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| Biosecurity is the guarantee that a state can maintain the health of its citizens and agriculture even under active threat of ] or ] disease. | |||
| ??''original said "'''by definition''' it cannot be ensured by ...." - not sure how this strictly follows - can someone explain''?? | |||
| ⚫ | Countermeasures include monitoring statistics for patterns which suggest emerging epidemics; ensuring sufficient stockpiles of the appropriate vaccines or other medicines required to contain an outbreak; public health education and alertness; widespread use of sophisticated pathogen detectors. | ||
| However, any ] has flaws, loopholes, vulnerabilities, and incentives to subvert it - and ] actually intends doing personal harm. Military or ] measures are always inadequate to protect a ] system that encourages the propagation of risks to human bodies and natural ecologies: ] is a stopgap measure. In an age of widespread knowledge of ] and potentially huge disruptions of natural ecology by ], e.g. flooding, migrant insects, it seems that more profound long-term change to institutions is required to ensure '''biosecurity''' previously taken for granted: | |||
| ⚫ | Preventative measures are unlikely to be effective or acceptable to the general population in peacetime. There could be general vaccination against biowarfare agents, but the public is unlikely to accept potentially harmful vaccines for such agents, which tend to be extinct or very rare in the wild. States do not currently routinely vaccinate against likely biowarfare agents. | ||
| What really distinguishes '''biosecurity''' from ], ], ] or ] systems (fire, paramedics) that guarantee other forms of ] is the long-term focus on insulating all organisms (not just humans) from the active threat of infection or parasitic competition, and the assumption that "what can go wrong will go wrong", i.e. once threats enter ] they are assumed to be risks to everyone, not just the few people who were present and perhaps saved recently. | |||
| ⚫ | Gathering intelligence could theoretically prevent attacks. However, in the case of an agent like smallpox, an attack could consist of a single individual with no apparent syptoms simply entering the country and walking around in population centres. | ||
| Local short-term measures to allay direct ] harms or detect it in advance of attacks, usually called ], are a small part of '''biosecurity'''. Military or other emergency responses can only be marshalled in a small area over a short time, whereas dangerous molecules, small organisms (or even potentially microscopic machines or robots) in the living ecology can be dormant for unlimited lengths of time and then strike. Active ] bypasses all ], and is an ancient and common technique of warfare, e.g. "scorched Earth", "poisoning wells". | |||
| '''Biosecurity''' can be assured and insured (but not *en*sured) by a robust ] that includes medical care and ]. Various means of ] test perimeters (around storage, transport) for effectiveness under threat and temptation, and are usually required to maintain insurance coverage, government licenses, and trade access to ] concerned about new infections. | |||
| One proposal to align biosecurity needs with public policy is ] - which re-patterns zones of inspection and enforcement around natural borders. This would extend existing measures to ensure agricultural regions are not infected by organisms from other ], e.g. along main highways in California. Under such schemes, North American '''biosecurity''' measures might be stronger along the ] and weaker along the US-Canada or US-Mexico borders (across which air, water, genes and bacteria flow without limit as part of natural ecology). ], ] or a ] may stress other benefits of such moves to secure urban centres or natural ] - including taxation and tariff schemes actually aligned to environment risks. | |||
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| ⚫ | Gathering intelligence could theoretically prevent |
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| However, intelligent threats can never be reliably contained by preventions; | |||
| ⚫ | Countermeasures include |
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| A single global ] and ] building on ], ], and various treaty measures to limit proliferation of ], has been proposed as part of ] peacekeeping mandate. This has been rejected by "rogue nations" and ] wishing to keep secrets from each other. So '''biosecurity''' remains an "end of pipe dream". It seems possible to ensure only with fundamental changes in ] and deep implementation of goals of the ] and ] - lack of it may threaten fundamental institutions of ], e.g. when a 2001 ] attack emptied the U.S. Capitol. | |||
Revision as of 00:43, 22 March 2002
Biosecurity is the guarantee that a state can maintain the health of its citizens and agriculture even under active threat of biological warfare or epidemic disease. ??original said "by definition it cannot be ensured by ...." - not sure how this strictly follows - can someone explain??
Countermeasures include monitoring statistics for patterns which suggest emerging epidemics; ensuring sufficient stockpiles of the appropriate vaccines or other medicines required to contain an outbreak; public health education and alertness; widespread use of sophisticated pathogen detectors.
Preventative measures are unlikely to be effective or acceptable to the general population in peacetime. There could be general vaccination against biowarfare agents, but the public is unlikely to accept potentially harmful vaccines for such agents, which tend to be extinct or very rare in the wild. States do not currently routinely vaccinate against likely biowarfare agents.
Gathering intelligence could theoretically prevent attacks. However, in the case of an agent like smallpox, an attack could consist of a single individual with no apparent syptoms simply entering the country and walking around in population centres.
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