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| SCIENCE IS EASY AND FUN! | |||
| {{About|the general term, particularly as it refers to experimental sciences|the specific topics of study by scientists|Natural science}}{{Other uses}} | |||
| {{Pp-move-indef}} | |||
| {{stack|] patterns. Above, the Greek ] unveils the ].]] | |||
| {{Science}}}} | |||
| '''Science''' (from {{lang-la|scientia}} meaning "knowledge") is a systematic enterprise that builds and organizes ] in the form of testable ] and ] about the ].<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/science |quote= knowledge or a system of knowledge covering general truths or the operation of general laws especially as obtained and tested through scientific method '''. . .''' such knowledge or such a system of knowledge concerned with the physical world and its phenomena |publisher=Merriam-Webster |title=Online dictionary |accessdate=2009-05-22}}</ref>{{sfn|Popper|2002|p=3}}<ref>{{Cite book| last = Wilson | first = Edward | title = Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge | publisher = Vintage | location = New York | year = 1999 | isbn = 0-679-76867-X }}</ref><ref>] (1935), reminds us that before a specific fact 'existed', it had to be created as part of a social agreement within a community.</ref> An older and closely related meaning still in use today is that of ], for whom scientific knowledge was a body of reliable knowledge that can be logically and ] explained (''see ] below'').<ref>], ca. 4th century BCE {{cite web | title = ] Book VI, and ] Book I: | url = http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0054%3Abekker%20page%3D1139b}} "In general the sign of knowledge or ignorance is the ability to teach, and for this reason we hold that art rather than experience is scientific knowledge (''epistemē''); ''for the artists can teach, but the others cannot''." — </ref> | |||
| Since ] science as a type of knowledge was closely linked to ]. In the ] the two words, "science" and "philosophy", were sometimes used interchangeably in the ]. By the 17th century, "natural philosophy" (which is today called "]") had begun to be considered separately from "philosophy" in general.<ref>Consider, for example, ] (1687) '']''</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Newton's Philosophy |author=Andrew Janiak |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/newton-philosophy/ |publisher=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |quote=Fully understanding Newton means avoiding anachronistically substituting our conception of philosophy in the twenty-first century for what the early moderns called 'natural philosophy'. To be sure, the latter includes much that we now call 'science', and yet it clearly includes much else besides...Newton may have provided physics with its paradigm...Newton's scientific achievement was in part to have vanquished both Cartesian and Leibnizian physics; in the eighteenth century, and indeed much of the nineteenth, physics was largely a Newtonian enterprise. |date=13 October 2006 |accessdate=19 March 2011}}</ref> However, "science" continued to be used in a broad sense denoting reliable knowledge about a topic, in the same way it is still used in modern terms such as ] or ]. | |||
| In modern use, science is "often treated as synonymous with ‘natural and physical science’, and thus restricted to those branches of study that relate to the phenomena of the material universe and their laws, sometimes with implied exclusion of pure mathematics. This is now the dominant sense in ordinary use."<ref>Oxford English Dictionary</ref> This narrower sense of "science" developed as a part of science became a distinct enterprise of defining "]", based on early examples such as ]'s laws, ]'s laws, and ]'s ]. In this period it became more common to refer to natural philosophy as "natural science". Over the course of the 19th century, the word "science" became increasingly associated with the ] of the natural world including ], ], ] and ]. This sometimes left the study of human thought and society in a linguistic limbo, which was resolved by classifying these areas of academic study as ]. Similarly, several other major areas of disciplined study and knowledge exist today under the general rubric of "science", such as ] and ].<ref>] (1949, 1965) points out that all knowledge, including natural or social science, is also subjective. Page 162: "Thus it dawned upon me that fundamentally everything is subjective, everything without exception. That was a shock." See: ].</ref> | |||
| ==History and etymology== | |||
| {{Main|History of science|Scientific revolution}} | |||
| ] of "Science" in front of the ]]] | |||
| While descriptions of disciplined ] investigations of the natural world exist from times at least as early as ] (for example, by ] and ]), and ]s have been employed since the ] (for example, by ] and ]), the dawn of modern science is generally traced back to the ] during what is known as the ] of the 16th and 17th centuries.<ref name="history">{{Cite book | |||
| | last = Hunt | |||
| | first = Shelby D. | |||
| | title = | |||
| | publisher = M.E. Sharpe | |||
| | year = 2003 | |||
| | page = 18 | |||
| | isbn = 0765609320}} | |||
| </ref> This period was marked by a new way of studying the natural world, by methodical experimentation aimed at defining "laws of nature" while avoiding concerns with metaphysical concerns such as Aristotle's ].<ref>. Washington State University</ref> | |||
| {{quote|Rapid accumulation of knowledge, which has characterized the development of science since the 17th century, had never occurred before that time. The new kind of scientific activity emerged only in a few countries of Western Europe, and it was restricted to that small area for about two hundred years. (Since the 19th century, scientific knowledge has been assimilated by the rest of the world).|Joseph Ben-David, 1971.<ref name="history"/>}} | |||
| This modern science developed from an older and broader enterprise. The word "science" is from ], and in turn from ] {{lang|la|''scientia''}} which was one of several words for "knowledge" in that language.<ref>It is the nominal form of the verb {{lang|la|''scire''}}, "to know". The ] (PIE) root that yields ''scire'' is ''*skei-'', meaning to "cut, separate, or discern".</ref><ref>. See also details of the PIE root at .</ref> In philosophical contexts, ''scientia'' and "science" were used to translate the Greek word ''epistemē'', which had acquired a specific definition in Greek philosophy, especially ], as a type of reliable knowledge which is built up logically from strong premises, and can be communicated and taught. In contrast to modern science, Aristotle's influential emphasis was upon the "theoretical" steps of ] universal rules from raw data, and did not treat the gathering of experience and raw data as part of science itself.<ref>"... man knows a thing scientifically when he possesses a conviction arrived at in a certain way, and when the first principles on which that conviction rests are known to him with certainty—for unless he is more certain of his first principles than of the conclusion drawn from them he will only possess the knowledge in question accidentally." — Aristotle, ''Nicomachean Ethics'' '''6''' (H. Rackham, ed.) </ref> | |||
| From the ] to the ], science or ''scientia'' continued to be used in this broad sense, which was still common until the 20th century.<ref name="MacMorris 1989 31–33">{{Cite book| first=Neville | last=MacMorris | year=1989 | title=The Natures of Science | pages=31–33 | publisher=Fairleigh Dickinson University Press | location=New York | isbn=0838633218 }}</ref> "Science" therefore had the same sort of very broad meaning that '']'' had at that time. In other Latin influenced languages, including ], ], ], and ], the word corresponding to ''science'' also carried this meaning. | |||
| Prior to the 18th century, the preferred term for the study of nature among English speakers was "]", while other philosophical disciplines (e.g., ], ], ], ] and ]) were typically referred to as "moral philosophy". (Today, "]" is more-or-less synonymous with "ethics".) Science only became more strongly associated with ] than other sciences gradually with the strong promotion of the importance of experimental ], by people such as ]. With Bacon, begins a more widespread and open criticism of Aristotle's influence which had emphasized theorizing and did not treat raw data collection as part of science itself. An opposed position became common: that what is critical to science at its best is methodical collecting of clear and useful raw data, something which is easier to do in some fields than others. | |||
| ] in ] established a new model of academic tuition.]] | |||
| The word "science" in English was still however used in the 17th century to refer to the ] concept of knowledge which was secure enough to be used as a prescription for exactly how to accomplish a specific task. With respect to the transitional usage of the term "natural philosophy" in this period, the philosopher ] wrote in 1690 that "natural philosophy is not capable of being made a science".<ref name=Locke1838>{{Cite book | |||
| | last=Locke | first=J. | authorlink=John Locke | year = 1838 | |||
| | title = ] | |||
| | publisher = Printed by Thomas Davison | |||
| | isbn=0140434828 }}'']''</ref> However, it may be that Locke was not using the word 'science' in the modern sense, but suggesting that 'natural philosophy' could not be deduced in the same way as mathematics and logic.<ref>Kragh, H., ''An intoduction to the historiography of science'', Cambridge University Press, 1989, p.138.</ref> | |||
| Locke's assertion notwithstanding, by the early 19th century natural philosophy had begun to separate from philosophy, though it often retained a very broad meaning. In many cases, ''science'' continued to stand for reliable knowledge about any topic, in the same way it is still used today in the broad sense (see the introduction to this article) in modern terms such as ], ], and ]. In the more narrow sense of ''science'', as natural philosophy became linked to an expanding set of well-defined laws (beginning with ]'s laws, ]'s laws, and ]'s laws for motion), it became more popular to refer to natural philosophy as natural science. Over the course of the 19th century, moreover, there was an increased tendency to associate science with study of the natural world (that is, the non-human world). This move sometimes left the study of human thought and society (what would come to be called ]) in a linguistic limbo by the end of the century and into the next.<ref name = Thurs>{{Cite book| first=Daniel Patrick | last=Thurs | year=2007 | title=Science Talk: Changing Notions of Science in American Popular Culture| publisher=] | location=New Brunswick, NJ | isbn = 978-0813540733 | oclc=170031241 | pages=22:55}}</ref> | |||
| Through the 19th century, many English speakers were increasingly differentiating science (i.e., the natural sciences) from all other forms of knowledge in a variety of ways. The now-familiar expression “],” which refers to the ''prescriptive'' part of how to make discoveries in natural philosophy, was almost unused until then, but became widespread after the 1870s, though there was rarely total agreement about just what it entailed.<ref name = Thurs/><!-- pp. 74–79 --> The word "scientist," meant to refer to a systematically working natural philosopher, (as opposed to an intuitive or empirically minded one) was coined in 1833 by ].<ref name=Ross1962>{{Cite journal| format = PDF | author = Ross, S. | year = 1962 | title = Scientist: The story of a word | journal = Annals of Science | volume = 18 | issue = 2 | pages = 65–85 | url = http://www.informaworld.com/index/739364907.pdf | accessdate = 2008-02-08 | doi = 10.1080/00033796200202722| ref = harv}}</ref> Discussion of ]s as a special group of people, who did science, even if their attributes were up for debate, grew in the last half of the 19th century.<ref name = Thurs/><!-- p. 69–74, 79–84 --> Whatever people actually meant by these terms at first, they ultimately depicted science, in the narrow sense of the habitual use of the scientific method and the knowledge derived from it, as something deeply distinguished from all other realms of human endeavor. | |||
| By the 20th century, the modern notion of science as a special kind of knowledge about the world, practiced by a distinct group and pursued through a unique method was essentially in place. It was used to give legitimacy to a variety of fields through such titles as "scientific" medicine, engineering, advertising, or motherhood.<ref name = Thurs/><!-- p. 95 --> Over the 20th century, links between science and ] also grew increasingly strong. As ] explains, progress in scientific understanding and technology have been synergistic and vital to one another.<ref>http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b00sp194/The_Reith_Lectures_Martin_Rees_Scientific_Horizons_2010_What_Well_Never_Know/</ref> | |||
| ] described science, to his students, as: "The principle of science, the definition, almost, is the following: ''The test of all knowledge is experiment.'' Experiment is the ''sole judge'' of scientific 'truth'. But what is the source of knowledge? Where do the laws that are to be tested come from? Experiment, itself, helps to produce these laws, in the sense that it gives us hints. But also needed is imagination to create from these hints the great generalizations — to guess at the wonderful, simple, but very strange patterns beneath them all, and then to experiment to check again whether we have made the right guess." Feynman also observed, "...there is an expanding frontier of ignorance...things must be learned only to be unlearned again or, more likely, to be corrected."<ref>Feynman, Leighton, Sands. "The Feynman Lectures On Physics", pp. 1–1, ], 1964.</ref> | |||
| ==Branches== | |||
| {{Main|Branches of science}} | |||
| ] are commonly divided into two major groups: ]s, which study natural phenomena (including ]), and ], which study ] and ]. These groupings are ] sciences, which means the knowledge must be based on observable ] and capable of being tested for its validity by other researchers working under the same conditions.{{sfn|Popper|2002|p=20}} There are also related disciplines that are grouped into interdisciplinary and applied sciences, such as ] and ]. Within these categories are specialized scientific fields that can include parts of other scientific disciplines but often possess their own terminology and expertise.<ref>See: {{Cite web| author=Editorial Staff | date=March 7, 2008 | url=http://www.seedmagazine.com/news/2007/03/scientific_method_relationship.php | title=Scientific Method: Relationships among Scientific Paradigms | publisher=Seed magazine | accessdate=2007-09-12 }}</ref> | |||
| ], which is classified as a ],<ref></ref><ref>Benedikt Löwe (2002) </ref> has both similarities and differences with the empirical sciences (the natural and social sciences). It is similar to empirical sciences in that it involves an objective, careful and systematic study of an area of knowledge; it is different because of its method of verifying its knowledge, using ] rather than empirical methods.{{sfn|Popper|2002|pp=10–11}} The formal sciences, which also include ] and ], are vital to the empirical sciences. Major advances in formal science have often led to major advances in the empirical sciences. The formal sciences are essential in the formation of ], ], and ],{{sfn|Popper|2002|pp=79–82}} both in discovering and describing how things work (natural sciences) and how people think and act (social sciences). | |||
| ==Scientific method== | |||
| {{Main|Scientific method}} | |||
| A ] seeks to explain the events of ] in a ] way, and to use these findings to make useful ]s. This is done partly through observation of natural phenomena, but also through experimentation that tries to simulate natural events under controlled conditions. Taken in its entirety, a scientific method allows for highly creative problem solving whilst minimizing any effects of subjective bias on the part of its users (namely the ]).<ref name=backer>{{Cite web | |||
| | last=Backer | first=Patricia Ryaby | |||
| | date=October 29, 2004 | |||
| | url=http://www.engr.sjsu.edu/pabacker/scientific_method.htm | |||
| | title=What is the scientific method? | |||
| | publisher=San Jose State University | |||
| | accessdate=2008-03-28 }}</ref> | |||
| ===Basic and applied research=== | |||
| Although some scientific research is ] into specific problems, a great deal of our understanding comes from the curiosity-driven undertaking of ]. This leads to options for technological advance that were not planned or sometimes even imaginable. This point was made by Michael Faraday when, allegedly in response to the question "what is the ''use'' of basic research?" he responded "Sir, what is the use of a new-born child?".<ref>http://richarddawkins.net/articles/91</ref> For example, research into the effects of red light on the human eye's ] did not seem to have any practical purpose; eventually, the discovery that our ] is not troubled by red light would lead ] teams (among others) to adopt red light in the cockpits of jets and helicopters.<ref>Stanovich, 2007, pp 106–110</ref> | |||
| In a nutshell: Basic research is the search for knowledge. Applied research is the search for solutions to practical problems using this knowledge. Finally, even basic research can take unexpected turns, and there is some sense in which the scientific method is built to ]. | |||
| ===Experimentation and hypothesizing=== | |||
| ] determines the genetic structure of all known life]] | |||
| Based on observations of a phenomenon, scientists may generate a ]. This is an attempt to describe or depict the phenomenon in terms of a logical, physical or mathematical representation. As empirical evidence is gathered, scientists can suggest a ] to explain the phenomenon.{{sfn|Nola|Irzik|2005|pp=199–201}} Hypotheses may be formulated using principles such as ] (also known as "]") and are generally expected to seek ]—fitting well with other accepted facts related to the phenomena. This new explanation is used to make ] predictions that are testable by experiment or observation. When a hypothesis proves unsatisfactory, it is either modified or discarded.{{sfn|Nola|Irzik|2005|p=208}} Experimentation is especially important in science to help establish ] (to avoid the ]). ] also plays an important role in coordinating research in/across different fields. | |||
| Once a hypothesis has survived testing, it may become adopted into the framework of a ]. This is a logically reasoned, self-consistent model or framework for describing the behavior of certain natural phenomena. A theory typically describes the behavior of much broader sets of phenomena than a hypothesis; commonly, a large number of hypotheses can be logically bound together by a single theory. Thus a theory is a hypothesis explaining various other hypotheses. In that vein, theories are formulated according to most of the same scientific principles as hypotheses. | |||
| While performing experiments, ]s may have a preference for one outcome over another, and so it is important to ensure that science as a whole can eliminate this bias.<ref>{{Cite web | |||
| | last=van Gelder | first=Tim | year=1999 | |||
| | url=http://www.philosophy.unimelb.edu.au/tgelder/papers/HeadsIWin.pdf | |||
| | format=PDF | |||
| | title="Heads I win, tails you lose": A Foray Into the Psychology of Philosophy | |||
| | publisher=University of Melbourne | |||
| | accessdate=2008-03-28 | |||
| |archiveurl = http://web.archive.org/web/20080409054240/http://www.philosophy.unimelb.edu.au/tgelder/papers/HeadsIWin.pdf <!-- Bot retrieved archive --> |archivedate = 2008-04-09}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web | |||
| | last=Pease | first=Craig | |||
| | date=September 6, 2006 | |||
| | url=http://law-and-science.net/Science4BLJ/Scientific_Method/Deliberate.bias/Text.htm | |||
| | title=Chapter 23. Deliberate bias: Conflict creates bad science | |||
| | work=Science for Business, Law and Journalism | |||
| | publisher=Vermont Law School | |||
| | accessdate=2008-03-28 | |||
| }}</ref> This can be achieved by careful ], transparency, and a thorough ] process of the experimental results as well as any conclusions.<ref>{{Cite book | |||
| | first=David | last=Shatz | year=2004 | |||
| | title=Peer Review: A Critical Inquiry | |||
| | publisher=Rowman & Littlefield | isbn=074251434X | |||
| | oclc=54989960 | |||
| }}</ref><ref>{{Cite book | |||
| | first=Sheldon | last=Krimsky | year=2003 | |||
| | title=Science in the Private Interest: Has the Lure of Profits Corrupted the Virtue of Biomedical Research | |||
| | publisher=Rowman & Littlefield | isbn=074251479X | |||
| | oclc=185926306 }}</ref> After the results of an experiment are announced or published, it is normal practice for independent researchers to double-check how the research was performed, and to follow up by performing similar experiments to determine how dependable the results might be.<ref>{{Cite book | |||
| | first=Ruth Ellen | last=Bulger | year=2002 | |||
| | coauthors=Heitman, Elizabeth; Reiser, Stanley Joel | |||
| | title=The Ethical Dimensions of the Biological and Health Sciences | |||
| | edition=2nd | isbn=0521008867 | |||
| | publisher=Cambridge University Press | |||
| | oclc=47791316 }}</ref> | |||
| ===Certainty and science=== | |||
| A scientific theory is ], and is always open to ] if new evidence is presented. That is, no theory is ever considered strictly ] as science accepts the concept of ]. The philosopher of science ] sharply distinguishes truth from certainty. He writes that scientific knowledge "consists in the search for truth", but it "is not the search for certainty ... All human knowledge is fallible and therefore uncertain."{{sfn|Popper|1996|p=4}} | |||
| ] is still widely regarded as an example of taking ] too far]]Theories very rarely result in vast changes in our understanding. According to psychologist ], it may be the media's overuse of words like "breakthrough" that leads the public to imagine that science is constantly proving everything it thought was true to be false.<ref>{{harvnb|Stanovich|2007}} pg 119–138</ref> While there are such famous cases as the ] that required a complete reconceptualization, these are extreme exceptions. Knowledge in science is gained by a gradual synthesis of information from different experiments, by various researchers, across different domains of science; it is more like a climb than a leap.<ref>{{harvnb|Stanovich|2007}} pg 123</ref> Theories vary in the extent to which they have been tested and verified, as well as their acceptance in the scientific community. For example, ], ], and ] still bear the name "theory" even though, in practice, they are considered ]ual.<ref>{{cite news| url=http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2005/sep/01/schools.research | location=London | work=The Guardian | title=One side can be wrong | first1=Richard | last1=Dawkins | first2=Jerry | last2=Coyne | date=2005-09-02}}</ref> | |||
| Philosopher ] adds that, although the best definition for "]" is contested, being ] and entertaining the ''possibility'' that one is incorrect is compatible with being correct. Ironically then, the scientist adhering to proper scientific method will doubt themselves even once they possess the ].<ref>http://philosophybites.com/2007/12/barry-stroud-on.html</ref> The ] ] argued that inquiry is the struggle to resolve actual doubt and that merely quarrelsome, verbal, or ] is fruitless<ref>Peirce (1877), "The Fixation of Belief", Popular Science Monthly, v. 12, pp. 1–15, see §IV on . Reprinted ''Collected Papers'' v. 5, paragraphs 358–87 (see 374–6), ''Writings'' v. 3, pp. 242–57 (see 247–8), ''Essential Peirce'' v. 1, pp. 109–23 (see 114–15), and elsewhere.</ref>—but also that the inquirer should try to attain genuine doubt rather than resting uncritically on common sense.<ref>Peirce (1905), "Issues of Pragmaticism", ''The Monist'', v. XV, n. 4, pp. 481–99, see "Character V" on . Reprinted in ''Collected Papers'' v. 5, paragraphs 438–63 (see 451), ''Essential Peirce'' v. 2, pp. 346–59 (see 353), and elsewhere.</ref> He held that the successful sciences trust, not to any single chain of inference (no stronger than its weakest link), but to the cable of multiple and various arguments intimately connected.<ref>Peirce (1868), "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities", ''Journal of Speculative Philosophy'' v. 2, n. 3, pp. 140–57, see . Reprinted in ''Collected Papers'', v. 5, paragraphs 264–317, ''Writings'' v. 2, pp. 211–42, ''Essential Peirce'' v. 1, pp. 28–55, and elsewhere.</ref> | |||
| Stanovich also asserts that science avoids searching for a "magic bullet"; it avoids the ]. This means a scientist would not ask merely "What is ''the'' cause of...", but rather "What ''are'' the most significant ''causes'' of...". This is especially the case in the more macroscopic fields of science (e.g. ], ]).<ref name="Stanovich, 2007, pp 141–147">{{harvnb|Stanovich|2007}} pp 141–147</ref> Of course, research often analyzes few factors at once, but this always to add to the long list of factors that are most important to consider.<ref name="Stanovich, 2007, pp 141–147"/> For example: knowing the details of only a person's genetics, or their history and upbringing, or the current situation may not explain a behaviour, but a deep understanding of all these variables combined can be very predictive. | |||
| ==Mathematics== | |||
| {{Main|Mathematics}} | |||
| ]]] | |||
| ] is essential to the sciences. One important function of mathematics in science is the role it plays in the expression of scientific ''models''. Observing and collecting measurements, as well as hypothesizing and predicting, often require extensive use of mathematics. ], ], ], ] and ], for example, are all essential to ]. Virtually every branch of mathematics has applications in science, including "pure" areas such as ] and ]. | |||
| ], which are mathematical techniques for summarizing and analyzing data, allow scientists to assess the level of reliability and the range of variation in experimental results. Statistical analysis plays a fundamental role in many areas of both the natural sciences and social sciences. | |||
| ] applies computing power to simulate real-world situations, enabling a better understanding of scientific problems than formal mathematics alone can achieve. According to the ], computation is now as important as theory and experiment in advancing scientific knowledge.<ref>, SIAM Working Group on CSE Education. Retrieved 2008-04-27.</ref> | |||
| Whether mathematics itself is properly classified as science has been a matter of some debate. Some thinkers see mathematicians as scientists, regarding physical experiments as inessential or mathematical proofs as equivalent to experiments. Others do not see mathematics as a science, since it does not require an experimental test of its theories and hypotheses. Mathematical ]s and ]s are obtained by ] derivations which presume ]atic systems, rather than the combination of ] observation and logical reasoning that has come to be known as ]. In general, mathematics is classified as ], while natural and social sciences are classified as ] sciences.<ref>{{Cite book| title = Philosophy of Science: From Problem to Theory | author = Bunge, Mario Augusto | year = 1998 | publisher = Transaction Publishers | isbn = 0-765-80413-1 | page = 24}}</ref> | |||
| ==Scientific community== | |||
| ] causes a ] to levitate above a ]]] | |||
| {{Main|Scientific community}} | |||
| The scientific community consists of the total body of scientists, its relationships and interactions. It is normally divided into "sub-communities" each working on a particular field within science. | |||
| ===Fields=== | |||
| {{Main|Fields of science}} | |||
| <!-- The organizational tables have been moved to the main article "Fields of science" --> | |||
| Fields of science are widely recognized categories of specialized expertise, and typically embody their own ] and ]. Each field will commonly be represented by one or more ], where ] research will be published. | |||
| ===Institutions=== | |||
| ] visiting the {{lang|fr|]}} in 1671]] | |||
| ] for the communication and promotion of scientific thought and experimentation have existed since the ] period.<ref>{{Cite web| last=Parrott | first=Jim | date=August 9, 2007 | url=http://www.scholarly-societies.org/1599andearlier.html | title=Chronicle for Societies Founded from 1323 to 1599 | publisher=Scholarly Societies Project | accessdate=2007-09-11}}</ref> The oldest surviving institution is the {{lang|it|'']''}} in ].<ref>{{Cite web| year=2006 | url=http://positivamente.lincei.it/ | title=Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei | language=Italian | accessdate=2007-09-11}}</ref> The respective National ] are distinguished institutions that exist in a number of countries, beginning with the British ] in 1660<ref>{{Cite web| url=http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/page.asp?id=2176 | title=Brief history of the Society | publisher=The Royal Society | accessdate=2007-09-11}}</ref> and the French {{lang|fr|'']''}} in 1666.<ref>{{Cite web| first=G.G. | last=Meynell | url=http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/page.asp?id=2176 | title=The French Academy of Sciences, 1666–91: A reassessment of the French Académie royale des sciences under Colbert (1666–83) and Louvois (1683–91) | publisher=Topics in Scientific & Medical History | accessdate=2007-09-11}}</ref> | |||
| International scientific organizations, such as the ], have since been formed to promote cooperation between the scientific communities of different nations. More recently, influential government agencies have been created to support scientific research, including the ] in the ] | |||
| Other prominent organizations include the ] in Argentina, the ] of many nations, ] in Australia, {{lang|fr|]}} in France, ] and {{lang|de|]}} in Germany, and in Spain, ]. | |||
| ===Literature=== | |||
| {{Main|Scientific literature}} | |||
| An enormous range of ] is published.<ref>{{Cite journal | |||
| | last=Ziman | first=Bhadriraju | |||
| | journal=Science | |||
| | title=The proliferation of scientific literature: a natural process | |||
| | year=1980 | volume=208 | issue=4442 | |||
| | pages=369–371 | |||
| | doi= 10.1126/science.7367863 | |||
| | pmid=7367863 | |||
| | ref=harv }}</ref> ]s communicate and document the results of research carried out in universities and various other research institutions, serving as an archival record of science. The first scientific journals, '']'' followed by the '']'', began publication in 1665. Since that time the total number of active periodicals has steadily increased. As of 1981, one estimate for the number of scientific and technical journals in publication was 11,500.<ref>{{Cite book | |||
| | first=Krishna | last=Subramanyam | |||
| | coauthors=Subramanyam, Bhadriraju | year=1981 | |||
| | title=Scientific and Technical Information Resources | |||
| | publisher=CRC Press | isbn=0824782976 | |||
| | oclc=232950234 }}</ref> Today ] lists almost 40,000, related to the medical sciences only.<ref></ref> | |||
| Most scientific journals cover a single scientific field and publish the research within that field; the research is normally expressed in the form of a ]. Science has become so pervasive in modern societies that it is generally considered necessary to communicate the achievements, news, and ambitions of scientists to a wider populace. | |||
| ]s such as ], ] and ] cater to the needs of a much wider readership and provide a non-technical summary of popular areas of research, including notable discoveries and advances in certain fields of research. ]s engage the interest of many more people. Tangentially, the ] genre, primarily fantastic in nature, engages the public imagination and transmits the ideas, if not the methods, of science. | |||
| Recent efforts to intensify or develop links between science and non-scientific disciplines such as ] or, more specifically, ], include the ''Creative Writing Science'' resource developed through the ].<ref>{{Cite web| first=Mario | last=Petrucci | |||
| | url=http://writeideas.org.uk/creativescience/index.htm | title=Creative Writing <-> Science | |||
| | accessdate=2008-04-27 }}</ref> | |||
| === Women in science === | |||
| {{Main|Women in science}} | |||
| ] | |||
| Science is, in general, a male-dominated field. Evidence suggests that this is due to stereotypes (e.g. science as "manly") as well as ].<ref>] (2005). Remarks at NBER Conference on Diversifying the Science & Engineering Workforce. The office of the President. Harvard University.</ref><ref>Nosek, B.A., et al. (2009). National differences in gender–science stereotypes predict national sex differences in science and math achievement. PNAS, June 30, 2009, 106, 10593–10597.</ref> Experiments have shown that parents challenge and explain more to boys than girls, asking them to reflect more deeply and logically.<ref>Crowley, K. Callanan, M.A., Tenenbaum, H. R., & Allen, E. (2001). Parents explain more often to boys than to girls during shared scientific thinking. Psychological Science, 258–261.</ref> Physicist ] argues that science may suffer for its manly stereotypes when ego and competitiveness obstruct progress, since these tendencies prevent collaboration and sharing of information.<ref>Reflections on Gender and Science. Yale University Press, 1985.</ref> As will be seen in the main article, many women have risen above past prejudices to do great things in science. | |||
| ==Philosophy of science== | |||
| {{Main|Philosophy of science}} | |||
| ] | |||
| Philosophy of science seeks to understand the nature and justification of scientific knowledge. Since it is difficult to distinguish science from non-science, there are legitimate arguments about the boundaries between science and non-science. This is known as the ]. There is however, a set of core precepts that have broad consensus among philosophers of science and within the ] on what constitutes scientific knowledge. For example, it is generally agreed that scientific hypotheses and theories must be capable of being independently tested and verified by other scientists in order to become accepted by the scientific community.{{Citation needed|date=May 2011}} | |||
| There are different schools of thought in philosophy of science. The most popular position is ], which claims that knowledge is created by a process involving observation and that scientific theories are the result of generalizations from such observations.{{Citation needed|date=May 2011}} Empiricism generally encompasses ], a position that tries to explain the way general theories can be justified by the finite number of observations humans can make and the hence finite amount of empirical evidence available to confirm scientific theories. This is necessary because the number of predictions those theories make is infinite, which means that they cannot be known from the finite amount of evidence using ] logic only. Many versions of empiricism exist, with the predominant ones being ] and the ].{{Citation needed|date=May 2011}} | |||
| Empiricism has stood in contrast to ], the position originally associated with ], which holds that knowledge is created by the human intellect, not by observation.{{Citation needed|date=May 2011}} A significant twentieth century version of rationalism is ], first defined by Austrian-British philosopher ]. Popper rejected the way that empiricism describes the connection between theory and observation. He claimed that theories are not generated by observation, but that observation is made in the light of theories and that the only way a theory can be affected by observation is when it comes in conflict with it.{{Citation needed|date=May 2011}} Popper proposed ] as the landmark of scientific theories, and ] as the empirical method to replace verifiability and induction by purely deductive notions.{{Citation needed|date=May 2011}} Popper further claimed that there is only one universal method in science, and that this method is not specific to science: The negative method of criticism, ]. It covers all products of the human mind, including science, mathematics, philosophy, and art <ref>Karl Popper: ''Objective Knowledge'' (1972)</ref> | |||
| Another approach, ], colloquially termed "shut up and calculate", emphasizes the utility of theories as instruments for explaining and predicting phenomena.<ref>{{Cite book|title = The Rationality of Science | author = Newton-Smith, W. H. | location = London | publisher = Routledge | year = 1994 | page = 30|isbn = 0710009135}}</ref> It claims that scientific theories are black boxes with only their input (initial conditions) and output (predictions) being relevant. Consequences, notions and logical structure of the theories are claimed to be something that should simply be ignored and that scientists shouldn't make a fuss about (see ]). | |||
| Finally, another approach often cited in debates of ] against controversial movements like ], is ]. Its main point is that a difference between natural and ] explanations should be made, and that science should be restricted methodologically to natural explanations.{{Citation needed|date=May 2011}} That the restriction is merely methodological (rather than ontological) means that science should not consider supernatural explanations itself, but should not claim them to be wrong either. Instead, supernatural explanations should be left a matter of personal belief outside the scope of science. Methodological naturalism maintains that proper science requires strict adherence to ] study and independent verification as a process for properly developing and evaluating explanations for ] phenomena.<ref>{{Cite journal|journal = The Review of Metaphysics|title = Casebeer, William D. Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition|author = Brugger, E. Christian|volume = 58| issue = 2|year = 2004|ref = harv}}</ref> The absence of these standards, ], biased ] and other common ] are frequently cited by supporters of methodological naturalism as criteria for the dubious claims they criticize not to be true science. | |||
| ==Science policy== | |||
| {{Main|Science policy|History of science policy|Funding of science}} | |||
| Science policy is an area of ] concerned with the policies that affect the conduct of the science and research enterprise, including ], often in pursuance of other national policy goals such as technological innovation to promote commercial product development, weapons development, health care and environmental monitoring. Science policy also refers to the act of applying scientific knowledge and consensus to the development of public policies. Science policy thus deals with the entire domain of issues that involve the natural sciences. Is accordance with ] being concerned about the well-being of its citizens, science policy's goal is to consider how science and technology can best serve the public. | |||
| ] ] has influenced the funding of ] and science for thousands of years, dating at least from the time of the ], who inspired the study of logic during the period of the ], and the study of defensive fortifications during the ] in China. In ], governmental approval of ] in the seventeenth century recognized a ] which exists to this day. The professionalization of science, begun in the nineteenth century, was partly enabled by the creation of scientific organizations such as the ], the ], and State funding of universities of their respective nations. Public policy can directly affect the funding of ], intellectual infrastructure for industrial research, by providing tax incentives to those organizations that fund research. ], director of the office of scientific research and development for the United States government, the forerunner of the ], wrote in July 1945 that "Science is a proper concern of government" <ref></ref> | |||
| Science and technology research is often funded through a competitive process, in which potential research projects are evaluated and only the most promising receive funding. Such processes, which are run by government, corporations or foundations, allocate scarce funds. Total research funding in most ] is between 1.5% and 3% of ].<ref name="OECD2008">{{PDF||50.8 KB}}</ref> In the ], around two-thirds of ] in scientific and technical fields is carried out by industry, and 20% and 10% respectively by ] and government. The government funding proportion in certain industries is higher, and it dominates research in ] and ]. Similarly, with some exceptions (e.g. ]) government provides the bulk of the funds for ]. In commercial research and development, all but the most research-oriented corporations focus more heavily on near-term commercialisation possibilities rather than "]" ideas or technologies (such as ]). | |||
| ==Pseudoscience, fringe science, and junk science== | |||
| {{Main| Pseudoscience|Fringe science|Junk science|Cargo cult science|Scientific misconduct}} | |||
| An area of study or speculation that masquerades as science in an attempt to claim a legitimacy that it would not otherwise be able to achieve is sometimes referred to as ], ], or "alternative science".<ref>"''Pseudoscientific - pretending to be scientific, falsely represented as being scientific''", from the ''Oxford American Dictionary'', published by the ]; Hansson, Sven Ove (1996).“Defining Pseudoscience”, Philosophia Naturalis, 33: 169–176, as cited in (2008) in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The Stanford article states: "Many writers on pseudoscience have emphasized that pseudoscience is non-science posing as science. The foremost modern classic on the subject (Gardner 1957) bears the title ]. According to Brian Baigrie (1988, 438), “hat is objectionable about these beliefs is that they masquerade as genuinely scientific ones.” These and many other authors assume that to be pseudoscientific, an activity or a teaching has to satisfy the following two criteria (Hansson 1996): (1) it is not scientific, and (2) its major proponents try to create the impression that it is scientific". | |||
| * For example, Hewitt et al. ''Conceptual Physical Science'' Addison Wesley; 3 edition (July 18, 2003) ISBN 0-321-05173-4, Bennett et al. ''The Cosmic Perspective'' 3e Addison Wesley; 3 edition (July 25, 2003) ISBN 0-8053-8738-2; ''See also'', e.g., Gauch HG Jr. ''Scientific Method in Practice'' (2003). | |||
| * A 2006 ] report on Science and engineering indicators quoted ]'s (1997) definition of pseudoscience: '"claims presented so that they appear scientific even though they lack supporting evidence and plausibility"(p. 33). In contrast, science is "a set of methods designed to describe and interpret observed and inferred phenomena, past or present, and aimed at building a testable body of knowledge open to rejection or confirmation"(p. 17)'.{{Cite book|author=Shermer M.|year=1997|title=Why People Believe Weird Things: Pseudoscience, Superstition, and Other Confusions of Our Time|location=New York|publisher=W. H. Freeman and Company|isbn=0716730901}} as cited by {{Cite book|author=National Science Board. ], Division of Science Resources Statistics|title=Science and engineering indicators 2006|chapter=Science and Technology: Public Attitudes and Understanding|url=http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind06/c7/c7s2.htm|year=2006}} | |||
| * "A pretended or spurious science; a collection of related beliefs about the world mistakenly regarded as being based on scientific method or as having the status that scientific truths now have," from the '']'', second edition 1989.</ref> Another term, ], is often used to describe scientific hypotheses or conclusions which, while perhaps legitimate in themselves, are believed to be used to support a position that is seen as not legitimately justified by the totality of evidence. Physicist ] coined the term "]" in reference to pursuits that have the formal trappings of science but lack "a principle of scientific thought that corresponds to a kind of utter honesty" that allows their results to be rigorously evaluated.<ref name='cargocultscience'> by ]. Retrieved 2011-07-21.</ref> Various types of commercial advertising, ranging from hype to fraud, may fall into these categories. | |||
| There also can be an element of political or ideological bias on all sides of such debates. Sometimes, research may be characterized as "bad science", research that is well-intentioned but is seen as incorrect, obsolete, incomplete, or over-simplified expositions of scientific ideas. The term "]" refers to situations such as where researchers have intentionally misrepresented their published data or have purposely given credit for a discovery to the wrong person.<ref><cite id="COPE1999PDF">{{cite journal |title=Coping with fraud |work=The COPE Report 1999 |pages=11–18 |url=http://www.publicationethics.org.uk/reports/1999/1999pdf3.pdf |format=PDF |archiveurl=http://web.archive.org/web/20070928151119/http://www.publicationethics.org.uk/reports/1999/1999pdf3.pdf |quote=It is 10 years, to the month, since Stephen Lock ... Reproduced with kind permission of the Editor, The Lancet. |archivedate=2007-09-28 |accessdate=2011-07-21}}</cite></ref> | |||
| ==Critiques== | |||
| {{Main|Criticism of science}} | |||
| ===Philosophical critiques=== | |||
| Historian ] termed science "a faith as fanatical as any in history" and warned against the use of scientific thought to suppress considerations of meaning as integral to human existence.<ref>Jacques Barzun, ''Science: The Glorious Entertainment'', Harper and Row: 1964. p. 15. (quote) and Chapters II and XII.</ref> Many recent thinkers, such as ], ] and ] considered that the 17th century ] shifted science from a focus on understanding ], or wisdom, to a focus on manipulating nature, i.e. ], and that science's emphasis on manipulating nature leads it inevitably to manipulate people, as well.<ref name=UW>Fritjof Capra, ''Uncommon Wisdom'', ISBN 0-671-47322-0, p. 213</ref> Science's focus on quantitative measures has led to critiques that it is unable to recognize important qualitative aspects of the world.<ref name=UW/> | |||
| Philosopher of science ] advanced the idea of ], which holds that there are no useful and exception-free ] governing the ] or the growth of ], and that the idea that science can or should operate according to universal and fixed rules is unrealistic, pernicious and detrimental to science itself.<ref name="contra">{{Cite book| last = Feyerabend | first = Paul |authorlink = Paul Feyerabend | title = Against Method | publisher = Verso | location = London | year = 1993 | isbn = 9780860916468 }}</ref> Feyerabend advocates treating science as an ] alongside others such as ], ] and ], and considers the dominance of science in society ] and unjustified.<ref name="contra"/> He also contended (along with ]) that the ] of distinguishing science from ] on objective grounds is not possible and thus fatal to the notion of science running according to fixed, universal rules.<ref name="contra"/> | |||
| Feyerabend also criticized science for not having evidence for its own philosophical precepts. Particularly the notion of Uniformity of Law and the Uniformity of Process across time and space. "We have to realize that a unified theory of the physical world simply does not exist" says Feyerabend, "We have theories that work in restricted regions, we have purely formal attempts to condense them into a single formula, we have lots of unfounded claims (such as the claim that all of chemistry can be reduced to physics), phenomena that do not fit into the accepted framework are suppressed; in physics, which many scientists regard as the one really basic science, we have now at least three different points of view...without a promise of conceptual (and not only formal) unification".<ref>{{Cite book| isbn = 0860911845 | title = Farewell To Reason| page = 100 | publisher = Verso | last = Feyerabend | first = Paul | year = 1987 | authorlink = Paul Feyerabend}}</ref> | |||
| Sociologist ] scrutinizes science for operating with the presumption that the only acceptable criticisms of science are those conducted within the methodological framework that science has set up for itself. That science insists that only those who have been inducted into its community, through means of training and credentials, are qualified to make these criticisms.<ref>{{Cite book| isbn = 0816616590 | title = Science As Power: Discourse and Ideology in Modern Society | page = viii (preface) | publisher = University of Minnesota Press | last = Aronowitz | first = Stanley | year = 1988 | authorlink = Stanley Aronowitz}}</ref> Aronowitz also alleges that while scientists consider it absurd that ] uses biblical references to bolster their claim that the ] is true, scientists pull the same tactic by using the tools of science to settle disputes concerning its own validity.<ref>Stanley Aronowitz in conversation with Derrick Jensen in {{Cite book| isbn = 1931498520 | title = Welcome to the Machine: Science, Surveillance, and the Culture of Control | page = 31 | publisher = Chelsea Green Publishing Company | last = Jensen | first = Derrick | year = 2004 | authorlink = Derrick Jensen}}</ref> | |||
| Psychologist ] believed that though science attempted to understand all of nature, the experimental method imposed artificial and conditional questions that evoke equally artificial answers. Jung encouraged, instead of these 'artificial' methods, empirically testing the world in a ] manner.<ref>{{Cite book| isbn = 0691017948 | title = Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle | page = 35 | publisher = Princeton University Press | last = Jung | first = Carl | year = 1973 | authorlink = Carl Jung}}</ref> David Parkin compared the ] stance of science to that of ].<ref>{{harvnb|Parkin|1991}} "Simultaneity and Sequencing in the Oracular Speech of Kenyan Diviners", p. 185.</ref> He suggested that, to the degree that divination is an epistemologically specific means of gaining insight into a given question, science itself can be considered a form of divination that is framed from a Western view of the nature (and thus possible applications) of knowledge. | |||
| Several academics have offered critiques concerning ] in science. In ''Science and Ethics'', for example, the philosopher ] examines the relevance of ethics to science, and argues in favor of making education in ethics part and parcel of scientific training.<ref>{{Cite book | |||
| | first=Bernard E. | last=Rollin | year=2006 | |||
| | title=Science and Ethics | |||
| | publisher=Cambridge University Press | |||
| | isbn=0521857546 | |||
| | oclc=238793190 }}</ref> | |||
| ===Media perspectives=== | |||
| The ] face a number of pressures that can prevent them from accurately depicting competing scientific claims in terms of their credibility within the scientific community as a whole. Determining how much weight to give different sides in a ] may require considerable expertise regarding the matter.<ref>{{Cite web | |||
| | last=Dickson | first=David | date=October 11, 2004 | |||
| | url=http://www.scidev.net/Editorials/index.cfm?fuseaction=readEditorials&itemid=131&language=1 | |||
| | title=Science journalism must keep a critical edge | |||
| | publisher=Science and Development Network | |||
| | accessdate=2008-02-20 | |||
| }}</ref> Few journalists have real scientific knowledge, and even ]s who know a great deal about certain scientific issues may be ignorant about other scientific issues that they are suddenly asked to cover.<ref>{{Cite web | |||
| | last=Mooney | first=Chris | year=2007 | |||
| | url=http://cjrarchives.org/issues/2004/6/mooney-science.asp | |||
| | title=Blinded By Science, How 'Balanced' Coverage Lets the Scientific Fringe Hijack Reality | |||
| | publisher=Columbia Journalism Review | |||
| | accessdate=2008-02-20 | |||
| }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal | |||
| | last=McIlwaine | first=S. | coauthors=Nguyen, D. A. | |||
| | title=Are Journalism Students Equipped to Write About Science? | |||
| | journal=Australian Studies in Journalism | |||
| | year=2005 | volume=14 | pages=41–60 | |||
| | url=http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:8064 | |||
| | accessdate=2008-02-20 | |||
| | ref=harv }}</ref> | |||
| ===Politics and public perception of science=== | |||
| {{see also|Politicization of science}} | |||
| Many issues damage the relationship of science to the media and the use of science and scientific arguments by ]s. As a very broad generalisation, many politicians seek certainties and ''facts'' whilst scientists typically offer probabilities and caveats. However, politicians' ability to be heard in the ] frequently distorts the scientific understanding by the public. Examples in ] include the controversy over the ] ], and the 1988 forced resignation of a Government Minister, ] for revealing the high probability that ] farmed eggs were contaminated with '']''.<ref>, "On This Day," BBC News, December 3, 1988.</ref> | |||
| ==See also== | |||
| {{Portal|Science}} | |||
| * ] | |||
| * ] | |||
| * ] | |||
| * ] | |||
| ==Notes== | |||
| {{Reflist|2}} | |||
| ==References== | |||
| * ] (2005). ''Science, history of the philosophy'', as cited in {{Cite book|author=Honderich, Ted |title=The Oxford companion to philosophy |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=Oxford ] |year=2005 |pages= |isbn=0199264791 |oclc= 173262485|doi=}} of.'' Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford. | |||
| * {{Cite book | |||
| |author=Feynman, R.P.|year=1999|title=The Pleasure of Finding Things Out: The Best Short Works of Richard P. Feynman|publisher=Perseus Books Group|isbn=0465023959 | oclc = 181597764}} | |||
| * {{cite book | |||
| | last1=Nola | first1=Robert | last2=Irzik | first2=Gürol | year=2005 | title=Philosophy, science, education and culture | volume=28 | series=Science & technology education library | isbn=1402037694 | publisher=Springer | ref=harv | url=http://books.google.com/books?id=HRqDnikufC0C }} | |||
| * ]. (2005). ''Science, problems of the philosophy of.'', as cited in {{Cite book|author=Honderich, Ted |title=The Oxford companion to philosophy |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=Oxford ] |year=2005|isbn=0199264791 |oclc= 173262485}} | |||
| * {{Cite book|last=Parkin|first=D|year=1991|article=Simultaneity and Sequencing in the Oracular Speech of Kenyan Diviners|editor=Philip M. Peek|title=African Divination Systems: Ways of Knowing|location=Indianapolis, IN|publisher=Indiana University Press|ref=harv|postscript=<!-- Bot inserted parameter. Either remove it; or change its value to "." for the cite to end in a ".", as necessary. -->{{inconsistent citations}}}}. | |||
| * {{cite book | |||
| | last=Popper | first=Karl Raimund | year=1996 | authorlink=Karl Popper | title=In search of a better world: lectures and essays from thirty years | publisher=Psychology Press | isbn=0415135486 | url=http://books.google.com/books?id=L33XSZE77OkC | ref=harv }} | |||
| * {{Cite book | |||
| | last=Popper | first=Karl | year=2002 | title=The Logic of Scientific Discovery | origyear=1959 | edition=2nd English | publisher=Routledge Classics | location=New York, NY | isbn=0-415-27844-9 | oclc=59377149 | ref=harv }} | |||
| *{{Cite document | |||
| |last=Stanovich|first=Keith E| year=2007 |title=How to Think Straight About Psychology| location=Boston|publisher=Pearson Education|ref=harv|postscript=<!-- Bot inserted parameter. Either remove it; or change its value to "." for the cite to end in a ".", as necessary. -->{{inconsistent citations}}}} | |||
| ==Further reading== | |||
| * Augros, Robert M., Stanciu, George N., "The New Story of Science: mind and the universe", Lake Bluff, Ill.: Regnery Gateway, c1984. ISBN 0-89526-833-7 | |||
| * Baxter, Charles {{PDFlink||66.4 KB}} | |||
| * {{Cite book|last=Becker|first=Ernest|title=The structure of evil; an essay on the unification of the science of man|location=New York|publisher=G. Braziller|year=1968|authorlink=Ernest Becker}} | |||
| * Cole, K. C., ''Things your teacher never told you about science: Nine shocking revelations'' ], ], March 23, 1986, pg 21+ | |||
| * Feynman, Richard | |||
| * Gopnik, Alison, , ], Winter 2004. | |||
| * Krige, John, and Dominique Pestre, eds., ''Science in the Twentieth Century'', Routledge 2003, ISBN 0-415-28606-9 | |||
| * ], '']'', 1962. | |||
| * McComas, William F. {{PDFlink||189 KB}} ], ]. Direct Instruction News. '''Spring 2002''' 24–30. | |||
| * {{Cite book|last=Obler|first=Paul C.|coauthors=Estrin, Herman A.|title = The New Scientist: Essays on the Methods and Values of Modern Science | publisher = ], Doubleday |year=1962}} | |||
| * {{Cite book| first=Daniel Patrick | last=Thurs | year=2007 | title=Science Talk: Changing Notions of Science in American Popular Culture| pages=22–52 | publisher=Rutgers University Press | location=New Brunswick, NJ | isbn=978-0-8135-4073-3 }} | |||
| * ] (2008). ''Imagining the Future: Science and American Democracy''. New York, Encounter Books. ISBN 1-59403-209-2 | |||
| * Stephen Gaukroger. ''The Emergence of a Scientific Culture: Science and the Shaping of Modernity 1210–1685.'' Oxford, ], 2006, 576 pp. | |||
| ==External links== | |||
| {{Wiktionary}} | |||
| {{Sister project links}} | |||
| '''Publications''' | |||
| * "'']''". ].org | |||
| '''News''' | |||
| * . Science news by the journal '']'' | |||
| * . An weekly magazine published by ] | |||
| * | |||
| * | |||
| * | |||
| * | |||
| * from Discover Science & Engineering | |||
| * Scientific Videoportal and Community | |||
| '''Resources''' | |||
| * : | |||
| ** (ESOF) | |||
| * | |||
| * | |||
| * in ''Dictionary of the History of Ideas''. (Dictionary's new electronic format is badly botched, entries after "Design" are inaccessible. ''Internet Archive'' ). | |||
| * University of California Museum of Paleontology | |||
| * . Selected science information provided by U.S. Government agencies, including research and development results. | |||
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