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Cypriot Civil War
Date 1963 to 1974 Location Island of Cyprus Result Coup inspired by Athens topples Cypriot President and attempts to unite island with Greece. Results in Turkish military intervention
Belligerents
Greek Cypriots Aided by Hellenic Republic	Turkish Cypriots Aided by Republic of Turkey
Strength
30,000	5,000

The Cypriot Civil War refers to a period of inter-ethnic conflict between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots on the island of Cyprus from 1963 to 1974.

Background

From 1955 to 1960 the Greek Cypriot paramilitary group EOKA waged a violent guerrilla campaign against the British colonial administration. Led by the Greek commander George Grivas, with the backing of Archbishop Makarios, the initial aim of the insurrection was in achieving union with Greece, or enosis. Amid the escalating violence, the British soon conscripted Turkish Cypriots into the police force to maintain security, thus creating the first signs of intercommunal conflict on the island. The death of Turkish Cypriot policemen were met with riots by the Turkish community, by 1958 signs of dissatisfaction with the British increased on both signs, with Turkish Cypriots now forming the TMT paramilitary group as a means of countering EOKA. As Turkish Cypriots began to look to Turkey for protection, it soon became apparent to Greek Cypriots that enosis was extremely unlikely, with Makarios's objective now turning to independence.

Britain thus resolved to solve the dispute by creating an independent Cypriot state. In 1959 all involved parties signed the Zurich agreements: Britain, Turkey and Greece as well the natural Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders, Makarios and Dr. Fazil Kucuk respectively. The new constitution drew heavily on the ethnic composition of the island. The President would be a Greek Cypriot and the Vice-President a Turkish Cypriot with an important veto. The contribution to the public service would be set at a ratio of 70:30, and the Supreme Court would consist of an equal number of judges from both communities as well as an independent judge who was not Greek, Turkish or British. The Zurich accords were also supplemented by a number of treaties. The Treaty of Guarantee stated that union or secession with any state was forbidden, and that Greece, Turkey and Britain would be given guarantor status to intervene should this be violated. The Treaty of Alliance allowed for two small Greek and Turkish military contingents to be stationed on the island whilst the Treaty of Establishment gave Britain sovereignty over two bases in Akrotiri and Dhekelia.

On August 15, 1960, the Republic of Cyprus was proclaimed.

1963 Constitutional breakdown

Within three years tensions between the two communities in administrative affairs began to show. In particular disputes over separate municipalities and taxation created a deadlock in government. A constitutional court ruled in 1963 that Makarios had failed to uphold article 173 of the constitution which called for the establishment of separate municipalities for Turkish Cypriots. Makarios subsequently declared his intention to ignore the judgement, resulting in the West German judge resigning from his position. Makarios went on to propose thirteen amendments to the constitution, which according to the historian Keith Kyle had the effect of resolving most of the issues in the Greek Cypriot favour. Both Presidents would lose their veto, the separate municipalities as sought after by the Turkish Cypriots would be abandoned, the need for separate majorities by both communities in passing legislation would be discarded and the civil service contribution would be set at actual population ratios (82:18) instead of the slightly higher figure for Turkish Cypriots.

The intention behind the amendments has long been called into question. The discovery of the Akritas plan, written in the height of the constitutional dispute by the Greek Cypriot interior minister Policarpos Yorgadjis, called for the removal of undesirable elements of the constitution so as to lay the foundations for Cyprus’s union with Greece. The plan stipulated an organised attack on Turkish Cypriots should they show signs of resistance to the measures, stating “In the event of a planned or staged Turkish attack, it is imperative to overcome it by force in the shortest possible time, because if we succeed in gaining command of the situation (in one or two days), no outside, intervention would be either justified or possible.” Whether Makarios's proposals were part of the Akritas plan is unclear, however it remains that sentiment towards enosis had not completely dissapeared with independence, with Makarios going as far to describe independence as "a step on the road to enosis". Preparations for conflict were not entirely absent from Turkish Cypriots either, with right wing elements still believing taksim (partition) the best safeguard against enosis.

Greek Cypriots however believe the amendments were a necessity stemming from a perceived attempt by Turkish Cypriots to frustrate the working of government. Turkish Cypriots saw it as a means to reduce their status within the state from one of co-founder to that of minority, seeing it as a first step towards enosis. The security situation deteriorated rapidly.

Intercommunal violence

On 21 December 1963, a Turkish Cypriot crowd clashed with the plainclothes special constables of Yorgadjis. Almost immediately an organised attack by Greek Cypriot paramilitaries was launched upon Turkish Cypriots in Nicosia and Larnaca. Though the TMT - now charged with defending the Turkish Cypriots - committed a number of acts of retaliation, Kyle notes “there is no doubt that the main victims of the numerous incidents that took place during the next few months were Turks”. 700 Turkish hostages, including women and children, were taken from the northern suburbs of Nicosia. Nikos Sampson led a group of Greek Cypriot irregulars into the mixed suburb of Omorphita and massacred the Turkish Cypriot population indiscriminately. By 1964, 193 Turkish Cypriots and 133 Greek Cypriots were killed, with a further 209 Turks and 41 Greeks missing, presumed dead.

Approximately 20,000 Turkish Cypriots fled their homes and villages to live in enclaves, much of their villages and homes looted. As Professor Clement Dodd notes, referring to the majority of the Turkish Cypriot population “They had, of necessity, to relocate themselves in about 3 per cent of the land they owned, estimated at about 34 per cent of Cyprus. Many left the country in those years to seek living in Britain, Australia and Turkey, and elsewhere, with active encouragement by Greek Cypriots.” Dodd's estimate would mean that about 118,000 people were crammed into a space of less than 95 square kilometres.

Turkey had by now readied its fleet and its fighter jets became visible over Nicosia, but were dissuaded from direct involvement by the creation of a United Nations peacekeeping force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in 1964. Despite the negotiated ceasefire in Nicosia, attacks on the Turkish Cypriot still persisted, particularly in Limmasol. Concerned at the possibility of a Turkish invasion, Makarios undertook the creation of a Greek Cypriot conscript based army entitled the National Guard. A general from Greece would take charge of the army, whilst a further 20,000 well equipped officers and men were smuggled from Greece into Cyprus. Turkey threatened to intervene once more, but was prevented by a strongly worded letter from the American President Lyndon B. Johnson, anxious to avoid a conflict between NATO allies Greece and Turkey at the height of the Cold War.

Turkish Cypriots had by now established an important bridgehead at Kokkina, providing them with arms, volunteers and materials from Turkey and abroad. Seeing this incursion of foreign weapons and troops as a major threat, the Cypriot government invited George Grivas to return from Greece as commander of the Greek troops on the island and launch a major attack on the bridgehead. Turkey retaliated by dispatching its fighter jets to bomb Greek positions, causing Makarios to threaten an attack on every Turkish Cypriot village on the island if the bombings did not cease. The conflict had now drawn in Greece and Turkey, with both countries ammasing troops on their Thracian borders. Efforts at mediation by Dean Acheson, a former Secretary of State, and UN appointed mediator Galo Plaza had failed, all the while the division of the two communities becoming more apparent. Greek Cypriot forces were estimated at some 30,000, including the National Guard as well as the large contingent from Greece. Defending the Turkish Cypriot enclaves was a force of approximately 5,000 irregulars, led by a Turkish colonel, but lacking the equipment and organization of the Greek forces.

The situation had worsensed in 1967, when a military junta had overthrown the democratically elected government of Greece, and began applying pressure on Makarios to achieve enosis. Makarios, not wishing to become part of a military dictatorship, nor in triggering a Turkish invasion, began to distance himself from the goal of enosis. This caused tensions with the junta in Greece as well as George Grivas in Cyprus. Grivas's control over the National Guard and Greek contingent was seen as a threat to Makarios's position, who now feared a possible coup. Grivas escalated the conflict when his armed units began patrolling the Turkish Cypriot encalves of Ayios Theodhoros and Kophinou, and on November 15 engaged in heavy fighting with the Turkish Cypriots. By the time of his withdrawal 26 Turkish Cypriots had been killed. Turkey replied with an ultimatum for Grivas to be removed from the island, along with the troops smuggled from Greece in excess of the limits of the Treaty of Alliance as well as lifting the economic blockades on the Turkish Cypriot enclaves. Grivas resigned his position and 12,000 Greek troops were duly withdrawn, with Makarios now attempting to consolidate his position by reducing the number of National Guard troops, as well as creating a paramilitary force loyal to Cypriot independence. In 1968, acknowledging that enosis was now all but impossible, Makarios stated "A solution by necessity must be sought within the limits of what is feasible which does not always coincide with the limits of what is desirable."

Greek Coup

After 1967 tensions between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots subsided. Instead, the main source of tension on the island came from factions within the Greek Cypriot community. Although Makarios had effectively abandoned enosis in favour of an ‘attainable solution’, many others continued to believe that the only legitimate political aspirations for Greek Cypriots was union with Greece. Makarios was branded a traitor to the cause by Grivas and in 1971 made a clandestine return to the island. On his arrival, Grivas began by establishing a nationalist paramilitary group known as the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agonistan B or EOKA B), drawing comparisons with the EOKA struggle for enosis under the British colonial administration of the 1950's. The Junta in Athens saw Makarios as an obstacle, and directed funds to Grivas to carry out a number of terrorist attacks as well as fund a propaganda campaign through the creation pro-enosis newspapers. Makarios's failure to disband the National Guard, with its officer class dominated by mainland by Greeks, had meant the junta had practical control over the Cypriot military establishment, leaving Makarios isolated and a vulnerable target.

See also

• Cyprus dispute

External links

• Cyprus-Conflict.net An independent and comprehensive website dedicated to the Cyprus conflict, containing a detailed narrative as well as documents, reports and eye-witness accounts.
• Library of Congress Cyprus Country Study Detailed information on Cyprus, covering the various phases of the Cyprus conflict.

Notes

1. David Hannay, 2005. Cyprus the search for a solution. I.B Tauris, p.2
2. http://www.mediaprof.org/tcvoices/ukhist.html Stephen, Michael. 1987. "Cyprus: Two Nations in One Island." Bow Educational Briefing No.5. London. Pages 1-7
3. http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/www.cyprus-conflict.net/narrative-main-%203.html
4. http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/www.cyprus-conflict.net/akritas_plan.html
5. David Hannay, 2005. Cyprus the search for a solution. I.B Tauris, p.3
6. http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/www.cyprus-conflict.net/narrative-main-%203.html
7. Andrew Borowiec, 2000. Cyprus: A troubled island. Praeger/Greenwood p.56
8. http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/www.cyprus-conflict.net/narrative-main-%203.html
9. Quoted in Andrew Borowiec, 2000. Cyprus: A troubled island. Praeger/Greenwood p.58
10. http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/www.cyprus-conflict.net/narrative-main-%203.html
11. http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/www.cyprus-conflict.net/narrative-main-%203.html
12. http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/august/10/newsid_3037000/3037898.stm BBC On This Day. 1964: Guns fall silent in Cyprus
13. http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+cy0023) Country Studies: Cyprus - Intercommunal Violence
14. http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/www.cyprus-conflict.net/narrative-main-%203.html

• Modern history of Cyprus
• Cyprus–Turkey relations
• History of Northern Cyprus
• Sectarian violence