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Second Battle of Kharkov
Part of World War II
The Eastern Front at the time of the Second Battle of Kharkov
Date 12 May, 1942 - 28 May, 1942 Location Kharkov, USSR Result Strategic German victory
Belligerents
Germany	Soviet Union
Commanders and leaders
Friedrich Paulus, Fedor von Bock	Semyon Timoshenko
Strength
1000 tanks,1500 aircraft, 300,000 men	1200 tanks,1,000 aircraft, 640,000 men
Casualties and losses
20,000 dead, wounded and captured	207,057 Personnel, 652 tanks, 1,646 guns, 3,278 mortars and 57,626 horse.

The Second Battle of Kharkov, 12 - 28 May 1942, was a Soviet attempt to expand upon their strategic initiative after their victories during the Winter Counteroffensive. Ironically, Soviet forces striking from the Izium Salient, established during the Winter Counteroffensive, had been originally targeted by German General Friedrich Paulus as a prelude to Operation Blue. However, on 12 May 1942, Soviet forces under the command of Marshal Semyon Timoshenko launched an offensive into the German Sixth Army, initiating a bloody 17-day battle which resulted in the loss of over 200,000 Red Army personnel. In the end, it would award Friedrich Paulus his first field victory and open the path for the eventual operations which led to the Battle of Stalingrad and Operation Blue.

Background

By late February 1942 the Soviet winter counteroffensive, which had pushed the Germans from the gates of Moscow and recaptured Rostov in the south, had petered out, leaving both sides licking their wounds. Stalin attempted to read the mind of the German military, and was convinced that the Germans were on their deathbed, and ready to collapse. So he decided to exploit this conceived weakness within the German military on the Eastern Front by launching a renewed offensive during the spring. Stalin's ultimate decision found heated resistance from his top advisors, including Chief of the Red Army General Staff, General B.M. Shaposhnikov, General A.M. Vasilevsky and General Georgy Zhukov, all of whom argued for a more defensive posture. Although, according to Zhukov, Stalin did believe that the Germans were able to carry out operations simultaneously along two strategic axes, Stalin was sure that the opening of spring offensives along the entire front would destabilize the German Army before it had a chance to effectively begin what could be a mortal offensive blow on Moscow. Despite the caution argued by his generals, Stalin's final decision was to catch the Germans by surprise through the conduct of 'local offensives'.

After the final conclusion to the winter offensive, both Stavka (Soviet Armed Forces High Command) and Stalin believed that the eventual German offensives would aim for Moscow, with a major offensive to the south as well, mirroring the previous year's Operation Barbarossa and Operation Typhoon. Originally, Stavka had argued that although the Germans had been defeated at Moscow, the seventy divisions which faced the axis remained a threat to Soviet security in the sector. Furthermore, all subordinate generals genuinely believed that the principal effort would be a German offensive towards Moscow. However, emboldened by the winter's success Stalin offered that local offensives in the area would only work to wear down German forces, consequently weakening German efforts to successfully mount another operation to take Moscow. Although at first he had agreed to prepare the Red Army for an 'active strategic defense', he later gave orders for the planning of seven local offensives, stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. One specific area was Kharkov, and action here was originally ordered for March.

Early that month, Stavka issued orders to Southwestern Direction headquarters for an attack in the region, after the victories at Rostov and the Donbas Region. Fighting erupted that month as Marshal S.K. Timoshenko and Lt. General K.S. Moskalenko penetrated German positions along the Northern Donets River, east of Kharkov. Heavy fighting continued into April, with Moskalenko successfully crossing the river and establishing a tenuous bridgehead, while in the south the Soviet 6th Army had limited success defending against German forces, who managed to keep a bridgehead of their own, on the east bank of the river. Catching the attention of Stalin it would set the pace for the succession of events which would form a prelude to the eventual Second Battle of Kharkov. By 15 March Stavka introduced preliminary plans for a campaign around Kharkov, envisioning a heavy buildup of reserves. On 20 March Timoshenko himself, held a conference in Kupiansk to discuss the upcoming offensive, and a subsequent report to Moscow, prepared by Timoshenko's chief of staff Lt. General Bagramian, managed to sum up the conference, although arguably leaving several key intelligence features out. The build up of Soviet forces in the region continued well into the beginning of May, and final details were hammered out between Stalin, Stavka and the leadership of the Southwestern Front led by Timoshenko, throughout March and April, with one of the final Stavka directives issued on 17 April.

Unbeknownst to the Soviets, however, the German 6th Army, under the newly appointed General Paulus, had been issued orders for Operation Friderikus, on 30 April 1942. This operation called for a concerted effort to crush the Soviet armies within the Izium Salient, captured during the Soviet early spring offensives in March and April. This task was given to the German Sixth Army, and the final directive issued on 30 April declared a 'probable start' on 18 May. In the end, the German operation would cause major disruption in Stavka's plan and ultimately pave the way for Timoshenko's defeat at Kharkov that year.

Soviet Order of Battle

By 11 May 1942, the Red Army was able to allocate six armies under two fronts, amongst other units. Under the command of the Southwestern Front fought the 21st Army, the 28th Army, the 38th Army, and the 6th Army. By 11 May the 21st Tank Corps had been successfully moved into the region along with the 23rd Tank Corps, providing 269 additional tanks. There were also three independent rifle divisions and a single rifle regiment, from the 270th Rifle Division, concentrated in the area and supported by the 2nd Cavalry Corps in Bogdanovka. The Southern Front boasted the 57th Army and the 9th Army, along with a remaining 30 rifle divisions a single rifle brigade, and the substantial reinforcements of the 24th Tank Corps, the 5th Cavalry Corps and three Guards Rifle Divisions. At its height, the Southern Front could operate eleven guns or mortars per kilometer of front.

The regrouping of forces in the sector ran into the rasputitsa, which turned much of the soil into mud and postponed several developments and inherently made reinforcing the Southern and Southwestern Front take longer than expected. There was also severe criticism from senior Soviet representatives who blamed front commanders for poor management of forces. Because the regrouping was done so haphazardly, the Germans received limited warning of Soviet movements to their direct forefront. Moskanlenko, commander of the 38th Army, places the blame on the fact that the fronts did not forge a plan previous to the decision to regroup, and thus demonstrated what would be a poor display of front management. He commented afterwards that it was no surprise that the "German-Fascist command divined our plans."

Soviet Leadership and Manpower

The primary leadership allotted to the battle was served by Marshal Semyon Timoshenko, a veteran of World War I and the Russian Civil War. Although Timoshenko had limited success at Smolensk a year earlier, his attempts would ultimately lead to the ultimate defeat at said battle. He was later able to orchestrate the victory at Rostov during the winter counterattacks, and enjoyed limited success during the spring offensive at Kharkov, previous to the actual battle. Overseeing the actions of the army was Military Commissar Nikita Khrushchev, a peasant by birth. All in all, both fronts had very experienced commanders, including army commanders and front commanders.

However, the standard Soviet soldier suffered from being rather green. With the Soviet debacle of the previous year, ameliorated only by the barest victory at Moscow, most of the original manpower the Red Army could count on had been killed, wounded or imprisoned by the Germans. Stavka and Stalin were forced to look into mass conscription to fill in the ranks, bringing about a surge of raw recruits and poorly trained soldiers, many of which were non-Slavic. The Red Army began to receive recruits from prisons, Central Asia, the Ukraine, Jews, Kazaks, Uzbeks, Tartars, et cetera. Coupled with the lack of trained soldiers the Red Army also began to suffer from poor logistics and a lack of supplies. In fact, prior to Operation Uranus, during the Battle of Stalingrad, the Red Army didn't have the necessary amounts of anti-tank ordnance and rocket artillery, while the crews of their own tanks, and even their artillery were just as poorly trained as their compatriots in the infantry. Most military historians have implied that the Soviet Army of 1942 was not prepared to conduct major offensive operations against the well-trained German Army, simply because the Red Army at that time failed to have the leadership, both in command and junior officer level, to oversee and successfully conclude a strategic offensive into the enemy's rear. The notion, however, is largely retrospective and is an analysis on Soviet conduct during their strategic offensives in 1942, and even beyond, such as Operation Mars, October 1942, and Târgul Frumos May 1944.

German Order of Battle

On the other hand, the Germans had also undergone a massive effort to reinforce Army Group South, transferred to the control of Field Marshall Fedor von Bock, former commander of Army Group Center during Operation Barbarossa and Operation Typhoon. On 5 April 1942, Hitler issued Directive Number 41, which pinpointed the south as the major area of operations for the German strategic summer campaign of the year, and at the expense of the other fronts the divisions of Army Group South were brought to full strength by late April and early May. The strategic objective was illustrated after the victories of Erich von Manstein and his 11th Army in the Crimea. The centerpiece objective remained the Caucasus, famous for their oil fields, and as a secondary objective Stalingrad, although the latter was not underlined as a major objective until after the beginning of Operation Blue, in June 1942.

The introduction of Operation Friderikus in April provided the further incentive to bolster total forces in the area of the German Sixth Army under the command of General Paulus. Therefore, unknown to the Soviets, the German Army was also undergoing a major regrouping effort in the area directly mapped as the center of operations for the upcoming offensive around Kharkov. It was on 10 May when Paulus submitted his final draft plans for Operation Friderikus, Paulus was fearing a Russian attack. By then, the German army directly opposite Timoshenko was fully prepared for combat duties in their eventual operation towards the Caucasus.

The battle

12 May: The Red Army on the Offensive

The offensive began at 6:30 in the morning, 12 May 1942, led by a concentrated one hour artillery strike, and a final twenty minute air attack upon German positions. The ground offensive began with a dual pincer movement from the Volchansk and Barvenkovo salients, beginning at 7:30 in the morning. The Soviet forces faced massive resistance from the opposing German defenses, which were slowly knocked out by concentrated air raids and artillery strikes, along with coordinated ground assaults against fortified positions. The fighting was so fierce that the Soviets inched forward their second echelon formations, preparing to throw them into combat as well. Fighting was particularly atrocious near the Russian village of Nepokrytaia, where the Germans launched three local counterattacks. By day's end the greatest penetration by Soviet forces was ten kilometers. Soviet command of the field, documented by General Moskalenko, caught the movement of several German reserve units and finally caught on that his forces were up against two German divisions, not the expected single division., indicating that the Red Army had conducted poor reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering prior to the initiation of the battle. In fact, a captured diary of a dead German general alluded to the fact that the Germans had very possibly known in advance about the pending Soviet operations in the region. The day also saw, after much persuasion on Paulus' part, the release of three German infantry divisions and a single Panzer division for use in the defense of Kharkov. For the most part, the Soviet advance was poor, achieving notable success only on the left flank, with the other advances continuing rather slowly and suffering minor setbacks. Bock had warned Paulus not to counter-attack immediately without air support, although this was later reconsidered when several Soviet tank brigades broke through General Walther Heitz's VIII Corps in the Volchansk sector, which was only 12 miles away from Kharkov, a grave threat to the Germans.

12 May: The Wehrmacht Defends Itself

The first 72 hours saw a battering of the German Sixth Army, with 16 battalions destroyed, fighting in the heavy rain and mud. Paulus called for a series of holding actions, although the Germans still preformed localized counter-attacks. Although by 14 May Stavka's army had made impressive gains, German actions in certain areas had taken their toll, and several shaken Soviet divisions were forced to withdraw from their attacks. Only Soviet tanks, held in reserve, were able to put a stop to the German counter-attacks, with much loss of life. Much to the chagrin of Timoshenko, German losses were only estimated to be minimal; for example, only 35-70 tanks were estimated to have been knocked out in the 3rd and 23rd Panzer Divisions. German close air support also began to take its toll, forcing units such as the Soviet 38th Army on the defensive. On 14 May the Germans continued to pound Soviet positions in the north in localized offensives and by then the Luftwaffe had gained air superiority over the Kharkov sector, forcing Timoshenko to move his own air assets forward in order to effectively counter the bolstered German aircraft, some of which were under the command of the Fourth Air Fleet, General Wolfram von Richthofen's command. Nonetheless, the Soviets pushed on, disengaging from several minor battles and changing the direction of their thrusts. However, in the face of continued German resistance and localized German counter-attacks the Soviet attack ebbed, especially when combined with the invariably heavy air raids. By the end of the day the 28th Army could no longer operate in an offensive manner against German positions.

Ironically, the Soviet southern pincer had not suffered as terribly as had the shock groups in the north. In fact, they achieved spectacular success the first three days of combat, with far reaching penetration of German positions. Although intensive fighting also marked the battles in the south, the Soviets routed several key German battalions, including many made up of personnel of foreign decent, including some Hungarian units. Colonel Bechtelzheim reported that many German and Hungarian troops were "bend", and that they "showed signs of crumbling." The success of the Southern Shock group, however, has been attributed to the fact that the early penetrations in the north had directed German reserves there, thus limiting the amount of troops thrown into defensive positions in the south. But, by 14 May, Hitler had briefed German General Ewald von Kleist and ordered his 1st Panzer Army to grab the initiative in a bold counter-offensive, setting the pace for the final launching of Operation Friderikus.

15 May: The Red Army Tries Again

15 May and 16 May saw another attempted Soviet offensive in the north, meeting the same resistance they had met the three first days of the battle. Much to the chagrin of Soviet forces, German bastions continued to hold out against Soviet assaults. The major contribution to Soviet frustration in the battle was the lack of heavy guns, which ultimately would not allow the attacking Red Army units to effectively wipe out resistance in heavily defended positions. One of the biggest examples of this was the defense of Ternovaia, where defending German units absolutely refused to surrender after excessive pummeling from the Red Army. The fighting was so harsh that after advancing an average of five kilometers, the offensive stopped for the day in the north. The next day saw a renewal of the Soviet attack which was largely blocked by counter-attacks of German tanks, and the tired Soviet divisions could simply not hold their own against the concerted attacks from the opposition. The south, however, achieved success, much like the earlier days of the battle, although Soviet forces began to face heavier air strikes from German combat aircraft. The Germans, on the other hand, had spent the day fighting holding actions in both sectors, launching small counter-attacks to whittle away at Soviet offensive potential, while continuously moving up reinforcements arriving from the south, including several aircraft squadrons transferred from the Crimea. Poor decisions by the 150th Rifle Division, which had successfully crossed the Barvenkovo River, played a major part in the poor exploitation of the tactical successes of the southern shock group.

17 May: The Wehrmacht Counterattacks

On 17 May the initiative of the battle was successfully transferred to the Germans as Kleist's 1st Panzer Army began a double headed counter-attack on the Barvenkovo bridgehead. Aided greatly from air support, Kleist was able to crush Soviet positions and advanced up to ten kilometers in the first day of the attack, leaving the Soviet forces shocked. Many of the Soviet units were sent to the rear that night to be refitted, while others were moved forward to reinforce tenuous positions across the front. That same day Timoshenko signaled Stavka, in Moscow, and asked for reinforcements and described the day's failures. Khrushchev claims that Timoshenko's attempts to gain approval for a general withdrawal were put down by Stalin. On 19 May Paulus, on orders from Bock, had already began a general offensive in the north in an attempt to encircle the remaining Soviet forces in the Izium salient. Much to the surprise of German troops, as explained by a senior NCO in the 389th Infantry Division, they began to encounter 'bandit' forces of women soldiers. Besides that, the Germans achieved considerable success against Soviet defensive positions. The day of 20 May saw much of the same, with the German forces closing in from the rear. More German divisions were put into the battle that day, shattering several Soviet counterparts, allowing the Germans to inch forward. Although Timoshenko's forces successfully regrouped on 21 May, he ordered a withdrawal of Army Group Kotenko by the end of 22 May, while he prepared an attack for 23 May, to be orchestrated by the 9th and 57th Armies. Although the Soviets desperately attempted to fend off advancing German soldiers and launched local counter-attacks to relieve several surrounded units, they generally failed. By the end of 24 May Soviet forces opposite of Kharkov had been successfully surrounded by German formations, which had been able to transfer several more divisions to the front, increasing the pressure put on the Soviet flanks and finally forcing them to collapse.

25 May: The Red Army Surrounded

25 May saw the first major Soviet attempt to break the encirclement, and German Major General Lanz describes the gruesome attacks, made en masse. By 26 May the surviving Red Army soldiers were forced into crowded positions in an area roughly fifteen square kilometers in size. Soviet attempts to break into the German encirclement from the East were continuously blocked using tenacious defensive maneuvers and German air power. In the face of determined German operations, Timoshenko ordered the official halt of all Soviet offensive maneuvers on 28 May, while attacks to break out of the encirclement continued until 30 May. Nonetheless, less than one man in ten managed to breakout of the "Barvenkovo mousetrap" (Beevor, 67). Beevor puts Soviet losses in terms of prisoners as 240,000, with the bulk of their armor, while Glantz states a total of around 207,000, both killed and captured. The latter has generally been accepted as the most impartial figure, although true casualties are not readily available. Both tend to agree on a low German casualty count, with the most formative rounding being at 20,000 German dead, wounded and missing. Regardless of the casualties, Kharkov would be a major Soviet setback and it would put an end to the astonishing successes of the Red Army during the Winter Counteroffensive, and the smaller offensives of the spring.

Conclusions

Many authors have attempted to pinpoint the reasons for the debacle of the Second Battle of Kharkov. Several Soviet generals have placed the blame on the inability of Stavka and Stalin to appreciate German military potential, on the Eastern Front, after their defeats in the winter of 1941-1942 and in the spring of 1942. In the end, however, it can be branded as an attempt to place blame on the obvious scapegoat, Stalin, especially during the de-Stalinization efforts of Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev. The truth is that the subordinate Soviet generals were just as willing to continue their own successes, and much like the German generals, under-appreciated the strength of their enemies. This manifested itself in the poor conduct of Soviet troops at the Second Battle of Kharkov which would transfer the initiative of the war back into German hands. Stalin's willingness to expend recently-conscripted armies, who were poorly-trained and poorly-supplied, illustrated this misconception of realities, both in the capabilities of the Red Army and the subordinate arms of the armed forces, and in the abilities of the Germans to defend themselves and successfully launch a counter-offensive. The latter would prove especially true in the subsequent Operation Blue, which would lead to the Battle of Stalingrad, though this would be the battle in which Paulus would meet his demise as a German army commander during World War II.

However, Kharkov had also shown the potential of the Soviet armies to successfully conduct an offensive. Although the Winter Offensive had been an early example, it had only began after the German offensive on Moscow had began to slow. Kharkov can be pointed to as one of the first major cases in which the Soviets attempted to pre-empt a German summer offensive. This would later unfold and grow as Stavka, soon to be led by Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov, planned and conducted Operation Mars, Operation Uranus and Operation Saturn. Although only two of the three were true victories, it still offers concise and telling evidence of the ability of the Soviets to reverse the war in their favor. This would finalize itself after the Battle of Kursk in July 1943. This is extremely important in the analysis of the evolution of the Red Army throughout the war, and the downplay of this fact by German generals who continued to prophesize German victory through the conception of a superior race and superior army would, in the end, gear the war to an ultimate German defeat.

Within the context of the Second Battle of Kharkov itself, the faults of the Red Army to properly regroup during the prelude to the battle and the ability of the Germans to effectively collect intelligence on Soviet movements would play an important role in the battle. Poor Soviet performance in the north and equally poor intelligence-gathering at the hands of Stavka and front headquarters, would also eventually spell doom for the offensive. Nonetheless, despite this poor performance, it underscored a dedicated evolution of tactics within the Red Army, which although not perfect, would win them the war.

References

• Beevor, Antony. Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege. Viking; New York City: 1998. ISBN 0-670-87095-1
• Cooper, Matthew. The German Army: 1933-1945. Random House; Lanham: 1978. ISBN 0-8128-8519-8
• Glantz, David M. Kharkov 1942: Anatomy of a Military Disaster. Sarpedon; New York City: 1998. ISBN 1-885119-54-2
• McCarthy, Peter and Mike Syron. Panzerkrieg: The Rise and Fall of Hiter's Tank Divisions. Carroll and Graf; New York City: 2002. ISBN 0-7867-1009-8

• Conflicts in 1942
• Soviet-German War