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Belton Cooper Edit

1745 Hours 26 March 2006

Errors regarding Belton Cooper were corrected. Misleading/irrelevant information about his knowledge of armor tactics, etc. deleted.

Best Regards, Philippsbourg

I'm doing a rewrite at M4 Sherman\temp Oberiko 18:30, 8 Dec 2004 (UTC)

I've added some details you might (or might not :o)) want to include in your rewite.

MWAK--84.27.81.59 15:59, 19 Dec 2004 (UTC)

Actually, it looks like I'll have to put it on hold for awhile. Still have to finish the article on the Lorraine Campaign first. Eyes bigger then stomache. Oberiko 00:58, 20 Dec 2004 (UTC)

I think the following: "However, it was often less capable one-on-one than the German tanks it faced" is a gross understatement, almost to the point of being offensive.

A Sherman tank will almost never beat most German tanks on-on-one. It's not a "gross understatement", it's the truth! Aaron L

You do know what "understatement" means, don't you? --SpacemanAfrica 01:00, 11 April 2006 (UTC)

Comments on M4 Sherman article

1. The Sherman was definitely inferior to the German Tiger and Panther, still more so the King Tiger. It was more or less equivalent to the Panzer Mark IV, though even that tank possessed a superior main gun from 1942 and onwards. True, but it is worth pointing out a couple things: first, tank-vs-tank fighting is much rarer than most people suppose. Tanks fire vastly more HE than antittank ammunition. Their main role is infantry support and exploitation. Second, the Tiger II was a very rare opponent for the Sherman. Of course it was a much more capable vehicle, but it would have been impractical for the US to equip all armor units with a tank that could better the Tiger II. The Tiger I was also a rare opponent. The Panther was a common opponent so that part of your point is valid. But the Panther did not appear until mid-1943, and was not seen by US forces until mid-1944. The failure on the US side was not the initial Shemran design - it was the failure to improve it. DMorpheus

2. A very vivid impression of how Sherman tank crews experienced the fighting in Normandy can be gleaned from Ken Tout's excellent books, such as "To Hell with Tanks!"

3. The name "Tommy cooker" did not have anything to do with a WWI stove, AFAIK. The Germans coined the term because the Sherman, when hit, often ignited immediately and burned with flames up to 50 feet high, incinerating the crew - who were often British soldiers (known as "Tommies").

4. The British 17-pounder gun fitted in the Firefly was about as good as the German 88 mm or the Panther's long 75 mm. It could drill clean through the frontal armour of a Tiger I from several hundred yards; at least one photograph exists to substantiate this.

5. While American doctrine did indeed call for tank destroyers to deal with enemy armour, can that really be called an excuse for the fact that the Sherman was hopelessly outgunned by its German opponents and so thinly armoured that practically ever single german anti-tank weapon could destroy it by D day?

It isn't an excuse at all, but it is an explanation for why the US Army, with the biggest industrial base in the world behind it, entered the Normandy campaign with a tank that had severe weaknesses.

- Indeed, but some people insist that such is the case.

The Sherman won the war because it was manufactured and deployed in such large numbers. If it was upgunned, those numbers would have been impossible. That's the excuse. Aaron L.

The Sherman is a triumph of mass production so the German forces would be broken by outnumbering rather than one-on-one outfighting. GraemeLeggett 13:34, 15 May 2005 (UTC)

Considering the appalling number of tanks, not to mention crews, which were lost due to a lack of armour and firepower, it strikes me as ridiculous that you use the Sherman and the word triumph together in that way.

But the Sherman helped secure triumph for the Allies. Without it the outcome could have been quite different. It was a vital weapon, no matter how many lives were lost. Aaron L.

And yet the fact remains that the Sherman, this flawed yet capable and adaptable vehicle, was the primary tank used to achieve Allied victory in the west. Ridiculous? I think not. --Cavgunner 08:55, 22 July 2005 (UTC)

The primary instrument was flawed by it's lack of armour and firepower, as proven by the exceedingly high casualties taken by the tank crews. Yes, the Allies won the war with it, but it was still appallingly inferior when comparede to the opposition, and certainly could and should have been better by the middle of 1944. --?

WINNING THE WAR: the allies won the war with immensely greater material resources, manpower and airpower. They won it despite the Sherman tank, whose defects were effectively disguised. It could take five Shermans to knock out one Tiger Tank, and then only by outflanking it - surely a completely wasteful necessity. It might have been a triumph of mass production, but begins to look reminiscent of the immoral Russian tactic of clearing minefields by simply advancing troops into them, a similar triumph of material economy. Had a tank equivalent to the Panther been designed and produced, Allied victory in the West would have been won that little bit more easily and with less loss of tank crew life. Even universally up-gunning the Sherman from its anachronistic 75mm gun to the long-barrelled 17 pounder (as was only done in the Guards regiment) would have given parity of firepower. The resources of mass production could have been far more wisely employed. It's easy with hindsight. --Tyrenius 18 August 2005

Please note, I have removed the following simply because it is too vague at the moment and doesn't really mean anything. It needs to be clarified if it is to be useful:

The Sherman's battlefield performance did vary wildly especially when used outside the intended roles but this was true of other tanks as well. --Tyrenius 18 August 2005

Please let's not discuss the ethics of using the Sherman. Have you ever wondered why we didn't build a tank like the Panther? Maybe because it would be quite difficult to out-engineer the Germans. Aaron L.

Hardly. The Allies thoroughly out-engineered the Germans in the air. There are no German equivalents of the Allied heavy bombers, and the best fighters were Allied. There is no comparison in engineering equipment, trucks, ships....in many areas the Allies did as well or better than the Germans. Why they didn't with tank design is a very interesting question.

As I have said elsewhere, the critics of the Sherman tank need to understand that an army's one and only objective is winning, not perserving its soldiers. Any discussion of a weapon's performance is only meaningful if one place it within the military system that it operates. The M4 tank despite of its defects was a highly effective cog within the US war machine. Furthermore, any criticism against the M4 Sherman has to be put into the historical context of WWII. The attrition rate of the M4 Sherman was only appalling if one ignored the casualties of the T-34 that the Russians had to put up with. The allied report that said the blood-price of killing a Panther is five Shermans, also said nine T-34s are needed for the same result. The comparison in the air is largely meaningless, since the balance of the air war was already tilting to the Allies' favor when they were fighting with P-38s and P-47s. The Germans chose not to manufacture heavy bombers not becasuse they didn't have the technological ablity, but because they didn't have the industrial base. The V-2 rocket, the first ballistic missile, and the Nazi jet fighters, which surely was more advanced, were designed and built by the Germans. Furthermore, this over emphasis on the ability to win an 1 on 1 fight is an unhealthy obsession. Technology did not play a decisive role in any of the great battles of WWII, with the exception of the Battle of the Atlantic. It was the the army that was better led, supplied, and given an effective war-making doctrine (and luckier) that won. A tank need to be produced in sufficent quantities, has high mobility, is capable of sustained advance, to be the place that mattered in battle. That is the excelence of the M4 tank. --Chin, Cheng-chuan

"High profile" myth

Height of:

• Sherman - 2.74m
• Panther - 2995mm
• T-34 - 2.7m
• Panzerkampfwagen IV - 2.68m

Surely 6cm difference does not create a "high profile"? --Roo72 05:58, 18 Feb 2005 (UTC)

The key word is profile (think of the silhouette) not just the absolute height. GraemeLeggett 13:44, 15 May 2005 (UTC)

So what makes Sherman's profile higher? Roo72 04:06, 15 July 2005 (UTC)

From a design point of view, the (stubby) Sherman could have been a lot lower; the height was of course due to its M2 ancestry. Your comparison to German types is somewhat problematic as the German tanks had higher cupola's. Roof height is more relevant.--MWAK 07:00, 31 July 2005 (UTC)

"High profile" in terms of tank defence can mean several things, which tend to be associated with each other. —Michael Z. 2005-08-28 22:04 Z

• A tall or large vehicle—I think shape is important, not just absolute height over the turret ceiling or commander's cupola (By the way, are all of the above-quoted vehicle heights measured the same way?)
• Boxy silhouette that visually stands out at a distance
• Poorly-sloped armour due to a boxy hull shape
• Awkward hull, turret, and armament configuration which exposes a lot of the vehicle when hull-down (e.g. M3 Lee tank with a big gun in the hull)

Sherman, and generally all American tanks afterwards, had very large turrents when seen in profile. The M4 might have been a foot or less taller than other contemporaries, but the turret was indeed wider in profile (compared to say the T-34 of any variant). Some will call this a disadvantage. In reality this is a significant ADVANTAGE. The crew had more room to operate. The actual combat rate of fire was inhanced, as the gunner and loader had room to coordinate their actions. Look inside a Tiger or Panther if you get a chance. Ammo handling inside those tanks was awkward. Inside the M4 one had more room to handle the ammunition.

"Ronson" myth

The improvements to the safety of the Sherman was mostly due to the wet storage system, which reduced fire considerably, from 60-80% down to only 10-15% Since the diesel version was only used by the marines and for lend-lease purpose, the "safer" diesel argument does not hold for the majority of US and British tanks. Furthermore German tanks used gasoline and were never accused of being prone to burning up (the reference in the Patton film is wrong)

As I know, Panther Ds where prone to start burning (even if not under enemy fire). The Germans lost a lot of Panthers in Kursk because of this.

The most likely cause for a tank to brew up is not engine fire. It is ammunition exlosion.The fact that the Sherman burns less readily than the T-34 has nothing to do with the diesel. It has everything to do with Russian ammunition. The way it is designed, the shell casings can catch on fire easily after being hit by spalling or come too close to a heat source to a greater extend than American shells. Some experts believe that Russian armor, despite high hardness, is more prone to spalling as well, makes sense too since resilence is decreased with hardness. As for German tanks "never accused of being prone to bruning up," the poster before me is right. Panther Ds catch on fire by itself. Also, one can burn most medium tanks by hitting it with sustained shell fire, without outright penetration. There were many tanks killed that way. -Chin, Cheng-chuan

This did not however keep it from getting the nickname "Ronson: Guarenteed to light on the first strike". (70.118.115.49)

The weakness of the Sherman vs German tanks

The US tank doctrine is essentially the same as the German doctrine. The major difference is that the Germans did not exclude their tanks from fighting other tanks, though they still preferred to let the dedicated tank hunters do the job. The powerful HE round was considered critical, since the 76mm HE was very poor.

The US army has been criticized for failing to see the weakness of the Sherman, but it does not take actual experience in the field into account. Up until Normandy, the US army fought mostly the Panzer III as the main German tank. The Tiger was extremely rare both in Africa and Italy and it wasn't considered a threat. The 1943-1944 period was fought in Italy which is poor tank terrain and skewed the view of German armor deployment. Nevertheless the US army delivered 76mm Sherman from June 1944 onwards and demand only increased until September 1944, where the German army collapsed and was thought to be almost completely defeated. Most decision makers felt that the worst was over and that the Sherman was good enough for the job and the introduction of the Pershing was stalled because many felt the war would be over by Christmas anyway. And even though the Pershing could have been introduced earlier, the allies faced major logistics problems until the opening of the port of Antwerp, another tank and the need for specific spare parts would have been a huge problem.

The replacement of the Sherman by the Pershing was slowed by bureaucratic inertia, logistical fears and the feeling that investing in the Pershing, when the end of the war seemed only a matter of weeks or months away, was a waste of resources. (Patrick R.W.A. R. 17:27, 20 July 2005 (UTC))

The Army Ord Dept planned to place the M26 in production much earlier. The AGF vetoed that idea. One issue was one M26 took up the space of 2 M4s in cargo space. Secondly, the production lines would be interrupted for mass production of the M26. Interestingly, had the AGF placed the M26 into mass production in May 1944 (reasonably the earliest date), logistics lags ment a projected shortfall of availible tanks in December-January 1944.

Explaining this in short, if the M4 were replaced on the production lines in May '44, the retooling process, manufacturing, buildup of spares, training of crews, transport of the new tanks to the ETO, and so on would cause such an equipment shortfall. There would be a gap where M4 production was at ebb, and the M26s were not on hand in sufficient quantity. Thus, had the AGF pushed the M26 into production, who knows the Battle of the Bulge might have been a major allied defeat.

Another point on this, the AGF considered sending M6 Heavy Tanks with 90mm guns to the ETO prior to D-Day. The M6 cost, in terms of shipping overhead, as much as four M4s. However arguably the M6 with such a gun could stand toe to toe with the early Tigers and Panthers.

My understanding is that none of the American tanks on the pipeline deemed 'superior' to the M4 are good medium tanks. They were all overly engineered and too heavily armored to have the mobility required to be a proper medium tank. Likewise, the attritation rate of the M4 actually reflects the defensive nature of the German heavy armor. The beloved panther, tiger, and jagdt series are powerful weapons; but none of them are capable of the sweeping attacks and rapid advance that are essential for mechanized warfare. Critics of the M4 need to understand the fact that the purpose of an army is to win, not achieving Romantic heorics.--Chin, Cheng-chuan

Needs accuracy improvement

The following section has some weaknesses:

It should also be considered that part of the blame lies in the cycle of tank development that was seen not only in US tanks, but in Russian and German tanks as well. The Russian T-34 developed out of experience gained in Russia's Winter War with Finland in the Winter of 1939-40. However it was not until the summer of 1941 that the T-34 became fully operational. A similar period of time was seen in the gap between Germany's rude shock on encountering the T-34 and KV-1 and the development of effective responses in the form of the Panzer IV Asuf F2 in 1942, and ultimately the Tiger I in 1943. Thus it is not suprising that there was a similar gap between the U.S. Army's first encounters with these improved German tanks in the summer of 1943 and fielding the M26 Pershing in late 1944. Developing new war machines takes time, and putting the war on hold was not an option. Besides the Germans had another series of even more powerful tanks being designed, ones which were designed to be simpler, more reliable, and easier to produce than the Tiger and Panther.

The T-34 was not developed as a result of the Finnish campaign. Development was underway long before the Finnish campaign started, and the major features were already in place.

The Pzkw-IV F (I believe the current research calls this a G, but, regardless, we are concerned with the first Pzkw-IVs with L/43 guns) with the long 75mm gun was operational by summer 1942, just under one year from the first encounters with the T-34.

The Tiger I was operational in Sep 1942, albeit in very small numbers.

The US Army first faced Tigers and Pzkw-IVs in the winter of 1942/43 in Africa, not the summer of 1943.

The T-26 (not M-26 until later) Pershing was not deployed in the field in late 1944. IIRC the first ones were issued to units in Feb 1945.

The major enemy tank threat to the M4 was the Panther, not the Tiger. The US Army did not encounter any Panther before the spring of 1944 at Anzio. The puzzle is why they did not react to the intel coming from the Red Army, which first faced Panthers in July 1943 and in increasing numbers thereafter. In Normandy half the German tanks were Panthers.

Thus this whole paragraph's timeline and logic really fall apart. The general point that there is a lag between the appearance of a threat and the reaction is valid. The idea that the US, Soviet, and German tank designers were all equally fast or slow to react to new threats is not supported by the evidence. It is precisely the too-slow improvement of the M4 series that gave it a poor reputation by 1944-45. In 1942 it was about as good as any other medium tank.

DMorpheus 16:29, 29 December 2005 (UTC)

Okay... I am responsible for writing part of that paragraph but not all of it. To respond to a couple of points that you made, first I should say that I did NOT say that the T-34 was the result of lessons learned from Winter Wars. The Pershing error might have been me, but it was awhile ago. If I said these things, it was a brain freeze. Then, to the things that I can respond to:

-The 76mm was already in existence before Overlord for tank destroyers. There were plans to issue the 76mm to the Sherman tanks. Gen. Patton terminated pre-1944 plans to replace the 75mm with 76mm because there was insufficient time to retrain the crew and refit the tanks for Overlord, which seemed justified given the objective of opening the already delayed 2nd front. But the weapon and the plans were there, and it was designed to counter heavier armor.

-The decision to delay its implementation came not because the commanders and policy makers refuse to recongnize the seriousness of the German armor threat, but because there existed pressures to get Operation Overlord on the way as quickly as possible, since Stalin was practically screaming for it and Marshall wanted to attack Germany as early as 1942. The 2nd Front was too important strategically to be delayed by issues of gun caliber.

-Also, the plans to replace the 75mm guns met significant opposition from the veterans, because the 75mm HE shell was twice as heavy as the 76mm, and packed a more powerful punch against earthworks, bunkers and the like. Creigton Abrams had to get his troopers to accept the 76mm gun by changing his old 75mm for the new gun.

-The window between the first encounter with the Panthers and issuing large numbers of 76mm guns were less than six months. After mid 1944 there were large numbers of 76mm Shermans available. As for the Soviet report--I can only attribute it to the prejudice against the socialist forces. Never the less, from the first time the US Army actually met the new generation of German tanks first hand, only less than six months had expired when 76mm guns were fielded to adequate numbers.

-Lastly, I did not wish to make the impression that the cycle of responding to new threats in all belligerents are the same. I merely wanted to point out that the absense of better armed Shermans in a historical context, that the urgency of developing a more powerful gun was absent due to the lack of experience. By the time the need for better armament is understood, they have missed the oppertunity to prepare for Overlord. The heart of the 76mm was politics and decision making, not the lack of know-how. --Chin, Cheng-chuan

Well, there where some good things, too

As I know, the Sherman was the first tank to include a gyroscopic stabilization for it's main gun. Also, later in the war the U.S. used special armor piercing rounds, which where similar in performance to the Panther gun at shorter ranges.

Underating the Sherman

Surely the Sherman is a much better tank then its critics would concede. I would compare the Sherman to T-34 only, since the two tanks are closest in their designated roles and class. The Soviet T-34's 76mm and 85mm were no better then Sherman's 75mm and 76mm, respectively. The Sherman tank, with the 76mm gun and Hyper Velocity Armor Piercing ammo can kill a Panther at 200mm with a frontal shot. Its rubber tracks make it a very quiet tank. The Sherman tank also has a gyro stablizer and a very quick turret traverse, resulting in very high rate of fire. In short, a deadly combination in close combat. The Sherman's superior quality armor is also less prone to spalling then T-34. The Shermans also achieved an exchange ratio overwhelmingly in its favor against T-34/85s in Korea, proving that it is a tank that can at least give itself a good account in tank-to-tank fighting. --Chin, Cheng-chuan

Absolutely, Russians themselves, at least those who knew Shermans well. loved those tanks – . Roo72 04:07, 15 July 2005 (UTC)

Yes, the M4 with 76 mm gun was a very dangerous tank; however, at the time of the Invasion, very few had been delivered to the troops. Lack of firepower was therefore its most serious defect. On the other hand the tank was much better armoured than is often presumed. Applying both the cosinus-rule and the deflection effect to calculate the armour equivalence, it turns out its hull armour was basically better protected than the Tiger's! (only basically though: penetrator:plate thickness ratio was of course often unfavourable). Using the standard APBC-round the many German vehicles that used the various 75 mm L/48 guns could not penetrate the Sherman front hull at average combat distances. I'd hesitate to call the Sherman a quiet tank, rubber padded tracks or not. The M3 already had a stabiliser.--MWAK 07:00, 31 July 2005 (UTC)

Agree with you fully. I must say however that the Sherman was quieter than most. The Russians had at least used the lend-leased Sherman tanks in a number of night time raids. In one particular memorable instance the Russians overwhelmed a strong German position in a forest by a quiet night time raid, according to D.F.Loza in COMMANDING THE RED ARMY'S SHERMAN TANKS. On the otherhand, the 75mm gun was found to be wholey defficient in the bloody fighting in Normandy, despite the campaigns successful resolution. -Chin, Cheng-chuan

Firepower

"The Sherman tank, with the 76mm gun and Hyper Velocity Armor Piercing ammo can kill a Panther at 200mm with a frontal shot." That's in-accurate. Shermans had to flank to kill Panthers. Aaron L.

Not so. The US 76mm gun firing HVAP penetrates 132mm of armor at 1,000 meters. Source is Zaloga and Sarson 1993. The 76mm firing the standard M62 APC round cannot penetrate the Panther frontally at any range, even pointblank. Needless to say, neither can the 75-mm-armed Shermans. Since the vast majority of the anti-armor ammunition provided to Shermans was APC rather than HVAP, there is a belief that the gun was not capable of killing a Panther. Actually the problem was the decisions made in ammunition distribution. The M-18 tank destroyer weas armed with the same 76mm gun, but was typically provided with more of the HVAP ammo.

Penetration figures need to state the type of ammunition to be meaningful.

DMorpheus 21:01, 15 December 2005 (UTC)

The last time I checked, the Panther's frontal upper hull is 80mm thick, lower 60mm, turet 100mm. HVAP can and does kill Panthers at frontal aspect. As for HVAP ammo supply, a Sherman tank in average gets 2 shots per tank. The luckiest divisions get 5-6 rounds. -Chin, Cheng-chuan

Right, that's what I am trying to point out above. If you re-read my comment I am providing the figures to show that the 76mm gun was not the dud many people seem to think it was. The M62 ammo was poor; the HVAP ammo was very good and capable of killing a Panther frontally. Please note that most penetration stats are tested against armor at 30 degrees slope, and the Panther's armor obviously varied from that figure. DMorpheus 16:05, 29 December 2005 (UTC)

Right, my response is to Aron L.--Chin, Cheng-chuan

Variants

We now seem to be in the state that half the article is a list of variants - why don't we remove the experimental ones to a list of ALL variants and retain the major ones for the main article? GraemeLeggett 05:56, 27 October 2005 (UTC)

Support - even better, why don't we move all the variants to M4 Sherman/variants ? Megapixie 07:45, 27 October 2005 (UTC)

Valid point, so long as we retain mention of the notable variants in the text (these being 75 ->76 mm gun, HVSS, addon armour "Jumbo", Firefly, and that it was adapted for specilaist roles as well (DD, Crab). I think that a table might help the layout as well if only just to show the US->British nomenclature since they aren't actually variants just other names for the same thing.GraemeLeggett 08:31, 27 October 2005 (UTC)

I like the table idea.

Support - For the U.K. names though, we can probably simply include them either in the name of the variant, like so: M4A4 (Sherman V). Or in the description of that variant: "...known to the UK as the Sherman V." Oberiko 12:21, 27 October 2005 (UTC)

As the person who bothered to add most of those, I don't understand why it can't be painfully comprehensive. This is an encyclopedia. The experimental ones don't warrant their own page. I just don't understand why you wouldn't want all the equipment variantions all in the same place. Thatguy96 08:33, 27 October 2005 (UTC)

Yeah, I agree. Putting the variants somewhere else would make things confusing. They should all be in the same place. Aaron L.

Aha, there's the word "painfully" - we don't want it to be hard to read, or unenjoyable. The suggestion is to make life easier on the eye by creating a full list of variants in one place (linked from within the article) while keeping reference to the more significant changes to the Sherman within the main article (see B-17 Flying Fortress for how it can be done. GraemeLeggett 13:22, 27 October 2005 (UTC)

Okay, I see what you're getting at, and it makes sense. Thatguy96 13:08, 27 October 2005 (UTC)

Naw, I still think they should be kept in one place. Does it really matter if half the article is variants? It's not like space is a concern here. And it doesn't really matter what the page looks like (to a certain extent), as long as the information is all there. Aaron L

Actually the horse has already bolted :) But, coming back to your point - checkout Misplaced Pages:Article size, the current article (without variants) is 22 k - the variants article is 22 k. Basically split they are the right size - together they are too big. Still needs a good variants paragraph or two though. Megapixie 00:51, 20 December 2005 (UTC)

Okay to move?

This has been proposed for a over a month now - I think it's probably okay to move it. Does anyone have a good 3 paragraph summary they'd like to put in the variants section - something like the B-17 one. Graeme ? Megapixie 05:38, 4 December 2005 (UTC)

Since nobody said anything - I have moved the variants to a subpage - however a suitable B-17 style paragraph (see the B-17 article) summarising the major models is needed. Anyone ? Megapixie 23:10, 13 December 2005 (UTC)

I will begin by saying that I am glad the revisionism and reductionist views on the talk page have not (for the most part) weaseled their way into this article. Observation indicates that the majority of contributers are drawing conclusions from specification charts rather than actual combat experiences.... and by doing so you run the risk of every historian's nightmare.... revisionism. The value of the Sherman was in it's production capability... but little else. It offered protection and support to infantry... but it's classification as a superior 'battle tank' is a dubious one at best - in more of the APC and infantry support role the Sherman may have had its day.... but it was woefully outclassed on the battlefield in WW2.

If nothing else this article is a great example of how opinions can be expressed without reverting into an edit war.

CanadianPhaedrus 22:16, 23 March 2006 (UTC)CanadianPhaedrus

==RE: Edits to Sherman page 23 March 2006.== I did not realize that I needed permission to contribute to the page. The contributions were based on the Armored Force History, The Operational History of the Third US Army, the Ordnance Dept. Annex of the Operational History of 12th US Army Group, and several unpublished SHAEF and ASF special reports including the Lutes Report. Some comments were also based on my extensive interviews with American tankers who served during WWII.

There seems to be a general misunderstanding of the role of the AGF in the development and implementation of Armored Force doctrine. It was the Armored Force under Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers, that created and codified armored doctrine, not the AGF. McNair and the AGF complicated matters by supporting the development and implementation of TDs, as well as advocating against more heavily armored tanks with greater firepower, but he did not influence Armored Force doctrine. Gen. Marshall made certain that Devers was left alone to do this without McNair's interference. At one point, Marshall gave serious consideration to placing the Armored Force on equal footing with the AGF and Army Air Corps, but decided against it when, in 1943, it became increasingly obvious that he would have to settle for fewer, lighter armored divisions. At that point it did not make sense to create a separate branch for what would be a smaller force, so the Armored Force remained under the AGF. Still, McNair was not allowed to interfere in the development of AF doctrine.

Armored Divisions and independent tank battalions trained extensively to fight tanks according to AF doctrine. The Armored Force required its tanks to fight tanks in both defensive and offensive roles. I ask that you check my sources and see for yourself.

Best Regards, Philippsbourg

Your edits were extensive and the issue to my mind is more with your deletions than your insertions. GraemeLeggett 17:20, 24 March 2006 (UTC)

REPLY: 11:00 hours RMT, 24 March, 2006.

The deletions were made to erroneous and misleading (unintentional I am sure) statements. Are you suggesting that they should be left in?

For example, the 76mm HVAP ammunition (second type: There were two types you know, and the first was so bad it had to be withdrawn.) arrived in the ETO so late that it wasn't just in short supply, most tankers never even saw one of the rounds until the very end of the war, much less fire one in combat. The Day of Supply for the round was about 2 rounds/tank/month by April, 1945. That does not mean that the rounds were "at the gun" only that they were in theater!

The description of Cooper was, for example, misleading. Cooper was the Ordnance Bn. officer responsible for the recovery of tanks for repairs. As such, he had intimate knowledge regarding the types of battle damage, destroyed tanks (as opposed to repairable), and the repairs that were made. This alone adds considerable weight to the accuracy of his figures. Cooper is right, and this is supported out by the battle losses and repairs shown in the Official Historical Reports, After-Action Reports, and Monthly Operations Reports of the various armored divisions that I have examined at the National Archives. The official US Army replacement rate for Shermans in the ETO was around 10-12% in the summer and fall of 1944. The actual replacement rate for the ETO was around 20%. (Replacement rate refers to estimated and actual losses for the entire theater for every month of combat.)

Here's another example. It did not take five Shermans to outmaneuver and destroy a single Panther or Tiger in Normandy or anywhere else for that matter. Five Shermans were, on average, knocked-out or destroyed for every Panther or Tiger knocked-out or destroyed in tank to tank fighting. This gives a combat loss ratio of about 5 to 1. This explains why the US had to ship so many replacement tanks to the ETO.

Here's one more. Most Shermans were lost to anti-tank guns (towed and SP) and other tanks, not to mines.

There are more examples, but I am sure you get my point.

Best Regards, Phillippsbourg

Edit 1630 Hours, 24 March 2006.

I have added some source material and comments concerning the investigations into the cause of catastrophic fires in early Shermans. Since I cited the original US Army Armored Force Study, I hope that everyone will respect my contribution, and not delete it.

While I am thinking about it, you might consider adding a brief discussion of the reasons why Lt. Gen. Devers chose to use gasoline engines rather than diesel in the Shermans used by US Army forces.

Do you guys know that the Armored Force under Devers, developed, implemented, and codified the Armored Doctrine, not McNair and the AGF?

Best Wishes, Phillipsbourg

Comments: 2120 Hours, 24 March 2006.

Just a few suggestions.

Now that I think about it, you guys might also include a description of the gyroscopic stabilizer used on the main gun. If you do, try to include some information about the actual effectiveness of the system in combat. (It was very inaccurate, and even the most experienced crews did not use it when they actually wanted to hit the target.)

Why isn't the 105mm howitzer Sherman mentioned on the page? (If you add it, you might think about mentioning the difference between the turret drives of the 105mm howitzer and the 75-76mm gun versions. You could also discuss the uses of this variant in different combat situations.

Best Regards, Phillippsbourg

Actually there were instances like the 5-1 scenario. 8 Tigers defending a hill... Im not sure which one... I'll find it somewhere... destroyed 30% of British Shermans in Europe. Perhaps one of you have read the the book as well... its an analysis of a Panzer unit through the war.... features the notes of the commanding officer.. ... I'll track it down at the library...

CanadianPhaedrus 08:54, 25 March 2006 (UTC)CanadianPhaedrus

Errors

1720 Hours 1 April 2006

This page contains numerous technical, historical, and doctrinal errors. There are simply too many errors to address individually. The best way to proceed is the following.

1. Delete the entire page and start over. 2. Recognize that a consensus of opinion formed by uninformed contributors will always result in an inaccurate document. 3. Obtain the services of a content expert to oversee the development of the new page and approve content. 4. Prevent the reversion of approved content by those who know little or nothing about the subject. 5. Lock the page when it is complete.

Good luck! Philippsbourg

My good sir, it appears you have mistaken Misplaced Pages for an infallible source, which is simply can never be as a product of what it is. You can either take the time to address all the issues permenantly and rewrite it yourself, or accept that it will simply not be 100% accurate (or according to you, anywhere close to that). I would think that if you have the time and inclination to be so personally afronted by the material presented here, that you would also have the time and the inclination to do something about it yourself instead of deciding what everyone else should do. This is wikipedia, the 💕, and if you want to treat it like a published and refined reference work, you'll be sorely dissappointed. It appears as if you already are as a matter of fact. -- Thatguy96 April 10 2006 20:02

1853 Hours 1 April 2006

Your position is that it is my responsbility to correct the multitude of errors on Sherman page because I pointed them out, and subsequently offered a course of action for correcting them.

Usually when someone makes the sort of remarks that you have, they realize that they do not know enough about the subject to assist in making the necessary corrections, and seek to avoid admiting it by raising unrelated questions. Prove this is not the case, and offer some improvements of your own. For example, you might write a paragraph about "Little Joe" and how it gave the Sherman crews an edge in the field. For my part, I will wait until the decision is made to delete the entire page, and start over. Then I will be more than happy to contribute to the development of a new page.

Best Regards, Philippsbourg

My position is that it is the responsibility of the community, not of some "content expert" to see that the information contained in the article is correct. Your course of action is simply not in the spirit of wikipedia. You do not need to wait until the page is deleted to begin revising it if you have the time and the inclination. The M4 Sherman is not a field of any sort of expertise for me. According to your complaints I would assume that it is one for you. There are dozens of articles on wikipedia that are blatantly incorrect, especially on the matter of military hardware. Instead of simply complaining that they are not accurate, I have taken what time I have to make small corrections and additions to them, and in certain cases deleted and rewritten the bulk of existing articles. I have also created a number of pages from scratch.

Misplaced Pages is a community effort, and that is both the source of its strengths and weaknesses. You simply cannot expect it to be a 100% accurate source unless you're willing to contribue, sometimes in large part, to it being such. I myself have been continually working and correcting things that I have added on the Sherman Variants page, initially a part of this article and then seperated, and I really don't see why I have to contribute to this one in order to convince you of anything. You can either contribute or be unsatisified by the results. Your complaints do nothing. -- Thatguy96 April 1 2006 21:29

0930 Hours, 2 April 2006

You are being intellectually dishonest. A quick examination of the "history" of the article will reveal that I made a rather significant contribution several days ago. My contribution was quickly reverted by someone who knows nothing about the subject.

Question: How can you create a page of any accuracy whatsoever without the involvement of a content expert?

Answer: You can't.

PS I made some comments about the content on the Variants Page. Lest you accuse me of doing nothing, I even provided an excellent source of information for you to look at on Lend-Lease.

Philippsbourg

0940 Hours, 2 April 2006

Do you really believe that you can deny my expertise so easily? (Your tactic is used by Holocaust Deniers too, and it does not work for them either.) After all, I spent years of serious study at major universities. I have written and published in professional military history journals, and have many, many years of experience in the field. So, as you can see, my expertise does not just "blow away" when you huff and puff.

Listen, I understand that you and many others here are seriously threatened by the involvement of a content expert. In fact, "wikipedians" have a solid reputation for agressive behavior towards content experts. Why? Because no one likes being told when they are wrong, and this venue allows the educationally and intellectually challenged to pretend to be something they are not, i.e. truly knowlegeable. Understandably, when a person arrives on scene who actually knows about a great deal about a particular subject, they are immediately perceived as a threat and attacked.

The Sherman page is riddled with errors, and should be deleted until such time as a completely new page can be researched and written. I will contribute, but I will not write the entire page for you.

Philippsbourg

Where do you get off? Threatened by content experts? This isn't a controlled medium, its wikipedia. People are threatened by people who claim credentials without taking the five seconds to provide any solid proof. I'm not defending the content of the article AT ALL. All I'm saying is that if it bothers you this much, and obviously it does, you have the power to do something. All you're doing now is complaining. You're not doing anything constructive. No one is actively challanging your integrity, we're challanging your refusal to do anything about it yourself.

Oh, and your holocaust denier reference is totally out of line. Something bothers you, take control and do something about it, that's the spirit of Misplaced Pages. Right now you're claiming that everyone else here should know all of what you do and do it instead of you lending your expertise to the cause. Its selfish is really what it is, selfish and arrogant. -- Thatguy96 April 2 2006 16:17

Philippsbourg,

Hello. I'm interested in seeing your documents, especially on HVAP. U.S. government documents are public domain, so you can create a wiki article on them or post a scanned PDF of them on a website and then add links to this Sherman page. I look forward to your contribution. Thank you.Wikist 05:02, 4 April 2006 (UTC)

Delete Characteristics section?

• 1. We have a better stats box in the intro
• 2. We are not listing variants on this page
• 3. Neither example is typical of the primary user, the U.S.
• 4. One of the examples (Firefly) has its own article that links in the "See also" section
• 5. The other example can appear in the Soviet section of the variants page, also linked in "See also"

Wikist 05:38, 4 April 2006 (UTC)

A better idea would be a small table as used on the Supermarine Spitfire which could illustrate the major changes across the variants. Although the full list of vairant shas been migrated there should still be some dicussion of the variation in the Sherman over its lifetime. GraemeLeggett 08:25, 4 April 2006 (UTC)

A table would be better than what we have. Hopefully someone will start it and people can add columns to it as time allows. Wikist 11:48, 4 April 2006 (UTC)

Here's the start of the barn-raising. People can add here until it looks respectable:

1930 Hours 10 April, 2006

 "Your" table looks remarkably like those found on an unassociated website. Why don't you just admit you swiped the code from someone else rather than try an act like you wrote it yourself? 
 Philippsbourg 

Photo caption of 105mm howitzer vehicle

I am not sure, but the vehicle shown in the 'Armamment" section may be mislabeled. It is an early 56-degree hull vehicle with 105mm howitzer and HVSS. It appears to be an M4 but it is labeled an M4A4. I don't think any M4A4 were built with 105mm howitzers, and the raised fan cover on the engine deck is consistent with an M4, not an M4A4. It's hard to tell for certain though. Anyone else have any thoughts on this?

The A4 had a bulge on the engine deck (but I know what you mean about the photo), the hull looked stretched at first glance, and that vehicle might be a post-war kitbash with the 105, HVSS, and the late, sharp-beak, single-piece cast transmission housing. However, that sentence was there when I poached the photo from the "M4 Sherman variants" page so I'll defer to anyone's closer inspection if they want to change or delete the 2nd sentence.Wikist 15:09, 4 April 2006 (UTC)

You're correct that there was a bulge in the engine deck of the M4A4, but it was much shorter (front to back) than the one on the M4 and M4A1. I agree it's a postwar refit, but I think it's an M4 and will edit the caption. Thanks. DMorpheus 14:18, 5 April 2006 (UTC)

Thank you for spotting the potential confusion: It was in divisions' headquarters units (at battalion level), it was not in "division HQ" (to my knowledge).

If it's a postwar refit, it could be re-engined like M50 Super Sherman. Read the strange hyrbrids claimed to exist as early as 1948 (http://www.israeli-weapons.com/weapons/vehicles/tanks/sherman/M-4.html), not to mention that a pedestal tank could be cobbled from the scrapyard. Without a positive ID, perhaps we should stay generic with "Sherman." Also, the caption appears on M4 Sherman variants, which is where I obtained the photo.Wikist 19:01, 5 April 2006 (UTC)

"Off-Topic" in Sections and Specific Problem in "Production" Section

There were many general statements repeated numerous times and many statements appeared in the wrong topic. Because section introductions or overviews about M4 tend to rehash the standard general arguments, it might be better if each section hewed to its narrow topic as much as possible.

For instance, the recent "production" section was 637 words but only required about 140 words to convey the actual original factory production information of engine, gun, suspension, etc. while 100 words were padding around that information, 200 were about mostly British conversions, 100 were about performance, and 100 were about operational service or doctrine.

I left brief mentions of performance to explain the "why" of production changes, although if you wanted to eliminate even that then the former original factory production information could have fit in one paragraph:

• The M4 had a 75 mm gun in a traversing turret on the interim M3 "Lee" chassis. Five main variants, the M4, the M4A1, the M4A2, the M4A3 and the M4A4, differed mainly in engine although the M4A1 had a fully cast upper hull. Upgrades included suspension units, ammunition stowage, and front hull protection like The M4 Composite which had a cast front hull section mated to a welded rear hull. Early models had a 75 mm low-velocity gun. Later M4A1, M4A2 and M4A3 were upgunned with the T23 turret and 76mm cannon, leading to the final M4A3E8/76(w) HVSS "Easy Eight" The US Ordnance Department rejected the British 17 pounder for factory production. Over 50,000 Shermans were produced during the war, and its chassis was the basis for many other vehicles including upgunned tank destroyers, armored recovery vehicles, artillery prime movers, and self-propelled guns.

The "production" section still has little production information: which factory built how many of which type when. It is important to distinguish:

• tank design (and possibly prototype tests)
• industrial manufacturing production
• post-production
  • factory conversions
  • field conversions
    • official
    • unofficial
• the resulting variants' characteristics

Would "Design Evolution" be a more accurate label for the "Production" section?

I'm interested to hear what others think. Thank you. Wikist 13:23, 5 April 2006 (UTC)

Service History?

1915 Hours, 10 April 2006

Equipment does not "serve." People do.

Philippsbourg