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At the same time, despite the ongoing Soviet-wide antireligious campaign, two Ukrainian national ] were created, the ] and the ] (See ]). The Bolshevik government initially saw the national churches as a tool in their goal to suppress the ] always viewed with the great suspicion by the regime for its being the cornerstone of pre-revolutionary Russian Empire and the initially strong opposition it took towards the regime change. Therefore, the government tolerated the new Ukrainian national church for some time and the the UAOC gained a wide following among the Ukrainian peasantry. At the same time, despite the ongoing Soviet-wide antireligious campaign, two Ukrainian national ] were created, the ] and the ] (See ]). The Bolshevik government initially saw the national churches as a tool in their goal to suppress the ] always viewed with the great suspicion by the regime for its being the cornerstone of pre-revolutionary Russian Empire and the initially strong opposition it took towards the regime change. Therefore, the government tolerated the new Ukrainian national church for some time and the the UAOC gained a wide following among the Ukrainian peasantry.


The Ukrainization even reached those regions of southern ], particularly the areas by the ] and ] rivers, where mixed population showed strong Ukrainian influences in the local dialect. Ukrainian language teachers, just graduated from expanded institutions of higher education in Soviet Ukraine, were dispatched to these regions to staff newly opened Ukrainian schools or to teach Ukrainian as a second language in Russian schools. A string of local Ukrainian-language publications were started and departments of Ukrainian studies were opened in colleges. Overall, these policies were implemented in thirty-five administrative districts in southern Russia.<ref name=Tereshchenko>{{uk icon}}{{Conference reference | Author = Oleksandr Tereshchenko | Year = 2004 | Month = December | Title = Ukrainian renaissance in the south of Russia| Booktitle = Cultural connections of Donetsk region with the Ukrainian Diaspora | Editor = | Publisher = | Location = | Pages = | URL = http://vesna.org.ua/txt/sxid/conference.doc | ID = }} "Конкретно, заходами цієї важливої національної кампанії було охоплено 35 районів: Абинський, Арзгирський, Азовський, Анапський, Баталпашинський, Брюховецький, Винодільський, Гаряче-Ключевський, Дивнівський, Єйський, Завітинський, Зимовниківський, Канівський, Кашарський, Коренівський, Краснодарський, Курганський, Курсавський, Кущевський, Кримський, Леоно-Калитвенський, Матвієво-Курганський, Мечетинський, Міллеровський, Невинномиський, Отрадненський, Павлівський, Приморсько-Ахтарський, Ремонтненський, Сіверський, Слов'янський, Старимінський, Таганрозький, Темрюкський та Тимошівський. Більшість цих районів зберегла свою територію та назви до сьогодні."</ref> The Ukrainization even reached those regions of southern ], particularly the areas by the ] and ] rivers, where mixed population showed strong Ukrainian influences in the local dialect. Ukrainian language teachers, just graduated from expanded institutions of higher education in Soviet Ukraine, were dispatched to these regions to staff newly opened Ukrainian schools or to teach Ukrainian as a second language in Russian schools. A string of local Ukrainian-language publications were started and departments of Ukrainian studies were opened in colleges. Overall, these policies were implemented in thirty-five administrative districts in southern Russia.<ref name=Tereshchenko>{{uk icon}}{{cite conference | author = Oleksandr Tereshchenko | year = 2004 | month = December | title = Ukrainian renaissance in the south of Russia| booktitle = Cultural connections of Donetsk region with the Ukrainian Diaspora | editor = | publisher = | location = | pages = | url = http://vesna.org.ua/txt/sxid/conference.doc | id = }} "Конкретно, заходами цієї важливої національної кампанії було охоплено 35 районів: Абинський, Арзгирський, Азовський, Анапський, Баталпашинський, Брюховецький, Винодільський, Гаряче-Ключевський, Дивнівський, Єйський, Завітинський, Зимовниківський, Канівський, Кашарський, Коренівський, Краснодарський, Курганський, Курсавський, Кущевський, Кримський, Леоно-Калитвенський, Матвієво-Курганський, Мечетинський, Міллеровський, Невинномиський, Отрадненський, Павлівський, Приморсько-Ахтарський, Ремонтненський, Сіверський, Слов'янський, Старимінський, Таганрозький, Темрюкський та Тимошівський. Більшість цих районів зберегла свою територію та назви до сьогодні."</ref>


Starting from the early ], the Ukrainization policies were abruptly and bloodily reversed. "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" was declared to be the primary problem in Ukraine. Many Ukrainian newspapers, publications, and schools were switched to Russian. The vast majority of leading scholars and cultural leaders of Ukraine were imprisoned, deported, or shot, as were the "Ukrainianized" and "Ukrainianizing" portions of the Communist party. Starting from the early ], the Ukrainization policies were abruptly and bloodily reversed. "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" was declared to be the primary problem in Ukraine. Many Ukrainian newspapers, publications, and schools were switched to Russian. The vast majority of leading scholars and cultural leaders of Ukraine were imprisoned, deported, or shot, as were the "Ukrainianized" and "Ukrainianizing" portions of the Communist party.

Revision as of 16:35, 8 April 2006

This article is about the ethnic policy of the governments. For localization into Ukrainian language and locale, see Ukrainization (computers).

Ukrainization (or Ukrainianization), in general, is the state policy to increase the prominence of Ukrainian language and/or representation of Ukrainian people within state institutions, mostly, but not exclusively, within Ukraine.

Times after the Russian Revolution

Following the Russian Revolution of 1917, the Russian Empire was broken up and the Ukrainians, that developed a renewed sense of national identity, intensified their struggle for an independent Ukrainian state. In the chaos of the Great War and revolutionary changes, a nascent Ukrainian state emerged but, initially, the state's very survival was not ensured. As the Central Rada, the governing body, was trying to assert the control over Ukraine amid the foreign powers and internal struggle, only a limited cultural development could take place. However, for the first time in the modern history, Ukraine had a government of its own and the Ukrainian language gained usage in much of the government affairs.

As the Rada was eventually overthrown in a German-backed coup (April 29, 1918), the rule of Hetmanate led by Pavlo Skoropadsky was established. While the stability of the government was only relative and Skoropadsky himself, as a former officer of the tsarist army, spoke Russian rather than Ukrainian, the Hetmanate managed to start an impressive Ukrainian cultural and education program, printed millions of Ukrainian-language textbooks, established many Ukrainian schools, two universities, and a Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. The Hetmanate's rule ended with the German evacuation. However, the Directorate government of Symon Petlura had to face a new wave of chaos as Ukraine was invaded by Bolshevik and Polish troops, as well as ravaged by the armed bands, some of lacking any political ideology.

Early years of Soviet Ukraine

The 1921 Soviet recruitment poster with the Ukrainization theme. It uses traditional Ukrainian imagery with Ukrainian-language text: "Son! Enrol in the school of Red commanders, and the defence of Soviet Ukraine will be ensured."

As the Bolshevik rule took hold in Ukraine, the early Soviet government had its own reasons to encourage the national movements of the formerRussian Empire. While trying to ascertain and consolidate its power, the Bolshevik government was by far more concerned about the political oppositions connected to the pre-revolutionary order than about the national movements inside the former empire. In such conditions, the Ukrainian national idea initially continued to develop and even spread to a large territory with traditionally mixed population in the east and south that became part of the Ukrainian Soviet republic.

Until the early-1930s, the Ukrainian culture enjoyed a widespread revival due to Bolshevik concessions known as the policy of Korenization ("indigenization"). In these years an impressive Ukrainization program was implemented throughout the republic. The rapidly developed Ukrainian language based education system dramatically raised the literacy of the Ukrainophone rural population. Simultaneously, the newly-literate ethnic Ukrainians migrated to the cities, which became rapidly largely Ukrainianized—in both population and in education. Similarly expansive was an increase in Ukrainian language publishing and overall eruption of Ukrainian cultural life.

At the same time, the usage of Ukrainian was continuously encouraged in the workplace and in the government affairs as the recruitment of indigenous cadre was implemented as part of the korenization policies. While initially, the party and government apparatus was mostly Russian-speaking, by the end of 1920s the ethnic Ukrainians composed over one half of the membership in the Ukrainian communist party, the number strengthened by accession of Borotbists, a formerly indigenously Ukrainian "independentist" and non-Bolshevik communist party.

At the same time, despite the ongoing Soviet-wide antireligious campaign, two Ukrainian national Orthodox churches were created, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Autonomous Orthodox Church (See History of Christianity in Ukraine). The Bolshevik government initially saw the national churches as a tool in their goal to suppress the Russian Orthodox Church always viewed with the great suspicion by the regime for its being the cornerstone of pre-revolutionary Russian Empire and the initially strong opposition it took towards the regime change. Therefore, the government tolerated the new Ukrainian national church for some time and the the UAOC gained a wide following among the Ukrainian peasantry.

The Ukrainization even reached those regions of southern Russian SFSR, particularly the areas by the Don and Kuban rivers, where mixed population showed strong Ukrainian influences in the local dialect. Ukrainian language teachers, just graduated from expanded institutions of higher education in Soviet Ukraine, were dispatched to these regions to staff newly opened Ukrainian schools or to teach Ukrainian as a second language in Russian schools. A string of local Ukrainian-language publications were started and departments of Ukrainian studies were opened in colleges. Overall, these policies were implemented in thirty-five administrative districts in southern Russia.

Starting from the early 1930s, the Ukrainization policies were abruptly and bloodily reversed. "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" was declared to be the primary problem in Ukraine. Many Ukrainian newspapers, publications, and schools were switched to Russian. The vast majority of leading scholars and cultural leaders of Ukraine were imprisoned, deported, or shot, as were the "Ukrainianized" and "Ukrainianizing" portions of the Communist party.

In the following fifty years the Soviet policies towards Ukrainian varied between quiet discouragement and suppression to persecution and cultural purges. All effects of Ukrainization were undone and Ukraine gradually became Russified to a significant degree. These policies softened somewhat only in the mid-to-late 1980s and were completely reversed again in newly-independent Ukraine in the 1990s.

Modern Ukrainian independence

On 28th of October 1989, the Supreme Soviet of Ukrainian SSR changed the Constitution and adopted the Law on Languages. The Ukrainian language was declared the only official state language, while Russian as well as other languages spoken in Ukraine were formally guaranteed the constitutional protections as well.

The government was obliged to create the conditions required for the development and use of Ukrainian language as well as languages of other ethnic groups (including Russian). Other languages might be used along with Ukrainian in local institutions located in places of residence of the majority of citizens of the corresponding ethnicities. Citizens should have the guaranteed right to use their native or any other languages. A citizen was entitled to address various institutions and organisations in Ukrainian, in Russian, or in another language of their work, or in a language acceptable for the parties.

After the Ukrainian accession of independence following the collapse of the Soviet Union the law, with some minor amendments, preserved its validity in the independent Ukrainian state.

Adopted in 1996, the new Ukrainian Constitution confirmed the official state status of the Ukrainian language, and guaranteed the free development, use, and protection of Russian, and other languages of national minorities of Ukraine.

The government implemented policies to broaden the use of Ukrainian. The educational system in Ukraine has been transformed over the first decade of independence from a system that was only partly Ukrainian to one that is overwhelmingly so. The government has also mandated a progressively increased role for Ukrainian in the media and commerce.

In some cases, the abrupt changing of the language of instruction in institutions of secondary and higher education, led to the charges of assimilation, raised mostly by the Russian-speaking population. However, the transition lacked most of the controversies that surrounded the de-Russification in several of the other former Soviet Republics.

In two presidential elections (1994 and 2004), the political talk over the Russian language in Ukraine was an election issue as the main candidates (Leonid Kuchma in 1994, Viktor Yanukovych in 2004) tried to appeal to some voters by their promises to support the idea of Russian becoming a second state language.

This contributed to Kuchma's win by bringing him the support of the eastern and southern regions but after the electoral win, Kuchma did not follow on his pledge to make Russian a state language in two 5-year terms of his presidency. A similar promise by Yanukovych might have also increased the turnout of his base, but it was rebutted during the campaign by his opponent (Viktor Yushchenko), who pointed out that Yanukovych could have already taken steps towards this change while he was a Prime Minister should this have really been his priority. (Yanukovych eventually lost that presidential election).

According to the Constitutional regulations and the newly-enacted laws of civil and administrative procedure all legal and court proceedings in Ukraine are to be conducted in Ukrainian. This does not restrict, however, using other languages. The law guarantees interpretation service for any language desired by the citizen. Nonetheless, on September 6, 2005, the Russian Foreign Ministry protested the measure issuing a statement that the change infringes on the rights of the Russian-speaking Ukrainian citizens. In response, the First Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine Volodymyr Ohryzko expressed his astonishment at the Russian Foreign Ministry's commentary. In this connection he cited Russian law provisions, which state that the Russian language is used Russia-wide by every body of state authority, local self-government, as well as public organisations. As Mr. Ohryzko stressed, after all, this matter is solely Ukraine's own affair.

Further reading

Notes

  1. Template:Uk iconOleksandr Tereshchenko (2004). "Ukrainian renaissance in the south of Russia". Cultural connections of Donetsk region with the Ukrainian Diaspora. {{cite conference}}: Unknown parameter |booktitle= ignored (|book-title= suggested) (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help) "Конкретно, заходами цієї важливої національної кампанії було охоплено 35 районів: Абинський, Арзгирський, Азовський, Анапський, Баталпашинський, Брюховецький, Винодільський, Гаряче-Ключевський, Дивнівський, Єйський, Завітинський, Зимовниківський, Канівський, Кашарський, Коренівський, Краснодарський, Курганський, Курсавський, Кущевський, Кримський, Леоно-Калитвенський, Матвієво-Курганський, Мечетинський, Міллеровський, Невинномиський, Отрадненський, Павлівський, Приморсько-Ахтарський, Ремонтненський, Сіверський, Слов'янський, Старимінський, Таганрозький, Темрюкський та Тимошівський. Більшість цих районів зберегла свою територію та назви до сьогодні."
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