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Falun Gong is a spiritual movement based on a qigong method devised in 1992 by Li Hongzhi, the movement's founder. Its history can be roughly divided into three parts - questions surrounding its phenomenal growth in China, the Chinese government's crackdown and suppression of the movement, and the movement's response to the Chinese government from abroad.

Falun Gong become immensely popular amongst the Chinese public in the mid 1980s due to its perceived health benefits and its philosophy which gives followers a sense of security in an increasingly uncertain world. However, the movement's teachings were questioned by skeptics and academics, and its sensitivity to outside criticism led to various protests around the country, culminating in a 10,000 person silent protest at Zhongnanhai on 25 April 1999, which was generally seen as the pivotal event leading to the movement's ban. On 20 July 1999, the government of the People's Republic of China banned Falun Gong, and began a nationwide crackdown against the practice, except in the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau, and in late 1999, legislation was created to outlaw "heterodox religions" and retroactively applied.

Li Hongzhi has lived in New York City since 1996, and his scriptures since then have been delivered by Internet on Clearwisdom, the movement's website. After the ban, Falun Gong's activities have been largely conducted from abroad, with the group having a particularly strong presence on the Internet, in Canada, the United States, Australia, and several European countries. While some practitioners continue to protest, these have largely dwindled since five individuals set themselves on fire in Tiananmen Square on the eve of Chinese New Year 2001—together with the government's full media assault associating Falun Gong with the self-immolations, the event is regarded by most observers as pivotal to ending domestic support for the movement. Falun Gong leaders in exile and the government of the People's Republic of China have been engaged in a protracted, large-scale media war that is still on-going. While the Chinese government has attempted to paint Falun Gong as an "evil cult", Falun Gong and its associated media have responded with large amounts of political rhetoric against the Communist Party of China and its former President Jiang Zemin.

Beginnings

Falun Gong was founded by Li Hongzhi (b. 1952 or 1951), a former trumpet player in a forest police unit in Jilin Province, and later a grain clerk at the Grain and Oil Procurement Company of Changchun. A hagiographical account of his life which appeared in early Falun Gong sources states that Li Hongzhi was taught the ways of spiritual cultivation by Quan Jue, a tenth-generation Buddhist master, from age four to twelve, and Baji Zhenren, a Daoist master, from age twelve onwards. The biography also stated that Li possessed various supernormal abilities from early childhood, such as changing location by the power of thought, and Li continues to claim that he possesses such powers, due to his existence at an exalted spiritual level. Many facts in the official biography have been disputed by Chinese state sources, which assert that government research efforts, including interviews with Li's school teachers and childhood friends, showed his early years to have been entirely unremarkable. According to Palmer, Li's biography is very similar to that of other qigong masters, all of whom learned apprenticed from mystic/mysterious masters, acquired their Extraordinary powers, and 'came down from the mountain' when their shifu considered them ready.

Li Hongzhi established the Falun Gong method in 1992, after having studied with a number of qigong masters in the mid-1980s, Li popularised his method through mass speaking events with low fees that were open to all comers, and began to attract followers who viewed him as their spiritual master. According to Ownby (2008), neither Li nor Falun Gong were particularly controversial in the beginning. Although his followers' demographic were weighted to the middle-to-elderly in the agricultural and industrial heartlands, his first generation of disciples included members of the local political elite. Four Party members, of which one was the local police chief and another a university professor, were named as vice-presidents of the Falun Dafa Research Society. Falun Gong was welcomed into the Scientific Qigong Research Association. In the latter half or 1992, Li gave a series of workshops in Beijing sponsored by the CQRS attended by some 9,000 participants. Li hired his own booth at Beijing Oriental Health Expos of both 1992 and 1993 where he would give workshops to thousands, and would heal sick people with his powerful Qi. Palmer wrote: "Under the effects of his qi, paraplegics cast aside their crutches and their wheelchairs: the public mobbed his stand." In total, Li gave 54 large-scale lectures throughout China in most major cities to an audience thought to be around 20,000. In 1993, Li founded the Falun Xiulian Dafa Research Society to coordinate Falun Gong activities and translate his works into foreign languages.

Growth in China

Against the backdrop of a crisis of confidence of the public in Qigong due to rampant 'quackery' and commercialisation, Li Hongzhi condemned the commercialisation and embraced a doctrine which Palmer (2007) describes as "moralistic, messianic and apocalyptic". In 1994, Li de-emphasised the physical benefits of Qigong in his teachings, and emphasised spiritual salvation. Li further distanced Falun Gong from Qigong and repositioned into a law of the universe unto itself complete with its own superior scripture, Zhuan Falun, which was to become "the only path of salvation from the apocalyptic end ".

Falun Gong was taught at the Chinese consulate in New York as part of the Party's "cultural propaganda to the West", alongside Chinese silk craft and cooking. The consulate at that time also set up Falun Gong clubs at MIT and Columbia University which are active to this day. Starting in 1995, Li himself taught the practice outside of China, chairing a series of conferences at the Chinese embassy in Paris, upon invitation by China's ambassador to France.

After teaching publicly in Changchun, Li began to make his lectures more widely accessible and affordable, charging less than competing qigong systems for lectures, tapes, and books. On 4 January 1995, Zhuan Falun, the main book on Falun Gong, was published and became a best-seller in China. In the face of Falun Gong's rise in popularity, a large part of which was attributed to its low cost, competing qigong masters accused Li of unfair business practices.

Li attempted to avoid the common anti-qigong diatribes on "magic tricks" of certain qigong masters by characterizing his teachings as qigong "at a higher level." He claimed to possess such powers, but denigrated them at the same time, hoping, according to Ownby, to "dodge the bullets" of Sima Nan and company; this was contiguous with the general attempt to align Falun Gong with high-level supporters of the qigong milieu in the government, who agreed there were "bad apples" around. Li's Zhuan Falun was on bestseller lists in the spring of 1996.

Commentators agree that Falun Gong's spread and popularity was reflective of the wider social transformation taking place in China in the early 1990s and growing sense of insecurity of the population. As Deng Xiaoping urged the pursuit of material wealth, the security for life model based around the work-unit was coming under threat; corruption was on the rise. Lowe (2003) acknowledges sociological "macro-issues," such as economic insecurity, free time, the collapse of moral standards, worries about health and medical care, the desire for existential certitude, and other factors as explanations for Falun Gong's rise. Zhao points to a comparative lack of spiritual fulfilment, and "a worldwide backlash against capitalist modernity". Palmer (2007) attributes it in part to a desire for security in an uncertain world. This contrasted with Falun Gong's insistence on the "search for meaning" and its calls for a "radical transcendence of materialism in both the mundane and philosophical senses."

These were merely secondary considerations to the growth of Falun Gong. According to Lowe, other qigong practices were unable to provide "clear, unambiguous explanations of life’s deepest mysteries" and such a "complete and intellectually satisfying picture of the universe," as practitioners see it.

By 1995, Falun Gong had established a clear competitive advantage over alternative qigong groups with its emphasis on morality and life philosophies, low cost, and its benefits to practitioners' health, rapidly spreading via word-of-mouth. In a reversal from the 1989 outpouring of desire for political participation, many Chinese turned to Falun Gong precisely because they saw it as an apolitical response to existing individual and social concerns. Its rapid growth within China was also related to family ties and community relationships, which still retain great power in contemporary China. Falun Gong attracted a wide range of adherents from all walks of life.

The Economist asserts that much of Falun Gong's success in the 1990s was due to claims that it could heal without costly medicine, as many citizens had lost medical benefits and services due to changing economic conditions. Some in China maintained that Falun Gong was the most popular qigong practice in the country, and that many professors from Peking University practiced the exercises every day on the campus grounds until the crackdown in 1999.

Official registration issues

Østergaard states that the FDRS was expelled from the China Qigong Research Association, the umbrella qigong association to which Li and other masters belonged, in November 1996 because Li was "posing as a god, spreading feudalistic superstition, and fabricating political rumours." However, according to Schechter, Li had refused a request of the CQRS to hike his fees. Palmer also stated that Li had disagreements with the CQRS, and that Li objected to the new policy of the CQRS to formalise the structure of FDRS through which to pass on Falun Gong revenues; he also objected to the requirement to start up a party branch. Palmer notes that the qigong movement had by that time become a profiteering industry which was beginning to acquire a bad name in the eyes of the public, and advances the hypothesis that Li may have withdrawn FDRS membership to distance his movement from the CQRS; Li officially maintained that he was no longer interested in teaching Falun Gong. In a possible attempt to maintain legitimacy without affiliation to the CQRS whilst preserving control of its own revenue streams, the movement attempted to register the Falungong Cultivators' Research Society, a new 'association of practitioners' (without the master, through whom flowed the revenues). However, after it was rejected in turn by the CQRS, the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the Minority Nationalities' Affairs Commission of the NPC, the China Buddhist Association, the United Front Department of the CCP Central Committee. In 1997, Falun Gong informed the Civil Administration and Public Security ministries that it had not succeeded in applying for recognition. Palmer notes from Falun Gong documents that, contrary to contention of Porter (2003) that the FDRS had disbanded after 1997, practice notices continued to be issued in its name until July 1999.

Critics and protests

Following Li's prohibition of commercialising Falun Gong in 1994, a faction in Changchun which wanted to open a clinic where they would presumably hold their own fee-charging workshops were rebuffed by Li, and its members were expelled from the movement. This group would send a three-volume report to several government ministries in late 1994, denouncing Li and Falun Gong and saying that Li had no superpowers and was unable to cure people — including the first time allegation that Li had altered his birthdate to that of Sakyamuni — the contents were to be found subsequently reused when the government's own anti-Falun Gong campaign was launched. Falun Gong replied to the various recipients in detail on 2 February 1995.

While Zhuan Falun II was enjoying a week as the tenth best-seller on the Beijing Daily book list, it received a scathing review in the 17 June 1996 edition of Guangming Daily which attacked it as a "pseudo-scientific book propagating feudal superstitions". Twenty major journals then wrote articles critical of Falun Gong. Responding to the Guangming article's concern that the title was being published legally, the Publicity Department issued a directive banning its official publication on 24 July 1996. Thousands of practitioners wrote in to the paper and to the China Qigong Research Society at the instigation of Li Hongzhi to protest at the violation of the Three Noes policy. Guangming stood firm; the state machine did nothing. With the qigong movement in trouble, the CQRS did not come to Falun Gong's defence. On 28 August, in an internet post, Li further admonished followers who practised at home without doing anything to defend Falun Gong; he referred to the incident as a test of moral stature for practitioners.

In 1996, Buddhist journals were issuing in-depth critiques of Falun Gong. Palmer observed that the Buddhists were the earliest to employ the term "邪教" (heretical sect) to describe the movement. In January 1998, the Buddhist Association convened a meeting to discuss how to deal with the slow growth of Buddhism compared to Falun Gong; the association magazine, Fayin, weighed in by March to denounce Falun Gong as a heretical popular religion, saying that its doctrines were opposed to Buddhism, and that Falun Gong denigrated the Buddhist clergy. The article also compared Falun Gong to sects like White Lotus. In response, Falun Gong practitioners wrote to CPPCC Chairman Li Ruihuan in protest, arguing that the attacks by the Buddhists were threatening social stability. The standoff between the two groups resulted in at least one documented conflict — a Chonqing monastery called on the police remove a Falun Gong demonstration outside its front gates in March 1999.

Tianjin incident

On 11 May 1998, He Zuoxiu, a physicist from the Chinese Academy of Science and opponent of supernatural and "unscientific thinking", denounced Falun Gong in an interview on Beijing Television. Falun Gong practitioners inundated the station with letters of protest; some 2,000 of them demonstrated peacefully in front of its offices. They besieged the station for a month. Under pressure from the Central Government to end the protest at the station "at any cost", the Beijing Television reporter responsible for the interview was dismissed and a report favourable towards Falun Gong was telecast a few days later.

In April 1999, He Zuoxiu published an article in the Tianjin Normal University’s Youth Reader magazine, entitled "I Do Not Agree with Youth Practicing qigong," and criticized all forms of "fake qigong". Describing some of the symptoms of 'Qigong deviation', He cited one of his students who refused to "eat, drink, sleep, or speak", and who was eventually sent to a mental institution as the result of practising Falun Gong, and alluded to the student's reverence for founder Li Hongzhi.

Drawing on the effectiveness of earlier protests in censoring criticism of Falun Gong, some 6,000 practitioners gathered in Tianjin, in front of the municipal office and the magazine editorial office, to protest the article, demanding an apology. Falun Gong organisers sent an appeal to the Tianjin Municipal party headquarters and government, reiterating claims that Falun Gong was a "harmless Qigong group" that benefits the nation. The Tianjin government, however, did not respond favourably. The local police were called, and a number of practitioners were arrested.

Zhongnanhai incident

As the incident in Tianjin did not give rise to a satisfactory outcome for Falun Gong, it led to a much larger protest on 25 April. Around ten thousand practitioners lined the streets near Zhongnanhai, the residence compound of the Communist Party's central leadership, where they stayed in silence for 12 hours. Chinese state media held Li Hongzhi personally responsible for orchestrating the protest, though Li denies it.

While Falun Gong's pre-1999 political involvement is difficult to verify, no other disenfranchised social group has ever staged a mass protest near the Zhongnanhai compound in PRC history. Ostergaard sees it as Li's unresolved dilemma between the claimed transcendental and metaphysical nature of the conflict, and the political nature of his demands in reality. Ownby believes Li is naive in trying to deny the political character of the demonstration, "which by its very location and object was inevitably destined to be interpreted as political, no matter what the 'true' motivations of Li and his followers..." Premier Zhu Rongji met with representatives and the crowd dispersed. One of the three practitioners received by Zhu listed their demands as "liberation of the practitioners arrested at Tianjin, a lawful environment in which to 'cultivate', and to be allowed to publish Falun Gong literature via normal channels."

The incident raised questions about the Communist Party's control over the country, and led fear and animosity towards the movement amongst China's central leadership. There reportedly were rifts in the Politburo at the time of the incident, with some members advocating for a crackdown and others opposing it. President Jiang Zemin is held by Falun Gong to be largely personally responsible for the final decision. Some reports indicate that Zhu Rongji, in his compromise to Falun Gong practitioners, was criticized by Jiang for being too soft.

The Chinese Communist Party later declared the gathering on 25 April to be "the most serious political incident" since the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. According to some analysts, the government was alarmed after the gathering at the possibility of such a large number of people amassing so close to the seat of power without the security forces being aware. According to some estimates there were more than 100,000 Falun Gong practitioners in Beijing at the time, and the scale of the protest pointed to the Communist Party losing its tight control on the people while it tinkered with political and economic reforms. Ownby and Ostergaard commented that the demonstration was a "deadly miscalculation" by Li Hongzhi; Ownby suggested the decision to authorise the gathering had "its roots in some combination of calculation and arrogance."

From a PR viewpoint, Østergaard recognised that Li Hongzhi, previously unknown to the West, had been interviewed by Time magazine for the first time just weeks before Zhongnanhai; he further asserted Time was tipped off on the day about the size and location of the demonstration.

The Wall Street Journal suggested a network of high-ranking political figures, which include PLA Generals and many members of China's National People's Congress, helped organise the 10,000-strong demonstration. A 74-year-old retired general, Yu Changxin, was arrested for organising the gathering, and sentenced to 17 years in prison in January 2000. Although Julia Ching from the University of Toronto says it is not certain where practitioners wanted to protest, many Falun Gong practitioners believe the police directed them to Zhongnanhai in order to create an incident that could later be held against Falun Gong.

The ban and crackdown

Three days after Zhongnanhai, Xinhua published an interview with an official who warned against similar protests: "Those who jeopardize social stability under the pretext of practising any type of 'qigong' will be dealt with according to the law." In early May, reports were circulating that Jiang Zemin had established a high-level task force to deal with the threat, with Hu Jintao and Luo Gan in charge. Authorities began to round up Falun Gong leaders. According to the BBC, Falun Gong mobilised "tens of thousands of followers in some 30 cities" in mid June after the arrests. On 22 July 1999, the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) issued a statement banning Falun Gong:

China today banned the Research Society of Falun Dafa and the Falun Gong organization under its control after deeming them to be illegal. In its decision on this matter issued today, the Ministry of Civil Affairs said that according to investigations, the Research Society of Falun Dafa had not been registered according to law and had been engaged in illegal activities, advocating superstition and spreading fallacies, hoodwinking people, inciting and creating disturbances, and jeopardizing social stability. The decision said that therefore, in accordance with the Regulations on the Registration and Management of Mass Organizations, the Research Society of Falun Dafa and the Falun Gong organization under its control are held to be illegal and are therefore banned.

In another commentary, Xinhua said that Falun Gong was opposed to the Party, that "It preaches idealism, theism and feudal superstition, and that its leaders were "a small number of behind-the-scenes plotters and organizers who harbor political intentions". Xinhua asserted that the actions taken against Falun Gong were essential to maintaining the "vanguard role and purity" of the Communist Party, and that "In fact, the so-called `truth, kindness and forbearance' principle preached by Li has nothing in common with the socialist ethical and cultural progress we are striving to achieve."

Li Hongzhi issued a "Brief Statement of Mine" on the same day, which dealt with a number of issues. On the ban, he said:

Falun Gong is simply a popular qigong activity. It does not have any particular organization, let alone any political objectives. We have never been involved in any anti-government activities... We are not against the government now, nor will we be in the future... We are calling for all governments, international organizations, and people of goodwill worldwide to extend their support and assistance to us in order to resolve the present crisis that is taking place in China.

Speculation on rationale

HRW notes that the crackdown on Falun Gong reflects historical efforts by the Chinese Communist Party to eradicate religion, which the government believed was inherently subversive. Only when eradication proved impossible, it would allow citizens to "enjoy freedom of religious belief" and to protect "normal religious activities," with the caveat of being under state control. Chinese leaders suspended its hard-line atheist stance in the early 1980s to gain cooperation from all sectors of society to advance their development agenda. HRW suggests that this official policy and suspicion that Falun Gong was a vehicle for external and domestic anti-China forces contributed to the crackdown on it. Furthermore, it notes that Qigong is not one of the recognised religions, thus not entitled to constitutional protection. Some journalists believe that Beijing's reaction exposes its authoritarian nature and its intolerance for competing loyalty. The Globe and Mail wrote : "...any group that does not come under the control of the Party is a threat"; secondly, the 1989 protests may have heightened the leaders' sense of losing their grip on power, making them live in "mortal fear" of popular demonstrations. Craig Smith of the Wall Street Journal suggests that the government which has by definition no view of spirituality, lacks moral credibility with which to fight an expressly spiritual foe; the party feels increasingly threatened by any belief system that challenges its ideology and has an ability to organize as well. Citing Kiplis (2001) that institutional boundaries between 'religion' and 'science' are constantly renegotiated, and that practitioners of 'apolitical activities' must focus on their relations with the state, Østergaard implies that Li neglected this, and was relying solely on the government's reaction. Lestz also agrees that unwritten rules of engagement had been violated by Falun Gong protests, and the government's fear of Falun Gong lay in the potential for it to turn itself into a political organisation on the backs of its nationwide organizational infrastructure, as has happened before in China's history; allied to that, is the strength and level of infiltration into the Communist Party intimated in Li's messages. Citing Lee (1987), Østergaard suggests that the movement had undoubtedly become political, and that Li had underestimated the party's reaction to the Zhongnanhai "siege".

Reports suggest that certain high-level Communist Party officials had wanted to crackdown on the practice for some years, but lacked pretext or support until Zhongnanhai, which Ching suggested was pivotal in elevating "fear, animosity and suppression" of the movement. Reportedly many high-ranking members of the politburo were opposed to a nationwide persecution of the movement, and Falun Gong considers Jiang Zemin personally responsible for the final decision and the ensuing political campaign." Jiang Zemin had allegedly received a letter from the former director of the 301 Military Hospital, "a doctor with considerable standing among the political elite," endorsing Falun Gong and advising high-level cadres to start practising it. Jiang also found out that Li's book, Zhuan Falun, had been published by People's Liberation Navy, and that possibly seven hundred thousand Communist Party members were practitioners. "Jiang accepts the threat of Falun Gong as an ideological one: spiritual beliefs against militant atheism and historical materialism. He to purge the government and the military of such beliefs".

The Washington Post reported that sources indicated not all of the standing committee of the Politburo shared Jiang's view that Falun Gong should be eradicated. The size and reach of Jiang's anti-Falun Gong campaign surpassed that of many previous mass-movements. Through a Mao-style purge of Falun Gong, Jiang forced senior cadres "to pledge allegiance to his line", thus boosting his authority to enable him to dictate events at the pivotal 16th Communist Party congress, according to a Communist Party veteran. "As with 1960s-style campaigns, the standard ritual of ideological sessions held in party units, factories, and colleges the past few years is that participants make public declarations of support for the Beijing line—and for the top leader." Lam reports a mid-level official saying that "The leadership is obsessed with the Falun Gong and have put its eradication as a top priority this year."

The crackdown

On 10 June 1999 the Party established the '6-10 Office', an extra-constitutional body to lead the suppression of groups which the government considered 'cults'. Representatives were selected in every province, city, county, university, government department and state-owned business in China. On 20 July 1999, the crackdown officially began. Public security officers throughout China quietly detained numerous Falun Gong leaders just after midnight, although Porter states this took place "within days". Across the country, police began arresting Falun Gong leaders from hundreds of homes, and hauling them to prison. Falun Gong's four Beijing "arch-leaders" were arrested, and quickly tried. Public Security Bureau ordered churches, temples, mosques, newspapers, media, courts and police to suppress Falun Gong. Three days of massive demonstrations by practitioners in some thirty cities followed. In Beijing and other cities, protesters were detained in sports stadia.

On 22 July, the Ministry of Civil Affairs and the Ministry of Public Security together dissolved the Falun Dafa Research Society and banned "the propagation of Falungong in any form" and to prohibit anyone from disrupting social order or confronting the government. Other qigong groups, such as Zhong Gong, were similarly forced to disband. HRW notes that Chinese officials did not hesitate to apply the same harsh tactics to Falun Gong that it had employed previously against other sects it sought to control – to illustrate its power over all religious expression, " who inspired extraordinary loyalty from worshippers or who resisted government edicts went to prison or simply were 'disappeared'". HRW and Amnesty stated that the official directives and legal documents issued for the purge fall short of international standards.

On 26 July, several state bureaux and the Ministry of Public Security jointly issued a circular calling for confiscation and destruction of all publications related to Falun Gong; it was condemned in the media, with books shredded and videotapes bulldozed for TV cameras. Three days later, an arrest warrant was issued for Li Hongzhi for "spreading superstition, deception, and organising gatherings to disturb public order", which was filed with but declined by Interpol. Protests continued, and thousands of practitioners entered Beijing for a demonstration in Tiananmen Square on 25 October. Politburo member Li Lanqing reported that up to the end of October, there had been 35,792 instances when followers were stopped by police and either taken away or told to leave Beijing; a large number are believed to have been stopped from reaching the capital.

The government enacted a statute (article 300 of the Criminal Law), passed by the National People’s Congress on 30 October 1999, with retrospective application to suppress thousands of "heterodox religions" across China, thus legitimising the persecution of Falun Gong and any other spiritual groups deemed "dangerous to the state." Arrested leaders had been formally charged on October 19 with various offences ranging from organizing a cult to "stealing, illegally possessing and leaking state secrets" and "running an illegal business." The State Council Information Office announced that at least 150 people had been detained or were being sought on similar charges by November 22; forty-four people had been indicted by November 28. Upon the sentencing of two key Falun Gong leaders to heavy prison terms (16 to 18 years') in late December, the protests which had abated resumed immediately.

Despite Beijing's heavy hand against practitioners, protests continued well into 2000. According to Time, a Falun Gong website editorial instructed followers to "step up , especially in Tiananmen Square". Founder Li Hongzhi urged followers to immobilize the police and other "evil scoundrels" through use of supernatural powers. Tiananmen Square thus became one of the prime locations where practitioners routinely demonstrated despite government deterrence. HRW observed that state's efforts to stop demonstrations were met by "orchestrated defiance" and daily protests throughout 2000. Daily protesters usually numbered in the hundreds, perhaps 1,000 protesters or more would gather on holidays and important dates; practitioners from around the country would "court detention" on Tiananmen Square by unfurling banners or meditating. In anticipation of their arrests by police, Falun Gong ensured international media were on hand to witness how their peaceful protest was met by violent responses from authorities; they would draw attention to arrests and suspicious deaths in custody, issue media alerts, and post information on the internet. According to Leung, 5,000 were detained across China by February 2000. By 25 April 2000, within one year after the massive demonstration at Zhongnanhai, a total of more than 30,000 practitioners had been arrested there. Seven hundred Falun Gong followers were arrested during a demonstration in the Square on 1 January 2001. Officials grew impatient with the constant flow of protesters into Beijing, and decided to implement a cascading responsibility system to push the responsibility for meeting central orders down onto those enforcing them: central authorities would hold local officials personally responsible for stemming the flow of protesters. The provincial government would fine mayors for each Falun Gong practitioner from their district who made it to Beijing; the mayors would in turn fine the heads of the Political and Legal commissions, who would in turn fine village chiefs, who fined police officers who administered the punishment. According to Johnson, police in turn extorted money illegally from Falun Gong practitioners, and the order was only relayed orally at meetings, “because they didn't want it made public.” A chief feature in the testimony of Falun Gong torture victims was that they were “constantly being asked for money to compensate for the fines.”

HRW reported that some work units would summarily fire people identified as practitioners, meaning they would lose housing, schooling, pensions, and be reported to the police. Whereas places remote from Beijing once turned a blind eye to solitary exercise and meditation, restrictions were tightened in 2001 after the Tiananmen Square self-immolation incident. Local officials would detain active practitioners and those unwilling to recant, and were expected to "make certain" that families and employers keep them isolated.

On the eve of Chinese new year on 23 January 2001, seven people attempted to set themselves ablaze at Tiananmen Square. Although the Falun Dafa Information Center disputed that self-immolators were practitioners, on the grounds that the movement's teachings explicitly forbid suicide and killing, the official Chinese press agency, Xinhua News Agency, and other state media asserted that they were practitioners. The incident received international news coverage, and video footage of the burnings were broadcast later inside China by China Central Television (CCTV). Images of a 12 year old girl, Liu Siying, burning and interviews with the other participants in which they stated their belief that self-immolation would lead them to paradise were shown. Time reported that prior to the self-immolation incident, many Chinese had felt that Falun Gong posed no real threat, and that the state's crackdown had gone too far. After the event, however, China's media campaign against Falun Gong gained significant traction.

Li was also a target for Chinese media during this time. The Chinese authorities charged that he had created Falun Gong on the basis of two other Qigong systems developed earlier, namely, Chanmi Gong and Jiugong Bagua Gong, and that some of Falun Gong's exercises were copied from "movements from Thai dance that he picked up during a visit to relatives in Thailand." Chinese authorities asserted that acquaintances Li Jingchao and Liu Yuqing helped to develop the system, and other earlier followers helped write texts and touch up photographs; it was not tested exhaustively beforehand, but was completed only one month before its official launch, they alleged. James Tong notes that these allegations were brought forth in the publication "Li Hongzhi qiren qishi", some already in print before 22 July 1999, that conformed to the guidelines of the suppression of Falun Gong as specified by the Politburo and Jiang Zemin. Many were hastily compiled reprints or re-writes of Renmin Ribao articles and Xinhua dispatches on exposes of Falun Gong and Li Hongzhi, and party and government documents banning the Falun Gong. Qiren qishi was itself produced by the research arm of the Public Security Bureau.

Use of the cult label

The government re-used may of the arguments which had been advanced by critics of the movement prior to the ban, including allegations that Falun Gong was "propagating feudal superstition", that Li had changed his birthdate, and that the practice exploited spiritual cultivation to engage in seditious politics. In exposés such as "Falun Gong is a Cult", "Exposing the Lies of the 'Falun Gong' Cult", and "Cult of Evil", they alleged that Falun Gong engaged in mind control and manipulation via "lies and fallacies," causing "needless deaths of large numbers of practitioners." State media seized upon Li's writing in which he expressed that illnesses are caused by karma, and that Li has stated on several occasions that the sign of a true practitioner is to refuse medicine or medical care. The authorities claimed over 1,000 deaths because practitioners followed Li's teachings and refused to seek medical treatment, that several hundred practitioners had cut their stomachs open "looking for the Dharma Wheel" or committed suicide, and that over 30 innocent people had been killed by "mentally deranged practitioners of Falun Gong." Li was portrayed as a charlatan, while snapshots of accounting records were shown on television, "purporting to prove that made huge amounts of money off his books and videos."

Ching (2001) states that "evil cult" was defined by an atheist government "on political premises, not by any religious authority", and was used by the authorities to make previous arrests and imprisonments constitutional. Most social scientists and scholars of religion reject "brainwashing" theories and do not use the term "cult" to describe Falun Gong. Chan claims that Falun Gong is neither a cult nor a sect, but a New Religious Movement with cult-like characteristics. Other scholars avoid the term "cult" altogether because "of the confusion between the historic meaning of the term and current pejorative use" These scholars prefer terms like "spiritual movement" or "new religious movement" to avoid the negative connotations of "cult" or to avoid mis-categorizing Falun Gong as a "cult" if it doesn't fit mainstream definitions. Nevertheless, many scholars, including notably Palmer (2007) and Ownby (2008), use the words "moralistic" and "apocalyptic" to describe its philosophy.

References

• Spiegel, Mickey (2002). Dangerous Meditation: China's Campaign Against Falungong. Human Rights Watch. ISBN 1-56432-269-6. Retrieved 28 December 2009.
• Østergaard, Clemens Stubbe (2003). Jude Howell (ed.). Governance in China. pp. 214–223 (Governance and the Political Challenge of Falun Gong). ISBN 0742519880.
• Palmer, David A. (2007). 9. Falun Gong challenges the CCP. pp. 241–295. ISBN 0231140665. {{cite book}}: |work= ignored (help)
• Sisci, Francesco (27 January 2001). "Part 1: From sport to suicide". Asia Times.; Part 2: A rude awakening; Part 3: The deeper crisis facing China
• Kavan, Heather (July 2008). "Falun Gong in the media: What can we believe?" (PDF). E. Tilley (Ed.) Power and Place: Refereed Proceedings of the Australian & New Zealand Communication Association Conference, Wellington.: 13. {{cite journal}}: More than one of |author= and |last= specified (help); More than one of |work= and |journal= specified (help)
• Schechter, Danny (November 2001). Falun Gong's challenge to China: spiritual practice or 'evil cult'?. ISBN 1888451270.
• Ownby, David (2008). Falun Gong and the future of China. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. p. 81. ISBN 9780195329056.

Footnotes

1. ^ Lewis, James R. (2005). Cults: a reference handbook. ABC-CLIO. pp. 124–125. ISBN 9781851096183.
2. ^ Julia Ching, "The Falun Gong: Religious and Political Implications," American Asian Review, Vol. XIX, no. 4, Winter 2001, p. 12
3. Faison, Seth (27 April 1999) "In Beijing: A Roar of Silent Protesters" New York Times. Retrieved 10 June 2006.
4. Kahn, Joseph (27 April 1999) "Notoriety Now for Exiled Leader of Chinese Movement" New York Times. Retrieved 14 June 2006.
5. ^ Leung, Beatrice (2002) 'China and Falun Gong: Party and society relations in the modern era', Journal of Contemporary China, 11:33, 761 – 784
6. Ownby (2008) p. 81
7. Chang, Maria Hsia (2004). Falun Gong – The End of Days. Yale University Press. pp. 3–4. ISBN 9780300102277.
8. Ownby (2008) pp. 81–82; the biography itself, which follows the style of the hagiographies of other qigong masters and Chinese "holy men", is available online here: A Short Biography of Mr. Li Hongzhi, Chinese Law and Government v. 32 no. 6 (Nov./Dec. 1999) p. 14-23 ISSN: 0009-4609
9. Ownby, David (2008). Falun Gong and the future of China. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 115–116. ISBN 9780195329056.
10. Ownby, David (2008). Falun Gong and the future of China. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. p. 83. ISBN 9780195329056.
11. Palmer (2007), pg. 95
12. Ownby, David (2008). Falun Gong and the future of China. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. p. 85. ISBN 9780195329056.
13. ^ Porter, Noah (2003). Falun Gong in the United States: An Ethnographic Study. Universal-Publishers. p. 79. ISBN 9781581121902., also available in pdf format online
14. Chang, Maria Hsia (2004). Falun Gong – The End of Days. Yale University Press. p. 4. ISBN 9780300102277.
15. ^ David Ownby, "The Falun Gong in the New World," European Journal of East Asian Studies, Sept 2003, Vol. 2 Issue 2, p 306
16. ^ Zhao, Yuezhi (2003). Falun Gong, Identity, and the Struggle over Meaning Inside and Outside China. Rowman & Littlefield publishers, inc. pp. 209–223 in Contesting Media Power: Alternative Media in a Networked World, ed. Nick Couldry and James Curran.
17. ^ Palmer (2007), pp 220-2
18. ^ Phillip Adams, Media and Internet Censorship in China, Late Night Live, Radio National Australia
19. David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China (2008) Oxford University Press
20. ^ Schechter (2001) p. 66
21. Schechter (2001) p. 62
22. Ownby 2008, p. 167
23. Ownby 2008, p. 167
24. ^ CNN.com, Endgame for the Falun Gong?, 21 August 2001
25. ^ Lowe, Scott (April 2003). "Chinese and International Contexts for the Rise of Falun Gong". Nova Religio. {{cite journal}}: Text "vol:Vol. 6, No. 2" ignored (help)
26. ^ Palmer (2007), p 220
27. ^ Thomas Lum, Congressional Research Report #RL33437, Congressional Research Service, 11 August 2006
28. Religion in China - When opium can be benign, The Economist, 1 Feb 2007
29. ^ Jude Howell (2003) pages=215
30. ^ Palmer (2007), p. 247.
31. ^ Palmer (2007), pp. 248-9.
32. ^ Palmer (2007), p. 246.
33. ^ Palmer (2007), pg249
34. ^ Ownby (2008), p. 168
35. Penny, Benjamin, “The Falun Gong, Buddhism and ‘Buddhist qigong’”, Asian Studies Review March 2005, Vol 29, pp.35-46.
36. Palmer (2007), pg262-3
37. "Spiritual Practice or Evil Cult"?: Comprehending Falun Gong in the Context of China's Religious Policy, Zhonghu Yan, Center for the Study of Religion, University of Toronto, 13 December 2001
38. ^ Ian Johnson, "A Blind Eye:China's Rigid Policies On Religion Helped Falun Dafa for Years", Page A1, The Wall Street Journal, 13 December 2000
39. Smith, Craig S. (26 April 1999). "Revered by Millions, a Potent Mystic Rattles China's Communist Leaders". Wall Street Journal. p. 1.c/o third party link
40. "The Truth Behind the 25 April Incident (Abridged version)". Faluninfo.net. Retrieved 18 December 2009.
41. He Zuoxiu (1999-04). "I do not agree with Youth Practicing Qigong (我不赞成青少年炼气功)" (in Chinese). {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
42. ^ Ownby (2008), p. 171 Cite error: The named reference "own171" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
43. ^ p. 66
44. ^ The crackdown on Falun Gong and other so-called heretical organizations , The Amnesty International
45. ^ Francesco Sisci,FALUNGONG Part 1: From sport to suicide, Asia Times, 27 January 2001
46. ^ Jude Howell (2003) p. 221
47. Ownby (2008), pg 190
48. ^ Ownby (2008), pg 171 Cite error: The named reference "own172" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
49. ^ Michael Lestz, Why Smash the Falun Gong?, Religion in the News, Fall 1999, Vol. 2, No. 3, Trinity College, Massachusetts
50. Dean Peerman, China syndrome: the persecution of Falun Gong, Christian Century, 10 August 2004
51. ^ Tony Saich, Governance and Politics in China, Palgrave Macmillan; 2nd Ed edition (27 Feb 2004)
52. China's Campaign Against Falungong, Human Rights Watch
53. ^ Reid, Graham (29 April-5 May 2006) "Nothing left to lose", New Zealand Listener. Retrieved 6 July 2006.
54. Ownby (2008), pg 173
55. Jude Howell (2003) p. 224 (note 18)
56. Smith, Craig S. (30 April 1999). "Chinese Spiritual Group Draws Strength From Retired Elite, Some Party Members". Wall Street Journal. c/o third party link].
57. "Chinese gov't warns cult not to repeat protest". Asian Political News. 3 May 1999.
58. Mickey Spiegel (2002), pg 17
59. "China bans sect". BBC News. 22 July 1999.
60. Xinhua, China Bans Falun Gong, People's Daily, 22 July 1999
61. Xinhua Commentary on Political Nature of Falun Gong, People's Daily, 2 August 1999
62. Gayle M.B. Hanson, China Shaken by Mass Meditation - meditation movement Falun Gong, Insight on the News, 23 August 1999, accessed 31/12/07
63. Li Hongzhi, A Brief Statement of Mine, 22 July 1999, accessed 31/12/07
64. ^ Mickey Spiegel (2002), pg 14
65. The Globe and Mail, Beijing v. falun gong, Metro A14, 01/26/2001
66. Smith, Craig S. (30 April 2000). "Rooting Out Falun Gong; China Makes War on Mysticism". New York Times.
67. ^ Jude Howell (2003) pages=220
68. ^ Willy Wo-Lap Lam, China’s sect suppression carries a high price, CNN.com, 9 February 2001
69. "Congressional-Executive commission on China, Annual Report 2008" (PDF). Retrieved 18 December 2009.
70. ^ Mickey Spiegel (2002), pg 21
71. Noah Porter (Masters thesis for the University of South Florida), Falun Gong in the United States: An Ethnographic Study, 2003, p 98
72. ^ Johnson, Ian, Wild Grass: three portraits of change in modern china, Vintage (8 March 2005) Cite error: The named reference "wildgrass" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
73. Mickey Spiegel (2002), pg 15
74. Mickey Spiegel, "Dangerous Meditation: China's Campaign Against Falungong", Human Rights Watch, 2002. Retrieved Sept 28, 2007.
75. (23 March 2000) The crackdown on Falun Gong and other so-called heretical organizations, Amnesty International
76. Mickey Spiegel (2002), pg 20
77. Mickey Spiegel (2002), pg 22
78. Mickey Spiegel (2002), pg 27
79. Mickey Spiegel (2002), pg 28
80. ^ Gornet, Matthew (25 June 2001). "The Breaking Point". Time. Cite error: The named reference "breakingpoint" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
81. ^ Johnson, Ian (25 April 2000). "Defiant Falun Dafa Members Converge on Tiananmen". The Wall Street Journal. Pulitzer.org. p. A21.
82. Mickey Spiegel (2002), pp 28-29
83. Selden, Elizabeth J. (2003). Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and Resistance. Routledge. ISBN 041530170X. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthor= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
84. Mickey Spiegel (2002), pg 43
85. Mickey Spiegel (2002), pg 36
86. "Press Statement". Clearwisdom. 23 January 2001. Retrieved 9 February 2007.
87. Li, Hongzhi. "The Issue of Killing". Zhuan Falun. Falun Dafa.
88. Pan, Philip P. (5 February 2001). "One-Way Trip to the End in Beijing". International Herald Tribune. {{cite news}}: |access-date= requires |url= (help)
89. Østergaard, Clemens Stubbe (2003). Jude Howell (ed.). Governance in China. pp. 220 (Governance and the Political Challenge of Falun Gong). ISBN 0742519880.
90. ^ Cite error: The named reference PennyB was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
91. "Li Hongzhi qiren qishi," p. 64 and cited in Benjamin Penny's study.
92. Publish to Perish: Regime Choices and Propaganda Impact in the Anti-Falungong Publications Campaign, July 1999 – April 2000, printed in Journal of Contemporary China (2005), 14(44), August, 507–523.
93. Embassy of the People's Republic of China (1 November 1999) "Falun Gong Is a Cult". Retrieved 10 June 2006.
94. Kavan (2008), pg10 (citing Li, 1998b; 1998c; 1999; 2001a; 2003b)
95. Exposing the Lies of "Falun Gong" Cult, Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States, 2005(?)
96. Chan, Cheris Shun-ching (2004). The Falun Gong in China: A Sociological Perspective. The China Quarterly, 179 , pp 665-683
97. Bainbridge, William Sims 1997 The sociology of religious movements, Routledge, 1997, page 24, ISBN 0-415-91202-4
98. Richardson, James T. 1993 "Definitions of Cult: From Sociological-Technical to Popular-Negative", , Review of Religious Research, Vol. 34, No. 4 pp. 348-356
99. Frank, Adam. (2004) Falun Gong and the threat of history. in Gods, guns, and globalization: religious radicalism and international political economy edited by Mary Ann Tétreault, Robert Allen Denemark, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004, ISBN 1-58826-253-7, pp 241-243

External links

• Pulitzer.org - The 2001 Pulitzer Prize Winners: International Reporting: Wall Street Journal: Ian Johnson

• Misplaced Pages neutral point of view disputes from September 2009
• Falun Gong