Article snapshot taken from Wikipedia with creative commons attribution-sharealike license.
Give it a read and then ask your questions in the chat.
We can research this topic together.
] gun aboard the battleship ] watches as a kamikaze plane prepares to strike ]]]
] gun aboard the battleship ] watches as a kamikaze plane prepares to strike ]]]
By the end of World War II, the Japanese naval air service had sacrificed 2,525 kamikaze pilots and the army air force had lost 1,387. An unknown number of these pilots were Koreans with Japanese names, adopted under the pre-war '']'' ordinance that compelled Koreans to take Japanese personal names. <ref> http://www.hindu.com/2005/08/22/stories/2005082202742000.htm </ref>
By the end of World War II, the Japanese naval air service had sacrificed 2,525 kamikaze pilots and the army air force had lost 1,387. <ref> http://www.hindu.com/2005/08/22/stories/2005082202742000.htm </ref>
According to an official Japanese announcement, the missions sank 81 ships and damaged 195, and according to a Japanese tally, suicide attacks accounted for up to 80 percent of US losses in the final phase of the war in the Pacific.
According to an official Japanese announcement, the missions sank 81 ships and damaged 195, and according to a Japanese tally, suicide attacks accounted for up to 80 percent of US losses in the final phase of the war in the Pacific.
EnsignKiyoshi Ogawa hit the aircraft carrier USS Bunker Hill (see picture right).
These attacks, beginning in 1944, followed several very significant and critical military and strategic defeats for Japan, its decreasing capacity to wage war along with loss of experienced pilots, and the Allies' increased ability, due largely to the industrial capacity of the United States and Japan's reluctance to surrender.
In these attacks Japanese pilots would deliberately attempt to crash their aircraft into naval vessels and other ships. Sometimes laden with explosives, extra bombs, and carrying just enough fuel to reach an Allied ship, their objective was to stop the Allied advance towards the Japanese home islands by causing as much damage and destruction as possible.
Since the end of the war, the term "kamikaze" has sometimes been used as a pars pro toto for other kinds of attack in which an attacker is deliberately sacrificed. These include a variety of suicide attacks, in other historical contexts, such as the proposed use of Selbstopfer aircraft by Nazi Germany and various suicide bombings by terrorist organizations around the world (such as the September 11, 2001 attacks). In English, the word kamikaze may also be used in a hyperbolic or metaphorical fashion to refer to non-fatal actions which result in significant loss for the attacker, such as injury or the end of a career.
In the Japanese language, kamikaze (IPA: ) (Japanese:神風), usually translated as "divine wind" (kami is the word for "god", "spirit", or "divinity"; and kaze for "wind"), came into being as the name of legendary typhoons said to have saved Japan from Mongol invasion fleets in 1274 and 1281.
In Japanese, the formal term used for units carrying out these suicide attacks during World War II is tokubetsu kōgeki tai (特別攻撃隊), which literally means "special attack unit." This is usually abbreviated to tokkōtai (特攻隊). More specifically, air suicide attack units from the Imperial Japanese Navy were officially called shinpū tokubetsu kōgeki tai (神風特別攻撃隊, "divine wind special attack units". Shinpū is the on-reading (on'yomi or Chinese-derived pronunciation) of the same characters that form the word Kamikaze in Japanese. However, during World War II, the actual word Kamikaze was never, or rarely, used in Japan in relation to suicide attacks. U.S. translators during the war erroneously used the kun'yomi (indigenous Japanese pronunciation) for Shinpū, giving the English language the word kamikaze, for Japanese suicide units in general. This usage gained acceptance worldwide. After the war, Japanese speakers re-imported the word and the English language pronunciation, under the influence of U.S. media sources. As a result, the special attack units are sometimes known in Japan as kamikaze tokubetsu kōgeki tai.
History
Background
A kamikaze (just left of center near the top border), a Mitsubishi Zero in this case, about to hit the Missouri.Model 52c Zeros are sent back from Korea to Kyūshū island, to take part in a Kamikaze attack (early 1945).
After six months of continuous victories following their Attack on Pearl Harbor, Japanese forces were checked at the Battle of the Coral Sea in May of 1942, defeated at the Battle of Midway in June of that year, and finally lost their momentum at Guadalcanal. During 1943-44, Allied forces, backed by the industrial might and rich resources of the United States, were advancing steadily towards Japan.
Japan's fighter planes were becoming outnumbered and outclassed by newer US-made planes, especially the F6F Hellcat and F4U Corsair. The Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service (IJNAS) was worn down by air battles against the Allies during the Solomons and New Guinea campaigns. Finally, in the Battle of the Philippine Sea, the Japanese lost over 400 carrier-based planes and pilots, an action referred to by the Allies as the "Great Marianas Turkey Shoot". Skilled fighter pilots were also becoming scarce. Tropical diseases, as well as shortages of spare parts and fuel made operations more and more difficult for the IJNAS.
On July 15, 1944, the important Japanese base of Saipan fell to the Allied forces. Its capture provided adequate forward bases which enabled US air forces using B-29 Superfortress long-range bombers to strike the Japanese home islands. After the fall of Saipan, the Japanese high command predicted that the Allies would try to capture the Philippines, which were strategically important due to their location between the oilfields of Southeast Asia and Japan.
The prediction came true in October 17, 1944, when Allied forces assaulted Suluan Island, beginning the Battle of Leyte Gulf. The Imperial Japanese Navy's 1st Air Fleet, based at Manila was assigned the task of assisting the Japanese ships which would attempt to destroy Allied forces in Leyte Gulf. However, the 1st Air Fleet at that time only had 40 aircraft: 34 Mitsubishi Zero carrier-based fighters, three Nakajima B6Ntorpedo bombers, one Mitsubishi G4M and two Yokosuka P1Y land-based bombers, with one additional reconnaissance plane. The task facing the Japanese air forces seemed totally impossible. The 1st Air Fleet commandant, Vice AdmiralTakijiro Onishi decided to form a suicide attack unit, the Kamikaze Special Attack Force. In a meeting at Magracut Airfield near Manila on October 19, Onishi, visiting the 201st Navy Flying Corps headquarters, suggested: "I don't think there would be any other certain way to carry out the operation , than to put a 250 kg bomb on a Zero and let it crash into a U.S. carrier, in order to disable her for a week."
Rituals for Kamikaze
There were rituals or ways in which Kamikaze pilots were sent off. They were given the flag of Japan or the Rising sun flag (Japanese naval ensign) with inspirational and spiritual words, Nambu pistol or katana and drank sake before they took off generally. It is also stated that they flew around once or more the mountain or anything with spiritual significance for the pilots and then they would set out on straight course to the target. It was highly patriotic and/or nationalistic procedure.
CommanderAsaiki Tamai asked a group of 23 talented student pilots, all of whom he had trained, to volunteer for the special attack force. All of the pilots raised both of their hands, thereby volunteering to join the operation. Later, Tamai asked LtYukio Seki to command the special attack force. Seki is said to have closed his eyes, lowered his head and thought for ten seconds, before asking Tamai: "please let me do that." Seki thereby became the 24th kamikaze pilot to be chosen. However, Seki later wrote: "Japan's future is bleak if it is forced to kill one of its best pilots. I am not going on this mission for the Emperor or for the Empire... I am going because I was ordered to."
The names of four sub-units within the Kamikaze Special Attack Force, were Unit Shikishima, Unit Yamato, Unit Asahi, and Unit Yamazakura. These names were taken from a patriotic poem (waka or tanka), "Shikishima no Yamato – gokoro wo hito, towaba Asahi ni niou Yamazakura Bama" by the Japanese classical scholar, Motoori Norinaga. The poem reads:
If someone asks about the Yamato spirit of Shikishima , it is the flowers of yamazakura that are fragrant in the Asahi .
If someone asks about the spirit of Japan, it is the flowers of mountain cherry blossom that are fragrant in the rising sun
Training and attacking
We tried to live with 120 percent intensity, rather than waiting for death. We read and read, trying to understand why we had to die in our early twenties. We felt the clock ticking away towards our death, every sound of the clock shortening our lives.
— Irokawa Daikichi, Kamikaze Diaries: Reflections of Japanese Student Soldiers
Tokkōtai/Kamikaze pilot training, as described by Kasuga Takeo, generally "consisted of incredibly strenuous training, coupled with
cruel and torturous corporal punishment as a daily routine." Irokawa Daikichi, who trained at Tsuchiura Naval Air Base, recalled that he "was struck on the face so hard and frequently that face was no longer recognizable." He also wrote: "I was hit so hard that I could no longer see and fell on the floor.
The minute I got up, I was hit again by a club so that I would confess." This brutal "training" was justified by the idea that it would instill a "soldier's fighting spirit." However, daily beatings and corporal punishment would eliminate patriotism among many pilots.
Pilots were given a manual which detailed how they were supposed to think, prepare, and attack. From this manual, pilots were told to "eliminate all thoughts about life and death" in order to "concentrate attention on eradicating the enemy with unwavering
determination," to "attain a high level of spiritual training," and to "keep health in the very best condition." These things, among others, were meant to put the pilot into the mindset in which he would be mentally ready to die.
The Tokkōtai pilot's manual also explained how a pilot may turn back if the pilot could not a locate a target and that " should not waste life lightly." However, one pilot who continuously came back to base was shot after his ninth return.
The manual was very detailed in how a pilot should attack. A pilot would dive towards his target and would "aim for a point between the bridge tower and the smoke stacks." Entering a smoke stack was also said to be "effective." Pilots were told not to aim at a ship's bridge tower or gun turret but instead to look for elevators or the flight deck to crash into. For horizontal attacks, the pilot was to "aim at the middle of the vessel, slightly higher than the waterline" or to "aim at the entrance to the aircraft hangar, or the bottom of the stack" if the former was too difficult.
The Tokkōtai pilot's manual told pilots to never close their eyes. This was because if a pilot closed his eyes he would lower the chances of hitting his target. In the finals moments before the crash, the pilot was to yell "Hissatsu" at the top of his lungs which roughly translates to "Sink without fail."
The first attacks
The bridge and forward turrets of HMAS Australia, in September 1944. The officer facing right is Captain Emile Dechaineux, killed by the first kamikaze to hit an Allied ship, on October 21, 1944.
At least one source cites Japanese planes crashing into the USS Indiana and USS Reno in mid-late 1944 as the first kamikaze attacks of World War II. However, there is little evidence that these hits were more than accidental collisions or last-minute decisions by pilots in doomed aircraft, of the kind likely to happen in intense sea-air battles.
Another source claims that the first kamikaze mission happened on September 13, 1944. A group of pilots, from the army's 31st Fighter Squadron, on Negros Island decided to launch a suicide attack the following morning. First Lieutenant Takeshi Kosai and a sergeant were selected. Two 100-kilogram bombs were attached to two fighters, and the pilots took off before dawn on September 13, planning to crash into carriers. They never returned and there is no record of an enemy plane hitting an Allied ship on September 13, 1944.
CaptainMasafumi Arima, the commander of the 26th Air Flotilla (part of the 11th Air Fleet), is also sometimes credited with inventing the kamikaze tactic. Arima personally led an attack by about 100 Yokosuka D4YSuisei (or "Judy") dive bombers against a large Essex class aircraft carrier, USS Franklin near Leyte Gulf, on (or about, accounts vary) October 15, 1944. Although Arima was killed, and part of a plane hit the Franklin, it is not clear that this was a planned suicide attack. The Japanese high command and propagandists seized on Arima's example: he was promoted posthumously to Admiral, and was given official credit for making the first kamikaze attack. Official accounts of his attack bore little resemblance to the events concerned.
According to eyewitness accounts, the first kamikaze attack to hit an Allied ship was carried out by an unknown pilot, who was also not a member of the Kamikaze Special Attack Force; the target was the flagship of the Royal Australian Navy, HMAS Australia. The attack took place on October 21, 1944, near Leyte Island; gunners from HMAS Australia and HMAS Shropshire fired at, and reportedly hit, an unidentified Japanese aircraft. The plane then flew away from the ships, before turning and flying into Australia, striking the ship's superstructure above the bridge, and spewing burning fuel and debris over a large area, before falling into the sea. A 200 kg (440 pound) bomb carried by the plane failed to explode; if it had, the ship might have been effectively destroyed. At least 30 crew members died as a result of the attack, including the commanding officer, Captain Emile Dechaineux; among the wounded was CommodoreJohn Collins, the Australian force commander.
On October 25, 1944 the Australia was hit again and was forced to retire to the New Hebrides for repairs. That same day, the Kamikaze Special Attack Force carried out its first mission. Five Zeros, led by Seki, and escorted to the target by leading Japanese ace Hiroyoshi Nishizawa, attacked several escort carriers. One Zero attempted to hit the bridge of the USS Kitkun Bay, but instead exploded on the port catwalk and cartwheeled into the sea. Two others dove at USS Fanshaw Bay, but were destroyed by anti-aircraft fire. The last two ran at the USS White Plains, however one, under heavy fire and trailing smoke, aborted the attempt on the White Plains and instead banked toward the USS St. Lo, plowing into the flight deck. Its bomb caused fires that resulted in the bomb magazine exploding, sinking the carrier.
By day's end on October 26, 55 kamikaze from the special attack force had also damaged the large escort carriers USS Sangamon (CVE-26), USS Suwannee (CVE-27), USS Santee (CVE-29), and the smaller escorts USS White Plains, USS Kalinin Bay, and USS Kitkun Bay. In total seven carriers had been hit, as well as 40 other ships (five sunk, 23 heavily damaged, and 12 moderately damaged).
HMAS Australia returned to combat at the Battle of Lingayen Gulf in January 1945. However, on January 5, 6, 8 and 9, the ship was again attacked by kamikazes and suffered damage which forced it to retire once more. The ship lost about 70 crew members to kamikaze hits. Other Allied ships which survived repeated hits from kamikazes during World War II included the Franklin and another Essex class carrier, USS Intrepid.
USS Columbia is attacked by a kamikaze off Lingayen Gulf, 6 January1945The kamikaze hits Columbia at 17:29. The plane and its bomb penetrated two decks before exploding, killing 13 and wounding 44.
When you eliminate all thoughts about life and death, you will be able to totally disregard your earthly life. This will also enable you to concentrate your attention on eradicating the enemy with unwavering determination, meanwhile reinforcing your excellence in flight skills. (A paragraph from the kamikaze pilots' manual.)
Early successes, such as the sinking of the St. Lo were followed by an immediate expansion of the program, and over the next few months over 2,000 planes made such attacks.
Purpose-built kamikaze planes, as opposed to converted fighters and dive-bombers, had no landing gear at all. A specially-designed propellor plane, the Nakajima Ki-115Tsurugi, was a simple, easy-to-build plane, intended to use up existing stocks of engines, in a wooden airframe. The undercarriage was non-retractable: it was jettisoned shortly after take-off for a suicide mission, and then re-used on other planes. Yokosuka MXY7 Ohka rocket-bombs — essentially anti-ship missiles guided by pilots; were first used in March 1945. These were also used against B-29 formations over Japanese cities, and were derisively known as the Baka Bomb ("baka" is Japanese for "idiot" or "stupid"). Small boats packed with explosives, and manned torpedoes, called Kaiten were also manufactured.
In early 1945, Commander John Thach, a U.S. Navy air operations officer, who was already famous for developing effective aerial tactics against the Japanese such as the Thach Weave, developed an anti-kamikaze strategy called the "big blue blanket". This plan called for round-the-clock fighter patrols over Allied fleets. However, the US Navy had cut back training of fighter pilots due to a perceived need for a higher percentage of pilots to fly bombers and transport aircraft, so there were not enough Navy pilots available to counter the kamikaze threat. The Navy hurriedly began to cross-train their carrier pilots on the F6F Hellcat, and brought Marine F4U Corsair squadrons aboard aircraft carriers.
Thach also recommended larger combat air patrols (CAP), further from the carriers than had previously been the case, intensive fighter sweeps over Japanese airfields, the bombing of Japanese runways with delayed action fuses, to make repairs more difficult, a line of picket destroyers and destroyer escorts at least 50 miles (80 km) from the main body of the fleet, to provide earlier radar interception, and improved coordination between fighter direction officers on carriers.
The peak in kamikaze attacks came during the period of April-June 1945, at the Battle of Okinawa. On April 6, 1945 waves of planes made hundreds of attacks, in Operation Kikusui ("floating chrysanthemums"). At Okinawa, kamikaze attacks focused at first on Allied destroyers on picket duty, and then on the carriers in the middle of the fleet. Suicide attacks by planes or boats at Okinawa sank or put out of action at least 30 US warships and at least three US merchant ships, along with some from other Allied forces. The attacks expended 1,465 planes. Many warships of all classes were damaged, some severely, but no aircraft carriers, battleships or cruisers were sunk by kamikaze at Okinawa. Most of the ships destroyed were destroyers or smaller vessels, especially those on picket duty.
Photo shows Corporal Yukio Araki holding a puppy with four other young men of the 72nd Shinbu Corps around him. An Asahi Shimbun cameraman took this photo on the day before the departure from Bansei Air Base. Araki died at the age of 17 in a suicide attack on US ships near Okinawa on May 27, 1945.
US aircraft carriers, with their wooden flight decks, were more vulnerable to kamikaze hits, than the reinforced steel-decked carriers from the British Pacific Fleet (BPF) which operated in the theatre during 1945. The resilience of well-armoured vessels was shown on May 4. Just after 11.30 a.m. there was a wave of attacks against the BPF. One Japanese plane made a steep dive from "a great height" at the carrier HMS Formidable and was engaged by AA guns. The kamikaze was hit at close range, but crashed into the flight deck, making a massive dent about 10 feet (3 m) long, two feet (0.6 m) wide and two feet deep in the armoured flight deck. A large steel splinter speared down through the hangar deck and the centre boiler-room, where it ruptured a steam line, and came to rest in a fuel tank, starting a major fire in the aircraft park. Eight crew members were killed and 47 were wounded. One Corsair and 10 Grumman Avengers were destroyed. However, the fires were gradually brought under control and the crater in the deck was repaired with concrete and steel plate. By 5 p.m., Corsairs were again able to land on Formidable.
As the end of the war approached, the Allies did not suffer significantly more damage, despite having far more ships than was previously the case and being attacked in far greater density. Due to their poor training, kamikaze pilots tended to be easy targets for experienced Allied pilots, who also flew superior aircraft. Moreover the U.S. Fast Carrier Task Force alone could bring over 1,000 fighter aircraft into play. Allied pilots also became adept at destroying enemy aircraft before they struck ships. Allied naval crews had also begun to develop techniques to negate kamikaze attacks, such as firing their high-caliber guns into the sea in front of attacking planes flying near sea level, in order to create walls of water which would swamp the attacking planes. Although such tactics could not be used against Okhas and other fast, high angle attacks, these were in turn more vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire.
During 1945, the Japanese military began stockpiling hundreds of Tsurugi, other propellor planes, Ohka, and suicide boats, for use against Allied forces expected to invade Japan. Few were ever used.
When Japan began to be subject to intense strategic bombing by B-29 Bombers after the capture of Iwo Jima, the Japanese military attempted to use suicide attacks against this threat.
However, it proved much less successful and practical since an airplane is a much faster, more maneuverable, and smaller target than a warship. Taken with the fact that the B-29 model also had formidable defensive weaponry, suicide attacks against the plane type demanded considerable piloting skill to be successful. That worked against the very purpose of using expendable pilots and even encouraging capable pilots to bail out before impact was ineffective because vital personnel were often lost when they mistimed when to exit and were killed as a result.
Effects
A crewman in an AA gun aboard the battleship USS New Jersey watches as a kamikaze plane prepares to strike USS Intrepid
By the end of World War II, the Japanese naval air service had sacrificed 2,525 kamikaze pilots and the army air force had lost 1,387.
According to an official Japanese announcement, the missions sank 81 ships and damaged 195, and according to a Japanese tally, suicide attacks accounted for up to 80 percent of US losses in the final phase of the war in the Pacific.
Approximately 2,800 Kamikaze attackers sunk 34 Navy ships, damaged 368 others, killed 4,900 sailors, and wounded over 4,800. Despite radar detection and cuing, airborne interception and attrition, and massive anti-aircraft barrages, a distressing 14 percent of Kamikazes survived to score a hit on a ship; nearly 8.5 percent of all ships hit by Kamikazes sank.
In a 2004 book, World War II, the historians Wilmott, Cross & Messenger stated that more than 70 U.S. vessels were "sunk or damaged beyond repair" by kamikazes.
Cultural background and attitudes in Japan
While commonly perceived that volunteers signed up in droves for Kamikaze missions, it has also been contended that there was extensive coercion and peer pressure involved in recruiting soldiers for the sacrifice. Their motivations in "volunteering" were complex and not simply about patriotism or bringing honour to their families.
Special ceremonies were often held, immediately prior to kamikaze missions, in which pilots, carrying prayers from their families, were given military decorations. Such practices honoured and legitimized the suicide missions.
According to legend, young pilots on kamikaze missions often flew southwest from Japan over the 922 metre (3,025 ft) Mount Kaimon. The mountain is also called "Satsuma Fuji" (meaning a geometrically symmetrical beautiful mountain like Mount Fuji, but located in the Satsuma Province region). Suicide mission pilots looked over their shoulders to see this, the most southern mountain on the Japanese mainland, while they were in the air, said farewell to their country, and saluted the mountain.
Chiran high school girls wave farewell with cherry blossom branches to departing kamikaze pilot in a Ki-43-II Hayabusa.
Residents on Kikaijima island, east of Amami Oshima, say that pilots from suicide mission units dropped flowers from the air, as they departed on their final missions. According to legend, the hills above Kikaijima airport have beds of cornflower that bloom in early May.
With the passing of time, some prominent Japanese military figures who survived the war became critical of the policy. Saburo Sakai, an IJN ace said:
A kamikaze is a surprise attack, according to our ancient war tactics. Surprise attacks will be successful the first time, maybe two or three times. But what fool would continue the same attacks for ten months? Emperor Hirohito must have realized it. He should have said "Stop."
Even now, many faces of my students come up when I close my eyes. So many students are gone. Why did headquarters continue such silly attacks for ten months! Fools! Genda, who went to America — all those men lied that all men volunteered for kamikaze units. They lied.
In 2006, Watanabe Tsuneo, Editor in Chief of the Yomiuri Shimbun, criticized Japanese nationalists' glorification of kamikaze attacks: "It's all a lie that they left filled with braveness and joy, crying, 'Long live the emperor!' They were sheep at a slaughterhouse. Everybody was looking down and tottering. Some were unable to stand up and were carried and pushed into the plane by maintenance soldiers."
Personnel involved in the development of World War II kamikaze attacks
In the creation of the kamikaze defensive tactic, in the beginning certain Imperial Japanese Navy officers were involved. Later in World War II, some personnel of the Imperial Japanese Army also participated in the development of this defensive tactic:
On May 29, 1943, 2,500 Japanese marines, lead by Captain Yasugo Yamazaki, who was determined to die rather than surrender in defense of Attu island, Alaska under Japanese control. He wrote a diary entry: "Only 33 years of living and I am to die here...I have no regrets. Banzai to the Emperor...Goodbye Tasuko, my beloved wife." Yamazaki gathered the remaining 1,000 Japanese troops and charged the Americans. He died Katana in hand, personally leading one of last Banzai charges. Only 28 Japanese were alive and taken prisoner by Americans.
An unknown Japanese naval pilot is alleged to have made a suicide attack with his Mitsubishi A6M "Zero" against the USS Indiana, near Guam, during June 19, 1944. However there is no proof that this was not an acccidental collision.
Similarly, on October 12-14, 1944, the USS Reno shot down six enemy planes. One torpedo bomber crashed and exploded on the Reno’s main deck aft, causing serious damage.
Rear Admiral Masafumi Arima, the commander of the Japanese 26th Air Fleet, led an attack by about 100 Yokosuka D4Y Suisei "Judy" dive bombers against the US Navy carrier USS Franklin on October 21, 1944. Although Arima was killed, and part of a plane hit the Franklin, it is unclear that this was a planned suicide attack.
An unknown Army pilot, possibly in a Nakajima Ki-43 Hayabusa "Oscar" fighter-bomber, hit the Australian flagship HMAS Australia during October 21, 1944. This was perceived at the time, by Allied personnel, to be a suicide attack.
Captain Motoharu Okamura, commander of the Tateyama Base in Tokyo and the 341st Air Group Home, may have first proposed these tactics in June 15, 1944, during the first naval battle at the Philippines.
Vice Admiral Shigeru Fukudome, C-in-C (Commander-in-Chief) of the Second Navy Air Fleet, showed interest in these tactics as well.
Vice Admiral Seishi Ito, sub-Chief of Navy State Major, was also another supporter of these operations.
Captain Eiichiro Jyo was commander of the carrier Chiyoda during the Philippines Battle. He himself proposed this style of attack to the Japanese Mobile Fleet Command.
Vice Admiral Tokusaburo Ozawa, the C-in-C, supported this idea of alternative strikes alongside conventional attacks.
Rear Admiral Sueo Obayashi, Commander of CarDiv Three, also supported this tactic.
Admiral Soemu Toyoda, the C-in-C of the Imperial Combined Fleet, at first was opposed to the tactic, but he later promoted the organization of units for these operations.
Vice Admiral Kimpei Teraoka, previous commander of the First Naval Air Fleet, also knew about Defensive operations.
Rear Admiral Takijiro Ohnishi was head of Naval Aviation in the Munitions and Armaments Ministry and "father" of the Japanese Navy "Kamikaze Corps". He himself took command of the First Air Fleet in the Philippines, shortly after the American landings on Leyte.
Captain Rikihei Inogushi was adviser of the State Major of First Air Fleet.
Lieutenant Colonel Asaiki Tamai was an officer expert in Strategics.
Captain Sakae Yamamoto, high rank officer, Commander of the 201 Air Group, was charged with preparing the Special Unit.
High Rank Officer Yoshioka, 26th Air Fleet State Major Member, responded to the question of the destructive effects of any Collision of Mitsubishi A6M3 (Model 32), or "Hamp" fighters against American Carriers.
Lieutenant Yukio Seki, the first official Kamikaze pilot, was assigned by Officer Tamai to be the first direct leader of the first special group called Shimpu, or the Kamikaze Tokubetsu Kogekitai Unit. Officer Seki himself guided these units, which were also divided into "Shikishima", "Yamato", "Asahi", and "Yamazakura" sections. Later, he organized the sixth unit "Giretsu" and decided to use light bombers and other aircraft types in such missions.
Lieutenant Naoshi Kanno, another commander, was elected to examine how to possibly replace officer Seki in guiding this special mission.
Captain Tadashi Nakajima, commander of the Mabalacat Air Base, the 201 Air Group home in the Philippines, also entered Special Operations and was first recruiter and trainer of these tactics.
Lieutenant j.g. Takeshi Shimizu was another expert of Special operations in this base and keeper of some archives related to these tactics.
Lieutenant j.g. Yoshiyasu Kuno was one of some pilots calling to these operations. He was also in command of the "Yamato" section of the Special group.
Petty Officer Hiroyoshi Nishizawa, the Japanese Navy's best Air ace with somewhere between 87 and 120 victories, also participated in special operations. He was charged with guiding and escorting the "Shikishima" section in the first Special mission against the American Fleet, and he announced the first success of the strike.
During the winter of 1944–1945, IJAAF organized the Shinten special unit, who defended the Tokyo metropolitan area along with regular interceptor aircraft, with the base in Narimasu, near the metropolitan area. This unit stayed equipped with Nakajima Ki-44 Shoki "Tojo" fighters for use in collision tactics against USAAFB-29 bombers in their striking incursions over Japan.
During January 5, 1945, Lieutenant Kanaya guided the special mission of the takeoff of 18 aircraft from the Mabalacat base. At the same time, other groups also took off from the Cebu airbase.
During the night of January 9–January 10, 1945, the Japanese Army, in coordination with the Japanese Navy in the Philippines, introduced the Maru-Ni (Shin-Yo for the navy) suicide boats to complement their defensive efforts. Their fire was directed against the American Attack Transport Warhawk and Vessel LST-610.
Petty Officer Goro Yonai was under the command of Lieutenant Yukio Seki during the first mission. PO Yonai was a native of Yamagata, Honshu, born in June 16, 1921, and was also a comrade of PO Tada.
Pilot and Young petty officer Tomi Zai, in November 25, 1944, at the control of a Mitsubishi A6M, caused severe damage to the American Carrier Intrepid during the Philippines Campaign.
During March 1945, they organized another special unit called "Azusa", specially formed for striking American units in Ulithi atoll.
Naval Ensign Ohta suggested to Ohnishi that manned glider bombs, carried to within reach of targets by a mother-plane, should be developed for attacks on enemy shipping. Following his idea, in Konoike, Yokosuka, the 721 Air Corps was formed under the direct command of Lieutenant Commander Goro Nonaka. This was the first unit specialized in the Ohka glider-bomb. The bombs were carried in the Mitsubishi G4M "Betty" Medium bomber. At the same time, under the command of Captain Okamura, who responded to Admiral Matome Ugaki, had other Ohka Bases stay in Kanoya and Toizaki.
The technical air naval center in Yokosuka arsenal approved and developed Ohta's idea of the Ohka Glider-bomber.
Lieutenant j.g. Saburo Dohi was an Ohka Pilot and son of Colonel Zazuho Dohi. During August 13, 1945, he himself treated along Ohnishi, continuing the Japanese resistance. Dohi's Ohka are the unique why obtain success in these strikes, and their mother airplane Mitsubishi G4M are the unique in return to airbase.
Admiral Takeo Tada, colleague and friend of Ohnishi, father of Lieutenant j.g. Keita Tada, was one of the pilots in the first special mission. He was also a knower of special tactics.
During April 6, 1945, in the Okinawa Campaign, Admiral Seiishi Ito led the special action of Superbattleship Yamato, Cruiser Yahaghi and some eight other vessels in Okinawa, in coordination of Kamikaze units.
In May 11, 1945, the Tjisadane, a Dutch Merchant ship and unique civil vessel, was the victim of a special striker, but suffered minor damage.
Some Mitsubishi Ki-67 KAI (Kamikaze type) of 1st Chutai, 7th Sentai IJAAF, took off from Formosa against American Forces in Okinawa during April 1945–July 1945.
Petty Officer Shiogi Kanako, the "Solitaire Kamikaze", himself, realizing with your Mitsubishi A6M, some one non-coordinate attack from Kamiyama Island (Ryu-Kyu archipelago), against American Cruisers during April 22, 1945.
In March 20, 1945, the American Submarine Devilfish suffered some strikes at the charge of Japanese Navy aircraft.
During June-July 1945 Japanese navy attempt to realizing the "Operation ARASHI" (Mountain Storm): The "Seiran" Bombing Special Attack on Ulithi US Navy Base,but later was suspend this plan.
Some unknown Japanese Navy pilots made further suicide strikes aboard an Aichi D3A2 "Val" against US Navy ships (USS Borie and USS Assault Transport Lagrange) during August 13, 1945.
During August 1945, Proper Kangde Manchu Emperor assist in quality of honoured guests to a Japanese Army special ceremony in praise of the "Human bullets" (some calling them "banzai charges") and certain infantry "Special volunteers" with explosives, the land equivalent of Kamikaze pilots. Puyi made one speech for the desire to achieve victory in the fight against Red Army forces, suggesting Yasunori Yoshioka, Army adviser in Manchukuo. These units were also used in Alaska, South Pacific Mandate, Iwo Jima and Okinawa defensive Campaigns for Japanese forces. Tanks, trucks and other land vehicles were also used.
The squadron of the Kwantung Army's Hane Air Unit completed the escort mission for Prince Takeda Tsuneyoshi (a nobility member), with 4 planes in a suicide plunge. Loza, in Commanding the Red Army’s Sherman Tanks, reports an attack by 6 suicide planes on his 46th Tank Brigade, 6th Guards Tank Army, near Tongliao, Manchukuo, in August 19, 1945. One truck was destroyed and a Sherman was damaged.
Rear Admiral Matome Ugaki, second chief of the Combined Pacific Fleet, realized the last official kamikaze attack, guiding some Yokosuka D4Y Suisei "Judy" Dive bombers of the 701st Air Group against the US Navy Fleet in Okinawa during August 15, 1945.
Furthermore, some sources report that the Soviet Navy Minesweeping cutter (little minelayer motor boat) KT-152 was sunk by a possibly Japanese Kamikaze (either a Nakajima B5N "Kate" or a Mitsubishi A6M "Zero") aircraft attack on August 18 or August 19, 1945, in the Shumushu area, Kuriles archipelago, during the August Storm Russian Campaign against Japanese territories.
Axell, Albert (2002). Kamikaze: Japan's Suicide Gods. New York: Longman. ISBN 0-582-77232-X. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
Hoyt, Edwin P. (1993). The Last Kamikaze. Praeger Publishers. ISBN 0-275-94067-5. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
Millot, Bernard (1971). DIVINE THUNDER: The life and death of the Kamikazes. Macdonald. ISBN 0-356-03856-4. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
.png)
_on_25_October_1944_(80-G-288882).jpg)
_in_Lingayen_Gulf_on_6_January_1945_(NH_79449).jpg)
_in_Lingayen_Gulf_on_6_January_1945_(NH_79450).jpg)
_is_hit_by_a_kamikaze_in_Lingayen_Gulf_on_6_January_1945_(80-G-363217).jpg)
