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| Despite personal reservations towards the ], he developed a cordial relationship with President ] and willingly acknowledged the SPD's accomplishments after ]. Kaas supported foreign minister ]'s policy of reconciliation and denounced ] ] against this policy - agitation he considered to be irresponsible. From ] to ] he was a German delegate to the ]. | Despite personal reservations towards the ], he developed a cordial relationship with President ] and willingly acknowledged the SPD's accomplishments after ]. Kaas supported foreign minister ]'s policy of reconciliation and denounced ] ] against this policy - agitation he considered to be irresponsible. From ] to ] he was a German delegate to the ]. | ||
| Of special interest to him were the relations between the state and the Catholic Church and served as an adviser in the ] negotiations between the ] and some German states. From ] onwards Kaas served ecclesiastically as secretary to Bishop Nuncio Pacelli. During this involvement, he cemented a formal but close and lasting friendship with ], then ] in Germany. Kaas used to stay with Pacelli in Rome and |
Of special interest to him were the relations between the state and the Catholic Church and served as an adviser in the ] negotiations between the ] and some German states. From ] onwards Kaas served ecclesiastically as secretary to Bishop Nuncio Pacelli. During this involvement, he cemented a formal but close and lasting friendship with ], then ] in Germany. Kaas used to stay with Pacelli in Rome and their relationship remained one of the basic factors throughout Kaas' life. | ||
| In ], Kaas contributed to the successful conclusion of the concordat negotiations with ] and in ] and ] he continued |
In ], Kaas contributed to the successful conclusion of the concordat negotiations with ] and in ] and ] he continued as an advisor in negotiations of a nationwide ] (]), that however came to nothing. | ||
| ==Kaas as party chairman== | ==Kaas as party chairman== | ||
Revision as of 14:47, 30 August 2005
Monsignor Ludwig Kaas (23 May 1881-15 April 1952) was a Roman Catholic priest, and a prominent German politician during the Weimar Republic.
Academic career
Born in Trier, Kaas was ordained a priest in 1906 and studied history and canon law in Trier and Rome. In 1916 he published the book "Ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the Catholic Church in Prussia", which already indicated his expertise in church history and canon law and his political interests. He was appointed professor for canon law at the Trier seminar in 1918 and published the study "Missing in war and remarriage in state law and canon law". In 1924 he resigned from his chair to concentrate on his political career ,and, in 1925 to take up the post of Secretary to Bishop Nuncio Eugenio Pacelli - later Pope Pius XII .
Political career
In 1918 Kaas, distressed by the revolution and the military defeat, had decided to enter politics and had joined the Centre Party. He was elected to the National Assembly in 1919 and also was a member of the Reichstag from 1920 to 1933.
Kaas considered himself a "Rhenian Patriot" and advocated the creation of a Rhineland state within the framework of the German Reich. In 1923, a year of crisis, he – just like Konrad Adenauer, then mayor of Cologne – fought the separatists that wanted to break away the Rhineland from Germany. Despite French occupation, he sought reconciliation with France and voiced this desire in a famous Reichstag speech on December 5, 1923.
Despite personal reservations towards the Social Democrats, he developed a cordial relationship with President Friedrich Ebert and willingly acknowledged the SPD's accomplishments after 1918. Kaas supported foreign minister Stresemann's policy of reconciliation and denounced nationalist agitation against this policy - agitation he considered to be irresponsible. From 1926 to 1930 he was a German delegate to the League of Nations.
Of special interest to him were the relations between the state and the Catholic Church and served as an adviser in the concordat negotiations between the Holy See and some German states. From 1925 onwards Kaas served ecclesiastically as secretary to Bishop Nuncio Pacelli. During this involvement, he cemented a formal but close and lasting friendship with Eugenio Pacelli, then nuncio in Germany. Kaas used to stay with Pacelli in Rome and their relationship remained one of the basic factors throughout Kaas' life.
In 1929, Kaas contributed to the successful conclusion of the concordat negotiations with Prussia and in 1931 and 1932 he continued as an advisor in negotiations of a nationwide concordat (Reichskonkordat), that however came to nothing.
Kaas as party chairman
In September 1928 Kaas was elected chairman of the Centre Party, in order to mediate the tension between the party's wings and to strengthen their ties with the Bishops.
From 1930 onwards, Kaas loyally supported the administration under the Centre's Heinrich Brüning and also campaigned for the re-election of Hindenburg, calling him a "venerate historical personality" and "the keeper of the constitution". After Brüning's resignation in 1932, Kaas led the Centre Party in its opposition to the new Chancellor, the renegade Franz von Papen. Kaas tried to re-establish a working parliament by cooperation with the National Socialists.
According to one report, Pope Pius XI and Cardinal Pacelli supported this policy through a letter, estimating Hitler as a bulwark against the Communists. This however is not corroborated by any other source and as long as neither the exact wording nor any qualifications in this letter are known, interpretations will remain speculative.
According to one report, Pope Pius XI and Cardinal Pacelli supported this policy through a letter, estimating Hitler as a bulwark against the Communists. This however is not corroborated by any other source and as long as neither the exact wording nor any qualifications in this letter are known, interpretations will remain speculative.
When Adolf Hitler became Chancellor on January 30, 1933 based on a coalition between NSDAP, DNVP and independent conservatives but without the Centre, Kaas felt betrayed. In the campaign leading up the election on March 5, Kaas vigorously campaigned against the new government, but after the government parties succeeded in attaining a majority, he visited his nemesis Vice Chancellor Papen, offering to put an end to their old animosities.
Later that month, from the 15 March he was the main advocate for supporting the Hitler administration's Enabling Act in return for certain guarantees both constitutional and ecclesiatic. Hitler responded positively via Papen. On 21 and 22 March the Centre leadership negotiated with Hitler on the conditions and reached an agreement. A letter, in which Hitler confirmed the agreement in writing, as the government had promised, was repeatedly put off and never delivered.
Kaas - as much as the other party leaders - was aware of the doubtful nature of any guarantees, and when the Centre fraction assembled on 23 March to decide on their vote, he still advised his fellow party members to support the bill, given the "precarious state of the fraction", saying: "On the one hand we must preserve our soul, but on the other hand a rejection of the Enabling Act would result in unpleasent consequences for fraction and party. What is left is only to guard us against the worst. Were a two-thirds majority not obtained, the government's plans would be carried through by other means. The President has acquiesced in the Enabling Act. From the DNVP no attempt of relieving the situation is to be expected."
A considerable group of parliamentarians however opposed the chairman's course, among these former Chancellors Brüning, Wirth and former minister Stegerwald. Brüning called the Act the "most monstrous resolution ever demanded of a parliament", and was also sceptical about Kaas' efforts: "The party has difficult years ahead, no matter how it would decide. Sureties for the government fulfilling its promises have not been given. Without a doubt, the future of the Centre Party is in danger and once it is destroyed it cannot be revived again."
The opponents also argued in regard to Catholic social teaching that ruled out participating in an act of revolution. The proponents however argued that a "national revolution" had already occurred with Hitler's appointment and the presidential decree suspending basic rights, and that the Enabling Act would contain revolutionary force and move the government back to a legal order. Both groupings were not unaffected by Hitler's self-portrayal as a moderate seeking co-operation, as given on the Day of Potsdam of 21 March, as against the more revolutionary SA led by Ernst Röhm. Even Brüning thought it to be "decisive which groups of the NSDAP will be in power in the future. Will Hitler's power increase or will he fail, that is the question."
In the end the majority of Centre parliamentarians supported Kaas' proposal. Brüning and his followers agreed to respect party discipline by also voting in favour of the bill.
On 23 March, the Reichstag assembled at midday under turbulent circumstances. Some SA men served as guards, while others crowded outside the building, both to intimidate any opposing views. Hitler's speech, which emphasised the importance of Christianity to the German culture, was aimed particularly at assuaging the Centre Party's sensibilities and almost verbatim incorprated Kaas' requested guarantees. Kaas gave a speech, voicing the Centre's support for supporting the bill amid "concerns put aside", while Brüning notably remained silent. When parliament assembled again in the evening, all parties except the Social Democrats, represented by their chairman Otto Wels, voted in favour of the Enabling Act. This vote was a major step in the instution of the dictatorship of Adolf Hitler and is remembered as the prime example of a democracy voting for its own demise.
Because of Kaas' request for guarantees and because of his later involvement in the Reichskonkordat negotiations, it is sometimes alleged that Kaas's assent was part of a quid pro quo of interests between the Holy See and the new regime. His actions might very well be influenced by reflections on how to further and protect the Church's interests and how to obtain the long-desired objective of a nationwide concordat, needed even more given the anti-Catholic stance of the NSDAP. There is however no evidence for involvement of the Holy See in these dealings.
Kaas and the Reichskonkordat
Kaas had planned to travel to Rome since the beginning of the year, to discuss a conclict in Eupen and Malmedy, formerly German towns now belonging to Belgium, where priests had been arrested. This trip had been postponed by the political events - first Hitler's appointment, then the March elections, then by the Enabling Act -, but on 24 March, one day after the vote, Kaas finally managed to leave for Rome. He then returned to Germany from the Vatican on 31 March, where he took part in sessions of the working committee, that had been promised during the Enabling Act negotiations. This committee was chaired by Hitler and Kaas, but remained without any impact. Kaas also had a private meeting with Hitler on 2 April.
On 7 April, Kaas once more left Berlin for Rome. The next day, in Munich, the Prelate was joined by Hitler's Vice-Chancellor Papen, who also was on his way to Rome. Papen officially went on skiing holidays, but his real objective was to offically offer a nationwide concordat on his government's behalf. Kaas and Papen travelled on together and had some discussions about the matter on the train. After their arival in Rome, Kaas was received first by Pacelli on 9th April. One day later, Papen had a morning meeting with Pacelli and presented Hitler's offer. Cardinal Pacelli subsequently authorized Kaas, who was known for his expertise in Church-state relations, to negotiate the draft of the terms with Papen.
These dealings also prolonged Kaas's stay in Rome and he was never to set foot on German soil again. On 5 May Kaas had resigned from his post as party chairman, and pressure from the German government forced him to withdraw from visibly participating in the concordat negotiations . Though the Vatican tried to hold back the exclusion of Catholic clergy and organisations from politics, in fact it accepted the restriction of priests to the religious and charitable field alone . This was a severe blow to the ability of the Hierarchy to counter Nazi excess.At the conclusion of the Concordat negotiations , Papen and Kaas are reported as finalising the Centre Party's auto-dissolution on 6 July.This favoured the apparent Holy Sees open acceptance of Nazism and undermined the catholic religious resistance to Nazism , leading to wholescale defection of Centre voters into the National Socialist's Nazi party
Again, it is alleged that Pius XI favoured Hitler as a bulwark against Communism and hence signed the Reichskonkordat, through which Hitler gained international resepectability. On the other hand it can be argued that the Pope stood before the alternative of either signing a concordat or undergoing another Kulturkampf. Later on, the concordat was the basis for formal complaints about the Third Reich's measures against the Church and to this day regulates the relationship between the Roman Catholic Church and the German state.
Kaas' further stay in Rome
Kaas, who had played a pivotal role in the concordat negotiations, hoped to head an information office, watching over the implementation in Germany. However, Cardinal Bertram of Breslau considered Kaas to be the wrong man, given his political past, and accordingly intervened in Rome and proposed to elevate Kaas to honours without responsibilities. Accordingly, Kaas was appointed papal protonatarius on 20 March, 1934 and canon of the cathedral of Saint Peter on 6 Aril, 1935. Meanwhile, Hitler avenged himself on Kaas by pushing the dioceses of Trier to stripping Kaas of his position as a cathedral canon.
The exiled Kaas suffered from homesickness and from the rejection by his fellow party members and the German episcopate which his . On 20 August, 1936, Kaas was appointed Economicus and Secretary of the Holy Congregation of the fabric of St. Peter's Basilica. In this position he was responsible for the archaeological excavation of the tomb of Saint Peter in the Vatican in 1950.
Late in 1939, after the outbreak of World War II, Kaas was one of key figures for the secret Vatican Exchanges, in which Widerstand circles within the German army tried to negotiate with the Allies through the mediation of the Pope. Josef Müller, a Bavarian lawyer, would travel to Rome from Berlin with instructions from Hans Oster or Hans von Dohnanyi and confer with Kaas or Pater Robert Leiber, in order to avoid direct contact between Müller and the Pope. These exchanges resumed in 1943 after the Casablanca Conference. Neither of these attempts were successful.
Kaas died in Rome in 1952.
Monsignor Kaas as Controversial Historical Personality
Because of Kaas' request for guarantees that were not actually forht-coming ,and, because of his later involvement in the Reichskonkordat negotiations, it is alleged that Kaas was part of a quid pro quo of interests between the Holy See and the Hitler regime. His and the Centre Party's action were in part influenced by earlier negotiations on how to further and protect the Church's interests and how to obtain the long-desired objective of a nationwide concordat, one needed even more given the hitherto anti-Catholic stance of the NSDAP. There is however no evidence for surreptitious involvement of the Holy See in these dealings except to see that that there was indeed a change in Hierarchy policy concerning the acceptibility of Nazis towards the sacrements, up until this point ecclesiatically denied them . The approbation delivered to new dictatorship by Pope Pius XI on 10 th April 1933 is widely recorded . The international respectability conferred by the Vatican upon Hitler is everywhere remarked , and it is undoubted that the position of Monsignor Ludwig Kaas as a political leader central in the demise of German democracy ,as negotiator with Adolf Hitler, as confidante of the Vatican's Secretary of State Pacelli ,as Vatican appointed composer of the Reichskonkordat itself , leaves comment through most main-stream historian's analyses (Wheeler Bennett , Shirer , Toland , Lewy ) . Lesser known historians and commentators such as Edgar Ansel Mowrer and John Cornwell openly accuse Kaas of being the real tool of the papacy in destroying German democracy for certain ends, particularly that of preventing further Communist advance in a country that ,since the 1919 German "revolution ,the world had expected to turn completely to the left . The meeting arranged( Kaas was recalled for this from Rome) for a private audience with Hitler on April 2 1933 is remarked because it was by then un-heard of for Hitler to give such private audience . Kaas was still Centre Party Chairman , and coupled with the diplomatic report concerning the auto -dissolution of that Party ( cJuly 5th ) as consequent upon the Reichskonkordat concord , the activities of Kaas's intermediaryship between the vatican and Hitler leave an open questioning . The various concerns coalesce into the description of the entire as being a quid pro quo despite Franz von Papen 's supposed lead role ,beginning , albeit surreptitioulsy on 9 April .