representative of the Four Olds. Tens of millions were persecuted, including senior officials: most notably, president ], as well as ], ], and ]. Millions were persecuted for being members of the ]. Intellectuals and scientists were considered to be the ], and many were persecuted. The country's schools and universities were closed, and the ] were cancelled. Over 10&nbsp;million ] were relocated under the ] policy.
Having compiled a selection of Mao's sayings into the ], which became a sacred text for ], ], ], was written into the ] as Mao's successor. In 1969, Mao suggested the end of the Cultural Revolution. However, the Revolution's active phase would last until at least 1971, when Lin Biao, accused of a ], fled and ]. In 1972, the ] rose to power and the Cultural Revolution continued. After ] and the arrest of the Gang of Four in 1976, the Cultural Revolution finally came to an end.


In December 1978, Deng Xiaoping became the new ], replacing Mao's successor ]. Deng and his allies introduced the '']'' program and initiated ], which, together with the ], gradually dismantled the ideology of Cultural Revolution. In 1981, the Communist Party publicly acknowledged numerous failures of the Cultural Revolution, declaring it "responsible for the most severe setback and the heaviest losses suffered by the people, the country, and the party since the founding of the People's Republic." Given its broad scope and social impact, memories and perspectives of the Cultural Revolution are varied and complex in contemporary China. It is often referred to as the "ten years of chaos" ({{zhi|c=十年动乱|p=shí nián dòngluàn}}) or "ten years of havoc" ({{zhi|c=十年浩劫|p=shí nián hàojié}}).<ref>{{Cite web |title=Translation Glossary for the CR/10 Project |url=https://culturalrevolution.pitt.edu/media/cr10-glossary.pdf |access-date=November 28, 2023 |website=]}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Lu |first=Xing |title=Rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Impact on Chinese Thought |year=2004 |page=2 |quote=Known to the Chinese as the ten years of chaos }}</ref>
The Cultural Revolution damaged ] and ], with an estimated death toll ranging from hundreds of thousands to 20&nbsp;million.<ref name=":1">{{cite journal |last1=Pye|first1=Lucian W.|date=1986|title=Reassessing the Cultural Revolution|journal=The China Quarterly |volume=108|issue=108|pages=597–612|issn=0305-7410|jstor=653530|doi=10.1017/S0305741000037085}}</ref><ref name=":2">{{cite web|url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1017272/remembering-dark-days-chinas-cultural-revolution|title=Remembering the dark days of China's Cultural Revolution |last= |first= |date=2012-08-18 |website=South China Morning Post |url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180609084717/http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1017272/remembering-dark-days-chinas-cultural-revolution|archive-date=June 9, 2018|access-date=2019-11-29}}</ref><ref name=":3">{{cite news |last1=Strauss |first1=Valerie |last2=Southerl |first2=Daniel |date=1994-07-17|title=HOW MANY DIED? NEW EVIDENCE SUGGESTS FAR HIGHER NUMBERS FOR THE VICTIMS OF MAO ZEDONG'S ERA |work=]|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/07/17/how-many-died-new-evidence-suggests-far-higher-numbers-for-the-victims-of-mao-zedongs-era/01044df5-03dd-49f4-a453-a033c5287bce/|url-status=live|access-date=2019-05-09|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190509114452/https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/07/17/how-many-died-new-evidence-suggests-far-higher-numbers-for-the-victims-of-mao-zedongs-era/01044df5-03dd-49f4-a453-a033c5287bce/?utm_term=.e069483359f6|archive-date=2019-05-09 |issn=0190-8286}}</ref><ref name=":4">{{cite web|url=https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2016/12/14/china-the-cultural-revolution/|title=China: the Cultural Revolution {{!}} Mass Atrocity Endings |last1=Foundation |first1=World Peace |access-date=2019-11-29|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191128203527/https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2016/12/14/china-the-cultural-revolution/|archive-date=November 28, 2019|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=":0">{{cite encyclopedia|title=A Brief Overview of China's Cultural Revolution |url=https://www.britannica.com/story/chinas-cultural-revolution|encyclopedia=Encyclopedia Britannica |accessdate=12 June 2019 |date= |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20190706210051/https://www.britannica.com/story/chinas-cultural-revolution|archivedate=July 6, 2019|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=":5">{{cite web |url=http://necrometrics.com/20c5m.htm#Mao |title=Source List and Detailed Death Tolls for the Primary Megadeaths of the Twentieth Century|work=Necrometrics|url-status=live|archive-url=https://www.webcitation.org/69erJ2JTC?url=http://necrometrics.com/20c5m.htm#Mao|archive-date=August 4, 2012|access-date=November 9, 2014}}</ref> Beginning with the ] of ], ]s took place across China, including the ], in which massive ] also occurred;<ref>{{cite news |last1=Kristof |first1=Nicholas D. |date=1993-01-06 |title=A Tale of Red Guards and Cannibals |work=] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1993/01/06/world/a-tale-of-red-guards-and-cannibals.html |access-date=2020-01-22 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|last1=Yan|first1=Lebin|date=|title=我参与处理广西文革遗留问题|url=http://www.yhcqw.com/34/8938.html |url-status=live |archive-url= |archive-date= |access-date=2020-01-22 |website=炎黄春秋 |language=zh}}</ref> the ]; the ]; the ];<!--Intentional link to DAB page--> and the ]<!--Intentional link to DAB page-->. Red Guards destroyed ], as well as ] cultural and religious sites. The ], one of the world's greatest technological catastrophes, also occurred during the Cultural Revolution. Meanwhile, tens of millions of people were ]: senior officials, most notably Chinese president ], along with ], ], and ], were purged or ]; millions were accused of being members of the ], suffering ], imprisonment, torture, hard labor, seizure of property, and sometimes execution or harassment into suicide; ] were considered the "]" and were widely persecuted—notable scholars and scientists such as ], ], ], and ] were killed or committed suicide. ] were closed with the ] cancelled. Over 10&nbsp;million ] were sent to the ] in the ].


== Etymology ==
In 1978, Deng Xiaoping became the new ] and started the "]" program which gradually dismantled the Maoist policies associated with the Cultural Revolution, and brought the country back to order. Deng then began a new phase of China by initiating the historic ] program. In 1981, the Communist Party of China declared that the Cultural Revolution was "responsible for the most severe setback and the heaviest losses suffered by the Party, the country, and the people since the founding of the People's Republic."<ref name=":18">{{Cite web|last=|first=|date=|title=关于建国以来党的若干历史问题的决议|url=http://www.gov.cn/test/2008-06/23/content_1024934_2.htm|url-status=live|archive-url=|archive-date=|access-date=2020-04-23|website=The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China|language=zh}}</ref><ref name=":10">Sixth ] of the ]. June 27, 1981. "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China." ''Resolution on CPC History (1949–81)''. Beijing: ]. p. 32.</ref>
The terminology of cultural revolution appeared in communist party discourses and newspapers prior to the founding of the People's Republic of China. During this period, the term was used interchangeably with "cultural construction" and referred to eliminating illiteracy in order to widen public participation in civic matters. This usage of "cultural revolution" continued through the 1950s and into the 1960s, and often involved drawing parallels to the ] or the ] of 1928–1931.<ref name="Thornton2019" />{{rp|56}}


==Background== ==Background==

===Creation of the People's Republic===
{{Main|Proclamation of the People's Republic of China}}

On 1 October 1949, Mao Zedong declared the People's Republic of China, symbolically bringing the decades-long ] to a close. Remaining ] forces fled to ], and continued to resist the People's Republic in various ways. Many soldiers of the Chinese Republicans were left in mainland China, and Mao Zedong launched the ] to eliminate these soldiers left behind, as well as elements of Chinese society viewed as potentially dangerous to Mao's new government. This was one of the earliest examples of mass arrests, detainments, and killings across all of China that would later be mirrored in the Cultural Revolution.

===Great Leap Forward=== ===Great Leap Forward===
{{Main|Great Leap Forward}} {{Main|Great Leap Forward}}
{{See also|Seven Thousand Cadres Conference}}
In 1958, after China's first ], Mao called for "] ]" in order to accelerate his plans for turning China into a modern ]. In this spirit, Mao launched the Great Leap Forward, established ]s in the countryside, and began the ] of the people into ]. Many communities were assigned production of a single commodity—]. Mao vowed to increase agricultural production to twice that of 1957 levels.<ref name="Tang"/>
]]]
The Great Leap was an economic failure. Many uneducated farmers were pulled from farming and harvesting and instead instructed to produce steel on a massive scale, partially relying on ]s to achieve the production targets set by local cadres. The steel produced was of low quality and mostly useless. The Great Leap reduced harvest sizes and led to a decline in the production of most goods except substandard ] and steel. Furthermore, local authorities frequently exaggerated production numbers, hiding and intensifying the problem for several years.<ref name="umd">{{cite web|last1=Worden|first1=Robert|title=A Country Study:China|url=http://www-chaos.umd.edu/history/prc2.html|publisher=Library of Congress|year=1987|accessdate=|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120716180625/http://www-chaos.umd.edu/history/prc2.html|archive-date=July 16, 2012|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=jin1>{{cite book|last1=Jin|first1=Qiu|title=The Culture of Power: Lin Biao and the Cultural Revolution|year=1999|publisher=Stanford University Press|location=Stanford, California|pages=25–30}}</ref> In the meantime, chaos in the collectives, bad weather, and exports of food necessary to secure hard currency resulted in the ]. Food was in desperate shortage, and production fell dramatically. The famine caused the deaths of more than 30&nbsp;million people, particularly in the more impoverished inland regions.<ref name="White">{{cite web|url=http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat1.htm#Mao|title=Historical Atlas of the 20th century|publisher=|access-date=October 23, 2004|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110301071401/http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat1.htm#Mao|archive-date=March 1, 2011|url-status=live}}</ref>


The Great Leap Forward, similar to the ], was Mao Zedong's proposal to make the newly created People's Republic of China an industrial superpower. Beginning in 1958, the Great Leap Forward did produce, at least on the surface, incredible industrialization, but also caused some of the worst famines in modern history, while still falling short of projected goals. The Great Leap Forward soon came to be seen as one of Mao's greatest mistakes, eventually costing him some of his official status in the ].
The Great Leap's failure reduced Mao's prestige within the Party. Forced to take major responsibility, in 1959, Mao resigned as the ], China's ''de jure'' head of state, and was succeeded by ], While Mao remained as ] and ]. In July, ] at the scenic ] to discuss policy. At the conference, Marshal ], the Minister of Defence, criticized Great Leap policies in a private letter to Mao, writing that it was plagued by mismanagement and cautioning against elevating political dogma over the laws of economics.<ref name=umd/>


{{Excerpt|Great Leap Forward|paragraphs=2}}
Despite the moderate tone of Peng's letter, Mao took it as a personal attack against his leadership.<ref>Jin Qiu, ]</ref> Following the Conference, Mao had Peng removed from his posts, and accused him of being a "right-opportunist". Peng was replaced by ], another revolutionary army general who became a more staunch Mao supporter later in his career. While the Lushan Conference served as a death knell for Peng, Mao's most vocal critic, it led to a shift of power to moderates led by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, who took effective control of the ] following 1959.<ref name=umd/>


===Impact of international tensions and anti-revisionism===
By the early 1960s, many of the Great Leap's economic policies were reversed by initiatives spearheaded by Liu, Deng, and Premier ]. This moderate group of pragmatists were unenthusiastic about Mao's utopian visions. Owing to his loss of esteem within the party, Mao developed a decadent and eccentric lifestyle.<ref>Spence</ref>{{failed verification|date=January 2020}} By 1962, while Zhou, Liu and Deng managed affairs of state and the economy, Mao had effectively withdrawn from economic decision-making, and focused much of his time on further contemplating his contributions to Marxist–Leninist social theory, including the idea of "continuous revolution".<ref>Jin Qiu, Ch. 2</ref> This theory's ultimate aim was to set the stage for Mao to restore his brand of Communism and his personal prestige within the Party.{{citation needed|date=December 2018}}

===Sino-Soviet split and anti-revisionism===
{{main|Sino-Soviet split}} {{main|Sino-Soviet split}}
In the early 1950s, the People's Republic of China and the ] (USSR) were the two largest ] in the world. Although initially they had been mutually supportive, disagreements arose after the ] and the rise of ] to power in the Soviet Union. In 1956, Khrushchev ], and began implementing post-Stalinist economic reforms. Mao and many other members of the ] (CCP) opposed these changes, believing that they would have negative repercussions for the worldwide ] movement, among whom ] was still viewed as a hero.<ref name="MacFarquhar and Schoenals 2006. pp. 04-07">]. pp. 4–7.</ref> In the early 1950s, the PRC and the ] (USSR) were the world's two largest communist states. Although initially they were mutually supportive, disagreements arose after ] took power in the USSR. In 1956, Khrushchev ], and began implementing ]. Mao and many other CCP members opposed these changes, believing that they would damage the worldwide communist movement.<ref name=Mac>{{cite book |last1=MacFarquhar |first1=Roderick |last2=Schoenhals |first2=Michael |title=Mao's Last Revolution |publisher=Harvard University Press |year=2006 |isbn=978-0-674-02332-1}}</ref>{{rp|4–7}}

Mao believed that Khrushchev was a ], altering ] concepts, which Mao claimed would give capitalists control of the USSR. Relations soured. The USSR refused to support China's case for joining the ] and reneged on its pledge to supply China with a nuclear weapon.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|4–7}}

Mao publicly denounced revisionism in April 1960. Without pointing at the USSR, Mao criticized its Balkan ally, the ]. In turn, the USSR criticized China's Balkan ally, the ]. In 1963, CCP began to denounce the USSR, publishing nine polemics. One was titled ''On Khrushchev's Phoney Communism and Historical Lessons for the World'', in which Mao charged that Khrushchev was a revisionist and risked capitalist restoration. Khrushchev's defeat by an internal ] in 1964 contributed to Mao's fears, mainly because of his declining prestige after the Great Leap Forward.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|7}}


Other Soviet actions increased concerns about potential ]. As a result of the tensions following the Sino-Soviet split, Soviet leaders authorized radio broadcasts into China stating that the Soviet Union would assist "genuine communists" who overthrew Mao and his "erroneous course".<ref name="Meyskens2020" />{{rp|141}} Chinese leadership also feared the increasing military conflict between the United States and ], concerned that China's support would lead to the United States to seek out potential Chinese assets.<ref name="Meyskens2020">{{Cite book |last=Meyskens |first=Covell F. |title=Mao's Third Front: The Militarization of Cold War China |year=2020 |publisher=] |isbn=978-1-108-78478-8 |doi=10.1017/9781108784788 |s2cid=218936313}}</ref>{{rp|141}}
Mao believed that Khrushchev did not adhere to ], but was instead a ], altering his policies from basic Marxist–Leninist concepts, something Mao feared would allow ] to regain control of the country. Relations between the two governments soured. The USSR refused to support China's case for joining the ] and went back on its pledge to supply China with a ].<ref name="MacFarquhar and Schoenals 2006. pp. 04-07"/>


=== Precursor ===
Mao went on to publicly denounce revisionism in April 1960. Without pointing fingers at the Soviet Union, Mao criticized its ideological ally, the ]. In turn, the USSR criticized China's ally the ].<ref name="MacFarquhar and Schoenals 2006. p. 07">]. p. 7.</ref> In 1963, the CCP began to denounce the Soviet Union openly, publishing nine polemics against its perceived revisionism, with one of them being titled ''On Khrushchev's Phoney Communism and Historical Lessons for the World'', in which Mao charged that Khrushchev was not only a revisionist but also increased the danger of capitalist restoration.<ref name="MacFarquhar and Schoenals 2006. p. 07"/> Khrushchev's downfall from an internal ''coup d'état'' in 1964 also contributed to Mao's fears of his own political vulnerability, mainly because of his declining prestige among his colleagues after the Great Leap Forward.<ref name="MacFarquhar and Schoenals 2006. p. 07"/>
{{See also|Socialist Education Movement|Hai Rui Dismissed from Office}}


] solidified the PLA's loyalty to Mao]]
===Precursor===
] solidified the Army's loyalty to Mao]]
{{see also|Socialist Education Movement}}
In 1963, Mao launched the ], which is regarded as the precursor of the Cultural Revolution.<ref name=":11">{{cite journal|last1=Baum|first1=Richard|date=1969|title=Revolution and Reaction in the Chinese Countryside: The Socialist Education Movement in Cultural Revolutionary Perspective|journal=The China Quarterly|volume=38|issue=38|pages=92–119|doi=10.1017/S0305741000049158|issn=0305-7410|jstor=652308}}</ref> Mao had set the scene for the Cultural Revolution by "]" powerful officials of questionable loyalty who were based in ]. His approach was less than transparent, achieving this purge through newspaper articles, internal meetings, and by skillfully employing his network of ].<ref name=":11" />


In 1963, Mao launched the ], the Cultural Revolution's precursor.<ref name="Baum-1969">{{cite journal |last=Baum |first=Richard |year=1969 |title=Revolution and Reaction in the Chinese Countryside: The Socialist Education Movement in Cultural Revolutionary Perspective |journal=] |volume=38 |issue=38 |pages=92–119 |doi=10.1017/S0305741000049158 |issn=0305-7410 |jstor=652308 |s2cid=154449798}}</ref> Mao set the scene by "]" powerful Beijing officials of questionable loyalty. His approach was not transparent, executed via newspaper articles, internal meetings, and by his network of political allies.<ref name="Baum-1969" />
In late 1959, historian and ] ] published a ] entitled '']''. In the play, an honest ], ], is dismissed by a corrupt emperor. While Mao initially praised the play, in February 1965, he secretly commissioned his wife ] and ] ] ] to publish an article criticizing it.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals. pp. 15–18.</ref> Yao boldly alleged that ''Hai Rui'' was really an ] attacking Mao; that is, Mao was the corrupt emperor, and ] was the honest civil servant.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals. p. 16.</ref>


In late 1959, historian and deputy mayor of Beijing ] published a historical drama entitled '']''. In the play, an honest ], ], is dismissed by a corrupt emperor. While Mao initially praised the play, in February 1965, he secretly commissioned his wife ] and Shanghai propagandist ] to publish an article criticizing it. Yao described the play as an allegory attacking Mao; flagging Mao as the emperor, and Peng Dehuai, who had previously questioned Mao during the ], as the honest civil servant.<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|15–18}}
Yao's article put Beijing Mayor ]<ref group="lower-roman">No relation to Peng Dehuai</ref> on the defensive. Peng, a powerful official and Wu Han's direct superior, was the head of the "]", a committee commissioned by Mao to study the potential for a cultural revolution. Peng Zhen, aware that he would be implicated if Wu indeed wrote an "anti-Mao" play, wished to contain Yao's influence. Yao's article was initially only published in select local newspapers. Peng forbade its publication in the nationally-distributed '']'' and other major newspapers under his control, instructing them to write exclusively about "academic discussion," and not pay heed to Yao's petty politics.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals. pp. 14–19.</ref> While the "literary battle" against Peng raged, Mao fired ]—director of the ], an organ that controlled ]—on a series of unsubstantiated charges, installing in his stead staunch ] ], head of Mao's security detail.<ref name="ReferenceA">]. Chapter 1.</ref> Yang's dismissal likely emboldened Mao's allies to move against their factional rivals.<ref name="ReferenceA" />


Yao's article put Beijing mayor ] on the defensive. Peng, Wu Han's direct superior, was the head of the ], a committee commissioned by Mao to study the potential for a cultural revolution. Peng Zhen, aware that he would be implicated if Wu indeed wrote an "anti-Mao" play, wished to contain Yao's influence. Yao's article was initially published only in select local newspapers. Peng forbade its publication in the nationally distributed '']'' and other major newspapers under his control, instructing them to write exclusively about "academic discussion", and not pay heed to Yao's petty politics.<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|14–19}} While the "literary battle" against Peng raged, Mao fired ]—director of the ], an organ that controlled internal communications—making unsubstantiated charges. He installed loyalist ], head of Mao's security detail. Yang's dismissal likely emboldened Mao's allies to move against their factional rivals.<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|14–19}}
In December, ] and Mao loyalist ] accused General ], the chief of staff of the PLA, of being anti-Mao, alleging that Luo put too much emphasis on military training rather than Maoist "political discussion." Despite initial skepticism in the ] of Luo's guilt, Mao pushed for an 'investigation', after which Luo was denounced, dismissed, and forced to deliver a ]. Stress from the events led Luo to attempt suicide.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006. pp. 20–27.</ref> Luo's removal secured the military command's loyalty to Mao.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals. p. 24.</ref>


Having ousted Luo and Yang, Mao returned his attention to Peng Zhen. On February 12, 1966, the "Five Man Group" issued a report known as the ''February Outline'' ({{lang|zh|二月提纲}}). The ''Outline'', sanctioned by the Party centre, defined ''Hai Rui'' as a constructive ''academic'' discussion and aimed to distance Peng Zhen formally from any ''political'' implications. However, Jiang Qing and Yao Wenyuan continued their denunciation of Wu Han and Peng Zhen. Meanwhile, Mao also sacked ] director ], a Peng Zhen ally.<ref name="ReferenceB">] Chapter 1.</ref> On 12 February 1966, the "Five Man Group" issued a report known as the ''February Outline''. The ''Outline'' as sanctioned by the party center defined ''Hai Rui'' as a constructive ''academic'' discussion and aimed to distance Peng Zhen formally from any ''political'' implications. However, Jiang Qing and Yao Wenyuan continued their denunciations. Meanwhile, Mao sacked ] director ], a Peng ally.<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|20–27}}


Lu's removal gave Maoists unrestricted access to the press. Mao would deliver his final blow to Peng Zhen at a high-profile Politburo meeting through loyalists ] and ]. They accused Peng Zhen of opposing Mao, labeled the ''February Outline'' "evidence of Peng Zhen's revisionism," and grouped him with three other disgraced officials as part of the "Peng-Luo-Lu-Yang Anti-Party Clique."<ref name="ReferenceB"/> On May 16, the Politburo formalized the decisions by releasing an official document condemning Peng Zhen and his "anti-party allies" in the strongest terms, disbanding his "Five Man Group", and replacing it with the Maoist ] (CRG).<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals. pp. 27–35.</ref> Lu's removal gave Maoists unrestricted access to the press. Mao delivered his final blow to Peng at a high-profile Politburo meeting through loyalists ] and ]. They accused Peng of opposing Mao, labeled the ''February Outline'' "evidence of Peng Zhen's revisionism", and grouped him with three other disgraced officials as part of the "Peng-Luo-Lu-Yang Anti-Party Clique".<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|20–27}} On 16 May, the Politburo formalized the decisions by releasing an official document condemning Peng and his "anti-party allies" in the strongest terms, disbanding his "Five Man Group", and replacing it with the Maoist Cultural Revolution Group (CRG).<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|27–35}}


== 1966: Outbreak ==
== Early stage: mass movement (1966–68) ==
{{anchor|Beginning}} {{anchor|Beginning}}
The Cultural Revolution can be divided into two main periods:


* spring 1966 to summer 1968 (when most of the key events took place)
===May 16 Notification===
* a tailing period that lasted until fall 1976<ref name="Russo-2020a">{{Cite book |last=Russo |first=Alessandro |title=Cultural Revolution and revolutionary culture |year=2020 |publisher=] |isbn=978-1-4780-1218-4 |location=Durham, NC |page=148}}</ref>
In May 1966, an "expanded session" of the ] was called in Beijing. The conference, rather than being a joint discussion on policy (as per the usual norms of party operations), was mainly a campaign to mobilize the Politburo into endorsing Mao's ]. The conference was heavily laden with Maoist political rhetoric on class struggle and filled with meticulously-prepared 'indictments' on the recently ousted leaders such as Peng Zhen and Luo Ruiqing. One of these documents, released on May 16, was prepared with Mao's personal supervision and was particularly damning:<ref>]. pp. 39–40.</ref>


The early phase was characterized by mass movement and political pluralization. Virtually anyone could create a political organization, even without party approval. Known as Red Guards, these organizations originally arose in schools and universities and later in factories and other institutions. After 1968, most of these organizations ceased to exist, although their legacies were a topic of controversy later.<ref name="Russo-2020a" />
<blockquote>Those representatives of the ] who have sneaked into the Party, the government, the army, and various spheres of culture are a bunch of counter-revolutionary revisionists. Once conditions are ripe, they will seize political power and turn the ] into a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Some of them we have already seen through; others we have not. Some are still trusted by us and are being trained as our successors, persons like Khrushchev for example, who are still nestling beside us.<ref>Quoted in ]. p. 47.</ref></blockquote>


=== Notification ===
This text, which became known as the "May 16 Notification" ({{zh|s=五一六通知|p=Wǔyīliù Tōngzhī}}), summarized Mao's ideological justification for the Cultural Revolution.<ref>Li Xuefeng quoted in ]. p. 40.</ref> Effectively it implied that there were enemies of the Communist cause within the Party itself: class enemies who "wave the red flag to oppose the red flag."<ref name="ms46">]. p. 46.</ref> The only way to identify these people was through "the telescope and microscope of Mao Zedong Thought."<ref name="ms46"/> While the party leadership was relatively united in approving the general direction of Mao's agenda, many Politburo members were not especially enthusiastic, or simply confused about the direction of the movement.<ref name=nianyi13>{{cite book|last1=Wang|first1=Nianyi|title=大动乱的年代:1949–1989 年的中国 |date=1989|publisher=Henan Renmin Chubanshe|page=13}}</ref> The charges against esteemed party leaders like Peng Zhen rang alarm bells in China's intellectual community and among the ].<ref name="ms41">]. p. 41.</ref>
{{Main|16 May Notification}}
]
In May 1966, an expanded session of the ] was called in Beijing. The conference was laden with Maoist political rhetoric on ] and filled with meticulously prepared 'indictments' of recently ousted leaders such as Peng Zhen and ]. One of these documents, distributed on 16 May, was prepared with Mao's personal supervision and was particularly damning:{{r|Mac|pp=39–40}}


<blockquote>Those representatives of the bourgeoisie who have sneaked into the Party, the government, the army, and various spheres of culture are a bunch of counter-revolutionary revisionists. Once conditions are ripe, they will seize political power and turn the ] into a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Some of them we have already seen through; others we have not. Some are still trusted by us and are being trained as our successors, persons like Khrushchev for example, who are still nestling beside us.{{r|Mac|p=47}}</blockquote>
=== Early mass rallies (May–June 1966) ===
After the purge of ], the Beijing Party Committee had effectively ceased to function, paving the way for disorder in the capital. On May 25, under the guidance of Cao Yi'ou—wife of Maoist henchman ]—], a philosophy lecturer at ], authored a ] ({{zh|s=大字报|p=dàzìbào|c=|t=|labels=no}}) along with other ] and posted it to a public bulletin. Nie attacked the university's party administration and its leader ].<ref name=mac57>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, pp. 56–58</ref> Nie insinuated that the university leadership, much like Peng Zhen, were trying to contain revolutionary fervour in a "sinister" attempt to oppose the party and advance revisionism.<ref name=mac57/>


Later known as the "16 May Notification", this document summarized Mao's ideological justification for CR.{{r|Mac|p=40}} Initially kept secret, distributed only among high-ranking party members, it was later declassified and published in '']'' on 17 May 1967.{{r|Mac|p=41}} Effectively it implied that enemies of the Communist cause could be found within the Party: class enemies who "wave the red flag to oppose the red flag." The only way to identify these people was through "the telescope and microscope of ]."{{r|Mac|p=46}} While the party leadership was relatively united in approving Mao's agenda, many Politburo members were not enthusiastic, or simply confused about the direction.<ref name="Nianyi">{{cite book |last=Wang |first=Nianyi |script-title=zh:大动乱的年代:1949–1989 年的中国 |trans-title=Great age of turmoil, a history of China 1949–89 |language=zh |year=1989 |publisher=Henan People's Publishing House}}</ref>{{rp|13}} The charges against party leaders such as Peng disturbed China's intellectual community and the ].{{r|Mac|p=41}}
Mao promptly endorsed Nie's ''dazibao'' as "the first ] big-character poster in China." Nie's call-to-arms, now sealed with Mao's personal stamp of approval, had a lasting ] across all educational institutions in China. Students everywhere began to revolt against their respective schools' party establishment. Classes were promptly cancelled in Beijing primary and secondary schools, followed by a decision on June 13 to expand the class suspension nationwide.<ref name=mac59>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, pp. 59–61</ref> By early June, throngs of young demonstrators lined the capital's major ] holding giant portraits of Mao, beating drums, and shouting slogans against his perceived enemies.<ref name=mac59/>


=== Mass rallies (May–June) ===
When the dismissal of Peng Zhen and the municipal party leadership became public in early June, widespread confusion ensued. The public and foreign missions were kept in the dark on the reason for Peng Zhen's ousting.<ref name=mac62>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, pp. 62–64</ref> Even the top Party leadership was caught off guard by the sudden ] wave of protest and struggled with what to do next.<ref name=mac62/> After seeking Mao's guidance in ], ] and ] decided to send in 'work teams' ({{zh|s=工作组|p=Gōngzuò zǔ|c=|t=|labels=no}})—effectively 'ideological-guidance' squads of ]—to the city's schools and '']'' to restore some semblance of order and re-establish party control.<ref name=mac62/>
]", an editorial published on the front page of '']'' on 1 June 1966, calling for the proletariat to "completely eradicate" the "] that have poisoned the people of China for thousands of years, fostered by the exploiting classes".<ref name="Gao1987">{{cite book |last1=Gao |first1=Yuan |title=Born Red: A Chronicle of the Cultural Revolution |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=OrN_UGo9S0UC |page=50}} |year=1987 |publisher=Stanford University Press |isbn=978-0-8047-6589-3}}</ref>{{rp|50}}]]
After the purge of Peng Zhen, the Beijing Party Committee effectively ceased to function, paving the way for disorder in the capital. On 25 May, under the guidance of {{Interlanguage link|Cao Yi'ou|lt=|zh|曹轶欧|WD=}}—wife of Mao loyalist Kang Sheng—], a philosophy lecturer at ], authored a ] along with other leftists and posted it to a public bulletin. Nie attacked the university's party administration and its leader Lu Ping. Nie insinuated that the university leadership, much like Peng, were trying to contain revolutionary fervor in a "sinister" attempt to oppose the party and advance revisionism.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|56–58}}


Mao promptly endorsed Nie's poster as "the first Marxist big-character poster in China". Approved by Mao, the poster rippled across educational institutions. Students began to revolt against their school's party establishments. Classes were cancelled in Beijing primary and secondary schools, followed by a decision on 13 June to expand the class suspension nationwide. By early June, throngs of young demonstrators lined the capital's major thoroughfares holding giant portraits of Mao, beating drums, and shouting slogans.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|59–61}}
The work teams were hastily dispatched and had a poor understanding of student sentiment. Unlike the political movement of the 1950s that squarely targeted intellectuals, the new movement was focused on established party cadres, many of whom were part of the work teams. As a result, the work teams came under increasing suspicion for being yet another group aimed at thwarting revolutionary fervour.<ref name=mac71>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 71</ref> The party leadership subsequently became divided over whether or not work teams should remain in place. Liu Shaoqi insisted on continuing work-team involvement and suppressing the movement's most radical elements, fearing that the movement would spin out of control.<ref name=mac75>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 75</ref>


When the dismissal of Peng and the municipal party leadership became public in early June, confusion was widespread. The public and foreign missions were kept in the dark on the reason for Peng's ousting. Top Party leadership was caught off guard by the sudden protest wave and struggled with how to respond. After seeking Mao's guidance in ], Liu Shaoqi and ] decided to send in 'work teams'—effectively 'ideological guidance' squads of cadres—to the city's schools and ''People's Daily'' to restore some semblance of order and re-establish party control.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|62–64}}
==="Bombard the headquarters" (July 1966)===

The work teams had a poor understanding of student sentiment. Unlike the political movement of the 1950s that squarely targeted intellectuals, the new movement was focused on established party cadres, many of whom were part of the work teams. As a result, the work teams came under increasing suspicion as thwarting revolutionary fervor.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|71}} Party leadership subsequently became divided over whether or not work teams should continue. Liu Shaoqi insisted on continuing work-team involvement and suppressing the movement's most radical elements, fearing that the movement would spin out of control.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|75}}

===''Bombard the Headquarters'' (July)===
{{multiple image {{multiple image
| width = | total_width = 240
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| footer = In 1966, Mao broke with ] (right), then serving as ], over the work-teams issue. Mao's polemic ''Bombard the Headquarters'' was widely recognized as targeting Liu, the purported "bourgeois headquarters" of the party. | footer = In 1966, Mao broke with ] (right), then serving as ], over the work-teams issue. Mao's polemic '']'' was widely recognized as targeting Liu, the purported "bourgeois" party headquarters
| image1 =
| alt1 = Mao Zedong, Chairman
| image1 = Mao_Zedong_portrait.jpg
| width1 = 120
| alt1 = Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Communist Party of China
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| image2 = LiuShaoqi_Colour.jpg | image2 = LiuShaoqi_Colour.jpg
| alt2 = Liu Shaoqi, President
| width2 = 120
| caption2 =
| alt2 = Liu Shaoqi, President of the People's Republic of China
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}} }}
]
On July 16, the 72-year-old Chairman Mao took to the ] in ], with the press in tow, in what became an iconic "swim across the ]" to demonstrate his battle-readiness. He subsequently returned to Beijing on a mission to criticize the party leadership for its handling of the work-teams issue. Mao accused the work teams of undermining the student movement, calling for their full withdrawal on July 24. Several days later a rally was held at the ] to announce the decision and set the new tone of the movement to university and high school teachers and students. At the rally, Party leaders told the masses assembled to 'not be afraid' and bravely take charge of the movement themselves, free of Party interference.<ref name=mac84>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 84</ref>
In July, Mao, in Wuhan, crossed the Yangtze River, showing his vigor. He then returned from Wuhan to Beijing and criticized party leadership for its handling of the work-teams issue. Mao accused the work teams of undermining the student movement, calling for their full withdrawal on 24 July. Several days later a rally was held at the ] to announce the decision and reveal the tone of the movement to teachers and students. At the rally, Party leaders encouraged the masses to 'not be afraid' and take charge of the movement, free of Party interference.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|81–84}}


The work-teams issue marked a decisive defeat for President ] politically; it also signaled that disagreement over how to handle the unfolding events of the Cultural Revolution would break Mao from the established party leadership irreversibly. On August 1, the Eleventh ] of the ] was hastily convened to advance Mao's now decidedly radical agenda. At the plenum, Mao showed outright disdain for Liu, repeatedly interrupting Liu as he delivered his opening day speech.<ref name=mac94>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 94</ref> For several days, Mao repeatedly insinuated that the Party's leadership had contravened his revolutionary vision. Mao's line of thinking received a lukewarm reception from the conference attendees. Sensing that the largely obstructive party elite was unwilling to embrace his revolutionary ideology on a full scale, Mao went on the offensive.{{citation needed|date=December 2018}} The work-teams issue marked a decisive defeat for Liu; it also signaled that disagreement over how to handle the CR's unfolding events would irreversibly split Mao from the party leadership. On 1 August, the Eleventh Plenum of the ] was convened to advance Mao's radical agenda. At the plenum, Mao showed disdain for Liu, repeatedly interrupting him as he delivered his opening day speech.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|94}}{{multiple image
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|footer = ''From left:'' (1) Students at ] writing ] denouncing ]; (2) Big-characters posted on the campus of ]; (3) Red guards at No. 23 Middle School wave the '']'' in a classroom revolution rally. All photos from '']''}} |footer = From left: (1) Students at ] making big-character posters denouncing ]; (2) Big-characters posted at ]; (3) Students at No. 23 Middle School in Beijing reading '']'' during the "Resume Classes" campaign}}
On July 28, ] representatives wrote to Mao, calling for rebellion and upheaval to safeguard the revolution. Mao then responded to the letters by writing his own ] entitled '']'', rallying people to target the "command centre (i.e., Headquarters) of counterrevolution." Mao wrote that despite having undergone a Communist revolution, a "bourgeois" elite was still thriving in "positions of authority" in the government and Communist Party.<ref name="Tang">]. 1986. ''The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms: A Historical Perspective''. Chicago: ]. {{ISBN|0-226-81514-5}}.</ref>


On 28 July, ] representatives wrote to Mao, calling for rebellion and upheaval to safeguard the revolution. Mao then responded to the letters by writing his own big-character poster entitled '']'', rallying people to target the "command centre (i.e., Headquarters) of counterrevolution." Mao wrote that despite having undergone a communist revolution, a "bourgeois" elite was still thriving in "positions of authority" in the government and Party.<ref name="Tang">{{Cite book |last=Tsou |first=Tang |author-link=Tsou Tang |title=The Cultural Revolution and post-Mao reforms: a historical perspective |year=1988 |publisher=] |isbn=978-0-226-81514-5}}</ref>
Although no names were mentioned, this provocative statement by Mao has been interpreted as a direct indictment of the party establishment under Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping—the purported "bourgeois headquarters" of China. The personnel changes at the Plenum reflected a radical re-design of the party's hierarchy to suit this new ideological landscape. Liu and Deng kept their seats on the ] but were in fact sidelined from day-to-day party affairs. Lin Biao was elevated to become the Party's number-two figure; Liu Shaoqi's rank went from second to eighth and was no longer Mao's heir apparent.<ref name="Tang"/>


Although no names were mentioned, this provocative statement has been interpreted as a direct indictment of the party establishment under Liu and Deng—the purported "bourgeois headquarters" of China. The personnel changes at the Plenum reflected a radical re-design of the party hierarchy. Liu and Deng kept their seats on the Politburo Standing Committee, but were sidelined from day-to-day party affairs. Lin Biao was elevated to become the CCP's number-two; Liu's rank went from second to eighth and was no longer Mao's heir apparent.<ref name="Tang"/>
Coinciding with the top leadership being thrown out of positions of power was the thorough undoing of the entire national bureaucracy of the Communist Party. The extensive ], in charge of party personnel, virtually ceased to exist. The Cultural Revolution Group (CRG), Mao's ideological ']', was catapulted to prominence to propagate his ideology and rally popular support. The top officials in the ] were sacked, with many of its functions folding into the CRG.<ref name=mac96>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 96</ref>


] targeting Liu Shaoqi's wife ]]]
=== Red August and the Sixteen Points (Aug. 1966) ===
Along with the top leadership losing power the entire national Party bureaucracy was purged. The extensive ], in charge of party personnel, virtually ceased to exist. The top officials in the Propaganda Department were sacked, with many of its functions folded into the CRG.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|96}}

=== Red August and the Sixteen Points ===
{{Main|Red August}} {{Main|Red August}}
] surrounded by rallying Red Guards in Beijing, December 1966]]
] and ] surrounded by rallying Red Guards in Beijing. Source: '']'']]The ] (''Mao's Quotations'') was the mechanism that led the Red Guards to commit to their objective as the future for China. These quotes directly from Mao led to other actions by the Red Guards in the views of other Maoist leaders,<ref>] and Schoenhals, Michael. ''Mao's Last Revolution''. ], 2006. p. 107</ref> and by December 1967, 350-million copies of the book had been printed.<ref>Lu, Xing. 2004. ''Rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Impact on Chinese Thought, Culture, and Communication''. ]. {{ISBN|1-57003-543-1}}.</ref> One of many quotations in the ''Little Red Book'' that the Red Guards would later follow as a guide, provided by Mao, was:<blockquote>The world is yours, as well as ours, but in the last analysis, it is yours. You young people, full of vigor and vitality, are in the bloom of life, like the sun at eight or nine in the morning. Our hope is placed on you.… The world belongs to you. China's future belongs to you.</blockquote>During the Red August of Beijing, on August 8, 1966, the party's ] passed its "Decision Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," later to be known as the "Sixteen Points."<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110520195051/http://www.rrojasdatabank.info/16points.htm |date=May 20, 2011 }}, adopted on August 8, 1966, by the CC of the CCP (official English version)</ref> This decision defined the Cultural Revolution as "a great revolution that touches people to their very souls and constitutes a deeper and more extensive stage in the development of the ] in our country:"<ref>{{Cite web|last=|first=|date=|title=1966.8.9 中共中央关于无产阶级文化大革命的决定(附图)|url=http://news.sina.com.cn/c/144490.html|url-status=live|archive-url=|archive-date=|access-date=2020-06-10|website=]|language=zh}}</ref>

The ] was the mechanism that led the Red Guards to commit to their objective as China's future. Quotes directly from Mao led to actions by the Red Guards in the views of other Maoist leaders.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|107}} By December 1967, 350 million copies had been printed.<ref name=Lu>{{cite book |last=Lu |first=Xing |title=Rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Impact on Chinese Thought, Culture, and Communication |publisher=University of South Carolina Press |year=2004 |isbn=978-1570035432}}</ref>{{rp|61–64}} One of these quotes was the famous line "]." The passage continues:

<blockquote>Revolutionary war is an antitoxin which not only eliminates the enemy's poison but also purges us of our filth. Every just, revolutionary war is endowed with tremendous power and can transform many things or clear the way for their transformation. The Sino-Japanese war will transform both China and Japan; Provided China perseveres in the War of Resistance and in the united front, the old Japan will surely be transformed into a new Japan and the old China into a new China, and people and everything else in both China and Japan will be transformed during and after the war.

The world is yours, as well as ours, but in the last analysis, it is yours. You young people, full of vigor and vitality, are in the bloom of life, like the sun at eight or nine in the morning. Our hope is placed on you&nbsp;... The world belongs to you. China's future belongs to you.</blockquote>During the Red August of Beijing, on 8 August 1966, the ] passed its "Decision Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," later to be known as the "Sixteen Points". This decision defined the Cultural Revolution as "a great revolution that touches people to their very souls and constitutes a new stage in the development of the socialist revolution in our country:"<ref>{{cite web |title=Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution |url=https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/peking-review/1966/PR1966-33g.htm |website=] |publisher=] |access-date=5 March 2024}}</ref><ref name=Mac/>{{rp|92–93}}<blockquote>

Although the bourgeoisie has been overthrown, it is still trying to use the old ideas, culture, customs and habits of the exploiting classes to corrupt the masses, capture their minds and endeavour to stage a comeback. The proletariat must do the exact opposite: it must meet head-on every challenge of the bourgeoisie&nbsp;... to change the mental outlook of the whole of society. At present, our objective is to struggle against and overthrow those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road, to criticize and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois academic "authorities" and the ideology of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes and to transform education, literature and art and all other parts of the superstructure not in correspondence with the socialist economic base, so as to facilitate the consolidation and development of the socialist system.</blockquote>
The implications of the Sixteen Points were far-reaching. It elevated what was previously a student movement to a nationwide mass campaign that would galvanize workers, farmers, soldiers and lower-level party functionaries to rise, challenge authority, and re-shape the ] of society.


]
<blockquote>Although the bourgeoisie has been overthrown, it is still trying to use the old ideas, culture, customs, and habits of the exploiting classes to corrupt the masses, capture their minds, and stage a comeback. The proletariat must do just the opposite: It must meet head-on every challenge of the ]…to change the outlook of society. Currently, our objective is to struggle against and crush those people in authority who are taking the capitalist road, to criticize and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois academic "authorities" and the ideology of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes and to transform education, literature and art, and all other parts of the superstructure that do not correspond to the socialist economic base, so as to facilitate the consolidation and development of the socialist system.</blockquote>
On 18 August in Beijing, over a million Red Guards from across the country gathered in and around ] for an audience with the chairman.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|106–107}} Mao mingled with Red Guards and encouraged them, donning a Red Guard armband. Lin also took centre stage, denouncing perceived enemies in society that were impeding the "progress of the revolution".<ref name=Nianyi/>{{rp|66}} Subsequently, violence escalated in Beijing and quickly spread.<ref name="Wang-2001-1">{{Cite web |last=Wang |first=Youqin |date=2001 |title=Student Attacks Against Teachers: The Revolution of 1966 |url=http://ywang.uchicago.edu/history/docs/2001_03_05.pdf |website=University of Chicago |page=5}}</ref><ref name="Jian-2006">{{Cite book |last1=Jian |first1=Guo |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=T5-4zOdHKOIC |page=237}} |title=Historical Dictionary of the Chinese Cultural Revolution |last2=Song |first2=Yongyi |last3=Zhou |first3=Yuan |year=2006 |publisher=Scarecrow |isbn=978-0-8108-6491-7 |author-link2=Song Yongyi}}</ref>{{rp|xvi}} The 18 August rally was filmed and shown to approximately 100 million people in its first month of release.<ref name="Li2023">{{Cite book |last=Li |first=Jie |title=Cinematic Guerillas: Propaganda, Projectionists, and Audiences in Socialist China |publisher=] |year=2023 |isbn=978-0-231-20627-3 |location=New York}}</ref>{{rp|53}}
The implications of the Sixteen Points were far-reaching. It elevated what was previously a student movement to a nationwide mass campaign that would galvanize workers, farmers, soldiers and lower-level party functionaries to rise, challenge authority, and re-shape the "superstructure" of society.] on September 15, 1966 the occasion of Chairman Mao's third of eight mass rallies with Red Guards in 1966.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://news.cri.cn/gb/9223/2006/04/19/1266@1007752_1.htm |script-title=zh:"毛泽东八次接见红卫兵始末(上) " |script-newspaper=zh:新闻午报 |date=2006-04-19 |language=zh-cn}} {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190306043233/http://news.cri.cn/gb/9223/2006/04/19/1266@1007752_1.htm |date=March 6, 2019 }}</ref> Source: '']'']]
During the ] of Beijing, on August 18, 1966, over a million Red Guards from all over the country gathered in and around ] in Beijing for a personal audience with the Chairman.<ref name="MacFarquhar106">] and Schoenhals, Michael. ''Mao's Last Revolution''. ], 2006. pp. 106–107</ref> Mao personally mingled with Red Guards and encouraged their motivation, donning a Red Guard armband himself.<ref name="disorder2" /> Lin Biao also took centre stage at the August 18 rally, vociferously denouncing all manner of perceived enemies in Chinese society that were impeding the "progress of the revolution."<ref name=disorder2>Wang, Nianyi. ''Period of Great Turmoil: China between 1949–1989'', p. 66</ref> Subsequently, ] began in Beijing and the ] quickly spread to other areas of China.<ref name=":27">{{Cite web|last=Wang|first=Youqin|date=2001|title=Student Attacks Against Teachers: The Revolution of 1966|url=http://ywang.uchicago.edu/history/docs/2001_03_05.pdf|url-status=live|archive-url=|archive-date=|access-date=|website=University of Chicago}}</ref><ref name=":15">{{Cite book|last=Jian|first=Guo|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=T5-4zOdHKOIC&printsec=frontcover&pg=PA237&dq=Historical+Dictionary+of+the+Chinese+Cultural+Revolution+red+august|title=Historical Dictionary of the Chinese Cultural Revolution|last2=Song|first2=Yongyi|last3=Zhou|first3=Yuan|date=2006-07-17|publisher=Scarecrow Press|isbn=978-0-8108-6491-7|language=en}}</ref>


On August 22, 1966, a central directive was issued to stop police intervention in Red Guard activities, and those in the police force who defied this notice were labeled ].<ref name="mac124">] and Schoenhals, Michael. ''Mao's Last Revolution''. ], 2006. p. 124</ref> Mao's praise for rebellion encouraged actions of the Red Guards.<ref>MacFarquhar & Schoenhals; p. 515</ref> Central officials lifted restraints on violent behavior in support of the revolution.<ref name="MacFarquhar126">] and Schoenhals, Michael. ''Mao's Last Revolution''. ], 2006. p. 126</ref> ], the national police chief, often pardoned Red Guards for their "crimes."<ref name="MacFarquhar125">] and Schoenhals, Michael. ''Mao's Last Revolution''. ], 2006. p. 125</ref> In about two weeks, the violence left some 100 officials of the ruling and middle class dead in Beijing's western district alone. The number injured exceeded that.<ref name="MacFarquhar126" /> On 22 August, a central directive was issued to prevent police intervention in Red Guard activities, and those in the police force who defied this notice were labeled counter-revolutionaries. Central officials lifted restraints on violent behavior. ], the national police chief, often pardoned Red Guards for their "crimes".<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|124–126}}


The campaign included incidents of torture, murder, and public humiliation. Many people who were indicted as counter-revolutionaries died by suicide. During Red August, 1,772 people were murdered in Beijing; many of the victims were teachers who were attacked or killed by their own students.<ref name="Wang-2001" /> The first such victim was ], the deputy principal of ], who was killed on 5 August by ] following several hours of physical abuse and public humiliation.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Buckley |first=Chris |date=2014-01-13 |title=Bowed and Remorseful, Former Red Guard Recalls Teacher's Death |url=https://archive.nytimes.com/sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/01/13/bowed-and-remorseful-former-red-guard-recalls-teachers-death/ |access-date=2024-09-24 |website=Sinosphere Blog}}</ref> The leader of the Red Guards, who had organised on campus only days prior, was 19-year-old ], who was alleged to have participated personally in the murder of Bian. At a mass rally held on 18 August, Song met Mao, and gifted him a Red Guard armband by tying it around his arm.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2014-12-18 |title=China's Brave Underground Journal – II |url=https://www.chinafile.com/library/nyrb-china-archive/chinas-brave-underground-journal-ii |access-date=2024-09-24 |website=ChinaFile}}</ref><ref name="Jian-2006" />{{rp|12}} In September, Shanghai experienced 704 suicides and 534 deaths; in Wuhan, 62 suicides and 32 murders occurred during the same period.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|124}} Peng Dehuai was brought to Beijing to be publicly ridiculed.
The most violent aspects of the campaign included incidents of torture, murder, and ]. Many people who were indicted as counter-revolutionaries died by suicide. During the Red August of 1966, in Beijing alone 1,772 people were murdered. In Shanghai, there were 704 suicides and 534 deaths related to the Cultural Revolution in September. In Wuhan, there were 62 suicides and 32 murders during the same period.<ref>MacFarquhar & Schoenhals; p. 124</ref> Peng Dehuai was brought to Beijing to be publicly ridiculed.


==== Destruction of the Four Olds ==== === Destruction of the Four Olds (August–November) ===
{{main|Four Olds}} {{main|Four Olds}}
] at the Ming tombs. Red Guards dragged the remains of the Wanli Emperor and Empresses to the front of the tomb, where they were posthumously "denounced" and burned<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/08/arts/08iht-wanli08.html?_r=0 |title=China's reluctant Emperor |newspaper=] |date=September 7, 2011 |access-date=February 15, 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161006175341/http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/08/arts/08iht-wanli08.html?_r=0 |archive-date=October 6, 2016 |url-status=live |last1=Melvin |first1=Shelia}}</ref>]]


Between August and November 1966, eight mass rallies were held in which over 12&nbsp;million people from all over the country, most of whom were Red Guards, participated.<ref name="MacFarquhar106" /> The government bore the expenses of Red Guards travelling around the country exchanging "revolutionary experiences".<ref name="MacFarquhar110">] and Schoenhals, Michael. ''Mao's Last Revolution''. ], 2006. p. 110</ref> Between August and November 1966, eight mass rallies were held, drawing in 12&nbsp;million people, most of whom were Red Guards.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|106}} The government bore the travel expenses of Red Guards.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|110}}


At the Red Guard rallies, Lin Biao also called for the destruction of the "Four Olds"; namely, old customs, culture, habits, and ideas.<ref name="disorder2" /> A revolutionary fever swept the country by storm, with Red Guards acting as its most prominent warriors. Some changes associated with the "Four Olds" campaign were mainly benign, such as assigning new names to city streets, places, and even people; millions of babies were born with "revolutionary"-sounding names during this period.<ref>{{cite web|last=Shi|first=Gang|date=2004|title=红卫兵破四旧的文化与政治|url=http://ww2.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/PaperCollection/Details.aspx?id=5436|url-status=live|archive-url=|archive-date=|access-date=2020-06-10|website=Chinese University of Hong Kong|language=zh}}</ref> Other aspects of Red Guard activities were more destructive, particularly in the realms of culture and religion. Various historical sites throughout the country were destroyed. The damage was particularly pronounced in the capital, Beijing. Red Guards also laid siege to the ] in ] province,<ref name="MacFarquhar119">] and Schoenhals, Michael. ''Mao's Last Revolution''. ], 2006. p. 119</ref> and numerous other historically significant tombs and artifacts.<ref name="Asiaweek, Volume 10" /> Libraries full of historical and foreign texts were destroyed; books were burned. Temples, churches, mosques, monasteries, and cemeteries were closed down and sometimes converted to other uses, looted, and destroyed.<ref> {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20051225041328/http://wwwistp.murdoch.edu.au/publications/e_public/Case%20Studies_Asia/tourchin/tourchin.htm |date=December 25, 2005}}</ref> ] propaganda depicted ] as ], and religion was looked upon as a means of hostile foreign infiltration, as well as an instrument of the ruling class.<ref name="Dan Smyer 2007">Yu, Dan Smyer. "Delayed contention with the Chinese Marxist scapegoat complex: re-membering Tibetan Buddhism in the PRC." ''The Tibet Journal'', 32.1 (2007)</ref> ] were arrested and sent to camps; many ] were forced to participate in the destruction of their ] at gunpoint.<ref name="Dan Smyer 2007" /> At the rallies, Lin called for the destruction of the "Four Olds"; namely, old customs, culture, habits, and ideas.<ref name=Nianyi/>{{rp|66}} Some changes associated with the "Four Olds" campaign were mainly benign, such as assigning new names to city streets, places, and even people; millions of babies were born with "revolutionary" names.<ref>{{cite web |last=Shi |first=Gang |year=2004 |script-title=zh:红卫兵 "破四旧" 的文化与政治 |url=http://ww2.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/PaperCollection/Details.aspx?id=5436 |access-date=June 10, 2020 |website=Chinese University of Hong Kong |language=zh}}</ref>


Other aspects were more destructive, particularly in the realms of culture and religion. Historical sites throughout the country were destroyed. The damage was particularly pronounced in the capital, Beijing. Red Guards laid siege to the ] in ],<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|119}} and other historically significant tombs and artifacts.<ref name="Asiaweek, Volume 10" />
=== Central Work Conference (October 1966) ===
] ] at the ]. Red Guards dragged the remains of the Wanli Emperor and Empresses to the front of the tomb, where they were posthumously "denounced" and burned.<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/08/arts/08iht-wanli08.html?_r=0 |title="China's reluctant Emperor", ''&#91;&#91;The New York Times&#93;&#93;'', Shelia Melvin, Sept. 7, 2011. |newspaper=The New York Times |date=September 7, 2011 |access-date=February 15, 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161006175341/http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/08/arts/08iht-wanli08.html?_r=0 |archive-date=October 6, 2016 |url-status=live |last1=Melvin |first1=Shelia}}</ref>]]
] was attacked by Red Guards in November 1966.<ref name="Asiaweek, Volume 10">{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=dIMMAQAAMAAJ&q=cemetery+Tan+Houlan |title=Asiaweek, Volume 10 |publisher= |date=January 1984 |access-date=June 27, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160427051328/https://books.google.com/books?id=dIMMAQAAMAAJ&q=cemetery+Tan+Houlan |archive-date=April 27, 2016 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Jeni Hung">{{cite magazine |url=http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3724/is_200304/ai_n9228762 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060321075615/http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3724/is_200304/ai_n9228762 |url-status=dead |archive-date=March 21, 2006 |title=Children of Confucius |author=Jeni Hung |magazine=The Spectator |accessdate=2007-03-04 |date=April 5, 2003}}</ref>]]


Libraries of historical and foreign texts were destroyed; books were burned. Temples, churches, mosques, monasteries, and cemeteries were closed and sometimes converted to other uses, or looted and destroyed.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://wwwistp.murdoch.edu.au/publications/e_public/Case%20Studies_Asia/tourchin/tourchin.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20051225041328/http://wwwistp.murdoch.edu.au/publications/e_public/Case%20Studies_Asia/tourchin/tourchin.htm |url-status=dead |title=murdoch edu |archive-date=December 25, 2005}}</ref> Marxist propaganda depicted ] as superstition, and religion was looked upon as a means of hostile foreign infiltration, as well as an instrument of the ruling class.<ref name="Dan Smyer 2007">{{Cite book |last=Smyer |first=Dan |title=The Spread of Tibetan Buddhism in China |year=2013 |publisher=Routledge |doi=10.4324/9780203803431 |isbn=978-1-136-63375-1}}</ref> Clergy were arrested and sent to camps; many ] were forced to participate in the destruction of their monasteries at gunpoint.<ref name="Dan Smyer 2007" />
In October 1966, Mao convened a "Central Work Conference", mostly to convince those in the party leadership who had not yet adopted revolutionary ideology. Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping were prosecuted as part of a ] ] line (''zichanjieji fandong luxian'') and begrudgingly gave self-criticisms.<ref>MacFarquhar & Schoenhals; p. 137</ref> After the conference, Liu, once a powerful moderate pundit of the ruling class, was placed under house arrest in Beijing, then sent to a detention camp, where he was denied medical treatment and died in 1969. Deng Xiaoping was sent away for a period of re-education three times and was eventually sent to work in an engine factory in ] province.


<gallery>
===Radicals seized power (1967)===
File:Kong Yanjin - looking north - P1060200.JPG|The ] was attacked by Red Guards in November 1966.<ref name="Asiaweek, Volume 10">{{cite book |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=dIMMAQAAMAAJ}} |title=Asiaweek, Volume 10 |year=1984}}</ref><ref name="Jeni Hung">{{cite magazine |url=http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3724/is_200304/ai_n9228762 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060321075615/http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3724/is_200304/ai_n9228762 |url-status=dead |archive-date=March 21, 2006 |title=Children of Confucius |author=Jeni Hung |magazine=The Spectator |access-date=March 4, 2007 |date=April 5, 2003}}</ref>
{{See also|Seizure of power (Cultural Revolution)|Violent Struggle}}
File:Statue of Emperor - Ming Tombs.jpg|This statue of the ] was originally carved in stone, and was destroyed in the Cultural Revolution. A metal replica is in its place.
Mass organisations in China coalesced into two hostile factions, the radicals who backed Mao's purge of the Communist party, and the conservatives who backed the moderate party establishment. At his birthday party on 26 December 1966, Mao declared an "All-round civil war" to resolve the standoff and asked the military forces of PLA to support "the Left," which was however not clearly defined. As the PLA commanders had developed close working relations with the party establishment, many military units worked instead to repress Mao's radicals.
File:Huineng.jpg|The remains of the 8th century Buddhist monk ] were attacked during the Cultural Revolution.
File:SuzhouGardenFrieze.jpg|A frieze damaged during the Cultural Revolution, originally from a garden house of a rich imperial official in Suzhou.
</gallery>


=== Central Work Conference (October) ===
Spurred by the events in Beijing, ']' (''duoquan'') groups formed all over the country and began expanding into factories and the countryside. In Shanghai, a young factory worker named ] organized a far-reaching revolutionary coalition, one that galvanized and displaced existing Red Guard groups. On January 3, 1967, with support from CRG heavyweights Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, the group of firebrand activists overthrew the Shanghai municipal government under ] in what became known as the "]," and formed in its place the ].<ref>Yan, Jiaqi. Gao, Gao. (1996). Turbulent Decade: A History of the Cultural Revolution. {{ISBN|0-8248-1695-1}}.</ref>
In October 1966, Mao convened a "Central Work Conference", mostly to enlist party leaders who had not yet adopted the latest ideology. Liu and Deng were prosecuted and begrudgingly offered self-criticism.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|137}} After the conference, Liu, once a powerful moderate pundit, was placed under house arrest, then sent to a detention camp, where he was denied medical treatment and died in 1969. Deng was sent away for a period of re-education three times and was eventually sent to work in an engine factory in ]. Rebellion by ] accelerated after the conference.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Walder |first=Andrew G. |year=2016 |title=Rebellion of the Cadres: The 1967 Implosion of the Chinese Party-State |journal=The China Journal |volume=75 |page=119 |doi=10.1086/683125 |s2cid=146977237 |issn=1324-9347}}</ref>


=== End of the year ===
The events in Shanghai were praised by Mao, who encouraged similar activities across China. Provincial governments and many parts of the state and party bureaucracy were affected, with power seizures taking place in a remarkably different fashion. ] were subsequently established, in place of local governments and branches of the ].<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Bridgham|first=Philip|date=1968|title=Mao's Cultural Revolution in 1967: The Struggle to Seize Power|url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/651368|journal=The China Quarterly|issue=34|pages=6–37|issn=0305-7410}}</ref> For example, in Beijing, three separate revolutionary groups declared power seizures on the same day, while in Heilongjiang, the local party secretary ] managed to "seize power" from the party organization under his own leadership. Some leaders even wrote the CRG asking to be overthrown.<ref>MacFaquhar and Schoenhals, pp. 170–172.</ref>
In ], rioting broke out during the ].<ref name="Simpson2023">{{Cite book |last=Simpson |first=Tim |title=Betting on Macau: Casino Capitalism and China's Consumer Revolution |year=2023 |publisher=] |isbn=978-1-5179-0031-1 |series=Globalization and Community series |location=Minneapolis}}</ref>{{rp|84}} The event was prompted by the colonial government's delays in approving a new wing for a CCP elementary school in ].<ref name="Simpson2023" />{{rp|84}} The school board illegally began construction, but the colonial government sent police to stop the workers. Several people were injured in the resulting ]. On December 3, 1966, two days of rioting occurred in which hundreds were injured and six to eight were killed, leading to a total clampdown by the Portuguese government.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Mendes |first=Carmen Amado |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=kebmyB-5-IYC |page=34}} |title=Portugal, China and the Macau Negotiations, 1986–1999 |year=2013 |publisher=] |isbn=978-988-8139-00-2 |page=34}}</ref> The event set in motion Portugal's de facto abdication of control over Macau, putting Macau on the path to eventual absorption by China.<ref name="Simpson2023" />{{rp|84–85}}


By the beginning of 1967, a wide variety of grassroots political organizations had formed. Beyond Red Guard and student rebel groups, these included poor peasant associations, workers' pickets, and Mao Zedong Thought study societies, among others. Communist Party leaders encouraged these groups to "join up", and these groups joined various coalitions and held various cross-group congresses and assemblies.<ref name="Thornton2019" />{{rp|60}}
In Beijing, Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao made a target out of Vice-Premier ]. The ] was rearing its head in the military as well. In February, prominent generals ] and ], as well as Vice-Premier ], vocally asserted their opposition to the more extreme aspects of the movement, with some party elders insinuating that the CRG's real motives were to remove the revolutionary old guard. Mao, initially ambivalent, took to the Politburo floor on February 18 to denounce the opposition directly, giving a full-throated endorsement to the radicals' activities. This short-lived resistance was branded the "]"<ref>MacFaquhar and Schoenhals, pp. 195–196.</ref>—effectively silencing critics of the movement within the party in the years to come.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Wang|first1=Nianyi|title=大动乱的年代:1949–1989 年的中国 |publisher=|year=|isbn=|location=|pages=207–209}}</ref>


==1967: Seizure of power==
While revolutionaries dismantled ruling government and party organizations all over the country, because power seizures lacked centralized leadership, it was no longer clear who truly believed in Mao's revolutionary vision and who was opportunistically exploiting the chaos for their own gain. The formation of rival revolutionary groups, some manifestations of long-established local feuds, led to factional ] across the country. Tension grew between mass organizations and the military as well. In response, Lin Biao issued a directive for the army to aid the radicals. At the same time, the army took control of some provinces and locales that were deemed incapable of sorting out their own power transitions.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Wang|first1=Nianyi|title=大动乱的年代:1949–1989 年的中国 |publisher=|year=|isbn=|location=|pages=219–221}}</ref>
{{See also|Seizure of power (Cultural Revolution)|Violent struggle|Rebel Faction (Cultural Revolution)|Conservative Faction (Cultural Revolution)}}


Mass organizations coalesced into two hostile factions, the radicals who backed Mao's purge of the Communist party, and the conservatives who backed the moderate party establishment. The "support the left" policy was established in January 1967.<ref name="Tanigawa-2018">{{Cite journal |last=Tanigawa |first=Shinichi |year=2018 |title=The Policy of the Military 'Supporting the Left' and the Spread of Factional Warfare in China's Countryside: Shaanxi, 1967–1968 |journal=Modern China |volume=44 |issue=1 |pages=35–67 |doi=10.1177/0097700417714159 |s2cid=148920995 |issn=0097-7004 |doi-access=free}}</ref> Mao's policy was to support the rebels in seizing power; it required the PLA to support "the broad masses of the revolutionary leftists in their struggle to seize power."<ref name="Tanigawa-2018" />
In the central city of Wuhan, like in many other cities, two major revolutionary organizations emerged, one supporting the conservative establishment and the other opposed to it. The groups fought over the control of the city. ], the Army general in charge of the area, forcibly repressed the anti-establishment demonstrators who were backed by Mao. However, during the commotion, Mao himself flew to Wuhan with a large entourage of central officials in an attempt to secure military loyalty in the area. In July 20, 1967, local agitators in response kidnapped Mao's emissary ] in what became known as the ]. Subsequently, Gen. Chen Zaidao was sent to Beijing and tried by Jiang Qing and the rest of the Cultural Revolution Group. Chen's resistance was the last major open display of opposition to the movement within the army.<ref>MacFaquhar and Schoenhals, p. 214.</ref>


The Gang of Four's ], himself, admitted that the most crucial factor in the Cultural Revolution was not the Red Guards or the Cultural Revolution Group or the "rebel worker" organisations, but the side on which the PLA stood. When the PLA local garrison supported Mao's radicals, they were able to take over the local government successfully, but if they were not cooperative, the seizures of power were unsuccessful.<ref>{{cite book |last1=MacFarquhar |first1=Roderick |last2=Schoenhals |first2=Michael |title=Mao's Last Revolution |date=2009 |publisher=Harvard University Press |isbn=978-0674040410 |page=175 |edition=illustrated}}</ref> Violent clashes occurred in virtually all cities, according to one historian. In response to the Wuhan Incident, Mao and Jiang Qing began establishing a "workers' armed self-defence force", a "revolutionary armed force of mass character" to counter what he estimated as rightism in "75% of the PLA officer corps." Chongqing city, a center of arms manufacturing, was the site of ferocious armed clashes between the two factions, with one construction site in the city estimated to involve 10,000 combatants with tanks, mobile artillery, anti-aircraft guns and "virtually every kind of conventional weapon." Ten thousand artillery shells were fired in Chongqing during August 1967.<ref>{{cite book |last1=MacFarquhar |first1=Roderick |last2=Schoenhals |first2=Michael |title=Mao's Last Revolution |date=2009 |publisher=Harvard University Press |isbn=978-0674040410 |pages=214–215, 217 |edition=illustrated}}</ref> Nationwide, a total of 18.77&nbsp;million firearms, 14,828 artillery pieces, 2,719,545 grenades ended up in civilian hands and used in the course of ] which mostly took place from 1967-1968; in the cities of ], ], and ], tanks, armoured vehicles and even warships were deployed in combat.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Song|first1=Yongyi|date=2011|title=Chronology of Mass Killings during the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966–1976)|url=https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/chronology-mass-killings-during-chinese-cultural-revolution-1966-1976|url-status=live|journal=Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence|issn=1961-9898|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190425062821/https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/chronology-mass-killings-during-chinese-cultural-revolution-1966-1976|archive-date=April 25, 2019|access-date=April 25, 2019}}</ref> In March 1967, the policy was adapted into the "Three Supports and Two Militaries" initiative, in which PLA troops were sent to schools and work units across the country to stabilize political tumult and end factional warfare.<ref name="Xu2022">{{Cite book |last1=Xu |first1=Youwei |title=Everyday Lives in China's Cold War Military Industrial Complex: Voices from the Shanghai Small Third Front, 1964–1988 |last2=Wang |first2=Y. Yvon |publisher=] |year=2022 |isbn=978-3030996871}}</ref>{{rp|345}} The three "Supports" were to "support the left", "support the interior", "support industry". The "two Militaries" referred to "military management" and "military training".<ref name="Xu2022" />{{rp|345}} The policy of supporting the left failed to define "leftists" at a time when almost all mass organizations claimed to be "leftist" or "revolutionary".<ref name="Tanigawa-2018" /> PLA commanders had developed close working relations with the party establishment, leading many military units to repress radicals.<ref name="war">{{cite journal |last1=Song |first1=Yongyi |author-link=Song Yongyi |year=2011 |title=Chronology of Mass Killings during the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) |url=https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/chronology-mass-killings-during-chinese-cultural-revolution-1966-1976 |url-status=live |journal=Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence |issn=1961-9898 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190425062821/https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/chronology-mass-killings-during-chinese-cultural-revolution-1966-1976 |archive-date=April 25, 2019 |access-date=April 25, 2019}}</ref>


Spurred by the events in Beijing, ] formed across the country and began expanding into factories and the countryside. In Shanghai, a young factory worker named ] organized a far-reaching revolutionary coalition, one that displaced existing Red Guard groups. On 3 January 1967, with support from CRG heavyweights Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, the group of firebrand activists overthrew the Shanghai municipal government under ] in what became known as the ], and formed in its place the ].<ref name=Jiaqi>{{cite book |last1=Jiaqi |first1=Yan |last2=Gao |first2=Gao |title=Turbulent Decade: A History of the Cultural Revolution |publisher=University of Hawai'i Press |year=1996 |isbn=978-0824816957}}</ref>{{rp|}}<ref name=Lu/>{{rp|115}} Mao then expressed his approval.<ref name="Walder-2016" />
=== Political purges and "Down to the Countryside" (1968) ===
{{Main|Cleansing the Class Ranks|Down to the Countryside Movement}}


] of Red Guards marching in Shanghai, 1967]]
==== Cleansing the Class Ranks (May–Sept.) ====
Shanghai's was the first provincial level government overthrown.<ref name="Walder-2016">{{Cite journal |last=Walder |first=Andrew G. |year=2016 |title=Rebellion of the Cadres: The 1967 Implosion of the Chinese Party-State |journal=The China Journal |volume=75 |page=103 |doi=10.1086/683125 |s2cid=146977237 |issn=1324-9347}}</ref> Provincial governments and many parts of the state and party bureaucracy were affected, with power seizures taking place. In the next three weeks, 24 more province-level governments were overthrown.<ref name="Walder-2016" /> ] were subsequently established, in place of local governments and branches of the Communist Party.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Bridgham |first=Philip |year=1968 |title=Mao's Cultural Revolution in 1967: The Struggle to Seize Power |journal=The China Quarterly |volume=34 |issue=34 |pages=6–37 |doi=10.1017/S0305741000014417 |jstor=651368 |s2cid=145582720 |issn=0305-7410}}</ref> For example, in Beijing, three separate revolutionary groups declared power seizures on the same day. In Heilongjiang, local party secretary ] seized power from the party organization under his own leadership. Some leaders even wrote the CRG asking to be overthrown.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|170–72}}
] rally]]
In May 1968, Mao launched the massive "Cleansing the Class Ranks" ] in ]. Many were sent to the ] to work in ].


In Beijing, Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao targeted Vice-Premier ]. The power-seizure movement was appearing in the military as well. In February, prominent generals ] and ], as well as Vice-Premier ], vocally asserted their opposition to the more extreme aspects of the movement, with some party elders insinuating that the CRG's real motives were to remove the revolutionary old guard. Mao, initially ambivalent, took to the Politburo floor on February 18 to denounce the opposition directly, endorsing the radicals' activities. This resistance was branded the "]"<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|195–196}}—effectively silencing critics within the party.<ref name=Nianyi/>{{rp|207–209}}
On July 27, 1968, the ]' power over the Army was officially ended, and the establishment government sent in units to ] areas that remained untouched by the Guards. A year later, the Red Guard factions were dismantled entirely; Mao predicted that the chaos might begin running its own agenda and be tempted to turn against revolutionary ideology. Their purpose had been largely fulfilled; Mao and his radical colleagues had largely overturned establishment power.{{citation needed|date=December 2018}}


], 1967. The banner in the center reads: "The People's Liberation Army firmly supports the proletarian revolutionary faction."]]
Liu was expelled from the Communist Party at the 12th Plenum of the ] in September 1968, and labelled the "headquarters of the bourgeoisie," seemingly alluding to Mao's '']'' '']'' written two years earlier.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Liu Shaoqi rehabilitated|url=https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/ncm-5/lrs-liu.htm|access-date=2020-06-10|website=www.marxists.org}}</ref>
Although in early 1967 popular insurgencies were limited outside of the biggest cities, local governments began collapsing all across China.<ref name="Walder-2019-1">{{Cite book |last=Walder |first=Andrew G. |title=Agents of disorder: inside China's Cultural Revolution |year=2019 |isbn=978-0-674-24363-7 |location=Cambridge, MA |page=172 |publisher=Harvard University Press |author-link=Andrew G. Walder}}</ref>{{rp|21}} Revolutionaries dismantled ruling government and party organizations, because power seizures lacked centralized leadership, it was no longer clear who believed in Mao's revolutionary vision and who was exploiting the chaos for their own gain. The formation of rival revolutionary groups and manifestations of long-established local feuds, led to ] between factions.


Tension grew between mass organizations and the military. In response, Lin Biao issued a directive for the army to aid the radicals. At the same time, the army took control of some provinces and locales that were deemed incapable of handling the power transition.<ref name="Nianyi" />{{rp|219–221}}
==== Down to the Countryside Movement (Dec.) ====
In December 1968, Mao began the "Down to the Countryside Movement." During this movement, which lasted for the next decade, young bourgeoisie living in cities were ordered to go to the countryside to experience working life. The term "young intellectuals" was used to refer to recently graduated college students. In the late 1970s, these students returned to their home cities. Many students who were previously Red Guard members supported the movement and Mao's vision. This movement was thus in part a means of moving Red Guards from the cities to the countryside, where they would cause less social disruption. It also served to spread revolutionary ideology across China geographically.<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-2PVYI4kAtQC&pg=PA18#v=onepage |title=Made In China: What Western Managers Can Learn from Trailblazing Chinese Entrepreneurs |author= Donald N. Sull |author2= Yong Wang |pages=17–18 |publisher= Harvard Business School Press |year= 2005 |isbn=978-1591397151 }}</ref>


In Wuhan, as in many other cities, two major revolutionary organizations emerged, one supporting and one attacking the conservative establishment. ], the Army general in charge of the area, forcibly repressed the anti-establishment demonstrators. Mao flew to Wuhan with a large entourage of central officials in an attempt to secure military loyalty in the area. On 20 July 1967, local agitators in response kidnapped Mao's emissary ], in what became known as the ]. Subsequently, Chen was sent to Beijing and tried by Jiang Qing and the rest of the CRG. Chen's resistance was the last major open display of opposition within the PLA.<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|214}}
==="Mango fever" and Mao's cult of personality (Aug. 1968)===
{{See also|Mao Zedong's cult of personality}}
]
In the spring of 1968, a massive campaign that aimed at ] began. A notable example was the "mango fever." On August 4, 1968, Mao was presented with about 40 ] by the ], ],<!-- Name not mentioned in sources but dates appear to be correct --> in an apparent diplomatic gesture.<ref name="Murck2013">{{cite book|author=Alfreda Murck|title=Mao's Golden Mangoes and the Cultural Revolution|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=mymWMQEACAAJ|year=2013|publisher=University of Chicago Press|isbn=978-3-85881-732-7|access-date=September 29, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190228032644/https://books.google.com/books?id=mymWMQEACAAJ|archive-date=February 28, 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> Mao had his aide send the box of mangoes to his Mao Zedong Propaganda Team at ] on August 5, the team stationed there to quiet strife among Red Guard factions.<ref name="Walder2015">{{cite book|author=Andrew G. Walder|title=China Under Mao|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=n_qpBwAAQBAJ&pg=PA280|year=2015|publisher=Harvard University Press|isbn=978-0-674-05815-6|pages=280–81|access-date=September 29, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190228032643/https://books.google.com/books?id=n_qpBwAAQBAJ&pg=PA280|archive-date=February 28, 2019|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Mango UofC P.R.">{{cite book |title=Mao's Golden Mangoes and the Cultural Revolution (Press Release) |url=https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/distributed/M/bo15616713.html |website=University of Chicago Press, Books |accessdate=17 August 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190929170716/https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/distributed/M/bo15616713.html |archive-date=September 29, 2019 |url-status=live }}</ref> On August 7, an article was published in the '']'' saying:


The Gang of Four's ] admitted that the most crucial factor in the Cultural Revolution was not the Red Guards or the CRG or the "rebel worker" organisations, but the PLA. When the PLA local garrison supported Mao's radicals, they were able to take over the local government successfully, but if they were not cooperative, the takeovers were unsuccessful.<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|175}} Violent clashes occurred in virtually all major cities.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Chronology of Mass Killings during the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) |url=https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/chronology-mass-killings-during-chinese-cultural-revolution-1966-1976.html |access-date=2024-01-01 |website=www.sciencespo.fr}}</ref>{{bsn|date=October 2024}}
<blockquote>In the afternoon of the fifth, when the great happy news of Chairman Mao giving mangoes to the Capital Worker and Peasant Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Team reached the Tsinghua University campus, people immediately gathered around the gift given by the Great Leader Chairman Mao. They cried out enthusiastically and sang with wild abandonment. Tears swelled up in their eyes, and they again and again sincerely wished that our most beloved Great Leader lived then thousand years without bounds ... They all made phone calls to their own work units to spread this happy news; and they also organised all kinds of celebratory activities all night long, and arrived at Zhongnanhai despite the rain to report the good news, and to express their loyalty to the Great Leader Chairman Mao.<ref name="Walder2015" /></blockquote>


In response to the Wuhan Incident, Mao and Jiang began establishing a "workers' armed self-defense force", a "revolutionary armed force of mass character" to counter what he saw as rightism in "75% of the PLA officer corps".
Subsequent articles were also written by government officials ] the reception of the mangoes,<ref name="Schrift2001">{{citation|author=Melissa Schrift|title=Biography of a Chairman Mao Badge: The Creation and Mass Consumption of a Personality Cult|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=MQFBcWSPRdYC&pg=PA98|year=2001|publisher=Rutgers University Press|isbn=978-0-8135-2937-0|pages=96–98|access-date=September 29, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190228032643/https://books.google.com/books?id=MQFBcWSPRdYC&pg=PA98|archive-date=February 28, 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> and another poem in the ''People's Daily'' said: "Seeing that golden mango/Was as if seeing the great leader Chairman Mao ... Again and again touching that golden mango/the golden mango was so warm."<ref name=Moore2013>{{cite news|last1=Moore|first1=Malcolm|title=How China came to worship the mango during the Cultural Revolution|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/9914895/How-China-came-to-worship-the-mango-during-the-Cultural-Revolution.html|accessdate=January 28, 2016|work=]|date=March 7, 2013|location=Beijing|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151120055831/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/9914895/How-China-came-to-worship-the-mango-during-the-Cultural-Revolution.html|archive-date=November 20, 2015|url-status=live}}</ref> Few people at this time in China had ever seen a mango before, and a mango was seen as "a fruit of extreme rarity, like Mushrooms of Immortality."<ref name=Moore2013 />
]


{{Location map+ |China |width=250 |float=right |caption=Some locations of armed conflict between rebel factions during the summer of 1967. |places=
One of the mangoes was sent to the Beijing Textile Factory,<ref name="Walder2015" /> whose ] organised a rally in the mangoes' honour.<ref name="Schrift2001" /> Workers read out quotations from Mao and celebrated the gift. Altars were erected to display the fruit prominently; when the mango peel began to rot after a few days, the fruit was peeled and boiled in a pot of water. Workers then filed by and each was given a spoonful of mango water. The revolutionary committee also made a wax replica of the mango and displayed this as a centrepiece in the factory. There followed several months of "mango fever," as the fruit became a focus of a "boundless loyalty" campaign for Chairman Mao. More replica mangoes were created, and the replicas were sent on tour around Beijing and elsewhere in China. Many revolutionary committees visited the mangoes in Beijing from outlying provinces; approximately half a million people greeted the replicas when they arrived in ]. Badges and wall posters featuring the mangoes and Mao were produced in the millions.<ref name="Walder2015" />
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In ], an arms manufacturing center, during August 1967, battles involved close to 10,000 combatants, killed or wounded close to 1,000, and created 180,000 refugees in ] alone. ] was destroyed in a battle involving tanks, mobile artillery, and anti-aircraft guns. In ], on 28 August 1967, ] gave orders allowing the PLA to fire on opposing ] factions, killing approximately 100 people and wounding 133. In ] and ], factory clashes killed 37, wounded 290, and led to 300 "prisoners of war", two of whom were ]. At ], a battle in which ] led the victorious faction, killed 18 and wounded 983. In ], fighting during July and August 1967 killed six and wounded 68. In ], on 13 August 1967, two PLA units mistook each other for rebels and opened fire, killing seven people. At ], on 10 August 1967, a firefight caused a panicked commercial pilot to depart early, stranding 54 Japanese passengers. Military control was imposed over the ] in March 1967 and over the ] in August.<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|214–217}}

], including ], were seized during conflicts, but not directly used. Citizens wrote letters to the ] residence of government leaders, warning of attacks on facilities that stored ], ] samples, radioactive substances, poison gas, toxicants, and other dangerous substances. In ], rebels working in geological institutes developed and tested the first ever ], testing two "radioactive self-defense bombs" and two "radioactive self-defense mines" on 6 and 11 August.<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|218–220}}

Nationwide, a total of 18.77&nbsp;million firearms, 14,828 artillery pieces, 2,719,545 grenades ended up in civilian hands. They were used in the course of violent struggles, which mostly took place from 1967 to 1968. In ], ], and ], tanks, armored vehicles and even warships were deployed in combat.<ref name="war" />

During the Cultural Revolution, Mao emphasized the need to improve medical care in rural China.<ref name=":0222">{{Cite book |last=Lin |first=Shuanglin |title=China's Public Finance: Reforms, Challenges, and Options |publisher=] |year=2022 |isbn=978-1-009-09902-8 |edition= |location=New York, NY |pages= |doi=10.1017/9781009099028}}</ref>{{Rp|page=270}} The Rural Cooperative Medical System (RCMS) developed in the late 1960s.<ref name=":0222" />{{Rp|page=270}} In this system, each large production brigade established a medical cooperative station staffed by ].<ref name=":0222" />{{Rp|page=270}} The medical cooperative stations provided primary health care.<ref name=":0222" />{{Rp|page=270}} ] brought healthcare to rural areas where urban-trained doctors would not settle. They promoted basic ], ], and ] and treated common ].<ref name=":16">{{Cite journal |last1=Gong |first1=Y. L. |last2=Chao |first2=L. M. |date=September 1982 |title=The role of barefoot doctors |journal=American Journal of Public Health |volume=72 |issue=9 Suppl |pages=59–61 |doi=10.2105/ajph.72.9_suppl.59 |issn=0090-0036 |pmc=1650037 |pmid=7102877}}</ref> Immunizations were provided free of charge.<ref name=":0222" />{{Rp|page=9}} Public healthcare was highly effective in curbing infectious diseases in rural China.<ref name=":0222" />{{Rp|page=9}} For treatment of major diseases, rural people traveled to state-owned hospitals.<ref name=":0222" />{{Rp|page=270}}

== 1968: Purges ==
{{See also|Cleansing the Class Ranks}}
]]]

In May 1968, Mao launched a massive political purge. Many people were sent to the countryside to work in reeducation camps. Generally, the campaign targeted rebels from the CR's earlier, more populist, phase.<ref name="Xu2022" />{{rp|239}} On 27 July, the Red Guards' power over the PLA was officially ended, and the establishment sent in units to besiege areas that remained untouched by the Guards. A year later, the Red Guard factions were dismantled entirely; Mao predicted that the chaos might begin running its own agenda and be tempted to turn against revolutionary ideology. Their purpose had been largely fulfilled; Mao and his radical colleagues had largely overturned established power.{{citation needed|date=December 2018}}

Liu was expelled from the CCP at the 12th Plenum of the ] in September, and labelled the "headquarters of the bourgeoisie".<ref>{{Cite web |title=Liu Shaoqi rehabilitated |url=https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/ncm-5/lrs-liu.htm |access-date=June 10, 2020 |website=www.marxists.org}}</ref>

=== Mao meets with Red Guard leaders (July) ===
As the Red Guard movement had waned over the preceding year, violence by the remaining Red Guards increased on some Beijing campuses. Violence was particularly pronounced at ], where a few thousand hardliners of two factions continued to fight. At Mao's initiative, on 27 July 1968, tens of thousands of workers entered the Qinghua campus shouting slogans in opposition to the violence. Red Guards attacked the workers, who remained peaceful. Ultimately, the workers disarmed the students and occupied the campus.<ref name="Russo2020">{{Cite book |last=Russo |first=Alessandro |title=Cultural Revolution and revolutionary culture |year=2020 |publisher=] |isbn=978-1-4780-1218-4 |location=Durham, NC}}</ref>{{rp|205–206}}

On 28 July, Mao and the Central Group met with the five most important remaining Beijing Red Guard leaders to address the movement's excessive violence and political exhaustion.<ref name="Russo2020" />{{rp|205–206}} It was the only time during the Cultural Revolution that Mao met and addressed the student leaders directly. In response to a Red Guard leader's telegram sent prior to the meeting, which claimed that some "Black Hand" had maneuvered the workers against the Red Guards, Mao told the student leaders, "The Black Hand is nobody else but me! ... I asked how to solve the armed fighting in the universities, and told them to go there to have a look."<ref name="Russo2020" />{{rp|210}}

During the meeting, Mao and the Central Group for the Cultural Revolution stated, "e want cultural struggle, we do not want armed struggle" and "The masses do not want civil war."<ref name="Russo2020" />{{rp|217}}
{{Blockquote|text=You have been involved in the Cultural Revolution for two years: struggle-criticism-transformation. Now, first, you're not struggling; second, you're not criticizing; and third, you're not transforming. Or rather, you are struggling, but it's an armed struggle. The people are not happy, the workers are not happy, city residents are not happy, most people in schools are not happy, most of the students even in your schools are not happy. Even within the faction that supports you, there are unhappy people. Is this the way to unify the world?}}

===Mao's cult of personality and "mango fever" (August) ===
{{Main|Mango cult}}{{See also|Mao Zedong's cult of personality}}
]

In the spring of 1968, a massive campaign aimed at enhancing Mao's reputation began. A notable example was the "mango fever". On 4 August, Mao was presented with mangoes by the Pakistani foreign minister ],<!-- Name not mentioned in sources but dates appear to be correct --> in an apparent diplomatic gesture.<ref name="Murck2013">{{cite book |first=Alfreda |last=Murck |title=Mao's Golden Mangoes and the Cultural Revolution |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=mymWMQEACAAJ}} |year=2013 |publisher=University of Chicago Press |isbn=978-3-85881-732-7}}</ref> Mao had his aide send the box of mangoes to his propaganda team at ] on 5 August, who were stationed there to quiet strife among Red Guard factions.<ref name="Walder2015">{{cite book |first=Andrew G. |last=Walder |title=China Under Mao |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=n_qpBwAAQBAJ |page=280}} |year=2015 |publisher=Harvard University Press |isbn=978-0-674-05815-6 |pages=280–281}}</ref><ref name="Murck2013"/> On 7 August, an article was published in ''People's Daily'', saying:
<blockquote>In the afternoon of the fifth, when the great happy news of Chairman Mao giving mangoes to the Capital Worker and Peasant Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Team reached the Tsinghua University campus, people immediately gathered around the gift given by the Great Leader Chairman Mao. They cried out enthusiastically and sang with wild abandonment. Tears swelled up in their eyes, and they again and again sincerely wished that our most beloved Great Leader lived ten thousand years without bounds&nbsp;... They all made phone calls to their own work units to spread this happy news; and they also organised all kinds of celebratory activities all night long, and arrived at Zhongnanhai despite the rain to report the good news, and to express their loyalty to the Great Leader Chairman Mao.<ref name="Walder2015" /></blockquote>

]
Subsequent articles also propagandized the mangoes,<ref name="Schrift2001">{{cite book |first1=Melissa |last1=Schrift |title=Biography of a Chairman Mao Badge: The Creation and Mass Consumption of a Personality Cult |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=MQFBcWSPRdYC |page=98}} |year=2001 |publisher=Rutgers University Press |isbn=978-0-8135-2937-0 |pages=96–98 |access-date=September 29, 2019}}</ref> and another poem in the ''People's Daily'' said: "Seeing that golden mango/Was as if seeing the great leader Chairman Mao&nbsp;... Again and again touching that golden mango/the golden mango was so warm."<ref name="Moore2013">{{cite news |last1=Moore |first1=Malcolm |title=How China came to worship the mango during the Cultural Revolution |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/9914895/How-China-came-to-worship-the-mango-during-the-Cultural-Revolution.html |access-date=January 28, 2016 |work=] |date=March 7, 2013 |location=Beijing |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151120055831/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/9914895/How-China-came-to-worship-the-mango-during-the-Cultural-Revolution.html |archive-date=November 20, 2015 |url-status=live}}</ref> Few people at this time had ever seen a mango before, and a mango was seen as "a fruit of extreme rarity, like Mushrooms of Immortality".<ref name="Moore2013" />

One mango was sent to the Beijing Textile Factory,<ref name="Walder2015" /> whose revolutionary committee organized a rally in its honor.<ref name="Schrift2001" /> Workers read quotations from Mao and celebrated the gift. Altars prominently displayed the fruit. When the mango began to rot after a few days, the fruit was peeled and boiled. Workers then filed by and each was given a spoonful of mango water. The revolutionary committee made a wax replica and displayed it in the factory.<ref name="Walder2015" />

Several months of "mango fever" followed as the fruit became a focus of a "boundless loyalty" campaign for Mao. More replica mangoes were created, and the replicas were sent on tour around Beijing and elsewhere. Many revolutionary committees visited the mangoes in Beijing from outlying provinces. Approximately half a million people greeted the replicas when they arrived in ]. Badges and wall posters featuring the mangoes and Mao were produced in the millions.<ref name="Walder2015" />


The fruit was shared among all institutions that had been a part of the propaganda team, and large processions were organised in support of the ''zhengui lipin'' ("precious gift"), as the mangoes were known as.<ref name="Leese2011">{{citation|author=Daniel Leese|title=Mao Cult: Rhetoric and Ritual in China's Cultural Revolution|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=iqjviY6aFloC&pg=PA221|year=2011|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-139-49811-1|pages=221–22|access-date=September 29, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190228032642/https://books.google.com/books?id=iqjviY6aFloC&pg=PA221|archive-date=February 28, 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> One dentist in a small town, Dr. Han, saw the mango and said it was nothing special and looked just like ]; he was put on trial for malicious ], found guilty, paraded publicly throughout the town, and then executed with one shot to the head.<ref name="Moore2013" /><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.collectorsweekly.com/articles/the-mao-mango-cult-of-1968/|title=The Mao Mango Cult of 1968 and the Rise of China's Working Class|last1=Marks|first1=Ben|website=Collectors Weekly|language=en|access-date=2019-02-28|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191105161815/https://www.collectorsweekly.com/articles/the-mao-mango-cult-of-1968/|archive-date=November 5, 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> The fruit was shared among all institutions that had been a part of the propaganda team, and large processions were organized in support of the "precious gift", as the mangoes were known.<ref name="Leese2011">{{citation |author=Daniel Leese |title=Mao Cult: Rhetoric and Ritual in China's Cultural Revolution |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=iqjviY6aFloC |page=221}} |year=2011 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-139-49811-1 |pages=221–222}}</ref> A dentist in a small town, Dr. Han, saw the mango and said it was nothing special and looked just like a sweet potato. He was put on trial for "malicious slander", found guilty, paraded publicly throughout the town, and then shot in the head.<ref name="Moore2013" /><ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.collectorsweekly.com/articles/the-mao-mango-cult-of-1968/ |title=The Mao Mango Cult of 1968 and the Rise of China's Working Class |last1=Marks |first1=Ben |website=Collectors Weekly |access-date=February 28, 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191105161815/https://www.collectorsweekly.com/articles/the-mao-mango-cult-of-1968/ |archive-date=November 5, 2019 |url-status=live}}</ref>


It has been claimed that Mao used the mangoes to express support for the workers who would go to whatever lengths necessary to end the factional fighting among students, and a "prime example of Mao's strategy of symbolic support."<ref name="Schrift2001" /> Even up until early 1969, participants of ] study classes in Beijing would return with mass-produced mango ] and still gain media attention in the provinces.<ref name="Leese2011" /> It has been claimed that Mao used the mangoes to express support for the workers who would go to whatever lengths necessary to end the factional fighting among students, and a "prime example of Mao's strategy of symbolic support."<ref name="Schrift2001" /> Through early 1969, participants of Mao Zedong Thought study classes in Beijing returned with mass-produced mango facsimiles, gaining media attention in the provinces.<ref name="Leese2011" />


== Lin Biao phase (1969–71) == === Down to the Countryside Movement (December) ===
{{Main|Down to the Countryside Movement}}
In December 1968, Mao began the Down to the Countryside Movement. During this movement, which lasted for the following decade, young bourgeoisie living in cities were ordered to go to the countryside to experience working life. The term "young intellectuals" was used to refer to recent college graduates. In the late 1970s, these students returned to their home cities. Many students who were previously Red Guard supported the movement and Mao's vision. This movement was thus in part a means of moving Red Guards from the cities to the countryside, where they would cause less social disruption. It also served to spread revolutionary ideology geographically.<ref>{{cite book |first1=Donald N. |last1=Sull |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=-2PVYI4kAtQC |page=18}} |title=Made In China: What Western Managers Can Learn from Trailblazing Chinese Entrepreneurs |last2=Yong |first2=Wang |publisher=Harvard Business School Press |year=2005 |isbn=978-1591397151 |pages=17–18}}</ref>


== 1969–1971: Lin Biao ==
===Transition of power (Apr. 1969)===
The ] was held in April 1969 and served as a means to "revitalize" the party with fresh thinking and new cadres after much of the old guard had been destroyed in the struggles of preceding years.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 285.</ref> The institutional framework of the Party established two decades earlier had broken down almost entirely: delegates for this Congress were effectively selected by ] rather than through election by party members.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 288.</ref> Representation of the military increased by a large margin from the previous Congress (28% of the delegates were PLA members), and the election of more PLA members to the new Central Committee reflected this increase.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 292.</ref> Many military officers elevated to senior positions were loyal to PLA Marshal Lin Biao, opening a new factional divide between the military and civilian leadership.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals. Chapter 17.</ref> The ] was held in April 1969. It served as a means to "revitalize" the party with fresh thinking—as well as new cadres, after much of the old guard had been destroyed in the struggles of the preceding years.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|285}} The party framework established two decades earlier broke down almost entirely: rather than through an election by party members, delegates for this Congress were effectively selected by Revolutionary Committees.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|288}} Representation of the military increased by a large margin from the previous Congress, reflected in the election of more PLA members to the new Central Committee—over 28%. Many officers now elevated to senior positions were loyal to PLA Marshal Lin Biao, which would open a new rift between the military and civilian leadership.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|292}}
{{Quote box {{Quote box
|quote = We do not only feel boundless joy because we have as our great leader the greatest Marxist-Leninist of our era, Chairman Mao, but also great joy because we have Vice Chairman Lin as Chairman Mao's universally recognized successor. |quote = We do not only feel boundless joy because we have as our great leader the greatest Marxist–Leninist of our era, Chairman Mao, but also great joy because we have Vice Chairman Lin as Chairman Mao's universally recognized successor.
|source = Premier Zhou Enlai at the Ninth Party Congress<ref>As quoted in MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 291.</ref> |source = Premier Zhou Enlai at the 9th Party Congress<ref>{{Cite book |last1=MacFarquhar |first1=Roderick |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=Ch0bH0uX8U0C |page=291}} |title=Mao's Last Revolution |last2=Schoenhals |first2=Michael |year=2009 |publisher=Harvard University Press |isbn=978-0-674-04041-0}}</ref>
|width = 30% |width = 30%
|align = right |align = right
}} }}


Lin Biao was officially elevated to become the Party's number-two figure, with his name written into the ] as Mao's "closest comrade-in-arms" and "universally recognized successor."<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 291. At the time, no other Communist parties or governments anywhere in the world had adopted the practice of enshrining a successor to the current leader into their constitutions; this practice was unique to China.</ref> Lin delivered the ] address at the Congress: a document drafted by hardliner leftists Yao Wenyuan and ] under Mao's guidance.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 289.</ref> The report was heavily critical of Liu Shaoqi and other "counter-revolutionaries" and drew extensively from quotations in the ]. The Congress solidified the central role of Maoism within the party psyche, re-introducing ] as an official guiding ideology of the party in the party constitution. Lastly, the Congress elected a new Politburo with Mao Zedong, Lin Biao, Chen Boda, Zhou Enlai, and Kang Sheng as the members of the new ]. Lin, Chen, and Kang were all beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution. Zhou, who was demoted in rank, voiced his unequivocal support for Lin at the Congress.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 290.</ref> Mao also restored the function of some formal party institutions, such as the operations of the party's Politburo, which ceased functioning between 1966 and 1968 because the Central Cultural Revolution Group held '']'' control of the country.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 296.</ref> Reflecting this, Lin was officially elevated to become the Party's preeminent figure outside of Mao, with his name written into the ] as his "closest comrade-in-arms" and "universally recognized successor".<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|291}} At the time, no other Communist parties or governments anywhere in the world had adopted the practice of enshrining a successor to the current leader into their constitutions. Lin delivered the keynote address at the Congress: a document drafted by hardliner leftists Yao Wenyuan and Zhang Chunqiao under Mao's guidance.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|289}}


The report was heavily critical of Liu Shaoqi and other "counter-revolutionaries" and drew extensively from quotations in the ''Little Red Book''. The Congress solidified the central role of Maoism within the party, re-introducing Maoism as the official guiding ideology in the party constitution. The Congress elected a new Politburo with Mao, Lin, Chen, Zhou Enlai and Kang as the members of the new Politburo Standing Committee.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|290}}
===PLA gains pre-eminent role (1970)===
] was constitutionally confirmed as Mao's successor in 1969.]]
Mao's efforts at re-organizing party and state institutions generated mixed results. Many far-flung provinces remained volatile as the political situation in Beijing stabilized. Factional struggles, many of which were violent, continued at the local level despite the declaration that the ] marked a temporary "victory" for the Cultural Revolution.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 316.</ref> Furthermore, despite Mao's efforts to put on a show of unity at the Congress, the factional divide between Lin Biao's PLA camp and the Jiang Qing–led radical camp was intensifying. Indeed, a personal dislike of ] drew many civilian leaders, including prominent theoretician Chen Boda, closer to Lin Biao.<ref>Qiu, p. 115</ref>


Lin, Chen, and Kang were all beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution. Zhou, who was demoted in rank, voiced his unequivocal support for Lin at the Congress.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|290}} Mao restored the function of some formal party institutions, such as the operations of the Politburo, which ceased functioning between 1966 and 1968 because the CCRG held de facto control.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|296}}
Between 1966 and 1968, China was isolated internationally, having declared its enmity towards both the ] and the United States. The friction with the Soviet Union intensified after ] on the ] in March 1969 as the Chinese leadership prepared for all-out war.<ref name=m317>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 317.</ref> In October, senior leaders were evacuated from Beijing.<ref name=m317/> Amidst the tension, Lin Biao issued what appeared to be an executive order to prepare for war to the PLA's eleven ] on October 18 without passing through Mao. This drew the ire of the Chairman, who saw it as evidence that his authority was prematurely usurped by his declared successor.<ref name=m317/>


In early 1970, the nationwide "]" was launched by Mao and the Communist Party Central, aiming to consolidate the new organs of power by targeting counterrevolutionary thoughts and actions.<ref name="Song-2011a" /> A large number of "minor criminals" were executed or forced to commit suicide between 1970 and 1972.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Yan |first=Fei |date=2024-02-05 |title='Turning One's Back on the Party and the People': Suicides during the Chinese Cultural Revolution |journal=The China Journal |volume=91 |pages=67–88 |doi=10.1086/729112 |issn=1324-9347}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=December 14, 2016 |title=China: the Cultural Revolution |url=https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2016/12/14/china-the-cultural-revolution/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240225111424/https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2016/12/14/china-the-cultural-revolution/#_edn13 |archive-date=2024-02-25 |access-date=2024-03-16 |website=]}}</ref> According to government statistics released after the Cultural Revolution, during the campaign 1.87 million people were persecuted as traitors, spies, and counterrevolutionaries, and over 284,800 were arrested or killed from February to November 1970 alone.<ref name="Song-2011a" />
The prospect of war elevated the PLA to greater prominence in domestic politics, increasing the stature of Lin Biao at the expense of Mao.<ref name=m321>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 321.</ref> There is some evidence to suggest that Mao was pushed to seek closer relations with the United States as a means to avoid PLA dominance in domestic affairs that would result from a military confrontation with the Soviet Union.<ref name=m321/> During his ] with U.S. President ] in 1972, Mao hinted that Lin had opposed seeking better relations with the U.S.<ref name=m322>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 322.</ref>


===PLA encroachment===
==== Restoration of State Chairman ====
] parade]]
After Lin was confirmed as Mao's successor, his supporters focused on the restoration of the position of ] (President),<ref>This position, effectively China's ], has been called "President" since 1982.</ref> which had been abolished by Mao after the purge of Liu Shaoqi. They hoped that by allowing Lin to ease into a constitutionally sanctioned role, whether Chairman or Vice-Chairman, Lin's succession would be institutionalized. The consensus within the ] was that Mao should assume the office with Lin becoming Vice-Chairman; but for unknown reasons, Mao had voiced his explicit opposition to the recreation of the position and his assuming it.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 327.</ref>


Mao's efforts at re-organizing party and state institutions generated mixed results. The situation in some of the provinces remained volatile, even as the political situation in Beijing stabilized. Factional struggles, many violent, continued at a local level despite the declaration that the 9th National Congress marked a temporary victory for the CR.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|316}} Furthermore, despite Mao's efforts to put on a show of unity at the Congress, the factional divide between Lin's PLA camp and the Jiang-led radical camp was intensifying. Indeed, a personal dislike of Jiang drew many civilian leaders, including Chen, closer to Lin.<ref name="Jin">{{cite book |last=Jin |first=Qiu |title=The Culture of Power: Lin Biao and the Cultural Revolution |publisher=Stanford University Press |year=1999 |isbn=978-0804735292}}</ref>{{rp|115}}
Factional rivalries intensified at the Second Plenum of the Ninth Congress in Lushan held in late August 1970. ], now aligned with the PLA faction loyal to Lin, galvanized support for the restoration of the office of President of China, despite Mao's wishes to the contrary.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 331.</ref> Moreover, Chen launched an assault on Zhang Chunqiao, a staunch Maoist who embodied the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, over the evaluation of Mao's legacy.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 328.</ref>


Between 1966 and 1968, China was isolated internationally, having declared its enmity towards both the USSR and the US. The friction with the USSR intensified after ] on the ] in March 1969 as Chinese leaders prepared for all-out war.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|317}} In June 1969, the PLA's enforcement of political discipline and suppression of the factions that had emerged during the Cultural Revolution became intertwined with the central Party's efforts to accelerate ] Those who did not return to work would be viewed as engaging in 'schismatic activity' which risked undermining preparations to defend China from potential invasion.<ref name="Meyskens2020" />{{rp|150–151}}
The attacks on Zhang found favour with many attendees at the Plenum and may have been construed by Mao as an indirect attack on the Cultural Revolution itself. Mao confronted Chen openly, denouncing him as a "false Marxist,"<ref name="m332">MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 332.</ref> and removed him from the ]. In addition to the purge of Chen, Mao asked Lin's principal generals to write self-criticisms on their political positions as a warning to Lin. Mao also inducted several of his supporters to the Central Military Commission and placed his loyalists in leadership roles of the ].<ref name="m332" />


In October 1969, the Party attempted to focus more on war preparedness and less on suppressing factions.<ref name="Meyskens2020" />{{rp|151}} That month, senior leaders were evacuated from Beijing. Amid the tension, Lin issued what appeared to be an executive order to prepare for war to the PLA's eleven ] on October 18 without going through Mao. This drew the ire of the chairman, who saw it as evidence that his declared successor was usurping his authority.<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|317}}
===Flight of Lin Biao (Sept. 1971)===
{{Main|Lin Biao incident}}
]


The prospect of war elevated the PLA to greater prominence in domestic politics, increasing Lin's stature at Mao's expense.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|321}} Some evidence suggests that Mao was pushed to seek closer relations with the US as a means to avoid PLA dominance that would result from a military confrontation with the Soviet Union.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|321}} During his later meeting with ] in 1972, Mao hinted that Lin had opposed better relations with the U.S.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|322}}
By 1971, diverging interests between the civilian and military wings of the leadership were apparent. Mao was troubled by the PLA's newfound prominence, and the purge of Chen Boda marked the beginning of a gradual scaling-down of the PLA's political involvement.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 353.</ref> According to official sources, sensing the reduction of Lin's power base and his declining health, Lin's supporters plotted to use the military power still at their disposal to oust Mao in a coup.<ref name=jin>{{cite book|last1=Qiu|first1=Jin|title=The Culture of Power: The Lin Biao Incident in the Cultural Revolution|year=1999|publisher=Standard University Press|location=Stanford, California}}</ref>


==== Restoration of State Chairman position ====
Lin's son, ], and other high-ranking military conspirators formed a coup apparatus in Shanghai and dubbed the plan to oust Mao by force '']'', which sounds similar to "Military Uprising" in ]. It is disputed whether Lin Biao was involved in this process. While official sources maintain that Lin planned and executed the alleged coup attempt, scholars such as Jin Qiu portray Lin as a passive character manipulated by members of his family and his supporters.<ref name="jin"/> Qiu contests that Lin Biao was never personally involved in drafting the ''Outline'' and evidence suggests that Lin Liguo drafted the coup.<ref name=jin/>
]
After Lin was confirmed as Mao's successor, his supporters focused on the restoration of the position of State Chairman,{{Notetag|This position, effectively China's de jure ], was renamed "President" in 1982.}} which had been abolished by Mao after Liu's purge. They hoped that by allowing Lin to ease into a constitutionally sanctioned role, whether Chairman or vice-chairman, Lin's succession would be institutionalized. The consensus within the ] was that Mao should assume the office with Lin as vice-chairman; but perhaps wary of Lin's ambitions or for other unknown reasons, Mao voiced his explicit opposition.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|327}}


Factional rivalries intensified at the Second Plenum of the Ninth Congress in Lushan held in late August 1970. Chen, now aligned with the PLA faction loyal to Lin, galvanized support for the restoration of the office of President of China, despite Mao's wishes. Moreover, Chen launched an assault on Zhang, a staunch Maoist who embodied the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, over the evaluation of Mao's legacy.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|328–331}}
The ''Outline'' allegedly consisted mainly of plans for aerial bombardments through use of the Air Force. It initially targeted Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, but would later involve Mao himself. If the plan succeeded, Lin would arrest his political rivals and assume power. Assassination attempts were alleged to have been made against Mao in Shanghai, from September 8 to September 10, 1971. Perceived risks to Mao's safety were allegedly relayed to the Chairman. One internal report alleged that Lin had planned to bomb a bridge that Mao was to cross to reach Beijing; Mao reportedly avoided this bridge after receiving intelligence reports.


The attacks on Zhang found favour with many Plenum attendees and may have been construed by Mao as an indirect attack on the CR. Mao confronted Chen openly, denouncing him as a "false Marxist",<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|332}} and removed him from the Politburo Standing Committee. In addition to the purge of Chen, Mao asked Lin's principal generals to write self-criticisms on their political positions as a warning to Lin. Mao also inducted several of his supporters to the Central Military Commission and placed loyalists in leadership roles of the ].<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|332}}
==== Death ====
In the official narrative, on September 13, 1971, Lin Biao, his wife ], Lin Liguo, and members of his staff attempted to flee to the ] ostensibly to ]. En route, Lin's plane crashed in ], killing all on board. The plane apparently ran out of fuel en route to the Soviet Union. A Soviet team investigating the incident was not able to determine the cause of the crash but hypothesized that the pilot was flying low to evade radar and misjudged the plane's altitude.


===Project 571===
The official account has been put to question by foreign scholars, who have raised doubts over Lin's choice of the Soviet Union as a destination, the plane's route, the identity of the passengers, and whether or not a coup was actually taking place.<ref name="jin"/><ref>Hannam and Lawrence 3–4</ref>
{{Main|Project 571}}


By 1971, the diverging interests of the civilian and military leaders was apparent. Mao was troubled by the PLA's newfound prominence, and the purge of Chen marked the beginning of a gradual scaling-down of the PLA's political involvement.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|353}} According to official sources, sensing the reduction of Lin's power base and his declining health, Lin's supporters plotted to use the military power still at their disposal to oust Mao in a coup.<ref name=Jin/>
On September 13, the Politburo met in an emergency session to discuss Lin Biao. Only on September 30 was Lin's death confirmed in Beijing, which led to the cancellation of the ] celebration events the following day. The Central Committee kept information under wraps, and news of Lin's death was not released to the public until two months following the incident.<ref name="jin"/> Many of Lin's supporters sought refuge in Hong Kong; those who remained on the mainland were purged. The event caught the party leadership off guard: the concept that Lin could betray Mao de-legitimized a vast body of Cultural Revolution political rhetoric, as Lin was already enshrined into the Party Constitution as Mao's "closest comrade-in-arms" and "successor." For several months following the incident, the party information apparatus struggled to find a "correct way" to frame the incident for public consumption.<ref name="jin"/>


Lin's son ], along with other high-ranking military conspirators, formed a coup apparatus in Shanghai and dubbed the plan to oust Mao ''Outline for Project 571''{{snd}}in the original Mandarin, the phrase sounds similar to the term for 'military uprising'. It is disputed whether Lin Biao was directly involved in this process. While official sources maintain that Lin did plan and execute the coup attempt, scholars such as Jin Qiu portray Lin as passive, cajoled by elements among his family and supporters. Qiu contests that Lin Biao was ever personally involved in drafting the ''Outline'', with evidence suggesting that Lin Liguo was directly responsible for the draft.<ref name=Jin/>
== "Gang of Four" (1972–76) ==
==== Lin's flight and plane crash ====
{{Main|Gang of Four}}
{{Main|Lin Biao incident}}
]'', with his name (lower right) later scratched out]]
According to the official narrative, on 13 September Lin Biao, his wife ], Lin Liguo, and members of his staff attempted to flee to the USSR ostensibly to seek political asylum. En route, Lin's plane crashed in Mongolia, killing all on board. The plane apparently ran out of fuel. A Soviet investigative team was not able to determine the cause of the crash but hypothesized that the pilot was flying low to evade radar and misjudged the plane's altitude.


The official account was questioned by foreign scholars, who raised doubts over Lin's choice of the USSR as a destination, the plane's route, the identity of the passengers, and whether or not a coup was actually taking place.<ref name=Jin/><ref>Hannam and Lawrence 3–4</ref>
===Antagonism towards Zhou and Deng (1972–73)===
] (left), who was the wife of Mao Zedong and a member of the ], received the ] in Beijing with Premier ] (center) and ]. They were all holding the ] (''Quotations from Mao'') in their hands.|alt=|left]]
Mao became depressed and reclusive after the Lin Biao incident. With Lin gone, Mao had no ready answers for who would succeed him. Sensing a sudden loss of direction, Mao attempted reaching out to old comrades whom he had denounced in the past. Meanwhile, in September 1972, Mao transferred a 38-year-old cadre from Shanghai, ], to Beijing and made him Vice-Chairman of the Party.<ref name="mac357">MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 357.</ref> Wang, a former factory worker from a peasant background,<ref name="mac357" /> was seemingly being groomed for succession.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 364.</ref> ]'s position also strengthened after Lin's flight. She held tremendous influence with the radical camp. With Mao's health on the decline, it was clear that Jiang Qing had political ambitions of her own. She allied herself with Wang Hongwen and propaganda specialists ] and ], forming a political clique later pejoratively dubbed as the "]".{{citation needed|date=December 2018}}


On 13 September, the Politburo met in an emergency session to discuss Lin. His death was confirmed in Beijing only on 30 September, which led to the cancellation of the ] celebration events the following day. The Central Committee did not release news of Lin's death to the public until two months later. Many Lin supporters sought refuge in Hong Kong. Those who remained on the mainland were purged.<ref name=Jin/>
By 1973, round after round of political struggles had left many lower-level institutions, including local government, factories, and railways, short of competent staff needed to carry out basic functions.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 340.</ref> The country's economy had fallen into disarray, which necessitated the rehabilitation of purged lower-level officials. However, the party's core became heavily dominated by Cultural Revolution beneficiaries and leftist radicals, whose focus remained to uphold ideological purity over economic productivity. The economy remained the domain of ] mostly, one of the few moderates 'left standing'. Zhou attempted to restore a viable economy but was resented by the Gang of Four, who identified him as their primary political threat in post-Mao era succession.{{citation needed|date=December 2018}}


The event caught the party leadership off guard: the concept that Lin could betray Mao de-legitimized a vast body of Cultural Revolution political rhetoric and by extension, Mao's absolute authority. For several months following the incident, the party information apparatus struggled to find a "correct way" to frame the incident for public consumption, but as the details came to light, the majority of the Chinese public felt disillusioned and realised they had been manipulated for political purposes.<ref name=Jin/>
In late 1973, to weaken Zhou's political position and to distance themselves from Lin's apparent betrayal, the "]" campaign began under Jiang Qing's leadership.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 366.</ref> Its stated goals were to purge China of ] thinking and denounce Lin Biao's actions as traitorous and regressive.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 372.</ref> Reminiscent of the first years of the Cultural Revolution, the battle was carried out through historical ], and although Zhou Enlai's name was never mentioned during this campaign, the Premier's historical namesake, the ], was a frequent target.{{citation needed|date=December 2018}}


== 1972–1976: The Gang of Four ==
==== Deng's rehabilitation and economic reconstruction (1975) ====
{{Main|Gang of Four}}
With a fragile economy and Zhou falling ill to cancer, Deng Xiaoping returned to the political scene, taking up the post of Vice-Premier in March 1973, in the first of a series of promotions approved by Mao. After Zhou withdrew from active politics in January 1975, Deng was effectively put in charge of the government, party, and military, earning the additional titles of ], Vice-Chairman of the Communist Party, and Vice-Chairman of the ] in a short time span.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 381.</ref>
{{multiple image|perrow = 2/3|total_width=280
|align =right
| image3 = 1967-07 1967年4月20日北京市革命委员会成立 江青.jpg|width3=2466|height3=2952
| image2 = 1967-07_1967年4月20日北京市革命委员会成立_张春桥-上海革委会主任.jpg|width2=653|height2=829
| image4 = Yaowenyuan.jpg |width4=2072|height4=2745
| image1 = Wanghongwen.jpg|width1=3005|height1=3000
| footer = The "]", clockwise from top-left: ], ], ], ]}}
Mao became depressed and reclusive after the Lin incident. With Lin gone, Mao had no answer for who would succeed him. Sensing a sudden loss of direction, Mao reached out to old comrades whom he had denounced in the past. Meanwhile, in September 1972, Mao transferred a 38-year-old cadre from Shanghai, Wang Hongwen, to Beijing and made him Party vice-chairman. Wang, a former factory worker from a peasant background,<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|357}} was seemingly getting groomed for succession.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|364}}


Jiang's position strengthened after Lin's flight. She held tremendous influence with the radical camp. With Mao's health on the decline, Jiang's political ambitions began to emerge. She allied herself with Wang and propaganda specialists Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, forming a political clique later pejoratively dubbed as the ].<ref name="Yao Wenyuan">{{Cite news |url=http://www.economist.com/node/5381892 |title=Yao Wenyuan |newspaper=The Economist |issn=0013-0613 |access-date=2016-05-22 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160623212046/http://www.economist.com/node/5381892 |archive-date=2016-06-23 |url-status=live}}</ref>
The speed of Deng's rehabilitation took the radical camp, who saw themselves as Mao's 'rightful' political and ideological heirs, by surprise. Mao wanted to use Deng as a counterweight to the military faction in government to suppress any remaining influence of those formerly loyal to Lin Biao. In addition, Mao had also lost confidence in the ability of the Gang of Four to manage the economy and saw Deng as a competent and effective leader. Leaving the country in grinding poverty would do no favours to the positive legacy of the Cultural Revolution, which Mao worked hard to protect. Deng's return set the scene for a protracted factional struggle between the radical Gang of Four and moderates led by Zhou and Deng.{{citation needed|date=December 2018}}


] (left) receiving Red Guards in Beijing with ] (center) and ], with each holding a copy of the ''Little Red Book''|alt=]]
At the time, Jiang Qing and associates held effective control of ] and the party's ] network, while Zhou and Deng held control of most government organs. On some decisions, Mao sought to mitigate the Gang's influence, but on others, he acquiesced to their demands. The Gang of Four's heavy hand in political and media control did not prevent Deng from reinstating his economic policies. Deng emphatically opposed Party factionalism, and his policies aimed to promote unity as the first step to restoring economic productivity.<ref name="ReferenceC">MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, Chapter 22</ref>
By 1973, round after round of political struggles had left many lower-level institutions, including local government, factories, and railways, short of competent staff to carry out basic functions.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|340}} China's economy had fallen into disarray, which led to the rehabilitation of purged lower-level officials. The party's core became heavily dominated by Cultural Revolution beneficiaries and radicals, whose focus remained ideological purity over economic productivity. The economy remained mostly Zhou's domain, one of the few remaining moderates. Zhou attempted to restore the economy, but was resented by the Gang of Four, who identified him as their primary political succession threat.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Forster |first=Keith |year=1992 |title=China's Coup of October 1976 |journal=Modern China |volume=18 |issue=3 |pages=263–303 |doi=10.1177/009770049201800302 |jstor=189334 |s2cid=143387271 |issn=0097-7004}}</ref>


In late 1973, to weaken Zhou's political position and to distance themselves from Lin's apparent betrayal, the ] campaign began under Jiang's leadership.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|366}} Its stated goals were to purge China of ] thinking and denounce Lin's actions as traitorous and regressive.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|372}}
Much like the post-] restructuring led by ], Deng streamlined the ], ], and other vital areas of the economy. By late 1975, however, Mao saw that Deng's economic restructuring might negate the legacy of the Cultural Revolution, and launched a campaign to oppose "rehabilitating the case for the rightists," alluding to Deng as the country's foremost "rightist." Mao directed Deng to write self-criticisms in November 1975, a move lauded by the Gang of Four.<ref name="ReferenceC"/>


===Death of Zhou Enlai (early 1976)=== === Deng Xiaoping's rehabilitation (1975) ===
With a fragile economy and Zhou falling ill to cancer, Deng Xiaoping returned to the political scene, assuming the post of Vice-Premier in March 1973, in the first of a series of Mao-approved promotions. After Zhou withdrew from active politics in January 1975, Deng was effectively put in charge of the government, party, and military, then adding the additional titles of ], ], and vice-chairman of the ].<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|381}}
On January 8, 1976, ] died of ]. On January 15 ] delivered Zhou's official ] in a funeral attended by all of China's most senior leaders with the notable absence of Mao himself, who had grown increasingly critical of Zhou.<ref>Teiwes and Sun 217–218</ref><ref>Spence 610</ref> After Zhou's death, Mao selected neither a member of the Gang of Four nor Deng to become Premier, instead choosing the relatively unknown ].<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=tprrCQAAQBAJ&pg=PT490&lpg=PT490&dq=after+Zhou's+death,+Mao+selected+neither+a+member+of+the+Gang+of+Four+nor+Deng+Xiaoping+to+become+Premier,+instead+choosing+the+relatively+unknown+Hua+Guofeng.#v=onepage|title=The Life/Death Rhythms of Capitalist Regimes - Debt Before Dishonour: Timetable of World Dominance 1400-2100|last1=Slatyer|first1=Will|date=2015-02-20|publisher=Partridge Publishing Singapore|isbn=9781482829617|language=en}}</ref>


The speed of Deng's rehabilitation took the radical camp by surprise. Mao wanted to use Deng as a counterweight to the military faction in government to suppress former Lin loyalists. In addition, Mao had also lost confidence in the Gang of Four and saw Deng as the alternative. Leaving the country in grinding poverty would damage the positive legacy of the CR, which Mao worked hard to protect. Deng's return set the scene for a protracted factional struggle between the radical Gang of Four and moderates led by Zhou and Deng.{{citation needed|date=December 2018}}
The Gang of Four grew apprehensive that spontaneous, large-scale popular support for Zhou could turn the political tide against them. They acted through the media to impose a set of restrictions on overt public displays of mourning for Zhou. Years of resentment over the Cultural Revolution, the public persecution of Deng Xiaoping (seen as Zhou's ally), and the prohibition against public mourning led to a rise in popular discontent against Mao and the Gang of Four.<ref name="TS1">Tiewes and Sun, 213</ref>


At the time, Jiang and associates held effective control of mass media and the party's ], while Zhou and Deng held control of most government organs. On some decisions, Mao sought to mitigate the Gang's influence, but on others, he acquiesced to their demands. The Gang of Four's political and media control did not prevent Deng from enacting his economic policies. Deng emphatically opposed Party factionalism, and his policies aimed to promote unity to restore economic productivity. Much like the post-Great Leap restructuring led by Liu Shaoqi, Deng streamlined the ], ], etc. By late 1975, however, Mao saw that Deng's economic restructuring might negate the CR's legacy and launched the ], a campaign to oppose "rehabilitating the case for the rightists", alluding to Deng as the country's foremost "rightist". Mao directed Deng to write self-criticisms in November 1975, a move lauded by the Gang of Four.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|381}}
Official attempts to enforce the mourning restrictions included removing public memorials and tearing down posters commemorating Zhou's achievements. On March 25, 1976, Shanghai's '']'' published an article calling Zhou "the ] roader inside the Party wanted to help the unrepentant capitalist roader regain his power." These propaganda efforts at smearing Zhou's image, however, only strengthened public attachment to Zhou's memory.<ref>Teiwes and Sun 214</ref>


===Tiananmen Incident (Apr. 1976)=== ===Death of Zhou Enlai===
On 8 January 1976, Zhou Enlai died of bladder cancer. On 15 January, Deng delivered Zhou's eulogy in a funeral attended by all of China's most senior leaders with the notable absence of Mao, who had grown increasingly critical of Zhou.<ref name=Teiwes>{{cite journal |first1=Frederick |last1=Teiwes |first2=Warren |last2=Sun |title=The First Tiananmen Incident Revisited: Elite Politics and Crisis Management at the End of the Maoist Era |journal=] |year=2004 |volume=77 |issue=2 |pages=211–235 |jstor=40022499}}</ref>{{rp|217–218}}<ref name=Spence>{{cite book |last=Spence |first=Jonathan |author-link=Jonathan Spence |title=The Search for Modern China |publisher=W. W. Norton |year=1999 |isbn=0-393-97351-4}}</ref>{{rp|610}} After Zhou's death, Mao selected the relatively unknown ] instead of a member of the Gang of Four or Deng to become Premier.<ref>{{Cite book |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=tprrCQAAQBAJ |page=490}} |page=490 |title=The Life/Death Rhythms of Capitalist Regimes – Debt Before Dishonour: Timetable of World Dominance 1400–2100 |last1=Slatyer |first1=Will |year=2015 |publisher=Partridge |isbn=978-1482829617}}</ref>
{{Main|Tiananmen Incident}}
]
On April 4, 1976, on the eve of China's annual ], a traditional day of mourning, thousands of people gathered around the ] in ] to commemorate Zhou Enlai. The people of Beijing honored Zhou by laying wreaths, banners, poems, placards, and flowers at the foot of the Monument.<ref name="Tiananmen1" /> The most apparent purpose of this memorial was to eulogize Zhou, but the Gang of Four were also attacked for their actions against the Premier. A small number of slogans left at Tiananmen even attacked Mao himself, and his Cultural Revolution.<ref name="TS2">Teiwes and Sun 218</ref>


The Gang of Four grew apprehensive that spontaneous, large-scale popular support for Zhou could turn the political tide against them. They acted through the media to impose restrictions on public displays of mourning for Zhou. Years of resentment over the CR, the public persecution of Deng—seen as Zhou's ally—and the prohibition against public mourning led to a rise in popular discontent against Mao and the Gang of Four. Official attempts to enforce the mourning restrictions included removing public memorials and tearing down posters commemorating Zhou's achievements. On 25 March 1976, Shanghai's '']'' published an article calling Zhou "the ] inside the Party wanted to help the unrepentant capitalist roader regain his power." These propaganda efforts at smearing Zhou's image, however, only strengthened public attachment to Zhou's memory.<ref name=Teiwes/>{{rp|213–214}}
Up to two million people may have visited Tiananmen Square on April 4.<ref name="TS2"/> All levels of society, from the most impoverished peasants to high-ranking PLA officers and the children of high-ranking cadres, were represented in the activities. Those who participated were motivated by a mixture of anger over the treatment of Zhou, revolt against the Cultural Revolution and apprehension for China's future. The event did not appear to have coordinated leadership but rather seemed to be a reflection of public sentiment.<ref>Teiwes and Sun 119–220</ref>


===Tiananmen incident===
The Central Committee, under the leadership of Jiang Qing, labelled the event 'counter-revolutionary' and cleared the square of memorial items shortly after midnight on April 6. Attempts to suppress the mourners led to a violent riot. Police cars were set on fire, and a crowd of over 100,000 people forced its way into several government buildings surrounding the square.<ref name="Tiananmen1">Spence, 612</ref> Many of those arrested were later sentenced to prison work camps. Similar incidents occurred in other major cities. Jiang Qing and her allies pinned Deng Xiaoping as the incident's 'mastermind', and issued reports on official media to that effect. Deng was formally stripped of all positions "inside and outside the Party" on April 7. This marked Deng's second purge in ten years.<ref name="Tiananmen1" />
{{Main|1976 Tiananmen incident}}


On 4 April 1976, on the eve of China's annual ], a traditional day of mourning, thousands of people gathered around the ] in Tiananmen Square to commemorate Zhou. They honored Zhou by laying wreaths, banners, poems, placards, and flowers at the foot of the Monument.<ref name=Spence/>{{rp|612}} The most apparent purpose of this memorial was to eulogize Zhou, but the Gang of Four were also attacked for their actions against the Premier. A small number of slogans left at Tiananmen even attacked Mao and his Cultural Revolution.<ref name=Teiwes/>{{rp|218}}
===Death of Mao and Arrest of the Gang of Four (Sept. 1976)===

Up to two million people may have visited Tiananmen Square on 4 April. All levels of society, from the most impoverished peasants to high-ranking PLA officers and the children of high-ranking cadres, were represented in the activities. Those who participated were motivated by a mixture of anger over Zhou's treatment, revolt against the Cultural Revolution and apprehension for China's future. The event did not appear to have coordinated leadership.<ref name=Teiwes/>{{rp|218–220}}

The Central Committee, under the leadership of Jiang Qing, labelled the event 'counter-revolutionary' and cleared the square of memorial items shortly after midnight on April 6. Attempts to suppress the mourners led to a riot. Police cars were set on fire, and a crowd of over 100,000 people forced its way into several government buildings surrounding the square. Many of those arrested were later sentenced to prison. Similar incidents occurred in other major cities. Jiang and her allies attacked Deng as the incident's 'mastermind', and issued reports on official media to that effect. Deng was formally stripped of all positions inside and outside the Party on 7 April. This marked Deng's second purge.<ref name=Spence/>{{rp|612}}

===Death of Mao Zedong and the Gang of Four's downfall===
{{See also|Death and state funeral of Mao Zedong}} {{See also|Death and state funeral of Mao Zedong}}
On September 9, 1976, Mao Zedong died. To Mao's supporters, his death symbolized the loss of the revolutionary foundation of Communist China. When his death was announced on the afternoon of September 9, in a press release entitled "A Notice from the Central Committee, the NPC, State Council, and the CMC to the whole Party, the whole Army and to the people of all nationalities throughout the country,"<ref>{{cite web|url=http://news.sina.com.cn/c/144508.html |script-title=zh:1976.9.10 毛主席逝世--中共中央等告全国人民书(附图)|publisher=] |work=] |date=2000-11-12 |access-date=March 21, 2007|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20041214123917/http://news.sina.com.cn/c/144508.html|archive-date=December 14, 2004|url-status=live}}</ref> the nation descended into grief and mourning, with people weeping in the streets and public institutions closing for over a week. Hua Guofeng chaired the Funeral Committee and delivered the memorial speech.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Memorial speech by Hua Kuo-Feng|url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hua-guofeng/1976/09/18.htm|website=www.marxists.org|access-date=2020-05-07}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=毛泽东葬礼上的江青:头戴黑纱 面无表情_历史频道_凤凰网|url=http://news.ifeng.com/history/zhiqing/detail_2011_12/06/11135418_0.shtml?_from_ralated|last=|first=|date=|website=news.ifeng.com|language=zh|url-status=live|archive-url=|archive-date=|access-date=2020-05-07}}</ref> On 9 September 1976, Mao Zedong died. To Mao's supporters, his death symbolized the loss of China's revolutionary foundation. His death was announced on 9 September.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://news.sina.com.cn/c/144508.html |script-title=zh:1976.9.10 毛主席逝世中共中央等告全国人民书(附图) |publisher=] |work=] |date=November 12, 2000 |access-date=March 21, 2007 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20041214123917/http://news.sina.com.cn/c/144508.html |archive-date=December 14, 2004 |url-status=live}}</ref> The nation descended into grief and mourning, with people weeping in the streets and public institutions closing for over a week. Hua Guofeng chaired the Funeral Committee and delivered the memorial speech.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Memorial speech by Hua Kuo-Feng |url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hua-guofeng/1976/09/18.htm |website=www.marxists.org |access-date=May 7, 2020}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |script-title=zh:毛泽东葬礼上的江青:头戴黑纱 面无表情 |trans-title=Jiang Qing at Mao's funeral: black veil on her head, expressionless face |url-status=dead |url=http://news.ifeng.com/history/zhiqing/detail_2011_12/06/11135418_0.shtml?_from_ralated |website=] |access-date=May 7, 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111206233053/http://news.ifeng.com/history/zhiqing/detail_2011_12/06/11135418_0.shtml |archive-date=December 6, 2011 |language=zh}}</ref>

Shortly before dying, Mao had allegedly written the message "]," to Hua. Hua used this message to substantiate his position as successor. Hua had been widely considered to be lacking in political skill and ambitions, and seemingly posed no serious threat to the Gang of Four in the race for succession. However, the Gang's radical ideas also clashed with influential elders and many Party reformers. With army backing and the support of Marshal Ye Jianying, Director of Central Office ], Vice Premier ] and party elder ], on October 6, the ]'s Special Unit 8341 had all members of the Gang of Four arrested in a bloodless coup.<ref>{{Cite journal |jstor=189334 |title=China's Coup of October 1976 |journal=Modern China |volume=18 |issue=3 |pages=263–303 |last1=Forster |first1=Keith |year=1992 |doi=10.1177/009770049201800302 |s2cid=143387271}}</ref>


After Mao's death, people characterized as 'beating-smashing-looting elements', who were seen as having disturbed the social order during the CR, were purged or punished. "Beating-smashing-looting elements" had typically been aligned with rebel factions.<ref name="Xu2022" />{{rp|359}}
Shortly before dying, Mao had allegedly written the message "With you in charge, I'm at ease," to Hua. Hua used this message to substantiate his position as successor. Hua had been widely considered to be lacking in political skill and ambitions, and seemingly posed no serious threat to the Gang of Four in the race for succession. However, the Gang's radical ideas also clashed with influential elders and a large segment of party reformers. With army backing and the support of Marshal Ye Jianying, on October 6, the ] had all members of the Gang of Four arrested in a bloodless coup.<ref>{{Cite journal |jstor = 189334|title = China's Coup of October 1976|journal = Modern China|volume = 18|issue = 3|pages = 263–303|last1 = Forster|first1 = Keith|year = 1992|doi = 10.1177/009770049201800302}}</ref>


==Aftermath== ==Aftermath==


=== Transition period === === Transitional period ===
Although ] publicly denounced the Gang of Four in 1976, he continued to invoke Mao's name to justify Mao-era policies. Hua spearheaded what became known as the ],<ref name = "Harding"/> namely, "Whatever policy originated from Chairman Mao, we must continue to support," and "Whatever directions were given to us from Chairman Mao, we must continue to follow." Like Deng, Hua wanted to reverse the damage of the Cultural Revolution; but unlike Deng, who wanted to propose new economic models for China, Hua intended to move the Chinese economic and political system towards Soviet-style planning of the early 1950s.<ref>]. 2014. ''The Chinese Debate about Soviet Socialism, 1978-1985''. Princeton: ]. pp. 63–68. {{ISBN|9781400858590}}. Although Hua publicly denounced the Gang of Four in 1976, he continued to invoke Mao's name to justify Mao-era policies. Hua spearheaded what became known as the ],<ref name = "Harding"/> namely, "Whatever policy originated from Chairman Mao, we must continue to support," and "Whatever directions were given to us from Chairman Mao, we must continue to follow." Like Deng, Hua wanted to reverse the CR's damage; but unlike Deng, who wanted new economic models for China, Hua intended to move the Chinese economic and political system towards Soviet-style planning.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Rozman |first=Gilbert |author-link=Gilbert Rozman |year=1987 |title=The Chinese Debate about Soviet Socialism, 1978–1985 |publisher=] |doi=10.1515/9781400858590 |pages=63–68 |isbn=978-1400858590}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |editor1-first=Martin M. |editor1-last=McCauley |date=2016-07-08 |journal=Leadership and Succession in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China |doi=10.4324/9781315494890 |last=Ferdinand |first=Pete |orig-year=1986 |title=China |pages=194–204 |editor2-first=Stephen |editor2-last=Carter |location=New York |publisher=Routledge |isbn=9781315494890}}</ref>
</ref><ref>Ferdinand, Peter. 1986. "China." Pp. 194–204 in ''Leadership and Succession in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China'', edited by ] and S. Carter. Armonk, NY: ].</ref>


It became increasingly clear to Hua that, without Deng Xiaoping, it was difficult to continue daily affairs of state. On October 10, Deng Xiaoping personally wrote a letter to Hua asking to be transferred back to state and party affairs; party elders also called for Deng's return. With increasing pressure from all sides, Premier Hua named Deng Vice-Premier in July 1977, and later promoted him to various other positions, effectively catapulting Deng to China's second-most powerful figure. In August, the Party's ] was held in Beijing, officially naming (in ranking order) Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, ] and Wang Dongxing as new members of the Politburo Standing Committee.<ref> {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070624082411/http://www.nihaotw.com/zhuanti/16da/pages/ghls_11.htm |date=June 24, 2007 }}</ref> It became increasingly clear to Hua, that without Deng, it was difficult to continue daily affairs of state. On 10 October, Deng wrote a letter to Hua asking to be transferred back to state and party affairs; party elders also called for Deng's return. With increasing pressure from all sides, Premier Hua named Deng Vice-Premier in July 1977, and later promoted him to various other positions, effectively elevating Deng to be China's second-most powerful figure. In August, the ] was held in Beijing, officially naming (in ranking order) Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, ] and Wang Dongxing as new members of the Politburo Standing Committee.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.nihaotw.com/zhuanti/16da/pages/ghls_11.htm |title=Basic Knowledge about the Communist Party of China: The Eleventh Congress |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070624082411/http://www.nihaotw.com/zhuanti/16da/pages/ghls_11.htm |archive-date=June 24, 2007}}</ref>


===Repudiation and reform under Deng===
=== Deng Xiaoping invalidated the Cultural Revolution ===
{{See also|Boluan Fanzheng|Reforms and Opening Up}} {{See also|Boluan Fanzheng|1978 Truth Criterion Controversy|Reforms and Opening Up}}
] became the ] in 1978. He started "]" that brought the country back to order, and initiated China's historic ].|alt=]] ] became the ] in 1978. He started the process of ]|alt=]]
] first proposed the idea of "]" in September 1977 in order to correct the mistakes of Cultural Revolution. In May 1978, Deng seized the opportunity to elevate his protégé ] to power. Hu published an article in the '']'', making clever use of Mao's quotations while lauding Deng's ideas. Following this article, Hua began to shift his tone in support of Deng. On July 1, Deng publicized Mao's self-criticism report of 1962 regarding the failure of the Great Leap Forward. With an expanding power base, in September 1978, Deng began openly attacking Hua Guofeng's "Two Whatevers".<ref name="Harding">Harding, Harry. (1987). China's Second Revolution: Reform after Mao. Brookings Institution Press. {{ISBN|0-8157-3462-X}}</ref>


Deng Xiaoping first proposed what he called ''Boluan Fanzheng'' in September 1977 in order to correct the mistakes of the Cultural Revolution.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Bradsher |first1=Keith |last2=Wellman |first2=William J. |date=2008-08-20 |title=Hua Guofeng, Transitional Leader of China After Mao, Is Dead at 87 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/21/world/asia/21hua.html |access-date=2022-03-16 |work=The New York Times |issn=0362-4331}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Barmé |first=Geremie R. |title=History for the Masses |url=http://www.morningsun.org/stages/history_for_the_masses.html |access-date=2022-03-16 |website=Morning Sun}}</ref> In May 1978, Deng seized the opportunity to elevate his protégé ] to power. Hu published an article in the '']'', making clever use of Mao's quotations, while lauding Deng's ideas. Following this article, Hua began to shift his tone in support of Deng. On 1 July, Deng publicized Mao's self-criticism report of 1962 regarding the failure of the Great Leap Forward. As his power base expanded, in September Deng began openly attacking Hua Guofeng's "Two Whatevers".<ref name="Harding">{{Cite book |last=Harding |first=Harry |title=China's second revolution: reform after Mao |year=1987 |publisher=The Brookings Institution |isbn=978-0-8157-3462-8 |location=Washington, D.C.}}</ref> The "]", launched by Deng and Hu and their allies, also triggered a decade-long ] movement in mainland China, promoting democracy, ] and universal values, while opposing the ideology of Cultural Revolution.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Xu |first=Jilin |author-link=Xu Jilin |date=December 2000 |title=The fate of an enlightenment: twenty years in the Chinese intellectual sphere (1978–98) |url=https://www.eastasianhistory.org/sites/default/files/article-content/20/EAH20_06.pdf |journal=East Asian History |publisher=] |issue=20 |pages=169–186}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Li |first=Huaiyin |url=https://academic.oup.com/hawaii-scholarship-online/book/15223/chapter-abstract/169722777?redirectedFrom=fulltext |title=Reinventing Modern China: Imagination and Authenticity in Chinese Historical Writing |year=2012 |publisher=] |isbn=9780824836085 |chapter=Challenging the Revolutionary Orthodoxy: 'New Enlightenment' Historiography in the 1980s}}</ref>
On December 18, 1978, the pivotal ] was held. At the congress, Deng called for "a liberation of thoughts" and urged the party to "]" and abandon ideological dogma. The Plenum officially marked the beginning of the ], with Deng becoming the second ]. Hua Guofeng engaged in self-criticism and called his "Two Whatevers" a mistake. ], a trusted ally of Mao, was also criticized. At the Plenum, the Party reversed its verdict on the ]. Disgraced former Chinese president ] was allowed a belated state funeral.<ref>Andrew, Christopher. Mitrokhin, Vasili. (2005). The World was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World. Basic Books Publishing. {{ISBN|0-465-00311-7}}</ref> ], one of China's ] and the first ], was persecuted to death during the Cultural Revolution; he was politically rehabilitated in 1978.


On 18 December 1978, ] was held. At the congress, Deng called for "a liberation of thoughts" and urged the party to "]" and abandon ideological dogma. The Plenum officially marked the beginning of the ], as Deng rose to become the #2 leader of China. Hua Guofeng engaged in self-criticism and called his "Two Whatevers" a mistake. Mao's trusted ally Wang Dongxing was also criticized. At the Plenum, the Party reversed its verdict on the Tiananmen Incident. Former Chinese president Liu Shaoqi was given a belated state funeral.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Legvold |first1=Robert |last2=Andrew |first2=Christopher |last3=Mitrokhin |first3=Vasili |year=2006 |title=The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World |journal=Foreign Affairs |volume=85 |issue=1 |pages=158 |jstor=20031879 |issn=0015-7120}}</ref> Peng Dehuai, one of China's ] and the first Minister of National Defense, who was persecuted to death during the Cultural Revolution was rehabilitated in 1978.
At the Fifth Plenum held in 1980, ], ] and other leaders who had been purged during the Cultural Revolution were politically rehabilitated. Hu Yaobang became head of the ] as its ]. In September, Hua Guofeng resigned and ], another Deng's ally, was named ]. Deng remained the ], but formal power was transferred to a new generation of pragmatic reformers, who reversed Cultural Revolution policies to a large extent during the Boluan Fanzheng period. Within a few years from 1978, Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang helped rehabilitate over 3&nbsp;million "unjust, false, erroneous" cases in Cultural Revolution.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.hybsl.cn/zonghe/xinwen/2008-01-23/7141.html|title=胡耀邦史料信息网 |last= |first= |date= |website=www.hybsl.cn|language=zh|url-status=live|archive-url=|archive-date=|access-date=2020-02-17}}</ref> In particular, the trial of the so-called Gang of Four took place in Beijing from 1980 to 1981, and the court stated that 729,511 people had been persecuted by the Gang, of whom 34,800 were said to have died.<ref>James P. Sterba, ''The New York Times'', January 25, 1981</ref>


At the Fifth Plenum held in 1980, Peng Zhen, ] and other leaders who had been purged during the Cultural Revolution were rehabilitated. Hu Yaobang became head of the ] as its ]. In September, Hua Guofeng resigned and ], another Deng ally, was named ]. Hua remained on the ], but formal power was transferred to a new generation of pragmatic reformers, who reversed Cultural Revolution policies to a large extent. Within a few years, Deng and Hu helped rehabilitate over 3&nbsp;million "unjust, false, erroneous" cases.<ref>{{cite web |date=June 1, 1989 |script-title=zh:胡耀邦同志领导平反"六十一人案"追记 |url=http://www.hybsl.cn/zonghe/xinwen/2008-01-23/7141.html |access-date=February 17, 2020 |website=www.hybsl.cn |publisher=] |language=zh |archive-date=January 3, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210103094052/http://www.hybsl.cn/zonghe/xinwen/2008-01-23/7141.html |url-status=dead}}</ref> In particular, the trial of the Gang of Four took place in Beijing from 1980 to 1981, and the court stated that 729,511 people had been persecuted by the Gang, of whom 34,800 were said to have died.<ref>Sterba, James P. ''The New York Times'', January 25, 1981</ref>
In 1981, the Communist Party of China passed a resolution and declared that the Cultural Revolution was "responsible for the most severe setback and the heaviest losses suffered by the Party, the country, and the people since the founding of the People's Republic."<ref name=":18" /><ref name=":10" />


In 1981, the Chinese Communist Party passed a resolution and declared that the Cultural Revolution was "responsible for the most severe setback and the heaviest losses suffered by the Party, the country, and the people since the founding of the People's Republic."<ref name="PRC-2020">{{Cite web |script-title=zh:关于建国以来党的若干历史问题的决议 |url=http://www.gov.cn/test/2008-06/23/content_1024934_2.htm |access-date=April 23, 2020 |website=The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China |language=zh}}</ref><ref name="Wilson Center-1981">{{Cite web |date=June 27, 1981 |title=Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People's Republic of China |url=https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121344.pdf?v=d461ad5001da989b8f96cc1dfb3c8ce7 |website=Wilson Center}}</ref><ref name="CCCCP-11">{{Cite book |url=https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/cpc/history/index.htm |title=Resolution on CPC History |chapter=6th Plenary Session of the ] "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China." |access-date=2023-11-19 |via=www.marxists.org}}</ref>
== Humanitarian crisis ==
] of ] and his wife during the Cultural Revolution.]]


== Atrocities ==
===Death toll=== ===Death toll===
] in September 1967 targeting ], the father of ], who had been labeled an "anti-party element"<ref>{{Cite web |title=Beijing Revises 'Correct' Version of Party History Ahead of Centenary |url=https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/history-04152021091451.html |access-date=May 20, 2021 |website=Radio Free Asia}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Cole |first=J. Michael |date=April 22, 2021 |title=The Chinese Communist Party is playing dangerous games with history |url=https://ipolitics.ca/2021/04/22/the-chinese-communist-party-is-playing-dangerous-games-with-history/ |url-status=live |access-date=May 20, 2021 |website=iPolitics |archive-date=2021-04-22 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210422235008/https://ipolitics.ca/2021/04/22/the-chinese-communist-party-is-playing-dangerous-games-with-history/}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=With whiffs of Cultural Revolution, Xi calls for struggle 50 times |url=https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/With-whiffs-of-Cultural-Revolution-Xi-calls-for-struggle-50-times |access-date=May 20, 2021 |website=Nikkei}}</ref>]]
Estimates of the death toll in Cultural Revolution, including civilians and Red Guards, vary greatly, ranging from hundreds of thousands to 20&nbsp;million.<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":2" /><ref name=":3" /><ref name=":4" /><ref name=":0" /><ref name=":5" /> The exact figure of those who were persecuted or died during the Cultural Revolution, however, may never be known, since many deaths went unreported or were actively covered up by the police or local authorities. The state of Chinese demographics records was also deplorable at the time, and the PRC has been hesitant to allow formal research into the period.<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070810235018/http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,483023,00.html|date=August 10, 2007}} by Andreas Lorenz (Beijing) '']'' Online. May 15, 2007</ref> In addition, the ], considered by some as the greatest technological catastrophe of the world, occurred in ] region of ] in August 1975, resulting in a death toll of 85,600 to 240,000.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.ozy.com/flashback/230000-died-in-a-dam-collapse-that-china-kept-secret-for-years/91699/|title=230,000 Died in a Dam Collapse That China Kept Secret for Years|date=2019-02-17|website=OZY|access-date=2020-03-26}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.globaltimes.cn/special/2011-02/621272_4.html|title=Ecologists dread new dam boom - GlobalTimes|website=www.globaltimes.cn|access-date=2020-03-26}}</ref>


Fatality estimates vary across different sources, ranging from hundreds of thousands to millions, or even tens of millions.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Chirot |first=Daniel |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=e-kVgozyE8gC |page=198}} |title=Modern Tyrants: The Power and Prevalence of Evil in Our Age |year=1996 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-0-691-02777-7 |pages=198 |quote=At least one million died, though some estimates of deaths go as high as 20 million |author-link=Daniel Chirot}}</ref><ref name="Song-2011c">{{Cite web |last=Song |first=Yongyi |author-link=Song Yongyi |date=2011-10-11 |script-title=zh:文革中到底"非正常死亡"了多少人?– 读苏扬的《文革中中国农村的集体屠杀》 |trans-title=How many really died in the Cultural Revolution? – After reading Su Yang's ''Collective Killings in Rural China during the Cultural Revolution'' |url=http://www.cnd.org/cr/ZK11/cr651.gb.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220624112011/http://www.cnd.org/cr/ZK11/cr651.gb.html |archive-date=2022-06-24 |website=China News Digest |language=zh}}</ref><ref name="Ling-2011">{{Cite web |last1=Ling |first1=Zhijun |last2=Ma |first2=Licheng |date=2011-01-30 |script-title=zh:"四人帮"被粉碎后的怪事:"文革"之风仍在继续吹 |trans-title=The strange thing after the collapse of the Gang of Four: the wind of Cultural Revolution continued to blow |url=http://history.people.com.cn/GB/205396/13852546.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200622104204/http://history.people.com.cn/GB/205396/13852546.html |archive-date=2020-06-22 |website=] |language=zh |script-quote=zh:粉碎"四人帮"之后,叶剑英在一次讲话中沉痛地说:"文化大革命"死了2000万人,整了1亿人,浪费了8000亿人民币。}}</ref><ref name="Pye-1986">{{cite journal |last1=Pye |first1=Lucian W. |year=1986 |title=Reassessing the Cultural Revolution |journal=The China Quarterly |volume=108 |issue=108 |pages=597–612 |doi=10.1017/S0305741000037085 |issn=0305-7410 |jstor=653530 |s2cid=153730706 |quote=See, for example, Huo-cheng, Li, "Chinese Communists reveal for the first time the number 20 million deaths for the Cultural Revolution," ] (Daily News), 26 10 1981, p. 3}}</ref><ref name="WangS-2012">{{cite web |date=August 18, 2012 |title=Remembering the dark days of China's Cultural Revolution |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1017272/remembering-dark-days-chinas-cultural-revolution |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180609084717/http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1017272/remembering-dark-days-chinas-cultural-revolution |archive-date=June 9, 2018 |access-date=November 29, 2019 |website=] |quote=According to a working conference of the Communist Party's Central Committee in 1978, 20 million Chinese died in the revolution, 100 million were persecuted and 800 billion yuan was wasted.}}</ref><ref name="Strauss-1994">{{cite news |last1=Strauss |first1=Valerie |last2=Southerl |first2=Daniel |date=July 17, 1994 |title=How Many Died? New Evidence Suggests Far Higher Numbers For the Victims of Mao Zedong's Era |newspaper=] |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/07/17/how-many-died-new-evidence-suggests-far-higher-numbers-for-the-victims-of-mao-zedongs-era/01044df5-03dd-49f4-a453-a033c5287bce/ |url-status=live |access-date=May 9, 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190509114452/https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/07/17/how-many-died-new-evidence-suggests-far-higher-numbers-for-the-victims-of-mao-zedongs-era/01044df5-03dd-49f4-a453-a033c5287bce/ |archive-date=May 9, 2019 |issn=0190-8286}}</ref> In addition to various regimes of secrecy and obfuscation concerning the Revolution, both top-down as perpetuated by authorities, as well as laterally among the Chinese public in the decades since, the discrepancies are due in large part to the totalistic nature of the Revolution itself: it is a significant challenge for historians to discern whether and in what ways discrete events that took place during the Cultural Revolution should be ascribed to it.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Wang |first=Youqin |date=2007-12-15 |title=Finding a Place for the Victims: The Problem in Writing the History of the Cultural Revolution |url=https://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/2593 |journal=China Perspectives |language=fr |volume=2007 |issue=4 |doi=10.4000/chinaperspectives.2593 |issn=2070-3449 |doi-access=free}}</ref> For example, the ], considered by some to be the greatest technological catastrophe of the 20th century, itself resulted in between 26,600 and 240,000 deaths. The scope of the collapse, which occurred near the end of the CR, was covered up by authorities until at least 1989.<ref>{{Cite encyclopedia |date=2023-09-01 |title=Typhoon Nina–Banqiao dam failure |url=https://www.britannica.com/event/Typhoon-Nina-Banqiao-dam-failure |access-date=2023-10-12 |encyclopedia=Encyclopædia Britannica}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2012-09-03 |script-title=zh:75·8板桥水库溃坝 20世纪最大人类技术灾难 |url=http://phtv.ifeng.com/program/shnjd/detail_2012_09/03/17307554_2.shtml |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200323211626/http://phtv.ifeng.com/program/shnjd/detail_2012_09/03/17307554_2.shtml |archive-date=2020-03-23 |website=] |language=zh}}</ref>
Estimates include those given by the following:


Most deaths occurred after the mass movements ended,<ref name="Walder2019a">{{Cite book |last=Walder |first=Andrew G. |title=Agents of disorder: inside China's Cultural Revolution |year=2019 |isbn=978-0-674-24363-7 |publisher=Harvard University Press |location=Cambridge, MA |pages=23}}</ref> when organized campaigns attempted to consolidate order in workplaces and communities.<ref name="Walder-20192">{{Cite book |last=Walder |first=Andrew G. |title=Agents of disorder: inside China's Cultural Revolution |year=2019 |isbn=978-0-674-24363-7 |publisher=Harvard University Press |location=Cambridge, MA |page=143 |author-link=Andrew G. Walder}}</ref>{{rp|172}} As Walder summarizes, "The cure for factional warfare was far worse than the disease."<ref name="Walder2019a" />
* According to ''{{Lang-zh|c=|s=|t=交锋—当代中国三次思想解放实录|p=|labels=no}}'', a book published by the ] in 2011, as well as some other documentations, ], the ] and one of China's ], claimed that "20 million people died, 100 million people were persecuted, and 80 billion ] was wasted in the Cultural Revolution" during a working conference of the ] on December 13, 1978.<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":2" /><ref name=":7">{{Cite web|url=http://www.chinainperspective.com/ArtShow.aspx?AID=12445|title=文革中"非正常死亡"了多少人?|last1=Song|first1=Yongyi|date=|website=China in Perspective|language=zh|url-status=live|archive-url=|archive-date=|access-date=2020-02-16}}</ref><ref name=":32">{{Cite web|url=http://history.people.com.cn/GB/205396/13852546.html|title="四人帮"被粉碎后的怪事:"文革"之风仍在继续吹|last=|first=|date=|website=|publisher=人民网|language=zh|url-status=live|archive-url=|archive-date=|accessdate=2019-11-29}}</ref><ref name=":25">{{Cite web|url=http://www.open.com.hk/content.php?id=3308#.XdhDPEZKhr8|title=文革到底害死了多少人?|last=|first=|date=|website=|publisher=开放杂志|language=zh|url-status=live|archive-url=|archive-date=|accessdate=2019-11-22}}</ref>
*] (]): 7,731,000 people died in the Cultural Revolution, or 96 people per every 10,000 of the population.<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Rummel|first1=R. J.|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=iIEPoEL4lG0C&pg=PA263&lpg=PA263&dq=7,731,000+cultural+revolution#v=onepage|title=China's Bloody Century: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900|date=2011-12-31|publisher=Transaction Publishers|isbn=978-1-4128-1400-3|language=en}}</ref>
*] and ]: at least 3&nbsp;million people died in the violence of the Cultural Revolution.<ref name=":5" /><ref>Chang, Jung and Halliday, Jon. ''].'' ], London, 2005. p. 569</ref>
*] (]): at least 1.72&nbsp;million people died in the Cultural Revolution.<ref name=":23">{{Cite web|url=http://ywang.uchicago.edu/history/victim_ebook_070505.pdf|title=文革受难者 ——关于迫害、监禁和杀戮的寻访实录|author=《文革受难者》电子版|date=2015-05-04|website=|publisher=王友琴|language=zh-cn|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161012075659/http://ywang.uchicago.edu/history/victim_ebook_070505.pdf|archive-date=2016-10-12|accessdate=2016-10-10|quote=谨以此书献给所有的文革受难者,愿你们的惨剧,不再被隐瞒、忽视或遗忘,而成为永远的警示:抵制一切暴行,尤其是以革命名义进行的群体性迫害。}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.voachinese.com/a/a-21-w2006-05-12-voa68-58875052/1099478.html|title=建立文革博物馆之争和海外成果|website=美国之音|language=zh|access-date=2020-02-16}}</ref>
*] (]) and Yang Su (]): some 36&nbsp;million people were persecuted in ] alone; 0.75-1.5 million died, and roughly the same number of people were crippled for life.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Walder|first1=Andrew G.|last2=Su|first2=Yang|date=2003|title=The Cultural Revolution in the Countryside: Scope, Timing and Human Impact|journal=The China Quarterly|volume=173|issue=173|pages=74–99|issn=0305-7410|jstor=20058959|doi=10.1017/S0009443903000068}}</ref>
*Daniel Chirot (]): at least 1&nbsp;million people died, but some estimates go as high as 20&nbsp;million.<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Chirot|first1=Daniel|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=e-kVgozyE8gC&pg=PA198&lpg=PA198&dq=Daniel+Chirot+cultural+revolution+20+million#v=onepage|title=Modern Tyrants: The Power and Prevalence of Evil in Our Age|date=1996-05-05|publisher=Princeton University Press|isbn=978-0-691-02777-7|language=en}}</ref>
*] (]): an estimate of around 400,000 deaths is a widely accepted minimum figure.<ref>{{cite book|author=Maurice Meisner|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=YpV7vbvclfgC&pg=PA354#v=onepage|title=Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic|publisher=Free Press|year=1999|isbn=978-0684856353|edition=3rd|page=354|access-date=June 27, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160505035530/https://books.google.com/books?id=YpV7vbvclfgC&pg=PA354#v=onepage&q&f=false|archive-date=May 5, 2016|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals. p. 262</ref>


]s of the overall death toll due to the Cultural Revolution usually include the following:<ref name="Song-2011c" /><ref name="Yan2016">{{cite journal |last=Yan |first=Fei |date=June 2016 |script-title=zh:政治運動中的集體暴力:「非正常死亡」再回顧(1966–1976) |trans-title=Collective violence in political movements: a review of the "unnatural deaths" (1966–1976) |url=https://www.cuhk.edu.hk/ics/21c/media/articles/c155-201603016.pdf |journal=] |volume=155 |pages=64–65, 74 |language=zh}}</ref><ref name="open2012">{{cite journal |last=Jin |first=Zhong |date=2012-10-07 |script-title=zh:最新版文革死亡人數 |trans-title=The latest version of the Cultural Revolution death toll |url=http://www.open.com.hk/content.php?id=1008 |url-status=live |journal=Open Magazine |location=Hong Kong |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220629225002/http://www.open.com.hk/content.php?id=1008%23.YrzXDnbMJw8 |archive-date=2022-06-29 |language=zh}}</ref>
=== Massacres and cannibalism ===
{| class="wikitable sortable"
{{See also|List of massacres in China|Cannibalism in China}}
|+
], one of the centers of Guangxi massacre and cannibalism during the Cultural Revolution.]]
!Time
During the Cultural Revolution, ] took place across ], including:
!Source
!Deaths (in millions)
!Remarks
|-
|2014
|]
|1.1–1.6<ref name="Walder-2014">{{cite journal |last=Walder |first=Andrew G. |year=2014 |title=Rebellion and Repression in China, 1966–1971 |journal=Social Science History |volume=38 |issue=3–4 |pages=513–39 |doi=10.1017/ssh.2015.23 |s2cid=143087356}}</ref>
|Examines the period between 1966 and 1971.<ref name="Walder-2014" /> Walder reviewed the reported deaths in 2,213 annals from every ] and interpreted the annals' vague language in the most conservative manner. For instance, "some died" and "a couple died" were interpreted as zero death, while "death in the scale of tens/hundreds/thousands" were interpreted as "ten/a hundred/a thousand died". The reported deaths underestimate the actual deaths, especially because some annals actively covered up deaths.<ref name="Song-2011c" /><ref name="open2012" /><ref name="Song-2017">{{Cite web |last=Song |first=Yongyi |author-link=Song Yongyi |date=2017-04-03 |script-title=zh:广西文革绝密档案中的大屠杀和性暴力 |trans-title=Massacres and sexual violence recorded in the classified documents of the Cultural Revolution in Guangxi |url=http://www.cnd.org/cr/ZK17/cr905.gb.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220622192624/http://www.cnd.org/cr/ZK17/cr905.gb.html |archive-date=2022-06-22 |website=China News Digest}}</ref> Annal editors were supervised by the ].<ref name="Song-2011c" /><ref name="Song-2017" /> In 2003, Walder and Yang Su coauthored a paper along this approach, but with fewer county annals available at the time.<ref name="Yan2016" /><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Walder |first1=Andrew G. |last2=Su |first2=Yang |year=2003 |title=The Cultural Revolution in the Countryside: Scope, Timing and Human Impact |journal=The China Quarterly |volume=173 |issue=173 |pages=74–99 |doi=10.1017/S0009443903000068 |jstor=20058959 |s2cid=43671719 |issn=0305-7410}}</ref>
|-
|1999
|Ding Shu
|2<ref name="Open Magazine-1999">{{ubl|{{cite news |date=August 1999 |script-title=zh:兩百萬人含恨而終─文革死亡人數統計 |journal=Open Magazine |location=Hong Kong |language=zh}}|A different version appears in:{{Cite news |last=Ding |first=Shu |date=2004-03-15 |script-title=zh:文革死亡人数的一家之言 |language=zh |trans-title=Home report on the Cultural Revolution's death toll |work=China News Digest |url=http://www.cnd.org/CR/ZK04/cr209.hz8.html}}}}</ref>
|Ding's figures include 100,000 killed in the Red Terror during 1966, with 200,000 forced to commit suicide, plus 300,000–500,000 killed in violent struggles, 500,000 during ], 200,000 during ] and the ].<ref name="Open Magazine-1999" /><ref name="Song-2011c" /><ref name="Yan2016" /><ref name="open2012" />
|-
|1996
|CCP History Research Center
|1.728<ref name="ConsensusNet-2016">{{Cite web |year=2016 |script-title=zh:文革五十周年:必须再来一次反文革 |trans-title=Fiftieth anniversary of the Cultural Revolution: It must be opposed once again |url=http://www.hybsl.cn/beijingcankao/beijingfenxi/2016-01-08/56368.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200625142850/http://www.hybsl.cn/beijingcankao/beijingfenxi/2016-01-08/56368.html |archive-date=2020-06-25 |website=胡耀邦史料信息网 |publisher=]}}</ref>
|The 1.728 million were counted as "]s", among which 9.4% (162,000) were CCP party members and 252,000 were intellectuals. The figures were extracted from {{zhi|c=建国以来历次政治运动事实|l=Facts on the Successive Political Movements since the Founding of the PRC}}, a book by the party's History Research Center, which states that "according to CCP internal investigations in 1978 and 1984&nbsp;... 21.44 million were investigated, 125 million got implicated in these investigations; 4.2 million were detained (by Red Guards and other non-police), 1.3 million were arrested by police, 1.728 million of unnatural deaths; 135,000 were executed for crimes of counter-revolution; during ''violent struggles'' 237,000 were killed and 7.03 million became disabled".<ref name="ConsensusNet-2016" /><ref>{{cite news |date=October 1996 |title=Title unknown |journal=Zhengming Magazine |location=Hong Kong |script-quote=zh:中共一九七八年和一九八四年的内部调查&nbsp;...「两千一百四十四万余人受到审查、冲击;一亿两千五百余万人受到牵连、影响」...「四百二十余万人曾被关押、隔离审查;一百三十余万人曾被公安机关拘留、逮捕;一百七十二万八千余人非正常死亡&nbsp;...「十三万五千余人被以现行反革命罪判为死刑;在武斗中有二十三万七千余人死亡,七十三万余人伤残」}}</ref> While these internal investigations were never mentioned or published in any other official documents, the scholarly consensus found these figures very reasonable.<ref name="open2012" /> ] endorsed the figures, yet he noted that peasants suffered far more in the GLF than in the CR.<ref name="Chen 1998">{{cite book |last=Chen |first=Yung-fa |script-title=zh:中國共產革命七十年 (下) |publisher=Linking |year=1998 |location=] |page=817 |language=zh |script-quote=zh:文化大革命的非正常死亡人數只有大躍進的十分之一不到, 從農民觀點來看, 其錯誤之嚴重, 遠遠不如大躍進&nbsp;... 二千六百萬人慘死 |author-link=Chen Yung-fa}}</ref>
|-
|1991
|]
|7.731<ref name="Rummel-1991">{{Cite book |last1=Rummel |first1=R. J. |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=iIEPoEL4lG0C |page=263}} |title=China's Bloody Century: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900 |year=1991 |publisher=Transaction |isbn=978-1412814003 |page=263}}</ref>
|Rummel included his estimate of '']'' camp deaths in this figure.<ref name="Yan2016" /> He estimated that 5% of the 10 million people in the Laogai camps died each year of the 12-year period, and that this amounts to roughly 6 million. He estimated that another 1.613 million were killed outright, a middle-ground figure he picked between 285,000 and 10,385,000, a range he deemed plausible.<ref name="Rummel-1991" />
|-
|1982
|]
|3.42–20<ref name="open2012" /><ref name="Pye-1986" />
|Several sources have quoted a statement made by ] ], of "683,000 deaths in the cities, 2.5 million deaths in the countryside, plus 123,700 deaths due to ] and 115,500 deaths due to ]s and imprisonment, in addition to 557,000 people missing."<ref name="open2012" /><ref name="ConsensusNet-2016" /><ref name="Dai-2016" /> In a 2012 interview with Hong Kong's ''Open Magazine'', an unnamed bureaucrat in Beijing claimed that Ye made the statement in a 1982 CCP meeting, while he was the party's ].<ref name="open2012" /><ref name="Dai-2016">{{cite news |last=Dai |first=Kaiyuan |date=2016-04-18 |script-title=zh:文革的本质:– 场大清洗 |language=zh |trans-title=The nature of the Cultural Revolution: a great purge |work=China News Digest |url=http://www.cnd.org/cr/ZK16/cr859.gb.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220408122445/http://www.cnd.org/cr/ZK16/cr859.gb.html |archive-date=2022-04-08 |quote=Note 12}}</ref> Several sources have also quoted that Marshal Ye estimated the death toll to be 20 million during a CCP working conference in December 1978.<ref name="Ling-2011" /><ref name="Pye-1986" /><ref name="WangS-2012" /><ref name="open2012" />
|-
|1979
|{{lang|fr|]}}
|0.4<ref name="AGP-1979">Agence France Presse, Beijing, February 3, 1979; compiled into ]-Chi 79.25 (February 5, 1979), p. E2.{{Title missing}}</ref>
|This figure was obtained by an AFP correspondent in Beijing, citing an unnamed but "usually reliable" source.<ref name="AGP-1979" /> In 1986, ] referred to this number as a "widely accepted nationwide figure", but also said "The toll may well have been higher. It is unlikely that it was less."<ref>{{cite book |last=Meisner |first=Maurice |url=https://archive.org/details/maoschinaaftera00meis/page/371/ |title=Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic |publisher=Free Press |year=1986 |edition=2nd |pages=371–372, 394 |quote=Li's estimate for Guangdong is roughly consistent with a widely accepted nationwide figure of 400,000 Cultural Revolution deaths, a number first reported in 1979 by the Agence France Presse correspondent in Peking based on estimates of unofficial but "usually reliable" Chinese sources. The toll may well have been higher. It is unlikely that it was less.}}</ref> Jonathan Leightner asserted that the number is "perhaps one of the best estimates".<ref>{{Cite book |last=Leightner |first=Jonathan |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=RzUlDwAAQBAJ |page=27}} |title=Ethics, Efficiency and Macroeconomics in China: From Mao to Xi |year=2017 |publisher=] |isbn=978-1-351-80583-4 |page=27 |quote=There is no agreement on how many people died during the Cultural Revolution. Perhaps one of the best estimates is 400,000, made by a Beijing correspondent for Agence France-Presse (Meisner 1999: 354).}}</ref>
|}


=== Massacres ===
* the ], in which massive ] occurred;
], one of the centers of the Guangxi Massacre]]
* the ];
* the ];
* the ];
* the ];
* the ] (i.e. Red August); and
* the ].


Massacres took place across China, including in ], ], ], ], ], and ], as well as ] in Beijing.<ref name="Song-2011a">{{Cite web |last=Song |first=Yongyi |author-link=Song Yongyi |date=August 25, 2011 |title=Chronology of Mass Killings during the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) |url=https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/chronology-mass-killings-during-chinese-cultural-revolution-1966-1976.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240114034126/https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/chronology-mass-killings-during-chinese-cultural-revolution-1966-1976.html |archive-date=2024-01-14 |access-date=December 27, 2019 |website=] }}</ref>
These massacres were mainly led and organized by local ], ] branches, ], and even the military. Most of the victims in the massacres were members of the ] as well as their children, or members of the "rebel groups ({{Lang-zh|c=|s=|t=造反派|p=|labels=no}})". Chinese scholars have estimated that at least 300,000 people died in these massacres.<ref name=":47">{{Cite book|last=杨继绳|title=《天地翻覆-中国文革大革命史》|publisher=天地图书有限公司}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last=宋永毅|title=《文革大屠杀》|publisher=开放杂志出版社|isbn=9789627934097|year=2002}}</ref> Collective killings in ] and ] were among the most serious. In Guangxi, the official annals of at least 43 counties have records of massacres, with 15 of them reporting a death toll of over 1,000, while in Guangdong at least 28 county annals record massacres, with 6 of them reporting a death toll of over 1,000.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Yang|first1=Su|date=2006|title="文革"中的集体屠杀:三省研究|url=https://www.modernchinastudies.org/cn/issues/past-issues/93-mcs-2006-issue-3/974-2012-01-05-15-35-10.html|journal=Modern China Studies|language=zh|volume=3|pages=|via=}}</ref>


These massacres were mainly led and organized by local revolutionary committees, Communist Party branches, militia, and the military.<ref name="Song-2011a" /><ref name="Song-2002">{{Cite book |last=Song |first=Yongyi |script-title=zh:文革大屠杀 |trans-title=Cultural Revolution Massacres |publisher=开放杂志出版社 |year=2002 |isbn=978-9627934097 |location=Hong Kong |author-link=Song Yongyi}}</ref><ref name="Yang-2006" /> Most victims were members of the ] as well as their children, or members of "rebel groups". Chinese scholars have estimated that at least 300,000 people died in these massacres.<ref name="Song-2002" /><ref name="Yang-2017">{{Cite book |last=Yang |first=Jisheng |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=4d4qDwAAQBAJ |page=524}} |script-title=zh:天地翻覆—中国文化大革命史 |year=2017 |publisher=Cosmos Books |location=Hong Kong |language=zh |author-link=Yang Jisheng (journalist)}}</ref> Collective killings in ] and ] were among the most serious. In Guangxi, the official annals of at least 43 counties have records of massacres, with 15 of them reporting a death toll of over 1,000, while in Guangdong at least 28 county annals record massacres, with 6 of them reporting a death toll of over 1,000.<ref name="Yang-2006">{{Cite journal |last1=Yang |first1=Su |year=2006 |script-title=zh:'文革' 中的集体屠杀:三省研究 |trans-title=Collective killings in the Cultural Revolution: a study of three provinces |url=https://www.modernchinastudies.org/cn/issues/past-issues/93-mcs-2006-issue-3/974-2012-01-05-15-35-10.html |journal=Modern China Studies |language=zh |volume=3}}</ref>
* In ], the official record shows an estimated death toll from 100,000 to 150,000.<ref name=":42">{{Cite web|url=https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/china-cultrev-04292016134149.html|title=Interview: 'People Were Eaten by The Revolutionary Masses'|website=Radio Free Asia|language=en|access-date=2019-11-30}}</ref><ref name=":02">{{Cite web|url=http://www.yhcqw.com/34/8938.html|last1=Yan|first1=Lebin|date=|publisher=炎黄春秋|language=zh|script-title=zh:我参与处理广西文革遗留问题|url-status=live|archive-url=|archive-date=|accessdate=2019-11-29}}</ref> According to '']'', an estimated 100,000 people died in one of the worst ] in ] between January and April 1968, before Premier ] sent the ] to intervene.{{sfnb|ChangHalliday|2005| p = 545}} Zheng Yi's '']'' alleged that "systematic killing and ] of individuals in the name of political revolution and ']'{{-"}} among the ] in ] during that period.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Zheng|first1=Yi|title=Scarlet Memorial: Tales of Cannibalism in Modern China|publisher=Westview Press|year=1996|isbn=081332615X|location=Boulder, Colo.|ref=harv}}, p. 198</ref> Zheng was criticized in China for reliance on unpublished interviews and for the negative portrayal of a Chinese ethnic minority,<ref name="Chen">{{Cite book|last1=Chen|first1=Xiaomei|title=Acting the Right Part: Political Theatre and Popular Drama in Contemporary China|publisher=University of Hawaii Press|year=2002|pages=30–31}}</ref> although senior party historians corroborated allegations of cannibalism.<ref name="r1">Roderick MacFarquhar, and Michael Schoenhals. ''Mao's Last Revolution''. ], 2006. p. 259</ref>
*In ] of ], massacre targeting ] led by the ] in 1975 resulted in the deaths of more than 1,600 civilians, including 300 children, and destroyed 4,400 homes.<ref name=":22">{{Cite book|last1=Zhou|first1=Yongming|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8Rv-MsA4UGIC&pg=PA162&lpg=PA162&dq=shadian+incident#v=onepage|title=Anti-drug Crusades in Twentieth-century China: Nationalism, History, and State Building|date=1999|publisher=Rowman & Littlefield|isbn=978-0-8476-9598-0|language=en}}</ref><ref name=":33">{{Cite web|url=https://stanfordpolitics.org/2018/11/26/chinas-puzzling-islam-policy/|title=China's Puzzling Islam Policy|date=2018-11-26|website=Stanford Politics|language=en-US|access-date=2019-12-27}}</ref><ref name=":6">{{Cite web|url=https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/chronology-mass-killings-during-chinese-cultural-revolution-1966-1976.html|title=Chronology of Mass Killings during the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) {{!}} Sciences Po Mass Violence and Resistance - Research Network|last=|first=|date=|website=chronology-mass-killings-during-chinese-cultural-revolution-1966-1976.html|language=en|url-status=live|archive-url=|archive-date=|access-date=2019-12-27}}</ref>
*In ] of ], from August 13 to October 17, 1967, a total of 7,696 people were killed, 1,397 people were forced to commit suicide, and 2,146 people were permanently disabled.<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Tan|first1=Hecheng|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0QCDDQAAQBAJ&pg=PA20&lpg=PA20&dq=daoxian+massacre+7696#v=onepage|title=The Killing Wind: A Chinese County's Descent Into Madness During the Cultural Revolution|date=2017|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-062252-7|language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://cn.nytimes.com/culture/20121108/cc08jiangfangzhou/|title=发生在湖南道县的那场大屠杀|author=蒋方舟|date=2012-11-09|publisher=纽约时报中文网|language=zh|accessdate=2019-12-05}}</ref>
*In ], official sources in 1980 have revealed that at least 1,772 people were killed by Red Guards from August to September 1966, including teachers and principals of many schools; in addition, 33,695 homes were ransacked and 85,196 families were forced to leave the city.<ref name=":24">{{Cite web|url=http://ywang.uchicago.edu/history/docs/2001_03_05.pdf|title=Student Attacks Against Teachers: The Revolution of 1966|last1=Wang|first1=Youqin|date=2001|website=University of Chicago|url-status=live|archive-url=|archive-date=|access-date=}}</ref><ref name=":322">{{Cite book|last1=Jian|first1=Guo|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=k9NQCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA86&lpg=PA86&dq=Daxing+Massacre#v=onepage|title=Historical Dictionary of the Chinese Cultural Revolution|last2=Song|first2=Yongyi|last3=Zhou|first3=Yuan|date=2015-07-23|publisher=Rowman & Littlefield|isbn=978-1-4422-5172-4|language=en}}</ref><ref name=":20">{{Cite web|url=https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/01/23/265228870/chinese-red-guards-apologize-reopening-a-dark-chapter|title=Chinese Red Guards Apologize, Reopening A Dark Chapter|website=NPR.org|language=en|access-date=2020-02-14}}</ref> In particular, the ] caused the deaths of 325 people from August 27 to September 1, 1966; the oldest killed was 80 years old and the youngest was only 38 days old, while 22 families were wiped out.<ref name=":6" /><ref name=":322"/><ref name=":26">{{Cite web|url=http://mjlsh.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/Book.aspx?cid=4&tid=2464|title=文革时期北京大兴县大屠杀调查|last1=Yu|first1=Luowen|date=|website=Chinese University of Hong Kong|url-status=live|archive-url=|archive-date=|access-date=2020-02-15}}</ref>


In 1975, the PLA led ] in ] around the town of Shadian, targeting ], resulting in the deaths of more than 1,600 civilians, including 300 children, and the destruction of 4,400 homes.<ref name="Song-2011a" /><ref name="Zhou-1999">{{Cite book |last1=Zhou |first1=Yongming |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=8Rv-MsA4UGIC |page=162}} |title=Anti-drug Crusades in Twentieth-century China: Nationalism, History, and State Building |year=1999 |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield |isbn=978-0-8476-9598-0}}</ref><ref name="Liang-2018">{{Cite web |url=https://stanfordpolitics.org/2018/11/26/chinas-puzzling-islam-policy/ |title=China's Puzzling Islam Policy |date=November 26, 2018 |website=Stanford Politics |access-date=December 27, 2019}}</ref>
=== Violent Struggles, Struggle sessions, and purges ===

In ], Hunan, a total of 7,696 people were killed ], in addition to 1,397 forced to commit suicide, and 2,146 becoming permanently disabled.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Tan |first1=Hecheng |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=0QCDDQAAQBAJ |page=20}} |title=The Killing Wind: A Chinese County's Descent Into Madness During the Cultural Revolution |date=2017 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-062252-7 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |author=Jiang |first=Fangzhou |date=November 9, 2012 |script-title=zh:发生在湖南道县的那场大屠杀 |url=https://cn.nytimes.com/culture/20121108/cc08jiangfangzhou/ |access-date=December 5, 2019 |newspaper=纽约时报中文网 |language=zh}}</ref> During Red August, official sources in 1980 revealed that at least 1,772 people were killed by Red Guards, including teachers and principals of many schools. 33,695 homes were ransacked and 85,196 families were forced to flee.<ref name="Wang-2001">{{Cite web |last1=Wang |first1=Youqin |author-link=Wang Youqin |date=2001 |title=Student Attacks Against Teachers: The Revolution of 1966 |url=http://ywang.uchicago.edu/history/docs/2001_03_05.pdf |url-status=live |website=University of Chicago |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181223052419/http://ywang.uchicago.edu:80/history/docs/2001_03_05.pdf |archive-date=December 23, 2018}}</ref><ref name="Jian-2015">{{Cite book |last1=Jian |first1=Guo |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=k9NQCgAAQBAJ |page=86}} |title=Historical Dictionary of the Chinese Cultural Revolution |last2=Song |first2=Yongyi |last3=Zhou |first3=Yuan |date=2015 |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield |isbn=978-1-4422-5172-4 |author-link2=Song Yongyi}}</ref><ref name="NPR-2014">{{Cite news |url=https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/01/23/265228870/chinese-red-guards-apologize-reopening-a-dark-chapter |title=Chinese Red Guards Apologize, Reopening A Dark Chapter |website=NPR |access-date=February 14, 2020|last1=Kuhn|first1=Anthony|date=2014-02-04}}</ref> The ] caused the deaths of 325 people from 27 August to 1 September 1966; those killed ranged from 80 years old to a 38-day old baby, with 22 families being completely wiped out.<ref name="Song-2011a" /><ref name="Jian-2015"/><ref name="Yu-2020">{{Cite web |last1=Yu |first1=Luowen |script-title=zh:文革时期北京大兴县大屠杀调查 |url=http://mjlsh.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/Book.aspx?cid=4&tid=2464 |access-date=February 15, 2020 |website=Chinese University of Hong Kong |language=zh}}</ref>

In the ], the official record shows an estimated death toll from 100,000 to 150,000<ref name="RFA-2016">{{Cite web |url=https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/china-cultrev-04292016134149.html |title=Interview: 'People Were Eaten by The Revolutionary Masses' |website=Radio Free Asia |access-date=November 30, 2019}}</ref><ref name="Yan">{{Cite web |last1=Yan |first1=Lebin |script-title=zh:我参与处理广西文革遗留问题 |url=http://www.yhcqw.com/34/8938.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201124094818/http://www.yhcqw.com/34/8938.html |archive-date=November 24, 2020 |access-date=November 29, 2019 |website=] |language=zh}}</ref> between January and April 1968 in Guangxi, in one of the worst violent struggles of the Revolution, before Zhou sent the PLA to intervene.<ref name="Chang">{{cite book |last1=Chang |first1=Jung |title=Mao: The Unknown Story |last2=Halliday |first2=Jon |publisher=Knopf |year=2005 |isbn=0679422714}}</ref>{{rp|545}}

=== Violent struggles, struggle sessions, and purges ===
{{main|Violent Struggle|Struggle session|Cleansing the Class Ranks}} {{main|Violent Struggle|Struggle session|Cleansing the Class Ranks}}
], where 400–500 people killed in factional clashes are buried, out of a total of at least 1,700 deaths<ref name="Buckley">{{cite news |last1=Buckley |first1=Chris |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/05/world/asia/china-cultural-revolution-chongqing.html |title=Chaos of Cultural Revolution Echoes at a Lonely Cemetery, 50 Years Later |date=April 4, 2016 |work=] |access-date=February 16, 2020 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref>]]
]. At least 1,700 people were killed during the violent faction clash, with 400-500 of them buried in this cemetery.<ref name="Buckley">{{cite news |last1=Buckley |first1=Chris |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/05/world/asia/china-cultural-revolution-chongqing.html |title=Chaos of Cultural Revolution Echoes at a Lonely Cemetery, 50 Years Later |date=2016-04-04 |work=The New York Times |access-date=2020-02-16 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref>]]]s, or ''Wudou'', were factional conflicts (mostly among ] and "]") which began in ] and then spread to other areas of ] in 1967. It brought the country to the state of ].<ref name=":6" /><ref>{{cite news |last1=Phillips |first1=Tom |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/11/the-cultural-revolution-50-years-on-all-you-need-to-know-about-chinas-political-convulsion |title=The Cultural Revolution: all you need to know about China's political convulsion |date=2016-05-11 |work=] |access-date=2020-02-16 |issn=0261-3077}}</ref> Weapons used in armed conflicts included some 18.77&nbsp;million ]s (some claim 1.877 million), 2.72&nbsp;million ]s, 14,828 ]s, millions of other ammunitions and even ] as well as ]s.<ref name=":6" /> Notable violent struggles include the battles in ], in ], and in ].<ref name=":05">{{cite web|url=https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/chronology-mass-killings-during-chinese-cultural-revolution-1966-1976.html|title=Chronology of Mass Killings during the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) {{!}} Sciences Po Mass Violence and Resistance - Research Network|last=|first=|date=|website=chronology-mass-killings-during-chinese-cultural-revolution-1966-1976.html|language=en|url-status=live|archive-url=|archive-date=|access-date=2020-02-16}}</ref><ref name="Buckley" /><ref>{{Cite news|last1=Ramzy|first1=Austin|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/15/world/asia/china-cultural-revolution-explainer.html|title=China's Cultural Revolution, Explained|date=2016-05-14|work=The New York Times|access-date=2020-02-16|language=en-US|issn=0362-4331}}</ref> Researchers have pointed out that the nationwide death toll in violent struggles ranges from 300 thousand to 500 thousand.<ref name=":7" /><ref name=":6" /><ref name=":8">{{Cite web|title=文革死亡人数统计为两百万人|url=https://www.chinesepen.org/blog/archives/47251|last1=Ding|first1=Shu|date=|website=Independent Chinese PEN Center|language=zh|url-status=live|archive-url=|archive-date=|access-date=2020-02-16}}</ref>


''Violent struggles'' were factional conflicts (mostly among Red Guards and "rebel groups") that began in Shanghai and then spread to other areas in 1967. They brought the country to a state of civil war.<ref name="Song-2011a" /><ref>{{cite news |last1=Phillips |first1=Tom |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/11/the-cultural-revolution-50-years-on-all-you-need-to-know-about-chinas-political-convulsion |title=The Cultural Revolution: all you need to know about China's political convulsion |date=May 11, 2016 |work=] |access-date=February 16, 2020 |issn=0261-3077}}</ref> Weapons used included some 18.77&nbsp;million guns{{notetag|Some claim 1.877 million.{{why|date=October 2023}}}}, 2.72&nbsp;million grenades, 14,828 cannons, millions of other ammunition and even armored cars and tanks.<ref name="Song-2011a" /> Notable violent struggles include the battles in Chongqing, in ], and in ].<ref name="Song-2011a" /><ref name="Buckley" /><ref>{{Cite news |last1=Ramzy |first1=Austin |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/15/world/asia/china-cultural-revolution-explainer.html |title=China's Cultural Revolution, Explained |date=May 14, 2016 |work=The New York Times |access-date=February 16, 2020 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> Researchers claimed that the nationwide death toll in violent struggles ranged from 300,000 to 500,000.<ref name="Song-2011b">{{Cite web |last1=Song |first1=Yongyi |author-link=Song Yongyi |date=September 2011 |script-title=zh:文革中"非正常死亡"了多少人? |url=http://www.chinainperspective.com/ArtShow.aspx?AID=12445 |website=China in Perspective |language=zh |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120513113444/http://www.chinainperspective.com/ArtShow.aspx?AID=12445 |archive-date=2012-05-13}}</ref><ref name="Open Magazine-1999" /><ref name="Song-2011a" />
Moreover, millions of people in China were violently persecuted, especially in the ]. Those identified as spies, "]s," "revisionists," or coming from a suspect class (including those related to former landlords or rich peasants) were subject to beating, imprisonment, rape, torture, sustained and systematic harassment and abuse, seizure of property, denial of medical attention, and erasure of social identity. Intellectuals were also targeted; many survivors and observers suggest that almost anyone with skills over that of the average person was made the target of political "struggle" in some way. At least hundreds of thousands of people were murdered, starved, or worked to death. Millions more were forcibly displaced. Young people from the cities were forcibly moved to the countryside, where they were forced to abandon all forms of standard education in place of the propaganda teachings of the CPC.<ref name="Harding" /> Some people were not able to stand the torture and, losing hope for the future, committed suicide. Researchers have pointed out that at least 100-200 thousand people committed suicides during early Cultural Revolution.<ref name=":7" /> One of the most famous cases of attempted suicide due to political persecution involved Deng Xiaoping's son, ], who jumped (or was thrown) from a four-story building after being "interrogated" by Red Guards. Instead of dying, he developed ].


The recorded rate of violence rose in 1967, reaching a peak that summer before dropping suddenly.<ref name="Walder-20192"/> During 1967, casualties were relatively low as the weapons used were primarily clubs, spears, and rocks until late July.<ref name="Walder-20192"/> Although firearms and heavier weapons began to spread during summer, most were neither trained nor committed fighters and therefore casualties remained relatively low.<ref name="Walder-20192"/> The peak of collective violence in summer 1967 dropped sharply after August, when Mao became concerned about rebel attacks on local army units and thereafter made clear that his prior calls to "drag out" army commanders was a mistake and he would instead support besieged army commands.<ref name="Walder-20192"/>{{rp|150}}
At the same time, a large number of "unjust, false, mistaken cases ({{Lang-zh|c=|s=|t=冤假错案|p=|labels=no}})" appeared due to political purges. In addition to those who died in massacres, a large number of people died or permanently disabled due to ] or other forms of persecution. From 1968–1969, the "]", a massive political purge launched by Mao, caused the deaths of at least 500,000 people.<ref name=":6" /><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://archives.cnd.org/HXWK/author/DING-Shu/zk0412b-0.gb.html|title=文革中的"清理阶级队伍"运动——三千万人被斗,五十万人死亡|last1=Ding|first1=Shu|date=|publisher=华夏文摘|language=zh|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170816021356/http://archives.cnd.org/HXWK/author/DING-Shu/zk0412b-0.gb.html|archive-date=2017-08-16|accessdate=2020-01-13}}</ref> Purges of similar nature such as the "]" and the "]" were launched subsequently in the 1970s.<ref name=":7" /><ref name=":25" />


The greatest number of casualties occurred during the process of restoring order in 1968, although the overall number of violent conflicts was lower. Walder stated that while "rising casualties from a smaller number of insurgent conflicts surely reflected the increasing scale and organizational coherence of rebel factions, and their growing access to military weaponry" another important factor was that "he longer that local factional warfare continued without the prospect of an equitable political settlement, the greater the stakes for the participants and the more intense the collective violence as factions fought to avoid the consequence of losing."<ref name="Walder-20192"/>{{rp|154–155}}
* In ], official sources in 1980 stated that 346,000 people were wrongly arrested, over 16,000 were persecuted to death or executed, and over 81,000 were permanently ].<ref name=":6" /><ref name=":36">{{Cite web|url=http://mjlsh.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/Book.aspx?cid=4&tid=4510|last1=Bai|first1=Yintai|date=|website=Chinese University of Hong Kong|language=zh|script-title=zh:"内人党"冤案前后|url-status=live|archive-url=|archive-date=|access-date=2019-12-05}}</ref><ref name=":52">{{Cite web|url=https://www.smhric.org/IMPRP.pdf|last1=Ba|first1=Yantai|date=|website=|publisher=Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center|language=zh|script-title=zh:挖肃灾难实录|format=|url-status=live|archive-url=|archive-date=|accessdate=}}</ref> However, academics have estimated a death toll between 20,000 and 100,000.<ref name=":6" /><ref name=":12">{{Cite journal|last1=Brown|first1=Kerry|date=2007-07-01|title=The Cultural Revolution in Inner Mongolia 1967–1969: The Purge of the "Heirs of Genghis Khan"|journal=Asian Affairs|volume=38|issue=2|pages=173–187|doi=10.1080/03068370701349128|issn=0306-8374}}</ref><ref name=":36" /><ref name=":52" />
*In the ] of Yunnan, more than 1.387&nbsp;million people were implicated and persecuted, which accounted for 6% of the total population of Yunnan at the time.<ref name=":6" /><ref name=":03">{{Cite web|url=http://www.hybsl.cn/xuezhewenji/wanghaiguang/2008-12-01/10962.html|last1=Wang|first1=Haiguang|date=|work=Hu Yaobang Historical Information Net<!--胡耀邦史料信息网-->|publisher=|language=zh|script-title=zh:一个人的冤案和一个时代的冤案|url-status=live|archive-url=|archive-date=|accessdate=2019-12-30}}</ref> From 1968&ndash;1969, more than 17,000 people died in massacres and 61,000 people were crippled for life; in ] (the capital city of Yunnan) alone, 1,473 people were killed and 9,661 people were permanently disabled.<ref name=":6" /><ref name=":03" />
*In the Li Chuli case of ], Li, the former deputy director of ], was purged in 1968 and implicated around 80,000 people, 2,955 of whom were persecuted to death.<ref name=":8" /><ref>{{Cite book|last1=Schoenhals|first1=Michael|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uNeVJgUZseoC&pg=PA377&lpg=PA377&dq=Li+Chuli+cultural+revolution#v=onepage|title=China's Cultural Revolution, 1966-1969: Not a Dinner Party|date=1996-08-28|publisher=M.E. Sharpe|isbn=978-0-7656-3303-3|language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Schoenhals|first1=Michael|date=March 1996|title=The Central Case Examination Group, 1966-79|journal=The China Quarterly|volume=145|issue=145|pages=87–111|jstor=655646|doi=10.1017/S0305741000044143}}</ref>


In addition to violent struggles, millions of Chinese were violently persecuted, especially via struggle sessions. Those identified as spies, "]s", "revisionists", or coming from a suspect class (including those related to former landlords or rich peasants) were subject to beating, imprisonment, rape, torture, sustained and systematic harassment and abuse, seizure of property, denial of medical attention, and erasure of social identity. Intellectuals were also targeted. Many survivors and observers suggest that almost anyone with skills over that of the average person was made the target of political "struggle" in some way.<ref name="Harding" />
=== Ethnic minorities ===

Some people were not able to stand the torture and committed suicide. Researchers claimed that at least 100,000 to 200,000 people committed suicide during the early CR.<ref name="Song-2011b" /> One of the most famous cases of apparent attempted suicide involved Deng Xiaoping's son ], who was paralyzed when he fell out of a four-story building after he was interrogated by Red Guards. It is disputed whether he jumped or was pushed.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Stewart |first=Whitney |title=Deng Xiaoping: leader in a changing China |year=2001 |publisher=Lerner |isbn=978-0-8225-4962-8 |series=A Lerner biography |location=Minneapolis |page=72}}</ref>

At the same time, many "unjust, false, and mistaken" cases appeared due to political purges. In addition to those who died in massacres, a large number of people died or became permanently disabled due to ] or other forms of persecution. From 1968 to 1969, the Cleansing the Class Ranks purge caused the deaths of at least 500,000 people.<ref name="Song-2011a" /><ref>{{Cite web |last1=Ding |first1=Shu |year=2004 |script-title=zh:文革中的"清理阶级队伍"运动 – 三千万人被斗,五十万人死亡 |url=http://archives.cnd.org/HXWK/author/DING-Shu/zk0412b-0.gb.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170816021356/http://archives.cnd.org/HXWK/author/DING-Shu/zk0412b-0.gb.html |archive-date=August 16, 2017 |access-date=January 13, 2020 |website=China News Digest |language=zh}}</ref> Purges of similar nature such as the ] and the campaign towards the ] were launched in the 1970s.<ref name="Song-2011b" /><ref name="Open Magazine-1999" />

During the ], official sources in 1980 stated that 346,000 people were wrongly arrested, over 16,000 were persecuted to death or executed, and over 81,000 were permanently disabled.<ref name="Song-2011a" /><ref name="Bai">{{Cite web |url=http://mjlsh.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/Book.aspx?cid=4&tid=4510 |last1=Bai |first1=Yintai |website=Chinese University of Hong Kong |language=zh |script-title=zh:"内人党"冤案前后 |access-date=December 5, 2019}}</ref><ref name="Ba">{{Cite web |url=https://www.smhric.org/IMPRP.pdf |last1=Ba |first1=Yantai |publisher=Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center |language=zh |script-title=zh:挖肃灾难实录}}</ref> However, academics instead estimated fatalities as between 20,000 and 100,000.<ref name="Song-2011a" /><ref name="Bai" /><ref name="Ba" /><ref name="Brown-2007">{{Cite journal |last1=Brown |first1=Kerry |date=July 1, 2007 |title=The Cultural Revolution in Inner Mongolia 1967–1969: The Purge of the "Heirs of Genghis Khan" |journal=Asian Affairs |volume=38 |issue=2 |pages=173–187 |doi=10.1080/03068370701349128 |issn=0306-8374 |s2cid=153348414}}</ref>

In Yunnan's ], more than 1.387&nbsp;million people were implicated and persecuted, which accounted for 6% of the province's population.<ref name="Song-2011a" /><ref name="WangH-2008">{{Cite web |url=http://www.hybsl.cn/xuezhewenji/wanghaiguang/2008-12-01/10962.html |last1=Wang |first1=Haiguang |work=Hu Yaobang Historical Information Net |language=zh |script-title=zh: – 个人的冤案和 – 个时代的冤案 |access-date=December 30, 2019 |archive-date=June 22, 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200622105350/http://www.hybsl.cn/xuezhewenji/wanghaiguang/2008-12-01/10962.html |url-status=dead}}</ref> From 1968 to 1969, more than 17,000 people died in massacres and 61,000 people were crippled for life; in ] alone, 1,473 people were killed and 9,661 people were permanently disabled.<ref name="Song-2011a" /><ref name="WangH-2008" />

In ], Li Chuli, the former deputy director of Organization Department, was purged in 1968 and in turn reported around 80,000 people, 2,955 of whom were persecuted to death.<ref name="Ding-2016">{{Cite web |last1=Ding |first1=Shu |title=文革死亡人数统计为两百万人 |url=https://www.chinesepen.org/blog/archives/47251 |access-date=February 16, 2020 |website=Independent Chinese PEN Center |date=April 8, 2016 |language=zh}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Schoenhals |first=Michael |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uNeVJgUZseoC&pg=PA377 |title=China's Cultural Revolution, 1966-1969: Not a Dinner Party |date=1996-08-28 |publisher=M.E. Sharpe |isbn=978-0-7656-3303-3 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Schoenhals |first1=Michael |date=March 1996 |title=The Central Case Examination Group, 1966–79 |journal=The China Quarterly |volume=145 |issue=145 |pages=87–111 |jstor=655646 |doi=10.1017/S0305741000044143 |s2cid=154681969}}</ref>

=== Repression of ethnic minorities ===
{{See also|Inner Mongolia incident|Shadian incident}} {{See also|Inner Mongolia incident|Shadian incident}}
] ] during a ].]] ] during a struggle session]]
] and his wife]]
The Cultural Revolution wreaked much havoc on minority cultures and ethnicities in China. In ], some 790,000 people were persecuted during the ]. Of these, 22,900 were beaten to death, and 120,000 were maimed,<ref>] and Schoenhals, Michael. ''Mao's Last Revolution''. ], 2006. p. 258</ref> during a witch hunt to find members of the alleged separatist New Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. In ], copies of the ] and other books of the ] were apparently burned. Muslim imams reportedly were paraded around with paint splashed on their bodies. In the ] areas of northeast China, language schools were destroyed. In ] Province, the palace of the ]'s king was torched, and a massacre of Muslim ] at the hands of the ] in Yunnan, known as the ], reportedly claimed over 1,600 lives in 1975.<ref>Yongming Zhou, ''Anti-drug crusades in twentieth-century China : nationalism, history, and state building'', Lanham Rowman & Littlefield 1999, p. 162</ref> After the Cultural Revolution was over, the government gave reparations for the Shadian Incident, including the erection of a Martyr's Memorial in Shadian.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Khalid|first1=Zainab|date=4 January 2011|title=Rise of the Veil: Islamic Modernity and the Hui Woman|url=http://digitalcollections.sit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2068&context=isp_collection|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140809045544/http://digitalcollections.sit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2068&context=isp_collection|archive-date=August 9, 2014|accessdate=25 July 2014|website=SIT Digital Collections|series=Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection|publisher=SIT Graduate Institute|pages=8, 11|format=PDF|id=Paper 1074}}</ref>


The Cultural Revolution wrought havoc on minority cultures and ethnicities. Languages and customs of ] were labeled as part of the Four Olds, texts in ethnic languages were burned, and bilingual education was suppressed.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Qingxia |first1=Dai |last2=Yan |first2=Dong |date=March 2001 |title=The Historical Evolution of Bilingual Education for China's Ethnic Minorities |journal=Chinese Education & Society |volume=34 |issue=2 |pages=7–53 |doi=10.2753/CED1061-193234027 |issn=1061-1932 |quote=Ethnic languages were repudiated as one of the "four olds" and large numbers of books and documents pertaining to ethnic languages were burned.}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Wu |first=Jiaping |date=May 2014 |title=The Rise of Ethnicity under China's Market Reforms |journal=] |volume=38 |issue=3 |pages=967–984 |doi=10.1111/j.1468-2427.2012.01179.x |issn=0309-1317 |quote=Campaigns of 'class eradication' became more radical during the Cultural Revolution (1966–76) and had a disastrous effect on ethnic culture. Ethnic traditions were seen as part of the 'four olds' (old ideas, customs, culture and habits; in Chinese, sijiu) that had to be destroyed.}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Chunli |first=Xia |date=2007 |title=From Discourse Politics to Rule of Law: A Constructivist Framework for Understanding Regional Ethnic Autonomy in China |journal=International Journal on Minority and Group Rights |volume=14 |issue=4 |pages=399–424 |doi=10.1163/138548707X247392 |issn=1385-4879 |jstor=24675396 |quote=Traditional minority designs and colourful lace were marked as "four olds" (sijiu) and burnt.}}</ref> In ], some 790,000 people were persecuted during the Inner Mongolia incident. Of these, 22,900 were beaten to death, and 120,000 were maimed,<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|258}} during a witch hunt to find members of the alleged separatist New Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. In ], copies of the ] and other books of the ] were apparently burned. Muslim imams reportedly were paraded around with paint splashed on their bodies.<ref name="Yongming Zhou 1999, p. 162">{{Cite journal |date=January 2001 |last=Fung |first=Edmund S. K. |title=Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth-Century China: Nationalism, History, and State Building. Zhou Yongming |journal=The China Journal |volume=45 |issn=1324-9347 |page=162 |jstor=3182405}}</ref>
Concessions given to minorities were abolished during the Cultural Revolution as part of the Red Guards' attack on the "Four Olds". ]s, previously only established in parts of Tibet, were established throughout ] in 1966,<ref>{{cite book|author=John Powers|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=wksCKIivSNUC&pg=PR35&lpg=PR35#v=onepage|title=Historical Dictionary of Tibet|author2=David Templeman|publisher=Grove Press|year=2007|isbn=9780810868052|page=35|access-date=September 30, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160522032800/https://books.google.com/books?id=wksCKIivSNUC&pg=PR35&lpg=PR35#v=onepage&q&f=false|archive-date=May 22, 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> removing Tibet's exemption from China's period of land reform, and reimposed in other minority areas. The effect on Tibet had been particularly severe as it came following the repression after the ].<ref>{{cite book|author=Adam Jones|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=TkPqxCBbF7UC&pg=PA97#v=onepage|title=Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction|publisher=Routledge|year=2006|isbn=978-0415353854|pages=96–97|access-date=September 30, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160522105753/https://books.google.com/books?id=TkPqxCBbF7UC&pg=PA97#v=onepage&q&f=false|archive-date=May 22, 2016|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="cycle">{{cite book|author=Ronald D. Schwartz|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=s_7WkbZAaWEC&pg=PA12&lpg=PA12#v=onepage|title=Circle Of Protest|year=1996|isbn=9788120813700|pages=12–13|access-date=September 30, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160617101146/https://books.google.com/books?id=s_7WkbZAaWEC&pg=PA12&lpg=PA12#v=onepage&q&f=false|archive-date=June 17, 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> The destruction of nearly all of its over 6,000 monasteries, which began before the Cultural Revolution, were often conducted with the complicity of local ethnic Tibetan Red Guards.<ref name="ardley">{{cite book|author=Jane Ardley|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=sFqQAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA9#v=onepage|title=Tibetan Independence Movement: Political, Religious and Gandhian Perspectives|publisher=Routledge|year=2002|isbn=978-0700715725|page=9|access-date=June 27, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160430030843/https://books.google.com/books?id=sFqQAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA9#v=onepage&q&f=false|archive-date=April 30, 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> Only eight were left intact by the end of the 1970s.<ref>{{cite book|author=Thomas Laird|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=As_4aQjGaUEC&pg=PA345&lpg=PA345#v=onepage|title=The Story of Tibet: Conversations with the Dalai Lama|date=December 2007|isbn=9781555846725|page=345|access-date=September 30, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160617113548/https://books.google.com/books?id=As_4aQjGaUEC&pg=PA345&lpg=PA345#v=onepage&q&f=false|archive-date=June 17, 2016|url-status=live}}</ref>


In the ] areas of northeast China, language schools were destroyed. According to ], "vents took a horrific turn in the frontier town of ], where freight trains trundled from China into the DPRK, draped with the corpses of Koreans killed in the pitched battles of the Cultural Revolution, and daubed with threatening graffiti: 'This will be your fate also, you tiny revisionists!'"<ref>{{Cite book |last=Lovell |first=Julia |title=Maoism: A Global History |year=2019 |publisher=Knopf Doubleday |isbn=978-0-525-65605-0 |pages=114–115 |quote=Events took a horrific turn in the frontier town of Yanbian, where freight trains trundled from China into the DPRK, draped with the corpses of Koreans killed in the pitched battles of the Cultural Revolution, and daubed with threatening graffiti: 'This will be your fate also, you tiny revisionists!' |author-link=Julia Lovell}}</ref>
Many monks and nuns were killed, and the general population were subjected to physical and psychological torture.<ref name="ardley" /> There were an estimated 600,000 monks and nuns in Tibet in 1950, and by 1979, most of them were dead, imprisoned or had disappeared.<ref>{{cite book|author=Jane Ardley|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=sFqQAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA22#v=onepage|title=Tibetan Independence Movement: Political, Religious and Gandhian Perspectives|publisher=Routledge <!--|isbn= 978-0700715725 |publisher=Scarecrow Press-->|year=2003|isbn=9781135790257|page=22|access-date=June 27, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160616180757/https://books.google.com/books?id=sFqQAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA22#v=onepage&q&f=false|archive-date=June 16, 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> The Tibetan government in exile claimed that many Tibetans also died from famines in 1961–1964 and 1968–1973 as a result of forced collectivization,<ref name="cycle" /><ref>{{cite book|author=Kimberley Ens Manning|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=aHPTn2Rq9IUC&pg=PA23&lpg=PA23#v=onepage|title=Eating Bitterness: New Perspectives on China's Great Leap Forward and Famine|author2=Felix Wemheuer|publisher=UBC Press|year=2011|isbn=9780774859554|page=23|access-date=October 1, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160518114602/https://books.google.com/books?id=aHPTn2Rq9IUC&pg=PA23&lpg=PA23#v=onepage&q&f=false|archive-date=May 18, 2016|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|author=John Powers|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=wksCKIivSNUC&pg=PA170#v=onepage|title=Historical Dictionary of Tibet|author2=David Templeman|publisher=Grove Press|year=2007|isbn=9780810868052|page=170|access-date=September 30, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160506205959/https://books.google.com/books?id=wksCKIivSNUC&pg=PA170#v=onepage&q&f=false|archive-date=May 6, 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> however the number of Tibetan deaths or whether famines, in fact, took place in these periods is disputed.<ref>{{cite book|author=Warren W. Smith|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=WYiVlfLzlRUC&pg=PA6#v=onepage|title=Tibet's Last Stand?: The Tibetan Uprising of 2008 and China's Response|publisher=Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.|year=2009|isbn=978-0742566859|page=6|access-date=September 30, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160506103025/https://books.google.com/books?id=WYiVlfLzlRUC&pg=PA6#v=onepage&q&f=false|archive-date=May 6, 2016|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|author=John Powers|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=D96ifo76RZEC&pg=PA142#v=onepage|title=History As Propaganda: Tibetan Exiles versus the People's Republic of China|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2004|isbn=978-0198038849|page=142|access-date=September 30, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160424080257/https://books.google.com/books?id=D96ifo76RZEC&pg=PA142#v=onepage&q&f=false|archive-date=April 24, 2016|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|author=Barry Sautman|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Z4hsGZ-idEwC&pg=PA240#v=onepage|title=Contemporary Tibet: Politics, Development, and Society in a Disputed Region|author2=June Teufel Dreyer|publisher=ME Sharp|year=2006|isbn=9780765631497|pages=238–47|access-date=October 1, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160616205143/https://books.google.com/books?id=Z4hsGZ-idEwC&pg=PA240#v=onepage&q&f=false|archive-date=June 16, 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> Despite official persecution, some local leaders and minority ethnic practices survived in remote regions.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Schwartz|first1=Ronald|title=Religious Persecution in Tibet|url=http://www.tibet.ca/_media/PDF/Religious-Persecution-in-Tibet.pdf|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130923042104/http://www.tibet.ca/_media/PDF/Religious-Persecution-in-Tibet.pdf|archive-date=September 23, 2013|accessdate=5 December 2018|website=www.tibet.ca|publisher=Memorial University of Newfoundland}}</ref>


In ] Province, the palace of the ]'s king was torched, and a massacre of Muslim ] at the hands of the PLA in Yunnan, known as the ], reportedly claimed over 1,600 lives in 1975.<ref name="Yongming Zhou 1999, p. 162" /> After the Cultural Revolution, the government gave reparations for the Shadian Incident, including the erection of a Martyr's Memorial in Shadian.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Khalid |first1=Zainab |date=January 4, 2011 |title=Rise of the Veil: Islamic Modernity and the Hui Woman |url=http://digitalcollections.sit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2068&context=isp_collection |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140809045544/http://digitalcollections.sit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2068&context=isp_collection |archive-date=August 9, 2014 |access-date=July 25, 2014 |website=SIT Digital Collections |series=Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection |publisher=SIT Graduate Institute |pages=8, 11 |format=PDF |id=Paper 1074}}</ref>
The overall failure of the Red Guards' and radical assimilationists' goals was mostly due to two factors. It was felt that pushing minority groups too hard would compromise China's border defences. This was especially important as minorities make up a large percentage of the population that live along China's borders. In the late 1960s, China experienced a period of strained relations with some of its neighbours, notably with the Soviet Union and India.<ref>See ] and ]</ref> Many of the Cultural Revolution's goals in minority areas were simply too unreasonable to be implemented. The return to pluralism, and therefore the end of the worst of the effects of the Cultural Revolution on ethnic minorities in China, coincides closely with Lin Biao's removal from power.<ref name="Dreyer">{{cite book|last1=Dreyer|first1=June Teufel|title=China's Political System: Modernization and Tradition|publisher=Macmillan|year=2000|isbn=0-333-91287-X|edition=3rd|location=London, Great Britain|pages=289–91}}</ref>


Concessions to minorities were abolished during the Cultural Revolution as part of the Red Guards' attack on the "Four Olds". ]s, previously only established in parts of Tibet, were established throughout ] in 1966,<ref>{{cite book |first1=John |last1=Powers |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=wksCKIivSNUC|page-PR35}} |title=Historical Dictionary of Tibet |first2=David |last2=Templeman |publisher=Grove |year=2007 |isbn=978-0810868052 |page=35}}</ref> removing Tibet's exemption from China's land reform, and reimposed in other minority areas. The effect on Tibet was particularly severe as it came following the repression after the ].<ref>{{cite book |author=Adam Jones |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=TkPqxCBbF7UC |page=97}} |title=Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction |publisher=Routledge |year=2006 |isbn=978-0415353854 |pages=96–97}}</ref><ref name="cycle">{{cite book |author=Ronald D. Schwartz |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=s_7WkbZAaWEC |page=12}} |title=Circle Of Protest |year=1996 |isbn=978-8120813700 |pages=12–13 |publisher=Motilal Banarsidass }}</ref> The destruction of nearly all of its over 6,000 monasteries, which began before the Cultural Revolution, were often conducted with the complicity of local ethnic Tibetan Red Guards.<ref name="Ardley">{{cite book |last=Ardley |first=Jane |title=Tibetan Independence Movement: Political, Religious and Gandhian Perspectives |publisher=Routledge |year=2002 |isbn=978-0700715725}}</ref>{{rp|9}} Only eight were intact by the end of the 1970s.<ref>{{cite book |author=Thomas Laird |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=As_4aQjGaUEC |page=345}} |title=The Story of Tibet: Conversations with the Dalai Lama |year=2007 |isbn=978-1555846725 |page=345 |publisher=Open Road }}</ref>
== Cultural results and influence ==


Many monks and nuns were killed, and the general population was subjected to physical and psychological torture.<ref name=Ardley/>{{rp|9}} An estimated 600,000 monks and nuns lived in Tibet in 1950, but by 1979, most were dead, imprisoned or had disappeared.<ref name=Ardley/>{{rp|22}} The Tibetan government in exile claimed that many Tibetans died from famines in 1961–1964 and 1968–1973 as a result of forced collectivization,<ref name="cycle" /><ref>{{cite book |first1=Kimberley Ens |last1=Manning |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=aHPTn2Rq9IUC |page=23}} |title=Eating Bitterness: New Perspectives on China's Great Leap Forward and Famine |first2=Felix |last2=Wemheuer |publisher=University of British Columbia Press |year=2011 |isbn=978-0774859554 |page=23}}</ref> however, the number of Tibetan deaths or whether famines, in fact, took place in these periods is disputed.<ref>{{cite book |first=Warren W. |last=Smith |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=WYiVlfLzlRUC |page=6}} |title=Tibet's Last Stand?: The Tibetan Uprising of 2008 and China's Response |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield |year=2009 |isbn=978-0742566859 |page=6}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |author=John Powers |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=D96ifo76RZEC |page=142}} |title=History As Propaganda: Tibetan Exiles versus the People's Republic of China |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2004 |isbn=978-0198038849 |page=142}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |first1=Barry |last1=Sautman |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=Z4hsGZ-idEwC |page=240}} |title=Contemporary Tibet: Politics, Development, and Society in a Disputed Region |first2=June Teufel |last2=Dreyer |publisher=M. E. Sharp |year=2006 |isbn=978-0765631497 |pages=238–247}}</ref> Despite persecution, some local leaders and minority ethnic practices survived in remote regions.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Schwartz |first1=Ronald |title=Religious Persecution in Tibet |url=http://www.tibet.ca/_media/PDF/Religious-Persecution-in-Tibet.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130923042104/http://www.tibet.ca/_media/PDF/Religious-Persecution-in-Tibet.pdf |archive-date=September 23, 2013 |access-date=December 5, 2018 |website=www.tibet.ca |publisher=Memorial University of Newfoundland}}</ref>
=== Red Guards riot ===
]


The overall failure of the Red Guards' and radical assimilationists' goals was mostly due to two factors. It was felt that pushing minority groups too hard would compromise China's border defenses. This was especially important as minorities make up a large percentage of the population that live in border regions. In the late 1960s, China experienced a period of strained relations with some of its neighbors, notably with the Soviet Union and India. Many of the Cultural Revolution's goals in minority areas were simply unreasonable. The return to pluralism, and therefore the end of the worst period, coincided with Lin Biao's removal from power.<ref name="Dreyer">{{cite book |last1=Dreyer |first1=June Teufel |title=China's Political System: Modernization and Tradition |publisher=Macmillan |year=2000 |isbn=0-333-91287-X |edition=3rd |location=London |pages=289–291}}</ref>
The effects of the Cultural Revolution directly or indirectly touched essentially all of China's population. During the Cultural Revolution, much economic activity was halted, with "revolution", regardless of interpretation, being the primary objective of the country. ] became the central operative guide to all things in China. The authority of the ] surpassed that of the army, local police authorities, and the law in general. Chinese traditional arts and ideas were ignored and publicly attacked, with praise for Mao being practiced in their place. People were encouraged to criticize cultural institutions and to question their parents and teachers, which had been strictly forbidden in traditional ].{{Citation needed|date=December 2018}}

=== Rape and sexual abuse ===
{{Further|Sent-down youth#Sexual violence}}
], Honig, and others documented that rape and sexual abuse of sent-down women were common during the CR's height.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Larson |first=Wendy |date=October 1999 |title=Never This Wild: Sexing the Cultural Revolution |journal=] |volume=25 |issue=4 |pages=423–450 |doi=10.1177/009770049902500402 |s2cid=144491731 |issn=0097-7004}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Honig |first=Emily |year=2003 |title=Socialist Sex: The Cultural Revolution Revisited |journal=] |volume=29 |issue=2 |pages=143–175 |doi=10.1177/0097700402250735 |issn=0097-7004 |jstor=3181306 |s2cid=143436282 |quote=A 1973 report on sent-down youth estimated that since 1969, there had been some 16,000 cases of rape.}}</ref> Branigan documented that women raped tended to be from educated urban backgrounds while their rapists were poor peasants or local officials.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Branigan |first=Tania |date=2023-01-19 |title=A tragedy pushed to the shadows: the truth about China's Cultural Revolution |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/19/tragedy-pushed-to-the-shadows-truth-about-china-cultural-revolution |access-date=2024-10-18 |work=The Guardian |language=en-GB |issn=0261-3077}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Branigan |first=Tania |title=Red Memory: The Afterlives of China's Cultural Revolution |date=2023 |publisher=W. W. Norton |isbn=978-1-324-05195-4 |page=166 |quote=But the city girls, naive and far from their families, were easy prey for peasants and especially cadres. Though fright and shame deterred many from reporting abuses, thousands of cases were recorded in a single year. The problem was pronounced enough that the centre kept threatening punishment for rapes. Often the victims took the blame, since they had worse class backgrounds than officials.}}</ref>

== Cultural impact and influence ==

=== Red Guards riot ===
]


The revolution aimed to destroy the Four Olds and establish the corresponding Four News, which ranged from changing of names and cutting of hair to ransacking homes, vandalizing cultural treasures, and desecrating temples.<ref name="Lu" />{{rp|61–64}}
The start of the Cultural Revolution brought huge numbers of Red Guards to Beijing, with all expenses paid by the government, and the railway system was in turmoil. The revolution aimed to destroy the "]" (i.e., old customs, old culture, old habits, and old ideas) and establish the corresponding "Four News", which could range from changing of names and cutting of hair to the ransacking of homes, vandalizing cultural treasures, and desecrating temples.<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GO5HrrJC_aMC&pg=PA62#v=onepage |title=Rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Impact on Chinese Thought, Culture, and Communication |pages=61–64 |author=Xing Lu |publisher=University of South Carolina Press |year=2004 |isbn=978-1570035432 |access-date=June 27, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160616205451/https://books.google.com/books?id=GO5HrrJC_aMC&pg=PA62#v=onepage&q&f=false |archive-date=June 16, 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref> In a few years, countless ancient buildings, artifacts, antiques, books, and paintings were destroyed by Red Guards. The status of traditional Chinese culture and institutions within China was also severely damaged as a result of the Cultural Revolution, and the practice of many traditional customs weakened.


The revolution also aimed to "sweep away" all "]", that is, all the class enemies who promoted bourgeois ideas within the party, the government, the army, among the intellectuals, as well as those from an exploitative family background or who belonged to one of the ]. Large numbers of people perceived to be "monsters and demons" regardless of guilt or innocence were publicly denounced, humiliated, and beaten. In their revolutionary fervor, students especially the Red Guards denounced their teachers, and children denounced their parents.<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GO5HrrJC_aMC&pg=PA60#v=onepage |title=Rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Impact on Chinese Thought, Culture, and Communication |pages=59–61 |author=Xing Lu |publisher=University of South Carolina Press |year=2004 |isbn=978-1570035432 |access-date=June 27, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160512174404/https://books.google.com/books?id=GO5HrrJC_aMC&pg=PA60#v=onepage&q&f=false |archive-date=May 12, 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref> Many died through their ill-treatment or committed suicide. In 1968, youths were mobilized to go to the countryside in the ] so they may learn from the peasantry, and the departure of millions from the cities helped end the most violent phase of the Cultural Revolution.<ref name="turmoil"/> The revolution aimed to eliminate ] - the class enemies who promoted bourgeois ideas, as well as those from an exploitative family background or who belonged to one of the Five Black Categories. Large numbers of people perceived to be "monsters and demons" regardless of guilt or innocence were publicly denounced, humiliated, and beaten. In their revolutionary fervor, students, especially the Red Guards, denounced their teachers, and children denounced their parents.<ref name="Lu" />{{rp|59–61}} Many died from ill-treatment or committed suicide. In 1968, youths were mobilized to go to the countryside in the ] so they may learn from the peasantry, and the departure of millions from the cities helped end the most violent phase of the Cultural Revolution.<ref name="King">{{cite book |last=King |first=Richard |title=Art in Turmoil: The Chinese Cultural Revolution, 1966–76 |publisher=University of British Columbia Press |year=2010 |isbn=978-0774815437}}</ref>{{rp|176}}


=== Academics and education === === Academics and education ===
], one of China's foremost ] scientists, was beaten to death by a mob in Beijing during the Cultural Revolution (1968). This caused ] to order special protection for key technical experts.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Stokes |first=Mark A. |chapter=The People's Liberation Army and China's Space and Missile Development |editor1=Laurie Burkitt |editor2=Andrew Scobell |editor3=Larry Wortzel |editor3-link=Larry Wortzel |title=The Lessons of History: The Chinese people's Liberation Army at 75 |publisher=] |url=https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB52.pdf |page=198 |year=2003 |isbn=978-1-58487-126-2 |access-date=January 11, 2022 |archive-date=February 5, 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120205072610/http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB52.pdf |url-status=dead}}</ref>]]
], one of China's foremost ] scientists, was beaten to death in Beijing during the Cultural Revolution (1968).]]
Academics and ]s were regarded as the "]" and were widely persecuted.<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Jihui|first1=Yu|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=WvIFxwEACAAJ&dq=stinking+old+ninth+cultural+revolution|title=The Stinking Old Ninth: A Tale of The Coal Capital|date=July 2019|publisher=Independently Published|isbn=978-1-0721-7605-3|location=|pages=|language=en}}</ref> Many were sent to rural labor camps such as the ]. According to the official documents in the prosecution of the ], 142,000 cadres and teachers in the education circles were persecuted and noted academics, scientists, and educators who died included ], ], ], ], ], ] and ].<ref name="documents"/> As of 1968, among the 171 senior members who worked at the headquarters of ] in Beijing, 131 were persecuted, and among all the members of the academy in China, 229 were persecuted to death.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://mjlsh.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/Book.aspx?cid=4&tid=3847|title=文革中的中科院:131位科学家被打倒,229人遭迫害致死|last1=Cao|first1=Pu|date=|website=Chinese University of Hong Kong|language=zh|url-status=live|archive-url=|archive-date=|access-date=2020-02-23}}</ref> As of September 1971, more than 4,000 staff members of China's nuclear center in ] were persecuted; more than 310 of them were permanently disabled, over 40 people committed suicide, and five were ].<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://news.ifeng.com/history/zhongguoxiandaishi/detail_2012_05/02/14277600_0.shtml|title=文革对中国核基地的损害:4000人被审查 40人自尽|last=|first=|date=|website=news.ifeng.com|language=zh|url-status=live|archive-url=|archive-date=|access-date=2020-02-23}}</ref> Nevertheless, during the Cultural Revolution, Chinese scientists still managed to successfully test the first missile, create the first ] and launch the first satellite in the ] program.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://phtv.ifeng.com/program/tfzg/detail_2013_11/21/31452743_0.shtml|title=中国"文革"科研仅两弹一星核潜艇|last=|first=|date=|website=phtv.ifeng.com|language=zh|url-status=live|archive-url=|archive-date=|access-date=2020-02-23}}</ref>


The Cultural Revolution brought China's education system to a virtual halt for a long time. In the early months of the Cultural Revolution, schools and universities were closed. Primary and middle schools later gradually reopened, but all colleges and universities were closed until 1970, and most universities did not reopen until 1972.<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=iRr8GOrCLgkC&pg=PA164#v=onepage |title=Rise of the Red Engineers: The Cultural Revolution and the Origins of China's New Class |author=Joel Andreas |page=164 |publisher=Stanford University Press |year=2009 |isbn=978-0804760782 |access-date=June 27, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160617113433/https://books.google.com/books?id=iRr8GOrCLgkC&pg=PA164#v=onepage&q&f=false |archive-date=June 17, 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref> The ] were cancelled after 1966, to be replaced later by a system whereby students were recommended by factories, villages and military units, and entrance exams were not restored until 1977 under Deng Xiaoping. Values taught in traditional education were abandoned.<ref name="xinglu">{{cite book |url= https://books.google.com/books?id=GO5HrrJC_aMC&pg=PA195#v=onepage |title= Rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Impact on Chinese Thought, Culture, and Communication |author= Xing Lu |page= 195 |publisher= University of South Carolina Press |year= 2004 |isbn= 978-1570035432 |access-date= June 27, 2015 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20160519125538/https://books.google.com/books?id=GO5HrrJC_aMC&pg=PA195#v=onepage&q&f=false |archive-date= May 19, 2016 |url-status= live }}</ref> During the Cultural Revolution, basic education was emphasized and rapidly expanded. While the years of schooling were reduced and education standard fell, the proportion of Chinese children who had completed primary education increased from less than half before the Cultural Revolution to almost all after the Cultural Revolution, and those who completed junior middle school rose from 15% to over two-third. The educational opportunities for rural children expanded considerably, while those of the children of the urban elite became restricted by the anti-elitist policies.<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=iRr8GOrCLgkC&pg=PA166#v=onepage |title=Rise of the Red Engineers: The Cultural Revolution and the Origins of China's New Class |author=Joel Andreas |pages=166–67 |publisher=Stanford University Press |year=2009 |isbn=978-0804760782 |access-date=June 27, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160617094327/https://books.google.com/books?id=iRr8GOrCLgkC&pg=PA166#v=onepage&q&f=false |archive-date=June 17, 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref>


Academics and ]s were regarded as the "]" and were widely persecuted. Many were sent to rural labor camps such as the ]. The prosecution of the Gang of Four revealed that 142,000 cadres and teachers in the education circles were persecuted. Academics, scientists, and educators who died included ], ], Wu Han, ], ], ] and ].<ref name="documents"/> As of 1968, among the 171 senior members who worked at the headquarters of ] in Beijing, 131 were persecuted. Among the members of the academy, 229 died.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://mjlsh.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/Book.aspx?cid=4&tid=3847 |script-title=zh:文革中的中科院:131位科学家被打倒,229人遭迫害致死 |last1=Cao |first1=Pu |website=Chinese University of Hong Kong |language=zh |access-date=February 23, 2020}}</ref>
In 1968, the Communist Party instituted the ], in which ] (''zhishi qingnian'' or simply ''zhiqing'') in urban areas were sent to live and work in agrarian areas to be re-educated by the peasantry and to better understand the role of manual agrarian labor in Chinese society. In the initial stages, most of the youth who took part volunteered, although later on, the government resorted to forcing many of them to move. Between 1968 and 1979, 17&nbsp;millions of China's urban youths left for the countryside, and being in the rural areas also deprived them the opportunity of higher education.<ref name="turmoil">{{Cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=XbapwCJRtdUC&pg=PA10#v=onepage |title=King. p. 10 |access-date=June 27, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160428031108/https://books.google.com/books?id=XbapwCJRtdUC&pg=PA10#v=onepage&q&f=false |archive-date=April 28, 2016 |url-status=live |isbn=9780774859110 |last1=King |first1=Richard |date=July 2010 }}</ref> The entire generation of tormented and inadequately educated individuals is often referred to as the 'lost generation' in both China and the West.<ref name="xinglu" /><ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=YFkx41kszGUC&pg=PA55#v=onepage |title=A River Forever Flowing: Cross-cultural Lives and Identities in the Multicultural Landscape |author=Ming Fang He |page=55 |publisher=Information Age Publishing |date=2000 |isbn=978-1593110765 |access-date=June 27, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160505174046/https://books.google.com/books?id=YFkx41kszGUC&pg=PA55#v=onepage&q&f=false |archive-date=May 5, 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=http://edition.cnn.com/2012/10/24/world/asia/china-lost-generation/ |title=China's 'lost generation' recall hardships of Cultural Revolution |author=Tracy You |work=CNN |date=October 25, 2012 |access-date=November 15, 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141129030828/http://edition.cnn.com/2012/10/24/world/asia/china-lost-generation/ |archive-date=November 29, 2014 |url-status=live }}</ref> In the post-Mao period, many of those forcibly moved attacked the policy as a violation of their human rights."<ref>]. p. 36.</ref>


As of September 1971, more than 4,000 staff members of China's nuclear center in ] had been persecuted. More than 310 were disabled, over 40 committed suicide, and 5 were ].<ref>{{Cite web |last=Wang |first=Jingheng |script-title=zh:青海核武基地的劫难 |url=http://www.yhcqw.com/36/9207.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200714221024/http://www.yhcqw.com/36/9207.html |archive-date=July 14, 2020 |access-date=July 14, 2020 |website=] |language=zh}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=May 2, 2012 |script-title=zh:文革对中国核基地的损害:4000人被审查 40人自尽 |url=http://news.ifeng.com/history/zhongguoxiandaishi/detail_2012_05/02/14277600_0.shtml |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200608171436/http://news.ifeng.com/history/zhongguoxiandaishi/detail_2012_05/02/14277600_0.shtml |archive-date=June 8, 2020 |access-date=February 23, 2020 |website=] |language=zh}}</ref> During the CR, scientists tested the first missile, created China's first ] and launched China's first satellite in the ] program.<ref>{{Cite web |date=November 21, 2013 |script-title=zh:中国"文革"科研仅两弹一星核潜艇 |url=http://phtv.ifeng.com/program/tfzg/detail_2013_11/21/31452743_0.shtml |access-date=February 23, 2020 |website=] |language=zh}}</ref> Significant achievements came in science and technology.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Ching |first=Pao-yu |author-link=Pao-yu Ching |year=2019 |title=From Victory to Defeat – China's Socialist Road and Capitalist Reversal |url=https://foreignlanguages.press/new-roads/from-victory-to-defeat-pao-yu-ching/ |url-status=live |website=] |page=45 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200810043322/https://foreignlanguages.press/new-roads/from-victory-to-defeat-pao-yu-ching/ |archive-date=August 10, 2020}}</ref>
However, the impact of the Cultural Revolution on accessible education varied among regions, and formal measurements of literacy did not resume until the 1980s.<ref name="Peterson">Peterson, Glen. (1997). The Power of Words: literacy and revolution in South China, 1949–95. UBC Press. {{ISBN|0-7748-0612-5}}</ref> Some counties in ] had illiteracy rates as high as 41% some 20 years after the revolution. The leaders of China at the time denied that there were any illiteracy problems from the start. This effect was amplified by the elimination of qualified teachers—many districts were forced to rely on selected students to educate the next generation.<ref name="Peterson" /> Though the effect of the Cultural Revolution was disastrous for millions in China, there were positive outcomes for some sections of the population, such as those in rural areas. For example, the upheavals of the Cultural Revolution and the hostility to the intellectual elite is widely accepted to have damaged the quality of education in China, especially at the upper end of the education system. However, the radical policies also provided many in rural communities with middle school education for the first time, which is thought to have facilitated the rural economic development in the 70s and 80s.<ref>{{cite book|author=Joel Andreas|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=iRr8GOrCLgkC&pg=PA163#v=onepage|title=Rise of the Red Engineers: The Cultural Revolution and the Origins of China's New Class|publisher=Stanford University Press|year=2009|isbn=978-0804760782|page=163|access-date=June 27, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160616211231/https://books.google.com/books?id=iRr8GOrCLgkC&pg=PA163#v=onepage&q&f=false|archive-date=June 16, 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> Similarly, many health personnel were deployed to the countryside as ] during the Cultural Revolution. Some farmers were given informal medical training, and health-care centers were established in rural communities. This process led to a marked improvement in the health and the life expectancy of the general population.<ref name="Huang Foreign Affairs 2011">{{cite journal|last1=Huang|first1=Yanzhong|year=2011|title=The Sick Man of Asia. China's Health Crisis|url=http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136507/yanzhong-huang/the-sick-man-of-asia|url-status=live|journal=Foreign Affairs|volume=90|pages=119–36|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141113012140/http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136507/yanzhong-huang/the-sick-man-of-asia|archive-date=November 13, 2014|access-date=November 12, 2014|number=6}}</ref>

In the CR's early months, schools and universities were closed. Secondary school classes of 1966, 1967, and 1968 were unable to graduate on time later and became known as the Old Three cohort.<ref name="Xu2022" />{{rp|362}} Primary and middle schools gradually reopened, but colleges and universities were closed until 1970, and most universities did not reopen until 1972.<ref name=Joel>{{cite book |last=Joel |first=Andreas |title=Rise of the Red Engineers: The Cultural Revolution and the Origins of China's New Class |publisher=Stanford University Press |year=2009 |isbn=978-0804760782}}</ref>{{rp|164}} ] were cancelled after 1966, replaced by a system whereby students were recommended by factories, villages and military units. Entrance exams were not restored until 1977 under Deng. Traditional values were abandoned.<ref name=Lu/>{{rp|195}}

During the Cultural Revolution, basic education was emphasized and expanded. While schooling years were reduced and education standard fell, the proportion of Chinese children who completed primary education increased from less than half to almost all, and the fraction who completed junior middle school rose from 15% to over two-thirds. Educational opportunities for rural children expanded, while education of the urban elite were restricted by anti-elitist policies.<ref name=Joel/>{{rp|166–167}} Industrial Universities were established in factories to supply technical and engineering programs for industrial workers. These study programs were inspired by Mao's July 1968 remarks advocating ].<ref name="Xu2022" />{{rp|362}} Mao had given the instruction to emulate the model of the Shanghai Machine Tool Factory university. Factories around the country therefore established their own educational programs for technicians and engineers. By 1976, there were 15,000 such 21 July Universities.<ref name=":Minami">{{Cite book |last=Minami |first=Kazushi |title=People's Diplomacy: How Americans and Chinese Transformed US-China Relations during the Cold War |year=2024 |publisher=] |isbn=9781501774157 |location=Ithaca, NY}}</ref>{{rp|92}}

In the Down to the Countryside Movement's initial stages, most of the youth who took part volunteered. Later on, the government forced them to move. Between 1968 and 1979, 17&nbsp;million urban youth left for the countryside. Living in the rural areas deprived them of higher education.<ref name=King/>{{rp|10}} This generation is referred to as the 'lost generation'.<ref name=Lu/>{{rp|}}<ref>{{cite book |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=YFkx41kszGUC |page=55}} |title=A River Forever Flowing: Cross-cultural Lives and Identities in the Multicultural Landscape |author=Ming Fang He |page=55 |publisher=Information Age Publishing |date=2000 |isbn=978-1593110765 |access-date=June 27, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160505174046/https://books.google.com/books?id=YFkx41kszGUC&pg=PA55 |archive-date=May 5, 2016 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=http://edition.cnn.com/2012/10/24/world/asia/china-lost-generation/ |title=China's 'lost generation' recall hardships of Cultural Revolution |author=Tracy You |work=CNN |date=October 25, 2012 |access-date=November 15, 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141129030828/http://edition.cnn.com/2012/10/24/world/asia/china-lost-generation/ |archive-date=November 29, 2014 |url-status=live}}</ref> In the post-Mao period, many of those forcibly moved attacked the policy as a violation of their human rights.<ref name=Gao>{{cite book |last=Gao |first=Mobo |title=The Battle for China's Past: Mao and the Cultural Revolution |publisher=Pluto Press |year=2008 |url=http://www.strongwindpress.com/pdfs/EBook/The_Battle_for_Chinas_Past.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121103094507/http://www.strongwindpress.com/pdfs/EBook/The_Battle_for_Chinas_Past.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-date=November 3, 2012 |isbn=978-0-7453-2780-8 |author-link=Gao Mobo}}</ref>{{rp|36}}

The Cultural Revolution's impact on accessible education varied across regions. Formal literacy measurements did not resume until the 1980s.<ref name="Peterson">{{Cite book |last=Peterson |first=Glen |title=The Power of Words |year=2007 |publisher=University of British Columbia Press |doi=10.59962/9780774854535 |isbn=978-0-7748-5453-5}}</ref> Some counties in ] had literacy rates as low as 59% 20 years after the revolution. China's leaders denied illiteracy problems. This was amplified by the elimination of qualified teachers—many districts were forced to rely on students to teach.<ref name="Peterson" />

Though the Cultural Revolution was disastrous for millions, positive outcomes advanced some groups, such as those in rural areas. For example, the upheavals and the hostility to the intellectual elite is widely seen to have damaged education, especially at the upper end of the education system. Radical policies provided many in rural communities with middle school education for the first time, which is thought to have facilitated rural economic development.<ref name=Joel/>{{rp|163}} Rural infrastructure developed during CR, facilitated by the political changes that empowered ordinary rurals.<ref name="Han2008" />{{rp|177}}

Many health personnel were deployed to the countryside as ]. Some farmers were given informal medical training, and health-care centers were established in rural communities. This process led to a marked improvement in health and life expectancy.<ref name="Huang Foreign Affairs 2011">{{cite journal |last1=Huang |first1=Yanzhong |year=2011 |title=The Sick Man of Asia. China's Health Crisis |url=http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136507/yanzhong-huang/the-sick-man-of-asia |url-status=live |journal=Foreign Affairs |volume=90 |pages=119–36 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141113012140/http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136507/yanzhong-huang/the-sick-man-of-asia |archive-date=November 13, 2014 |access-date=November 12, 2014 |number=6}}</ref>


===Slogans and rhetoric=== ===Slogans and rhetoric===
]'', with "revolution is no crime, to rebel is justified" written on a flag next to him, 1967]]
].]]
According to Shaorong Huang, the fact that the Cultural Revolution had such massive effects on Chinese society is the result of extensive use of political slogans.<ref name="huang">Huang, Shaorong. 2001. "The power of Words: Political Slogans as Leverage in Conflict and Conflict Management during China's Cultural Revolution Movement." In ''Chinese Conflict Management and Resolution'', edited by G. Chen and R. Ma. ].</ref> In Huang's view, rhetoric played a central role in rallying both the Party leadership and people at large during the Cultural Revolution. For example, the slogan "to rebel is justified" ({{Lang-zh|c=|s=|t=造反有理|p=zàofǎn yǒulǐ|labels=no}}) became a unitary theme.<ref name=huang/> Huang claimed that the Cultural Revolution had massive effects on Chinese society because of the extensive use of political slogans.<ref name="huang">{{Cite book |title=The power of words: political slogans as leverage in conflict and conflict management during China's cultural revolution movement |editor-first1=G. |editor-last1=Chen |editor-first2=R. |editor-last2=Ma |publisher=Greenwood}}</ref> He claimed that slogans played a central role in rallying Party leadership and citizens. For example, the slogan "to rebel is justified" ({{zhi|c=造反有理|p=zàofǎn yǒulǐ}}) affected many views.<ref name=huang/>


]]]
Huang asserts that political slogans were ubiquitous in every aspect of people's lives, being printed onto everyday items such as bus tickets, cigarette packets, and mirror tables.<ref>]. p. 14.</ref> Workers were supposed to "grasp revolution and promote productions", while peasants were supposed to raise more pigs because "more pigs means more manure, and more manure means more grain." Even a casual remark by Mao, "Sweet potato tastes good; I like it" became a slogan everywhere in the countryside.<ref name=huang/>
Huang asserted that slogans were ubiquitous in people's lives, printed onto everyday items such as bus tickets, cigarette packets, and mirror tables.<ref name=Gao/>{{rp|14}} Workers were supposed to "grasp revolution and promote productions", while peasants were supposed to raise more pigs because "more pigs means more manure, and more manure means more grain." Even a casual remark by Mao, "Sweet potato tastes good; I like it" became a slogan.<ref name=huang/>{{Page needed|date=November 2024}}


Political slogans of the time had three sources: Mao, official Party media such as ''People's Daily'', and the Red Guards.<ref name=huang/> Mao often offered vague, yet powerful directives that led to the factionalization of the Red Guards.<ref>Chan</ref> These directives could be interpreted to suit personal interests, in turn aiding factions' goals in being most loyal to Mao Zedong. Red Guard slogans were of the most violent nature, such as "Strike the enemy down on the floor and step on him with a foot", "Long live the red terror!" and "Those who are against Chairman Mao will have their dog skulls smashed into pieces."<ref name=huang/> Political slogans had three sources: Mao, Party media such as ''People's Daily'', and the Red Guards.<ref name=huang/> Mao often offered vague, yet powerful directives that divided the Red Guards.{{sfn|Chang|Halliday|2005}} These directives could be interpreted to suit personal interests, in turn aiding factions' goals in claiming loyalty to Mao. Red Guard slogans were violent, advancing themes such as "Strike the enemy down on the floor and step on him with a foot", "Long live the red terror!" and "Those who are against Chairman Mao will have their dog skulls smashed into pieces."<ref name=huang/>{{Page number|date=November 2024}}


Sinologists Lowell Dittmer and Chen Ruoxi point out that the Chinese language had historically been defined by subtlety, delicacy, moderation, and honesty, as well as the "cultivation of a refined and elegant literary style."<ref name="dittmerchen">Dittmer, Lowel, and ]. 1981 "Ethics and rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural Revolution." ''Studies in Chinese Terminology'' 19. p. 108</ref> This changed during the Cultural Revolution. Since Mao wanted an army of bellicose people in his crusade, rhetoric at the time was reduced to militant and violent vocabulary.<ref name=huang/> These slogans were a powerful and effective method of "thought reform," mobilizing millions in a concerted attack upon the subjective world, "while at the same time reforming their objective world."<ref name=huang/><ref name="Dittmer and Chen 1981, p. 12">Dittmer and Chen 1981, p. 12.</ref> Dittmer and Ruoxi claim that the ] had historically been defined by subtlety, delicacy, moderation, and honesty, as well as the cultivation of a "refined and elegant literary style".<ref name=Dittmer>{{Cite book |last1=Dittmer |first1=Lowell |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=7NkhMkuCs7QC}} |title=Ethics and Rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural Revolution |last2=Chen |first2=Ruoxi |year=1981 |publisher=Center for Chinese Studies, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California |isbn=978-0-912966-47-2}}</ref> This changed during the CR. These slogans were an effective method of "thought reform", mobilizing millions in a concerted attack upon the subjective world, "while at the same time reforming their objective world."<ref name=huang/>{{Page number|date=November 2024}}<ref name=Dittmer/>{{rp|12}}


Dittmer and Chen argue that the emphasis on politics made language a very effective form of propaganda, but "also transformed it into a jargon of stereotypes—pompous, repetitive, and boring."<ref name="Dittmer and Chen 1981, p. 12"/> To distance itself from the era, Deng Xiaoping's government cut back heavily on the use of political slogans. The practice of sloganeering saw a mild resurgence in the late 1990s under ].{{Citation needed|date=December 2018}} Dittmer and Chen argued that the emphasis on politics made language into effective propaganda, but "also transformed it into a jargon of stereotypes—pompous, repetitive, and boring".<ref name=Dittmer/>{{rp|12}} To distance itself from the era, Deng's government cut back on political slogans. During a eulogy for Deng's death, ] called the Cultural Revolution a "grave mistake".<ref>{{cite book |last1=Paulson |first1=Henry M. |title=Dealing with China: an insider unmasks the new economic superpower |year=2015 |location=New York |publisher=Grand Central Publishing |isbn=978-1455504213 |page=4}}</ref>


===Arts and literature=== ===Arts and literature===
]'', one of the Model Dramas promoted during the Cultural Revolution.]] ]'', one of the Model Dramas promoted during the Cultural Revolution]]

Before the Cultural Revolution, in the years 1958–1966, theatre became part of the struggles in the political arena as plays were used to criticize or support particular members of the party leadership. An opera by ], '']'', was interpreted as a veiled criticism of Mao. It elicited an attack by Yao Wenyuan on the opera, and the attack is often considered the opening shot of the Cultural Revolution.<ref>{{cite book |url=https://archive.org/details/bub_gb_7zFiHwkpo88C |title=The Contemporary Chinese Historical Drama: Four Studies |author=Rudolf G. Wagner |page= |publisher=University of California Press |edition=1st |year=1990 |isbn=978-0520059542 |access-date=June 27, 2015 }}</ref> It led to the persecution and death of its writer Wu Han, as well as others involved in theater, such as ], ], and ].<ref>{{cite book |url= https://books.google.com/books?id=3o_Ujqw4Kh0C&pg=PA102#v=onepage |title= Using the Past to Serve the Present: Historiography and Politics in Contemporary China |editor= by Jonathan Unger |publisher= M.E. Sharpe |page= 102 |year= 1997 |isbn= 9780873327480 |access-date= June 27, 2015 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20160617113442/https://books.google.com/books?id=3o_Ujqw4Kh0C&pg=PA102#v=onepage&q&f=false |archive-date= June 17, 2016 |url-status= live }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=XOGdnCPJSOMC&pg=PA497#v=onepage |title=Biographical Dictionary of Chinese Women, Volume 2 |editor1=Lily Xiao Hong Lee |editor2=A. D. Stefanowska |editor3=Sue Wiles |pages=497–500 |year=2003 |publisher=M.E. Sharpe |isbn=0-7656-0798-0 |access-date=June 27, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160505103847/https://books.google.com/books?id=XOGdnCPJSOMC&pg=PA497#v=onepage&q&f=false |archive-date=May 5, 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref>
Drastic changes in art and culture took place.<ref name="Ching-2021">{{Cite book |last=Ching |first=Pao-Yu |title=Revolution and counterrevolution: China's continuing class struggle since liberation |year=2021 |publisher=Foreign Languages Press |isbn=978-2-491182-89-2 |edition=2nd |location=Paris |page=137}}</ref> Before this period, few cultural productions reflected the lives of peasants and workers. The struggles of workers, peasants, and revolutionary soldiers became frequent artistic subjects, often created by peasants and workers themselves.<ref name="Ching-2021" /> The spread of peasant paintings in rural China, for example, became one of the "]" celebrated in a socialist society.<ref name="Ching-2021" /> In poor and remote areas, movies and operas were shown for free.<ref name="Lin 2006">{{Cite book |last=Lin |first=Chun |title=The transformation of Chinese socialism |date=2006 |publisher=] |isbn=978-0-8223-3785-0 |location=Durham, NC}}</ref> Mobile film units brought cinema to the countryside and were crucial to the standardization and popularization of culture, particularly including ].<ref name="Coderre2021">{{Cite book |last=Coderre |first=Laurence |title=Newborn Socialist Things: Materiality in Maoist China |date=2021 |publisher=] |isbn=978-1-4780-2161-2 |location=Durham, NC |doi=10.2307/j.ctv1r4xd0g |jstor=j.ctv1r4xd0g}}</ref>{{rp|30}}

Jiang took control of the stage and introduced revolutionary operas under her direct supervision. Traditional operas were banned as they were considered feudalistic and bourgeois, but revolutionary opera, which modified ] in both content and form, was promoted.<ref name=Lu/>{{rp|115}} Six operas and two ballets were produced in the first three years, most notably the opera '']''. These operas were the only approved opera form. Other opera troupes were required to adopt or change their repertoire.<ref name=King/>{{rp|176}}

The model operas were broadcast on the radio, made into films, blared from public loudspeakers, taught to students in schools and workers in factories, and became ubiquitous as a form of popular entertainment and were the only theatrical entertainment for millions.<ref name=Jiaqi/>{{rp|352–53}}<ref name=Lu/>{{rp|115}} Most model dramas featured women as their leads and promoted Chinese state feminism.<ref name="Karl-2010">{{Cite book |last=Karl |first=Rebecca E. |title=Mao Zedong and China in the twentieth-century world: a concise history |year=2010 |publisher=] |isbn=978-0-8223-4780-4 |location=Durham, NC |pages=148}}</ref> Their narratives begin with them oppressed by ], class position, and imperialism before liberating themselves through the discovery of internal strength and the CCP.<ref name="Karl-2010" />

In 1966, Jiang advanced the Theory of the Dictatorship of the Black Line. Those perceived to be bourgeois, anti-socialist or anti-Mao (black line) should be cast aside, and called for the creation of new literature and arts.<ref name=Jiaqi/>{{rp|352–353}} Disseminators of the "old culture" would be eradicated. The majority of writers and artists were seen as "black line figures" and "reactionary literati", and were persecuted, and subjected to "criticism and denunciation" where they could be humiliated and ravaged, and be imprisoned or sent to hard labour.<ref name=Hong>{{cite book |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=S7C9xtFKGWEC |page=213}} |title=A History of Contemporary Chinese Literature |first=Zicheng |last=Hong |translator-first=Michael M. |translator-last=Day |publisher=Brill |year=2009 |isbn=978-9004173668}}</ref>{{rp|213–214}} For instance, ] and her husband were sent to a tea farm in ]. She did not resume writing until the 1980s.<ref name=sina>{{cite web |url=http://news.sina.com.cn/s/2008-03-12/113615131996.shtml |script-title=zh:张晓风:我的父亲母亲 |trans-title=Zhang Xiaofeng: My father and mother |language=zh |last1=Zhang |first1=Xiaofeng |author-mask=Zhang Xiaofeng (张晓风) |website=Sina |date=March 12, 2008 |access-date=May 3, 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171019152135/http://news.sina.com.cn/s/2008-03-12/113615131996.shtml |archive-date=October 19, 2017 |url-status=live}}</ref>

Documents released in 1980 regarding the prosecution of the Gang of Four show that more than 2,600 people in the field of arts and literature were persecuted by the ].<ref name="documents">{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ipHX7n55ISIC&pg=PA132 |title=Chinese Politics: Fall of Hua Kuo-Feng (1980) to the Twelfth Party Congress (1982) |editor-first=James T. |editor-last=Myers |editor-first2=Jürgen |editor-last2=Domes |editor-first3=Erik |editor-last3=von Groeling |publisher=University of South Carolina Press |year=1995 |isbn=978-1570030635}}</ref> Many died: the names of 200 writers and artists who were persecuted to death were commemorated in 1979. These include writers such as ], ], ], ], ], ] and ].<ref name=Hong/>{{rp|213–14}}

In 1970, the communist party came to view the Ministry of Culture as so disruptive that it decided to dissolve the Ministry and establish a Culture Group within the ] in an effort to rein in cultural politics.<ref name=":Minami" />{{rp|160}}

The principles for cultural production laid out by Mao in the 1942 "]" became dogmatized.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Cai |first1=Xiang |title=Revolution and its narratives : China's socialist literary and cultural imaginaries (1949–1966) |last2=蔡翔 |year=2016 |publisher=] |others=Rebecca E. Karl, Xueping Zhong, 钟雪萍 |isbn=978-0-8223-7461-9 |location=Durham, NC |pages=xix}}</ref> The literary situation eased after 1972, as more were allowed to write, and many provincial literary periodicals resumed publication, but the majority of writers still could not work.<ref name=Hong/>{{rp|219–20}}

The effect is similar in the film industry. The ''Four Hundred Films to be Criticized'' booklet was distributed, and film directors and actors/actresses were criticized with some tortured and imprisoned.<ref name=Jiaqi/>{{rp|401–02}} These included many of Jiang's rivals and former friends. Those who died in the period included ], ], ], ], and ].<ref>{{cite book |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=3XNyF4a7xHsC |page=128}} |title=China on Film: A Century of Exploration, Confrontation, and Controversy |author=Paul G. Pickowicz <!-- |pages=371–72 --> |pages=128–29 |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield |year=2013 |isbn=978-1442211797}}</ref> No feature films were produced in mainland China for seven years apart from a few approved "Model dramas" and highly ideological films.<ref>{{cite book |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=V0R-3zFSJbkC |page=207}} |title=Handbook of Chinese Popular Culture |editor=Dingbo Wu |editor2=Patrick D. Murphy |page=207 |publisher=Greenwood |year=1994 |isbn=978-0313278082 |access-date=June 27, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160429072451/https://books.google.com/books?id=V0R-3zFSJbkC&pg=PA207 |archive-date=April 29, 2016 |url-status=live}}</ref> A notable example is '']''.<ref>{{cite book |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=6WzJq0hForAC |page=219}} |title=Chinese National Cinema |author=Yingjin Zhang |pages=219–20 |publisher=Routledge |year=2004 |isbn=978-0415172905}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=Wh0QMOLRCeIC |page=41}} |title=Historical Dictionary of Chinese Cinema |author1=Tan Ye |author2=Yun Zhu |page=41 |publisher=Scarecrow Press |year=2012 |isbn=978-0810867796}}</ref>

]s became common and were performed throughout the country by both professional cultural workers and ordinary people.<ref name="Xu2022" />{{rp|362}}

During the Cultural Revolution, composers of '']'', which had already banned following the communist takeover, were persecuted, including ] who was killed in 1967.<ref>{{cite book |url=https://archive.org/details/isbn_9781578066094 |url-access=registration |title=Jazz Planet |editor=E. Taylor Atkins |page= |publisher=University Press of Mississippi |year=2004 |isbn=978-1578066094 |access-date=June 27, 2015}}</ref> Revolution-themed songs instead were promoted, and songs such as "]", "]", "]" and "]" were either written or became popular during this period. "The East Is Red", especially, became popular; it ''de facto'' supplanted "]" as the national anthem of China, though the latter was later restored to its previous place.{{citation needed|date=December 2018}}

Quotation songs, in which Mao's quotations were set to music, were particularly popular during the early years of the Cultural Revolution.<ref name="Coderre2021"/>{{rp|34}} Records of quotation songs were played over loudspeakers, their primary distribution,<ref name="Coderre2021"/>{{rp|35}} as the use of transistor radios lagged until 1976.<ref name="Coderre2021"/>{{rp|32–33}} "]" with an interest in broadcast technology frequently operated rural radio stations after 1968.<ref name="Coderre2021"/>{{rp|42}}

====Visual arts====
]


Some of the most enduring images come from poster arts. Propaganda in posters was used as a mass communication device and often served as the people's leading source of information. They were produced in large numbers and widely disseminated, and were used by the government and Red Guards to push ideology defined by the Party.<ref>{{cite book |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=I3S6mlTj1K4C |page=4}} |title=Picturing Power in the People's Republic of China: Posters of the Cultural Revolution |editor-first=Harriet |editor-last=Evans |editor-first2=Stephanie |editor-last2=Donald |pages=1–5 |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield |year=1999 |isbn=978-0847695119}}</ref> The two main posters genres were the big-character poster and commercial propaganda poster.<ref name=Cushing>{{cite book |last1=Cushing |first1=Lincoln |last2=Tompkins |first2=Ann |title=Chinese Posters: Art from the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution |publisher=Chronicle Books |year=2007 |isbn=978-0811859462}}</ref>{{rp|7–12}}
During the Cultural Revolution, Jiang Qing took control of the stage and introduced the ] under her direct supervision. Traditional operas were banned as they were considered feudalistic and bourgeois, but revolutionary opera, which is based on ] but modified in both content and form, was promoted.<ref>{{cite book |url= https://books.google.com/books?id=GO5HrrJC_aMC&pg=PA115#v=onepage |title= Rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Impact on Chinese Thought, Culture, and Communication |author= Xing Lu |page= 115 |publisher= University of South Carolina Press |year= 2004 |isbn= 978-1570035432 |access-date= June 27, 2015 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20160511223102/https://books.google.com/books?id=GO5HrrJC_aMC&pg=PA115#v=onepage&q&f=false |archive-date= May 11, 2016 |url-status= live }}</ref> Starting in 1967, eight ] (six operas and two ballets) were produced in the first three years, and the most notable of the operas was '']''. These operas were the only approved opera form and other opera troupes were required to adopt or change their repertoire.<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=XbapwCJRtdUC&pg=PA176#v=onepage |title=King. p. 176 |access-date=June 27, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160513191824/https://books.google.com/books?id=XbapwCJRtdUC&pg=PA176#v=onepage&q&f=false |archive-date=May 13, 2016 |url-status=live |isbn=9780774859110 |last1=King |first1=Richard |date=July 2010 }}</ref> The model operas were also broadcast on the radio, made into films, blared from public loudspeakers, taught to students in schools and workers in factories, and became ubiquitous as a form of popular entertainment and the only theatrical entertainment for millions in China.<ref name="turbulent decade"/><ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GO5HrrJC_aMC&pg=PA115#v=onepage |title=Rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Impact on Chinese Thought, Culture, and Communication |author=Xing Lu |page=115 |publisher=University of South Carolina Press |year=2004 |isbn=978-1570035432 |access-date=June 27, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160511223102/https://books.google.com/books?id=GO5HrrJC_aMC&pg=PA115#v=onepage&q&f=false |archive-date=May 11, 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref>


The ''dazibao'' presented slogans, poems, commentary and graphics often posted on walls in public spaces, factories and communes. Mao wrote his own ''dazibao'' at Beijing University on 5 August 1966, calling on the people to "Bombard the Headquarters".<ref name=Cushing/>{{rp|5}}
In 1966, Jiang Qing put forward the Theory of the Dictatorship of the Black Line in Literature and Arts where those perceived to be bourgeois, anti-socialist or anti-Mao "black line" should be cast aside, and called for the creation of new literature and arts.<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=7bNooFMV12sC&pg=PA352#v=onepage |title=Turbulent Decade: A History of the Cultural Revolution |author1=Jiaqi Yan |author2=Gao Gao |pages=352–53 |publisher=University of Hawai'i Press |edition=1st |year=1996 |isbn=978-0824816957 |access-date=June 27, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160516060823/https://books.google.com/books?id=7bNooFMV12sC&pg=PA352#v=onepage&q&f=false |archive-date=May 16, 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref> Writers, artists and intellectuals who were the recipients and disseminators of the "old culture" would be comprehensively eradicated. The majority of writers and artists were seen as "black line figures" and "reactionary literati", and therefore persecuted, many were subjected to "criticism and denunciation" where they may be publicly humiliated and ravaged, and may also be imprisoned or sent to be reformed through hard labour.<ref name="hong"/> For instance, ] and her husband were sent to a tea farm in ], and she did not resume writing until the 1980s.<ref name=sina>{{cite web | url=http://news.sina.com.cn/s/2008-03-12/113615131996.shtml |script-title=zh:张晓风:我的父亲母亲 | trans-title=Zhang Xiaofeng: My father and mother | language=Chinese | last1=Zhang 张 | first1=Xiaofeng 晓风 | website=Sina | date=12 March 2008 | access-date=3 May 2017 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171019152135/http://news.sina.com.cn/s/2008-03-12/113615131996.shtml | archive-date=October 19, 2017 | url-status=live }}</ref>


'']hua'' were artworks produced by the government and sold cheaply in stores to be displayed in homes or workplaces. The artists for these posters might be amateurs or uncredited professionals, and the posters were largely in a ] visual style with specific conventions—for example, images of Mao were to be depicted as "red, smooth, and luminescent".<ref name=Cushing/>{{rp|7–12}}<ref name=Andrews>{{cite book |last=Andrews |first=Julia Frances |title=Painters and Politics in the People's Republic of China, 1949–1979 |publisher=University of California Press |year=1995 |isbn=978-0520079816}}</ref>{{rp|360}}
Documents released in 1980 regarding the prosecution of the Gang of Four show more than 2,600 people in the field of arts and literature were revealed to have been persecuted by the Ministry of Culture and units under it alone.<ref name="documents">{{cite book |url= https://books.google.com/books?id=ipHX7n55ISIC&pg=PA132#v=onepage |title= Chinese Politics: Fall of Hua Kuo-Feng (1980) to the Twelfth Party Congress (1982) |editor= James T. Myers |editor2= Jürgen Domes |editor3= Erik von Groeling |publisher= University of South Carolina Press |year= 1995 |isbn= 978-1570030635 |access-date= June 27, 2015 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20160428141628/https://books.google.com/books?id=ipHX7n55ISIC&pg=PA132#v=onepage&q&f=false |archive-date= April 28, 2016 |url-status= live }}</ref> Many died as a result of their ordeal and humiliation—the names of 200 well-known writers and artists who were persecuted to death during the Cultural Revolution were commemorated in 1979, these include writers such as ], ], ], ], ], ], and ].<ref name="hong">{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=S7C9xtFKGWEC&pg=PA213#v=onepage |title=A History of Contemporary Chinese Literature |author=Zicheng Hong |translator=Michael M. Day |publisher=Brill |pages=213–14 |year=2009 |isbn=978-9004173668 |access-date=June 27, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160527131624/https://books.google.com/books?id=S7C9xtFKGWEC&pg=PA213#v=onepage&q&f=false |archive-date=May 27, 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref>


Traditional themes were sidelined and artists such as ], ], and ] were persecuted.<ref name=King/>{{rp|97}} Many of the artists were assigned to manual labour, and artists were expected to depict subjects that glorified the Cultural Revolution related to their labour.<ref name=Andrews/>{{rp|351–52}} In 1971, in part to alleviate their suffering, several leading artists were recalled from manual labour or freed from captivity under a Zhou initiative to decorate hotels and railway stations defaced by Red Guard slogans. Zhou said that the artworks were meant for foreigners, therefore were "outer" art and not under the obligations and restrictions placed on "inner" art meant for Chinese citizens. He claimed that landscape paintings should not be considered one of the "Four Olds". However, Zhou was weakened by cancer, and in 1974, the Jiang faction seized these and other paintings and mounted exhibitions in Beijing, Shanghai and other cities denouncing the artworks as "]".<ref name=Andrews/>{{rp|368–376}}
During the Cultural Revolution, only a few writers who gained permission or requalification under the new system, such as ] and some writers of worker or farmer background, can have had their work published or reprinted. The permissible subject matter of proletarian and socialist literature would be strictly defined, and all the literary periodicals in the country ceased publication by 1968. The situation eased after 1972, more writers were allowed to write, and many provincial literary periodicals resumed publication, but the majority of writers still could not work.<ref name="hong"/><ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=S7C9xtFKGWEC&pg=PA219#v=onepage |title=A History of Contemporary Chinese Literature |author=Zicheng Hong |translator=Michael M. Day |publisher=Brill |pages=219–20 |year=2009 |isbn=978-9004173668 |access-date=June 27, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160527174704/https://books.google.com/books?id=S7C9xtFKGWEC&pg=PA219#v=onepage&q&f=false |archive-date=May 27, 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref>


==== Film ====
The effect is similar in the film industry. A booklet titled "Four Hundred Films to be Criticized" was distributed, and film directors and actors/actresses were criticized with some tortured and imprisoned.<ref name="turbulent decade">{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=7bNooFMV12sC&pg=PA401#v=onepage |title=Turbulent Decade: A History of the Cultural Revolution |author1=Jiaqi Yan |author2=Gao Gao |pages=401–02 |publisher=University of Hawai'i Press |edition=1st |year=1996 |isbn=978-0824816957 |access-date=June 27, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160517193335/https://books.google.com/books?id=7bNooFMV12sC&pg=PA401#v=onepage&q&f=false |archive-date=May 17, 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref> These included many of Jiang Qing's rivals and former friends in the film industry, and those who died in the period included ], ], ], ], and ].<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3XNyF4a7xHsC&pg=PA128&lpg=PA128#v=onepage |title=China on Film: A Century of Exploration, Confrontation, and Controversy |author=Paul G. Pickowicz <!--|pages=371–372 --> |pages=128–29 |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield Publisher |year=2013 |isbn=978-1442211797 |access-date=June 27, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160514012031/https://books.google.com/books?id=3XNyF4a7xHsC&pg=PA128&lpg=PA128#v=onepage&q&f=false |archive-date=May 14, 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref> No feature films were produced in mainland China for seven years apart from the few approved "Model dramas" and highly ideological films,<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=V0R-3zFSJbkC&pg=PA207#v=onepage |title=Handbook of Chinese Popular Culture |editor=Dingbo Wu |editor2=Patrick D. Murphy |page=207 |publisher=Greenwood Press |year=1994 |isbn=978-0313278082 |access-date=June 27, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160429072451/https://books.google.com/books?id=V0R-3zFSJbkC&pg=PA207#v=onepage&q&f=false |archive-date=April 29, 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref> a notable example of the handful of films made and permitted to be shown in this period is '']''.<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6WzJq0hForAC&pg=PA219#v=onepage |title=Chinese National Cinema |author=Yingjin Zhang |pages=219–20 |publisher=Routledge |year=2004 |isbn=978-0415172905 |access-date=June 27, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160603153252/https://books.google.com/books?id=6WzJq0hForAC&pg=PA219#v=onepage&q&f=false |archive-date=June 3, 2016 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Wh0QMOLRCeIC&pg=PA41#v=onepage |title=Historical Dictionary of Chinese Cinema |author1=Tan Ye |author2=Yun Zhu |page=41 |publisher=Scarecrow Press |year=2012 |isbn=978-0810867796 |access-date=June 27, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160430173644/https://books.google.com/books?id=Wh0QMOLRCeIC&pg=PA41#v=onepage&q&f=false |archive-date=April 30, 2016 |url-status=live}}</ref>
Mobile film units brought ] to the countryside and were crucial to the standardization and popularization of culture during this period, particularly including revolutionary model operas.<ref name="Coderre2021"/>{{rp|30}} During the Cultural Revolution's early years, mobile film teams traveled to rural areas with news reels of Mao meeting with Red Guards and Tiananmen Square parades, and welcomed ceremoniously in rural communities. These news reels became known as "red treasure films", analogous to how the Little Red Books were dubbed "red treasure books".<ref>{{Cite book |last=Li |first=Jie |title=Material Contradictions in Mao's China |year=2022 |publisher=] |isbn=978-0-295-75085-9 |editor-last=Altehenger |editor-first=Jennifer |location=Seattle |chapter=Mobile Projectionists and the Things They Carried |editor-last2=Ho |editor-first2=Denise Y.}}</ref>{{rp|110}}The release of the filmed versions of the revolutionary model operas resulted in a re-organization and expansion of China's film exhibition network.<ref name="Li2023" />{{rp|73}}


From 1965 to 1976, the number of film projection units in China quadrupled, total film audiences nearly tripled, and the national film attendance rate doubled.<ref name="Li2023" />{{rp|133}} The Cultural Revolution Group drastically reduced ticket prices which, in its view, would allow film to better serve the needs of workers and of socialism.<ref name="Li2023" />{{rp|133}}
After the communist takeover in China, much of the popular music from Shanghai was condemned as ] and banned, and during the Cultural Revolution, composers of such popular music such as ] were persecuted.<ref>{{cite book |url=https://archive.org/details/isbn_9781578066094 |url-access=registration |title=Jazz Planet |editor=E. Taylor Atkins |page= |publisher=University Press of Mississippi |year=2004 |isbn=978-1578066094 |access-date=June 27, 2015}}</ref> Revolution-themed songs instead were promoted, and songs such as "]", "]", "]" and "]" were either written or became extremely popular during this period. "The East Is Red", especially, became popular; it ''de facto'' supplanted "]" as the national anthem of China, though the latter was restored to its previous place after the Cultural Revolution ended.{{citation needed|date=December 2018}}


China rejected Hollywood films and most foreign films.<ref name="Li2023" />{{rp|213}} ] and ] developed mass audiences in China.<ref name="Li2023" />{{rp|213}}
====Propaganda art====
]
Some of the most enduring images of the Cultural Revolution come from poster arts. Propaganda art in posters was used as a campaigning tool and mass communication device and often served as the leading source of information for the people. They were produced in large number and widely disseminated, and were used by the government and Red Guards to educate the public the ideological value as defined by the party state.<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=I3S6mlTj1K4C&pg=PA4#v=onepage |title=Picturing Power in the People's Republic of China: Posters of the Cultural Revolution |editor1=Harriet Evans |editor2=Stephanie Donald |pages=1–5 |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield |year=1999 |isbn=978-0847695119 |access-date=June 27, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160603095230/https://books.google.com/books?id=I3S6mlTj1K4C&pg=PA4#v=onepage&q&f=false |archive-date=June 3, 2016 |url-status=live}}</ref> There were many types of posters, the two main genres being the ] ({{Lang-zh|c=|s=|t=大字报|p=dazibao|labels=no|l=}}) and "commercial" propaganda poster ({{lang-zh|c=|s=|t=宣传画|p=xuanchuanhua|labels=no}}).<ref name="posters">{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=XxxKXShYEJwC&pg=PA10#v=onepage |title=Chinese Posters: Art from the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution |author=Lincoln Cushing |author2=Ann Tompkins |pages=7–12 |publisher=Chronicle Books |year=2007 |isbn=978-0811859462 |access-date=June 27, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160507191948/https://books.google.com/books?id=XxxKXShYEJwC&pg=PA10#v=onepage&q&f=false |archive-date=May 7, 2016 |url-status=live}}</ref>


In 1972, Chinese officials invited ] to China to film the achievements of the Cultural Revolution. Antonioni made the documentary '']''. When it was released in 1974, CCP leadership in China interpreted the film as ] and anti-Chinese. Viewing art through the principles of the ], particularly the concept that there is no such thing as art-for-art's-sake, party leadership construed Antonioni's aesthetic choices as politically motivated and banned the film. Since its 2004 release in China, the film has been well-regarded by Chinese audiences, especially for its beautiful depictions of a more simple time.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Sorace |first=Christian |title=Afterlives of Chinese Communism: Political Concepts from Mao to Xi |year=2019 |publisher=] |isbn=9781760462499 |location=Acton |chapter=Aesthetics}}</ref>{{rp|13–14}}
The '']'' may be slogans, poems, commentary and graphics often freely created and posted on walls in public spaces, factories and communes. They were vital to Mao's struggle in the Cultural Revolution, and Mao himself wrote his own ''dazibao'' at Beijing University on August 5, 1966, calling on the people to "]."<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=XxxKXShYEJwC&pg=PA5#v=onepage |title=Chinese Posters: Art from the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution |author=Lincoln Cushing |author2=Ann Tompkins |page=5 |publisher=Chronicle Books |year=2007 |isbn=978-0811859462 |access-date=June 27, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160518105023/https://books.google.com/books?id=XxxKXShYEJwC&pg=PA5#v=onepage&q&f=false |archive-date=May 18, 2016 |url-status=live}}</ref>


===Historical sites===
The '']'' were artworks produced by the government and sold cheaply in store to be displayed in homes or workplaces. The artists for these posters might be amateurs or uncredited professionals, and the posters were largely in a ] visual style with certain conventions—for example, images of Mao were to be depicted as "red, smooth, and luminescent".<ref name="posters" /><ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=h3kDsTxGSJMC&pg=PA360#v=onepage |title=Painters and Politics in the People's Republic of China, 1949–1979 |author=Julia Frances Andrews |page=360 |publisher=University of California Press |year= 1995 |isbn=978-0520079816}}</ref>
]


China's historical sites, artifacts and archives suffered devastating damage, as they were thought to be at the root of "old ways of thinking". Artifacts were seized, museums and private homes ransacked, and any item found that was thought to represent bourgeois or ] ideas was destroyed. Few records relate how much was destroyed—Western observers suggest that much of China's thousands of years of history was in effect destroyed, or, later, smuggled abroad for sale. Chinese historians compare the suppression to ]'s ]. ] intensified during this period, as religion was viewed in opposition to Marxist–Leninist and Maoist thinking.<ref name=Jiaqi/>{{rp|73}}
Traditional themes in art were sidelined the Cultural Revolution, and artists such as ], ], and ] were persecuted.<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=XbapwCJRtdUC&pg=PA97#v=onepage |title=King. p. 97 |access-date=June 27, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160513192723/https://books.google.com/books?id=XbapwCJRtdUC&pg=PA97#v=onepage&q&f=false |archive-date=May 13, 2016 |url-status=live |isbn=9780774859110 |last1=King |first1=Richard |date=July 2010}}</ref> Many of the artists have been assigned to manual labour, and artists were expected to depict subjects that glorified the Cultural Revolution related to their labour.<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=h3kDsTxGSJMC&pg=PA352#v=onepage |title=Painters and Politics in the People's Republic of China, 1949–1979 |author=Julia Frances Andrews |pages=351–52 |publisher=University of California Press |year=1995 |isbn=978-0520079816}}</ref> In 1971, in part to alleviate their suffering, several leading artists were recalled from manual labour or free from captivity under the initiative of Zhou Enlai to decorate hotels and railway stations defaced by Red Guards slogans. Zhou said that the artworks were for meant for foreigners, therefore were "outer" art not be under the obligations and restrictions placed on "inner" art meant for Chinese citizens. To him, landscape paintings should also not be considered one of the "Four Olds". However, Zhou was weakened by cancer, and in 1974, the Jiang Qing faction seized these and other paintings and mounted exhibitions in Beijing, Shanghai and other cities denouncing the artworks as "Black Paintings".<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=h3kDsTxGSJMC&pg=PA368#v=onepage |title=Painters and Politics in the People's Republic of China, 1949–1979 |author=Julia Frances Andrews |pages=368–76 |publisher=University of California Press |year=1995 |isbn=978-0520079816}}</ref>


The destruction of historical relics was never formally sanctioned by the Party, whose official policy was instead to protect such items. On 14 May 1967, the Central Committee issued ''Several suggestions for the protection of cultural relics and books during the Cultural Revolution''.<ref name=Gao/>{{rp|21}} Despite this, enormous damage was inflicted on China's cultural heritage. For example, a survey in 1972 in Beijing of 18 cultural heritage sites, including the ] and ], showed extensive damage. Of the 80 cultural heritage sites in Beijing under municipal protection, 30 were destroyed, and of the 6,843 cultural sites under protection by Beijing government decision in 1958, 4,922 were damaged or destroyed.<ref>{{cite book |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=zDhquEq5kTYC |page=446}} |title=Beijing Record: A Physical and Political History of Planning Modern Beijing |author=Jun Wang |pages=446–47 |publisher=World Scientific |year=2011 |isbn=978-9814295727}}</ref> Numerous valuable old books, paintings, and other cultural relics were burnt.<ref name=Barnouin>{{cite book |last1=Barnouin |first1=Barbara |last2=Yu |first2=Changgen |title=Ten Years of Turbulence: The Chinese Cultural Revolution |publisher=Routledge |year=2010 |isbn=978-0-7103-0458-2}}</ref>{{rp|98}}
===Historical relics===
]
China's historical sites, artifacts and archives suffered devastating damage, as they were thought to be at the root of "old ways of thinking." Artifacts were seized, museums and private homes ransacked, and any item found that was thought to represent bourgeois or ] ideas was destroyed. There are few records of exactly how much was destroyed—Western observers suggest that much of China's thousands of years of history was in effect destroyed, or, later, smuggled abroad for sale, during the short ten years of the Cultural Revolution. Chinese historians compare the cultural suppression during the Cultural Revolution to ]'s ]. ] intensified during this period, as a result of religion being viewed in opposition to Marxist–Leninist and Maoist thinking.<ref>Jiaqi Yan, Gao Gao, Danny Wynn Ye Kwok, ''Turbulent decade: a history of the cultural revolution'', Honolulu Univ. of Hawai'i Press 1996, p. 73</ref>


Later ] excavation and preservation after the destructive period were protected, and several significant discoveries, such as the ] and the ], occurred after the peak of the Revolution.<ref name=Gao/>{{rp|21}} Nevertheless, the most prominent medium of academic research in archaeology, the journal '']'', did not publish.<ref>{{cite web |title=《Archaeology》 Publishing report |url=http://oversea.cnki.net/kns55/oldNavi/n_YearStats.aspx?NaviID=48&Flg=local&BaseID=KAGU&NaviLink=Search%3a%E8%80%83%E5%8F%A4-%2fkns55%2foldNavi%2fn_list.aspx%3fNaviID%3d48%26Field%3dcykm%24%25%2522%7b0%7d%2522%26selectIndex%3d0%26Value%3d%25e8%2580%2583%25e5%258f%25a4%7cArchaeology-%2fkns55%2foldNavi%2fn_item.aspx%3fNaviID%3d48%26Flg%3dlocal%26BaseID%3dKAGU |publisher=China Academic Journals Full-text Database |access-date=31 January 2017}}</ref> After the most violent phase, the attack on traditional culture continued in 1973 with the ''Anti-Lin Biao, Anti-Confucius Campaign'' as part of the struggle against moderate Party elements.
Although being undertaken by some of the Revolution's enthusiastic followers, the destruction of historical relics was never formally sanctioned by the Communist Party, whose official policy was instead to protect such items. On May 14, 1967, the CCP central committee issued a document entitled ''Several suggestions for the protection of cultural relics and books during the Cultural Revolution''.<ref name="Gao 2008. p. 21">]. p. 21.</ref> Nevertheless, enormous damage was inflicted on China's cultural heritage. For example, a survey in 1972 in Beijing of 18 key spots of cultural heritage, including the ] and ], showed extensive damage. Of the 80 cultural heritage sites in Beijing under municipal protection, 30 were destroyed, and of the 6,843 cultural sites under protection by Beijing government decision in 1958, 4,922 were damaged or destroyed.<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=zDhquEq5kTYC&pg=PA446#v=onepage |title=Beijing Record: A Physical and Political History of Planning Modern Beijing |author= Jun Wang |pages=446–47 |publisher=World Scientific Publishing Co Pte Ltd. |year=2011 |isbn=978-9814295727}}</ref><ref name="Barnouin"/> Numerous valuable old books, paintings, and other cultural relics were also burnt to ashes.<ref name="Barnouin">{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=D1iIkALdmNIC&pg=PA98#v=onepage |title=Ten Years of Turbulence: The Chinese Cultural Revolution |author=Barbara Barnouin |author2=Changgen Yu |page=98 |year=2010 |publisher=Kegan Paul International, Routledge |isbn=978-0-7103-0458-2 |access-date=June 27, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160513111204/https://books.google.com/books?id=D1iIkALdmNIC&pg=PA98#v=onepage&q&f=false |archive-date=May 13, 2016 |url-status=live}}</ref>


=== Media ===
Later ] excavation and preservation after the destructive period in the 1960s, however, were protected, and several significant discoveries, such as the ] and the ], occurred after the peak of the Revolution.<ref name="Gao 2008. p. 21"/> Nevertheless, the most prominent symbol of academic research in archaeology, the journal '']'', did not publish during the Cultural Revolution.<ref>''Journal of Asian history'', Volume 21, 1987, p. 87</ref> After the most violent phase of the 1960s ended, the attack on traditional culture continued in 1973 with the ''Anti-Lin Biao, Anti-Confucius Campaign'' as part of the struggle against the moderate elements in the party.
{{Further|Media history of China}}
During the early period of the Cultural Revolution, ] was at its peak.<ref name="Russo2020a">{{Cite book |last=Russo |first=Alessandro |title=Cultural Revolution and Revolutionary Culture |year=2020 |publisher=] |isbn=978-1-4780-1218-4 |page=148 |doi=10.2307/j.ctv15kxg2d |jstor=j.ctv15kxg2d}}</ref> While the number of newspapers declined in this period, the number of independent publications by mass political organizations grew.<ref name="Volland2021">{{Cite journal |last=Volland |first=Nicolai |year=2021 |title="Liberating the Small Devils": Red Guard Newspapers and Radical Publics, 1966–1968 |journal=] |volume=246 |page=367 |doi=10.1017/S0305741021000424 |issn=0305-7410 |s2cid=235452119 |doi-access=free}}</ref> According to ], the number of newspapers dropped from 343 in 1965, to 49 in 1966, and then to a 20th-century low of 43 in 1967.<ref name="Volland2021" /> At the same time, the number of publications by mass organizations such as ] grew to an estimated number as high as 10,000.<ref name="Volland2021" />


Independent political groups could publish ] and handbills, as well as leaders' speeches and meeting transcripts which would normally have been considered highly classified.<ref name="Walder2019b">{{Cite book |last=Walder |first=Andrew G. |title=Agents of Disorder: Inside China's Cultural Revolution |year=2019 |publisher=] |doi=10.2307/j.ctvnjbhrb |isbn=978-0-674-24363-7 |jstor=j.ctvnjbhrb |s2cid=241177426}}</ref>{{rp|24}} From 1966 to 1969, at least 5,000 new broadsheets by independent political groups were published.<ref name="Thornton2019" />{{rp|60}} Several Red Guard organizations also operated independent printing presses to publish newspapers, articles, speeches, and ].<ref name="Russo2020a" /> For example, the largest student organization in Shanghai, the Red Revolutionaries, established a newspaper that had a print run of 800,000 copies by the end of 1966.<ref name="Walder2019b" />{{rp|58–59}}
=== Foreign relations ===
] (1968), which states "Cheer for the world that has entered the great new era of ]!"]]
During the Cultural Revolution, the Communist China exported the "Communist Revolution" as well as the Communist ideology to multiple countries in ], supporting the communist parties in ], ], ], ], ] and in particular, the ] which was responsible for the ].<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.scmp.com/magazines/post-magazine/books/article/2188861/maoism-global-history-how-china-exported-revolution |title=When Pol Pot lounged by Mao's pool: how China exported Maoism |date=2019-03-08 |website=South China Morning Post |access-date=2020-04-01}}</ref><ref name=":9">{{cite web|url=http://www.aisixiang.com/data/80986.html|title=黄华:文革时期的荒诞外交_爱思想|website=www.aisixiang.com|access-date=2020-04-01}}</ref> It is estimated that at least 90% of the foreign aid to the Khmer Rouge came from ], with 1975 alone seeing at least ]1 billion in interest-free economic and military aid and US$20&nbsp;million gift from China.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Laura |first1=Southgate |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=54iUDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA84&lpg=PA84&dq=By+mid-september+China+was+prepared+to+extend+to+Cambodia+a+total+of+US$1+billion#v=onepage |title=ASEAN Resistance to Sovereignty Violation: Interests, Balancing and the Role of the Vanguard State |date=2019-05-08 |publisher=Policy Press |isbn=978-1-5292-0221-2}}</ref>


== Foreign relations ==
Among the over 40 countries which had established diplomatic or half-diplomatic relations with China at the time, around 30 countries went into diplomatic disputes with China—some countries even terminated their diplomatic relations with China, including ], ] and ].<ref name=":9" />
] after being burned]]
The functions of China's embassies abroad were disrupted during the early part of the Cultural Revolution. In a March 22, 1969 meeting on the ], Mao stated that in ], China was "now isolated" and "we need to relax a little".<ref name=":Li" />{{rp|287}} Later that year, China began to restore its embassies to normal functioning.<ref name=":Li">{{Cite book |last=Li |first=Hongshan |title=Fighting on the Cultural Front: U.S.-China Relations in the Cold War |year=2024 |publisher=] |isbn=9780231207058 |location=New York |doi=10.7312/li--20704 |jstor=10.7312/li--20704 }}</ref>{{rp|287}}


China ] as well as communist ideologies to multiple countries in ], supporting parties in ], ], ], ], ] and in particular, the ] (responsible for the ]).<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.scmp.com/magazines/post-magazine/books/article/2188861/maoism-global-history-how-china-exported-revolution |title=When Pol Pot lounged by Mao's pool: how China exported Maoism |date=March 8, 2019 |website=South China Morning Post |access-date=April 1, 2020}}</ref> It is estimated that at least 90% of the Khmer Rouge's foreign aid came from China. In 1975 alone at least US$1 billion in interest-free economic and military aid and US$20&nbsp;million came from China.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Laura |first1=Southgate |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=54iUDwAAQBAJ |page=84}} |title=ASEAN Resistance to Sovereignty Violation: Interests, Balancing and the Role of the Vanguard State |date=2019 |publisher=Policy Press |isbn=978-1-5292-0221-2}}</ref> China's economic malaise impacted China's ability to assist ] in its ] against ] by the 1970s, which cooled relations between the once allied nations.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Path |first1=Kosal |date=18 April 2011 |title=The economic factor in the Sino-Vietnamese split, 1972–75: An analysis of Vietnamese archival sources |journal=] |volume=11 |issue=4 |pages=519–555 |doi=10.1080/01446193.2010.512497 |s2cid=155036059}}</ref>
* With the help of Chinese ] and ] overseas, the Communist China launched various propaganda campaigns for ], such as sending the ] and the ] to local citizens.<ref name=":9" />
* Many of Chinese ambassadors and consuls were called back to China to engage in the Cultural Revolution. Senior officials such as ], the 2nd ], were persecuted.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Curran|first1=Thomas D.|date=2000|title=Chinese Foreign Policy during the Cultural Revolution (Book Review)|url=https://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1046&context=his_fac|journal=History Faculty Publications|volume=|pages=|via=}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Gurtov|first1=Melvin|date=1969|title=The Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs during the Cultural Revolution|journal=The China Quarterly|volume=|issue=40|pages=65–102|jstor=651980}}</ref>
* Several foreign guests were "mandated" to stand in front of the statue of Mao Zedong, holding the Little Red Book and "reporting" to Mao as other Chinese citizens did.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://news.ifeng.com/history/zhongguoxiandaishi/detail_2010_08/26/2328352_1.shtml|title=沉重的外交笑话:外国大使需挥舞《毛主席语录》_历史频道_凤凰网|website=news.ifeng.com|access-date=2020-04-01}}</ref>


==Public views== ==Opinions and views==
{{see also|Boluan Fanzheng}} {{see also|Boluan Fanzheng}}


===Communist Party opinions=== ===Communist Party opinions===
{{main|Ideology of the Communist Party of China}} {{main|Ideology of the Chinese Communist Party}}
] ]


To make sense of the mass chaos caused by Mao's leadership in the Cultural Revolution while preserving the Party's authority and legitimacy, Mao's successors needed to lend the event a "proper" historical judgment. On June 27, 1981, the Central Committee adopted the "''Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China''," an official assessment of major historical events since 1949.<ref name="marxists.org">{{cite web|url=http://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/cpc/history/01.htm|title=Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China (Chinese Communism Subject Archive)|publisher=|access-date=December 27, 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121213182749/http://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/cpc/history/01.htm|archive-date=December 13, 2012|url-status=live}}</ref> To make sense of the chaos caused by Mao's leadership without undermining the CCP's authority and legitimacy, Mao's successors needed to provide a "proper" historical judgment. On 27 June 1981, the Central Committee adopted the '']'', an official assessment of major historical events since 1949.<ref name="marxists.org">{{cite web |url=http://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/cpc/history/01.htm |title=Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China (Chinese Communism Subject Archive) |access-date=December 27, 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121213182749/http://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/cpc/history/01.htm |archive-date=December 13, 2012 |url-status=live}}</ref> This document became the key official interpretation of the Cultural Revolution.<ref name="Wu-2014">{{Cite book |last=Wu |first=Yiching |title=The cultural revolution at the margins: Chinese socialism in crisis |year=2014 |publisher=] |isbn=978-0-674-41985-8 |location=Cambridge, MA |page=7}}</ref>


The Resolution frankly noted Mao's leadership role in the movement, stating that "chief responsibility for the grave 'Left' error of the 'Cultural Revolution,' an error comprehensive in magnitude and protracted in duration, does indeed lie with Comrade Mao Zedong." It diluted blame on Mao himself by asserting that the movement was "manipulated by the counterrevolutionary groups of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing," who caused its worst excesses. The Resolution affirmed that the Cultural Revolution "brought serious disaster and turmoil to the Communist Party and the Chinese people."<ref name="marxists.org"/> The Resolution frankly noted Mao's leadership role in the movement, stating that "chief responsibility for the grave 'Left' error of the 'Cultural Revolution,' an error comprehensive in magnitude and protracted in duration, does indeed lie with Comrade Mao Zedong". It diluted blame by asserting that the movement was "manipulated by the counterrevolutionary groups of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing", who caused its worst excesses. The Resolution affirmed that the Cultural Revolution "brought serious disaster and turmoil to the Communist Party and the Chinese people."<ref name="marxists.org"/> These themes of "turmoil" and "disaster" underlie historical and popular understanding of the Cultural Revolution.<ref name="Wu-2014" /> The 1981 ''Resolution'' was followed by a three-year campaign to "totally negate" the Cultural Revolution.<ref name="Thornton2019">{{Cite book |last=Thornton |first=Patricia M. |title=Afterlives of Chinese Communism: Political Concepts from Mao to Xi |date=2019 |publisher=] |isbn=9781760462499 |editor-last=Sorace |editor-first=Christian |location=Acton, Australia |chapter=Cultural Revolution |editor-last2=Franceschini |editor-first2=Ivan |editor-last3=Loubere |editor-first3=Nicholas}}</ref>{{rp|55}} The communist party called on individuals and cooperatives to study the ''Resolution'' and engage in ]. People were urged to root out followers of Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, those seriously impacted by factional ideas, and the "smashers and grabbers" of the Cultural Revolution.<ref name="Thornton2019" />{{rp|55}}


The official view aimed to separate Mao's actions during the Cultural Revolution from his "heroic" revolutionary activities during the ] and the ]. It also separated Mao's personal mistakes from the correctness of the theory that he created, going as far as to rationalize that the Cultural Revolution contravened the spirit of Mao Zedong Thought, which remains an official guiding ideology of the Party. Deng Xiaoping famously summed this up with the phrase "Mao was 70% good, 30% bad."<ref name=ms>{{cite web|last1=Schiavenza|first1=Matt|title=Does a New Biography Tell the Whole Story on Deng Xiaoping?|url=http://asiasociety.org/blog/asia/does-new-biography-tell-whole-story-deng-xiaoping|publisher=Asia Society|accessdate=October 30, 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111022060805/http://asiasociety.org/blog/asia/does-new-biography-tell-whole-story-deng-xiaoping|archive-date=October 22, 2011|url-status=live}}</ref> After the Cultural Revolution, Deng affirmed that Maoist ideology was responsible for the revolutionary success of the Communist Party, but abandoned it in practice to favour "]", a very different model of state-directed ].{{Citation needed|date=December 2018}} The official view in the ''Resolution'' and elsewhere aimed to separate Mao's actions during the Cultural Revolution from his "heroic" revolutionary activities during the ] and the ]. It also separated Mao's personal mistakes from the correctness of the theory that he created, going as far as to rationalize that the Cultural Revolution contravened the spirit of Mao Zedong Thought, which remains the official guiding ideology. Deng famously summed this up with the phrase "Mao was 70% good, 30% bad."<ref name=ms>{{cite web |last1=Schiavenza |first1=Matt |title=Does a New Biography Tell the Whole Story on Deng Xiaoping? |url=http://asiasociety.org/blog/asia/does-new-biography-tell-whole-story-deng-xiaoping |publisher=Asia Society |access-date=October 30, 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111022060805/http://asiasociety.org/blog/asia/does-new-biography-tell-whole-story-deng-xiaoping |archive-date=October 22, 2011 |url-status=live}}</ref>


In Mainland China, the official view of the party now serves as the dominant framework for ] of the period; alternative views (see below) are discouraged. Following the Cultural Revolution, a new genre of literature known as "]" (''Shanghen Wenxue'') emerged, being encouraged by the post-Mao government. Written mainly by educated youth such as Liu Xinhua, ], and ], scar literature depicted the Revolution from a negative viewpoint, using their own perspectives and experiences as a basis.<ref>]. p. 32.</ref> CCP ] characterizes the Cultural Revolution as an aberration and a period of chaos.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Volland |first=Nicolai |year=2021 |title="Liberating the Small Devils": Red Guard Newspapers and Radical Publics, 1966–1968 |journal=The China Quarterly |volume=246 |page=355 |doi=10.1017/S0305741021000424 |s2cid=235452119 |issn=0305-7410 |doi-access=free}}</ref> The official view is the dominant framework for historiography of the period; alternative are discouraged. A new genre of literature known as ] emerged, encouraged by the post-Mao government. Written mainly by educated youth such as Liu Xinhua, ], and ], scar literature depicted the Revolution negatively, based on their own perspectives and experiences.<ref name=Gao/>{{rp|32}} Movies criticizing Cultural Revolution hardliners were prevalent from the late 1970s to the early 1980s, although they were later banned as ].<ref name="Marquis2022">{{Cite book |last1=Marquis |first1=Christopher |url= |title=Mao and Markets: The Communist Roots of Chinese Enterprise |last2=Qiao |first2=Kunyuan |year=2022 |publisher=] |isbn=978-0-300-26883-6 |location=New Haven, CT |doi=10.2307/j.ctv3006z6k |jstor=j.ctv3006z6k |author-link=Christopher Marquis |s2cid=253067190}}</ref>{{rp|248}}


After the suppression of the ], both liberals and conservatives within the Party accused each other of excesses that they claimed were reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution. ], who promoted the use of military force, cited that the student movement had taken inspiration from the grassroots populism of the Cultural Revolution and that if it is left unchecked, would eventually lead to a similar degree of mass chaos.<ref>''AsiaNews.it''</ref> Zhao Ziyang, who was sympathetic to the protestors, later accused his political opponents of illegally removing him from office by using "Cultural Revolution-style" tactics, including "reversing black and white, exaggerating personal offenses, taking quotes out of context, issuing slander and lies... inundating the newspapers with critical articles making me out to be an enemy, and casual disregard for my personal freedoms."<ref>Zhao 43–44</ref> After the ], both liberals and conservatives within the CCP accused each other of excesses that they claimed were reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution. ], who promoted the use of military force, claimed that the student movement had taken inspiration from the populism of the Cultural Revolution and that if left unchecked, would eventually lead to mass chaos.<ref>''AsiaNews.it''</ref> Zhao Ziyang, who was sympathetic to the protestors, later accused his political opponents of illegally removing him from office by using "Cultural Revolution-style" tactics, including "reversing black and white, exaggerating personal offenses, taking quotes out of context, issuing slander and lies&nbsp;... inundating the newspapers with critical articles making me out to be an enemy, and casual disregard for my personal freedoms."{{sfn|Zhao|Bao|Chiang|Ignatius|2009|pp=43–44}} Speaking during his ], Deng Xiaoping characterized the Cultural Revolution as civil war and contrasting it with the contemporary situation: "Why was it that our country could remain stable after the 4 June Incident? It was precisely because we had carried out the ], which have promoted economic growth and raised living standards."<ref>{{Cite book |last=Meng |first=Wenting |title=Developmental Piece: Theorizing China's Approach to International Peacebuilding |year=2024 |publisher=] |isbn=9783838219073 |series=Ibidem}}</ref>{{rp|49}}


===Alternative opinions in China=== ===Alternative opinions===
Although the Chinese Communist Party officially condemns the Cultural Revolution, there are many Chinese people who hold more positive views of it, particularly amongst the working class, who benefited most from its policies.<ref name="Gao 2008">].</ref> Since Deng's ascendancy to power, the government has arrested and imprisoned figures who have taken a strongly pro-Cultural Revolution stance. For instance, in 1985, a young shoe-factory worker put up a poster on a factory wall in ], Shaanxi, which declared that "The Cultural Revolution was Good" and led to achievements such as "the building of the ], the creation of hybrid rice crops and the rise of people's consciousness." The factory worker was eventually sentenced to ten years in prison, where he died soon after "without any apparent cause."<ref>]. pp. 46–47.</ref> Although the Chinese Communist Party officially condemns the Cultural Revolution, many Chinese people hold more positive views, particularly amongst the working class, who benefited most from its policies.<ref name=Gao/>{{Page needed|date=September 2023}} People in rural areas tend to view the Cultural Revolution more positively given the expansion of rural infrastructure and agricultural development that occurred.<ref name="Han2008">{{Cite book |last=Han |first=Dongping |url= |title=The Unknown Cultural Revolution: Life and Change in a Chinese Village |date=2008 |isbn=978-1-58367-180-1 |location=New York |publisher=Monthly Review Press}}</ref>{{rp|ix}} During Deng's ascendancy, the government arrested and imprisoned figures who took a strongly pro-Cultural Revolution stance. For instance, in 1985, a young shoe-factory worker put up a poster at a factory in ], ], which declared that "The Cultural Revolution was Good" and led to achievements such as "the building of the ], the creation of hybrid rice crops and the rise of people's consciousness." The worker was eventually sentenced to ten years in prison, where he died soon after "without any apparent cause".<ref name=Gao/>{{rp|46–47}} Since the late 1980s, China has experienced "at first a fitful and then a nationwide revival in Mao Zedong", including aspects of the Cultural Revolution.<ref name="Wu-2014" />{{rp|6–7}}


One of the student leaders of the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, ], author of ''Almost a Revolution'', has a positive view of some aspects of the Cultural Revolution. According to Shen, the trigger for the famous Tiananmen hunger-strikes of 1989 was a big-character poster (''dazibao''), a form of public political discussion that gained prominence during the Cultural Revolution. Shen remarked that the congregation of students from across the country to Beijing on trains and the hospitality they received from residents was reminiscent of the experiences of Red Guards in the Cultural Revolution.<ref name="Tang"/> One of the student leaders of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, ], author of '']'', has a positive view of some aspects of the CR. According to Shen, the trigger for the Tiananmen hunger-strikes was a big-character poster, a form of public political discussion that gained prominence during the Cultural Revolution. Shen remarked that the travel of students from across the country to Beijing on trains and the hospitality they received from residents was reminiscent of the experiences of Red Guards.<ref name="Tang"/>


Since the advent of the Internet, people inside and outside China have argued online that the Cultural Revolution had many beneficial qualities for China that have been denied by both the post-Mao Chinese Communist Party and Western media. Some hold that the Cultural Revolution 'cleansed' China from superstitions, religious dogma, and outdated traditions in a 'modernist transformation' that later made Deng's economic reforms possible. These sentiments increased following the ] in 1999 when a segment of the population began to associate anti-Maoist viewpoints with the United States.<ref>]. p. 117.</ref> Since the advent of the Internet, people inside and outside China have argued online that the Cultural Revolution had many benefits. Some hold that the Cultural Revolution "cleansed" China from superstitions, religious dogma, and outdated traditions in a 'modernist transformation' that later made Deng's economic reforms possible. The popular revival of Mao in the late 1990s coincided with the government's increasing privatization and its dismantling of its ] employment and welfare policies.<ref name="Wu-2014" />{{rp|5}} These sentiments also increased following the ] in 1999 when a segment of the population began to associate anti-Mao viewpoints with the US.<ref name=Gao/>{{rp|117}}


] have also become more organized in the internet era, partially as a response to criticisms of Mao from academics and scholars. One Maoist website managed to collect thousands of signatures demanding punishment for those who publicly criticize Mao. Along with the call for legal action, this movement demands the establishment of agencies similar to Cultural Revolution-era "neighborhood committees", in which "citizens" would report anti-Maoists to local public security bureaus. Maoist rhetoric and mass mobilization methods were resurgent in the interior city of Chongqing during the political career of ].<ref>Ewing</ref> ] became more organized in the internet era, partially as a response to academic criticisms of Mao. One Maoist website collected thousands of signatures demanding punishment for those who publicly criticize Mao.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Lim |first=Louisa |date=June 22, 2011 |title=Chinese Reopen Debate Over Chairman Mao's Legacy |website=] |url=https://www.npr.org/2011/06/22/137231508/chinese-reopen-debate-over-chairman-maos-legacy}}</ref> Along with the call for legal action, this movement demanded the establishment of agencies similar to Cultural Revolution-era "neighborhood committees", in which "citizens" would report anti-Maoists to local public security bureaus. Maoist rhetoric and mass mobilization methods were resurgent in Chongqing during the 2000s.{{sfn|Ewing|2011}}

In 2012, Chinese web portal and social media platform Tencent conducted an online survey focused on combatting "the unhealthy trend of Cultural Revolution nostalgia."<ref name="Wu-2014" /> Seventy-eight percent of survey participants expressed Cultural Revolution nostalgia.<ref name="Wu-2014" />

] internet forum ] was suspended for one month in response to its advocacy of a new Cultural Revolution.<ref name="Marquis2022" />{{rp|47}}


===Contemporary China=== ===Contemporary China===
{{see also|Shantou Cultural Revolution Museum}}
Public discussion of the Cultural Revolution is still limited in China. The Chinese government continues to prohibit news organizations from mentioning details of the Cultural Revolution, and online discussions and books about the topic are subject to official scrutiny. Textbooks on the subject continue to abide by the "official view" (see above) of the events. Many government documents from the 1960s onward remain classified and are not open to formal inspection by private academics.<ref name="Fong">Fong</ref> At the ] in Beijing, the Cultural Revolution is barely mentioned in its historical exhibits.<ref name=johnson>{{cite news|last1=Johnson|first1=Ian|title=At China's New Museum, History Toes Party Line|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/04/world/asia/04museum.html?pagewanted=all|accessdate=October 31, 2011|newspaper=The New York Times|date=April 3, 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111014205212/http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/04/world/asia/04museum.html?pagewanted=all|archive-date=October 14, 2011|url-status=live}}</ref> Despite inroads made by numerous prominent sinologists, independent scholarly research of the Cultural Revolution is discouraged by the Chinese government.<ref name="Fong" /> There are concerns that as witnesses age and die, the opportunity to research the event thoroughly within China may be lost.<ref> {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170216210326/http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/23/world/asia/23iht-letter.html |date=February 16, 2017}} article by Didi Kirsten Tatlow in ''The New York Times'', July 22, 2010, accessed July 22, 2010.</ref>
Public discussion is still limited. The Chinese government continues to prohibit news organizations from mentioning details, and online discussions and books about the topic are subject to official scrutiny. Textbooks abide by the "official view" of the events. Many government documents from the 1960s onward remain classified.<ref name="Fong">Fong</ref> Despite inroads by prominent sinologists, independent scholarly research is discouraged.<ref name="Fong" />


=== Mao Zedong's legacy ===
In 2018, it was reported that one practice typical of the Cultural Revolution, ''Fengqiao'', or public criticism of supposed counter-revolutionaries by a whole village, was experiencing an unexpected revival: but it is unclear whether this was an isolated incident or a sign of a renewed interest for cultural styles typical of the Revolution.<ref>Jiang Tao, {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181229031748/https://bitterwinter.org/fengqiao-a-maoist-revival-to-attack-religion/ |date=December 29, 2018}}, '']'', December 27, 2018, accessed December 28, 2018.</ref>
Mao Zedong's legacy remains in some dispute. During the anniversary of his birth, many people viewed Mao as a godlike figure and referred to him as "the people's great savior". Contemporary discussions in newspapers such as the ''Global Times'' continue to glorify Mao. Rather than focus on consequences, newspapers claim that revolutions typically have a brutal side and are unable to be viewed from the "humanitarian perspective".<ref>{{Cite news |date=December 23, 2013 |title=China media: Mao Zedong's legacy |work=BBC News |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-25490140 |access-date=May 18, 2021}}</ref>

Critics of Mao Zedong look at the actions that occurred under his leadership from the point of view that "he was better at conquering power than at ruling the country and developing a socialist economy". Mao went to extreme measures on his path to power, costing millions of lives then and during his rule.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Schram |first=Stuart R. |year=1994 |title=Mao Zedong a Hundred Years On: The Legacy of a Ruler |journal=The China Quarterly |volume=137 |issue=137 |pages=125–143 |doi=10.1017/S0305741000034068 |jstor=655689 |s2cid=154770001 |issn=0305-7410}}</ref>


===Outside mainland China=== ===Outside mainland China===
In the world at large, Mao Zedong emerged as a symbol of anti-establishment, grassroots populism, and self-determination. His revolutionary philosophies found adherents in the ] of Peru, the ] insurgency in India, various ], the United States–based ],<ref>{{Cite book |last=Austin |first=Curtis J. |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=iRACjD1JdMkC}} |title=Up Against the Wall: Violence in the Making and Unmaking of the Black Panther Party |year=2008 |publisher=University of Arkansas Press |isbn=978-1-61075-444-6}}</ref>
In Hong Kong, a ] inspired by the Cultural Revolution was launched in 1967. Its excesses damaged the credibility of these activists for more than a generation in the eyes of Hong Kong residents.<ref>Wiltshire, Trea. (republished & reduced 2003). Old Hong Kong – Volume Three. Central, Hong Kong: Text Form Asia books Ltd. {{ISBN|962-7283-61-4}}</ref> In Taiwan, ] initiated the ] to counter what he regarded as the destruction of traditional Chinese values by the Communists on the mainland. In ], Communist leader and Chinese ally ] began a "]" organized along the same lines as the Cultural Revolution.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Blumi|first1=Isa|date=1999|title=Hoxha's Class War: The Cultural Revolution and State Reformation, 1961-1971|url=|journal=East European Quarterly|volume=33|issue=3|pages=303–326|via=ProQuest}}</ref>


In Hong Kong, a ] inspired by the Cultural Revolution was launched in 1967. Its excesses damaged the credibility of these activists in the eyes of Hong Kong residents.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Bellis |first=David |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=XSDkDwAAQBAJ}} |title=Old Hong Kong Photos and The Tales They Tell, Volume 3 |year=2019 |publisher=Gwulo |isbn=978-988-78276-2-7}}</ref> In Taiwan, ] initiated the ] to counter what he regarded as the destruction of traditional Chinese values by mainland Communists.
In the world at large, Mao Zedong emerged as a symbol of the anti-establishment, grassroots populism, and self-determination. His revolutionary philosophies found adherents in the ] of Peru, the ] insurgency in India, various political movements in Nepal, the U.S.-based ],<ref>''Up Against the Wall,'' Curtis Austin, University of Arkansas Press, Fayetteville, 2006, p. 170</ref> and the 1960s ] movement in general.{{According to whom|date=May 2019}} In 2007 ] ] remarked that the Cultural Revolution represented the 'dangers of democracy', remarking "People can go to the extreme like what we saw during the Cultural Revolution , when people take everything into their own hands, then you cannot govern the place."<ref name=hk>{{cite news|last=BBC|title=HK's Tsang apologises for gaffe|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7042941.stm|date=October 13, 2007|work=BBC News|access-date=April 1, 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110728181344/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7042941.stm|archive-date=July 28, 2011|url-status=live}}</ref> The remarks caused controversy in Hong Kong and were later retracted with an accompanying apology.<ref name=hk/>

In ], Communist leader and Chinese ally ] began a "]" organized along the same lines as the Cultural Revolution.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Blumi |first1=Isa |year=1999 |title=Hoxha's Class War: The Cultural Revolution and State Reformation, 1961–1971 |journal=East European Quarterly |volume=33 |issue=3 |pages=303–326 |via=ProQuest}}</ref> Hoxha delivered a speech to a plenum of the CC of the Party of Labour titled ''Some Preliminary Ideas about the Cultural Revolution,'' criticizing it. He said that "the cult of Mao was raised to the skies in a sickening and artificial manner" and added that, in reading its purported objectives, "you have the impression that everything old in Chinese and world culture should be rejected without discrimination and a new culture, the culture they call proletarian, should be created." He further stated that, "It is difficult for us to call this revolution, as the 'Red Guards' are carrying it out, a Proletarian Cultural Revolution... the enemies could and should be captured by the organs of the dictatorship on the basis of the law, and if the enemies have wormed their way into the party committees, let them be purged through party channels. Or in the final analysis, arm the working class and attack the committees, but not with children."<ref>{{cite book |url=http://www.enverhoxha.ru/Archive_of_books/English/enver_hoxha_selected_works_volume_IV_eng.pdf |last=Hoxha |first=Enver |title=Selected Works |volume=4 |location=Tirana |publisher=8 Nëntori |year=1982}}</ref>

In October 1966, ] criticized the Cultural Revolution as a synonym for Mao Zedong's method in the name of proletarian revolution after failures of Proletarian Revolution General Route, Great Leap Forward, People's commune and the Three Red Flags. He claimed that Maoism lost its origins in Marxism–Leninism. And Mao himself dropped his Marxist–Leninist mask, revealing its roots in ], ], roving gang, and the ], destroying Chinese Culture, purging intellectuals, destroying modern civilization, and used his "people's war" to attempt to rule Asia and the world following ]'s actions.<ref>{{cite web |author=Chiang, Kai-Shek |date=9 October 1966 |script-title=zh:中華民國五十五年國慶日前夕告中共黨人書 |trans-title=Manifesto to the CPC Members on the Eve of the National Day of the 55th Years of the Republic of China |url=http://www.ccfd.org.tw/ccef001/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=795:0003-94&catid=246&Itemid=256 |access-date=6 October 2023 |work=總統蔣公思想言論總集 |publisher=Chungcheng Cultural and Educational Foundation |language=zh}}</ref>

In the 1970s, ] criticized the Cultural Revolution in his memoir. He saw Chinese people repeatedly recite Mao's quotations and felt sick after he saw human dignity trampled. He argued that Mao is not supernatural, but upended his country, and that the Cultural Revolution was actually counter-revolutionary.<ref>{{Cite book |title=Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament |first=Nikita |last=Khrushchev |publisher=Little, Brown and Company |year=1974 |chapter=Chapter 11}}</ref>

In 2007 ] ] remarked that the Cultural Revolution represented the 'dangers of democracy', remarking "People can go to the extreme like what we saw during the Cultural Revolution , when people take everything into their own hands, then you cannot govern the place."<ref name=hk>{{cite news |last=BBC |title=HK's Tsang apologises for gaffe |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7042941.stm |date=October 13, 2007 |work=BBC News |access-date=April 1, 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110728181344/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7042941.stm |archive-date=July 28, 2011 |url-status=live}}</ref> The remarks caused controversy in Hong Kong and were later retracted.<ref name=hk/>


===Academic debate=== ===Academic debate===
Scholars and academics debate the origin, the events, Mao's role, and its legacy. These debates evolved as researchers explored new sources.<ref name="Karl2010" />{{rp|195}} In the 1960s, while many scholars dismissed Mao's initiatives as ideological and destructive, others sympathized with his goals. They saw Maoism as a populist insistence on mass participation, mass criticism and the right to rebel, and a determination to wipe out a new ruling class. By the 1980s, however, Harvard University sociologist ] wrote that the "public opinion in the field had changed markedly". Most in the field now "seem convinced that the Cultural Revolution was a human disaster, even a historical crime, something on the order of Hitler's holocaust and Stalin's great terror."<ref name=Walder/>
Scholars and academics continue to debate why events unfolded the way they did, Mao's role, how the Cultural Revolution began, and what it ''was''. These debates have changed over the decades as researchers explored new sources.


In the 1960s, while many scholars dismissed Mao's initiatives as ideological and destructive, others sympathized with his concern for equality, opposition to bureaucratism and corruption, and individual selfishness. They saw Maoism as a populist insistence on mass participation, mass criticism and the right to rebel, and a determination to wipe out a new ruling class. By the 1980s, however, Harvard University sociologist ] wrote that the “public opinion in the field had changed markedly”. Most in the field now “seem convinced that that the Cultural Revolution was a human disaster, even a historical crime, something on the order of Hitler’s holocaust and Stalin’s great terror.” Walder argued that the failures of the Cultural Revolution did not come from poor implementation, bureaucratic sabotage, disloyalty, or lingering class antagonisms. If things turned out differently from what Mao expected, Walder concluded, this was “probably due to the fact that Mao did not know what he wanted, or that he did know what he was doing, or both.... the outcomes are what one should have expected, given the Maoist doctrine and aims. Walder argued that the failures of the Cultural Revolution did not come from poor implementation, bureaucratic sabotage, disloyalty, or lingering class antagonisms. If things turned out differently than Mao expected, Walder concluded, this was "probably due to the fact that Mao did not know what he wanted, or that he did know what he was doing, or both&nbsp;... the outcomes are what one should have expected, given the Maoist doctrine and aims."<ref name="Walder">{{cite journal |last=Walder |first=Andrew |date=1987 |title=Actually Existing Maoism |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ho9CAAAAYAAJ&q=%22seem+convinced+that++the+Cultural+Revolution+was+a+human+disaster%22 |journal=Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs |volume=18 |issue=18 |pages=155–266 |doi=10.2307/2158588 |jstor=2158588 |s2cid=156609951}}</ref>
<ref>{{cite journal |last1 =Walder|first1 =Andrew |authorlink = |title =Actually Existing Maoism |journal =Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs |volume =18 |issue = 18|pages =155–166 |date =1987|url = |jstor = 2158588|issn = |doi = 10.2307/2158588|accessdate = |ref= harv}}</ref>


Nevertheless, the debate continues because the movement contains many contradictions: led by an all-powerful omnipresent leader, it was mainly driven by a series of grassroots popular uprisings against the Communist establishment. Virtually all English-language books published since the 1980s paint a negative picture of the movement. Historian Anne F. Thurston wrote that it "led to loss of culture, and of spiritual values; loss of hope and ideals; loss of time, truth and of life".<ref>]. pp. 605–06.</ref> Barnouin and Yu summarized the Cultural Revolution as "a political movement that produced unprecedented social divisions, mass mobilization, hysteria, upheavals, arbitrary cruelty, torture, killings, and even civil war", calling Mao "one of the most tyrannical despots of the twentieth century".<ref>Barnouin and Yu 217</ref> The debate continues because the movement contains many contradictions: led by an all-powerful omnipresent leader, it was mainly driven by a series of grassroots popular uprisings. Many English-language books published since the 1980s paint a negative picture of the movement. Historian Anne F. Thurston wrote that it "led to loss of culture, and of spiritual values; loss of hope and ideals; loss of time, truth and of life".{{sfn|Thurston|1988|pp=605–606}} Barnouin and Yu summarized the Cultural Revolution as "a political movement that produced unprecedented social divisions, mass mobilization, hysteria, upheavals, arbitrary cruelty, torture, killings, and even civil war", calling Mao "one of the most tyrannical despots of the twentieth century".<ref name=Barnouin/>{{rp|217}} According to historian Chun Lin, despite these human tragedies, individual freedoms and political self-organization expanded rapidly.<ref name="Lin 2006"/>
Some scholars challenge the mainstream portrayals of the Cultural Revolution and offer to understand it in a more positive light. Mobo Gao, writing in ''The Battle for China's Past: Mao and the Cultural Revolution'',<ref name=about>Pluto Press, {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110101121337/http://www.plutobooks.com/about.asp |date=January 1, 2011 }}</ref> argues that the movement benefited millions of Chinese citizens, particularly agricultural and industrial workers,<ref>]. p. 1.</ref> and sees it as egalitarian and genuinely populist, citing continued Maoist nostalgia in China today as remnants of its positive legacy.<ref>]. p. 3.</ref> Some draw a distinction between intention and performance. {{sfnb|Walder|1987| p = 159}} While Mao's leadership was pivotal at the beginning of the movement, Jin Qiu contends that as events progressed, it deviated significantly from Mao's utopian vision.<ref name=jinqiu>{{cite book|last1=Jin|first1=Qiu|title=The Culture of Power the Lin Biao Incident in the Cultural Revolution|year=1999|publisher=Standard University Press|location=Palo Alto, California|isbn=0-8047-3529-8|pages=2–3}}</ref> In this sense, the Cultural Revolution was actually a much more decentralized and varied movement that gradually lost cohesion, spawning many 'local revolutions' which differed in their nature and goals.<ref name=jinqiu/>


Some scholars challenge the mainstream portrayals and conceive it in a more positive light. ], writing in ''The Battle for China's Past: Mao and the Cultural Revolution'', argues that the movement benefited millions of Chinese citizens, particularly agricultural and industrial workers,<ref name="Gao" />{{rp|1}} and sees it as egalitarian and genuinely populist, citing continued Maoist nostalgia today as remnants of its positive legacy.<ref name="Gao" />{{rp|3}} Some draw a distinction between intention and performance.<ref name="Walder" />{{rp|159}} While Mao's leadership was pivotal at the beginning of the movement, Jin Qiu contends that as events progressed, it deviated significantly from Mao's utopian vision.<ref name="Jin" />{{rp|2–3}} In this sense, the Cultural Revolution was actually a decentralized and varied movement that gradually lost cohesion, spawning many 'local revolutions' that differed in their nature and goals.<ref name="Jin" />{{rp|2–3}}
Academic interest has also focused on the movement's relationship with Mao's personality. Mao envisioned himself as a wartime guerrilla leader, which made him wary of the bureaucratic nature of peacetime governance. With the Cultural Revolution Mao was simply "returning to form", once again taking on the role of a guerrilla leader fighting against an institutionalized party bureaucracy. Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, paint the movement as neither a ''bona fide'' war over ideological purity ''nor'' a mere power struggle to remove Mao's political rivals.<ref name=rmms>{{cite book|last1=MacFaquhar|first1=Roderick|title=Mao's Last Revolution|year=2006|publisher=Belknap Press of Harvard University Press|location=Cambridge, Massachusetts|isbn=0-674-02332-3|first2=Michael|last2=Schoenhals|url=https://archive.org/details/maoslastrevoluti00macf}}</ref> While Mao's personal motivations were undoubtedly pivotal to the Cultural Revolution, they reasoned that other complex factors contributed to the way events unfolded. These include China's relationship with the global Communist movement, geopolitical concerns, the ], Khrushchev's ouster, and the failures of the Great Leap Forward.<ref name=rmms/> They conclude that the movement was, at least in part, a legacy project to cement Mao's place in history, aimed to boost his prestige while he was alive ''and'' preserve the invulnerability of his ideas after his death.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, ''Mao's Last Revolution'', Introduction</ref>


Academic interest focused on the movement's relationship with Mao's personality. Mao envisioned himself as a wartime guerrilla leader, which made him wary of the bureaucratic nature of peacetime governance. With the Cultural Revolution Mao was simply "returning to form", once again acting as a guerrilla leader fighting an institutionalized bureaucracy. ] and ], paint the movement as neither a ''bona fide'' war over ideological purity ''nor'' a mere power struggle to remove Mao's political rivals.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|2–3}}
The mass hysteria surrounding the Cultural Revolution was also unprecedented. Historian Phillip Short contends that the Cultural Revolution contained elements that were akin to a form of religious worship.<ref name=ps>{{cite web|last1=Short|first1=Phillip|title=Mao's Bloody Revolution: Revealed|url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wd0aW-4mV68|accessdate=November 1, 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151118133310/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wd0aW-4mV68|archive-date=November 18, 2015|url-status=live}}</ref> Mao's godlike status during the period yielded him ultimate definitional power over Communist doctrine, yet the esoteric and often contradictory nature of his writings led to endless wars over its interpretation, with both conservatives and liberals drawing on Mao's teachings to achieve their divergent goals.{{According to whom|date=May 2019}} Many factional struggles were not unlike religious wars, with all sides claiming allegiance to the most "authentic" form of Maoism.{{Citation needed|date=December 2018}}


While Mao's personal motivations were undoubtedly pivotal, they reasoned that other factors contributed to the way events unfolded. These include China's relationship with the global Communist movement, geopolitical concerns, the ], Khrushchev's ouster, and Great Leap Forward catastrophe.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|2–3}} They conclude that the movement was, at least in part, a legacy project to cement Mao's place in history, aimed to boost his prestige while he was alive and preserve his ideas after his death.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|2–3}}
In '']'', ] and ] attribute all the destruction of the Cultural Revolution to Mao personally, with more sympathetic portrayals of his allies and opponents.<ref>Chang and Halliday, ''Mao: The Unknown Story''.</ref>


Varying academic focuses on power conflicts or clashes of personalities as underlying Mao's motivations, or alternatively on ideological reasons for launching the Cultural Revolution, are not necessarily conflicting. Mao's suspicions of those in power around him reflected his longstanding concerns with the decline of revolutionary spirit and the potential rise of a new class-stratified society arising as the popular revolutionary movement transformed into a socialist bureaucracy.<ref name="Wu-2014" />{{rp|20}} Historian Rebecca Karl writes that for Mao, the pursuit of power was never an end in itself, but rather the seizure of state power was to be used in making the revolution.<ref name="Karl2010">{{Cite book |last=Karl |first=Rebecca E. |title=Mao Zedong and China in the twentieth-century world: a concise history |year=2010 |publisher=Duke University Press |isbn=978-0-8223-4780-4 |location=Durham, NC}}</ref>{{rp|117}}
==See also==
{{Portal|China|Communism}}
* ]
*]
* ], a mini–Cultural Revolution in Romania


Professor Yiching Wu argues that the typical historiography of the Cultural Revolution as an "era of madness" is simpleminded but writes that such narratives have a "remarkably tenacious ideological power:"<ref name="Wu-2014" />{{rp|3}}
==References==

{{Blockquote|text=Since the early 1980s, there have been concerted efforts to reduce the extraordinary complexity of the Cultural Revolution to the simplicity almost exclusively of barbarism, violence, and human suffering. Flattening historical memory of the Cultural Revolution through moralistic condemnation and exhortation, these narratives not only deprive an immensely important and complex episode of Chinese history of its multilayered historicity, but also provide the discursive ground for delegitimizing China's revolutionary history of the twentieth century.}}

==See also==
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]


=== Notes === == Notes ==
{{NoteFoot}}
{{Reflist|35em|group=lower-roman}}


== References ==
=== Citations === === Citations ===
{{Reflist}} {{Reflist}}


=== Sources === === Sources ===
{{refbegin}}
* "." ''].'' 2003. Retrieved August 21, 2011.
* {{Cite news |date=2003 |title=Li Peng, the 'butcher of Tiananmen,' was 'ready to die' to stop the student turmoil |url=https://www.asianews.it/news-en/Li-Peng,-the-%25E2%2580%259Cbutcher-of-Tiananmen,%25E2%2580%259D-was-%25E2%2580%259Cready-to-die%25E2%2580%259D-to-stop-the-student-turmoil-18592.html |access-date=August 21, 2011 |work=]}}
* Barnouin, Barbara, and Yu Changgen. 2006. . Hong Kong: ]. {{ISBN|962-996-280-2}}. Retrieved on March 12, 2011.
* {{Cite book |last1=Barnouin |first1=Barbara |url={{google books|plainurl=y|id=NztlWQeXf2IC}} |title=Zhou Enlai: a political life |last2=Yu |first2=Changgeng |publisher=] |year=2006 |isbn=978-962-996-280-7 |location=Hong Kong}}
* Ewing, Kent. June 4, 2011. "." '']''. Retrieved on June 16, 2011.
* {{Cite news |last=Ewing |first=Kent |date=2011-06-05 |title=Mao's Army on the Attack |url=http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MF04Ad01.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110605024417/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MF04Ad01.html |archive-date=5 June 2011 |access-date=2023-11-19 |publisher=]}}
* Fong Tak-ho. May 19, 2006. "" ''Asia Times Online''. Retrieved on June 15, 2011.
* {{Cite news |last=Tak-ho |first=Fong |date=May 19, 2006 |title=Cultural Revolution? What Revolution? |url=http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HE19Ad01.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060616144533/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HE19Ad01.html |archive-date=June 16, 2006 |access-date=June 15, 2011 |work=]}}
* Gao, Mobo. 2008. ''''. London: ]. {{ISBN|978-0-7453-2780-8}}. Retrieved on September 2, 2012.
* {{Cite book |last=Gao |first=Mobo |url=http://www.strongwindpress.com/pdfs/EBook/The_Battle_for_Chinas_Past.pdf |title=The battle for China's past: Mao and the Cultural Revolution |publisher=] |year=2008 |isbn=978-0-7453-2780-8 |location=London |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121103094507/http://www.strongwindpress.com/pdfs/EBook/The_Battle_for_Chinas_Past.pdf |archive-date=3 November 2012}}
* King, Richard, ed. 2010. ''Art in Turmoil: The Chinese Cultural Revolution, 1966–76''. ]. {{ISBN|978-0774815437}}.
* {{Cite book |title=Art in Turmoil: the chinese cultural revolution, 1966-76 |publisher=] |year=2010 |isbn=978-0-7748-1543-7 |editor-last=King |editor-first=Richard |series=Contemporary chinese studies series |location=Vancouver}}
* ], and ]. 2006. '']''. ]. {{ISBN|978-0-674-02332-1}}.
* {{Cite book |last=Lieberthal |first=Kenneth G. |title=Governing China: from revolution through reform |date=2003 |publisher=] |isbn=978-0-393-92492-3 |edition=2nd |location=New York, NY}}
* ] 1999. ''The Search for Modern China''. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. {{ISBN|0-393-97351-4}}.
* {{Cite book |last1=MacFarquhar |first1=Roderick |author-link=Roderick MacFarquhar |title=Mao's last revolution |last2=Schoenhals |first2=Michael |author-link2=Michael Schoenhals |date=2006 |publisher=] |isbn=978-0-674-02332-1 |location=Cambridge, Mass |oclc=ocm64427572}}
* ], and Warren Sun. 2004. "The First Tiananmen Incident Revisited: Elite Politics and Crisis Management at the End of the Maoist Era." '']'' 77(2):211–35. {{JSTOR|40022499}}.
* {{Cite book |last=Spence |first=Jonathan D. |author-link=Jonathan Spence |title=The search for modern China |date=1999 |publisher=] |isbn=978-0-393-97351-8 |edition=2nd |location=New York}}
* Thurston, Anne F. 1988. ''Enemies of the People: The Ordeal of Intellectuals in China's Great Cultural Revolution''. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
* {{Cite journal |last1=Teiwes |first1=Frederick C. |author-link=Frederick Teiwes |last2=Sun |first2=Warren |date=Summer 2004 |title=The First Tiananmen Incident Revisited: Elite Politics and Crisis Management at the End of the Maoist Era |journal=] |volume=77 |issue=2 |pages=211–235 |jstor=40022499}}
* ]. 2009. '']'', translated and edited by B. Pu, R. Chiang, and ]. New York: ]. {{ISBN|1-4391-4938-0}}.
* {{Cite book |last=Thurston |first=Anne F. |title=Enemies of the people: The ordeal of the intellectuals in China's great Cultural Revolution |publisher=] |year=1988 |isbn=978-0-674-25375-9 |edition=Repr |location=Cambridge, Mass.}}
* {{Cite book |last1=Zhao |first1=Ziyang |title=Prisoner of the state: the secret journal of Zhao Ziyang |title-link=Prisoner of the State |last2=Bao |first2=Pu |last3=Chiang |first3=Renee |last4=Ignatius |first4=Adi |author-link4=Adi Ignatius |last5=MacFarquhar |first5=Roderick |publisher=] |year=2009 |isbn=978-1-4391-4938-6 |location=New York |oclc=301887109}}
{{refend}}


==Further reading== ==Further reading==
Line 527: Line 744:
===General=== ===General===
{{Library resources box}} {{Library resources box}}
* Jack Chen, '']'' (New York: Macmillan, 1973). Book chronicling a year in a rural Chinese village during the Cultural Revolution
* Michael Schoenhals, ed., ''China's Cultural Revolution, 1966–1969: Not a Dinner Party'' (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1996. An East Gate Reader). xix, 400 p. {{ISBN|1-56324-736-4}}.
* Yuan Gao, with Judith Polumbaum, '']'' (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987). An autobiography that includes experiences during the Cultural Revolution
* Richard Curt Kraus. ''The Cultural Revolution: A Very Short Introduction''. New York: Oxford University Press, Very Short Introductions Series, 2012. xiv, 138 p. {{ISBN|9780199740550}}.
* ], '']'' (New York: HarperCollins, 1997).
* ] and Schoenhals, Michael. ''Mao's Last Revolution''. ], 2006. {{ISBN|0-674-02332-3}}
* {{cite book |title=Turbulent Decade: A History of the Cultural Revolution |author1=Jiaqi Yan |author2=Gao Gao |publisher= University of Hawai'i Press |edition= 1st |year= 1996 |isbn=978-0824816957 }} * Richard Curt Kraus, ''The Cultural Revolution: A Very Short Introduction'' (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). {{ISBN|978-0199740550}}
* Morning Sun, "Bibliography," Books and articles of General Readings and Selected Personal Narratives on the Cultural Revolution. * Morning Sun, "Bibliography," Books and articles of General Readings and Selected Personal Narratives on the Cultural Revolution
* {{Cite web |last=Ramzy |first=Austin |date=May 14, 2016 |title=China's Cultural Revolution, Explained |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/15/world/asia/china-cultural-revolution-explainer.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160514190548/https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/15/world/asia/china-cultural-revolution-explainer.html |archive-date=May 14, 2016 |access-date=November 28, 2023 |website=]}}
*'']: A Chronicle of the Cultural Revolution'', an autobiography that includes experiences during the Cultural Revolution
*'']'', a memoir of experiences during the Cultural Revolution
*'']'', book chronicling a year in a rural Chinese village during the Cultural Revolution


===Specific topics=== ===Specific topics===
* ]. ''China: Alive in the Bitter Sea'' (New York: Crown, 1990). {{ISBN|0812918657}} An oral history of some Chinese people's experience during the Cultural Revolution
* Andreas, Joel (2009). ''Rise of the Red Engineers: The Cultural Revolution and the Origins of China's New Class''. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
* Chan, Anita. 1985. ''Children of Mao: Personality Development and Political Activism in the Red Guard Generation''. Seattle: University of Washington Press. * Anit Chan, ''Children of Mao: Personality Development and Political Activism in the Red Guard Generation''. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1985).
* Lingchei Letty Chen, ''The Great Leap Backward: Forgetting and Representing the Mao Years'' (New York: Cambria Press, 2020). Scholarly studies on memory writings and documentaries of the Mao years, victimhood narratives, perpetrator studies, ethics of bearing witness to atrocities
* Leese, Daniel (2011). ''Mao Cult: Rhetoric and Ritual in the Cultural Revolution''. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
* Li, Jie and Enhua Zhang, eds. ''Red Legacies in China: Cultural Afterlives of the Communist Revolution (Harvard University Asia Center, 2016) 409 p.; Scholarly studies on cultural legacies and continuities from the Maoist era in art, architecture, literature, performance, film, etc. * Jie Li and Enhua Zhang, eds., ''Red Legacies in China: Cultural Afterlives of the Communist Revolution'' (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2016). Scholarly studies on cultural legacies and continuities from the Maoist era in art, architecture, literature, performance, film, etc.
* ], ''The White-Boned Demon: A Biography of Madame Mao Zedong'' (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984). {{ISBN|0804729220}}
* ], ''China: Alive in the Bitter Sea'', (1982, revised 2000), {{ISBN|0-553-34219-3}}, an oral history of some Chinese people's experience during the Cultural Revolution.
* ], ''The Good Women of China: Hidden Voices'', translated by ]. (London: Chatto & Windus, 2002). {{ISBN|0701173459}}
* {{cite book |last1 = Chang |first1= Jung |first2 = Jon |last2 = Halliday |year = 2005 |title = Mao: The Unknown Story |publisher = Knopf| location = New York |isbn = 0679422714|ref = harv}}
* {{cite book |title= Rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Impact on Chinese Thought, Culture, and Communication |author= Xing Lu |publisher=University of South Carolina Press |year= 2004 |isbn=978-1570035432 }}
* ], ''The White-Boned Demon: A Biography of Madame Mao Zedong'' Stanford University Press, 1984 {{ISBN|0-8047-2922-0}}; rpr. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992 {{ISBN|0-671-74484-4}}.
* Wu, Yiching (2014). ''The Cultural Revolution at the Margins: Chinese Socialism in Crisis''. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.


===Commentaries=== ===Commentaries===
*]. 1977. ''The Chairman's New Clothes: Mao and the Cultural Revolution.'' {{ISBN|0-85031-208-6}} * Guokai Liu, ''A Brief Analysis of the Cultural Revolution'' edited by Anita Chan. (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1982).
* ], ''The Chairman's New Clothes: Mao and the Cultural Revolution'' (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977). {{ISBN|0850312086}}
** (revised ed.) 1981. {{ISBN|0-85031-435-6}}.
* —— 1978. '']''. {{ISBN|0-670-21918-5}}; {{ISBN|0-14-004787-5}}. * —— '']'' (New York: Viking Press, 1977). {{ISBN|0670219185}}
* —— 1979. ''Broken Images: Essays on Chinese Culture and Politics''. {{ISBN|0-8052-8069-3}} * —— ''Broken Images: Essays on Chinese Culture and Politics'' (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980). {{ISBN|0805280693}}
* —— 1986. ''The Burning Forest: Essays on Chinese Culture and Politics''. {{ISBN|0-03-005063-4}}; {{ISBN|0-586-08630-7}}; {{ISBN|0-8050-0350-9}}; {{ISBN|0-8050-0242-1}}. * —— ''The Burning Forest: Essays on Chinese Culture and Politics'' (New York: Holt, 1985). {{ISBN|0030050634}}
*Liu, Guokai. 1987. ''A Brief Analysis of the Cultural Revolution''. edited by Anita Chan. Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe.


===Fictional treatments=== ===Fictional treatments===
* ], ''Revolution Is Not a Dinner Party'' (New York: Holt, 2007). {{ISBN|0805082077}}. Young adult novel
* ]. 2001. ''Balzac and the Little Chinese Seamstress'', translated by ]. New York: ] / ]. 197 p. {{ISBN|0-375-41309-X}}
* Gao, Xingjian. 2002. ''One Man's Bible: A Novel'', translated by ]. New York: ]. 450 p. * ], '']'', translated by ] (New York: Knopf / Random House, 2001). {{ISBN|037541309X}}
* Gu, Hua. 1983. ''A Small Town Called Hibiscus'', translated by ]. Beijing: Chinese Literature / China Publications Centre. 260 p. * ], '']'', translated by ] (New York: HarperCollins, 2002).
* ], ''A Small Town Called Hibiscus'', translated by ] (Beijing: Chinese Literature / China Publications Centre, 1983).
** Reprinted: San Francisco: China Books.
* Yu, Hua. 2003. ''To Live: A Novel'', translated by M. Berry. New York: ]. 250 p. * ], '']'', translated by ] (New York: Tor Books, 2014). {{ISBN|0765377063}}
* ], '']'', translated by Michael Berry (New York: Anchor Books, 2003).
* ]. 2007. New York: ]. {{ISBN|0805082077}}. Young adult novel.
* ]. 2014. '']'', translated by ]. New York: ]. {{isbn|0765377063}}.


===Memoirs by Chinese participants=== ===Memoirs by Chinese participants===
* Guanlong Cao, ''The Attic: Memoir of a Chinese Landlord's Son'' (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).
* Liu Ping, ''My Chinese Dream – From Red Guard to CEO'' (San Francisco, June 2012). 556 p. {{ISBN|9780835100403}}
* ], '']'' (Grove, May 1987). 547 p. {{ISBN|0-394-55548-1}} * ], '']'' (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991).
* ], '']'' (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991). 524 p.&nbsp;{{LCCN|91020696}} * ], '']'' (New York: Grove, 1987). {{ISBN|0394555481}}
* Heng Liang Judith Shapiro, '']'' (New York: Knopf : Distributed by Random House, 1983). * ] and ], ''Son of the Revolution'' (New York: Knopf, 1983).
* Wenguang Huang, ''The Little Red Guard: A Family Memoir'' (New York: Riverhead Books, 2012).
* Yuan Gao, with Judith Polumbaum, '']'' (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987).
* Jiang Yang Chu translated and annotated by Djang Chu, ''Six Chapters of Life in a Cadre School: Memoirs from China's Cultural Revolution'' (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986). * ], ''The Cowshed: Memories of the Chinese Cultural Revolution'', translated by Chenxin Jiang (New York: New York Review Books, 2016).
* Kang Zhengguo, ''Confessions: An Innocent Life in Communist China'', translated by Susan Wilf (New York: W. W. Norton, 2007).
* ], ''Blood Red Sunset: A Memoir of the Chinese Cultural Revolution'' (New York: Viking, 1995). Translated by Howard Goldblatt.
* Ken Ling, '']: Journal of a Young Chinese'', English text prepared by Miriam London and Ta-Ling Lee. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1972).
* Guanlong Cao, ''The Attic: Memoir of a Chinese Landlord's Son'' (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).
* Liu Ping, ''My Chinese Dream: From Red Guard to CEO'' (San Francisco: China Books, 2012). {{ISBN|978-0835100403}}
* ], '']'' (New York: HarperCollins, 1997).
* ], ''Blood Red Sunset: A Memoir of the Chinese Cultural Revolution'', translated by Howard Goldblatt. (New York: Viking, 1995).
* ], '']'' (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994). {{ISBN|1-4000-9698-7}}.
* ], '']'' (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994). {{ISBN|1400096987}}
* Rae Yang, ''Spider Eaters: A Memoir'' (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).
* Nanchu, ''Red Sorrow'' (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2012).
* Weili Ye, Xiaodong Ma, ''Growing up in the People's Republic: Conversations between Two Daughters of China's Revolution'' (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
* ], ''Feather in the Storm'' (New York: Pantheon, 2006). {{ISBN|978-0375424281}}
* Lijia Zhang, "Socialism Is Great": A Worker's Memoir of the New China (New York: Atlas & Co, Distributed by Norton, 2007).
* ], ''Six Chapters from My Life "Downunder"'', translated by Howard Goldblatt. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988).
* ], ''Feather in the Storm'' (Pantheon, 2006). {{ISBN|978-0-375-42428-1}}.
* Rae Yang, ''Spider Eaters'' (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).
* Xinran Xue, ''The Good Women of China: Hidden Voices '' (Chatto & Windus, 2002). Translated by Esther Tyldesley. {{ISBN|0-7011-7345-9}}
* ], ] (England, Bantam Books, 2000) * ], '']'' (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 1997).
* Weili Ye and Xiaodong Ma, ''Growing up in the People's Republic: Conversations between Two Daughters of China's Revolution'' (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
* ], ], {{ISBN|0-7493-9774-8}}
* Lijia Zhang, ''Socialism Is Great!: A Worker's Memoir of the New China'' (New York: Atlas & Co, 2007).
*Dongping Han, ''The Unknown Cultural Revolution: Life and Change in a Chinese Village,'' {{ISBN|978-1583671801}}

===Films set in the Cultural Revolution===
<!-- chronological order -->
* ], '']'' (1984)
* ], '']'' (1987)
* ], '']'' (1992)
* Zhang Yimou, '']'' (1992)
* ] '']'' (1993)
* ], '']'' (1993)
* ], '']'' (1994)


==External links== ==External links==
{{Wikiquote}}
{{Sister project links|n=no|v=Modern China: China since 1945 and the Modern World|q=no|s=no|b=VCE History Revolutions/Chinese Revolution}} {{Sister project links|n=no|v=Modern China: China since 1945 and the Modern World|q=no|s=no|b=VCE History Revolutions/Chinese Revolution}}
* *
* *
* *
* *
* and the of the subject available from the film's site. * and the of the subject available from the film's site.
* *
* by Dave Pugh * by Dave Pugh
* by Youqin Wang * by Youqin Wang
* by ]. '']'', January 6, 1993.


{{Maoism}} {{Cultural Revolution}}{{Mao Zedong}}{{Maoism}}
{{Religious persecution}}
{{Cultural Revolution}}


{{Authority control}} {{Authority control}}


{{DEFAULTSORT:Cultural Revolution}}
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Latest revision as of 08:16, 24 December 2024

Period of sociopolitical turmoil in China (1966–1976) This article is about the movement in China. For events elsewhere also called the "Cultural Revolution", see Cultural Revolution (disambiguation). For revolutions in culture generally, see List of cultural, intellectual, philosophical and technological revolutions.

This article may be too long to read and navigate comfortably. When this tag was added, its readable prose size was 16,483 words. Consider splitting content into sub-articles, condensing it, or adding subheadings. Please discuss this issue on the article's talk page. (October 2024)
Cultural Revolution
Propaganda poster depicting Mao Zedong, above a group of soldiers from the People's Liberation Army. The caption reads, "The Chinese People's Liberation Army is the great school of Mao Zedong Thought".
Duration16 May 1966 – 6 October 1976 (1966-05-16 – 1976-10-06) (10 years and 143 days)
LocationChina
MotivePreservation of communism by purging capitalist and traditional elements, and power struggle between Maoists and pragmatists.
Organized byChinese Communist Party Politburo
OutcomeEconomic activity impaired, historical and cultural material destroyed.
DeathsEstimates vary from hundreds of thousands to millions (see § Death toll)
Property damageCemetery of Confucius, Temple of Heaven, Ming tombs
ArrestsJiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen
Cultural Revolution
Chinese文化大革命
Literal meaning"Great Cultural Revolution"
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinWénhuà dàgémìng
Bopomofoㄨㄣˊ ㄏㄨㄚˋ ㄉㄚˋ ㄍㄜˊ ㄇㄧㄥˋ
Gwoyeu RomatzyhWenhuah dahgerminq
Wade–GilesWen-hua ta-ko-ming
Tongyong PinyinWún-huà dà-gé-mìng
IPA
Wu
Romanization Error: {{Transliteration}}: transliteration text not Latin script (pos 9) (help)
Hakka
Pha̍k-fa-sṳVùn-fa thai-kiet-min
Yue: Cantonese
Yale RomanizationMàhn-faa daaih-gaak-mihng
Jyutpingman4 faa3 daai6 gaak3 ming6
IPA
Southern Min
Hokkien POJBûn-hoà tāi-kek-bēng
Eastern Min
Fuzhou BUCÙng-huá dâi gáik-mêng
Formal name
Simplified Chinese无产阶级文化大革命
Traditional Chinese無產階級文化大革命
Literal meaning"Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution"
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinWúchǎnjiējí wénhuà dàgémìng
Bopomofoㄨˊ ㄔㄢˇ ㄐㄧㄝ ㄐㄧˊ ㄨㄣˊ ㄏㄨㄚˋ ㄉㄚˋ ㄍㄜˊ ㄇㄧㄥˋ
Wade–GilesWu-chʻan-chieh-chi wen-hua ta-ko-ming
Tongyong PinyinWú-chǎn-jie-jí wún-huà dà-gé-mìng
IPA
Wu
Romanization Error: {{Transliteration}}: transliteration text not Latin script (pos 8) (help)
Hakka
Pha̍k-fa-sṳVû-sán-kiê-kip vùn-fa thai-kiet-min
Yue: Cantonese
Jyutpingmou4 caan2 gaai1 kap1 man4 faa3 daai6 gaak3 ming6
IPA
Southern Min
Hokkien POJBû-sán-kai-kip bûn-hòa tōa kek-bēng
Eastern Min
Fuzhou BUCÙ-sāng-găi-ngék ùng-huá dâi gáik-mêng
History of the People's Republic of China
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1949–1976: Mao era
1976–1989: Deng era
1989–2002: Jiang era
2002–2012: Hu era
2012–present: Xi era
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The Cultural Revolution, formally known as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, was a sociopolitical movement in the People's Republic of China (PRC). It was launched by Mao Zedong in 1966 and lasted until his death in 1976. Its stated goal was to preserve Chinese socialism by purging remnants of capitalist and traditional elements from Chinese society. Though it failed to achieve its main objectives, the Cultural Revolution marked the effective return of Mao to the center of power in China after his political sidelining, in the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward and the Great Chinese Famine.

In May 1966, with the help of the Cultural Revolution Group, Mao launched the Revolution and said that bourgeois elements had infiltrated the government and society with the aim of restoring capitalism. Mao called on young people to bombard the headquarters, and proclaimed that "to rebel is justified". Mass upheaval began in Beijing with Red August in 1966. Many young people, mainly students, responded by forming cadres of Red Guards throughout the country. A selection of Mao's sayings were compiled into the Little Red Book, which became revered within his cult of personality. In 1967, emboldened radicals began seizing power from local governments and party branches, establishing new revolutionary committees in their place. These committees often split into rival factions, precipitating armed clashes among the radicals. After the fall of Lin Biao in 1971, the Gang of Four became influential in 1972, and the Revolution continued until Mao's death in 1976, soon followed by the arrest of the Gang of Four.

The Cultural Revolution was characterized by violence and chaos across Chinese society, including a massacre in Guangxi that included acts of cannibalism, as well as massacres in Beijing, Inner Mongolia, Guangdong, Yunnan, and Hunan. Estimates of the death toll vary widely, typically ranging from 1–2 million. Red Guards sought to destroy the Four Olds (old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits), which often took the form of destroying historical artifacts, cultural and religious sites, and targeting others deemed to be representative of the Four Olds. Tens of millions were persecuted, including senior officials: most notably, president Liu Shaoqi, as well as Deng Xiaoping, Peng Dehuai, and He Long. Millions were persecuted for being members of the Five Black Categories. Intellectuals and scientists were considered to be the Stinking Old Ninth, and many were persecuted. The country's schools and universities were closed, and the National College Entrance Examination were cancelled. Over 10 million youth from urban areas were relocated under the Down to the Countryside Movement policy.

In December 1978, Deng Xiaoping became the new paramount leader of China, replacing Mao's successor Hua Guofeng. Deng and his allies introduced the Boluan Fanzheng program and initiated reforms and opening of China, which, together with the New Enlightenment movement, gradually dismantled the ideology of Cultural Revolution. In 1981, the Communist Party publicly acknowledged numerous failures of the Cultural Revolution, declaring it "responsible for the most severe setback and the heaviest losses suffered by the people, the country, and the party since the founding of the People's Republic." Given its broad scope and social impact, memories and perspectives of the Cultural Revolution are varied and complex in contemporary China. It is often referred to as the "ten years of chaos" (十年动乱; shí nián dòngluàn) or "ten years of havoc" (十年浩劫; shí nián hàojié).

Etymology

The terminology of cultural revolution appeared in communist party discourses and newspapers prior to the founding of the People's Republic of China. During this period, the term was used interchangeably with "cultural construction" and referred to eliminating illiteracy in order to widen public participation in civic matters. This usage of "cultural revolution" continued through the 1950s and into the 1960s, and often involved drawing parallels to the May Fourth Movement or the Soviet cultural revolution of 1928–1931.

Background

Creation of the People's Republic

Main article: Proclamation of the People's Republic of China

On 1 October 1949, Mao Zedong declared the People's Republic of China, symbolically bringing the decades-long Chinese Civil War to a close. Remaining Republican forces fled to Taiwan, and continued to resist the People's Republic in various ways. Many soldiers of the Chinese Republicans were left in mainland China, and Mao Zedong launched the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries to eliminate these soldiers left behind, as well as elements of Chinese society viewed as potentially dangerous to Mao's new government. This was one of the earliest examples of mass arrests, detainments, and killings across all of China that would later be mirrored in the Cultural Revolution.

Great Leap Forward

Main article: Great Leap Forward See also: Seven Thousand Cadres Conference

The Great Leap Forward, similar to the Five-year plans of the Soviet Union, was Mao Zedong's proposal to make the newly created People's Republic of China an industrial superpower. Beginning in 1958, the Great Leap Forward did produce, at least on the surface, incredible industrialization, but also caused some of the worst famines in modern history, while still falling short of projected goals. The Great Leap Forward soon came to be seen as one of Mao's greatest mistakes, eventually costing him some of his official status in the Communist Party.

This section is an excerpt from Great Leap Forward.
Rural workers smelting iron during the nighttime in 1958
This article is part of
a series aboutMao Zedong

Personal
Leadership
Works
Legacy
Mao Zedong's signature
The Great Leap Forward stemmed from multiple factors, including "the purge of intellectuals, the surge of less-educated radicals, the need to find new ways to generate domestic capital, rising enthusiasm about the potential results mass mobilization might produce, and reaction against the sociopolitical results of the Soviet's development strategy." Mao ambitiously sought an increase in rural grain production and an increase in industrial activity. Mao was dismissive of technical experts and basic economic principles, which meant that industrialization of the countryside would solely be dependent on the peasants. Grain quotas were introduced with the idea of having peasants provide grains for themselves and support urban areas. Output from the industrial activities such as steel was also supposed to be used for urban growth. Local officials were fearful of Anti-Rightist Campaigns and they competed to fulfill or over-fulfill quotas which were based on Mao's exaggerated claims, collecting non-existent "surpluses" and leaving farmers to starve to death. Higher officials did not dare to report the economic disaster which was being caused by these policies, and national officials, blaming bad weather for the decline in food output, took little or no action.

Impact of international tensions and anti-revisionism

Main article: Sino-Soviet split

In the early 1950s, the PRC and the Soviet Union (USSR) were the world's two largest communist states. Although initially they were mutually supportive, disagreements arose after Nikita Khrushchev took power in the USSR. In 1956, Khrushchev denounced his predecessor Josef Stalin and his policies, and began implementing economic reforms. Mao and many other CCP members opposed these changes, believing that they would damage the worldwide communist movement.

Mao believed that Khrushchev was a revisionist, altering Marxist–Leninist concepts, which Mao claimed would give capitalists control of the USSR. Relations soured. The USSR refused to support China's case for joining the United Nations and reneged on its pledge to supply China with a nuclear weapon.

Mao publicly denounced revisionism in April 1960. Without pointing at the USSR, Mao criticized its Balkan ally, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. In turn, the USSR criticized China's Balkan ally, the Party of Labour of Albania. In 1963, CCP began to denounce the USSR, publishing nine polemics. One was titled On Khrushchev's Phoney Communism and Historical Lessons for the World, in which Mao charged that Khrushchev was a revisionist and risked capitalist restoration. Khrushchev's defeat by an internal coup d'état in 1964 contributed to Mao's fears, mainly because of his declining prestige after the Great Leap Forward.

Other Soviet actions increased concerns about potential fifth columnists. As a result of the tensions following the Sino-Soviet split, Soviet leaders authorized radio broadcasts into China stating that the Soviet Union would assist "genuine communists" who overthrew Mao and his "erroneous course". Chinese leadership also feared the increasing military conflict between the United States and North Vietnam, concerned that China's support would lead to the United States to seek out potential Chinese assets.

Precursor

See also: Socialist Education Movement and Hai Rui Dismissed from Office
The purge of General Luo Ruiqing solidified the PLA's loyalty to Mao

In 1963, Mao launched the Socialist Education Movement, the Cultural Revolution's precursor. Mao set the scene by "cleansing" powerful Beijing officials of questionable loyalty. His approach was not transparent, executed via newspaper articles, internal meetings, and by his network of political allies.

In late 1959, historian and deputy mayor of Beijing Wu Han published a historical drama entitled Hai Rui Dismissed from Office. In the play, an honest civil servant, Hai Rui, is dismissed by a corrupt emperor. While Mao initially praised the play, in February 1965, he secretly commissioned his wife Jiang Qing and Shanghai propagandist Yao Wenyuan to publish an article criticizing it. Yao described the play as an allegory attacking Mao; flagging Mao as the emperor, and Peng Dehuai, who had previously questioned Mao during the Lushan Conference, as the honest civil servant.

Yao's article put Beijing mayor Peng Zhen on the defensive. Peng, Wu Han's direct superior, was the head of the Five Man Group, a committee commissioned by Mao to study the potential for a cultural revolution. Peng Zhen, aware that he would be implicated if Wu indeed wrote an "anti-Mao" play, wished to contain Yao's influence. Yao's article was initially published only in select local newspapers. Peng forbade its publication in the nationally distributed People's Daily and other major newspapers under his control, instructing them to write exclusively about "academic discussion", and not pay heed to Yao's petty politics. While the "literary battle" against Peng raged, Mao fired Yang Shangkun—director of the party's General Office, an organ that controlled internal communications—making unsubstantiated charges. He installed loyalist Wang Dongxing, head of Mao's security detail. Yang's dismissal likely emboldened Mao's allies to move against their factional rivals.

On 12 February 1966, the "Five Man Group" issued a report known as the February Outline. The Outline as sanctioned by the party center defined Hai Rui as a constructive academic discussion and aimed to distance Peng Zhen formally from any political implications. However, Jiang Qing and Yao Wenyuan continued their denunciations. Meanwhile, Mao sacked Propaganda Department director Lu Dingyi, a Peng ally.

Lu's removal gave Maoists unrestricted access to the press. Mao delivered his final blow to Peng at a high-profile Politburo meeting through loyalists Kang Sheng and Chen Boda. They accused Peng of opposing Mao, labeled the February Outline "evidence of Peng Zhen's revisionism", and grouped him with three other disgraced officials as part of the "Peng-Luo-Lu-Yang Anti-Party Clique". On 16 May, the Politburo formalized the decisions by releasing an official document condemning Peng and his "anti-party allies" in the strongest terms, disbanding his "Five Man Group", and replacing it with the Maoist Cultural Revolution Group (CRG).

1966: Outbreak

The Cultural Revolution can be divided into two main periods:

  • spring 1966 to summer 1968 (when most of the key events took place)
  • a tailing period that lasted until fall 1976

The early phase was characterized by mass movement and political pluralization. Virtually anyone could create a political organization, even without party approval. Known as Red Guards, these organizations originally arose in schools and universities and later in factories and other institutions. After 1968, most of these organizations ceased to exist, although their legacies were a topic of controversy later.

Notification

Main article: 16 May Notification
The 16 May Notification

In May 1966, an expanded session of the Politburo was called in Beijing. The conference was laden with Maoist political rhetoric on class struggle and filled with meticulously prepared 'indictments' of recently ousted leaders such as Peng Zhen and Luo Ruiqing. One of these documents, distributed on 16 May, was prepared with Mao's personal supervision and was particularly damning:

Those representatives of the bourgeoisie who have sneaked into the Party, the government, the army, and various spheres of culture are a bunch of counter-revolutionary revisionists. Once conditions are ripe, they will seize political power and turn the dictatorship of the proletariat into a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Some of them we have already seen through; others we have not. Some are still trusted by us and are being trained as our successors, persons like Khrushchev for example, who are still nestling beside us.

Later known as the "16 May Notification", this document summarized Mao's ideological justification for CR. Initially kept secret, distributed only among high-ranking party members, it was later declassified and published in People's Daily on 17 May 1967. Effectively it implied that enemies of the Communist cause could be found within the Party: class enemies who "wave the red flag to oppose the red flag." The only way to identify these people was through "the telescope and microscope of Mao Zedong Thought." While the party leadership was relatively united in approving Mao's agenda, many Politburo members were not enthusiastic, or simply confused about the direction. The charges against party leaders such as Peng disturbed China's intellectual community and the eight non-Communist parties.

Mass rallies (May–June)

"Sweep Away All Cow Demons and Snake Spirits", an editorial published on the front page of People's Daily on 1 June 1966, calling for the proletariat to "completely eradicate" the "Four Olds that have poisoned the people of China for thousands of years, fostered by the exploiting classes".

After the purge of Peng Zhen, the Beijing Party Committee effectively ceased to function, paving the way for disorder in the capital. On 25 May, under the guidance of Cao Yi'ou [zh]—wife of Mao loyalist Kang Sheng—Nie Yuanzi, a philosophy lecturer at Peking University, authored a big-character poster along with other leftists and posted it to a public bulletin. Nie attacked the university's party administration and its leader Lu Ping. Nie insinuated that the university leadership, much like Peng, were trying to contain revolutionary fervor in a "sinister" attempt to oppose the party and advance revisionism.

Mao promptly endorsed Nie's poster as "the first Marxist big-character poster in China". Approved by Mao, the poster rippled across educational institutions. Students began to revolt against their school's party establishments. Classes were cancelled in Beijing primary and secondary schools, followed by a decision on 13 June to expand the class suspension nationwide. By early June, throngs of young demonstrators lined the capital's major thoroughfares holding giant portraits of Mao, beating drums, and shouting slogans.

When the dismissal of Peng and the municipal party leadership became public in early June, confusion was widespread. The public and foreign missions were kept in the dark on the reason for Peng's ousting. Top Party leadership was caught off guard by the sudden protest wave and struggled with how to respond. After seeking Mao's guidance in Hangzhou, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping decided to send in 'work teams'—effectively 'ideological guidance' squads of cadres—to the city's schools and People's Daily to restore some semblance of order and re-establish party control.

The work teams had a poor understanding of student sentiment. Unlike the political movement of the 1950s that squarely targeted intellectuals, the new movement was focused on established party cadres, many of whom were part of the work teams. As a result, the work teams came under increasing suspicion as thwarting revolutionary fervor. Party leadership subsequently became divided over whether or not work teams should continue. Liu Shaoqi insisted on continuing work-team involvement and suppressing the movement's most radical elements, fearing that the movement would spin out of control.

Bombard the Headquarters (July)

Mao–Liu conflictLiu Shaoqi, PresidentIn 1966, Mao broke with Liu Shaoqi (right), then serving as President, over the work-teams issue. Mao's polemic Bombard the Headquarters was widely recognized as targeting Liu, the purported "bourgeois" party headquarters
Mao waves to the crowd on the banks of the Yangtze before his swim across, July 1966

In July, Mao, in Wuhan, crossed the Yangtze River, showing his vigor. He then returned from Wuhan to Beijing and criticized party leadership for its handling of the work-teams issue. Mao accused the work teams of undermining the student movement, calling for their full withdrawal on 24 July. Several days later a rally was held at the Great Hall of the People to announce the decision and reveal the tone of the movement to teachers and students. At the rally, Party leaders encouraged the masses to 'not be afraid' and take charge of the movement, free of Party interference.

The work-teams issue marked a decisive defeat for Liu; it also signaled that disagreement over how to handle the CR's unfolding events would irreversibly split Mao from the party leadership. On 1 August, the Eleventh Plenum of the 8th Central Committee was convened to advance Mao's radical agenda. At the plenum, Mao showed disdain for Liu, repeatedly interrupting him as he delivered his opening day speech.

Red Guards in BeijingFrom left: (1) Students at Beijing Normal University making big-character posters denouncing Liu Shaoqi; (2) Big-characters posted at Peking University; (3) Students at No. 23 Middle School in Beijing reading People's Daily during the "Resume Classes" campaign

On 28 July, Red Guard representatives wrote to Mao, calling for rebellion and upheaval to safeguard the revolution. Mao then responded to the letters by writing his own big-character poster entitled Bombard the Headquarters, rallying people to target the "command centre (i.e., Headquarters) of counterrevolution." Mao wrote that despite having undergone a communist revolution, a "bourgeois" elite was still thriving in "positions of authority" in the government and Party.

Although no names were mentioned, this provocative statement has been interpreted as a direct indictment of the party establishment under Liu and Deng—the purported "bourgeois headquarters" of China. The personnel changes at the Plenum reflected a radical re-design of the party hierarchy. Liu and Deng kept their seats on the Politburo Standing Committee, but were sidelined from day-to-day party affairs. Lin Biao was elevated to become the CCP's number-two; Liu's rank went from second to eighth and was no longer Mao's heir apparent.

A struggle session targeting Liu Shaoqi's wife Wang Guangmei

Along with the top leadership losing power the entire national Party bureaucracy was purged. The extensive Organization Department, in charge of party personnel, virtually ceased to exist. The top officials in the Propaganda Department were sacked, with many of its functions folded into the CRG.

Red August and the Sixteen Points

Main article: Red August
Mao and Lin Biao surrounded by rallying Red Guards in Beijing, December 1966

The Little Red Book was the mechanism that led the Red Guards to commit to their objective as China's future. Quotes directly from Mao led to actions by the Red Guards in the views of other Maoist leaders. By December 1967, 350 million copies had been printed. One of these quotes was the famous line "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." The passage continues:

Revolutionary war is an antitoxin which not only eliminates the enemy's poison but also purges us of our filth. Every just, revolutionary war is endowed with tremendous power and can transform many things or clear the way for their transformation. The Sino-Japanese war will transform both China and Japan; Provided China perseveres in the War of Resistance and in the united front, the old Japan will surely be transformed into a new Japan and the old China into a new China, and people and everything else in both China and Japan will be transformed during and after the war. The world is yours, as well as ours, but in the last analysis, it is yours. You young people, full of vigor and vitality, are in the bloom of life, like the sun at eight or nine in the morning. Our hope is placed on you ... The world belongs to you. China's future belongs to you.

During the Red August of Beijing, on 8 August 1966, the party's General Committee passed its "Decision Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," later to be known as the "Sixteen Points". This decision defined the Cultural Revolution as "a great revolution that touches people to their very souls and constitutes a new stage in the development of the socialist revolution in our country:"

Although the bourgeoisie has been overthrown, it is still trying to use the old ideas, culture, customs and habits of the exploiting classes to corrupt the masses, capture their minds and endeavour to stage a comeback. The proletariat must do the exact opposite: it must meet head-on every challenge of the bourgeoisie ... to change the mental outlook of the whole of society. At present, our objective is to struggle against and overthrow those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road, to criticize and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois academic "authorities" and the ideology of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes and to transform education, literature and art and all other parts of the superstructure not in correspondence with the socialist economic base, so as to facilitate the consolidation and development of the socialist system.

The implications of the Sixteen Points were far-reaching. It elevated what was previously a student movement to a nationwide mass campaign that would galvanize workers, farmers, soldiers and lower-level party functionaries to rise, challenge authority, and re-shape the superstructure of society.

Tiananmen Square on 15 September 1966, the occasion of Chairman Mao's third of eight mass rallies with Red Guards in 1966.

On 18 August in Beijing, over a million Red Guards from across the country gathered in and around Tiananmen Square for an audience with the chairman. Mao mingled with Red Guards and encouraged them, donning a Red Guard armband. Lin also took centre stage, denouncing perceived enemies in society that were impeding the "progress of the revolution". Subsequently, violence escalated in Beijing and quickly spread. The 18 August rally was filmed and shown to approximately 100 million people in its first month of release.

On 22 August, a central directive was issued to prevent police intervention in Red Guard activities, and those in the police force who defied this notice were labeled counter-revolutionaries. Central officials lifted restraints on violent behavior. Xie Fuzhi, the national police chief, often pardoned Red Guards for their "crimes".

The campaign included incidents of torture, murder, and public humiliation. Many people who were indicted as counter-revolutionaries died by suicide. During Red August, 1,772 people were murdered in Beijing; many of the victims were teachers who were attacked or killed by their own students. The first such victim was Bian Zhongyun, the deputy principal of Beijing Normal University Female Middle School, who was killed on 5 August by Red Guards following several hours of physical abuse and public humiliation. The leader of the Red Guards, who had organised on campus only days prior, was 19-year-old Song Binbin, who was alleged to have participated personally in the murder of Bian. At a mass rally held on 18 August, Song met Mao, and gifted him a Red Guard armband by tying it around his arm. In September, Shanghai experienced 704 suicides and 534 deaths; in Wuhan, 62 suicides and 32 murders occurred during the same period. Peng Dehuai was brought to Beijing to be publicly ridiculed.

Destruction of the Four Olds (August–November)

Main article: Four Olds
The remains of Wanli Emperor at the Ming tombs. Red Guards dragged the remains of the Wanli Emperor and Empresses to the front of the tomb, where they were posthumously "denounced" and burned

Between August and November 1966, eight mass rallies were held, drawing in 12 million people, most of whom were Red Guards. The government bore the travel expenses of Red Guards.

At the rallies, Lin called for the destruction of the "Four Olds"; namely, old customs, culture, habits, and ideas. Some changes associated with the "Four Olds" campaign were mainly benign, such as assigning new names to city streets, places, and even people; millions of babies were born with "revolutionary" names.

Other aspects were more destructive, particularly in the realms of culture and religion. Historical sites throughout the country were destroyed. The damage was particularly pronounced in the capital, Beijing. Red Guards laid siege to the Temple of Confucius in Qufu, and other historically significant tombs and artifacts.

Libraries of historical and foreign texts were destroyed; books were burned. Temples, churches, mosques, monasteries, and cemeteries were closed and sometimes converted to other uses, or looted and destroyed. Marxist propaganda depicted Buddhism as superstition, and religion was looked upon as a means of hostile foreign infiltration, as well as an instrument of the ruling class. Clergy were arrested and sent to camps; many Tibetan Buddhists were forced to participate in the destruction of their monasteries at gunpoint.

  • The cemetery of Confucius was attacked by Red Guards in November 1966. The cemetery of Confucius was attacked by Red Guards in November 1966.
  • This statue of the Yongle Emperor was originally carved in stone, and was destroyed in the Cultural Revolution. A metal replica is in its place. This statue of the Yongle Emperor was originally carved in stone, and was destroyed in the Cultural Revolution. A metal replica is in its place.
  • The remains of the 8th century Buddhist monk Huineng were attacked during the Cultural Revolution. The remains of the 8th century Buddhist monk Huineng were attacked during the Cultural Revolution.
  • A frieze damaged during the Cultural Revolution, originally from a garden house of a rich imperial official in Suzhou. A frieze damaged during the Cultural Revolution, originally from a garden house of a rich imperial official in Suzhou.

Central Work Conference (October)

In October 1966, Mao convened a "Central Work Conference", mostly to enlist party leaders who had not yet adopted the latest ideology. Liu and Deng were prosecuted and begrudgingly offered self-criticism. After the conference, Liu, once a powerful moderate pundit, was placed under house arrest, then sent to a detention camp, where he was denied medical treatment and died in 1969. Deng was sent away for a period of re-education three times and was eventually sent to work in an engine factory in Jiangxi. Rebellion by party cadres accelerated after the conference.

End of the year

In Macau, rioting broke out during the 12-3 incident. The event was prompted by the colonial government's delays in approving a new wing for a CCP elementary school in Taipa. The school board illegally began construction, but the colonial government sent police to stop the workers. Several people were injured in the resulting melee. On December 3, 1966, two days of rioting occurred in which hundreds were injured and six to eight were killed, leading to a total clampdown by the Portuguese government. The event set in motion Portugal's de facto abdication of control over Macau, putting Macau on the path to eventual absorption by China.

By the beginning of 1967, a wide variety of grassroots political organizations had formed. Beyond Red Guard and student rebel groups, these included poor peasant associations, workers' pickets, and Mao Zedong Thought study societies, among others. Communist Party leaders encouraged these groups to "join up", and these groups joined various coalitions and held various cross-group congresses and assemblies.

1967: Seizure of power

See also: Seizure of power (Cultural Revolution), Violent struggle, Rebel Faction (Cultural Revolution), and Conservative Faction (Cultural Revolution)

Mass organizations coalesced into two hostile factions, the radicals who backed Mao's purge of the Communist party, and the conservatives who backed the moderate party establishment. The "support the left" policy was established in January 1967. Mao's policy was to support the rebels in seizing power; it required the PLA to support "the broad masses of the revolutionary leftists in their struggle to seize power."

In March 1967, the policy was adapted into the "Three Supports and Two Militaries" initiative, in which PLA troops were sent to schools and work units across the country to stabilize political tumult and end factional warfare. The three "Supports" were to "support the left", "support the interior", "support industry". The "two Militaries" referred to "military management" and "military training". The policy of supporting the left failed to define "leftists" at a time when almost all mass organizations claimed to be "leftist" or "revolutionary". PLA commanders had developed close working relations with the party establishment, leading many military units to repress radicals.

Spurred by the events in Beijing, power seizure groups formed across the country and began expanding into factories and the countryside. In Shanghai, a young factory worker named Wang Hongwen organized a far-reaching revolutionary coalition, one that displaced existing Red Guard groups. On 3 January 1967, with support from CRG heavyweights Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, the group of firebrand activists overthrew the Shanghai municipal government under Chen Pixian in what became known as the January Storm, and formed in its place the Shanghai People's Commune. Mao then expressed his approval.

Rebel factions of Red Guards marching in Shanghai, 1967

Shanghai's was the first provincial level government overthrown. Provincial governments and many parts of the state and party bureaucracy were affected, with power seizures taking place. In the next three weeks, 24 more province-level governments were overthrown. "Revolutionary committees" were subsequently established, in place of local governments and branches of the Communist Party. For example, in Beijing, three separate revolutionary groups declared power seizures on the same day. In Heilongjiang, local party secretary Pan Fusheng seized power from the party organization under his own leadership. Some leaders even wrote the CRG asking to be overthrown.

In Beijing, Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao targeted Vice-Premier Tao Zhu. The power-seizure movement was appearing in the military as well. In February, prominent generals Ye Jianying and Chen Yi, as well as Vice-Premier Tan Zhenlin, vocally asserted their opposition to the more extreme aspects of the movement, with some party elders insinuating that the CRG's real motives were to remove the revolutionary old guard. Mao, initially ambivalent, took to the Politburo floor on February 18 to denounce the opposition directly, endorsing the radicals' activities. This resistance was branded the "February Countercurrent"—effectively silencing critics within the party.

Red Guards marching in Guizhou, 1967. The banner in the center reads: "The People's Liberation Army firmly supports the proletarian revolutionary faction."

Although in early 1967 popular insurgencies were limited outside of the biggest cities, local governments began collapsing all across China. Revolutionaries dismantled ruling government and party organizations, because power seizures lacked centralized leadership, it was no longer clear who believed in Mao's revolutionary vision and who was exploiting the chaos for their own gain. The formation of rival revolutionary groups and manifestations of long-established local feuds, led to violent struggles between factions.

Tension grew between mass organizations and the military. In response, Lin Biao issued a directive for the army to aid the radicals. At the same time, the army took control of some provinces and locales that were deemed incapable of handling the power transition.

In Wuhan, as in many other cities, two major revolutionary organizations emerged, one supporting and one attacking the conservative establishment. Chen Zaidao, the Army general in charge of the area, forcibly repressed the anti-establishment demonstrators. Mao flew to Wuhan with a large entourage of central officials in an attempt to secure military loyalty in the area. On 20 July 1967, local agitators in response kidnapped Mao's emissary Wang Li, in what became known as the Wuhan Incident. Subsequently, Chen was sent to Beijing and tried by Jiang Qing and the rest of the CRG. Chen's resistance was the last major open display of opposition within the PLA.

The Gang of Four's Zhang Chunqiao admitted that the most crucial factor in the Cultural Revolution was not the Red Guards or the CRG or the "rebel worker" organisations, but the PLA. When the PLA local garrison supported Mao's radicals, they were able to take over the local government successfully, but if they were not cooperative, the takeovers were unsuccessful. Violent clashes occurred in virtually all major cities.

In response to the Wuhan Incident, Mao and Jiang began establishing a "workers' armed self-defense force", a "revolutionary armed force of mass character" to counter what he saw as rightism in "75% of the PLA officer corps".

Cultural Revolution is located in ChinaWuzhongWuzhongZhengzhouZhengzhouKaifengKaifengShanghaiShanghaiLianyuanLianyuanChongqingChongqingGuangzhouGuangzhouclass=notpageimage| Some locations of armed conflict between rebel factions during the summer of 1967.

In Chongqing, an arms manufacturing center, during August 1967, battles involved close to 10,000 combatants, killed or wounded close to 1,000, and created 180,000 refugees in Chengdu alone. Chaotianmen harbor district was destroyed in a battle involving tanks, mobile artillery, and anti-aircraft guns. In Wuzhong, Ningxia, on 28 August 1967, Kang Sheng gave orders allowing the PLA to fire on opposing Hui Muslim factions, killing approximately 100 people and wounding 133. In Zhengzhou and Kaifeng, factory clashes killed 37, wounded 290, and led to 300 "prisoners of war", two of whom were buried alive. At Shanghai Diesel Engine Plant, a battle in which Wang Hongwen led the victorious faction, killed 18 and wounded 983. In Lianyuan, fighting during July and August 1967 killed six and wounded 68. In Wenzhou, on 13 August 1967, two PLA units mistook each other for rebels and opened fire, killing seven people. At Guangzhou Baiyun International Airport, on 10 August 1967, a firefight caused a panicked commercial pilot to depart early, stranding 54 Japanese passengers. Military control was imposed over the Daqing Oil Field in March 1967 and over the Anshan Iron and Steel Plant in August.

Unconventional weapons, including weapon of mass destruction, were seized during conflicts, but not directly used. Citizens wrote letters to the Zhongnanhai residence of government leaders, warning of attacks on facilities that stored pathogenic bacteria, poisonous plant samples, radioactive substances, poison gas, toxicants, and other dangerous substances. In Changchun, rebels working in geological institutes developed and tested the first ever dirty bomb, testing two "radioactive self-defense bombs" and two "radioactive self-defense mines" on 6 and 11 August.

Nationwide, a total of 18.77 million firearms, 14,828 artillery pieces, 2,719,545 grenades ended up in civilian hands. They were used in the course of violent struggles, which mostly took place from 1967 to 1968. In Chongqing, Xiamen, and Changchun, tanks, armored vehicles and even warships were deployed in combat.

During the Cultural Revolution, Mao emphasized the need to improve medical care in rural China. The Rural Cooperative Medical System (RCMS) developed in the late 1960s. In this system, each large production brigade established a medical cooperative station staffed by barefoot doctors. The medical cooperative stations provided primary health care. Barefoot doctors brought healthcare to rural areas where urban-trained doctors would not settle. They promoted basic hygiene, preventive healthcare, and family planning and treated common illnesses. Immunizations were provided free of charge. Public healthcare was highly effective in curbing infectious diseases in rural China. For treatment of major diseases, rural people traveled to state-owned hospitals.

1968: Purges

See also: Cleansing the Class Ranks
A rally in opposition to Liu Shaoqi

In May 1968, Mao launched a massive political purge. Many people were sent to the countryside to work in reeducation camps. Generally, the campaign targeted rebels from the CR's earlier, more populist, phase. On 27 July, the Red Guards' power over the PLA was officially ended, and the establishment sent in units to besiege areas that remained untouched by the Guards. A year later, the Red Guard factions were dismantled entirely; Mao predicted that the chaos might begin running its own agenda and be tempted to turn against revolutionary ideology. Their purpose had been largely fulfilled; Mao and his radical colleagues had largely overturned established power.

Liu was expelled from the CCP at the 12th Plenum of the 8th Central Committee in September, and labelled the "headquarters of the bourgeoisie".

Mao meets with Red Guard leaders (July)

As the Red Guard movement had waned over the preceding year, violence by the remaining Red Guards increased on some Beijing campuses. Violence was particularly pronounced at Qinghua University, where a few thousand hardliners of two factions continued to fight. At Mao's initiative, on 27 July 1968, tens of thousands of workers entered the Qinghua campus shouting slogans in opposition to the violence. Red Guards attacked the workers, who remained peaceful. Ultimately, the workers disarmed the students and occupied the campus.

On 28 July, Mao and the Central Group met with the five most important remaining Beijing Red Guard leaders to address the movement's excessive violence and political exhaustion. It was the only time during the Cultural Revolution that Mao met and addressed the student leaders directly. In response to a Red Guard leader's telegram sent prior to the meeting, which claimed that some "Black Hand" had maneuvered the workers against the Red Guards, Mao told the student leaders, "The Black Hand is nobody else but me! ... I asked how to solve the armed fighting in the universities, and told them to go there to have a look."

During the meeting, Mao and the Central Group for the Cultural Revolution stated, "e want cultural struggle, we do not want armed struggle" and "The masses do not want civil war."

You have been involved in the Cultural Revolution for two years: struggle-criticism-transformation. Now, first, you're not struggling; second, you're not criticizing; and third, you're not transforming. Or rather, you are struggling, but it's an armed struggle. The people are not happy, the workers are not happy, city residents are not happy, most people in schools are not happy, most of the students even in your schools are not happy. Even within the faction that supports you, there are unhappy people. Is this the way to unify the world?

Mao's cult of personality and "mango fever" (August)

Main article: Mango cultSee also: Mao Zedong's cult of personality
A propaganda oil painting of Mao during the Cultural Revolution (1967)

In the spring of 1968, a massive campaign aimed at enhancing Mao's reputation began. A notable example was the "mango fever". On 4 August, Mao was presented with mangoes by the Pakistani foreign minister Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, in an apparent diplomatic gesture. Mao had his aide send the box of mangoes to his propaganda team at Tsinghua University on 5 August, who were stationed there to quiet strife among Red Guard factions. On 7 August, an article was published in People's Daily, saying:

In the afternoon of the fifth, when the great happy news of Chairman Mao giving mangoes to the Capital Worker and Peasant Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Team reached the Tsinghua University campus, people immediately gathered around the gift given by the Great Leader Chairman Mao. They cried out enthusiastically and sang with wild abandonment. Tears swelled up in their eyes, and they again and again sincerely wished that our most beloved Great Leader lived ten thousand years without bounds ... They all made phone calls to their own work units to spread this happy news; and they also organised all kinds of celebratory activities all night long, and arrived at Zhongnanhai despite the rain to report the good news, and to express their loyalty to the Great Leader Chairman Mao.

Poster featuring mangoes, 1968

Subsequent articles also propagandized the mangoes, and another poem in the People's Daily said: "Seeing that golden mango/Was as if seeing the great leader Chairman Mao ... Again and again touching that golden mango/the golden mango was so warm." Few people at this time had ever seen a mango before, and a mango was seen as "a fruit of extreme rarity, like Mushrooms of Immortality".

One mango was sent to the Beijing Textile Factory, whose revolutionary committee organized a rally in its honor. Workers read quotations from Mao and celebrated the gift. Altars prominently displayed the fruit. When the mango began to rot after a few days, the fruit was peeled and boiled. Workers then filed by and each was given a spoonful of mango water. The revolutionary committee made a wax replica and displayed it in the factory.

Several months of "mango fever" followed as the fruit became a focus of a "boundless loyalty" campaign for Mao. More replica mangoes were created, and the replicas were sent on tour around Beijing and elsewhere. Many revolutionary committees visited the mangoes in Beijing from outlying provinces. Approximately half a million people greeted the replicas when they arrived in Chengdu. Badges and wall posters featuring the mangoes and Mao were produced in the millions.

The fruit was shared among all institutions that had been a part of the propaganda team, and large processions were organized in support of the "precious gift", as the mangoes were known. A dentist in a small town, Dr. Han, saw the mango and said it was nothing special and looked just like a sweet potato. He was put on trial for "malicious slander", found guilty, paraded publicly throughout the town, and then shot in the head.

It has been claimed that Mao used the mangoes to express support for the workers who would go to whatever lengths necessary to end the factional fighting among students, and a "prime example of Mao's strategy of symbolic support." Through early 1969, participants of Mao Zedong Thought study classes in Beijing returned with mass-produced mango facsimiles, gaining media attention in the provinces.

Down to the Countryside Movement (December)

Main article: Down to the Countryside Movement

In December 1968, Mao began the Down to the Countryside Movement. During this movement, which lasted for the following decade, young bourgeoisie living in cities were ordered to go to the countryside to experience working life. The term "young intellectuals" was used to refer to recent college graduates. In the late 1970s, these students returned to their home cities. Many students who were previously Red Guard supported the movement and Mao's vision. This movement was thus in part a means of moving Red Guards from the cities to the countryside, where they would cause less social disruption. It also served to spread revolutionary ideology geographically.

1969–1971: Lin Biao

The 9th National Congress was held in April 1969. It served as a means to "revitalize" the party with fresh thinking—as well as new cadres, after much of the old guard had been destroyed in the struggles of the preceding years. The party framework established two decades earlier broke down almost entirely: rather than through an election by party members, delegates for this Congress were effectively selected by Revolutionary Committees. Representation of the military increased by a large margin from the previous Congress, reflected in the election of more PLA members to the new Central Committee—over 28%. Many officers now elevated to senior positions were loyal to PLA Marshal Lin Biao, which would open a new rift between the military and civilian leadership.

We do not only feel boundless joy because we have as our great leader the greatest Marxist–Leninist of our era, Chairman Mao, but also great joy because we have Vice Chairman Lin as Chairman Mao's universally recognized successor.

— Premier Zhou Enlai at the 9th Party Congress

Reflecting this, Lin was officially elevated to become the Party's preeminent figure outside of Mao, with his name written into the party constitution as his "closest comrade-in-arms" and "universally recognized successor". At the time, no other Communist parties or governments anywhere in the world had adopted the practice of enshrining a successor to the current leader into their constitutions. Lin delivered the keynote address at the Congress: a document drafted by hardliner leftists Yao Wenyuan and Zhang Chunqiao under Mao's guidance.

The report was heavily critical of Liu Shaoqi and other "counter-revolutionaries" and drew extensively from quotations in the Little Red Book. The Congress solidified the central role of Maoism within the party, re-introducing Maoism as the official guiding ideology in the party constitution. The Congress elected a new Politburo with Mao, Lin, Chen, Zhou Enlai and Kang as the members of the new Politburo Standing Committee.

Lin, Chen, and Kang were all beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution. Zhou, who was demoted in rank, voiced his unequivocal support for Lin at the Congress. Mao restored the function of some formal party institutions, such as the operations of the Politburo, which ceased functioning between 1966 and 1968 because the CCRG held de facto control.

In early 1970, the nationwide "One Strike-Three Anti Campaign" was launched by Mao and the Communist Party Central, aiming to consolidate the new organs of power by targeting counterrevolutionary thoughts and actions. A large number of "minor criminals" were executed or forced to commit suicide between 1970 and 1972. According to government statistics released after the Cultural Revolution, during the campaign 1.87 million people were persecuted as traitors, spies, and counterrevolutionaries, and over 284,800 were arrested or killed from February to November 1970 alone.

PLA encroachment

Mao (left) and Lin (right) in 1967, riding in the back of a vehicle during an International Workers' Day parade

Mao's efforts at re-organizing party and state institutions generated mixed results. The situation in some of the provinces remained volatile, even as the political situation in Beijing stabilized. Factional struggles, many violent, continued at a local level despite the declaration that the 9th National Congress marked a temporary victory for the CR. Furthermore, despite Mao's efforts to put on a show of unity at the Congress, the factional divide between Lin's PLA camp and the Jiang-led radical camp was intensifying. Indeed, a personal dislike of Jiang drew many civilian leaders, including Chen, closer to Lin.

Between 1966 and 1968, China was isolated internationally, having declared its enmity towards both the USSR and the US. The friction with the USSR intensified after border clashes on the Ussuri River in March 1969 as Chinese leaders prepared for all-out war. In June 1969, the PLA's enforcement of political discipline and suppression of the factions that had emerged during the Cultural Revolution became intertwined with the central Party's efforts to accelerate Third Front Those who did not return to work would be viewed as engaging in 'schismatic activity' which risked undermining preparations to defend China from potential invasion.

In October 1969, the Party attempted to focus more on war preparedness and less on suppressing factions. That month, senior leaders were evacuated from Beijing. Amid the tension, Lin issued what appeared to be an executive order to prepare for war to the PLA's eleven military regions on October 18 without going through Mao. This drew the ire of the chairman, who saw it as evidence that his declared successor was usurping his authority.

The prospect of war elevated the PLA to greater prominence in domestic politics, increasing Lin's stature at Mao's expense. Some evidence suggests that Mao was pushed to seek closer relations with the US as a means to avoid PLA dominance that would result from a military confrontation with the Soviet Union. During his later meeting with Richard Nixon in 1972, Mao hinted that Lin had opposed better relations with the U.S.

Restoration of State Chairman position

Liu Shaoqi on his deathbed in 1969

After Lin was confirmed as Mao's successor, his supporters focused on the restoration of the position of State Chairman, which had been abolished by Mao after Liu's purge. They hoped that by allowing Lin to ease into a constitutionally sanctioned role, whether Chairman or vice-chairman, Lin's succession would be institutionalized. The consensus within the Politburo was that Mao should assume the office with Lin as vice-chairman; but perhaps wary of Lin's ambitions or for other unknown reasons, Mao voiced his explicit opposition.

Factional rivalries intensified at the Second Plenum of the Ninth Congress in Lushan held in late August 1970. Chen, now aligned with the PLA faction loyal to Lin, galvanized support for the restoration of the office of President of China, despite Mao's wishes. Moreover, Chen launched an assault on Zhang, a staunch Maoist who embodied the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, over the evaluation of Mao's legacy.

The attacks on Zhang found favour with many Plenum attendees and may have been construed by Mao as an indirect attack on the CR. Mao confronted Chen openly, denouncing him as a "false Marxist", and removed him from the Politburo Standing Committee. In addition to the purge of Chen, Mao asked Lin's principal generals to write self-criticisms on their political positions as a warning to Lin. Mao also inducted several of his supporters to the Central Military Commission and placed loyalists in leadership roles of the Beijing Military Region.

Project 571

Main article: Project 571

By 1971, the diverging interests of the civilian and military leaders was apparent. Mao was troubled by the PLA's newfound prominence, and the purge of Chen marked the beginning of a gradual scaling-down of the PLA's political involvement. According to official sources, sensing the reduction of Lin's power base and his declining health, Lin's supporters plotted to use the military power still at their disposal to oust Mao in a coup.

Lin's son Lin Liguo, along with other high-ranking military conspirators, formed a coup apparatus in Shanghai and dubbed the plan to oust Mao Outline for Project 571 – in the original Mandarin, the phrase sounds similar to the term for 'military uprising'. It is disputed whether Lin Biao was directly involved in this process. While official sources maintain that Lin did plan and execute the coup attempt, scholars such as Jin Qiu portray Lin as passive, cajoled by elements among his family and supporters. Qiu contests that Lin Biao was ever personally involved in drafting the Outline, with evidence suggesting that Lin Liguo was directly responsible for the draft.

Lin's flight and plane crash

Main article: Lin Biao incident
Graffiti of Lin Biao's foreword to the Little Red Book, with his name (lower right) later scratched out

According to the official narrative, on 13 September Lin Biao, his wife Ye Qun, Lin Liguo, and members of his staff attempted to flee to the USSR ostensibly to seek political asylum. En route, Lin's plane crashed in Mongolia, killing all on board. The plane apparently ran out of fuel. A Soviet investigative team was not able to determine the cause of the crash but hypothesized that the pilot was flying low to evade radar and misjudged the plane's altitude.

The official account was questioned by foreign scholars, who raised doubts over Lin's choice of the USSR as a destination, the plane's route, the identity of the passengers, and whether or not a coup was actually taking place.

On 13 September, the Politburo met in an emergency session to discuss Lin. His death was confirmed in Beijing only on 30 September, which led to the cancellation of the National Day celebration events the following day. The Central Committee did not release news of Lin's death to the public until two months later. Many Lin supporters sought refuge in Hong Kong. Those who remained on the mainland were purged.

The event caught the party leadership off guard: the concept that Lin could betray Mao de-legitimized a vast body of Cultural Revolution political rhetoric and by extension, Mao's absolute authority. For several months following the incident, the party information apparatus struggled to find a "correct way" to frame the incident for public consumption, but as the details came to light, the majority of the Chinese public felt disillusioned and realised they had been manipulated for political purposes.

1972–1976: The Gang of Four

Main article: Gang of Four The "Gang of Four", clockwise from top-left: Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Jiang Qing

Mao became depressed and reclusive after the Lin incident. With Lin gone, Mao had no answer for who would succeed him. Sensing a sudden loss of direction, Mao reached out to old comrades whom he had denounced in the past. Meanwhile, in September 1972, Mao transferred a 38-year-old cadre from Shanghai, Wang Hongwen, to Beijing and made him Party vice-chairman. Wang, a former factory worker from a peasant background, was seemingly getting groomed for succession.

Jiang's position strengthened after Lin's flight. She held tremendous influence with the radical camp. With Mao's health on the decline, Jiang's political ambitions began to emerge. She allied herself with Wang and propaganda specialists Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, forming a political clique later pejoratively dubbed as the Gang of Four.

Jiang Qing (left) receiving Red Guards in Beijing with Zhou Enlai (center) and Kang Sheng, with each holding a copy of the Little Red Book

By 1973, round after round of political struggles had left many lower-level institutions, including local government, factories, and railways, short of competent staff to carry out basic functions. China's economy had fallen into disarray, which led to the rehabilitation of purged lower-level officials. The party's core became heavily dominated by Cultural Revolution beneficiaries and radicals, whose focus remained ideological purity over economic productivity. The economy remained mostly Zhou's domain, one of the few remaining moderates. Zhou attempted to restore the economy, but was resented by the Gang of Four, who identified him as their primary political succession threat.

In late 1973, to weaken Zhou's political position and to distance themselves from Lin's apparent betrayal, the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign began under Jiang's leadership. Its stated goals were to purge China of New Confucianist thinking and denounce Lin's actions as traitorous and regressive.

Deng Xiaoping's rehabilitation (1975)

With a fragile economy and Zhou falling ill to cancer, Deng Xiaoping returned to the political scene, assuming the post of Vice-Premier in March 1973, in the first of a series of Mao-approved promotions. After Zhou withdrew from active politics in January 1975, Deng was effectively put in charge of the government, party, and military, then adding the additional titles of PLA General Chief of Staff, Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, and vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission.

The speed of Deng's rehabilitation took the radical camp by surprise. Mao wanted to use Deng as a counterweight to the military faction in government to suppress former Lin loyalists. In addition, Mao had also lost confidence in the Gang of Four and saw Deng as the alternative. Leaving the country in grinding poverty would damage the positive legacy of the CR, which Mao worked hard to protect. Deng's return set the scene for a protracted factional struggle between the radical Gang of Four and moderates led by Zhou and Deng.

At the time, Jiang and associates held effective control of mass media and the party's propaganda network, while Zhou and Deng held control of most government organs. On some decisions, Mao sought to mitigate the Gang's influence, but on others, he acquiesced to their demands. The Gang of Four's political and media control did not prevent Deng from enacting his economic policies. Deng emphatically opposed Party factionalism, and his policies aimed to promote unity to restore economic productivity. Much like the post-Great Leap restructuring led by Liu Shaoqi, Deng streamlined the railway system, steel production, etc. By late 1975, however, Mao saw that Deng's economic restructuring might negate the CR's legacy and launched the Counterattack the Right-Deviationist Reversal-of-Verdicts Trend, a campaign to oppose "rehabilitating the case for the rightists", alluding to Deng as the country's foremost "rightist". Mao directed Deng to write self-criticisms in November 1975, a move lauded by the Gang of Four.

Death of Zhou Enlai

On 8 January 1976, Zhou Enlai died of bladder cancer. On 15 January, Deng delivered Zhou's eulogy in a funeral attended by all of China's most senior leaders with the notable absence of Mao, who had grown increasingly critical of Zhou. After Zhou's death, Mao selected the relatively unknown Hua Guofeng instead of a member of the Gang of Four or Deng to become Premier.

The Gang of Four grew apprehensive that spontaneous, large-scale popular support for Zhou could turn the political tide against them. They acted through the media to impose restrictions on public displays of mourning for Zhou. Years of resentment over the CR, the public persecution of Deng—seen as Zhou's ally—and the prohibition against public mourning led to a rise in popular discontent against Mao and the Gang of Four. Official attempts to enforce the mourning restrictions included removing public memorials and tearing down posters commemorating Zhou's achievements. On 25 March 1976, Shanghai's Wen Hui Bao published an article calling Zhou "the capitalist roader inside the Party wanted to help the unrepentant capitalist roader regain his power." These propaganda efforts at smearing Zhou's image, however, only strengthened public attachment to Zhou's memory.

Tiananmen incident

Main article: 1976 Tiananmen incident

On 4 April 1976, on the eve of China's annual Qingming Festival, a traditional day of mourning, thousands of people gathered around the Monument to the People's Heroes in Tiananmen Square to commemorate Zhou. They honored Zhou by laying wreaths, banners, poems, placards, and flowers at the foot of the Monument. The most apparent purpose of this memorial was to eulogize Zhou, but the Gang of Four were also attacked for their actions against the Premier. A small number of slogans left at Tiananmen even attacked Mao and his Cultural Revolution.

Up to two million people may have visited Tiananmen Square on 4 April. All levels of society, from the most impoverished peasants to high-ranking PLA officers and the children of high-ranking cadres, were represented in the activities. Those who participated were motivated by a mixture of anger over Zhou's treatment, revolt against the Cultural Revolution and apprehension for China's future. The event did not appear to have coordinated leadership.

The Central Committee, under the leadership of Jiang Qing, labelled the event 'counter-revolutionary' and cleared the square of memorial items shortly after midnight on April 6. Attempts to suppress the mourners led to a riot. Police cars were set on fire, and a crowd of over 100,000 people forced its way into several government buildings surrounding the square. Many of those arrested were later sentenced to prison. Similar incidents occurred in other major cities. Jiang and her allies attacked Deng as the incident's 'mastermind', and issued reports on official media to that effect. Deng was formally stripped of all positions inside and outside the Party on 7 April. This marked Deng's second purge.

Death of Mao Zedong and the Gang of Four's downfall

See also: Death and state funeral of Mao Zedong

On 9 September 1976, Mao Zedong died. To Mao's supporters, his death symbolized the loss of China's revolutionary foundation. His death was announced on 9 September. The nation descended into grief and mourning, with people weeping in the streets and public institutions closing for over a week. Hua Guofeng chaired the Funeral Committee and delivered the memorial speech.

Shortly before dying, Mao had allegedly written the message "With you in charge, I'm at ease," to Hua. Hua used this message to substantiate his position as successor. Hua had been widely considered to be lacking in political skill and ambitions, and seemingly posed no serious threat to the Gang of Four in the race for succession. However, the Gang's radical ideas also clashed with influential elders and many Party reformers. With army backing and the support of Marshal Ye Jianying, Director of Central Office Wang Dongxing, Vice Premier Li Xiannian and party elder Chen Yun, on October 6, the Central Security Bureau's Special Unit 8341 had all members of the Gang of Four arrested in a bloodless coup.

After Mao's death, people characterized as 'beating-smashing-looting elements', who were seen as having disturbed the social order during the CR, were purged or punished. "Beating-smashing-looting elements" had typically been aligned with rebel factions.

Aftermath

Transitional period

Although Hua publicly denounced the Gang of Four in 1976, he continued to invoke Mao's name to justify Mao-era policies. Hua spearheaded what became known as the Two Whatevers, namely, "Whatever policy originated from Chairman Mao, we must continue to support," and "Whatever directions were given to us from Chairman Mao, we must continue to follow." Like Deng, Hua wanted to reverse the CR's damage; but unlike Deng, who wanted new economic models for China, Hua intended to move the Chinese economic and political system towards Soviet-style planning.

It became increasingly clear to Hua, that without Deng, it was difficult to continue daily affairs of state. On 10 October, Deng wrote a letter to Hua asking to be transferred back to state and party affairs; party elders also called for Deng's return. With increasing pressure from all sides, Premier Hua named Deng Vice-Premier in July 1977, and later promoted him to various other positions, effectively elevating Deng to be China's second-most powerful figure. In August, the 11th National Congress was held in Beijing, officially naming (in ranking order) Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian and Wang Dongxing as new members of the Politburo Standing Committee.

Repudiation and reform under Deng

See also: Boluan Fanzheng, 1978 Truth Criterion Controversy, and Reforms and Opening Up
Deng Xiaoping became the paramount leader of China in 1978. He started the process of reform and opening up

Deng Xiaoping first proposed what he called Boluan Fanzheng in September 1977 in order to correct the mistakes of the Cultural Revolution. In May 1978, Deng seized the opportunity to elevate his protégé Hu Yaobang to power. Hu published an article in the Guangming Daily, making clever use of Mao's quotations, while lauding Deng's ideas. Following this article, Hua began to shift his tone in support of Deng. On 1 July, Deng publicized Mao's self-criticism report of 1962 regarding the failure of the Great Leap Forward. As his power base expanded, in September Deng began openly attacking Hua Guofeng's "Two Whatevers". The "1978 Truth Criterion Discussion", launched by Deng and Hu and their allies, also triggered a decade-long New Enlightenment movement in mainland China, promoting democracy, humanism and universal values, while opposing the ideology of Cultural Revolution.

On 18 December 1978, Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee was held. At the congress, Deng called for "a liberation of thoughts" and urged the party to "seek truth from facts" and abandon ideological dogma. The Plenum officially marked the beginning of the economic reform era, as Deng rose to become the #2 leader of China. Hua Guofeng engaged in self-criticism and called his "Two Whatevers" a mistake. Mao's trusted ally Wang Dongxing was also criticized. At the Plenum, the Party reversed its verdict on the Tiananmen Incident. Former Chinese president Liu Shaoqi was given a belated state funeral. Peng Dehuai, one of China's ten marshals and the first Minister of National Defense, who was persecuted to death during the Cultural Revolution was rehabilitated in 1978.

At the Fifth Plenum held in 1980, Peng Zhen, He Long and other leaders who had been purged during the Cultural Revolution were rehabilitated. Hu Yaobang became head of the party secretariat as its secretary-general. In September, Hua Guofeng resigned and Zhao Ziyang, another Deng ally, was named premier. Hua remained on the Central Military Commission, but formal power was transferred to a new generation of pragmatic reformers, who reversed Cultural Revolution policies to a large extent. Within a few years, Deng and Hu helped rehabilitate over 3 million "unjust, false, erroneous" cases. In particular, the trial of the Gang of Four took place in Beijing from 1980 to 1981, and the court stated that 729,511 people had been persecuted by the Gang, of whom 34,800 were said to have died.

In 1981, the Chinese Communist Party passed a resolution and declared that the Cultural Revolution was "responsible for the most severe setback and the heaviest losses suffered by the Party, the country, and the people since the founding of the People's Republic."

Atrocities

Death toll

A struggle session in September 1967 targeting Xi Zhongxun, the father of Xi Jinping, who had been labeled an "anti-party element"

Fatality estimates vary across different sources, ranging from hundreds of thousands to millions, or even tens of millions. In addition to various regimes of secrecy and obfuscation concerning the Revolution, both top-down as perpetuated by authorities, as well as laterally among the Chinese public in the decades since, the discrepancies are due in large part to the totalistic nature of the Revolution itself: it is a significant challenge for historians to discern whether and in what ways discrete events that took place during the Cultural Revolution should be ascribed to it. For example, the 1975 Banqiao Dam failure, considered by some to be the greatest technological catastrophe of the 20th century, itself resulted in between 26,600 and 240,000 deaths. The scope of the collapse, which occurred near the end of the CR, was covered up by authorities until at least 1989.

Most deaths occurred after the mass movements ended, when organized campaigns attempted to consolidate order in workplaces and communities. As Walder summarizes, "The cure for factional warfare was far worse than the disease."

Literature reviews of the overall death toll due to the Cultural Revolution usually include the following:

Time Source Deaths (in millions) Remarks
2014 Andrew G. Walder 1.1–1.6 Examines the period between 1966 and 1971. Walder reviewed the reported deaths in 2,213 annals from every county and interpreted the annals' vague language in the most conservative manner. For instance, "some died" and "a couple died" were interpreted as zero death, while "death in the scale of tens/hundreds/thousands" were interpreted as "ten/a hundred/a thousand died". The reported deaths underestimate the actual deaths, especially because some annals actively covered up deaths. Annal editors were supervised by the CCP Propaganda Department. In 2003, Walder and Yang Su coauthored a paper along this approach, but with fewer county annals available at the time.
1999 Ding Shu 2 Ding's figures include 100,000 killed in the Red Terror during 1966, with 200,000 forced to commit suicide, plus 300,000–500,000 killed in violent struggles, 500,000 during Cleansing the Class Ranks, 200,000 during One Strike-Three Anti Campaign and the Anti-May Sixteenth Elements Campaign.
1996 CCP History Research Center 1.728 The 1.728 million were counted as "unnatural deaths", among which 9.4% (162,000) were CCP party members and 252,000 were intellectuals. The figures were extracted from 建国以来历次政治运动事实; 'Facts on the Successive Political Movements since the Founding of the PRC', a book by the party's History Research Center, which states that "according to CCP internal investigations in 1978 and 1984 ... 21.44 million were investigated, 125 million got implicated in these investigations; 4.2 million were detained (by Red Guards and other non-police), 1.3 million were arrested by police, 1.728 million of unnatural deaths; 135,000 were executed for crimes of counter-revolution; during violent struggles 237,000 were killed and 7.03 million became disabled". While these internal investigations were never mentioned or published in any other official documents, the scholarly consensus found these figures very reasonable. Chen Yung-fa endorsed the figures, yet he noted that peasants suffered far more in the GLF than in the CR.
1991 Rudolph J. Rummel 7.731 Rummel included his estimate of Laogai camp deaths in this figure. He estimated that 5% of the 10 million people in the Laogai camps died each year of the 12-year period, and that this amounts to roughly 6 million. He estimated that another 1.613 million were killed outright, a middle-ground figure he picked between 285,000 and 10,385,000, a range he deemed plausible.
1982 Ye Jianying 3.42–20 Several sources have quoted a statement made by Marshal Ye Jianying, of "683,000 deaths in the cities, 2.5 million deaths in the countryside, plus 123,700 deaths due to violent struggles and 115,500 deaths due to struggle sessions and imprisonment, in addition to 557,000 people missing." In a 2012 interview with Hong Kong's Open Magazine, an unnamed bureaucrat in Beijing claimed that Ye made the statement in a 1982 CCP meeting, while he was the party's Vice Chairman. Several sources have also quoted that Marshal Ye estimated the death toll to be 20 million during a CCP working conference in December 1978.
1979 Agence France Presse 0.4 This figure was obtained by an AFP correspondent in Beijing, citing an unnamed but "usually reliable" source. In 1986, Maurice Meisner referred to this number as a "widely accepted nationwide figure", but also said "The toll may well have been higher. It is unlikely that it was less." Jonathan Leightner asserted that the number is "perhaps one of the best estimates".

Massacres

Quotations of Mao Zedong on a street wall of Wuxuan County, one of the centers of the Guangxi Massacre

Massacres took place across China, including in Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Guangdong, Yunnan, Hunan, and Ruijin, as well as Red August in Beijing.

These massacres were mainly led and organized by local revolutionary committees, Communist Party branches, militia, and the military. Most victims were members of the Five Black Categories as well as their children, or members of "rebel groups". Chinese scholars have estimated that at least 300,000 people died in these massacres. Collective killings in Guangxi and Guangdong were among the most serious. In Guangxi, the official annals of at least 43 counties have records of massacres, with 15 of them reporting a death toll of over 1,000, while in Guangdong at least 28 county annals record massacres, with 6 of them reporting a death toll of over 1,000.

In 1975, the PLA led a massacre in Yunnan around the town of Shadian, targeting Hui people, resulting in the deaths of more than 1,600 civilians, including 300 children, and the destruction of 4,400 homes.

In Dao County, Hunan, a total of 7,696 people were killed from 13 August to 17 October 1967, in addition to 1,397 forced to commit suicide, and 2,146 becoming permanently disabled. During Red August, official sources in 1980 revealed that at least 1,772 people were killed by Red Guards, including teachers and principals of many schools. 33,695 homes were ransacked and 85,196 families were forced to flee. The Daxing Massacre caused the deaths of 325 people from 27 August to 1 September 1966; those killed ranged from 80 years old to a 38-day old baby, with 22 families being completely wiped out.

In the Guangxi Massacre, the official record shows an estimated death toll from 100,000 to 150,000 between January and April 1968 in Guangxi, in one of the worst violent struggles of the Revolution, before Zhou sent the PLA to intervene.

Violent struggles, struggle sessions, and purges

Main articles: Violent Struggle, Struggle session, and Cleansing the Class Ranks
The Cultural Revolution Cemetery in Chongqing, where 400–500 people killed in factional clashes are buried, out of a total of at least 1,700 deaths

Violent struggles were factional conflicts (mostly among Red Guards and "rebel groups") that began in Shanghai and then spread to other areas in 1967. They brought the country to a state of civil war. Weapons used included some 18.77 million guns, 2.72 million grenades, 14,828 cannons, millions of other ammunition and even armored cars and tanks. Notable violent struggles include the battles in Chongqing, in Sichuan, and in Xuzhou. Researchers claimed that the nationwide death toll in violent struggles ranged from 300,000 to 500,000.

The recorded rate of violence rose in 1967, reaching a peak that summer before dropping suddenly. During 1967, casualties were relatively low as the weapons used were primarily clubs, spears, and rocks until late July. Although firearms and heavier weapons began to spread during summer, most were neither trained nor committed fighters and therefore casualties remained relatively low. The peak of collective violence in summer 1967 dropped sharply after August, when Mao became concerned about rebel attacks on local army units and thereafter made clear that his prior calls to "drag out" army commanders was a mistake and he would instead support besieged army commands.

The greatest number of casualties occurred during the process of restoring order in 1968, although the overall number of violent conflicts was lower. Walder stated that while "rising casualties from a smaller number of insurgent conflicts surely reflected the increasing scale and organizational coherence of rebel factions, and their growing access to military weaponry" another important factor was that "he longer that local factional warfare continued without the prospect of an equitable political settlement, the greater the stakes for the participants and the more intense the collective violence as factions fought to avoid the consequence of losing."

In addition to violent struggles, millions of Chinese were violently persecuted, especially via struggle sessions. Those identified as spies, "running dogs", "revisionists", or coming from a suspect class (including those related to former landlords or rich peasants) were subject to beating, imprisonment, rape, torture, sustained and systematic harassment and abuse, seizure of property, denial of medical attention, and erasure of social identity. Intellectuals were also targeted. Many survivors and observers suggest that almost anyone with skills over that of the average person was made the target of political "struggle" in some way.

Some people were not able to stand the torture and committed suicide. Researchers claimed that at least 100,000 to 200,000 people committed suicide during the early CR. One of the most famous cases of apparent attempted suicide involved Deng Xiaoping's son Pufang, who was paralyzed when he fell out of a four-story building after he was interrogated by Red Guards. It is disputed whether he jumped or was pushed.

At the same time, many "unjust, false, and mistaken" cases appeared due to political purges. In addition to those who died in massacres, a large number of people died or became permanently disabled due to lynching or other forms of persecution. From 1968 to 1969, the Cleansing the Class Ranks purge caused the deaths of at least 500,000 people. Purges of similar nature such as the One Strike-Three Anti Campaign and the campaign towards the May Sixteenth elements were launched in the 1970s.

During the Inner Mongolia incident, official sources in 1980 stated that 346,000 people were wrongly arrested, over 16,000 were persecuted to death or executed, and over 81,000 were permanently disabled. However, academics instead estimated fatalities as between 20,000 and 100,000.

In Yunnan's Zhao Jianmin Spy Case, more than 1.387 million people were implicated and persecuted, which accounted for 6% of the province's population. From 1968 to 1969, more than 17,000 people died in massacres and 61,000 people were crippled for life; in Kunming alone, 1,473 people were killed and 9,661 people were permanently disabled.

In Hebei, Li Chuli, the former deputy director of Organization Department, was purged in 1968 and in turn reported around 80,000 people, 2,955 of whom were persecuted to death.

Repression of ethnic minorities

See also: Inner Mongolia incident and Shadian incident
The Panchen Lama during a struggle session
Struggle session of Sampho Tsewang Rigzin and his wife

The Cultural Revolution wrought havoc on minority cultures and ethnicities. Languages and customs of ethnic minorities in China were labeled as part of the Four Olds, texts in ethnic languages were burned, and bilingual education was suppressed. In Inner Mongolia, some 790,000 people were persecuted during the Inner Mongolia incident. Of these, 22,900 were beaten to death, and 120,000 were maimed, during a witch hunt to find members of the alleged separatist New Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. In Xinjiang, copies of the Qur'an and other books of the Uyghur people were apparently burned. Muslim imams reportedly were paraded around with paint splashed on their bodies.

In the ethnic Korean areas of northeast China, language schools were destroyed. According to Julia Lovell, "vents took a horrific turn in the frontier town of Yanbian, where freight trains trundled from China into the DPRK, draped with the corpses of Koreans killed in the pitched battles of the Cultural Revolution, and daubed with threatening graffiti: 'This will be your fate also, you tiny revisionists!'"

In Yunnan Province, the palace of the Dai people's king was torched, and a massacre of Muslim Hui people at the hands of the PLA in Yunnan, known as the Shadian incident, reportedly claimed over 1,600 lives in 1975. After the Cultural Revolution, the government gave reparations for the Shadian Incident, including the erection of a Martyr's Memorial in Shadian.

Concessions to minorities were abolished during the Cultural Revolution as part of the Red Guards' attack on the "Four Olds". People's communes, previously only established in parts of Tibet, were established throughout Tibetan Autonomous Region in 1966, removing Tibet's exemption from China's land reform, and reimposed in other minority areas. The effect on Tibet was particularly severe as it came following the repression after the 1959 Tibetan uprising. The destruction of nearly all of its over 6,000 monasteries, which began before the Cultural Revolution, were often conducted with the complicity of local ethnic Tibetan Red Guards. Only eight were intact by the end of the 1970s.

Many monks and nuns were killed, and the general population was subjected to physical and psychological torture. An estimated 600,000 monks and nuns lived in Tibet in 1950, but by 1979, most were dead, imprisoned or had disappeared. The Tibetan government in exile claimed that many Tibetans died from famines in 1961–1964 and 1968–1973 as a result of forced collectivization, however, the number of Tibetan deaths or whether famines, in fact, took place in these periods is disputed. Despite persecution, some local leaders and minority ethnic practices survived in remote regions.

The overall failure of the Red Guards' and radical assimilationists' goals was mostly due to two factors. It was felt that pushing minority groups too hard would compromise China's border defenses. This was especially important as minorities make up a large percentage of the population that live in border regions. In the late 1960s, China experienced a period of strained relations with some of its neighbors, notably with the Soviet Union and India. Many of the Cultural Revolution's goals in minority areas were simply unreasonable. The return to pluralism, and therefore the end of the worst period, coincided with Lin Biao's removal from power.

Rape and sexual abuse

Further information: Sent-down youth § Sexual violence

Suiming, Honig, and others documented that rape and sexual abuse of sent-down women were common during the CR's height. Branigan documented that women raped tended to be from educated urban backgrounds while their rapists were poor peasants or local officials.

Cultural impact and influence

Red Guards riot

A 1968 map of Beijing showing streets and landmarks renamed during the Cultural Revolution. Andingmen Inner Street became "Great Leap Forward Road", Taijichang Street became the "Road for Eternal Revolution", Dongjiaominxiang was renamed "Anti-Imperialist Road", Beihai Park was renamed "Worker-Peasant-Soldier Park" and Jingshan Park became "Red Guard Park". Most of the Cultural Revolution-era name changes were later reversed.

The revolution aimed to destroy the Four Olds and establish the corresponding Four News, which ranged from changing of names and cutting of hair to ransacking homes, vandalizing cultural treasures, and desecrating temples.

The revolution aimed to eliminate cow demons and snake spirits - the class enemies who promoted bourgeois ideas, as well as those from an exploitative family background or who belonged to one of the Five Black Categories. Large numbers of people perceived to be "monsters and demons" regardless of guilt or innocence were publicly denounced, humiliated, and beaten. In their revolutionary fervor, students, especially the Red Guards, denounced their teachers, and children denounced their parents. Many died from ill-treatment or committed suicide. In 1968, youths were mobilized to go to the countryside in the Down to the Countryside Movement so they may learn from the peasantry, and the departure of millions from the cities helped end the most violent phase of the Cultural Revolution.

Academics and education

Yao Tongbin, one of China's foremost missile scientists, was beaten to death by a mob in Beijing during the Cultural Revolution (1968). This caused Zhou Enlai to order special protection for key technical experts.


Academics and intellectuals were regarded as the "Stinking Old Ninth" and were widely persecuted. Many were sent to rural labor camps such as the May Seventh Cadre School. The prosecution of the Gang of Four revealed that 142,000 cadres and teachers in the education circles were persecuted. Academics, scientists, and educators who died included Xiong Qinglai, Jian Bozan, Wu Han, Rao Yutai, Wu Dingliang, Yao Tongbin and Zhao Jiuzhang. As of 1968, among the 171 senior members who worked at the headquarters of Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing, 131 were persecuted. Among the members of the academy, 229 died.

As of September 1971, more than 4,000 staff members of China's nuclear center in Qinghai had been persecuted. More than 310 were disabled, over 40 committed suicide, and 5 were executed. During the CR, scientists tested the first missile, created China's first hydrogen bomb and launched China's first satellite in the Two Bombs, One Satellite program. Significant achievements came in science and technology.

In the CR's early months, schools and universities were closed. Secondary school classes of 1966, 1967, and 1968 were unable to graduate on time later and became known as the Old Three cohort. Primary and middle schools gradually reopened, but colleges and universities were closed until 1970, and most universities did not reopen until 1972. University entrance exams were cancelled after 1966, replaced by a system whereby students were recommended by factories, villages and military units. Entrance exams were not restored until 1977 under Deng. Traditional values were abandoned.

During the Cultural Revolution, basic education was emphasized and expanded. While schooling years were reduced and education standard fell, the proportion of Chinese children who completed primary education increased from less than half to almost all, and the fraction who completed junior middle school rose from 15% to over two-thirds. Educational opportunities for rural children expanded, while education of the urban elite were restricted by anti-elitist policies. Industrial Universities were established in factories to supply technical and engineering programs for industrial workers. These study programs were inspired by Mao's July 1968 remarks advocating vocational education. Mao had given the instruction to emulate the model of the Shanghai Machine Tool Factory university. Factories around the country therefore established their own educational programs for technicians and engineers. By 1976, there were 15,000 such 21 July Universities.

In the Down to the Countryside Movement's initial stages, most of the youth who took part volunteered. Later on, the government forced them to move. Between 1968 and 1979, 17 million urban youth left for the countryside. Living in the rural areas deprived them of higher education. This generation is referred to as the 'lost generation'. In the post-Mao period, many of those forcibly moved attacked the policy as a violation of their human rights.

The Cultural Revolution's impact on accessible education varied across regions. Formal literacy measurements did not resume until the 1980s. Some counties in Zhanjiang had literacy rates as low as 59% 20 years after the revolution. China's leaders denied illiteracy problems. This was amplified by the elimination of qualified teachers—many districts were forced to rely on students to teach.

Though the Cultural Revolution was disastrous for millions, positive outcomes advanced some groups, such as those in rural areas. For example, the upheavals and the hostility to the intellectual elite is widely seen to have damaged education, especially at the upper end of the education system. Radical policies provided many in rural communities with middle school education for the first time, which is thought to have facilitated rural economic development. Rural infrastructure developed during CR, facilitated by the political changes that empowered ordinary rurals.

Many health personnel were deployed to the countryside as barefoot doctors. Some farmers were given informal medical training, and health-care centers were established in rural communities. This process led to a marked improvement in health and life expectancy.

Slogans and rhetoric

A Red Guard holding up the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, with "revolution is no crime, to rebel is justified" written on a flag next to him, 1967

Huang claimed that the Cultural Revolution had massive effects on Chinese society because of the extensive use of political slogans. He claimed that slogans played a central role in rallying Party leadership and citizens. For example, the slogan "to rebel is justified" (造反有理; zàofǎn yǒulǐ) affected many views.

The remnants of a banner containing slogans from the Cultural Revolution in Anhui

Huang asserted that slogans were ubiquitous in people's lives, printed onto everyday items such as bus tickets, cigarette packets, and mirror tables. Workers were supposed to "grasp revolution and promote productions", while peasants were supposed to raise more pigs because "more pigs means more manure, and more manure means more grain." Even a casual remark by Mao, "Sweet potato tastes good; I like it" became a slogan.

Political slogans had three sources: Mao, Party media such as People's Daily, and the Red Guards. Mao often offered vague, yet powerful directives that divided the Red Guards. These directives could be interpreted to suit personal interests, in turn aiding factions' goals in claiming loyalty to Mao. Red Guard slogans were violent, advancing themes such as "Strike the enemy down on the floor and step on him with a foot", "Long live the red terror!" and "Those who are against Chairman Mao will have their dog skulls smashed into pieces."

Dittmer and Ruoxi claim that the Chinese language had historically been defined by subtlety, delicacy, moderation, and honesty, as well as the cultivation of a "refined and elegant literary style". This changed during the CR. These slogans were an effective method of "thought reform", mobilizing millions in a concerted attack upon the subjective world, "while at the same time reforming their objective world."

Dittmer and Chen argued that the emphasis on politics made language into effective propaganda, but "also transformed it into a jargon of stereotypes—pompous, repetitive, and boring". To distance itself from the era, Deng's government cut back on political slogans. During a eulogy for Deng's death, Jiang Zemin called the Cultural Revolution a "grave mistake".

Arts and literature

The ballet The Red Detachment of Women, one of the Model Dramas promoted during the Cultural Revolution

Drastic changes in art and culture took place. Before this period, few cultural productions reflected the lives of peasants and workers. The struggles of workers, peasants, and revolutionary soldiers became frequent artistic subjects, often created by peasants and workers themselves. The spread of peasant paintings in rural China, for example, became one of the "newborn things" celebrated in a socialist society. In poor and remote areas, movies and operas were shown for free. Mobile film units brought cinema to the countryside and were crucial to the standardization and popularization of culture, particularly including revolutionary model operas.

Jiang took control of the stage and introduced revolutionary operas under her direct supervision. Traditional operas were banned as they were considered feudalistic and bourgeois, but revolutionary opera, which modified Peking opera in both content and form, was promoted. Six operas and two ballets were produced in the first three years, most notably the opera The Legend of the Red Lantern. These operas were the only approved opera form. Other opera troupes were required to adopt or change their repertoire.

The model operas were broadcast on the radio, made into films, blared from public loudspeakers, taught to students in schools and workers in factories, and became ubiquitous as a form of popular entertainment and were the only theatrical entertainment for millions. Most model dramas featured women as their leads and promoted Chinese state feminism. Their narratives begin with them oppressed by misogyny, class position, and imperialism before liberating themselves through the discovery of internal strength and the CCP.

In 1966, Jiang advanced the Theory of the Dictatorship of the Black Line. Those perceived to be bourgeois, anti-socialist or anti-Mao (black line) should be cast aside, and called for the creation of new literature and arts. Disseminators of the "old culture" would be eradicated. The majority of writers and artists were seen as "black line figures" and "reactionary literati", and were persecuted, and subjected to "criticism and denunciation" where they could be humiliated and ravaged, and be imprisoned or sent to hard labour. For instance, Mei Zhi and her husband were sent to a tea farm in Lushan County, Sichuan. She did not resume writing until the 1980s.

Documents released in 1980 regarding the prosecution of the Gang of Four show that more than 2,600 people in the field of arts and literature were persecuted by the Ministry of Culture. Many died: the names of 200 writers and artists who were persecuted to death were commemorated in 1979. These include writers such as Lao She, Fu Lei, Deng Tuo, Baren, Li Guangtian, Yang Shuo and Zhao Shuli.

In 1970, the communist party came to view the Ministry of Culture as so disruptive that it decided to dissolve the Ministry and establish a Culture Group within the State Council in an effort to rein in cultural politics.

The principles for cultural production laid out by Mao in the 1942 "Talks at the Yan'an Forum on Art and Literature" became dogmatized. The literary situation eased after 1972, as more were allowed to write, and many provincial literary periodicals resumed publication, but the majority of writers still could not work.

The effect is similar in the film industry. The Four Hundred Films to be Criticized booklet was distributed, and film directors and actors/actresses were criticized with some tortured and imprisoned. These included many of Jiang's rivals and former friends. Those who died in the period included Cai Chusheng, Zheng Junli, Shangguan Yunzhu, Wang Ying, and Xu Lai. No feature films were produced in mainland China for seven years apart from a few approved "Model dramas" and highly ideological films. A notable example is Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy.

Loyalty dances became common and were performed throughout the country by both professional cultural workers and ordinary people.

During the Cultural Revolution, composers of Yellow Music, which had already banned following the communist takeover, were persecuted, including Li Jinhui who was killed in 1967. Revolution-themed songs instead were promoted, and songs such as "Ode to the Motherland", "Sailing the Seas Depends on the Helmsman", "The East Is Red" and "Without the Communist Party, There Would Be No New China" were either written or became popular during this period. "The East Is Red", especially, became popular; it de facto supplanted "March of the Volunteers" as the national anthem of China, though the latter was later restored to its previous place.

Quotation songs, in which Mao's quotations were set to music, were particularly popular during the early years of the Cultural Revolution. Records of quotation songs were played over loudspeakers, their primary distribution, as the use of transistor radios lagged until 1976. "Rusticated youths" with an interest in broadcast technology frequently operated rural radio stations after 1968.

Visual arts

Posters from the Cultural Revolution period

Some of the most enduring images come from poster arts. Propaganda in posters was used as a mass communication device and often served as the people's leading source of information. They were produced in large numbers and widely disseminated, and were used by the government and Red Guards to push ideology defined by the Party. The two main posters genres were the big-character poster and commercial propaganda poster.

The dazibao presented slogans, poems, commentary and graphics often posted on walls in public spaces, factories and communes. Mao wrote his own dazibao at Beijing University on 5 August 1966, calling on the people to "Bombard the Headquarters".

Xuanchuanhua were artworks produced by the government and sold cheaply in stores to be displayed in homes or workplaces. The artists for these posters might be amateurs or uncredited professionals, and the posters were largely in a Socialist Realist visual style with specific conventions—for example, images of Mao were to be depicted as "red, smooth, and luminescent".

Traditional themes were sidelined and artists such as Feng Zikai, Shi Lu, and Pan Tianshou were persecuted. Many of the artists were assigned to manual labour, and artists were expected to depict subjects that glorified the Cultural Revolution related to their labour. In 1971, in part to alleviate their suffering, several leading artists were recalled from manual labour or freed from captivity under a Zhou initiative to decorate hotels and railway stations defaced by Red Guard slogans. Zhou said that the artworks were meant for foreigners, therefore were "outer" art and not under the obligations and restrictions placed on "inner" art meant for Chinese citizens. He claimed that landscape paintings should not be considered one of the "Four Olds". However, Zhou was weakened by cancer, and in 1974, the Jiang faction seized these and other paintings and mounted exhibitions in Beijing, Shanghai and other cities denouncing the artworks as "Black Paintings".

Film

Mobile film units brought Chinese cinema to the countryside and were crucial to the standardization and popularization of culture during this period, particularly including revolutionary model operas. During the Cultural Revolution's early years, mobile film teams traveled to rural areas with news reels of Mao meeting with Red Guards and Tiananmen Square parades, and welcomed ceremoniously in rural communities. These news reels became known as "red treasure films", analogous to how the Little Red Books were dubbed "red treasure books".The release of the filmed versions of the revolutionary model operas resulted in a re-organization and expansion of China's film exhibition network.

From 1965 to 1976, the number of film projection units in China quadrupled, total film audiences nearly tripled, and the national film attendance rate doubled. The Cultural Revolution Group drastically reduced ticket prices which, in its view, would allow film to better serve the needs of workers and of socialism.

China rejected Hollywood films and most foreign films. Albanian films and North Korean films developed mass audiences in China.

In 1972, Chinese officials invited Michelangelo Antonioni to China to film the achievements of the Cultural Revolution. Antonioni made the documentary Chung Kuo, Cina. When it was released in 1974, CCP leadership in China interpreted the film as reactionary and anti-Chinese. Viewing art through the principles of the Yan'an Talks, particularly the concept that there is no such thing as art-for-art's-sake, party leadership construed Antonioni's aesthetic choices as politically motivated and banned the film. Since its 2004 release in China, the film has been well-regarded by Chinese audiences, especially for its beautiful depictions of a more simple time.

Historical sites

Buddhist statues defaced during the Cultural Revolution

China's historical sites, artifacts and archives suffered devastating damage, as they were thought to be at the root of "old ways of thinking". Artifacts were seized, museums and private homes ransacked, and any item found that was thought to represent bourgeois or feudal ideas was destroyed. Few records relate how much was destroyed—Western observers suggest that much of China's thousands of years of history was in effect destroyed, or, later, smuggled abroad for sale. Chinese historians compare the suppression to Qin Shi Huang's great Confucian purge. Religious persecution intensified during this period, as religion was viewed in opposition to Marxist–Leninist and Maoist thinking.

The destruction of historical relics was never formally sanctioned by the Party, whose official policy was instead to protect such items. On 14 May 1967, the Central Committee issued Several suggestions for the protection of cultural relics and books during the Cultural Revolution. Despite this, enormous damage was inflicted on China's cultural heritage. For example, a survey in 1972 in Beijing of 18 cultural heritage sites, including the Temple of Heaven and Ming Tombs, showed extensive damage. Of the 80 cultural heritage sites in Beijing under municipal protection, 30 were destroyed, and of the 6,843 cultural sites under protection by Beijing government decision in 1958, 4,922 were damaged or destroyed. Numerous valuable old books, paintings, and other cultural relics were burnt.

Later archaeological excavation and preservation after the destructive period were protected, and several significant discoveries, such as the Terracotta Army and the Mawangdui, occurred after the peak of the Revolution. Nevertheless, the most prominent medium of academic research in archaeology, the journal Kaogu, did not publish. After the most violent phase, the attack on traditional culture continued in 1973 with the Anti-Lin Biao, Anti-Confucius Campaign as part of the struggle against moderate Party elements.

Media

Further information: Media history of China

During the early period of the Cultural Revolution, freedom of the press in China was at its peak. While the number of newspapers declined in this period, the number of independent publications by mass political organizations grew. According to China's National Bureau of Statistics, the number of newspapers dropped from 343 in 1965, to 49 in 1966, and then to a 20th-century low of 43 in 1967. At the same time, the number of publications by mass organizations such as Red Guards grew to an estimated number as high as 10,000.

Independent political groups could publish broadsheets and handbills, as well as leaders' speeches and meeting transcripts which would normally have been considered highly classified. From 1966 to 1969, at least 5,000 new broadsheets by independent political groups were published. Several Red Guard organizations also operated independent printing presses to publish newspapers, articles, speeches, and big-character posters. For example, the largest student organization in Shanghai, the Red Revolutionaries, established a newspaper that had a print run of 800,000 copies by the end of 1966.

Foreign relations

The Embassy of China, Jakarta after being burned

The functions of China's embassies abroad were disrupted during the early part of the Cultural Revolution. In a March 22, 1969 meeting on the Sino-Soviet border clashes, Mao stated that in foreign relations, China was "now isolated" and "we need to relax a little". Later that year, China began to restore its embassies to normal functioning.

China exported communist revolutions as well as communist ideologies to multiple countries in Southeast Asia, supporting parties in Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and in particular, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia (responsible for the Cambodian genocide). It is estimated that at least 90% of the Khmer Rouge's foreign aid came from China. In 1975 alone at least US$1 billion in interest-free economic and military aid and US$20 million came from China. China's economic malaise impacted China's ability to assist North Vietnam in its war against South Vietnam by the 1970s, which cooled relations between the once allied nations.

Opinions and views

See also: Boluan Fanzheng

Communist Party opinions

Main article: Ideology of the Chinese Communist Party
The central section of this wall shows the faint remnant marks of a propaganda slogan that was added during the Cultural Revolution, but has since been removed. The slogan read "Boundless faith that in Chairman Mao."

To make sense of the chaos caused by Mao's leadership without undermining the CCP's authority and legitimacy, Mao's successors needed to provide a "proper" historical judgment. On 27 June 1981, the Central Committee adopted the Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China, an official assessment of major historical events since 1949. This document became the key official interpretation of the Cultural Revolution.

The Resolution frankly noted Mao's leadership role in the movement, stating that "chief responsibility for the grave 'Left' error of the 'Cultural Revolution,' an error comprehensive in magnitude and protracted in duration, does indeed lie with Comrade Mao Zedong". It diluted blame by asserting that the movement was "manipulated by the counterrevolutionary groups of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing", who caused its worst excesses. The Resolution affirmed that the Cultural Revolution "brought serious disaster and turmoil to the Communist Party and the Chinese people." These themes of "turmoil" and "disaster" underlie historical and popular understanding of the Cultural Revolution. The 1981 Resolution was followed by a three-year campaign to "totally negate" the Cultural Revolution. The communist party called on individuals and cooperatives to study the Resolution and engage in criticism and self-criticism. People were urged to root out followers of Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, those seriously impacted by factional ideas, and the "smashers and grabbers" of the Cultural Revolution.

The official view in the Resolution and elsewhere aimed to separate Mao's actions during the Cultural Revolution from his "heroic" revolutionary activities during the Chinese Civil War and the Second Sino-Japanese War. It also separated Mao's personal mistakes from the correctness of the theory that he created, going as far as to rationalize that the Cultural Revolution contravened the spirit of Mao Zedong Thought, which remains the official guiding ideology. Deng famously summed this up with the phrase "Mao was 70% good, 30% bad."

CCP historiography characterizes the Cultural Revolution as an aberration and a period of chaos. The official view is the dominant framework for historiography of the period; alternative are discouraged. A new genre of literature known as scar literature emerged, encouraged by the post-Mao government. Written mainly by educated youth such as Liu Xinhua, Zhang Xianliang, and Liu Xinwu, scar literature depicted the Revolution negatively, based on their own perspectives and experiences. Movies criticizing Cultural Revolution hardliners were prevalent from the late 1970s to the early 1980s, although they were later banned as historical nihilism.

After the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre, both liberals and conservatives within the CCP accused each other of excesses that they claimed were reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution. Li Peng, who promoted the use of military force, claimed that the student movement had taken inspiration from the populism of the Cultural Revolution and that if left unchecked, would eventually lead to mass chaos. Zhao Ziyang, who was sympathetic to the protestors, later accused his political opponents of illegally removing him from office by using "Cultural Revolution-style" tactics, including "reversing black and white, exaggerating personal offenses, taking quotes out of context, issuing slander and lies ... inundating the newspapers with critical articles making me out to be an enemy, and casual disregard for my personal freedoms." Speaking during his 1992 Southern Tour, Deng Xiaoping characterized the Cultural Revolution as civil war and contrasting it with the contemporary situation: "Why was it that our country could remain stable after the 4 June Incident? It was precisely because we had carried out the reform and the open policy, which have promoted economic growth and raised living standards."

Alternative opinions

Although the Chinese Communist Party officially condemns the Cultural Revolution, many Chinese people hold more positive views, particularly amongst the working class, who benefited most from its policies. People in rural areas tend to view the Cultural Revolution more positively given the expansion of rural infrastructure and agricultural development that occurred. During Deng's ascendancy, the government arrested and imprisoned figures who took a strongly pro-Cultural Revolution stance. For instance, in 1985, a young shoe-factory worker put up a poster at a factory in Xianyang, Shaanxi, which declared that "The Cultural Revolution was Good" and led to achievements such as "the building of the Nanjing Yangtze River Bridge, the creation of hybrid rice crops and the rise of people's consciousness." The worker was eventually sentenced to ten years in prison, where he died soon after "without any apparent cause". Since the late 1980s, China has experienced "at first a fitful and then a nationwide revival in Mao Zedong", including aspects of the Cultural Revolution.

One of the student leaders of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, Shen Tong, author of Almost a Revolution, has a positive view of some aspects of the CR. According to Shen, the trigger for the Tiananmen hunger-strikes was a big-character poster, a form of public political discussion that gained prominence during the Cultural Revolution. Shen remarked that the travel of students from across the country to Beijing on trains and the hospitality they received from residents was reminiscent of the experiences of Red Guards.

Since the advent of the Internet, people inside and outside China have argued online that the Cultural Revolution had many benefits. Some hold that the Cultural Revolution "cleansed" China from superstitions, religious dogma, and outdated traditions in a 'modernist transformation' that later made Deng's economic reforms possible. The popular revival of Mao in the late 1990s coincided with the government's increasing privatization and its dismantling of its iron rice bowl employment and welfare policies. These sentiments also increased following the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 when a segment of the population began to associate anti-Mao viewpoints with the US.

Contemporary Maoists became more organized in the internet era, partially as a response to academic criticisms of Mao. One Maoist website collected thousands of signatures demanding punishment for those who publicly criticize Mao. Along with the call for legal action, this movement demanded the establishment of agencies similar to Cultural Revolution-era "neighborhood committees", in which "citizens" would report anti-Maoists to local public security bureaus. Maoist rhetoric and mass mobilization methods were resurgent in Chongqing during the 2000s.

In 2012, Chinese web portal and social media platform Tencent conducted an online survey focused on combatting "the unhealthy trend of Cultural Revolution nostalgia." Seventy-eight percent of survey participants expressed Cultural Revolution nostalgia.

Chinese New Left internet forum Utopia was suspended for one month in response to its advocacy of a new Cultural Revolution.

Contemporary China

See also: Shantou Cultural Revolution Museum

Public discussion is still limited. The Chinese government continues to prohibit news organizations from mentioning details, and online discussions and books about the topic are subject to official scrutiny. Textbooks abide by the "official view" of the events. Many government documents from the 1960s onward remain classified. Despite inroads by prominent sinologists, independent scholarly research is discouraged.

Mao Zedong's legacy

Mao Zedong's legacy remains in some dispute. During the anniversary of his birth, many people viewed Mao as a godlike figure and referred to him as "the people's great savior". Contemporary discussions in newspapers such as the Global Times continue to glorify Mao. Rather than focus on consequences, newspapers claim that revolutions typically have a brutal side and are unable to be viewed from the "humanitarian perspective".

Critics of Mao Zedong look at the actions that occurred under his leadership from the point of view that "he was better at conquering power than at ruling the country and developing a socialist economy". Mao went to extreme measures on his path to power, costing millions of lives then and during his rule.

Outside mainland China

In the world at large, Mao Zedong emerged as a symbol of anti-establishment, grassroots populism, and self-determination. His revolutionary philosophies found adherents in the Shining Path of Peru, the Naxalite insurgency in India, various political movements in Nepal, the United States–based Black Panther Party,

In Hong Kong, a pro-Communist, anti-colonial strike inspired by the Cultural Revolution was launched in 1967. Its excesses damaged the credibility of these activists in the eyes of Hong Kong residents. In Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek initiated the Chinese Cultural Renaissance to counter what he regarded as the destruction of traditional Chinese values by mainland Communists.

In Albania, Communist leader and Chinese ally Enver Hoxha began a "Cultural and Ideological Revolution" organized along the same lines as the Cultural Revolution. Hoxha delivered a speech to a plenum of the CC of the Party of Labour titled Some Preliminary Ideas about the Cultural Revolution, criticizing it. He said that "the cult of Mao was raised to the skies in a sickening and artificial manner" and added that, in reading its purported objectives, "you have the impression that everything old in Chinese and world culture should be rejected without discrimination and a new culture, the culture they call proletarian, should be created." He further stated that, "It is difficult for us to call this revolution, as the 'Red Guards' are carrying it out, a Proletarian Cultural Revolution... the enemies could and should be captured by the organs of the dictatorship on the basis of the law, and if the enemies have wormed their way into the party committees, let them be purged through party channels. Or in the final analysis, arm the working class and attack the committees, but not with children."

In October 1966, Chiang Kai-Shek criticized the Cultural Revolution as a synonym for Mao Zedong's method in the name of proletarian revolution after failures of Proletarian Revolution General Route, Great Leap Forward, People's commune and the Three Red Flags. He claimed that Maoism lost its origins in Marxism–Leninism. And Mao himself dropped his Marxist–Leninist mask, revealing its roots in Huang Chao, Li Zicheng, roving gang, and the Boxer Rebellion, destroying Chinese Culture, purging intellectuals, destroying modern civilization, and used his "people's war" to attempt to rule Asia and the world following Adolf Hitler's actions.

In the 1970s, Nikita Khrushchev criticized the Cultural Revolution in his memoir. He saw Chinese people repeatedly recite Mao's quotations and felt sick after he saw human dignity trampled. He argued that Mao is not supernatural, but upended his country, and that the Cultural Revolution was actually counter-revolutionary.

In 2007 Hong Kong Chief Executive Donald Tsang remarked that the Cultural Revolution represented the 'dangers of democracy', remarking "People can go to the extreme like what we saw during the Cultural Revolution , when people take everything into their own hands, then you cannot govern the place." The remarks caused controversy in Hong Kong and were later retracted.

Academic debate

Scholars and academics debate the origin, the events, Mao's role, and its legacy. These debates evolved as researchers explored new sources. In the 1960s, while many scholars dismissed Mao's initiatives as ideological and destructive, others sympathized with his goals. They saw Maoism as a populist insistence on mass participation, mass criticism and the right to rebel, and a determination to wipe out a new ruling class. By the 1980s, however, Harvard University sociologist Andrew Walder wrote that the "public opinion in the field had changed markedly". Most in the field now "seem convinced that the Cultural Revolution was a human disaster, even a historical crime, something on the order of Hitler's holocaust and Stalin's great terror."

Walder argued that the failures of the Cultural Revolution did not come from poor implementation, bureaucratic sabotage, disloyalty, or lingering class antagonisms. If things turned out differently than Mao expected, Walder concluded, this was "probably due to the fact that Mao did not know what he wanted, or that he did know what he was doing, or both ... the outcomes are what one should have expected, given the Maoist doctrine and aims."

The debate continues because the movement contains many contradictions: led by an all-powerful omnipresent leader, it was mainly driven by a series of grassroots popular uprisings. Many English-language books published since the 1980s paint a negative picture of the movement. Historian Anne F. Thurston wrote that it "led to loss of culture, and of spiritual values; loss of hope and ideals; loss of time, truth and of life". Barnouin and Yu summarized the Cultural Revolution as "a political movement that produced unprecedented social divisions, mass mobilization, hysteria, upheavals, arbitrary cruelty, torture, killings, and even civil war", calling Mao "one of the most tyrannical despots of the twentieth century". According to historian Chun Lin, despite these human tragedies, individual freedoms and political self-organization expanded rapidly.

Some scholars challenge the mainstream portrayals and conceive it in a more positive light. Gao Mobo, writing in The Battle for China's Past: Mao and the Cultural Revolution, argues that the movement benefited millions of Chinese citizens, particularly agricultural and industrial workers, and sees it as egalitarian and genuinely populist, citing continued Maoist nostalgia today as remnants of its positive legacy. Some draw a distinction between intention and performance. While Mao's leadership was pivotal at the beginning of the movement, Jin Qiu contends that as events progressed, it deviated significantly from Mao's utopian vision. In this sense, the Cultural Revolution was actually a decentralized and varied movement that gradually lost cohesion, spawning many 'local revolutions' that differed in their nature and goals.

Academic interest focused on the movement's relationship with Mao's personality. Mao envisioned himself as a wartime guerrilla leader, which made him wary of the bureaucratic nature of peacetime governance. With the Cultural Revolution Mao was simply "returning to form", once again acting as a guerrilla leader fighting an institutionalized bureaucracy. Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, paint the movement as neither a bona fide war over ideological purity nor a mere power struggle to remove Mao's political rivals.

While Mao's personal motivations were undoubtedly pivotal, they reasoned that other factors contributed to the way events unfolded. These include China's relationship with the global Communist movement, geopolitical concerns, the ideological rift between China and the Soviet Union, Khrushchev's ouster, and Great Leap Forward catastrophe. They conclude that the movement was, at least in part, a legacy project to cement Mao's place in history, aimed to boost his prestige while he was alive and preserve his ideas after his death.

Varying academic focuses on power conflicts or clashes of personalities as underlying Mao's motivations, or alternatively on ideological reasons for launching the Cultural Revolution, are not necessarily conflicting. Mao's suspicions of those in power around him reflected his longstanding concerns with the decline of revolutionary spirit and the potential rise of a new class-stratified society arising as the popular revolutionary movement transformed into a socialist bureaucracy. Historian Rebecca Karl writes that for Mao, the pursuit of power was never an end in itself, but rather the seizure of state power was to be used in making the revolution.

Professor Yiching Wu argues that the typical historiography of the Cultural Revolution as an "era of madness" is simpleminded but writes that such narratives have a "remarkably tenacious ideological power:"

Since the early 1980s, there have been concerted efforts to reduce the extraordinary complexity of the Cultural Revolution to the simplicity almost exclusively of barbarism, violence, and human suffering. Flattening historical memory of the Cultural Revolution through moralistic condemnation and exhortation, these narratives not only deprive an immensely important and complex episode of Chinese history of its multilayered historicity, but also provide the discursive ground for delegitimizing China's revolutionary history of the twentieth century.

See also

Notes

  1. This position, effectively China's de jure head of state, was renamed "President" in 1982.
  2. Some claim 1.877 million.

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Sources

Further reading

General

Library resources about
Cultural Revolution

Specific topics

  • Fox Butterfield. China: Alive in the Bitter Sea (New York: Crown, 1990). ISBN 0812918657 An oral history of some Chinese people's experience during the Cultural Revolution
  • Anit Chan, Children of Mao: Personality Development and Political Activism in the Red Guard Generation. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1985).
  • Lingchei Letty Chen, The Great Leap Backward: Forgetting and Representing the Mao Years (New York: Cambria Press, 2020). Scholarly studies on memory writings and documentaries of the Mao years, victimhood narratives, perpetrator studies, ethics of bearing witness to atrocities
  • Jie Li and Enhua Zhang, eds., Red Legacies in China: Cultural Afterlives of the Communist Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2016). Scholarly studies on cultural legacies and continuities from the Maoist era in art, architecture, literature, performance, film, etc.
  • Ross Terrill, The White-Boned Demon: A Biography of Madame Mao Zedong (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984). ISBN 0804729220
  • Xinran, The Good Women of China: Hidden Voices, translated by Esther Tyldesley. (London: Chatto & Windus, 2002). ISBN 0701173459

Commentaries

  • Guokai Liu, A Brief Analysis of the Cultural Revolution edited by Anita Chan. (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1982).
  • Pierre Ryckmans, The Chairman's New Clothes: Mao and the Cultural Revolution (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977). ISBN 0850312086
  • —— Chinese Shadows (New York: Viking Press, 1977). ISBN 0670219185
  • —— Broken Images: Essays on Chinese Culture and Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980). ISBN 0805280693
  • —— The Burning Forest: Essays on Chinese Culture and Politics (New York: Holt, 1985). ISBN 0030050634

Fictional treatments

Memoirs by Chinese participants

  • Guanlong Cao, The Attic: Memoir of a Chinese Landlord's Son (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).
  • Jung Chang, Wild Swans: Three Daughters of China (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991).
  • Nien Cheng, Life and Death in Shanghai (New York: Grove, 1987). ISBN 0394555481
  • Liang Heng and Judith Shapiro, Son of the Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1983).
  • Wenguang Huang, The Little Red Guard: A Family Memoir (New York: Riverhead Books, 2012).
  • Ji Xianlin, The Cowshed: Memories of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, translated by Chenxin Jiang (New York: New York Review Books, 2016).
  • Kang Zhengguo, Confessions: An Innocent Life in Communist China, translated by Susan Wilf (New York: W. W. Norton, 2007).
  • Ken Ling, The Revenge of Heaven: Journal of a Young Chinese, English text prepared by Miriam London and Ta-Ling Lee. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1972).
  • Liu Ping, My Chinese Dream: From Red Guard to CEO (San Francisco: China Books, 2012). ISBN 978-0835100403
  • Ma Bo, Blood Red Sunset: A Memoir of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, translated by Howard Goldblatt. (New York: Viking, 1995).
  • Anchee Min, Red Azalea (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994). ISBN 1400096987
  • Nanchu, Red Sorrow (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2012).
  • Emily Wu, Feather in the Storm (New York: Pantheon, 2006). ISBN 978-0375424281
  • Yang Jiang, Six Chapters from My Life "Downunder", translated by Howard Goldblatt. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988).
  • Rae Yang, Spider Eaters (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).
  • Ting-Xing Ye, A Leaf in the Bitter Wind (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 1997).
  • Weili Ye and Xiaodong Ma, Growing up in the People's Republic: Conversations between Two Daughters of China's Revolution (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
  • Lijia Zhang, Socialism Is Great!: A Worker's Memoir of the New China (New York: Atlas & Co, 2007).

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