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The Deir Yassin massacre refers to the killing of between 100 and 120 villagers, alleged to have been mainly elderly people, women and children during and after the battle at the village of Deir Yassin (also written as Dayr Yasin or Dir Yassin) near Jerusalem in the British Mandate of Palestine by an Irgun-Lehi force between April 9 and April 11, 1948. This occurred during a period of increasing local Arab-Jewish fighting about one month prior to the regional outbreak of the much larger 1948 Middle East war. Reports of the event and the exaggerated number of casualties had considerable contemporary impact on the conflict, and were a major cause of Arab civilian flight from Palestine. The circumstances, nature, evaluation, and scope of the Deir Yassin incident remain a source of discussion decades later.

Historical background

The attack on and massacre of Deir Yassin occurred during the civil war period of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War (from December 1947 to mid-May 1948).

On 29 November 1947, the United Nations passed U.N. Resolution 181, calling for the internationalization of Jerusalem and the partition of the British Mandate of Palestine into two states, Arab and Jewish. Widespread disagreements over partition, tensions, and occasional fighting between Jews and Arabs boiled as British rule deteriorated, culminating into widespread riots and low intensity warfare in December of 1947. Fighting grew progressively worse after the Mandate dissolved on 15 May 1948, and after Israel declared its statehood, intensified into the 1948 Arab-Israeli war.

During the winter and spring of 1948, the Arab League sponsored Arab Liberation Army, composed of Palestinian Arabs and Arabs from other Middle Eastern countries, attacked Jewish communities in Palestine, and Jewish traffic on major roads. This phase of the war became known as "the battle of roads" because the Arab forces mainly concentrated on major roadways in an attempt to cut off Jewish communities from each other. Arab forces at that time had engaged in sporadic and unorganized ambushes since the riots of December 1947, and began to make organized attempts to cut off the highway linking Tel Aviv with Jerusalem, the city's sole supply route. Initially, they were successful in cutting off supplies and controlled several strategic vantage points overlooking the sole highway linking Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, enabling them to fire at convoys going to the city. By late March 1948, the vital road that connected Tel Aviv to western Jerusalem, where about 16% of all Jews in the Palestinian region lived, was cut off and under siege.

The Haganah decided to launch a major military counteroffensive named Operation Nachshon to break the siege of Jerusalem. This was the first large-scale military operation of what would evolve into the Arab-Israeli conflict over the ensuing months, years, and decades. On 6 April the Haganah and its strike force, the Palmach, in an offensive to secure strategic points, took al-Qastal, town overlooking the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv highway two kilometers north of Deir Yassin. But intense fighting lasted for days more as control of that key village remained contested.

Throughout the siege on Jerusalem, Jewish convoys tried to reach the city to alleviate the food shortage, which, by April, had become critical. On 9 April 1948, IZL-Lehi forces attacked Deir Yassin on their own initiative. . The levels of provocation, military necessity and authority justifying the action remain controversial, and the various accounts are listed.

Overview of the event and its consequences

The Deir Yassin events began with an attack on April 9, 1948, in which several Jewish armed factions seized and occupied the Arab town of Deir Yassin, simultaneous with Jewish attempts to break the siege of western Jerusalem.

During the takeover or related holding of the village, according to conclusions drawn from villager oral histories in a 1998 study by Birzeit University, between approximately 107 and 120 Palestinian Arab civilians were killed by elements of two Jewish nationalist irregular military organizations. (Certain persons present, such as Meir Pa'il and burial unit commander Yehoshua Arieli have felt the death-toll to be possibly higher; others, e.g. Lehi member and attack veteran Shimon Monita, have felt it to be lower.)

Most of the estimated 750 villagers survived the takeover of the village, either by fleeing, or by being captured and then transported to the Arab-held eastern areas of Jerusalem. Many sources originally reported a far higher death toll (usually around 254) but such numbers have been more recently accepted by most sources as a contemporary exaggeration that was disseminated for a variety of political and practical reasons.

There is still a measure of controversy surrounding the deaths of the villagers , with defenders of the record of the attacking forces claiming that the deaths came mostly from unintended consequences of a tough military battle. Nevertheless, most conventional historical sources along with most contemporary reporting and official commentary have treated the event as a massacre involving the infliction of unnecessary deaths and other abuses during or after the battle.

The relatively large number of dead in a single village, the relatively small number of dead attackers (4 to 5), and the relatively low number of reported villagers wounded in relation to deaths additionally attest to the dominant consensus of a "massacre" involving the large-scale killing of captive non-resisting individuals.

There were claims of other atrocities during the attack, such as rape and mutilation of the dead, but evidence for these claims is somewhat contradictory.

Revenge for Dier Yassin

The ambush and no-quarter killing of a large number (about 77) of mostly unarmed Jewish medical personnel in a convoy headed to Hadassah Hospital on Mt. Scopus near Jerusalem by Arab fighters (see Hadassah medical convoy massacre) soon after the events of Deir Yassin is regarded as one immediate act of retaliation by Arab armed groupings. Later attacks, in 1972, the Japanese Red Army (trained in Lebanon) acted on behalf of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and fired indiscriminately in the Lod Airport in Israel, killing 24 people and wounding 78 others. The PFLP referred to it as "Operation Deir Yassin" (see Lod Airport massacre).

Contemporary reports of the Deir Yassin incident also had considerable impact on the development and outcome of the larger war of 1948 and on the regional conflict of which it was a part. These reports are widely credited with greatly stimulating Palestinian Arab refugee flight (see Palestinian Exodus).

Background to the military operation

Political and historical background of the attacking forces

The main Jewish forces participating in the Deir Yassin attack belonged to two underground Jewish paramilitary groups, the Irgun (Etzel) (National Military Organization) and the Lehi (Freedom Fighters of Israel).

During the Great Uprising (1936-1939) of the Arabs in Palestine, in which more than 320 Jews were killed in Arab attacks, the Irgun in turn carried out attacks against Arabs, which are believed to have killed at least 250. Irgun's tactics, which included bus and marketplace bombings, were condemned by both the British mandate authorities and the mainstream Zionist leadership, the Jewish Agency.

Lehi, an Irgun splinter group, was formed in 1940 following Irgun's decision to declare a truce with the British during World War Two. Lehi subsequently carried out a series of assassinations designed to force the British out of Palestine. Both Irgun and Lehi were strong ideological nationalist groups aligned with the right-wing Revisionist movement.

The third group which took part in the attack on Deir Yassin was the Palmach, the armed wing of the mainstream Jewish Haganah (Defense) organization, whose membership eventually formed the nucleus of the Israeli Army, and whose leadership was aligned with the political left (see Mapai). The Palmach's role in the attack appears to have been limited to a brief but decisive intervention in the closing stages of the battle. Unlike the other two organizations, the Palmach has never been accused of taking part in the massacre which is said to have followed the battle.

Because of the political differences and mutual hostility between the Haganah and Irgun/Lehi, Deir Yassin became an issue of mutual recrimination between the various Jewish nationalist factions in Palestine and their successor political parties in Israel, one which continues to the present day.

The Village and Irgun and Lehi Activity

At this time the Irgun and Lehi had not made any major offensive action by their ground forces yet. The guerrillas consisted of a mix of hardened veterans and some inexperienced teenagers. The Arab village of Deir Yassin was situated on a hill which overlooked the main highway entering Jerusalem (although a direct line of sight from the village to the highway was blocked by a ridge below). Deir Yassin was also adjacent to a number of Jerusalem's western neighborhoods. The pathway connecting the town to nearby Givat Shaul and the elevation of the hills in the area made control of the town attractive as an airstrip.

Deir Yassin was different from al-Qastel that had recently been attacked by the Haganah, in that it did not participate directly in the conflict. The villagers reportedly wanted to remain neutral in the war and they had repeatedly resisted help and alliances with the Palestinian irregulars. Instead they had made a pact with Haganah to not help the irregulars as long as they were not the target of military operations.

The inhabitants had even remained cooperative while the Haganah took the strategic Sharafa ridge between Deir Yassin and the nearby ALA base Ein Karem. Haganah intelligence confirmed after the village had been captured that it in fact had stayed "faithful allies of the western Jerusalem sector".

Yoma Ben-Sasson, Haganah commander in Givat Shaul, later recalled that "there was not even one incident between Deir Yassin and the Jews".

The question of foreign Arab (ALA) troops in Deir Yassin

The Irgun and Lehi claimed subsequently that foreign combatants were present in the village. Arab testimonies, including those of the refugees themselves, as well as SHAI's Arab sources, contend that the villagers were the only combatants present . Menachem Begin writes in his memoirs that Iraqi troops were present in Deir Yassin, but Gelber says these were in fact stationed in Ain Karim (Gelber, 2006, p. 311).

The most detailed account of what happened at Deir Yassin was published by Israeli military historian Uri Milstein. Milstein brings an account of one of the fighters claiming the presence of an Iraqi soldier:

"My unit stormed and passed the first row of houses. I was among the first to enter the village. There were a few other guys with me, each encouraging the other to advance. At the top of the street I saw a man in khaki clothing running ahead. I thought he was one of ours. I ran after him and told him, "advance to that house." Suddenly he turned around, aimed his rifle and shot. He was an Iraqi soldier. I was hit in the foot."

• On January 11, an Arab group tried to set up a base in the village. But the inhabitants resisted this with force which led to the miller's son getting killed. In the end the attempt was frustrated.

• On January 27 a force commanded by Abdel Khader El-Husseini Suleiman. Again the villagers resisted and the force had to leave.

• On March 23 the Haganah got a report stating that 150 Iraqi and Syrian troops had entered the village and the villagers were leaving. But the troops had to leave due to determined resistance from the villagers.

• On April 7 the Haganah intelligence reported that three days earlier the elders of Deir Yassin and Ein Kareem had met Kemal Erikat (Abdel Kader's deputy) who proposed to bring foreign troops into the villages. The elders of Deir Yassin rejected the proposal.

A theory that has been put forward is that Arab troops passed through Deir Yassin and that it therefore was an important military target. Abba Eban claimed that "In fact, the two villages were interconnected militarily, reinforcements passing from Dir Yassin to Kastel during the fierce engagement for ."

A booklet published by Israel's Foreign Ministry of the State on Deir Yassin in 1969, claims that: were attempting to cut the only highway linking Jerusalem with Tel Aviv and the outside world. It had cut the pipeline upon which the defenders depended for water. Palestinian Arab contingents, stiffened by men of the regular Iraqi army, had seized vantage points overlooking the Jerusalem road and from them were firing on trucks that tried to reach the beleaguered city with vital food-stuffs and supplies. Dir Yassin, like the strategic hill and village of Kastel, was one of these vantage points. In fact, the two villages were interconnected militarily, reinforcements passing from Dir Yassin to Kastel during the fierce engagement for hill.

Meir Pail's account strongly suggests that the attack on Deir Yassin was made because it was friendly and peaceful. He describes going to see David Shaltiel of the Jewish Agency, who wanted the dissidents to attack other villages. But the dissidents said "No, it is too difficult. Only Deir Yassin." Even, astonishingly, the offer of more arms failed to persuade them.

Meir Pail also speaks of "a crowd of people from Givat Shaul, with peyot {earlocks}, most of them religious, came into the village and started yelling 'gazlanim' 'rozchim' - (thieves, murderers) "we had an agreement with this village. It was quiet. Why are you murdering them?""

Battle Plans

During the battle for Kastel, the Irgun and Lehi took their plan to attack Deir Yassin to Haganah for coordination. Rivalry between them made matters tense. According to Meir Pa'il: The commanders of the underground groups came to Shaltiel , and asked for his approval. Shaltiel was surprised by their choice and asked: "Why go to Deir Yassin? It is a quiet village. There is a non-aggression pact between Givat Shaul and the Mukhtar of Deir Yassin. The village is not a security problem in any way. Our problem is in the battle for the Qastel. I suggest you participate in the operations in that area. I will give you a base in Bayit Vagan, and from there you will take over Ein Kerem, which is providing Arab reinforcements to the Qastel."

The Zionist irregulars refused to change their minds and complained that the proposed mission would be too hard for them. Shaltiel ultimately yielded and wrote in a letter to the underground commanders that he allows them to attack the village, provided that they could hold it thereafter.

Shaltiel's consent was met with internal resistance. Meir Pa'il objected to violating the agreement with the village but Shaltiel maintained that he had no power to stop the guerillas. Yitzchak Levi proposed that the inhabitants should be notified that the truce was over but Shaltiel refused to endanger the operation by warning them. During some of the preliminary meetings the idea of a massacre was discussed and rejected. A Lehi proposal suggested "liquidating" them "to show what happens when the IZL and the Lehi set out together."

According to most insider accounts, instructions were given to minimize casualties, some guerillas nonetheless anticipated inciting panic throughout Arab Palestine by their actions in Deir Yassin.

The attack

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The attack force consisted of about 132 men, 72 from Irgun and 60 from Lehi as well as a few women to serve as support.

From Givat Shaul a Lehi unit approached Deir Yassin, accompanied with Meir Pa'il and a photographer "to watch their military performance".

One Irgun unit moved towards Deir Yassin from the east, while a second approached it from the south. At 4:45 a.m. the fighting started when concealed Irgunists encountered a village guard.

The road south-westward towards Ein Kerem filled with panicked villagers fleeing.

Villager fire inflicted heavy casualties and drove off the Irgun. The Lehi units advance stopped at the town's center where they were only holding the eastern parts. The attacker's fighting capability matched their progress, weapons failed to work, a few tossed hand-grenades without pulling the plug, and a Lehi unit commander, Amos Keynan, was wounded by his own men.

While both Irgun and Lehi commanders had anticipated many residents would flee, and the remaining would surrender after token resistance, both groups of Jewish fighters, entering the town from different sides, immediately encountered fierce volleys of Arab rifle fire.

Irgun deputy commander Michael Harif, one of the first to enter Deir Yassin, later recalled how, early in the battle, "I saw a man in khaki run ahead. I thought he was one of us, I ran after him and told him, 'Move ahead to that house!' Suddenly he turned, pointed his weapon at me and fired. He was an Iraqi soldier. I was wounded in the leg". Patchiah Zalivensky of Lehi recalled that among the Arab soldiers killed by his unit was a Yugoslavian Muslim officer.

The villagers sniper fire from higher positions in the west contained effectively the attack, especially from the mukhtar's (= mayor's) house. Some Lehi units went for help from the Haganah's Camp Schneller in Jerusalem.

Intense Arab firepower caused the fighters' advance into Deir Yassin to be very slow. Reuven Greenberg reported later that "the Arabs fought like lions and excelled at accurate sniping". He added that " women ran from the houses under fire, collected the weapons which had fallen from the hands of Arab fighters who had been wounded, and brought them back into the houses". In certain cases, after storming a house, dead Arab women were found with guns in their hands, a sign they had taken part in the battle.

Ezra Yachin recalled, "To take a house, you had either to throw a grenade or shoot your way into it. If you were foolish enough to open doors, you got shot down — sometimes by men dressed up as women, shooting out at you in a second of surprise".

Briefings before the battle had stated that most of the houses in Deir Yassin had wooden doors, so, while trying to storm them, the fighters were surprised to discover the doors were made of iron, leaving no recourse but to blow them open with powerful explosives, in the process inadvertently killing or wounding some inhabitants. The Lehi forces slowly advanced house by house.

Meanwhile, the Irgun soldiers on the other side of the village, were having a very difficult time. By 7:00 a.m., discouraged by the Arab resistance and their own increasing casualties, Irgun commanders relayed a message to the Lehi camp that they were seriously considering retreating from the town. Lehi commanders relayed back that they had already entered the village and expected victory soon.

The large number of wounded was a big problem for the guerillas: they had to be evacuated but if they did they could be fired upon. Meret called the Magen David Adom station for an ambulance that came to the battle area. The attackers took beds out of the houses, laid the wounded on them and ordered the inhabitants of the village, including women and old people, to carry the beds to the ambulance and to screen them. They believed the Arabs would not shoot their own people, which however they did.

The Irgun quickly arranged to receive a supply of explosives from their base in Givat Shaul, and started blasting their way into house after house. In certain instances, the force of the explosions collapsed whole parts of houses, burying Arab soldiers as well as civilians who were still inside.

In numerous instances Arabs emerged from the houses and surrendered; over 100 were taken prisoner by day's end. At least two Haganah members on the scene reported the Lehi repeatedly using a loudspeaker to implore the residents to surrender.

In certain cases Arabs pretending to surrender revealed hidden weapons and shot at their would-be Jewish captors. Benny Morris, has characterized Gorodenchik's testimony as confused.

At about 10:00 am a sizeable Palmach unit from the Haganah arrived. They brought an armored vehicle and a two-inch mortar. The mortar was fired three times at the mukhtar's house which silenced its snipers. The Palmach unit managed to clear the village of serious resistance and Lehi officer David Gottlieb saw the Palmach accomplish "in one hour what we could not accomplish in several hours."

The loudspeaker truck

This article contains weasel words: vague phrasing that often accompanies biased or unverifiable information. Such statements should be clarified or removed.

Before the battle the Irgun had prepared a truck with a loudspeaker to warn the villagers of the attack and attempt to force them from their homes. However, there is near-total agreement that the truck never even entered the settlement. The truck left Givat Shaul a few minutes before 5:00 AM as planned, and by then the battle had already started. According to Irgun leader Menachem Begin the truck was driven to the entrance of the area and broadcasted a warning to the civilians. Other sources say that the truck never reached the village and still others claim that the truck came to a relatively small distance from the village. Other sources claim that the truck rolled into a ditch caused by Palestinian gunfire before it could broadcast its warning. According to Ezra Yachin, "After we filled in the ditch we continued travelling. We passed two barricades and stopped in front of the third, 30 meters away from the village. One of us called out on the loudspeaker in Arabic, telling the inhabitants to put down their weapons and flee. I don't know if they heard, and I know these appeals had no effect. We alighted from the armored car and joined the attack." Whether or not the truck's message was heard by the villagers is unclear. It is known, however that hundreds of Deir Yassin residents did flee.

After the battle

The fighting was over at about 11:00 am. The fighters begin to clean up the houses to secure them. Irgun's commander Ben-Zion Cohen noted: " felt a desire for revenge." One villager has stated that the attackers appeared to have been set off by an Irgun commander's death, still others reported that upon discovering an armed man disguised as a woman, one guerrilla began shooting everyone around, followed by his comrades joining in. In the afternoon prisoners were taken on the village trucks to a victory parade in the Jewish neighbourhoods in Jerusalem before they were released in Arab East Jerusalem. Fahimi Zeidan testified that they "put us in trucks and drove us around the Jewish quarters, all while cursing us." Harry Levin, a Haganah broadcaster, reported seeing "three trucks driving slowly up and down King George V Avenue bearing men, women, and children, their hand above their heads, guarded by Jews armed with sten-guns and rifles."

The massacre

Milstein writes: The story of the Deir-Yassin massacre is now part of the heritage of both Arabs and Jews. Sharif Kana'ana, of Bir Zeit University, came in a detailed study to an estimate of 110-120 killed villagers, an estimate generally accepted by other authors. Of the killed, most were old people, women and children, while only a limited number were young men that could be seen as fighters.

Of the many eyewitness accounts, only the core IZL narrative differs from the Arab and the remaining Israeli narratives. Morris attributes this in part to the: unstated semantic differences over what constitutes a "massacre". He summarizes, drawing on work of Milstein and Khalidi, but also on the investigation of the Bir Zeit University and on the Israeli documentation, that: Combatants and noncombatants were gunned down in the course of the house-to-house fighting, and, subsequently, after the battle, groups of prisoners and noncombatants were killed in separate, sporadic acts of frenzy and revenge in different parts of the village and outside of Deir Yassin. The remaining villagers were then expelled. But this was no Srebrenica.

Eyewitness accounts

Meir Pa'il's eyewitness account is one of the most detailed single eye witness accounts of the massacre, as he claims to have been at the scene while it happened. Pa'il was a spy for the mainstream Jewish organizations in Palestine monitoring the activities of the right-wing or "dissident" groups. He stated that he:

"... started hearing shooting in the village. The fighting was over, yet there was the sound of firing of all kinds from different houses ... Sporadic firing, not like you would hear when they clean a house.". He also stated that no commanders directed the actions, just groups of guerillas running about "full of lust for murder".

Historian Uri Milstein says: "On a massacre following the battle there is only the account of Me’ir Pa’il, who claims that he was in the village during and after the battle." (Milstein, page 378) and subsequently brings evidence that Pa’il was not at Deir-Yassin at all. All other members of the Irgun denied seeing Pa'il there.

Mordechai Gihon's eyewitness account: Mordechai Gihon was a Haganah intelligence officer in Jerusalem. He was in the village at the afternoon of April 9. He reported:-

"Before we got to the village we saw people carrying bodies to the quarry east of Deir Yassin. We entered the village around 3:00 in the afternoon . . . In the village there were tens of bodies. The dissidents got them out of the roads. I told them not to throw the bodies into cisterns and caves, because that was the first place that would be checked..."

"I didn't count the dead. I estimated that there were four pits full of bodies, and in each pit there were 20 bodies, and several tens more in the quarry. I throw out a number, 150."

Eliahu Arbel's eyewitness account: Eliahu Arbel arrived at the scene April 10. He was an Operations Officer B of the Haganah's Etzioni Brigade. He reported:-

"I saw the horrors that the fighters had created. I saw bodies of women and children, who were murdered in their houses in cold blood by gunfire, with no signs of battle and not as the result of blowing up the houses. From my experience I know well, that there is no war without killing, and that not only combatants get killed. I have seen a great deal of war, but I never saw a sight like Deir Yassin."

Jacques de Reynier's eyewitness accout:Jacques de Reynier was a French-Swiss Representative of the International Red Cross. He came to the village on April 11. He reported: "... a total of more than 200 dead, men, women, and children. About 150 cadavers have not been preserved inside the village in view of the danger represented by the bodies' decomposition. They have been gathered, transported some distance, and placed in a large trough (I have not been able to establish if this is a pit, a grain silo, or a large natural excavation). ... a woman who must have been eight months pregnant, hit in the stomach, with powder burns on her dress indicating she'd been shot point-blank.".

Dr. Alfred Engel's eyewitness account: Alfred Engel went to Deir Yassin with Jacques de Reynier, his conclusion is similar to de Reynier's. He reported: "In the houses there were dead, in all about a hundred men, women and children. It was terrible. ... It was clear that they (the attackers) had gone from house to house and shot the people at close range. I was a doctor in the German army for 5 years, in World War I, but I had not seen such a horrifying spectacle."

Yeshurun Schiff's eyewitness account: Yeshurun Shiff was an adjutant to David Shaltiel. He was in Deir Yassin April 9 and April 12. He reported: " to kill anybody they found alive as though every living thing in the village was the enemy and they could only think 'kill them all.'...It was a lovely spring day, the almond trees were in bloom, the flowers were out and everywhere there was the stench of the dead, the thick smell of blood, and the terrible odor of the corpses burning in the quarry.".

Yair Tsaban's eyewitness accout: Yair Tsaban was one of several youths in the burial team at Deir Yassin April 12. He reported: "What we saw were women, young children, and old men. What shocked us was at least two or three cases of old men dressed in women's clothes. I remember entering the living room of a certain house. In the far corner was a small woman with her back towards the door, sitting dead. When we reached the body we saw an old man with a beard. My conclusion was that what happened in the village so terrorized these old men that they knew being old men would not save them. They hoped that if they were seen as old women that would save them."

Eyewitness accounts from villagers: According to the Daily Telegraph, April 8 1998, Ayish Zeidan, a resident of the village and a survivor of the fighting there, stated: "The Arab radio talked of women being killed and raped, but this is not true... I believe that most of those who were killed were among the fighters and the women and children who helped the fighters. The Arab leaders committed a big mistake. By exaggerating the atrocities they thought they would encourage people to fight back harder. Instead they created panic and people ran away.".

Jerusalem Report dated April 2 1998 described a BBC program in which Abu Mahmud resident of Dir Yassin in 1948 stated: "... the villagers protested against the atrocity claims: We said, "There was no rape." said, "We have to say this, so the Arab armies will come to liberate Palestine from the Jews..."

Khalidi was a prominent Palestinian Arab leader who pushed the editor of the Palestine Broadcasting Service's Arabic news in 1948, Hazem Nusseibeh, to make the most use of alleged atrocities in Dir Yassin.

Mohammed Radwan who fought in the battle: "I know when I speak that God is up there and God knows the truth and God will not forgive the liars," said Radwan, who puts the number of villagers killed at 93, listed in his own handwriting. "There were no rapes. It's all lies. There were no pregnant women who were slit open. It was propaganda that... Arabs put out so Arab armies would invade," he said. "They ended up expelling people from all of Palestine on the rumor of Deir Yassin." This was reported by Paul Holmes, Middle East Times, 20-April-1998

Yunes Ahmed Assad of Dir Yassin wrote in the Jordan daily Al Urdun (April 9, 1953): "The Jews never intended to hurt the population of the village but were forced to do so after they met hostile fire from the population which killed the Irgun commander. “The Arab exodus from other villages was not caused by the actual battle, but by the exaggerated description spread by Arab leaders to incite them to fight the Jews."

Mohammed Jaber, a village boy, observed the guerillas "break in, drive everybody outside, put them against the wall and shoot them."

Ayish Zeidan, a teenager, known as Haj Ayish:

"We heard shooting. My mother did not want us to look out of the window. I fled with my sister, but my mother and my other sisters could not make it. They hid in the cellar for four days and then ran away". He said he never believed that more than 110 people had died at Deir Yassin and that Arab leaders exaggerated the atrocities. "There had been no rape. The Arab radio at the time talked of women being killed and raped, but this is not true. I believe that most of those who were killed were among the fighters and the women and children who helped the fighters."

Zeinab Akkel, a woman, offered money (about $400) to protect her brother. One guerilla took the money and "then he just knocked my brother over and shot him in the head with five bullets.".

Fahimi Zeidan stated that she and her wounded siblings encounted a captured pair of village males and "When they reached us, the soldiers shot them.". When the mother of one of the killed started hitting the fighters, "one of them stabbed her with a knife a few times."

"When one of his daughters screamed, they shot her too. They then called my brother Mahmoud and shot him in our presence, and when my mother screamed and bent over my brother (she was carrying my little sister Khadra who was still being breast fed) they shot my mother too."

Haleem Eid, a woman, saw "a man shoot a bullet into the neck of my sister Salhiyeh who was nine months pregnant."

Irgun & Lehi member's eyewitness accounts: Irgunist Yehoshua Gorodentchik said that they "found men dressed as women and therefore they began to shoot at women who did not hasten to go down to the place designated for gathering the prisoners."

Irgun commander Mordechai Raanan recalled:-

"A young fighter holding a Bren machine gun in his hands took up a position, ... Having seen what happened to the inhabitants of the other houses, came out to us with their hands up. There were nine people there, including a woman and a boy. The chap holding the Bren suddenly squeezed the trigger and held it. A round of shots hit the group of Arabs. While he was shooting he yelled "This is for Yiftach!"

Ben Zion-Cohen (an Irgun commander) reported to the Jabotinsky archives that at some point in Deir Yassin "We eliminated every Arab that came our way."

The Jewish Agency and the Haganah leadership immediately condemned the massacre.

Number of dead, wounded and prisoners

In 1948 participants, observers and journalists wrote that as many as 254 villagers were killed that day. Everyone had an interest in publicizing a high Arab casualty figure: the Haganah, to tarnish the Irgun and Lehi; the Arabs and the British to malign the Jews; the Irgun and Lehi to provoke terror and frighten Arabs into fleeing the country.

Arab forces used the incident to unify and invigorate Arab anger against the Jews — resulting in the Hadassah medical convoy massacre, in which 78 Jewish doctors, nurses and patients were killed.

The first number publicized about the death toll was 254. Irgun commander Raanan told it to reporters and it quickly stuck. Raanan's figure was a deliberate exaggeration, he later explained: "I told the reporters that 254 were killed so that a big figure would be published, and so that Arabs would panic."

The fog of war accounts for some of the discrepancies. In addition, there were severe rivalries between the Haganah, the Irgun and the Lehi. The number of 254 killed was readily accepted and disseminated for different reasons of convenience for various parties. This figure has become, until recently, the standard one usually quoted.

In 1987, the Research and Documentation Center of Bir Zeit University, a prominent Arab university on the West Bank, published a comprehensive study of the history of Deir Yassin, as part of its Destroyed Palestinian Villages Documentation Project. The Center's findings concerning Deir Yassin were published, in Arabic only, as the fourth booklet in its "Destroyed Arab Villages Series.

The Bir Zeit researchers tracked down the surviving Arab eyewitnesses to the attack and personally interviewed each of them. "For the most part, we have gathered the information in this monograph during the months of February–May 1985 from Deir Yassin natives living in the Ramallah region, who were extremely cooperative," the Bir Zeit authors explained, listing by name twelve former Deir Yassin residents whom they had interviewed concerning the battle. The study continued: "The sources which discuss the Deir Yassin massacre unanimously agree that number of victims ranges between 250–254; however, when we examined the names which appear in the various sources, we became absolutely convinced that the number of those killed does not exceed 120, and that the groups which carried out the massacre exaggerated the numbers in order to frighten Palestinian residents into leaving their villages and cities without resistance." A list of 107 people killed and twelve wounded was given.

Additional reports:

From "The Revolt", by Menachem Begin (who did not participate in the battle), Dell Publishing, NY, 1977, pp. 225–227:

"Apart from the military aspect, there is a moral aspect to the story of Dir Yassin. At that village, whose name was publicized throughout the world, both sides suffered heavy casualties. We had four killed and nearly forty wounded. The number of casualties was nearly forty percent of the total number of the attackers. The Arab troops suffered casualties neraly three times as heavy. The fighting was thus very severe. Yet the hostile propaganda, disseminated throughout the world, deliberately ignored the fact that the civilian population of Dir Yassin was actually given a warning by us before the battle began. One of our tenders carrying a loud speaker was stationed at the entrance to the village and it exhorted in Arabic all women, children and aged to leave their houses and to take shelter on the slopes of the hill. By giving this humane warning our fighters threw away the element of complete surprise, and thus increased their own risk in the ensuing battle. A substantial number of the inhabitants obeyed the warning and they were unhurt. A few did not leave their stone houses — perhaps because of the confusion. The fire of the enemy was murderous - to which the number of our casualties bears eloquent testimony. Our men were compelled to fight for every house; to overcome the enemy they used large numbers of hand grenades. And the civilians who had disregarded our warnings suffered inevitable casualties.

The education which we gave our soldiers throughout the years of revolt was based on the observance of the traditional laws of war. We never broke them unless the enemy first did so and thus forced us, in accordance with the accepted custom of war, to apply reprisals. I am convinced, too, that our officers and men wished to avoid a single unnecessary casualty in the Dir Yassin battle. But those who throw stones of denunciation at the conquerors of Dir Yassin would do well not to don the cloak of hypocrisy.

In connection with the capture of Dir Yassin the Jewish Agency found it necessary to send a letter of apology to Abdullah, whom Mr. Ben Gurion, at a moment of great political emotion, called 'the wise ruler who seeks the good of his people and this country.' The 'wise ruler,' whose mercenary forces demolished Gush Etzion and flung the bodies of its heroic defenders to birds of prey, replied with feudal superciliousness. He rejected the apology and replied that the Jews were all to blame and that he did not believe in the existence of 'dissidents.' Throughout the Arab world and the world at large a wave of lying propaganda was let loose about 'Jewish atrocities.'

The enemy propaganda was designed to besmirch our name. In the result it helped us. Panic overwhelmed the Arabs of Eretz Israel. Kolonia village, which had previously repulsed every attack of the Haganah, was evacuated overnight and fell without further fighting. Beit-Iksa was also evacuated. These two places overlooked the main road; and their fall, together with the capture of Kastel by the Haganah, made it possible to keep open the road to Jerusalem. In the rest of the country, too, the Arabs began to flee in terror, even before they clashed with Jewish forces. Not what happened at Dir Yassin, but what was invented about Dir Yassin, helped to carve the way to our decisive victories on the battlefield. The legend of Dir Yassin helped us in particular in the saving of Tiberias and the conquest of Haifa.".

A footnote from "The Revolt", pp.226–7:

"To counteract the loss of Dir Yassin, a village of strategic importance, Arab headquarters at Ramallah broadcast a crude atrocity story, alleging a massacre by Irgun troops of women and children in the village. Certain Jewish officials, fearing the Irgun men as political rivals, seized upon this Arab gruel propaganda to smear the Irgun. An eminent Rabbi was induced to reprimand the Irgun before he had time to sift the truth. Out of evil, however, good came. This Arab propaganda spread a legend of terror amongst Arabs and Arab troops, who were seized with panic at the mention of Irgun soldiers. The legend was worth half a dozen battalions to the forces of Israel. The `Dir Yassin Massacre' lie is still propagated by Jew-haters all over the world.".

From "Righteous Victims, 208" by Benny Morris:

"Deir Yassin is remembered… for the atrocities committed by the IZL and LHI troops during and immediately after the drawn-out battle: Whole families were riddled with bullets… men, women, and children were mowed down as they emerged from houses; individuals were taken aside and shot." Haganah intelligence reported "there were piles of dead. Some of the prisoners moved to places of incarceration, including women and children, were murdered viciously by their captors… LHI members… relate that the IZL men raped a number of Arab girls and murdered them afterward (we don't know if this is true)." Another intelligence operative (who visited the site hours after the event) reported the "adult males were taken to town Jerusalem in trucks and paraded in the city streets, then taken back to the site and killed… Before they were put on the trucks, the IZL and LHI men searched the women, men, and children took from them all the jewelry and stole their money." Finally, the "Haganah made great efforts to hide its part in the operation…"

Results

Deir Yassin very quickly became an ideological bait in the propaganda war between Israel and the Arab states. Panic flight of Arabs across Palestine intensified. It was also used as a strong argument for the Arab states to intervene against Israel, Arab League chief Azzam Pasha said "The massacre of Deir Yassin was to a great extent the cause of the wrath of the Arab nations and the most important factor for sending the Arab armies**.

Moreover an Arab retaliatory strike came very quickly. Just four days after the massacre at Deir Yassin had been published, an Arab force ambushed a Jewish convoy on the way to Hadassah Hospital, killing 77 Jews, doctors, nurses and patients (see Hadassah medical convoy massacre).

After the war Deir Yassin was settled by Israelis and named Givat Schaul Beth, today belonging to the city of Jerusalem (at the top end of Har Nof). Much of the western side of the village is part of the Kfar Shaul mental health center.

Modern debate

In 1969, the Israeli Foreign Ministry published a pamphlet “Background Notes on Current Themes: Deir Yassin” in English denying that there had been a massacre at Deir Yassin, and calling the story "part of a package of fairy tales, for export and home consumption". The pamphlet led to a series of derivative articles giving the same message, especially in America. Menachem Begin's Herut party disseminated a Hebrew translation in Israel, causing a widespread but largely non-public debate within the Israeli establishment. Several former leaders of the Hagannah demanded that the pamphlet be withdrawn on account of its inaccuracy, but the Foreign Ministry explained that "While our intention and desire is to maintain accuracy in our information, we sometimes are forced to deviate from this principle when we have no choice or alternative means to rebuff a propaganda assault or Arab psychological warfare." Yitzhak Levi, the 1948 leader of Hagannah Intelligence, wrote to Begin: "On behalf of the truth and the purity of arms of the Jewish soldier in the War of Independence, I see it as my duty to warn you against continuing to spread this untrue version about what happened in Deir Yassin to the Israeli public. Otherwise there will be no avoiding raising the matter publicly and you will be responsible." Eventually, the Foreign Ministry agreed to stop distributing the pamphet, but it remains the source of many popular accounts.

As mentioned above, the most detailed account of what happened at Deir Yassin was published by Israeli military historian Uri Milstein. Milstein describes examples of atrocities committed by the Irgun and Lehi forces, and agrees that most of the dead were “old people, women and children. Only a modest number were young men classifiable as fighters.” However, Milstein concluded that most of these events occurred while the fighting was in progress, rather than afterwards. He doubts that Meir Pa'il was present early enough to see everything he claims to have seen (which Pa'il hotly denies). Finally he is reluctant to call it a "massacre", claiming that such occurrences are typical of war and that the Haganah did similar things on many occasions, even if not on such a scale.

See also

• List of massacres committed during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war

Notes

Sources quoted by author and year only can be found in full below under References

1. ^ Kana'ana, Sharif and Zeitawi, Nihad (1987), "The Village of Deir Yassin," Bir Zeit, Bir Zeit University Press, 1987)
2. ^ Milstein (1999), Chapter 16: Deir Yassin, Section 12: The Massacre, page 376: Only a modest number were young men classifiable as fighters
3. Milstein (1999), Chapter 16: Deir Yassin, Section 12: The Massacre, page 376-381
4. ^ Morris (2005), page 100-101
5. Milstein (1999), Chapter 16: Deir Yassin, Section 16: Brutality and Hypocrisy, page 388: the leaders of ETZEL, LEHI, Hagana and MAPAM leaders had a vested interest in spreading the highly inflated version of the true facts
6. Milstein (1999), Chapter 17: April 9, Section 1: The Palestinian Refugees: The Beginning, page 397-399
7. Morris (2004) Chanter 4: The second wave: the mass exodus, April—June 1948, Section: Operation Nahshon, page 239: IZL leaders may have had an interest, then and later, in exaggerating the panic-generating effects of Deir Yassin, but they were certainly not far off the mark. In the Jerusalem Corridor area, the effect was certainly immediate and profound.
8. "In April, a massacre by the Jewish militia Irgun in the Arab village of Deir Yassin shot waves of fear through Arab Palestine; this provoked a reprisal massacre by Arabs of Jewish doctors and nurses on the road to Hadassah hospital near Jerusalem." Sandy Tolan, "The catastrophe that never ends", Salon.com, July 11, 2006.
9. Yitzhak Levi, "Conquest of Deir Yassin" (1948 Jerusalem Haganah intelligence chief) file, quoted in Levi, "Nine Measures", pp 340-341)
10. Kanani and Zitawi, "Deir Yassin, Monograph No. 4," 50; Collins and Lapierre, "Deir Yassin"; Milstein, "Out of Crisis Comes Decision", 257 (Hebrew version) ; Yitzhak Levi, "Conquest of Deir Yassin" (1948 Jerusalem Haganah intelligence chief) file, quoted in Levi, "Nine Measures", 343.
11. Milstein (1999), Chapter 16: Deir Yassin, Section 3: The Objective, page 351
12. Chashmonai Diary (IDF Archives) 12 January Paragraph 9;IDF Archives 2504/49/16 15
13. Chashmonai Diary (IDF Archives) 28 January Paragraph 10; IDF Archives 446/48/20 66
14. Yitzhak Levi, "Nine Measures", p.340
15. IDF Archives 4944/49/520 42; 446/48/22 60,65;500/48/29 409; 446/48/18 57
16. "Background Notes on Current Themes" - No.6: Dir Yassin
17. Abba Eban in "Background Notes on Current Themes" - No.6: Dir Yassin (Jerusalem: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Information Division, 16 March 1969, larger quote can be found here
18. Kfir, Ilan, Yediot Ahronot 4.4.72; Yitzak Levi, "Nine Measures", p. 341
19. Shaltiel, David, Jerusalem 1948, Israel Ministry of Defense, Tel Aviv 1981, p. 139
20. Pa'il and Isseroff, "Meir Pa'il's Eyewitness Account"; Levi, Nine Measures, p. 341
21. Milstein, "Out of Crisis Comes Decision", p. 258
22. Statement of Yehuda Lapidot , file 1/10 4-K, Jabotinsky Archives, Tel Aviv, quoted in Silver, "Begin: The Haunted Prophet", 90
23. Dan Kurzman, Geneis 1948: "The First Arab-Israeli War", 1970, p.139
24. Uri Milstein, "Deir Yassin"
25. Uri Milstein, "Out of Crisis Comes Decision", p.262 (Hebrew version)
26. "Deir Yassin", Milstein; "A Jewish Eyewitness": An Interview with Meir Pa'il, McGowan
27. Milstein, interview with Harif, p. 262 (Hebrew version)
28. Uri Milstein, "Out of Crisis Came Decision", p.263 (Hebrew version)
29. Uri Milstein, "Out of Crisis Comes Decision", p.262-265 (Hebrew version)
30. Testimony of Reuven Greenberg.
31. Testimony of Yehoshua Gorodenchik, MZ.
32. Lynne Reid Banks, "A Torn Country"; "An Oral History of the Israeli War of Independence", New York: Franklin Watts, 1982, p. 62.
33. Testimony of Yehoshua Gorodenchik, MZ
34. Uri Milstein, "Out of Crisis Came Decision", p. 265 (Hebrew version)
35. Milstein, interview with Uri Brenner, p.263 (Hebrew version); Daniel Spicehandler's testimony, quoted in Ralph G. Martin, Golda: "Golda Meir - The Romantic Years" (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988), p. 329
36. Testimony of Yehoshua Gorodenchik, MZ
37. Morris, "The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem" (New York and London: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 323, n. 175.
38. "Out of Crisis Comes Decision", p.265-266, Milstein.
39. "Edge of the Sword", p.450, Lorch
40. "The Revolt", 1977, Begin; Levi, Yitzhak, "Nine Measures", p 342; "Terror out of Zion", 1977, Bowyer Bell; Uri Milstein, op. cit. p. 262. (Hebrew version)
41. Statement of Ben-Zion Cohen, file 1/10 4-K, Jabotinsky Archives; "Out of Crisis Comes Decision", p.276, Milstein (Hebrew version); "Deir Yassin", Monograph No. 4, p.56, Kanani and Zitawi; "Jerusalem Embattled", p.5 Levin.
42. Morris (2004) Chanter 4: The second wave: the mass exodus, April—June 1948, Section: Operation Nahshon, page 238
43. Milstein (1999), Chapter 16: Deir Yassin, Section 12: The Massacre, page 377
44. ^ Morris (2005), page 98
45. Meir Pa'il's Eyewitness Account, Pa'il and Isseroff
46. Milstein, "Out of Crisis came decision", p. 274 (Hebrew version), Yitzhak Levi, Nine Measures, p. 343
47. Yediot Ahronot, 1972-02-05
48. Jacques de Reynier, "A Jerusalem un drapeau flottait sur la ligne de feu" p. 74, Larry Collins & Dominique Lapierre, O Jerusalem! p. 278
49. Uri Milstein, Out of Crisis came Decision, p. 279 (Hebrew version)
50. Larry Collins & Dominique Lapierre, "O Jerusalem!", p. 280
51. Eric Silver, "Begin", p. 93, 95
52. Statement of Mohammed Jaber, dossier 179/110/17 GS, "Secret," Police Investigator Team reports dated 13, 15, and 16 April 1948
53. Anton LaGuardia, "War Without End: Israelis, Palestinians, and the Struggle for a Promised Land", St. Martin's Griffin; Rev&Updtd edition (May 23, 2003) ISBN 0-312-31633-X , page 195
54. "Meir Pa'il's Eyewitness Account", Pa'il and Isseroff
55. "Deir Yassin", Monograph No. 4, p.56, Kanani and Zitawi
56. Fahimi Zeidan, quoted by Kanani and Zitawi, "Deir Yassin, Monograph No. 4," 55.
57. Kanani and Zitawi, "Deir Yassin, Monograph No. 4," 55
58. Statement of Yehoshua Gorodentchik, file 1/10 4-K, Jabotinsky Archives
59. Yediot Ahronot, 1972-04-04
60. Amos Perlmutter, The Life and Times of Menachem Begin, p. 216
61. Out of Crisis Comes Decision, p. 269, Milstein (Hebrew version)
62. Kanani and Zitawi, Deir Yassin (Bir Zeit study), p. 5
63. Kanani and Zitawi, Deir Yassin (Bir Zeit study), p. 57
64. Morris 2005, pp80-85

References

• Milstein, Uri (1998) . "Chapter 16: Deir Yassin". History of the War of Independence IV: Out of Crisis Came Decision (in Hebrew and English version translated and edited by Alan Sacks). Lanhan, Maryland: University Press of America, Inc. pp. 343–396. ISBN 0-7618-1489-2.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: unrecognized language (link)
• Morris, Benny (1989). The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-33028-9.
• Morris, Benny (2004). The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-81120-1; ISBN 0-521-00967-7 (pbk.).
• Morris, Benny (2005). "The Historiography of Deir Yassin". Journal of Israeli History. 24 (1): 79–107.
• Katz, Shmuel (1973) Battleground: Fact and Fantasy in Palestine Shapolsky Pub; ISBN 0-933503-03-2
• Gelber, Yoav (2006). Palestine 1948. Sussex Academic Press. ISBN 1-84519-075-0
• Sharif Kanaana and Nihad Zitawi, "Deir Yassin," Monograph No. 4, Destroyed Palestinian Villages Documentation Project (Bir Zeit: Documentation Center of Bir Zeit University, 1987), p. 55.
• "There was no Massacre there" by Yerach Tal, in Ha'Aretz, 8 September 1991, page B3.
• "Indeed there was a Massacre there" by Danny Rubinstein, in Ha'Aretz, 11 September 1991.
• Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, O Jerusalem!, History Book Club, 1972, ISBN 0-671-66241-4, p303-314.

External links

• Irgun - Essay by Prof. Yehuda Lapidot from the IZL (Irgun) site
• Deir Yassin Remembered - a non-profit organisation with the stated goal to "do justice to the victims of the Deir Yassin massacre"
• "Remembering Deir Yassin" by James Zogby, Al-Ahram Weekly
• "On Recent Hebrew and Israeli Sources for the Palestinian Exodus, 1947-49" (Database access required) by Nur-eldeen Masalha, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1, Special Issue: Palestine 1948 Autumn, 1988), pp. 121-137
• "A report of the Dayr Yasin Massacre by Shai the Israeli Internal intelligence"
• "NY Times Op-Ed article written by prominent American Jews (including Albert Einstein) critical of Menahem Begin's visit to the States, Dec. 2, 1948" mentions Deir Yassin
• www.us-israel.org - Essay by Mitchell Bard.
• - Essay by Paul Holmes
• Zionist Organisation of America - Essay by Sid Zion.
• PEACE Middle East Dialog Group
• Webpage opposing the massacre theses
• Compilation of sources and essays (PDF, 188 pages)
• Was There a Massacre at Deir Yassin?
• The Political Abuse of the Refugee Issue By David Meir-Levi

• 1948 Arab-Israeli War
• Israeli-Palestinian conflict
• Massacres in Israel
• Irgun
• Lehi