| Revision as of 10:13, 12 July 2007 editGhirlandajo (talk | contribs)Autopatrolled, Extended confirmed users, Pending changes reviewers89,629 edits necessary tag← Previous edit | Revision as of 11:28, 12 July 2007 edit undoPiotrus (talk | contribs)Autopatrolled, Event coordinators, Extended confirmed users, File movers, Pending changes reviewers, Rollbackers285,689 edits remove non-neutral phrases like miracle or agression, provide references in case the fact is controversialNext edit → | ||
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
| {{POV}} | |||
| '''Plan Wschód''' (''Plan East'') was a ] defensive ], created in case of war with the ]. Unlike ] (''Plan West''), it was being prepared during the whole ], as the government of the ] treated the Soviet Union as the main enemy, capable of starting a full-scale war. However, Plan East has not been preserved to this day; what is known are only some loose documents. | '''Plan Wschód''' (''Plan East'') was a ] defensive ], created in case of war with the ]. Unlike ] (''Plan West''), it was being prepared during the whole ], as the government of the ] treated the Soviet Union as the main enemy, capable of starting a full-scale war. However, Plan East has not been preserved to this day; what is known are only some loose documents. | ||
| Line 5: | Line 4: | ||
| Since its first days, the Second Polish Republic was involved in wars and conflicts with almost all its neighbors (see: ], ], ], ], ], ]). However, of all these countries, two were rightfully regarded as possible aggressors — ] and the Soviet Union. | Since its first days, the Second Polish Republic was involved in wars and conflicts with almost all its neighbors (see: ], ], ], ], ], ]). However, of all these countries, two were rightfully regarded as possible aggressors — ] and the Soviet Union. | ||
| Rulers of the 1920s and 1930s Poland were obsessed with the threat from the East. Fresh were memories of the ] and the ], which saved both Poland and ] from ] |
Rulers of the 1920s and 1930s Poland were obsessed with the threat from the East. Fresh were memories of the ] and the ], which saved both Poland and ] from ] spreading ] by force.<ref name="Suny">According to the British historian ], the Polish-Soviet War "largely determined the course of European history for the next twenty years or more. Unavowedly and almost unconsciously, Soviet leaders abandoned the cause of international revolution." It would be twenty years before the Bolsheviks would send their armies abroad to 'make revolution'.<br>], ''The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States'', Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19-508105-6, </ref><ref name="Gella">According to American sociologist ] "the Polish victory had gained twenty years of independence not only for Poland, but at least for an entire central part of Europe.<br>], ''Development of Class Structure in Eastern Europe: Poland and Her Southern Neighbors'', SUNY Press, 1988, ISBN 0-88706-833-2, </ref> Both the ] and the government in ] were sure that another war with the Soviets was inevitable, thus preparations for it were far more advanced than preparation for armed conflict with Germany. Only after 1935, when ] anti-Polish propaganda increased, Army planners started to draw Plan West, as threats from Poland’s western neighbor became visible. | ||
| ==Polish-Soviet border in the interbellum== | ==Polish-Soviet border in the interbellum== | ||
Revision as of 11:28, 12 July 2007
Plan Wschód (Plan East) was a Polish defensive military plan, created in case of war with the Soviet Union. Unlike Plan Zachod (Plan West), it was being prepared during the whole interbellum period, as the government of the Second Polish Republic treated the Soviet Union as the main enemy, capable of starting a full-scale war. However, Plan East has not been preserved to this day; what is known are only some loose documents.
Introduction
Since its first days, the Second Polish Republic was involved in wars and conflicts with almost all its neighbors (see: Polish-Soviet War, Polish-Ukrainian War, Polish-Lithuanian War, Great Poland Uprising, Silesian Uprisings, Border conflicts between Poland and Czechoslovakia). However, of all these countries, two were rightfully regarded as possible aggressors — Germany and the Soviet Union.
Rulers of the 1920s and 1930s Poland were obsessed with the threat from the East. Fresh were memories of the Polish-Soviet War and the Battle of Warsaw, which saved both Poland and Europe from Bolshevik spreading revolution by force. Both the Polish Army and the government in Warsaw were sure that another war with the Soviets was inevitable, thus preparations for it were far more advanced than preparation for armed conflict with Germany. Only after 1935, when Nazi anti-Polish propaganda increased, Army planners started to draw Plan West, as threats from Poland’s western neighbor became visible.
Polish-Soviet border in the interbellum
Poland’s borderline with the Soviet Union was 1,412 kilometers long (by comparison, the border with Germany and its province of East Prussia was 1,912 km long). Like the border with Germany, it lacked any major geographical obstacles, so defence of this sprawling line was very difficult.
In the north there was a flat, plain land, with huge forests (e.g. Puszcza Nalibocka — the Wilderness of Naliboki). Also, in the north there was a major rail route connecting Moscow to Western Europe. The major city in this area was Wilno, located in the northeast corner of interbellum Poland.
In the middle there was a huge, sparsely populated swamp known as Polesie. This land had no roads and few rail lines, however its strategic importance was huge, as its landscape made it possible to organize a long-lasting defence. In Polesie as well as in adjacent Volhynia, there were no major urban centers.
The south, which had formerly belonged to the Austrian Empire as the eastern part of the province of Galicia, was the best developed, with high rail density, growing industry (e.g., oil fields in Boryslaw), and the well-developed agriculture of Podolia. One of the major urban centers of interbellum Poland, Lwow, was located there. Also, the borderline with the Soviet Union was marked by a natural obstacle—the Zbrucz river.
It should be mentioned that basically all Polish industrial and urban centers were located in the West. This made long-lasting defence possible, as Soviets’ reaching of Upper Silesia, Warsaw, Krakow or Poznan would possibly have taken weeks. Also, Polish planners counted on the cooperation of Romania, which was Poland’s main ally in the East.
Border conflicts in the East
Soviet government from the very beginning undermined validity of the Riga Peace Treaty, the same treaty that had been signed by Moscow in 1921. In the early 1920s the Soviets on several occasions organized guerilla attacks on Polish towns and villages located near the border. The most famous was the attack on Stolpce, which took place on the night of August 3-4 1924. This event resulted in creation of Korpus Ochrony Pogranicza (Border Protection Corps). Such attacks were numerous in the 1920s, however in the 1930s the situation improved.
Plan East and its idea
Unfortunately, no copy of the Plan has been preserved. All that is known are some basic ideas, but restoring the whole Plan is impossible. Work on the document was completed on February 4, 1939. The Plan was based on the notions of Jozef Pilsudski, who until his death in 1935 was sure that the war would start in the East. Thus most army maneuvers and field fortifications were held in the east, while Poland's western border was to a large extent neglected. Up to this day some of these fortifications can be seen in the Sarny area. Bunkers built by Polish Corps of Engineers in the 1930s were in late 1940s used by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in their guerilla skirmishes with Red Army.
Polish planners were well aware of the fact that the Red Army was in all elements superior. Therefore, the main idea was to organize a so-called “resistance in motion’’, and to try to split Soviet forces south and north of the Polesie swamps. Frontline armies, located in the vicinity of the border, were going to try to stop advance of the aggressors and to bleed them, while reserves, located mostly in the area of Brzesc nad Bugiem, were supposed to enter the conflict in later stages.
According to some sources, the Poles were expecting the Red Army to advance in three directions. First was along the rail line Minsk - Baranowicze - Bialystok - Warsaw. Second direction was along the line Sarny - Kowel - Lublin and the third, in the south, along the line Tarnopol - Lwow.
Structure of the Polish Army in the East
According to Polish historian Rajmund Szubanski, in case of war in the East, the bulk of the Polish Army was supposed to have been concentrated both in the north and south, with middle part of the borderline left to a large extent unguarded. Some military historians claim today that Polish planners placed too many units in the vicinity of the borderline, which would have resulted in their total destruction in the first days of the conflict. On the contrary - rear positions were inadequately protected.
Front-line units
- In the extreme north-east, around the rail nexus of Molodeczno, there was Armia Wilno, with possibly consisted of three Infantry Divisions (1st “Legionnaire” I.D. from Wilno, 19th I.D. from Wilno, 29th I.D. from Grodno), two Cavalry Brigades (3rd Wilenska BK from Wilno, 4th Suwalska BK from Suwalki), and the 5th Lida Air Corps.
- South to it there was Armia Baranowicze, probably consisting of four Infantry Divisions (9th I.D. from Siedlce, 20th I.D. from Baranowicze, 18th I.D. from Lomza, 28th I.D. from Warszawa), two Cavalry Brigades (9th Nowogrodzka BK from Baranowicze, 11th Podlaska BK from Bialystok) and the 4th Torun Air Corps.
- In the middle there was Armia Polesie (also called Independent Operational Group Polesie). It possibly consisted of three Infantry Divisions (8th I.D. from Modlin, 27th I.D. from Kowel, 30th I.D. from Kobryn), one Cavalry Brigade (1st Mazowiecka BK from Warszawa), Riverine Flotilla of the Polish Navy and the 3rd Poznan Air Corps.
- To the south there was Armia Wolyn - three Infantry Divisions (2nd “Legionnaire” I.D. from Kielce, 3rd “Legionnaire” I.D. from Zamosc, 13th I.D. from Rowne), one Cavalry Brigade (10th Wolynska BK from Rowne) and the 2nd Krakow Air Corps.
- In the extreme south there was Armia Podole - five Infantry Divisions (5th I.D. from Lwow, 11th I.D. from Stanislawow, 12th I.D. from Tarnopol, 22nd I.D. from Przemysl, 24th I.D. from Jaroslaw), two Cavalry Brigades (6th Podolska BK from Stanislawow, 2nd Kresowa BK from Brody) and the 6th Lwow Air Corps.
Apart from these units, in all armies there were Border-Area Defence Corps units and garrisons of the main cities.
Reserve forces
- Behind Armia Wilno and Armia Baranowicze there was Armia Lida, consisting of three Infantry Divisions.
- Behind Armia Podole and Armia Wolyn there was Armia Lwow, consisting of two Infantry Divisions and a Cavalry Brigade (5th Krakowska BK from Krakow).
- Deep in the rear, around the city of Brzesc, there was the main reserve, probably consisting of six IDs, two Cavalry Brigades (7th Wielkopolska BK from Poznan, 8th Pomorska BK from Bydgoszcz), an Armored Brigade and the 1st Warsaw Air Corps.
The Red Army and its units along the Polish border
In the mid-1930s, the Soviet government started an immense armament program, which resulted in a fast increase of units. Number of tanks and airplanes grew significantly, and the Soviets enjoyed superiority in all elements. Polish planners anticipated that the Soviets had three times as many soldiers.Their superiority in tanks and airplanes was not estimated, but the disproportion was immense. Probably, in August 1939 along the Polish border there were as many as 173 Infantry Divisions of the Red Army (see: Soviet order of battle for invasion of Poland in 1939).
September 1939
On September 1, 1939, Nazi Germany attacked Poland (see: Invasion of Poland (1939)). Consequently, Plan East became void. On September 17, following the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Soviets, breaking the Soviet-Polish Non-Aggression Pact, invaded Poland (see: Soviet invasion of Poland (1939)). Red Army met little resistance, as Polish Army was concentrated in the West, finghting the Germans. Thus, the Soviets quickly managed to occupy Polish Kresy.
References
- Rajmund Szubański, Plan operacyjny "Wschód", Warszawa 1994, ISBN 83-11-08313-4
Further reading
- Stanisław Feret, Polska sztuka wojenna 1918-39, Warszawa 1972.
External links
- Template:Pl icon Plan operacyjny "Wschód" discussed on a University of Warsaw forum
- Template:Pl icon POLSKI PLAN OBRONNY ZACHÓD
- According to the British historian A.J.P. Taylor, the Polish-Soviet War "largely determined the course of European history for the next twenty years or more. Unavowedly and almost unconsciously, Soviet leaders abandoned the cause of international revolution." It would be twenty years before the Bolsheviks would send their armies abroad to 'make revolution'.
Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States, Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19-508105-6, Google Print, p.106 - According to American sociologist Alexander Gella "the Polish victory had gained twenty years of independence not only for Poland, but at least for an entire central part of Europe.
Aleksander Gella, Development of Class Structure in Eastern Europe: Poland and Her Southern Neighbors, SUNY Press, 1988, ISBN 0-88706-833-2, Google Print, p. 23