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Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310 (Minn. 1971), was a case in which the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that Minnesota law limited marriage to opposite-sex couples, and that this limitation did not violate the United States Constitution. Upon Review The United States Supreme Court, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), dismissed the appeal "for want of substantial federal question".

Facts

In 1971, two men, Richard John Baker and James Michael McConnell, applied to Gerald R. Nelson, the clerk of Minnesota's Hennepin County District Court, for a marriage license. Nelson denied the request on the sole grounds that the two were of the same sex. Baker and McConnell then sued Nelson, arguing that Minnesota law permitted same-sex marriages, and that Nelson's interpretation that it did not violated their rights under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The trial court ruled Nelson was not required to issue Baker and McConnell a marriage license, and specifically directed that they not be issued a license. On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling, and specifically ruled that Minnesota's limiting of marriage to opposite-sex unions "does not offend the First, Eighth, Ninth, or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution".

Opinion of the court

The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)—in which the Court ruled that a statute probiting interracial marriages was unconstitutional—was not applicable to the Baker case. The Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits some state restrictions upon the right to marry, but that "in commonsense and in a constitutional sense, there is a clear distinction between a marital restriction based merely upon race and one based upon the fundamental difference in sex".

Review by the United States Supreme Court

Upon losing their case before the Minnesota Supreme Court, Baker and McConnell appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Upon review, the United States Supreme Court dismissed the case "for want of a substantial federal question".

Unlike a denial of certiorari, a dismissal for want of a substantial federal question constitutes a decision on the merits of the case, and as such, is binding precedent on all lower Federal Courts.

"ntil the Supreme Court should instruct otherwise, inferior federal courts had best adhere to the view that the Court has branded a question as unsubstantial". Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975) "ismissals for want of a substantial federal question without doubt reject the specific challenges presented in the statement of jurisdiction." Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977). Lower Federal Courts are expressely prohibited from ruling in a way inconsistant with binding precedent. " prevent lower courts from coming to opposite conclusions on the precise issues presented and necessarily decided by those actions." Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977)

This is explicit not only in the holdings of the United States Supreme Court, but also the holdings of other Circuit Courts. ower courts are bound by summary decision by this Court until such time as the Court informs that are not. Doe v. Hodgson, 478 F.2d 537, 539 (2nd Cir. 1973)

Baker is binding precedent and until overruled by the United States Supreme Court, it remains that way, as such Baker expressly establishes that a State's decision to define marriage in whatever manner the state desires, does not offend the United States Constitution.

Subsequent history

Lockyer v. San Francisco

In 2004, Justice Kennard of the California Supreme Court noted the precedential value of Baker in her Concurring and Dissenting opinion in Lockyer v. San Francisco:

"ndeed, there is a decision of the United States Supreme Court, binding on all other courts and public officials, that a state law restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples does not violate the federal Constitution’s guarantees of equal protection and due process of law. After the Minnesota Supreme Court held that Minnesota laws preventing marriages between persons of the same sex did not violate the equal protection or due process clauses of the United States Constitution (Baker v. Nelson (Minn. 1971) 191 N.W.2d 185), the decision was appealed to the United States Supreme Court, as federal law then permitted (see 28 U.S.C. former § 1257(2), 62 Stat. 929 as amended by 84 Stat. 590). The high court later dismissed that appeal “for want of substantial federal question.” (Baker v. Nelson (1972) 409 U.S. 810.) As the United States Supreme Court has explained, a dismissal on the ground that an appeal presents no substantial federal question is a decision on the merits of the case, establishing that the lower court’s decision on the issues of federal law was correct. (Mandel v. Bradley (1977) 432 U.S. 173, 176; Hicks v. Miranda (1975) 422 U.S. 332, 344.) Summary decisions of this kind “prevent lower courts from coming to opposite conclusions on the precise issues presented and necessarily decided by those actions.” (Mandel v. Bradley, supra, at p. 176.) Thus, the high court’s summary decision in Baker v. Nelson, supra, 409 U.S. 810, prevents lower courts and public officials from coming to the conclusion that a state law barring marriage between persons of the same sex violates the equal protection or due process guarantees of the United States Constitution.

The binding force of a summary decision on the merits continues until the high court instructs otherwise. (Hicks v. Miranda, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 344.)That court may release lower courts from the binding effect of one of its decisions on the merits either by expressly overruling that decision or through “ ‘doctrinal developments’ ” that are necessarily incompatible with that decision. (Id. at p. 344.) The United States Supreme Court has not expressly overruled Baker v. Nelson, supra, 409 U.S. 810, nor do any of its later decisions contain doctrinal developments that are necessarily incompatible with that decision... Until the United States Supreme Court says otherwise, which it has not yet done, Baker v. Nelson defines federal constitutional law on the question whether a state may deny same-sex couples the right to marry." Lockyer V San Francisco (Kennard, J. Concurring and Dissenting) (Emphasis Added.)

Wilson v. Ake

Baker was cited as precedent in the January 19, 2005 case of Wilson v. Ake, argued before James S. Moody, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division. In that case, two Florida women, married the previous summer in Massachusetts, sued Florida and the federal government, arguing that Florida's refusal to recognize their marriage, and the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), were violations of their rights under the United States Constitution. The district court dismissed the case, ruling that the U.S. Supreme Court's Summary Affirmance in Baker was binding on the district court—which meant that the District Court was required to uphold DOMA and the Florida marriage statute as constitutional.

External links

• Text of Baker v. Nelson
• Baker and McConnell's jurisdictional statement filing with the U.S. Supreme Court
• Text of Wilson v. Ake

• United States state case law