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Military history: European / Italian / World War II B‑class

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Italy B‑class High‑importance

This article is within the scope of WikiProject Italy, a collaborative effort to improve the coverage of Italy on Misplaced Pages. If you would like to participate, please visit the project page, where you can join the discussion and see a list of open tasks.ItalyWikipedia:WikiProject ItalyTemplate:WikiProject ItalyItaly B This article has been rated as B-class on Misplaced Pages's content assessment scale. High This article has been rated as High-importance on the project's importance scale.

One of the most interesting counterfactuals emerging in World War II history is what would have happened if Italy had been engaged earlier. The tantalizing prospect glimmers that if Britain and France had been able to declare war on Italy as well as Germany in 1939, Mussolini's house of cards could have been torn apart before Germany could have intervened .

There is an even more compelling counterfactual: the British and French gave way to Italy in its Abyssinian adventure, partly, it seems, because they were genuinely impressed by the evident power of Fascist Italy. But it was a sham then, just as much as it was a sham later. One can argue that the history of the 20th Century would have been radically different had Fascist Italy been suppressed in the middle of the 1930s.

From this counterfactual comes a significant question: we know now how feeble Italy was, but why did the military advisors of the day not realize this? The answers to this question have the potential to illuminate not only past history, but also many of the perplexing military questions we face today.

Well, everybody miscalculated the international situation in the years before the war. The British were paralysed by fear of the Italian Navy throughout the '30s, but they discounted the small and apparently weak German fleet: a serious error

Mussolini and Stalin also underestimated German power: they were expecting Germany vs. France/Britain to be another slow war of attrition which would take years to decide. If they had foreseen the rapid German victories of 1940 they would have stayed away from Hitler and supported the Allies.

And of course, Hitler in turn seriously miscalculated Russian power...

The lesson of the whole sorry episode is "expect the unexpected"

Mmartins

The reason France and Britain didn't move against Italy during the 30s is part military and part political. Military, it couldn't be known in advance that the British Matilda tanks would be so important in the African war against Italy and neither could the triumph of air power over the battleships be known beforehand. So even though Britain/France had clear advantage over Italy they still saw that they would need to pay a heavy cost in ships and resources to defeat her (the whole point of the Italian navy versus British and the French). If they'd attacked Italy in 1939, they would not only be launching a war of aggression against a neutral nation, but they would also have to gather much bigger forces to defeat the Italians in Africa (which would drain manpower from Europe) than was the case in Operation Compass were a British force defeated the Italians in spite of severe numerical inferiority that wasn't of the British choosing. The political reasons which have been lost in the post-WWII propganda of the allies as the altruistic saviors of mankind is that the French and British governments (if not their populations) prefered a fascist government in Italy (and Spain and Germany) over the leftist government that surely would've taken it's place had Mussolini been brought down, say by military defeat at the hands of the British over Abyssinia. It was this preference that gave the fascist governments such leeway during the 30s although it is generally forgetten. Even Churchill wrote at the time that he would want a Hitler to save Britain should Britain ever face the same ruin as Germany. --Sus scrofa 20:45, 29 January 2006 (UTC)

Inaccuracies

"However, on June 10, 1940, as Rommel reached the English Channel, ..."

1. German forces reached the English Channel, surrounding the French and British armies in northeast France and the low countries on May 20, 1940, not June 10. Indeed, by June 4 the Dunkirk evacuation was over and pocket had surrendered.

2. Rommel was only a division commander in the 1940 campaign, and his panzer division was NOT the one that reached the English Channel on May 20. If you want to attribute the reaching of the channel to a German commander, the appropriate person is Kluge, commander of Panzer Group Kluge and in control of the panzer forces that did reach the channel.

Pre War Naval Demonstration for Germany

Before Italy decalared war, there was a massive and highly complex set of naval demonstations performed with Hitler in attendance. I remember reading about something like 70 Submarines firing deck guns in formation, then submersing and surfacing in perfect formation. There was also some record-breaking fleet sail-past at something like 37 Knots. Does anyone know the details of this, and if so, should it be included in the article? --Zegoma beach 20:56, 31 March 2006 (UTC)

Tone and Citation Tags

I've taken out the Tone tag because I don't see what is wrong with the tone of this article and because I don't think it appropriate this tag should be added by an unidentified IP address. I feel the same way about the citation tag but will leave it pending debate. This article is a summary article and each section has an underlying 'Main article' in Misplaced Pages cited. The contents therefore summarise the underlying articles and don't need citations. If there is a problem with citations this should be addressed in the underlying articles. Stephen Kirrage 11:34, 14 March 2007 (UTC)

In the absence of any response to the above, I've taken out the unreferenced tag as well Stephen Kirrage 08:41, 27 March 2007 (UTC)

"and thus they have remained theoretically at war with each other up to the present time."

I must say, the notion that two states formerly at war that although for a long time now at peace have failed to agree a peace treaty somehow makes them still "theoretically" at war seems to me rather preposterous. There is no realistic sense, even theoretical, in which one can claim that Italy is still at war with Japan. (This is not even comparable to the two Koreas, which still have a significant military buildup targeted against each other, and in the case of which a return to hostilities is still conceivable -- Italy and Japan do not target each other militarily, and the thought of a resumption of hostilities between them is simply unimaginable.) It seems far saner to say that a peace treaty is not necessary to end a state of war (even a "theoretical" state of war), than to claim that Italy and Japan are still in any sense (however theoretical) at war. --SJK (talk) 08:50, 4 May 2008 (UTC)

Narrative must begin earlier

The history of Italy during the Second World War does not begin with the Nazi invasion of Poland nor with Mussolini's 10 June declaration. While I don't have the time to write this section now, I would hope someone would edit this piece to add Italy's invasions of Ethiopia (1935), Albania, and other territories, without which it is not really possible to understand Italy's position in 1939. Italy's irredentism and Mussolini's ideas about resurrecting a "Roman Empire" begin much earlier than Poland and should be reflected on this page. While Italy may not have been allied with Germany and fighting Britain and France right away, its actions in the Mediterranean and Red Sea were very much a part of the situation in Europe that led to war. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 88.254.241.30 (talk) 22:37, 3 June 2008 (UTC)

Censoring by Nick Dowling

Who gives him the right to decide that the broadcasts by Radio Rome and Radio Berlin concerning the role of Axis forces are unreliable and of dubious nature. I'd hate to see him work for BBC. What has he got the mentality of a child?? Isn't it obvious that historians would've discovered by now that Radio Berlin and Radio Rome had got it all wrong, inventing units that didn't exist and placing them in wrong areas, and ofcourse, getting the dates, timing and weather all wrong when describing actions. Nick Dowling, get real, and have a read of the pages that deal with "Siege Of Tobruk", "Operation Brevity", "Operation Crusader", etcetera, to see that you got it all wrong mate. GENERALMESSE. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Generalmesse (talk • contribs) 03:25, 8 June 2008 (UTC)

I've responded at Talk:Italian participation in the Eastern Front and have reported you for incivility. Nick Dowling (talk) 06:19, 8 June 2008 (UTC)

Reputation of Italian fighting efficiency during World War II

This is a sensitive topic for some. From what I have learned, there are some that have essentially spammed and vandalised the page with unfounded bias and propaganda. There are some that have been battling the propaganda. Others have been constructive. Yet, there are some that are aware that this is a topic with a historical legacy of being incorrectly depicted and simply wish to get the facts out.

Further there are others who would not be aware that a ubiquitous number of books have dismissed the Italian involvement in the war. For them it may be difficult to believe as we inherently grew up to believe that non-fiction books are generally gospel. Well, even a technical text book or the most cutting–edge work is prone to mistakes. The whole premise of scientist/philosophical reporting is about constructive critique in order to build on what we currently know. There is plenty to warrant a reassessment of the reputation of Italian soldiers. Their memories are equally as worthy as those of the other participants. To not appraise their involvement based on facts is a disservice to them, and also denigrates those who fought bravely against them. It always cuts both ways.

I would hope that if anyone has any concerns regarding the content in this subsection that they present their arguments here. Lets work together, rather than against each other. Feel free to comment.

I will start with an excerpt to illustrate some of the relevant background, and provided justification for the subsection. This comes from relevant fragments form the first 3 pages of: Walker, Ian W. (2003). Iron Hulls, Iron Hearts; Mussolini's Elite Armoured Divisions in North Africa. Ramsbury: The Crowood Press. ISBN 1-86126-646-4.;

In Britain and the wider English-speaking world almost everyone is familiar with the Desert War fought in North Africa between June 1940 and May 1943. They have all herd of the famous Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery and his 8th Army. They are equally familiar with his legendary opponent Field Marshall Erwin Rommel and his Deutches Africa Korps (DAK). The epic encounter between these two rivals an their two forces that took place at El Alamein is viewed as one of the key battles of World War II. There are countless book on the North African campaign, ranging in scope from academic studies of the grand strategies through to personal memoirs. In their entirety these works manage to touch on almost every conceivable aspect of the conflict.

In spite of this, I hope to offer an entirely different perspective on this familiar campaign of World War II. This will come form a focus on the hitherto neglected Italian involvement. In all previous accounts in English, the Italians have either been ignored completely or afforded little more than an acknowledgement of their presence – yet they made up the bulk of the axis forces involved in this campaign, a fact not yet reflected in existing accounts. They are sometimes allowed a place during the first phase of the campaign as Britain’s only opponents, but the arrival of Rommel in early 1941 quickly relegates them to obscurity thereafter.....In terms of their influence on fighting, however, they are usually dismissed in a few paragraphs that primarily concentrate on describing their many deficiencies. Thereafter, they are usually ignored.....In Britain pople are familiar with the war time propaganda images of endless lines of Italian prisoners...This strong visual image was reinforced by contemporary newsreel and newspaper accounts of Italian military incompetence and cowardice, often involving the use of racial stereotypes. This image was often deliberately contrasted with German military efficiency and ferocity. This produced a strong British prejudice against the Italians very early in the war, which has consistently been reinforced in most histories produced since its end....All this has left a powerful legacy in English-speaking accounts, in which the Italians are widely seen as a nation of dilettantes, devoid of military skills and entirely lacking courage. It high is time, however, that this view was re-examined to reveal what, if any, truth lies behind it. It is only by doing so that we will be able to assess what impact the Italians actually had on this campaign. ....The process really requires a complete re-evaluation of the Italian economy and the political and military systems......

I recommend this book as part of ones library to all who are interested in the North African campaign, in particular.

I’ll state now that I will reinsert verifiable statements that are deleted, within reason.

Romaioi (talk) 16:20, 4 July 2008 (UTC)

Reputation of Italian fighting efficiency during World War II (Again!)

There have been a number of edits recently giving examples of brave battalion actions. If the point of this section is to show that the "general" reputation of Italian fighting prowess was misrepresented during and immediately after the war, then citing a few individual battalion actions won't help. What we need is much broader evidence - opinions of allied generals, German generals and later historians - of which there is a convincing amount of in the article already. I'm tempted to go through this section and remove the "micro detail" (subject to any reaction here to this comment) which at present is swamping and in my opinion diluting the broader evidence. After all, at battalion level it's easy to quote just as many incidents where battalions made a poor showing. Stephen Kirrage 12:49, 5 August 2008 (UTC)

What has happened to this article, is cleary gangstarism on the part of noclador and others who refuses to admit that many Italian units fought well in North Africa. The fact that some Italian battalions overwhelmed their adversaries at Alemein is certainly the tip of the iceberg for these Italian successes were unknown in the post war literature in English-speaking countries, and have only just come to light thanks to some people who have dug deep. These fairly recent relevations should not be deleted like noclador has just done. This individual even had the nerve to remove references/evidence in the form of profesor Sadkovich and other authors who pointed out that the Italians played an important role and were mainly responsable for taking large numbers of prisoners in the battle of Alemein on 22nd and 27th of July. This is clearly ganstarism on his part and let me repeat, he has committed a sin according to the wikipedia rules by also removing a number of verifiable sources in the page about the first battle of Alemein that proved the Italians played an important part. This individual is guilty of perpetuating the myth about the Italians in North Africa like the first lot of writers (many of whom were biased or ill informed generals) in the English-speaking world. Reading that page about Alemein makes you believe the Italians played a ridiculously small part and the Germans did all the fighting while the Italians did all the surrendering. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 202.172.105.49 (talk) 01:51, 6 August 2008 (UTC)

Are you perhaps GeneralMesse? Your abusive friend Noclador tried his darndest to invent proof that I was one of GeneralMesse's sockpuppets and hurled a lot of insults my way. I am still dealing with the outfall. You must have sparked something in him. If it is a big issue for you, you can raise it with the administrators as a WQA or ANI.

In deleting your inclusions Noclador has also vandalised some existing "concensus" information. It is yet another example of him not doing his homework properly. There is no need to state that an author is a professor or Dr. or whatever, the surname should suffice. Just please ensure that you cite what you include. I will undo Noclador's vandalism. But, with respect, I think that it needs some work. So I have commented out what I believe to be your contibutions for further consideration. They are still there.

"I agree with Stephen Kirrage. There is probably no need to include many battalion level actions. Those passages are more appropriate in campaign specific articles. The information that was there before your inclusions actually painted an accurate enough picture. The formatting of your included content was not consistent with the existing content. When you make a quote can you please format accordingly, i.e. as quote?

Romaioi (talk) 08:27, 6 August 2008 (UTC)

I don't normally respond to anonymous talk page entries but here I must defend noclador. As it currently stands, as Romaioi has pointed out, the section makes a convincing rebuttal of the "myth" using credible quotes from historians and generals. The micro-detail that has been removed in my view actually detracted from the argument by clogging the article up with unnecessary and confusing detail. Sourced or not this stuff already appears in other more specific articles anyway. The aggressive and POV tone of 202.172.105.49's comment does not help and is in itself contrary to the Misplaced Pages ethos. By using words like "gangsterism", "myth", "sin" and referring to sources as "biased or ill-informed" the editor above betrays his/her own POV stance which manifests itself in approving sources that align with a particular view and denigrating those that don't. NPOV is a cornerstone of Misplaced Pages and 202.172.105.49 could do no better than revisiting the contents of Misplaced Pages:Neutral point of view and in particular the following:

2.5 Balance

NPOV weights viewpoints in proportion to their prominence. However, when reputable sources contradict one another and are relatively equal in prominence, the core of the NPOV policy is to let competing approaches exist on the same page: work for balance, that is: describe the opposing viewpoints according to reputability of the sources, and give precedence to those sources that have been the most successful in presenting facts in an equally balanced manner.

2.6 Impartial tone

Misplaced Pages describes disputes. Misplaced Pages does not engage in disputes. A neutral characterization of disputes requires presenting viewpoints with a consistently impartial tone, otherwise articles end up as partisan commentaries even while presenting all relevant points of view. Even where a topic is presented in terms of facts rather than opinions, inappropriate tone can be introduced through the way in which facts are selected, presented, or organized. Neutral articles are written with a tone that provides an unbiased, accurate, and proportionate representation of all positions included in the article. The tone of Misplaced Pages articles should be impartial, neither endorsing nor rejecting a particular point of view.

Stephen Kirrage 09:08, 6 August 2008 (UTC)

To the IP I would say that I agree entirely with Stephen Kirrage. Your edit was POV-motivated, did nothing to improve the article (indeed made it worse by cluttering it up with distracting detail), and noclador was entirely correct to RV it.

To Romaioi I'd say, yes, this IP probably is Generalmesse. But, in general, OK, you've made your point about noclador, now move on. Bearing grudges is unhelpful, and you should restrict yourself to commenting on the content, rather than other editors. AlasdairGreen27 (talk) 11:30, 6 August 2008 (UTC)

noclador is quite a bully on the wiki editorial board who has already decided what can and cannot be written with regards to the Italian army in WWII. I would love to contribute but I'm afraid I'd be labelled a Nazi. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 72.157.177.44 (talk) 12:26, 8 August 2008 (UTC)

Bruno, what are you doing? Have you forgotten that you are banned? AlasdairGreen27 (talk) 14:00, 8 August 2008 (UTC)

What we need is much broader evidence - opinions of allied generals, German generals and later historians (kirrages 05.08.08

I've just set up an account as teresita100403 and was much suprised to find out that the Italian army defeated a number of Commonwealth units at Alamein. Of course that information is no longer visible, due to vandalism? I believe readers need to know about the successes at battalion-level of the Sabratha, Trieste and Trento at El Alamein. After all these battalions were representative of their divisions and the perception out there is that these divisions simply 'melted away in the fighting' but in reality these divisions rallied and indeed fought well. Sadkovich pointed this out and extracts from his work about the Italians at El Alamein, that were available for all to see in Wikepedia, have been removed by noclador who sees his work as an 'incovenient truth'. I have just pointed this out in the page about the First Battle of Alamein, that the Sabratha recovered her lost positions and that the Trento did the same in its sector, but I gather both edits will be removed by vandals in the disguise of editors. I say goodbye for now but encourage everybody, including noclador and his team of puppets to stop 'sweeping the truth under the carpet,' and to read the following extract(p.141-142)from World War II in Europe, Africa, and the Americas, with General Sources: A Handbook of Literature and Research(by Loyd E. Lee and Robin D. S. Higham, Greenwood Publishing Group, 1997,ISBN 0313293252):

Because many writers have uncritically repeated stereotypes shared by their sources, biases and prejudices have taken on the status of objective obervations, including the idea that the Germans and British were the only belligerents in the Mediterranean after Italian setbacks in early 1941. Sadkovich questioned this point of view in 'Of Myths and Men' and 'The Italian Navy', but persistent stereotypes, including that of the incompetent Italian, are well entrenched in the literature, from Puleston's early 'The Influence of Sea Power', to Gooch's 'Italian Military Incompetence,' to more recent publications by Mack Smith, Knox and Sullivan. Wartime bias in early British and American histories, which focused on German operations, dismissed Italian forces as inept and or unimportant, and viewed Germany as the pivotal power in Europe during the interwar period. For a discussion of this, see Sadkovich, 'Anglo-American Bias and the Italo-Greek War.' Bias includes both implicit assumptions, evident in Knox's title 'The Sources of Italy's Defeat in 1940: Bluff or Institutionalized Incompetence?' and the selective use of sources. Also see Sullivan's 'The Italian Armed Forces.' Sims, 'The Fighter Pilot,' ignored the Italians, while d'Este in 'World War II in the Meditaranean' shaped his reader's image of Italians by citing a German comment that Italy's surrender was 'the basest treachery' and by discussing Allied and German commanders but ignoring Messe, whose 'Come fini la guerra in Africa' is an account of operations in Tunisia, where he commanded the Italian First Army, which held off both the U.S. Second Corps and the British Eighth Army. Like Young, whose 'Rommel the Desert Fox' created the Rommel myth, authors can appear biased because they echo sources that reflect the prejudices and assumptions of the period. Indeed, many of our unconscious assumptions about the war have been shaped by documentaries like 'Victory at Sea', by sophisticated propaganda like Frank Capra's wartime 'Why We Fight' films, and by Hollywood films, television programs, and popular fiction in general. Dependence on non-Italian sources compromised Murray's analysis of the Italian military in 'The Change in the European Balance of Power', it led Van Creveld to conclude in 'Supplying War' that Italians were "useless ballast," and it caused Fraser, 'And We Shall Shock Them', to dimiss Graziani as an anxiety-ridden procrastinator but praised Wavell as a fearless problem solver. Liddel Hart's German sources led him to conclude in 'The Generals Talk' that "Italian jealousy of the Germans" had helped save Egypt. Such conclusions later lead Mearsheimer to question Liddell Hart's objectivity, though Liddell Hart's history of British 'Tanks' and his concise 'History of the Second World War' remain useful, as do Jackson's 'The Battle for North Africa' and Lewin's 'Rommel' and 'The Life and Death of the Afrika Corps'. If stereotypes make it hard for readers of English to credit any acts of heroism or any display of competence or persistence by Italians, the official Italian service histories, De Felice, Faldella, and Sadkovich in works previously cited, have sought to set the record straight-- 200.253.161.2 (talk) 03:58, 9 August 2008 (UTC)

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