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| This theory explores "behind the scenes" contextual systems, which shape conscious contents without ever becoming conscious, such as the ] ] stream of the visual system. This architectural approach leads to specific neural hypotheses. ] ] in different modalities may be mutually inhibitory, within approximately 100-ms time steps. | This theory explores "behind the scenes" contextual systems, which shape conscious contents without ever becoming conscious, such as the ] ] stream of the visual system. This architectural approach leads to specific neural hypotheses. ] ] in different modalities may be mutually inhibitory, within approximately 100-ms time steps. | ||
| Susan Blackmore challenged the concept of stream of consciousness in several papers, by stating that "When I say that consciousness is an illusion I do not mean that consciousness does not exist. I mean that consciousness is not what it appears to be. If it seems to be a continuous stream of rich and detailed experiences, happening one after the other to a conscious person, this is the illusion". Blackmore also quotes ]: "The attempt at introspective analysis in these cases is in fact like seizing a spinning top to catch its motion, or trying to turn up the gas quickly enough to see how the darkness looks." | Susan Blackmore challenged the concept of stream of consciousness in several papers, by stating that "When I say that consciousness is an illusion I do not mean that consciousness does not exist. I mean that consciousness is not what it appears to be. If it seems to be a continuous stream of rich and detailed experiences, happening one after the other to a conscious person, this is the illusion". Blackmore also quotes ]: "The attempt at introspective analysis in these cases is in fact like seizing a spinning top to catch its motion, or trying to turn up the gas quickly enough to see how the darkness looks." | ||
| == References == | == References == | ||
Revision as of 18:39, 22 August 2005
Global Workspace Theory (GWT) is a simple cognitive architecture that has been developed to account qualitatively for a large set of matched pairs of conscious and unconscious processes, and it was proposed by Bernard Baars (1988, 1997). It is based on the concept of a human working memory – the "inner domain in which we can rehearse telephone numbers to ourselves or, more interestingly, in which we carry on the narratives of our lives. It is usually thought to include inner speech and visual imagery." The contents of this small, short-term memory closely correspond to what we are conscious of, and get broadcast to the vast multitude of unconscious cognitive brain processes which require entrance into the workspace to be globally accessible. These subconscious processes, operating in parallel with limited communication between them, can form coalitions whose participants cooperate to achieve certain goals. Individual as well as allied processes compete for access to the global workspace, striving to disseminate their messages to all other processes in an effort to obtain more cohorts and thereby increase the likelihood of achieving their goals. While Baars (1997) concedes that the global workspace "is closely related to conscious experience, though not identical to it", GWT can successfully explain several characteristics of consciousness, such as its role in handling novel situations, its limited capacity, and its sequential nature. Moreover, it lends itself well to computational modeling.
This theory explores "behind the scenes" contextual systems, which shape conscious contents without ever becoming conscious, such as the dorsal cortical stream of the visual system. This architectural approach leads to specific neural hypotheses. Sensory consciousness in different modalities may be mutually inhibitory, within approximately 100-ms time steps.
Susan Blackmore challenged the concept of stream of consciousness in several papers, by stating that "When I say that consciousness is an illusion I do not mean that consciousness does not exist. I mean that consciousness is not what it appears to be. If it seems to be a continuous stream of rich and detailed experiences, happening one after the other to a conscious person, this is the illusion". Blackmore also quotes William James: "The attempt at introspective analysis in these cases is in fact like seizing a spinning top to catch its motion, or trying to turn up the gas quickly enough to see how the darkness looks."
References
- Baars, Bernard (1988), A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press)
- Baars, Bernard (1997), In the Theater of Consciousness (New York, NY: Oxford University Press)
- Damasio, A.R. (1989). Time-locked multiregional retroactivation: A systems-level proposal for the neural substrates of recall and recognition. Cognition 33. 1-2:25-62.
- Metzinger, T. (ed) (2000). Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions. MIT Press.
- Blackmore, Susan (2002). There is no stream of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9. 5-6
- Blackmore, Susan (2004). Why Global Workspace Theory cannot explain consciousness(2004) Presentation.