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Hurricane Katrina was the eleventh-named tropical storm, fourth hurricane, third major hurricane, and first Category 5 hurricane of the record-breaking 2005 Atlantic hurricane season. It was the third most powerful storm of the season, and the sixth-strongest Atlantic hurricane ever recorded. Katrina formed over the Bahamas in late August, and crossed southern Florida at Category 1 intensity before strengthening rapidly in the Gulf of Mexico. The storm weakened considerably before making its second landfall as an extremely large Category 3 storm on the morning of August 29 along the Central Gulf Coast near Buras-Triumph, Louisiana.

The storm surge from Katrina caused catastrophic damage along the coastlines of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. Levees separating Lake Pontchartrain from New Orleans were breached by the surge, ultimately flooding about 80% of the city. Wind damage was reported well inland, impeding relief efforts. Katrina is estimated to be reponsible for $75 billion in damages, making it the costliest hurricane in United States history; the storm has killed at least 1,383 people, becoming the deadliest U.S. hurricane since the 1928 Okeechobee Hurricane.

Synopsis

Katrina first made landfall as a Category 1 hurricane just north of Miami, Florida in late August, resulting in a dozen deaths in South Florida and spawning several tornadoes which happened not to strike any dwellings. In the Gulf of Mexico it strengthened into a formidable Category 5 hurricane with maximum winds of 175 mph and minimum central pressure of 902 mbar. It weakened considerably as it was approaching land, making its second landfall on the morning of August 29 along the Central Gulf Coast near Buras-Triumph, Louisiana with 125 mph winds and a central pressure of 920 mbar, a strong Category 3 storm (having just weakened from Category 4 as it was making landfall).

The sheer physical size of Katrina caused devastation far from the eye of the hurricane; it was possibly the largest hurricane of its strength ever recorded, but estimating the size of storms from before the 1960s (the pre-satellite era) is difficult or impossible. On August 29, its storm surge breached the levee system that protected New Orleans from Lake Pontchartrain and the Mississippi River. Most of the city was subsequently flooded mainly by water from the lake. Heavy damage was also inflicted onto the coasts of Mississippi and Alabama, making Katrina the most destructive and costliest natural disaster in the history of the United States and the deadliest since the 1928 Okeechobee Hurricane.

The official combined (direct and indirect) death toll now stands at 1,383, the fourth or fifth highest in U.S. history (behind the Galveston Hurricane of 1900, the Okeechobee Hurricane of 1928, the 1893 Chenier Caminanda Hurricane, and possibly the 1893 Sea Islands Hurricane). As of January 18, 2006, more than 3,200 people remain unaccounted for, so the death toll may still grow. As of November 22, 2005, 1,300 of those missing were either in heavily-damaged areas or were disabled and "feared dead"; if all 1,300 of these were to be confirmed dead, Katrina would surpass the Okeechobee Hurricane and become the second-deadliest in US history and deadliest in over a century.

Over 1.2 million people were under an evacuation order before landfall. In Louisiana, the hurricane's eye made landfall at 6:10am CDT on Monday, August 29. After 11:00 am CDT, several sections of the levee system in New Orleans collapsed. By early September, people were being forcibly evacuated, mostly by bus to neighboring states. More than 1.5 million people were displaced — a humanitarian crisis on a scale unseen in the U.S. since the Great Depression. The damage is estimated to be about $75 billion by the NHC (with other estimates ranging from $40 to $120 billion) , almost double the previously most expensive Hurricane Andrew, making Katrina the most expensive natural disaster in U.S. history.

Federal disaster declarations blanketed 90,000 square miles (233,000 km²) of the United States, an area almost as large as the United Kingdom. The hurricane left an estimated three million people without electricity, taking some places several weeks for power to be restored (but faster than the four months originally predicted). On September 3, Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff described the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina as "probably the worst catastrophe, or set of catastrophes" in the country's history, referring to the hurricane itself plus the flooding of New Orleans.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency set a deadline of February 7, 2006 (extended from January 7 ) as the official end of any further coverage of temporary housing costs for Katrina victims. After the February 7 deadline, Katrina victims will be left to their own devices to either find permanent housing for the long term, or to continue in social welfare programs set up by other organizations. There are hundreds of thousands of Katrina evacuees living in temporary shelters and/or trailer parks set up by FEMA and other relief organizations in the first months after the disaster hit.

For a timeline of events leading up to Hurricane Katrina through to the aftermath of the hurricane, see Timeline of Hurricane Katrina.

Storm history

Hurricane Katrina
2005 Atlantic hurricane season
General
Timeline Meteorological history Tornado outbreak
Impact
Economic effects Political effects Criticism of government response Social effects Effects in the Southeastern United States Effects in New Orleans Levee failures Memorial Medical Center New Orleans Hornets New Orleans Saints Superdome Tulane University Infrastructure repairs Reconstruction
Relief
Disaster relief International response
Analysis
Media coverage
External links
Media related to Hurricane Katrina at Wikimedia Commons Katrina stories at Wikinews Works related to Katrina sources at Wikisource
v t e

Tropical Depression Twelve formed over the southeastern Bahamas at 5 p.m. EDT (2100 UTC) on August 23, partially from the remains of Tropical Depression Ten. The system was upgraded to Tropical Storm Katrina on the morning of August 24, and Katrina became a hurricane only two hours before it made landfall around 6:30 p.m. EST (22:30 UTC) on August 25 between Hallandale Beach and Aventura, Florida. Katrina had a well-defined eye on radar which remained intact throughout its passage over Florida. Katrina weakened over land on August 26 to a tropical storm, but it regained hurricane status at 2 a.m. EST (0600 UTC) only about one hour after reentering the Gulf of Mexico. Throughout August 26, parts of the Florida Keys experienced tropical storm winds, with Dry Tortugas briefly experiencing hurricane-force winds.

Rapid intensification occurred during the first 24 hours after entering the Gulf of Mexico due in part to the storm's movement over the warm sea surface temperatures of the Gulf Loop Current. On August 27, the storm was upgraded to Category 3 intensity, becoming the third major hurricane of the season. An eyewall replacement cycle disrupted the intensification but led to an almost doubling in size. A second period of rapid intensification led to Katrina strengthening to a Category 5 storm by 7 a.m. CDT (1200 UTC) August 28. Katrina reached its peak at 1:00 p.m. CDT (1800 UTC) with maximum sustained winds of 175 mph (280 km/h), gusts of 215 mph (344 km/h) and a central pressure of 26.64 inches or 902 mbar (hPa). The minimum pressure made Katrina, at the time, the fourth most intense Atlantic Basin hurricane on record. (Hurricane Rita and Hurricane Wilma in 2005 would later surpass Katrina in the same year.)

Going into August 29, effects could be felt along the Gulf Coast. The center of Katrina was about 200 miles (315 km) away from the mouth of the Mississippi River. Tropical storm-force winds extended 230 statute miles (370 km) away from the center, and hurricane-force winds extended about 100 miles (165 km) away.

Overnight on August 29 and into that morning, Katrina began to enter another eyewall replacement cycle and its maximum winds quickly weakened. However, storm surge remained high because large waves at greater than 30 feet (and up to 55 feet) were generated beforehand when Katrina was at Categories 4 and 5. The waves combined with the storm surge of a large Category 3 hurricane.

Katrina made landfall on August 29 as a Category 3 hurricane with sustained winds of 125 mph (200 km/h) with higher gusts, at 6:10 a.m. CDT near Buras-Triumph, Louisiana. Since Katrina had just weakened from Category 4 at landfall and due to the shape of the coastline, sustained Category 4 winds were likely recorded on land while the eye was over water. Hurricane-force winds extended outward 120 miles (190 km) from the center, the storm's pressure was 920 mbar (27.17 inHg), and its forward speed was 15 mph (10 km/h).

Making its way up the eastern Louisiana coastline, most communities in Plaquemines, St. Bernard Parish, and Slidell in St. Tammany Parish were severely damaged by storm surge and the strong winds of the eyewall, which also grazed eastern New Orleans. A few hours later, after weakening slightly, it made landfall for a third time near the Louisiana/Mississippi border with 120 mph (190 km/h) sustained winds, still a Category 3.

Record storm surges smashed the entire Mississippi Gulf Coast, including towns in Mississippi such as Waveland, Bay St. Louis, Pass Christian, Long Beach, Gulfport, Biloxi, Ocean Springs, Gautier and Pascagoula, and, in Alabama, Bayou La Batre. As Katrina moved inland diagonally over Mississippi, high winds cut a swath of damage that affected almost the entire state.

The storm surges from Katrina were as follows:

• 34 feet (10.4 m) at Bay St Louis/Waveland MS
• 24 feet (7.3 m) at Gulfport MS
• 19 feet (5.8 m) at Biloxi MS
• 16 feet (4.9 m) at Pascagoula MS
• 15 feet (4.6 m) at Dauphin Island AL
• 15 feet (4.6 m) at Slidell LA
• 13 feet (4.0 m) at Mobile AL
• 12 feet (3.7 m) at Bayou La Batre AL
• 11 feet (3.4 m) at New Orleans LA

Katrina's large storm surge, despite its hitting land as only a Category 3, was due to its quick weakening before landfall. The record storm surge was generated at the time of its Category 5 intensity. This factor is what was feared to have lured many people along the Gulf Coast into a false sense of security which may have contributed to the high death toll.

Katrina weakened thereafter, losing hurricane strength more than 150 miles (240 km) inland, near Jackson, Mississippi. It was downgraded to a tropical depression near Clarksville, Tennessee and continued to race northward.

Katrina continued to affect the central U.S. as it moved north, and was last distinguishable in the eastern Great Lakes region on August 31. Before being absorbed by a frontal boundary, Katrina's last known position was over southeast Quebec and northern New Brunswick. On August 31, Katrina became a powerful extratropical low in the province of Quebec that gave 50 to 170 mm (1.97 to 6.69 in) of rain in 12 hours; also numerous wind gusts from 50 to 98 km/h (31 to 61 mph) were reported in southern and eastern Quebec. In the region of Saguenay and Cote-Nord, rain caused breakdowns and failure in roads. The Cote-Nord region was isolated from rest of Quebec for at least 1 week.

At 11 p.m. EDT on August 31 (0300 UTC, September 1), U.S. government weather officials announced that the center of the remnant low of what was Katrina had been completely absorbed by a frontal boundary in southeastern Canada, with no discernible circulation. The Hydrometeorological Prediction Center's last public advisory on Katrina was at 11 p.m. EDT on August 31 and the Canadian Hurricane Centre's last public advisory on Katrina was at 9 a.m. EDT on August 31.

Impact

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Preparations and expectations before landfall

Previous short term preparations and expectations

Advance weather forecasts

Many living in the area felt that south Florida had minimal advance warning when Katrina strengthened from a tropical storm to a hurricane in one day, and struck southern Florida later that same day, on August 25. Even so, NHC forecasts showed Katrina strengthening into a hurricane well in advance of landfall, and hurricane watches and warnings were indeed issued nearly 36 and 24 hours, respectively, before hurricane conditions were felt in the area (watches and warnings are supposed to be issued at those time periods), .

By August 26 the possibility of "unprecedented cataclysm" was already being considered. Some computer models were putting New Orleans right in the center of their track probabilities, and the chances of a direct hit were forecast at nearly 90%. This scenario was considered a "potential catastrophe" because 80% of the New Orleans metropolitan area is below sea level. Louisiana governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco declared a state of emergency for state agencies.

On August 27, after Katrina crossed southern Florida and strengthened to Category 3, President George W. Bush declared a state of emergency in Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi two days before the hurricane made landfall. On August 28 the National Weather Service issued a predicting "devastating" damage rivaling the intensity of Hurricane Camille. At a news conference, New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin ordered a mandatory evacuation of the city with Gov. Blanco standing beside him.

Transportation and infrastructure

On Sunday, August 28, Canadian National Railway (CN) suspended all rail traffic on its lines south of McComb, Mississippi (lines owned by its subsidiary Illinois Central Railroad that extend into New Orleans), in anticipation of damage from the hurricane. To help ease the resumption of services after the storm passes, CN also issued an embargo with the Association of American Railroads against all deliveries to points south of Osyka, Mississippi. CSX Transportation also suspended service south of Montgomery, Alabama until further notice. The CSX (former Louisville and Nashville Railroad) main line from Mobile to New Orleans is believed to have suffered extensive damage, especially in coastal Mississippi, but repair crews were not able to reach most parts of the line as of August 30.

Amtrak, America's rail passenger carrier, announced that the southbound City of New Orleans passenger trains from Chicago, Illinois, on August 29 and through September 3 would terminate in Memphis, Tennessee, rather than their usual destination of New Orleans; the corresponding northbound trains will also originate in Memphis. The southbound Crescent from New York City, for the same period terminated in Atlanta, Georgia, with the corresponding northbound trains originating in Atlanta as well. Amtrak's westbound Sunset Limited originated in San Antonio, Texas, rather than its normal origin point of Orlando, Florida. Amtrak announced that no alternate transportation options would be made available into or out of the affected area .

The Waterford nuclear power plant was shut down on Sunday, August 28, before Katrina's arrival.

The State Departments of Transportation in the affected area, in conjunction with the Federal Highway Administration, have a huge job to rebuild the critical highways for access to the region. Interstate 10 seems, at first glance, to be the most critical to repair, especially the twin bridges over Lake Pontchartrain, which were destroyed. These are "lifelines" to the east, but assessing the damage, there will be no quick fix. These costs could run into many billions of dollars.

Experts: Predictions, risks and preparations

The risk of devastation from a direct hit was well documented.

The New Orleans Times-Picayune newspaper ran a series on the risk in 2002 titled "Washing Away"; the series predicted many of the events that happened in 2005, including the breakdown of the levee system. "It's only a matter of time before South Louisiana takes a direct hit from a major hurricane. Billions have been spent to protect us, but we grow more vulnerable every day." New Orleans Times-Picayune June 23 - 27 June 2002

National Geographic ran a feature in October 2004 . Scientific American covered the topic thoroughly in an October 2001 piece titled "Drowning New Orleans" . Walter Williams did a serious short feature on it called "New Orleans: The Natural History", in which an expert said a direct hit by a hurricane could damage the city for six months . CSO magazine ran an interview with the National Weather Service's Gary Woodall in which he listed six steps that citizens and company executives can take to be prepared for hurricanes such as this.

Evacuation and emergency shelters

"Not since the Dust Bowl of the 1930s or the end of the Civil War in the 1860s have so many Americans been on the move from a single event."

At a news conference 10 a.m. on August 28, shortly after Katrina was upgraded to a Category 5 storm, New Orleans mayor Ray Nagin, calling Katrina "a storm that most of us have long feared," ordered the first ever mandatory evacuation of the city. Contraflow lane reversal on Interstate 10 leading west and Interstates 55 and 59 leading north from New Orleans was ended that afternoon.

Two weeks after the storm, over half the States were involved in providing shelter for evacuees. By four weeks after the storm, evacuees had been registered in all 50 states and in almost half the Zip codes of the U.S. Three quarters of evacuees had stayed within 250 miles but tens of thousands had located more than 1000 miles away.

The Louisiana State Evacuation Plan declares "The primary means of hurricane evacuation will be personal vehicles. School and municipal buses, government-owned vehicles and vehicles provided by volunteer agencies may be used to provide transportation for individuals who lack transportation and require assistance in evacuating" in Part 1 Section D. The state evacuation plan also assigns the responsibility of evacuation to each Parish with the language "Conduct and control local evacuation in parishes located in the risk area and manage reception and shelter operations in parishes located in the host area" in Part 1 Section D. The state evacuation plan also assigns the responsibility of evacuation of the sick and those needing assistance to the owners of the facilities with the language: "Hospitals, nursing homes, group homes, etc. will have pre-determined evacuation and/or refuge plans if evacuation becomes necessary. All facilities will have approved Multi-Hazard Emergency Operations Plans as mandated by the State of Louisiana, Dept. of Health and Hospitals (DHH). Before operating permits are given to homes/hospitals, emergency precautions are to be taken, such as the placement of emergency supplies and equipment (i.e., generators and potable water) on upper floors.." in Part 1 Section D. As many of these facilities relied on the same bus companies and ambulance services for evacuation, several were unable to evacuate before the storm hit, resulting in the deaths of their occupants.

In addition to residents, many tourists were stranded. Fuel and rental cars were in short supply; also, Greyhound bus and Amtrak train service were halted well before the hurricane made landfall . Future analysis of motor vehicle registration, census and Social Security Information, and death certificates may help to provide more clarity. During the Hurricane Ivan evacuation, 600,000 people remained in the city .

Mandatory evacuations were also ordered for Assumption, Jefferson (Kenner, Metairie, as well as Grand Isle and other low lying areas), Lafourche (outside the floodgates), Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Charles and St. James parishes and parts of St. Tammany, Tangipahoa and Terrebonne parishes in Louisiana.

In Alabama, evacuations were ordered for parts of Mobile and Baldwin counties (including Gulf Shores). In Mississippi, evacuations were ordered for parts of Hancock, Harrison and Jackson counties.

New Orleans shelters

It has been suggested that this article be merged with Effect of Hurricane Katrina on New Orleans. (Discuss)

Louisiana Superdome

On August 28, as Hurricane Katrina grew into a Category 5 storm that had yet to make landfall, Nagin established several "refuges of last resort" for citizens who could not leave the city, including the massive Louisiana Superdome. The New Orleans Times - Picayune reported that the Louisiana National Guard delivered three truckloads of water and seven truckloads of MRE's, enough to supply 15,000 people for three days according to Col. Jay Mayeaux, deputy director of the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Emergency Preparedness . The Superdome housed over 9,000 people along with 550 National Guard troops when Katrina came ashore . On August 29, Katrina passed over New Orleans with such force that it ripped two holes in the Superdome roof. A National Guard official said on Thursday, September 1, that as many as 60,000 people had gathered at the Superdome for evacuation, having remained there in increasingly difficult circumstances.

Air conditioning, electricity, and running water all failed, making for very unsanitary and uncomfortable conditions. There have been widespread reports of murders, rapes, beatings, robberies, and general mayhem in the Superdome.

Some of these reports were determined to be based on unverified rumors and myths . There are currently reports that as many as 40 sexual assaults did indeed occur in New Orleans during and after hurricane Katrina

On August 31, it was announced that evacuees would be moved to the Astrodome in Houston, Texas. By September 6, the Superdome was completely evacuated. New Orleans Saints team owner Tom Benson said the state agency managing the Superdome told him the stadium can be ready for games by Sept. 15, 2006 But because earlier estimates put the target opening in November, Benson acknowledged he needed another 30 days to feel comfortable the September date can be met.

New Orleans Convention Center

The Ernest N. Morial Convention Center was broken into by August 30, and by September 1, the facility, like the Superdome, was overwhelmed and declared unsafe and unsanitary. Reports of violence, beatings, and rape among those gathered in the convention center were widespread, though later questioned. Several people died while sheltered within. Reports indicated that up to 20,000 people had gathered at the Convention Center, many dropped off after rescue from flooded areas of the city. Others were directed to the center by the police, headed by Eddie Compass, as a possible refuge. However, even though there were thousands of evacuees at the center, along with network newscasters, pleading desperately for help on CNN, FOX, and other broadcast outlets, FEMA head Michael Brown and Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff both claimed to have no knowledge of the use of the Convention Center as a shelter until the afternoon of September 1 , although later Brown said he misspoke and had learned of them 24 hours earlier. For two days, still, the evacuees' pleas were ignored. Those able to walk the distance could have left the Convention Center, and the city, via the Crescent City Connection Bridge, but were prevented from doing so at gunpoint by Gretna, LA sheriffs . The Convention Center was completely evacuated by September 3. By September 8 there were reports that the claims of rape and murder at the Convention Center and the Superdome could be false . There are currently reports that as many as 40 sexual assaults did indeed occur in New Orleans during and after hurricane Katrina

Shelters in Texas

It has been suggested that this article be merged with Hurricane Katrina effects by region#Texas. (Discuss)

On August 31, the Harris County, Texas Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management and the State of Louisiana came to an agreement to allow at least 25,000 evacuees from New Orleans, especially those who were sheltered in the Louisiana Superdome, to move to the Astrodome until they could return home. The evacuation began on September 1.

However, as of September 2, officials declared the Reliant Astrodome full and unable to accept additional hurricane refugees from the disaster. The Reliant Astrodome was reopened a few hours later, and it was announced that the Reliant Center would have all events cancelled through December so as to open the building to ~11,000 additional evacuees. The George R. Brown Convention Center was announced as an additional shelter site at the same time, but was not opened for use until September 3.

When the Houston shelters began to reach capacity on September 2, Texas Governor Rick Perry activated an emergency plan that made space for an additional 25,000 in each of San Antonio and the Dallas/Fort Worth/Arlington, Texas Metroplex and smaller shelters in communities across Texas. Beginning with a convoy of 50 buses (2,700 people) that arrived at the Dallas Reunion Arena at 3:00 a.m. CST September 3, a wave of over 120,000 additional evacuees began pouring into Texas at a rate, such that as of September 5, it was estimated there are roughly 139,000 evacuees in official shelters in the state, adding to the estimated 90,000 already in hotels and homes.

By the afternoon of September 5, with a total estimated number of over 230,000 evacuees in Texas, Governor Perry ordered that buses begin being diverted to other shelters outside the state resulting in 20,000 being sent to Oklahoma and 30,000 being sent to Arkansas. By Labor Day, September 6, Texas had an estimated 250,000 evacuees and Governor Perry was forced to declare a state of emergency in Texas and issued an impassioned plea to other states to begin taking the 40,000-50,000 evacuees that were still in need of shelter.

Local effects and aftermath

Areas affected include southern Florida, Louisiana (especially the Greater New Orleans area), Mississippi, Alabama, the western Florida Panhandle, western and north Georgia (hit by tornadoes), the Tennessee Valley and Ohio Valley regions, the eastern Great Lakes region and the length of the western Appalachians. Over 1,300 deaths have been reported in seven states, a number which is expected to rise as casualty reports come in from areas currently inaccessible. Three levees in New Orleans gave way, and 80% of the city was under water at peak flooding, which in some places was 20 to 25 feet (7 or 8 meters) deep. As of September 6, the flood pool had abated to covering 60% of the city.

By September 2, NOAA had published satellite photography of many of the affected regions. The storm surge in Katrina as it was making landfall on August 29 was very high to the east of where the storm center crossed the coast. Storm surge of near 30 feet high was observed, where during the height of the storm at the Mississippi Coast Coliseum scenes like a car floating outside the first floor lobby, and a boat is being swept across the parking lot as the surge comes in with the eyewall winds were not uncommon. The lobby and parking lot are over 20 feet above sea level of the Gulf of Mexico, and less than 1/4 mile away from the Gulf coastal road Highway 90 in Harrison County between Biloxi and Gulfport.

Looting and violence

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It has been suggested that this article be merged with Effect of Hurricane Katrina on New Orleans. (Discuss)

Shortly after the hurricane ended on August 30, some residents of New Orleans, including police officers, who remained in the city began looting stores . Many looters were in search of food and water that was not available to them due to the destruction, though many people stole non-essential items as well. Drug, convenience, clothing, and jewelry stores in the French Quarter and on Canal Street were hardest hit. Looting also occurred in other towns throughout the disaster area. "The looting is out of control. The French Quarter has been attacked," Councilwoman Jackie Clarkson said. "We're using exhausted, scarce police to control looting when they should be used for search and rescue while we still have people on rooftops."

Some police officers barricaded their stations to avoid snipers and "resorted to looting for shoes, dry socks and food" . Reports of carjacking, murders, thefts, and rapes flooded the news, but many of the stories were determined to likely be based on rumors—despite being spread by officials such as Mayor Nagin . Thousands of National Guard and federal troops were mobilized and sent to Louisiana along with numbers of local law enforcement agents from across the country who were temporarily deputized by the state. "They have M-16s and are locked and loaded. These troops know how to shoot and kill and I expect they will," Kathleen Blanco said. Congressman Bill Jefferson (D-LA) told ABC News. "There was shooting going on. There was sniping going on. Over the first week of September, law and order was gradually restored to the city." Several shootings occurred between police and New Orleans residents including the fatal incident at Danziger Bridge.

A number of arrests were made throughout the affected area including near the New Orleans Convention Center. A temporary jail was constructed of chain link cages in the city train station although controversy arose over at least one inmate. A September 26 2005 article from The Times Picayune, titled 'Rumors of deaths greatly exaggerated' provides updated information on attempts to corroborate many of the reports of violence. Issues of racial bias in media coverage began to surface as Caucasian flood victims were portrayed in one Agence France-Presse photo as "finding" supplies while a black person was described in an Associated Press photo as engaging in "looting." The photographers later clarified the two stories, one claiming he witnessed the black person looting a store, while the other photographer described the white people as finding the food floating in floodwaters.

In Texas, with more than 300,000 evacuees, local officials have run 20,000 criminal background checks on the evacuees, as well as the relief workers helping them and people who have opened up their homes. Most of the checks have found little for police to be concerned about. While Philadelphia police found no criminals at all in those evacuated to their city, the state police in West Virginia said roughly half of the nearly 350 Katrina victims evacuated by the government to that state had criminal records, and 22 percent have a history of committing a violent crime.

Death toll (summary)

Template:Hurricane Katrina death toll

As of January 4, the confirmed death toll stands at 1,386, mainly from Louisiana (1,077) and Mississippi (231). (This number includes often-omitted deaths in Ohio (2), Kentucky (1), and among evacuees (57).)

Direct deaths indicate those caused by the direct effects of the winds, flooding, storm surge or oceanic effects of Katrina. Indirect deaths indicate those caused by hurricane-related accidents (including car accidents), fires or other incidents, as well as clean-up incidents and health issues.

The New Orleans Times Picayune newspaper ran a story in November 2005 noting that 5000 missing New Orleans residents alone are still unaccounted for.

In hard-hit St. Bernard Parish, which was 100% flooded by Katrina, the search for missing was slow. According to an interview in the Times Picayune, the coroner was still trying to get a list of missing from the Red Cross in November 2005. The initial list of missing persons of around 200 residents was published at several local media outlets. While there were some victims on this list whose bodies were found in their homes as recently as December 2005, the vast majority were tracked down through word-of-mouth and credit card records.

As of December 2005, The official missing list in St. Bernard Parish stands at 47 . It's feared that shrimpers and oystermen who usually ride out storms in their boats may have been swept into the marshes by the surge. While there were news reports of marsh searches reported on CNN, a more comprehensive search of the marshes of Eastern St. Bernard Parish is slated to begin in January 2006.

After protracted arguments over who would handle the costs, DNA testing began in early December to identify approximately 263 bodies that could not be identified by other means.

On September 6 FEMA stopped allowing journalists to accompany rescuers searching for victims, saying they would take up too much space. At the same time, FEMA requested that journalists stop taking pictures of dead bodies. News organizations have filed suit in Federal Court, claiming a violation of the First Amendment's freedom of the press. In face of the lawsuit, FEMA has since countermanded this request.

On September 9 FEMA ordered 50,000 body bags in addition to the 25,000 previously ordered.

On September 13, officials announced that negligent homicide charges had been filed against the owners of a St. Bernard Parish nursing home, where the bodies of thirty four residents, apparently drowned, were found.

Humanitarian and animal concerns

Main article: Humanitarian effects of Hurricane Katrina

Causes of levee failures

System design flaws and lack of adequate maintenance helped contribute to the massive levee failures. Those responsible for the conception, design, construction, and maintenance of the region's flood-control system apparently failed to pay sufficient attention to public safety, according to an investigation by the National Science Foundation.

According to new modeling and field observations by a team from Louisiana State University, the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO), a 200-meter wide canal designed to provide a shortcut from New Orleans to the Gulf of Mexico, helped provide a funnel for the storm surge, making it 20% higher and 100%-200% faster as it crashed into the city. The St. Bernard Parish, which was one of the most devastated areas, lies just south of the MRGO. The Army Corps of Engineers disputes this causality and maintains Katrina would have overwhelmed the levees with or without the contributing effect of the MRGO. Opponents of the MRGO have been lobbying for its closure, since the expected shipping traffic it was designed for has never materialized.

Disaster response

Some disaster recovery response to Katrina began before the storm, with Federal Emergency Management Agency preparations that ranged from logistical supply deployments to a mortuary team with refrigerated trucks. A network of volunteers have been rendering assistance to local residents and residents emerging from New Orleans and surrounding Parishes.

In accordance with federal law, President George W. Bush directed Secretary Michael Chertoff of the Department of Homeland Security to coordinate the Federal response. Chertoff designated Michael D. Brown, head of FEMA, as the Principal Federal Official to lead the deployment and coordination of all federal response resources and forces in the Gulf Coast region. However, the President and Secretary Chertoff have come under harsh criticism from many Americans, particularly in the media, for their lack of planning and coordination. Eight days later, Brown was recalled to Washington and Coast Guard Vice Admiral Thad W. Allen replaced him as chief of hurricane relief operations. Three days after the recall, Michael D. Brown resigned as director of FEMA in spite of having received praise from President George W. Bush .

The United States Northern Command established Joint Task Force (JTF) Katrina based out of Camp Shelby, Mississippi to act as the military's on-scene command on Sunday, August 28 . Lieutenant General Russel Honoré of the U.S. First Army in Fort Gillem, Georgia, is the commander.

The U.S. Senate approved a bill authorizing $10.5 billion in aid for victims on September 1 2005. The U.S. House of Representatives voted and approved on the measure Friday, September 2 2005 without any debate; Bush signed it into law an hour later. On September 7, another $51.8 billion in addition to the original $10.5 billion was proposed by President Bush to fund disaster relief.

In addition to asking for federal funds, President Bush has enlisted the help of former presidents Bill Clinton and George H.W. Bush to raise additional voluntary contributions, much as they did after the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami. On September 3, Gov. Blanco hired James Lee Witt, the former FEMA director during the Clinton Administration, to oversee recovery efforts in Louisiana. .

Federal response

Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, decided to take over the federal, state, and local operations officially on September 30, 2005 going forward by citing the National Response Plan. The National Response Plan states that, when responding to a catastrophic incident, the federal government should start emergency operations even in the absence of clear assessment of the situation. "A detailed and credible common operating picture may not be achievable for 24 to 48 hours (or longer) after the incident," the NRP's "Catastrophic Annex" states. "As a result, response activities must begin without the benefit of a detailed or complete situation and critical needs assessment."

U.S. states response

Many U.S. states have offered to shelter evacuees displaced by the storm, including places as far away as Oregon and California. The majority of the evacuees from this crisis were taken to Texas, with over 230,000 people taking shelter in Texas by Labor Day, September 5 2005. As Texas shelters became filled to capacity, it became a waypoint for the other evacuees still leaving the area of crisis. From Texas, thousands of evacuees have been dispersed to other states.

Many religious organizations have traveled to Lousiana and Mississippi to offer relief and to help the people and the religious organizations.

About 100,000 New Orleans college and university students have been displaced as a result of Hurricane Katrina. Higher institutions from across the U.S. have opened their doors to enroll students displaced. See list compiled by Wikinews.

Army and Air National Guard troops have been activated from nearly every American state.

International response

Over seventy countries pledged money or other assistance, including the single largest pledge of support from Kuwait for $500 million; $100 million from the country of Qatar; $5 million from India; $1 million from Bangladesh and $5 million from People's Republic of China. . Countries like Sri Lanka, which is still recovering from the Indian Ocean Tsunami, Dominica, one of the smallest countries in the world by any measure, Cuba and Venezuela, despite their differences with the United States, have also offered to help. Countries including Canada, Mexico, Singapore, and Germany have offered to send in supplies, relief personals, troops, ships and water pumps to aid in the disaster recovery. Russia, whose initial offer was to send at least two jets was declined by the U.S. State Department; France, whose initial offer of concrete help was also declined.

Non-governmental charitable response

The American Red Cross, Salvation Army, and many other charitable organizations are trying to provide housing, food, and water to the victims of the storm. These organizations provided an infrastructure for shelters throughout Louisiana and other states that held thousands of evacuees. On September 8, 2005, FOX News reported that the Red Cross was prepositioned to provide water, food and essential supplies to the Superdome and convention center as soon as the storm finished, but was prohibited from entering the city prior to Hurricane Katrina making landfall by the Louisiana State Department of Homeland Security, under the direction of Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco. The safety of Red Cross personnel was among the primary reasons given.

In addition to providing shelter and relocation services, many organizations are also active in the recovery and rebuilding processes. In areas of Southern Mississippi and Louisiana, dozens of organizations have been collaborating in providing free house 'gutting' and tree removal for affected residents. Prior to gutting, houses are assessed to ensure that less than 50% of the structure is compromised, and that the house is still on its foundation. In past disasters, FEMA coordinated the work order process. Due to FEMA restructuring and the scope of this disaster, local organizations such as the East Biloxi Coordination and Relief Center are handling the case management and order processing.

Larger relief groups such as the Red Cross and Habitat for Humanity are not active in this process due to liability concerns, but many smaller organizations are stepping to the plate and providing this valuable service for the community. They include Hands On USA, Presbyterian Disaster Assistance, Mennonite Disaster Services, Four Square, Grassroots/Global Crossroads, Catholic Charities, Back Bay Mission, UMCOR, dozens of Baptist groups, Lutheran Episcopal Disaster Response, Mercy Ships, and others. The process is still ongoing, with serious concerns about toxic chemicals, volunteer safety, persistent black mold, and asbestos presenting substantial roadblocks.

Effects outside the immediate region

Economic effects

Most experts anticipate that Katrina will be recorded as the costliest natural disaster in U.S. history. Some early predictions in damages exceeded $100 billion, not accounting for potential catastrophic damage inland due to flooding, interruption of oil supply (much of the U.S. energy operations are in the Gulf Coast region), and decreased exports of commodities such as grain. The Gulf Coast region accounts for 30% of US total oil production, 20% of natural gas production, and 40% of imported oil docks in that region. Other predictions placed the minimum insured damage at around $12.5 billion (the insured figure is normally doubled to account for uninsured damages in the final cost). There are also effects on ocean shipping, the casino industry, and tourism.

International oil prices rose. In the UK, pump prices for unleaded petrol (gas) hit £1 per litre ($7 per US gallon) for the first time in a significant number of places (averaging about 95p), a rise of about 3% from pre-Katrina prices. Wholesale prices were up 5% as of 6 September.

Space Shuttle program

The hurricane passed over the Michoud Assembly Facility and materially interrupted the production of external tanks for the Space Shuttle, leading to a further interruption of the shuttle flights . Evan McCollum, a Lockheed Martin Space Systems spokesman in Denver has reported that "there is water leakage and potential water damage in the buildings, but there's no way to tell how much at this point" .

The Michoud Assembly Facility will remain closed until at least September 26. Plans to ship three tanks -- including the one for NASA's next mission -- back to Michoud for retrofitting are on indefinite hold. The next Shuttle flight, STS-121, could be postponed to May or later during the second half of 2006 . This facility is also used as a temporary staging area and headquarters for the U.S. Marine Corps effort in New Orleans, helping with the evacuation.

The John C. Stennis Space Center in Hancock County, Mississippi was also damaged by Katrina, with structural damage to the main facility causing some water leakage into the interior portions of the research facility and halting any major tests while repairs are being made. In addition, the space center was used as a temporary evacuation center for areas near the Mississippi gulf coast region and for residents of New Orleans.

Internet

Technology for All set up technology centers for Internet access in the Astrodome. There were also reports that SBC Communications and T-Mobile installed and provided free wifi access in the Astrodome. Cisco, Vonage, and SBC provided similar services at the Dallas Convention Center and Reunion Arena where another 8,000 evacuees were sheltered.

The DirectNIC (Intercosmos Media Group, ) data center in downtown New Orleans was able to continue operations uninterrupted, due in part to the efforts of a few determined individuals. They also worked to help procure fuel for telco providers, and provided a router for New Orleans' city hall, apparently so city officials could establish VoIP telephone service during the disaster. According to Netcraft, DirectNIC is the 11th largest domain registrar on the Internet, at 1.1 million domains. They are currently running a very popular blog that is documenting things that are happening around them, including pictures of the New Orleans aftermath, with a link to a webcam showing part of the Central Business District on Poydras St. A LiveJournal community, InterdictorNews has been started for those who have been commenting in this blog. It includes FAQs about the actions of the DirectNIC team in setting up Outpost Crystal.

The effects of the storm disrupted the OC-12 Abilene Network Internet2 link between Houston and Atlanta, as well as some of DirectNIC's many high-speed connections. The staff on site are working to restore more upstream connectivity, as well as Internet access to local municipal organizations.

As of September 1 2005, Sans Infocon is reporting code green for Internet attacks. Keynote Internet Health Report is reporting code green for select Internet networks. The Internet Traffic Report was reporting code yellow for North America. Earthlink network status reports that DSL is unavailable in New Orleans. Perhaps one of the more interesting sets of status information is Googling New Orleans and checking the reachability of the top 20 websites. On September 1, 25% were unreachable, 20% were impaired, and 55% remained reachable. The NO Visitor's Bureau reports "There is virtually total internet disruption as well, as locally hosted servers and routers have gone down with the loss of primary and backup power. Only those hotels with corporate housed servers in other cities have any internet possibility."

Cybertelecom.org established a webpage to collect data on the status of and impact on the Internet from Katrina. .

Science research

Important work on heart disease, cancer, AIDS and many other other ailments may be lost to scientists at Tulane and Louisiana State universities' medical schools in New Orleans. Military research was also affected as state police broke into a high-security government lab in New Orleans and destroyed unspecified dangerous pathogens before they could escape or be stolen.

Political effects

As high profile news coverage has reported, the American public in general blames all levels of government in different proportions for failures to perform their responsibilities in hurricane preparedness, reaction, and aftermath.

Prevention and evacuation issues

According to the National Response Plan, the Department of Homeland Security "will assume responsibility on March 1st for ensuring that emergency response professionals are prepared for any situation. This will entail providing a coordinated, comprehensive federal response to any large-scale crisis and mounting a swift and effective recovery effort" . The state evacuation plan (Part 1 Section D7) states , evacuation is the responsibility of the local parish. In Orleans Parish that responsibility fell to Mayor Ray Nagin. Many critics have noted that while Mayor Nagin gave a mandatory evacuation order on August 28, before the storm hit, they did not make sufficient prevention and provisions to evacuate the homeless, the poor, the elderly, the infirm, or the car-less households. Hospitals, nursing homes, group homes, were supposed to have pre-determined evacuation and/or refuge plans in place. Foreign nationals without transport claimed that the police refused to evacuate them, giving bus places only to American citizens.

Prior to this, on August 27 the White House issued a statement , effective August 26, authorizing federal emergency assistance for Louisiana. The statement authorized the DHS and FEMA to coordinate disaster relief and "...required emergency measures, authorized under Title V of the Stafford Act, to save lives, protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in the parishes of Allen, Avoyelles, Beauregard, Bienville, Bossier, Caddo, Caldwell, Claiborne, Catahoula, Concordia, De Soto, East Baton Rouge, East Carroll, East Feliciana, Evangeline, Franklin, Grant, Jackson, LaSalle, Lincoln, Livingston, Madison, Morehouse, Natchitoches, Pointe Coupee, Ouachita, Rapides, Red River, Richland, Sabine, St. Helena, St. Landry, Tensas, Union, Vernon, Webster, West Carroll, West Feliciana, and Winn." This includes all the parishes in the state of Louisiana except the coastal parishes which are inherently exposed to the most destructive forces of a hurricane. The President had not yet authorized FEMA to enter the coastal areas despite the governors request including those parishes. The governor activated the National Guard with her August 26, State of Emergency Declaration page II-4 Red Cross relief in New Orleans remains forbidden by the Governor.

According to the Louisiana Evacuation plan, evacuation was mainly left up to individual citizens to find their own way out of the city. It was known that many residents of New Orleans lacked cars. It is also believed that many citizens, having survived previous hurricanes, did not anticipate the impending catastrophe and chose to ride out the storm. Even so, a 2000 census revealed that 27% of New Orleans households, amounting to approximately 120,000 people, were without privately-owned transportation. Additionally, at 38%, New Orleans has one of the highest poverty rates in the United States. These factors may have prevented many people from being able to evacuate on their own. Consequentially most of those stranded in the city are the poor, the elderly, and the sick.

State and city evacuation plans ( Part 1 Section C and part II-2) mention use of school buses for evacuation. With the following language: "The primary means of hurricane evacuation will be personal vehicles. School and municipal buses, government-owned vehicles and vehicles provided by volunteer agencies may be used to provide transportation for individuals who lack transportation and require assistance in evacuating." Several hundred school buses were left parked on low ground where they would be easily flooded with storm water and then later by the levee flooding making their use impossible in the emergency evacuation. It is not clear whether these buses were owned by the city or by a private contractor to which the city had outsourced school bus services. Mayor Nagin testified in his hearing in Washington that those buses were owned by the school board and that he had no control over them. The precise number of buses available was been cited anywhere from a couple of hundred to a likely exagerated 2,000 .

During non-emergency times, drivers of school buses must own and maintain a class D commercial license or better depending on the exact size and weight of the bus. During an emergency any driver is suitable as long as approved by the Governor. In spite of risks and his lack of formal training or license, 20-year-old Jabbar Gibson commandeered a New Orleans school bus and rescued 70 people from the rising floodwaters before making the 13-hour drive to Houston's Reliant Astrodome, arriving on Wednesday evening. A day later a commercially licensed driver's bus filled with evacuees flipped, resulting in one death and many injuries after a passenger fought with the driver.

In a phone call to WWL radio made after the idle school and RTA buses were flooded, Mayor Nagin called for 500 Greyhound buses to be sent from outside the city to help evacuate. Coordination of transportation from outside the Parish is the responsibility of the Governor according to the State Evacuation Plan (Part 1 Section D). Governor Blanco had yet to exercise this responsibility.

Some evacuees report that the drive from New Orleans to Baton Rouge took anywhere from five hours to nine hours; this drive usually takes up to an hour. Reports from the Associated Press state that 80% of the near 500,000 had evacuated safely from New Orleans prior to the hurricane's landfall. Even if licensed drivers had been available and the available buses had been used to evacuate the remaining approximately 150,000 people, they may not have made it to safety before landfall.

This massive migration is the largest since the Dust Bowl of the 1930's sent about 300,000 people from the Great Plains States to other regions of the US, most notably California.

Performance of leaders

A few days before the storm hit New Orleans, Michael Brown had been emailing his colleagues about what wardrobe would look best on television during the disaster. "Tie or not for tonight? Button-down blue shirt?" On August 29th, wrote Brown, "I got it at Nordstroms. ... Are you proud of me?" Adding an hour later, "If you'll look at my lovely FEMA attire, you'll really vomit. I am a fashion god." The morning Katrina hit New Orleans, Michael Brown wrote, ""Can I quit now? Can I come home?" A few days later, he wrote to a friend, "I'm trapped now, please rescue me."

Race and class issues

In the aftermath of the hurricane, vivid images depicting the stranded as overwhelmingly black, the realization that those without private means of evacuation had been left behind, and the perception that the poorest areas were those most prone to flooding, very quickly gave the rise to racial and class interpretations of the response. The U.S. Census Bureau estimates the 2004 New Orleans population to be 20.0% white and 67.9% black, and the conventional wisdom became that black and poor people had suffered disproportionately.

Members of the Congressional Black Caucus, Black Leadership Forum, National Conference of State Legislators, National Urban League and the NAACP held a news conference expressing anger and charging that the response was slow because those most affected are poor. Critics say city, state and federal officials didn't bother to consider citizens who cannot afford private transportation when planning for a natural disaster in New Orleans. Mayor Nagin was criticized for failing to formulate an evacuation plan that provided transportation out of the city for those without private means.

However, the greater amount of criticism was directed at the slow reaction of the Bush administration to the crisis. Although some commentators suggest that FEMA's response was inadequate across the board, including its treatment of the predominantly white victims in Mississippi and suburban Louisiana, polls revealed that a majority of African-Americans believed that racial bias played a role in the indifference the administration, including FEMA.

This was perhaps crystalized on September 2, when, while presenting on the NBC Concert for Hurricane Relief, music producer and rapper Kanye West strayed from his script and addressed what he perceived as the racism of both the government and of the media, stating: "George Bush doesn't care about black people". During these comments NBC cut filming on West and footage resumed with Chris Tucker. (West's comments were heard in the entirety in the eastern U.S., where the telecast was shown live; NBC later removed a portion of the comments on the tape-delayed telecast shown in the west. NBC also issued an apology for the comments.)

African-American leaders including Jesse Jackson and Marc Morial of the National Urban League have also called for the creation of a victims' compensation fund modeled after the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund.

"Within days after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress passed and the president signed legislation authorizing a 9/11 victims compensation fund, which eventually provided more than $7 billion in compensation for the victims of 9/11," Morial said in a press release. "As it did then, Congress must take immediate and decisive action to begin compensating American citizens whose lives have been disrupted by this major national tragedy."

The impact of the racial dimension of the tragedy may affect African-Americans most. According to poll data and media accounts, the treatment of victims in New Orleans led to feelings of distrust, alienation and anger among black Americans nationwide.

Debates about terminology

Language was one of the specific fields in which the debate about the racial elements of the aftermath played out. For instance, civil rights groups were very displeased with the use of the word "looter" in regard to the predominately black citizens of New Orleans. Some people perceived racism in a pair of photo captions that were posted at Yahoo.com. A caption said a white couple as had found items and a different caption said black man as having looted. But the photos and captions were from two news organizations and two photographers. The photographers said they had written what they saw, finding items floating in the water in one case, and taking items from a store in the other case.

Another concern was the media's choice of terminology for the displaced. In one analysis, it was found that "refugees" appeared 5 times more frequently in the global media than "evacuees", which some people see as more neutral. Most of the major U.S. news outlets eliminated the usage of "refugees".

The Immigration and Nationality Act defines "refugee" in Sec. 101(a)(42) as: Any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.

According to the conventions of international humanitarian assistance, the correct term for the former residents of the hurricane affected areas would be "internally displaced persons". The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights defines internally displaced persons as: "Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border."

The word 'refugee' was rejected by critics because it implies lack of citizenship or second-class citizenship especially in light of the civil-right movement's work towards equal citizenship rights for African-Americans.

Doubt cast on conventional wisdom

There appears to be a growing body of evidence that contradicts the recieved interpretations of whom was affected by the hurricane. Casualty statistics, broken down by race and released by the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals (LDHH), have been cited as evidence that African-Americans were not dispropotionately affected, at least in terms of deaths. According to the LDHH, as of December 16 2005, 48 percent of the identified victims were African American and 41 percent were white. This is a substantially higher proportion of white casualties than New Orleans's racial makeup would suggest. However, the deceased are not from New Orleans alone, but rather from throughout the southern part of the state, and this greatly reduces the conclusions that can be drawn from the data.

A much more convincing analysis is one conducted by the Los Angeles Times and published on December 24, 2005. Its method was to tabulate bodies retrieved from neighborhoods (excluding those found in hospitals), as they could give clues to socio-economic status. Surprisingly, bodies were spread throughout the city, with the distribution displaying only a "slight bias for economic status." Upon investigation, it was found that the only other neighborhoods to suffer as complete a destruction as the poor, predominately black Lower 9th Ward, were actually rich, predominately white neighborhoods near Lake Pontchartrain. These neighborhoods were actually lower-lying than the Lower 9th. In addition to the class-based analysis, the study also revealed that "of the bodies formally identified, a disproportionate number are white." This conclusion came from the fact that of the 380 bodies from New Orleans identified, 33 percent were white, when, according to the study, the white population of New Orleans was only 28 percent. Although necessarily preliminary due to the fact that many people have not yet been identified and bodies are still being found, and while limited to the easily measurable death rate, this study suggests that the brunt of the hurricane was not disproportionately borne by the poor and black. This is perhaps more in line with New Orleans' previous reputation for high levels of social and racial integration.

Environmental issues

Katrina has caused a renewed interest in global warming. However it is impossible to link individual events such as Hurricane Katrina with long term action. It is believed by many climatologists and meteorologists that warmer seas (caused by global warming) will make hurricanes such as Katrina more fierce . It is worth noting however that world-wide, there has not been an increase in number of storms. The number of storms may not be the best measure of whether there is a global warming impact on tropical cyclones. There are two or three recent studies that do show an effect on intensity of storms though this remains disputed. See or the discussion on Long term trends in cyclone activity for more information.

An environmental factor in the extent of damage caused by Katrina has been the destruction of wetlands in the affected regions, which traditionally have a mitigating effect on hurricane damage acting as a "sponge" to slow floodwaters.

Untreated sewage, decomposing bodies and livestock as well as a complicated mixture of toxic chemicals and oils originating from both domestic, agricultural and industrial sources are still mixing into the floodwaters creating a serious health risk across the whole of the flooded area. The immediate threats include disease contagions being spread from decomposing bodies, both by water and by animal vectors such as mosquitoes. Longer term threats will reveal themselves as the floodwaters recede, including biochemical residue which could severely impact surface and ground water, soil, and urban environments. An immediate challenge exists in safely disposing of vast quantities of polluted water inside New Orleans. Many news reports currently state that the water inside New Orleans will be pumped straight back into Lake Pontchartrain and the Gulf of Mexico. The effects of this action remain extremely unclear and will result in serious contamination of both bodies of water.

Of the approximately 3050 off-shore oil rigs in the Gulf of Mexico, 108 platforms were destroyed, and 53 suffered significant damage. In addition, tanks were moved and burst, and there were a total of 336 spills that poured an estimated 8 million gallons of oil into the Louisiana marshes.

Congressional investigation

The Washington Post reported on September 7 2005, that in an apparent attempt to control the political fallout over the destruction of much of New Orleans, the U.S. Congress would form a rare joint House-Senate investigative commission, but that unlike the bipartisan 9/11 Commission, a majority of the committee would be Republicans, and that Democrats would have no subpoena authority . The composition of the committee mirrored the divides in every standing committee of the House and Senate and in the Congress.

Demographic shifts

In surveys since the storm 45-50% of the nearly half a million people evacuated from the affected area into other states have indicated an unwillingness to return. A full 40% of those surveyed among the 250,000 evacuees in Texas indicated that they intended to remain in the state permanently. Another 15% indicated that they would probably relocate to other areas of the country instead of returning to Louisiana. Already, thousands of the evacuees and other citizens from Louisiana have started to migrate not only to the evacuation areas such as Texas, Georgia, and Arkansas, but to other areas including Tennessee, California, along with North and South Carolina.

Mayor Nagin of New Orleans recently admitted that he expected that even after several years of rebuilding, the City of New Orleans would likely only be about half the pre-Katrina size of 460,000.

With this major shift in population will come significant political changes. It is estimated that in the next congressional seat realignment, after the census in 2010, Louisiana could stand to lose several of its seven Congressional seat due to population loss. Surrounding states -- particularly Texas -- will likely pick up these seats as a result. Oklahoma, Arkansas, Georgia and Tennessee could potentially each pick up a seat as well. This could have a profound and long-lasting impact on the electoral map and on national elections beginning in 2010 due to both the migration of seats between states and the change in demographics in existing districts in the affected states.

Within the state of Louisiana, the reduction of the predominantly African-American and Democratic community within New Orleans, combined with a reduction of the relative influence of the New Orleans area in the state legislature, has the potential to shift the balance of political power in favor of the Republican party. Loss of federal funds commensurate with the drop in population is also expected, although some cities, such as Baton Rouge, which have grown in population as a result of evacuees, are seeking re-evaluation of the demographic statistics used to calculate apportionment of funds in the wake of Katrina.

In terms of Congressional representation, there have been concerns about population equality between U.S. House of Representatives districts within Louisiana due to the massive population shifts; however any redistricting would first require an accurate accounting of where the displaced New Orleans residents are, and if they plan to return. The Center for Voting and Democracy has proposed amending the 1842 Apportionment Bill (which mandates the use of single member districts) to allow Louisiana, at least temporarily, to act as one large multi-member district, with Representatives elected using a form of proportional representation. A full assessment of Louisiana's post-Katrina electoral problems can be found here: FairVote.org.

Media involvement

Many representatives of the news media reporting on the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina became directly involved in the unfolding events, instead of simply reporting. Due to the loss of most means of communication, such as land-based and cellular telephone systems, field reporters in many cases became conduits for information between victims and authorities.

Several reporters for various news agencies located groups of stranded victims, and reported their location via satellite uplink. Authorities, who monitored the network news broadcasts, would then attempt to coordinate rescue efforts based on the news reports. This was best illustrated when Shepard Smith and Geraldo Rivera of Fox News, among others, reported thousands of evacuees stranded at the New Orleans Convention Center. Rivera tearfully pleaded for authorities to either send help or let the evacuees leave. Geraldo Rivera went so far as to compare the convention center to Willowbrook State School.

The news media, both traditional and Internet, also played a role in helping families locate missing loved ones. Many family members, unable to contact local authorities in the affected areas, discovered the fate of a loved one via an online photo or television video clip. In one instance, a family in Clearwater, Florida discovered their mother was still alive in Bay St. Louis, Mississippi after seeing a photo of her on TampaBayStart.com , a regional news site.

Many journalists also contributed to the spread of false rumors of lawlessness among the victims. Many news organizations carried the unsubstantiated accounts that murder and rape were widespread, and in some cases later repeated the claims as fact, without attribution. These rumors often impeded the relief and rescue efforts.

Restrictions on the media

As the US military and rescue services regained control over the city, there were restrictions on the activity of the media.

On September 7 a FEMA spokeswoman requested in an email to journalists that they voluntarily refrain from taking photographs of the many corpses still present in the city at that time. On September 8, FEMA spokesman Mark Pfeifle confirmed this request. On September 9, Lt. Gen. Russel Honoré, the military leader of the relief effort, announced that reporters would have "zero access" to efforts to recover bodies in New Orleans. Critics of the federal government considered this effort to be similar to the controversial post-9/11 policy that corpses under federal custody should be kept shielded from media photographers.

Immediately following the government decision, CNN filed a lawsuit and obtained a temporary restraining order against the federal ban. The next day (September 10), spokesperson Col. Christian E. deGraff announced that the government would no longer attempt to bar media access to the victim recovery efforts.

Journalists Brian Williams and Pete Williams reported that government personnel on the scene blocked attempts to report on rescue efforts in New Orleans. Brian Williams also reported that in the process of blocking journalists, police even went so far as to threaten reporters with a weapon . However, at evacuee centers such as the Austin Convention Center and the Houston Astrodome press activity was extensive.

On September 7, a journalist for the Denver Post was denied access to a survivor camp at the Community College of Aurora and reported that the camp was fenced-in and heavily guarded.

On September 7, KATU journalist Brian Barker reported that his team was threatened with automatic weapons by US Marshals until they were identified by Brig. Gen. Doug Pritt, commander of the 41st Brigade Combat Team of Oregon that they were embedded with. Subsequently, his team taped the letters "TV" on the side of their vehicles in accordance with standard practice in war zones.

Toronto Star staff photojournalist Lucas Oleniuk was thrown to the ground by police in the Spanish Quarter after taking photographs. He took pictures of a firefight between looters and police and the subsequent beating of a looter by the police. They attempted to take all of his equipment. He convinced them to just take the memory cards.

Freelance photojournalist Marko Georgiev, shooting for The New York Times, took photos of a body presumably shot and killed by the police. Police then pointed their weapons at the car and ordered the journalists out. They proceeded to search the car and stole one of Georgiev's memory cards.

See also

Template:Tcportal

• List of notable tropical cyclones
• List of Category 5 Atlantic hurricanes
• 2005 Atlantic hurricane season
• Hurricane Andrew
• Hurricane Rita
• Hurricane Wilma
• Tributes to Hurricane Katrina (songs)
• After The Mardi Gras by R.S. Pierpoint

Notes

1. http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-AL122005_Katrina.pdf
2. http://www.breitbart.com/news/2006/01/18/D8F78L200.html
3. http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-11-21-katrina-missing_x.htm?csp=34
4. http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-AL122005_Katrina.pdf
5. http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-AL122005_Katrina.pdf
6. http://www.zwire.com/site/news.cfm?newsid=15822182&BRD=1574&PAG=461&dept_id=532215&rfi=6
7. http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2005/pub/al122005.public.004.shtml?
8. http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2005/dis/al122005.discus.006.shtml?
9. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050827-1.html
10. http://wikisource.org/August_28_2005_10:11_AM_CDT_NOAA_Bulletin bulletin
11. http://www.amtrak.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=Amtrak/am2Copy/Simple_Copy_Popup&c=am2Copy&cid=1093554014709
12. http://www.nola.com/hurricane/?/washingaway/
13. http://www3.nationalgeographic.com/ngm/0410/feature5/
14. http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?chanID=sa006&articleID=00060286-CB58-1315-8B5883414B7F0000
15. http://soundwaves.usgs.gov/2002/09/outreach3.html/
16. http://www.csoonline.com/read/090105/safekeeping.html
17. http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/hurricanekatrina/2002486584_katuproot11.html
18. http://www.burlingtonfreepress.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20050905/NEWS01/509050309/1009&theme=
19. http://www.blackpressusa.com/News/Article.asp?SID=3&Title=Hot+Stories&NewsID=4744
20. http://www.nola.com/newslogs/breakingtp/index.ssf?/mtlogs/nola_Times-Picayune/archives/2005_08_28.html#074657
21. http://www.wwltv.com/local/stories/WWL082705nagin.b7724856.html
22. http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/asection/la-na-rumors27sep27,0,5536446.story?track=hpmostemailedlink
23. http://www.wdsu.com/news/5627087/detail.html
24. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5063796
25. http://www.wwltv.com/local/stories/WWL123005benson.2d03024c.html
26. CNN Video
27. http://www.thisamericanlife.org/pages/descriptions/05/296.html
28. http://www.reason.com/links/links090605.shtml
29. http://www.wdsu.com/news/5627087/detail.html
30. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5063796
31. http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20050830_hurricane_katrina_050830/?hub=World
32. http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/hurricane_katrina;_ylt=AuMEcGUKzaA0k_o5kA8EIWOs0NUE;_ylu=X3oDMTA2Z2szazkxBHNlYwN0bQ--
33. http://ngs.woc.noaa.gov/katrina/KATRINA0000.HTM
34. http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20050906/ts_nm/police_dc_1
35. http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20050906/ts_nm/police_dc_1
36. http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/asection/la-na-rumors27sep27,0,5536446.story?track=hpmostemailedlink
37. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9208195/
38. http://www.komotv.com/news/mnewsaction.asp?ID=39002
39. http://msnbc.msn.com/id/9356608/
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67. http://mgno.com/
68. http://livejournal.com/community/interdictornews/
69. http://abilene.internet2.edu/
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72. http://www.internettrafficreport.com/namerica.htm
73. http://netstatus.earthlink.net/netstatus/netstatus.aspx
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External links and sources

Disaster recovery

• American Red Cross: Official donation site
• www.disastersearch.org: Find missing persons or report yourself found in Hurricane Katrina
• Environmental impact
• Hurricane Survivors' Group (information and support)
• Katrina Help.com - Katrina Help and Recovery Info
• NewOrleans-HurricaneKatrina.com
• Katrina Housing.org - The largest, non-governemental free housing program, for displaced individuals and families
• The NOLA Hurricane Fund - The Tulane University Student-Led Relief Initiative, a 501(c)3 public charity.
• Workforce Redevelopment in the Gulf Coast

Survivor and eyewitness accounts

• The real heroes and sheroes of New Orleans: Eyewitness report from two people trapped in the city and prevented from leaving by police, in what became the notorious Gretna bridge incident
• Eye of the Storm: Two local journalists follow Katrina from landfall to recovery in South Mississippi
• New Orleans survivor stories: oral histories
• My Katrina: Life as an American Refugee
• Recording Katrina: a collection of survivors' stories and non-traditional reporting on the recovery effort in the Gulf.
• Hurricane Digital Memory Bank Hurricane Digital Memory Bank: Preserving the Stories from Katrina, Rita, and Wilma.

Damage to technological infrastructure

• Computer Infrastructure Co-dependency implications

Government

• Federal Emergency Management Agency
• Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals
• Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
• Mississippi Emergency Management Agency
• Dallas Hurricane Katrina Evacuee Resources & Volunteer/Donation Registry Pages
• National Hurricane Center advisory archive on Katrina
• National Hurricane Center tropical cyclone report on Katrina

Non-Profit Organizations

• Levees.org
• Secular Humanist Aid and Relief Organization

Maps & imagery

• Hurricane (Katrina) Crisis Imagery - National Geospatial Intelligency Agency (NGA)
• NASA Hurricane Resource Page
• Aftermath Photos of Hurricane Katrina
• Digital Memory Bank by Center for History and New Media and University of New Orleans, locates first-hand accounts and images on a Google map page.
• Katrina Information (Google)Map

Research

• Increasing destructiveness of tropical cyclones
• Changes in Tropical Cyclone Number, Duration, and Intensity in a Warming Environment
• Science Magazine Katrina/Rita page

Timelines

• Hurricane Katrina Timeline by Teresa Harvey La Loggia. Posted at the Center for Cooperative Research's website.
• Hurricane Katrina Timeline by Think Progress.
• Hurricane Katrina Timeline by Daily Kos.
• Hurricane Katrina Timeline by Talking Points Memo.

v t e Tropical cyclones of the 2005 Atlantic hurricane season
Timeline
	TSArlene TSBret 1Cindy 4Dennis (history) 5Emily TSFranklin TSGert TSHarvey 2Irene TDTen TSJose 5Katrina (history) TSLee 3Maria 1Nate 1Ophelia 1Philippe 5Rita TDNineteen 1Stan SSUnnamed TSTammy SDTwenty-two 1Vince 5Wilma (history) TSAlpha 3Beta TSGamma TSDelta 1Epsilon TSZeta
Category

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• 2005 Atlantic hurricane season
• 2005 meteorology
• Alabama hurricanes
• Atlantic hurricanes
• August 2005 news
• Category 5 hurricanes
• Historic weather events in the United States
• Hurricane Katrina
• Louisiana hurricanes
• Mississippi hurricanes
• Mississippi River
• Natural disasters
• New Orleans, Louisiana
• October 2005 news
• September 2005 news
• Disasters in the United States