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Fighter aircraft

Main types: Hurricane, Spitfire and Bf 109

The most famous fighter aircraft used in the Battle of Britain were the British Hawker Hurricane, Supermarine Spitfire and the German Messerschmitt Bf 109E (Emil). Although nowadays the glamorous Spitfire is often thought of as the main British fighter, in fact the Hurricanes were at first more numerous (by a factor of about 5:3) and (especially in the early part of the battle), were responsible for most of the German losses.

The Spitfire and Bf 109E were well-matched in speed and agility, and both were somewhat faster than the Hurricane. The slightly larger Hurricane was regarded as less "twitchy" and provided a more stable gun platform, as Luftwaffe bombers would later find out to their cost. The RAF's preferred tactic was if possible to deploy the Hurricane's concentrated firepower against formations of less-agile bombers, and to pit the Spitfires against the fighter escorts waiting to pounce from higher altitude. View forward from the Spitfire’s one-piece sliding moulded canopy was considered fair while upwards good; view to the rear was considered fair for a covered canopy. The windscreen however gave great distortion, and flat panels would have been preferred. The canopy of the Bf 109 E-3 was made of curved panels, while the E-4 was modified for better visibility with flat windscreen panels and the new design was often retrofitted to earlier 109s.. Visibility in this Messerschmitt was all that a fighter pilot could reasonably ask, but the addition of the armored headrest seriously restricted visibibilty to the rear (see 'Durability and Armour').

Handling and General overview

In terms of manoeuvrability, if flown by experienced pilots, the Bf 109E could out-turn the Hurricane and Spitfire for a short period at all heights however it could not sustain the turn. If the stick was pulled back too far on the Spitfire in a tight turn, the aircraft would stall rather violently, flick over on to its back, and spin. Knowledge of this undoubtedly deterred Spitfire pilots from tightening their turn when being chased from fear of stalling and spinning, particularly if he was not very experienced. British testing in September 1940 revealed that Bf 109 pilots succeeded in keeping on the tail of the Spitfire in many cases, despite the latter aircraft's superior turning performance, because a number of the Spitfire pilots failed to tighten up the turn sufficiently. The gentle stall and good control under G of the Bf 109 were of some importance, as they enabled the Luftwaffe pilot to get the most out of the aircraft in a circling dog-fight by flying very near the stall. The Bf 109 used leading edge slats which were deployed prior to stalling.

Both the Spitfire and Hurricane had the drawback of being equipped with a float-type carburettor which cut out under negative 'g' forces. The fuel injected Daimler-Benz DB 601 engine gave the 109 an advantage over the carburettor-equipped Merlin engine; neither RAF fighter could simply "bunt" and dive away from an opponent as the 109 could. This ability to perform negative-g manoeuvres without the engine cutting out gave a 109 pilot the option to disengage at will. The direct fuel injection also meant that the DB 601 engine was more fuel efficient than the Merlin.

The Emil was smaller than either RAF fighter, and it was more difficult to land and take-off than the Spitfire and Hurricane. At high speeds controls tightened considerably, and the Bf 109E needed more strength to throw around the air than either of its main opponents. Of all three fighters, the Bf 109E would possess the highest roll rate, with the aileron controls being brisk and responsive; the Spitfire had the highest aileron forces, but both the Spitfire and the Messerschmitt's rate of roll suffered at high speed.

Armament

Both RAF fighters were armed with eight Browning .303 machine guns in the wings, converged at a certain distance. The guns of the Spitfire were spread out along the wing and the outer machine guns were prone to spreading their bullets in a cone shaped pattern due to flexing of the wings. The Hurricane was a superbly steady gun platform, and the closely clustered .303 machine guns in each wing proved very destructive.

During the battle at least one Hurricane was experimentally armed with a single Hispano 20 mm cannon in a pod under each wing. One pilot who flew this aircraft was Flight Lieutenant Dick Smith of 151 Squadron, who reported that:

the normally highly manoeuvrable Hurricane became a heavy old cow.

The extra weight and drag of the pods reduced the top speed to 300 mph and made the aircraft slow in rolls and turns. Later in 1941 the Hurricane was adapted to take two Hispano cannon internally in each wing panel, the first version being the Hurricane Mk IIC.

Several Spitfires, designated Spitfire Mk IBs, were also modified to carry a single Hispano cannon, with 60 rounds per gun in a drum magazine in each wing panel. 19 Squadron was equipped with this version in June 1940. On entering combat in August this first cannon armed Spitfire failed to create an impact. The Hispano was designed for rigid, engine based mountings and it was found that the less rigid wing mountings brought about serious problems, with the cannons often jamming and unable to fire. The commander of the unit, Squadron Leader R Pinkham observed:

In all the engagements so far occurring it is considered that had the unit been equipped with eight gun fighter it would have inflicted far more severe losses on the enemy...It is most strongly urged that until the stoppages at present experienced have been eliminated this squdron should be re-equipped with Browning gun Spitfires.

When it did work, however, the Hispano was an effective weapon, with its shells being easily able to defeat the armour plating and self-sealing fuel tanks of the Luftwaffe aircraft. Late in 1940 Spitfire IBs armed with two 20mm Hispanos and four .303 Brownings started appearing in numbers and this armament went on to become standard in the bulk of the fighter versions of the Spitfire.

The Emil's main armament depended on the subtype. The E-1 sported only four MG-17 7.92mm machine guns, compared to the eight machine guns carried by RAF fighter, but with more generous ammunition capacity: two cowl guns above the engine with 1,000 rounds per gun, and two in the wing roots with 500 rounds per gun. A large number, approximately one third of the Emils during the Battle were of the E-1 type.

The E-3 was armed with two MG-17s on the engine decking, with 500 r.p.g., as on the E-1, and two MG FF 20mm cannons, one in each wing with 60 r.p.g. Although the explosive cannon shells had much greater destructive power, the FF's low muzzle velocity and limited ammunition carried meant the cannon was not markedly superior to the Hurricane and Spitfire's eight proven machine guns. The E-3s were present in the Battle in smaller numbers, as most of them were converted into E-4s by August.

The cannon, if hit, had devastating effects on enemy aircraft compared to machineguns. Three or four hits from the cannons were usually enough to bring down an enemy fighter, and even if the fighter would return to base, it would be often written down as scrap. John Greenwood, a Hurricane veteran of the Battle of France and the Battle of Britain who fought with 253 Sqn., recalled:

I also saw that the German fighters were a lot better than we had been led to believe, and that to attack them head-on with their two cannon was suicide.

The revised armament of the E-4, that was introduced in May 1940, included two 20 mm MG FF/M cannon. The new cannon was modified to fire the even more destructive, high-capacity Minengeschoss or Mine-shells at greater velocities than the MG FF. The early shells of this type had contact fusing, detonating on contact with the skin of the airframe rather than penetrating, then exploding. The E-7, introduced during August, shared this armament. The Bf 109F-1, that was issued for a couple of German aces in October, carried two cowl MG-17 and a single 20mm MG-FF/M in the nose, firing through the propeller hub.

Protection of Fuel tanks

A drawback of the Hurricane was the presence of a fuel tank just behind the cockpit firewall, which could catch fire and within a few seconds severely burn the pilot before he managed to bale out. This was later partly solved by fitting a layer of "Linatex" fire-resistant material to the tank, but this was only after Air Chief Marshal Sir H.C.T. "Stuffy" Dowding insisted that it be done. Another hazard was presented by the main wing root mounted fuel tanks of the Hurricane, which were vulnerable to bullets fired from behind. The main fuel tanks of the Spitfire, which were mounted in the fuselage forward of the cockpit, were better protected than that of the Hurricane; internally they were coated with layers of "Linatex", the cockpit bulkhead was fireproofed with a thick panel of asbestos and a panel of 3mm thick aluminium, sufficient to deflect small calibre bullets, was wrapped externally over the top of the tanks. On all the German fighters and bombers, the fuel tanks were self-sealing, although this could not prevent possibly fatal damage being inflicted by the "de Wilde" incendiary round which was being used by the RAF

Durability and Armour

The Spitfire, from about mid 1940, had 73 pounds (33 kg) of armoured steel plating in the form of head (of 6.5mm thickness) and back protection on the seat bulkhead (4.5mm) and covering the forward face of the glycol header tank. The Messerschmitt Bf 109 E-3 received extra armour in late 1939, and this was supplemented with a 10mm thickness armoured plate behind the pilot's head during and after the Battle of France. Behind the fuel tank, a 8 mm armoured plate was placed in the fuselage protecting the tank and the pilot from attacks from behind. The Hurricane had similiar armor layout as the Spitfire, and was the toughest and most durable of the three, and serviceability rates of Hawker's less sophisticated fighter were always higher than the more complex and advanced Spitfire.

Propeller types

By July 1940, the more efficient de Havilland and Rotol constant-speed propellers had begun replacing the two-pitch propellers on front line RAF fighters. The new units allowed the Merlin to perform more smoothly at all altitudes and reduced the takeoff and landing runs. The majority of the front line RAF fighters were equipped with these propellers by mid-August. The Me 109 also used a constant speed VDM unit with automatic pitch control.

100 octane aviation fuel

German high-octane aviation fuels with an octane rating of 100 octane (designated 'C-2' (natural) and 'C-3' (synthetic)) were produced domestically; these fuels were used in some subtypes of the Bf 110C, the Bf 109E-4/Ns and E-7s, some Luftwaffe bomber types and also the Bf 109F which was introduced into combat in very small numbers in October 1940. All were powered by the high compression Daimler-Benz DB 601N engine. By 19th July 1940, three Gruppen (Wings) of Bf 110C and one Gruppe of Bf 109E flew aircraft equipped with the DB 601N and running on 100 octane fuel. Supplies of the new engine were limited, such that on 1 January 1941 112 Bf 109Es and 153 Bf 110s were listed as being available to the fighter units. The new fuel allowed high compression ratio and manifold pressure to be used, and yielded for a substantial 20% increase of output at both low, medium and high altitudes at maximum boost, improving level speed and rate of climb.

The RAF fighters also used aviation fuel with an octane rating of 100 octane during the battle. By the time of the invasion of the Low Countries by Germany in May 1940 the RAF had converted approximately 25% of its total fighter force to 100 octane fuel. The subsequent escalation in air activity and demands placed upon Fighter Command over the next two months put great strain on both the 100 octane fuel stockpiles and aircraft modified to use the fuel. Against the backdrop of total war the RAF found that its reserves of 100 octane fuel was well below the level considered necessary for widespread use, for any sustained length of time. Two actions were immediately undertaken by the British War Cabinet in May to resolve the looming crisis. Firstly 87 octane fuel was deemed the primary fuel source to be used until further supplies could be discovered and delivered in sufficient quantities to allow the Merlin conversions to again take place. One source of supply immediately available was the United States, which had already supplied 100 Octane fuel; starting in 1939 oil refineries had formulated a blend of fuel which was suitable for use in British aircraft engines, including the Merlin and Bristol Mercury. The second action was for the British Government to contract the Shell Oil Refining Company to assist the British-controlled Iraqi Petroleum Company at Kirkuk to produce 100 octane fuel. This arrangement proved quite successful as production was quickly converted to 100 octane fuel.

The first Middle East shipment of 100 octane fuel arrived in Portsmouth on 12 August, with a further two deliveries in September and four in October. Apart from the Middle East supplies of the high octane fuel were being manufactured in the United States;

By the Esso refineries at Baytown, Baton Rouge and Aruba and, it is believed, by the Shell refineries at Houston and Curacao. (These five refineries shipped the majority of the then special 100 octane fuel shipped to Britain prior to 1941 and thus used in the Battle of Britain.

With 100 octane fuel the supercharger of the Merlin engine could be "boosted" to +12, producing 1,350 hp for short periods, a 30% increase on the nominal rating of 1,030hp, thus substantially improving the rate of climb, especially at low to medium altitudes. The combination of Middle East and American supplies were sufficient to ensure that the majority of RAF fighters operational during the battle were able to rely on this emergency boost.

Comparison trials in Britain and Germany

On 22 November 1939, a Bf 109E-3 (Wk-Nr 1304 of JG 76) landed intact in France. Evaluated at RAE Farnborough, the Bf 109 was used in mock combats with Spitfire Mk Is. The RAF test pilots found:

The Bf 109 is inferior as a fighter to the Hurricane or Spitfire. Its manoeuvrability at high speeds is seriously curtailed by the heaviness of the controls, while its high wing loading causes it to stall readily under high normal accelerations and results in a poor turning circle.

Speed trials carried out by the Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE) at Farnborough said:

The Spitfire proved to be considerably the faster of the two, both in acceleration and straight and level flight, without having to make use of the emergency +12 boost.

A standard evasive manoeuvre adopted by RAF fighters was a steep, climbing spiral at about at 120 mph (193 km/h). The 109 trying to follow this often stalled, then had to dive to regain control. Should a Spitfire perform a half-roll, then dive, the superiority of the Spitfire's rate of roll would ensure the German fighter would gain too much speed, often overshooting its opponent. At high speeds, the Bf 109's flight controls became too heavy for the pilot to use and he could not respond to any evasive manoeuvres.

The example tested was an older Bf 109 airframe which had suffered from considerable damage, as had its engine. During some of the tests, the Bf 109 lacked some components of its oxygen gear, meaning that these comparisons were performed at a maximum altitude of 15,000 ft (4,572 m), not its optimum combat altitude. It is doubtful that the airframe tested could have performed as well as a newer, undamaged and well maintained airframe.

Luftwaffe pilots who flew captured Spitfires reached completely different conclusions; the German testing centre, E-Stelle Rechlin, reported:

The Bf 109 E type clearly outperforms all foreign planes. Speed: the Spitfire is at 0 m by ca. 20 km/h, at 4 km by ca. 10 km/h, Hurricane and Curtiss at 0 and 4 km altitude by ca. 60 km/h. A similar superiority of the Bf 109 E exists in the climb performance as well... In summary, it can be said that all three enemy planes types are inferior to the German planes regarding the flying qualities. Especially the Spitfire has bad rudder and elevator stability on the target approach. In addition the wing-mounted weapons have the known shooting-technique disadvantages.

Werner Mölders, the leading German ace at the time, who flew a captured Hurricane and a Spitfire Mk I in June 1940 (one of three examples obtained in flyable condition by the Luftwaffe), added:

It was very interesting to carry out the flight trials at Rechlin with the Spitfire and the Hurricane. Both types are very simple to fly compared to our aircraft, and childishly easy to take-off and land. The Hurricane is good-natured and turns well, but its performance is decidedly inferior to that of the Me 109. It has strong stick forces and is "lazy" on the ailerons... The Spitfire is one class better , being very nice to the touch, light, excellent in the turn and almost equal to the Bf 109E in performance, but it is a rotten dogfighter, as any sudden dive and the engine cuts out for seconds at a time, and because the propeller's only two pitch (takeoff and cruise), it means that in any vertical dogfight at constantly changing heights, it's either continually over-revving or never develops full power at all.

None of the RAF fighters tested had the constant speed propeller units, nor would they have used the special blend of 100 octane fuel needed for their Merlin engines. The comment about the Spitfire having "bad rudder and elevator stability" indicates that the aircraft was badly loaded Jeffrey Quill, Chief test pilot of Supermarine:

Another very important influence on stability is the position of the aircraft's centre of gravity, which usually lies at a point about one third of the mean chord of the wing. If the centre of gravity is moved backwards it tends to de-stabilise the aircraft...In general configuration the Mk I and Mk II production aeroplanes were almost identical to the prototype and so there was no trouble with their stability.(italics added)

The RAF fighters tested had the the two-speed propeller units. This was representative to their condition at the start of the Battle, however by mid-August large numbers of them received constant-speed units. The comment about the Spitfire having bad elevator stability and poor control harmony were also noted in R.A.F. manuals issued during the Battle of Britain, warning the pilots about the danger of the relative ease of tightening up in turns or in worst case, overstressing the airframe in dive. Indeed sevaral Spitfires were lost in this way when they broke up in the air during pull-outs, due to this control characteristic.

When reading such flight test reports on captured aircraft it should be noted that:

The two sets of flight trials showed that the "home team" possessed the superior fighter type. Given the naivety with which the trials were conducted, any other finding would probably been regarded as "politically incorrect." War provided the acid test of the two fighter's capabilities vis-a-vis each other. In the Battle of Britain most fighter versus fighter combat took place in the height band between 13,000 and 20,000 feet, because that was where the German bombers flew. At that altitude the Mark I and Mark II Spitfires were roughly equal to the Bf 109 in capability. In the fleeting air combats that were the norm, tactical initiative counted for far more than the relatively small performance differences that existed between the fighter types.

Messerschmitt Bf 110

At the start of the battle, the twin-engine Messerschmitt Bf 110 long range "Destroyer" (Zerstörer) was also expected to engage in air-to-air combat while escorting the Luftwaffe bomber fleet. It was soon realised that the Bf 110 stood little chance against determined pilots flying the Hurricane or Spitfire. Although reasonably fast (Bf 110C about 340 mph ) and possessing a respectable combat radius as well as carrying a heavy armament of two 20 mm MG FF/M cannon and four 7.92 mm MG 17s concentrated in the forward fuselage, along with a single 7.92 mm MG 15 mounted for rear defence in the rear cockpit, the 110 was only slightly more manoeuvrable than the bombers it was meant to escort. It also suffered from poor acceleration. The casualty rates of the Bf 110 fighter units were extremely high throughout the battle and they fulfilled none of the high aspirations of Hermann Göring, who had referred to them as his Eisenseiten or "Ironsides".

The most successful role of the 110 during the Battle was as a schnellbomber (fast bomber). One unit, Erprobungsgruppe 210, proved it could carry a greater bomb load over a greater range than a Ju 87 and deliver it with similar accuracy, while its much higher maximum speed, especially at lower altitudes, meant it was far more capable of evading RAF fighters.

Boulton Paul Defiant

For the British, the most disappointing fighter was the Boulton-Paul Defiant. This aircraft was intended to be used as a "bomber destroyer" because it was thought:

The speed of modern bombers is so great that it is only worthwhile to attack them under conditions which allow no relative motion between the fighter and its target. The fixed-gun fighter with guns firing ahead can only realise these conditions by attacking the bomber from dead astern...

By 1940, it was clear to both the RAF and the Luftwaffe that the deadliest opponents of bombers were single-engine, single-seat fighters with fixed, forward firing armament. Apart from the extra weight and drag imposed by the four gun turret and second crew member, the Defiant lacked any forward-firing armament. Should the gunner need to escape from the turret in an emergency, the only way he could do this was to traverse the turret to one side and bail out through the escape hatch; should the aircraft's electric system, which operated the turret, be disabled, there was no escape. After the strong intervention of Dowding, who realised the Defiant was designed to an unworkable concept, there were only two units equipped with this aircraft, 141 and 264 squadrons. On 19 July 141 Sqn had four Defiants shot down, one written off and one damaged, with 10 crew members killed or missing, after encountering Bf 109s of III./JG 51. Just over a month later, on 24 August, 264 Sqn suffered the loss of four Defiants shot down and three badly damaged with seven crew members killed. Both units were withdrawn from 11 Group and the Defiants were eventually reassigned as "cat's eye" night fighters, where they had more success.During the winter Blitz on London of 1940–41, the Defiant equipped four squadrons, shooting down more enemy aircraft than any other type.

Other fighter aircraft

On 11 November 1940, Fiat CR.42s flew their first raid against Great Britain as part of the Corpo Aereo Italiano. However, German Luftwaffe aircraft had difficulty flying in formation with the slow biplanes, which also proved to be poor match for more modern British fighters, and the CR.42s were transferred back to the Mediterranean theatre.

The only other biplane fighter in operational service was the Gloster Gladiator which equipped No. 247 Squadron RAF, stationed in Robourgh, Devon. Although no combat sorties took place at the height of the aerial battles, No. 247 Gladiators intercepted a He 111 in late October 1940, without result. No. 239 Squadron RAF using Gladiators in an army cooperation role and No. 804 Squadron, Fleet Air Arm outfitted with Sea Gladiators were also operational during the Battle of Britain.

Flown in significantly larger numbers, the Bristol Blenheim was used by both Bomber and Fighter Commands. Some 200 Mk I bombers were modified into Mk IF long-range fighters with 600 (Auxiliary Air Force) Squadron based at Hendon, the first squadron to take delivery of these variants in September 1938. By 1939, at least seven squadrons were operating these twin engined fighters and within a few months some 60 squadrons had transitioned to the type. The Mk IF proved to be slower and less nimble than expected and by June 1940, daylight Blenheim losses was to cause concern for Fighter Command. It was then decided that the IF would be relegated mainly to night fighter duties where No. 23 Squadron RAF who had already operated the type under night time conditions had better success.

In the German night bombing raid on London, 18 June 1940, Blenheim night fighters accounted for five German bombers thus proving they were better suited in the nocturnal role. In July, No. 600 Squadron, by then based at RAF Manston, had some of its IFs equipped with Airborne Interception (AI) Mk. III radar. With this radar equipment, a Blenheim from FIU at RAF Ford achieved the first success on the night of 2/3 July 1940, accounting for a Dornier Do 17 bomber. More successes came and, before long, the Blenheim was to prove invaluable in the night fighter role. Gradually, with the introduction of the Bristol Beaufighter in 1940–1941, its role was supplanted by its faster, better armed progeny.

The first Beaufighters entered service in early September 1940, at first delivered in standard day fighter camouflage schemes although the type was intended for a night fighting role. The first night operations took place in September and October 1940 and on the night of 19–20 November 1040, a Beaufighter IF, equipped with AI radar downed a Ju 88. The aircraft from No. 604 Squadron RAF was flown by Flt Lt. John Cunningham, scoring the first of his 20 victories.

Bomber aircraft

Luftwaffe

There were two main constraints on the capabilities of the Luftwaffe bombers the Dornier Do 17, the Heinkel He 111 and the Junkers Ju 88 in use in 1940. Despite the Luftwaffe being in the possession of advanced gyroscopic bomb sights, the Lotfe for daylight bombing and electronic navigational aids like the Knickebeing, X-Gerät and Y-Gerät for noctural bombing, there were some very fundamental limitations to the accuracy of bombing from level flight. In 1938, for example:

even well-qualified bomber crews could achieve only a two percent bombing accuracy in high-level, horizontal attacks (up to 13,500 t), and 12 to 25% accuracy in low level attacks against targets of between 165 to 330 t in radius.

In practice this meant that the ability of the main Luftwaffe bomber force to deliver precision attacks on tactical targets such as airfields and radar sites was severely limited. Large formations of these level bombers were required in order to blanket the target zone so that at least a few bombs might be direct hits.

For precision attack emphasis was placed on the development of aircraft which could utilise the technique of dive bombing which, in the case of the Junkers Ju 87 Stuka and the Junkers Ju 88;

was to prove effective in the hands of expert pilots, who, in dives of eighty degrees to within 2,300 feet from the ground, could deliver a bomb with an accuracy of less than thirty yards. Even average pilots could achieve a twenty-five percent success rate in hitting their targets.

The light bomb loads carried were used effectively. However, the Ju 87 was slow and possessed inadequate defences. Furthermore, it could not be effectively protected by fighters, because of its low speed and the very low altitudes at which it ended its dive bomb attacks. The Stuka depended on air superiority, the very thing being contested over Britain. It was therefore withdrawn from attacks on Britain in August after prohibitive losses, leaving the Luftwaffe short of precision ground-attack aircraft.

Another constraint was imposed by the light armament carried by the Luftwaffe bombers. At the start of the battle they were still armed with an average of three hand held MG 15 light machine guns, which were supplied by 75 round "saddle" magazines. When faced with concentrated attacks by modern fighters such as the Hurricane and Spitfire this proved totally inadequate. Although many of the Luftwaffe gunners were well trained and capable of hitting a fast moving fighter the damage done was seldom enough to stop the attack in time to prevent heavy damage being done to the bomber. The high rate of fire of the MG 15 meant that the small magazines emptied quickly; the time taken to reload often gave a fighter the time it needed to make a successful attack. Efforts had been made to increase the number of defensive weapons, but this also meant that because the weapons were hand-held either more crew members were needed in each aircraft, or the existing crew members could be overworked. It was a problem which was never to be fully resolved and the Luftwaffe bombers had to rely on the ability of their fighters to protect their formations.

The bombers did enjoy some advantages. Their fuel tanks were well protected by layers of self-sealing rubber, although the tracer ammunition which was carried by RAF fighters could sometimes ignite fuel vapour in empty tanks and, as more armour plate was added in vital areas, crew members became less vulnerable. Of the four types of bomber used by the Luftwaffe the Ju 88 was considered to be the most difficult to shoot down. As a bomber it was relatively manoeuvrable and, especially at low altitudes with no bomb load, it was fast enough to ensure that a Spitfire caught in a tail-chase would be hard pressed to catch up. In reality, the Ju 88, although operating in smaller numbers than the Do 17 and He 111, suffered the highest losses of the three German bomber types. Losses of Do 17 and He 111s amounted to 132 and 252 machines destroyed respectively, while the 313 Ju 88s were lost.

The He 111 was nearly 100 mph slower than the Spitfire and didn't present much of a challenge to catch, although the heavy armour, self-sealing fuel tanks and progressively uprated defensive armament meant that it was still a challenge to shoot down. The Do 17Z's air-cooled radial engines meant that many of these aircraft were able to survive fighter attack because there was no vulnerable cooling system to disable. The Dornier, known as "the flying pencil" due to its "thin" fuselage, also presented a small silhouette, and was harder to hit. The Dornier was also manoeuvrable, and as a result was popular in the Luftwaffe. The main problem with the Dornier was its limited 200 mile range, when fully loaded with bombs. Its bomb carrying capacity was also limited to 2,205 lbs

RAF

The aircraft used in the greatest numbers in Bomber Command was the Bristol Blenheim. The Blenheim was regarded as a pleasant aircraft to fly, although it did have some characteristics which could catch even experienced pilots by surprise. Unfortunately, with the rapid advances in technology which had taken place in the late 1930s by the start of the Second World War the Blenheim had become obsolescent. The aircraft had become heavier as extra service equipment was installed; much of this was found to be needed through operational experience. This, coupled with the rapid performance increases of fighters, had eclipsed the Blenheim's speed advantage.

Although the rear gunner was housed in a turret, the turret could only traverse a total of 180 degrees, leaving the forward arc open to attack. The light armament of one .303 calibre Vickers VGO in the turret and one .303 Browning machine gun in the port wing was seldom able to deter fighter opposition. Squadrons were forced to use several different improvisations in an attempt to provide better defensive armament, until officially sanctioned modifications were able to be introduced in early 1940. The Blenheim also proved to be vulnerable to flak, especially around the rear fuselage. Flexible, self-sealing liners had been fitted to the fuel tanks but they were still not fully protected against the 20 mm MG/FF cannon carried by the Luftwaffe's Bf 109s and Bf 110s.

The Blenheim was used to attack a range of targets, including the invasion barges and shipping gathered in French ports by the Germans, Luftwaffe airfields and strategic targets, such as factories and power stations, in Germany. In these roles the Blenheim force suffered from heavy casualties from flak guns and fighter attack.

Corpo Aereo Italiano (Italy)

The Italian bomber effort was fairly limited with Fiat BR.20 bombers used against Great Britain, serving with the Corpo Aereo Italiano, based in Belgium during the Battle of Britain. The 13° and 50° Stormo formed the major bombing strength of the Corpo Aereo Italiano. They were fully equipped with BR.20Ms, but this did not prevent one disaster after the other. The ferry journey from Italy to their bases in Belgium ended with five bombers crashing, and a further 12 being forced to land enroute due to poor visibility. The first mission, a night attack of 16 aircraft on Harwich, lead to three bombers being lost, with one crashing on takeoff and two becoming lost on their return, failing to find their airfield and their crews bailing out. In a famous battle on 11 November, a formation of 10 BR.20s, escorted by Fiat CR.42 biplane fighters on a daylight raid on Harwich, was intercepted by RAF Hurricanes. Despite the escort, three bombers were downed (together with three CR.42s) and four damaged, with no loss to the Hurricanes.

Full list of aircraft

United Kingdom

Only the squadrons listed as Battle of Britain RAF squadrons were counted as being part of the Battle of Britain for the award of a campaign medal

• Bristol Blenheim Mk IF - Fighter Command
• Bristol Beaufighter Mk I - Fighter Command
• Boulton Paul Defiant Mk I - Fighter Command
• Gloster Gladiator - Fighter Command (limited numbers)
• Supermarine Spitfire Mk I and Mk II - Fighter Command

Germany

• Breguet 521 Bizerte
• Dornier Do 17
  • Do 17M and P
  • Do 17Z-2
  • Do 17Z-3
• Dornier Do 18D-1
• Focke-Wulf Fw 200C-3
• Heinkel He 59C-2
• Heinkel He 111
  • He 111H-2
  • He 111H-3
  • He 111H-4
  • He 111P-1
• Junkers Ju 87B-1 and Ju 87B-2 Stuka
• Junkers Ju 88A-1 and Ju 88A-5
• Messerschmitt Me 109
  • Me 109E-1
  • Me 109E-3
  • Me 109E-4
  • Me 109E-4/N
  • Me 109E-4/B
  • Me 109E-7
  • Me 109F-1
• Messerschmitt Me 110C-4

Italy

• Fiat BR.20M Cicogna
• Fiat CR.42S Falco

References

Notes

• Werner Mölders flew one of the first operational Bf 109F-1s over England from early October 1940; he may well have been credited with shooting down eight Hurricanes and four Spitfires while flying Werke Nummer 5628, Stammkennzeichen SG+GW between 11 October and 29 October 1940. Photographs of SG+GW appear in Prien & Rodeike, 1995, pp.8-9.

Citations

1. Aeroplane and Armament Experimental Establishment, Martlesham Heat. Handling trials of Spitfire K 5054. September 1936.
2. Feist 1993, p. 27.
3. Major Al Williams' Test Flight With Bf-109D
4. Messerschmitt Me. 109 Handling and Manoeuvrability Tests, 5.4. Discussion. By M. B. Morgan, M.A. and D. E. Morris, B.SC. September 1940.
5. Bf 109 Myths and views from the cockpitRetrieved: 14 July 2008
6. ^ Spitfire Vs 109. Retrieved: 10 April 2008.
7. Price 1980, pp. 22, 41, 152.
8. Price 1996, pp. 20-21, 53.
9. Price, Alfred: The Spitfire Story. Page 76.
10. Bungay 2000, p. 197.
11. Bungay, 2000.
12. Bungay, 2000.
13. ^ Price 1996, pp. 18–21.
14. Report on 609 Sqn Spitfire armour plating Retrieved: 15 July 2008.
15. DB 601N datasheet and history."
16. Mankau and Petrick 2001, p. 24.
17. ^ Society of Automotive Engineers 1997, pp. 11-12.
18. Note: See "External Links"
19. Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And Its Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War, February 1941, Australian War Memorial Archives.
20. RAE Farnborough report September 1940 Retrieved: 9 April 2008.
21. Comparative trials of Spitfire Vs Captured 109, July 1940 Retrieved: 9 April 2008.
22. Holmes 2007, p. 56.
23. Bf 109 Myths; hard to fly? Retrieved: 24 April 2008.
24. Comparison flight between Bf 109 E, Bf 110 C, Spitfire, Hurricane and Curtiss, August 1940 Retrieved: 14 July 2008.
25. Holmes 2007, p. 57.
26. Quill, 1983 pp, 230-232
27. A.P.1565B. Pilot's notes Spitfire II A and IIB aeroplanes, Merlin engine. July 1940.
28. A&AEE, Boscombe Down - An investigation into handling and stability characteristics with special reference to pull out from dives and steep turns.
29. Price 1996, pp. 87–90.
30. ^ Weal 1999, pp. 42–51.
31. Bungay 2000, pp. 257–258.
32. Bungay 2000, p. 84.
33. Ramsay 1989, pp. 326–327.
34. Ramsay 1989, pp. 376–377.
35. Bungay 2000, pp. 84, 178, 269–273.
36. Ansell 2005, pp. 712–714.
37. Taylor 1969, p. 326.
38. ^ Green and Swanborough 1982, p. 308.
39. Rimell 1990, p. 27.
40. Rimell 1990, p. 23.
41. Rimell 1990, p. 17.
42. Cooper 1981, p. 50.
43. The Battle of Britain; German Perspective Retrieved: 13 June 2008.
44. Cooper 1981, p. 46.
45. Bungay 2000, p. 256.
46. Aircraft Strength and Losses.
47. Price 1980, pp. 7–8.
48. Goss 2005, p. 12.
49. Warner, 2005 p.158
50. Warner, 2005 pp.155-158
51. Green and Swanborough 1982, pp. 311–312.
52. "Mölders victory list." Retrieved: 20 April 2008.

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External links

• Royal Air Force history
• Battle Of Britain Historical Society
• Battle of Britain in the Words of Air Chief Marshall Hugh Dowding (despatch to the Secretary of State, August 1941)
• ADLG Visits RAF Uxbridge Battle of Britain Operations Room
• British Invasion Defences
• Map of UK Airfields and squadrons.
• RAF Battle of Britain Roll of Honour
• Battle-Of-Britain Website.
• Battle-Of-Britain Website in Dutch.
• Royal Engineers Museum Royal Engineers and Second World War (airfield repair)
• Battle of Britain Memorial
• Shoreham Aircraft Museum
• Tangmere Military Aviation Museum
• Kent Battle of Britain Museum
• Sir Keith Park describing Battle of Britain (Radio New Zealand audio & podcast download) Note: Scroll down to April 25 ANZAC day, 10:50 am "Sir Keith Park".
• Battle of Britain from the German perspective (Lt Col Earle Lund, USAF): Pdf file
• Battle of Britain from the German perspective (Lt Col Earle Lund, USAF)
• American supplies of 100 Octane fuel

• Battle of Britain