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The '''argument from morality''' is one of several ]. This argument comes in different forms, all aiming to prove ]’s existence from the evidence of ] in the world.
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The '''argument from morality''' is one of several ]. This argument comes in different forms, all aiming to prove God’s existence from the evidence of morality in the world.


==The argument== ==The argument==
The moral argument works on the idea that most people have some experience of morality, and feel there are certain rules about how they should behave.


All forms of the moral argument begin with the observation of ''moral normativity''. That is, human beings are typically aware of actions as being right and wrong. This awareness seems to bind us toward certain obligations, regardless of our personal goals and ends. In this sense, moral qualities have the appearance of universality and objectivity.
===Divine Command===
# Moral law requires a moral lawgiver.
# There is a moral law.
# There must be a moral lawgiver. (from 1 and 2)
# This moral lawgiver is God.


In its most general form, the moral argument takes the following form:
The two premises must, of course, be defended separately. However, usually this argument is employed with those (the great majority of the human population) who already subscribe to the second premise. Thus, the first premise is the more oft-debated. That the moral lawgiver is God must also be justified, but so with most arguments for God's existence must the proven entity be shown to be God as regularly understood (e.g., that Aquinas' prime mover is the God of the Bible). This is not, however, a circular argument.


# Moral normativity exists.
Another argument from morality can be expressed as follows:
# The best explanation of moral normativity is God.
# If ] exists, then God and God alone decides what is (truly) right and wrong. Without God there could be no ultimate standards of ].
# Therefore God exists. (from 1 and 2)
# So, if people assumed that God does not exist, then they would be doomed to a life without fixed moral standards. They would have no reasons to think that ], ], or even ] are wrong. According to this view, nonbelievers contribute to the corruption of themselves and the entire ]. (Cf the famous quote associated with ], "If God does not exist, everything is permitted".)
# Given the above, it is necessary that God exists if society is to have stable standards of morality.
# Everyone in society either obviously needs or already has stable standards of morality. Therefore, God exists.


What follows are some of the more common variations of the moral argument. The list is by no means exclusive.
That is the basis of ], or alternatively, the ]. The argument is valid if and only if the following assumptions are correct:


==Variation 1: Moral sanctions==
# There is an ultimate standard of morality.
# People are able to know God's commands, and the sources of such knowledge are infallible.
# Something is right if and only if God commands it; something is wrong if and only if God forbids it; and something is morally permissible if and only if God neither commands nor forbids it.
# God's standards are stable; God's commands are as valid today as they were when the infallible sources of information were created.
# There is no alternative source of moral and ethical ideas and action, meaning that all other systems such as ] are invalid; that is to say, even if they ultimately endorse the same morals they are wrong about what it is that makes those things moral.


<ol>
A third variant of the argument from morality is based on the existence of standards, and the existence of conscience in humans. In any argument, various standards are appealed to, and only unreasonable arguers would make claims like "I am right because I think I am." If no standard really exists, then no '']'' system can ever be objectively just, and all justice systems would be shams, which is assumed to be untrue. Therefore, it is argued that the standards of moral good exists external from ourselves, and are not arbitrary. Since such standards exist, so must God.
<li value=4>Moral norms exist and have authority.
<li value=5>If they have authority, there must be a reliable motive for human beings to be moral.
<li value=6>No such motive could exist, unless there was an omniscient, omnipresent, wholly just agent to attach sanctions to behavior under moral norms.
<li value=7>Therefore God exists.
</ol>


One may ask why the required recognition and upholding of moral norms must be carried out by divine intelligence, as opposed to human intelligence. A. E. Taylor explains that the moral law holds everywhen and everywhere, whereas the human mind is limited in its comprehension and scope. Only a sovereign God could properly detect infringements of the moral law and apply sanctions. In his ''Letter concerning Toleration'', ] contends that one of the few religious stances that the commonwealth cannot tolerate is ], for atheists have no motive to act upon their promises and oaths.
===Pointing towards God===
This form of the moral argument interprets morality as an indirect religious experience which points towards God.
# Our feelings of obligation guide us to make a moral decision.
# This obligation is due to the fact that each person has value, and this supports each decision.
# If people have an intrinsic value, there must be a source to this value.
# This source must be God.


===Kant's argument=== ===Criticism===
] believed that in a perfect world behaving morally should lead to happiness. However, as this rarely happens in our world, he considered that there must be another answer.
He argued that there are certain rational laws which we feel duty bound to follow, and these he called categorical imperatives. He concluded that if this is true, we can assume three things:
*Free will – We must have the free will to act
*Immortality – happiness will eventually reward us (in the afterlife)
*God – there is a regulating being that will reward virtue with happiness.


Critics assert that laws can carry normative force without being derived from an act of legislation. Here are some examples:
His argument is thus:
# If it is our unconditional duty to follow these moral laws, it must be our unconditional duty to aim for the goal of these laws, and so we seek to bring about the highest good.
# Humans do not have enough power to bring about the highest good. Even with perfect morality, we cannot ensure the perfect happiness that should follow.
# However, if we aim for the highest good, it must be possible to achieve it. If we are unable to attain this goal in our present life, there must be someone else to ensure we can attain it in a future life.
# God has this necessary power, therefore we can assume the existence of God.


<ul>
Kant believes that this does not prove the existence of God, but our sense of morality implies the world is ordered in a moral way.
<li>If someone affirms both "''p''" and "''p'' implies ''q''", he or she cannot deny "''q''".
<li>It is wrong to believe both "''p''" and "not-''p''" at the same time.
</ul>


These laws carry clear normative force over our speech and thought. Yet, one does not feel compelled to posit the existence of a Great Logician in the sky to sanction infringements of these laws. In this light, the argument is seen to rest on the following questionable assumption: "All authoritative norms are based on the acts of a legislator." However, some theistic philosophers maintain that even such "norms of reason" derive their authority from God in some fashion.
==Criticisms==
===Logical flaws===
<!-- This section is just a stub I wrote late at night. I will probably update this soon, but as always extensions are encouraged and appreciated ] 23:12, ] ] (UTC) -->


Furthermore, critics assert that this argument denies one of the main features of moral normativity. The two norms of reason given above can be thought of as being intrinsically normative. A rule such as, "If you want to stay healthy, exercise daily", on the other hand, is extrinsicially normative, since its normative force derives from a secondary desire (the desire to stay healthy). The given argument, and its thought that God must exist to attach a fail-safe system of rewards and punishments to moral rules, concedes that moral facts are not intrinsically normative. Bindingness attaches to them only in so far as they engage with a secondary desire (the desire to avoid punishment).
The most common attack on the logic of this argument is by the conclusion (4), which is an assumption. Objections point out that there is no reason to assume that God is the moral lawgiver; or that if he exists, he should be the only moral lawmaker. Such an assumption requires knowledge of the existence of God (which is what the argument is trying to prove) and of the character of God (which is disputed).


==Variation 2: Transcendentality of morality ==
Indeed, there is no reason to suppose (or given by the argument) why morality is objective, or that people themselves are not the moral lawgivers. Morality can easily be explained as a ] which everybody agrees to for the purpose of maximising survival - if everybody acted as they wished, most people would invariably end up committing selfish acts (eg. to gain power and possessions) at the expense of others; eventually nobody would live. Some people might unconditionally wish not to do harm, other people might wish not to do harm to prevent harm from being done to themselves. However, the result of a social contract being formed is the same.


<ol>
====Formal formulation====
<li value=8> Moral facts exist.
#Humankind's core ]s are greed and a fear of the ] of ].
<li value=9> Moral facts are ] in nature.
#] is defined as wanting things that ] oneself, possibly at the expense of others, and avoiding things that cause ] to oneself, possibly at the expense of others.
<li value=10> The best explanation of there being transcendental moral facts is provided by theism.
#Greed causes people to want to experience as little ] as possible since suffering is ].
<li value=11> Therefore the existence of moral facts provides good grounds for thinking theism is true.
#] is defined as a set of ] that one should follow to prevent suffering.
</ol>
#Assume morality can only come from fear of God's wrath.
#Then a world devoid of God would have no morality. (by 5)
#Since greed is the only remaining motivation, people will engage in immoral behavior in order to satisfy their greed. (by 1, 2, 6)
#This causes a ].
#Due to greed, humankind is eventually motivated to lessen the overall suffering of humanity (and thus its individuals) by preventing a state of nature. (by 1, 3)
#Governments of some sort are established to further this goal. (by 9)
#Governments create and enforce a ]. (by 10)
#This contract is a form of morality. (by 4, 9)
#But this contradicts assumption 5 and logical consequence 6.
#Therefore assumption 5 is incorrect, thus morality doesn't only come from a fear of God's wrath.


Here, a ''transcendental'' fact is one that cannot be stated entirely in the language of the natural sciences, and that is true irrespective of human opinion. Theism provides the most intelligible explanation for such moral facts via the notion that rightness is one and the same property as the property of being commanded by God (wrongness consists in being forbidden by God).
Another criticism of the existence of standards variant, in addition to the argument for using man as the moral lawgiver, is that it equates the "ultimate standard" and God, and that this is an example of ].


===Contrary evidence===
Many argue this argument makes the prediction that since God is the source of morality, then someone who believes that (and behaves as if) God does not exist, i. e. a nonbeliever, should generally behave less morally than a believer. Therefore, the argument goes, nonbelievers should perform immoral actions more frequently than believers.


In order for this argument to work, it should be shown that a non-theistic worldview cannot adequately account for transcendental normative facts. Historically, the burden of proof has been placed on the non-theist to demonstrate a naturalistic metaphysics for morals, as both proponents and opponents of the moral argument tend to agree that morality may be a phenomenon which shows that there is more to the real world than meets the ]'s eye.
Some of these immoral actions fall under the category of secular crime in most legislations around the world (such as homicide, rape and theft); others are punished in some but considered private actions in others (homosexual intercourse, drug consumption); other are considered immoral by certain religions (such as divorce).


===Criticism===
The prediction has been found to fail in the following cases:
*In the United States, a 1999 poll by the Barna Research Group showed that in fact certain religious groups, such as Jews, Mainline Protestants, and Evangelical Christians, get divorced more often than atheists.
*If prison statistics in the USA are reliable, religious people are imprisoned by at least 40 times the rate of atheists.
*Believers have been responsible for countless historical atrocities, including (but not limited to) the ] and the ] attacks. While atheists have also been responsible for some atrocities, such as the ] ] camps of ] or the genocide of the ], they are not primarily motivated by their religious beliefs.


Critics point out this argument's appeal to a ] of ethics. Objections to divine command theories of ethics are numerous, most stemming from forms of the ]. Is an action good because God commanded it, or did God command it because it is good? The first horn would imply that what is good is arbitrary; God decides what is right and wrong in the same way that a government decides which side of the street cars should drive on. This seems unreasonable. The second horn would imply that God made his commands in accordance with transcendental facts that exist apart from God - exactly the types of facts that the theist is asking the non-theist to provide an account for. The argument is thus turned over on its head: the theist must account for the existence of these transcendental facts without invoking God. The non-theist can thus recognize the transcendentality of moral facts and yet still reject premise (10) on the basis that a theistic hypothesis still leaves transcendental moral facts unexplained.
Statistics for other measures of morality provide similar results.


Proponents of the argument maintain that the Euthyphro dilemma can be adequately resolved. ], for example, explains that God indeed commands something because it is good, but the reason it is good is that ''good is an essential part of God's nature''. Some criticize such a response as exhibiting ].
However, many advocates of the moral argument deny that the prediction is valid, arguing that believers who don't act morally are not correctly interpreting God's morality, and that non-believers who do act morally may still believe in morality, but only not see it as connected to God. The former defence (relating to incorrect interpretation) arguably falls victim to the "No True Scotsman" fallacy.


==Variation 3: Moral order (Kant) ==
===Responses and counter-responses===
'''Response:''' Many theists, or believers, will argue that the prediction stated above does not logically stem from its premises, i.e., that (4) is a ]. Thus, from this point of view, the "contrary evidence" would in essence be evidence against a ].


<ol>
]s, for example, argue that The Absolute Moral Law is written in our consciences, those of both believers and non-believers (Romans 2:15). It would then follow that the morals accepted by both believers and non-believers are essentially the same. Therefore we would logically expect their behavior to be essentially the same as well. The theist making this argument would claim that that is exactly what we see throughout history and even in modern societies today.
<li value=12> The '']'' is where moral virtue and happiness coincide.
<li value=13> We are rationally obliged to attain the ''summum bonum''.
<li value=14> What we are obliged to attain, it must be possible for us to attain.
<li value=15> If there is no God or afterlife, it is not possible to attain the ''summum bonum''.
<li value=16> God (and the afterlife) must exist.
</ol>


Premises (12) and (13) reflect ]'s belief that behaving morally should lead to happiness. Premise (14) tells us that “ought implies can”. It cannot be true that we ought to seek an end if there is no chance of our attaining it. Premise (15) points to the fact that the world as it appears to us is governed by morally blind causes. These causes give no hope whatsoever that pursuit of moral virtue will lead to happiness. They do not even give hope that we can become morally virtuous. Human agency is beset by weaknesses that make the attainment of virtue — in the absence of external aid — seem impossible. The being postulated in (16) has omniscience and omnipotence combined with perfect goodness. Thus it will ensure that the pursuit of a virtuous state is possible through external aid (as in grace) and will promise an immortality where the moral journey can be completed. It will also ensure that in the long run happiness will result from virtue. Its existence would mean that there is a perfect moral causality at work in the world.
'''Response:''' The prediction claimed above assumes that because believers believe, they will always (or usually) act on this belief. Many Christians will state that this is contrary to well-established Christian doctrine, that all are sinners (Romans 3:23, 1 John 1:8), including Christians. Simply believing in a god of some sort does not necessarily enable anyone to behave more righteously than anyone else.


===Criticism===
'''Response:''' When assessing the above tests and "morality measures" in the prediction, some issues must be taken into account:
*How terms such as "religious", "nonreligious", "atheist", "agnostic", "believer", "nonbeliever", etc. are defined, if at all.
*Whether the tests assume that there are no factors correlated with religiosity or belief that may influence the measurement.
*Whether the statistics have taken into account the religious demographics of the U.S. namely that the 'religious' far outnumber the atheists, which could account for the above results.
*Whether society prosecutes and punishes the "correct" crimes (are laws moral? are the police, the judicial system, etc. biased towards believers or nonbelievers?).
*Whether there is such a thing as a "right" crime, or whether it's all relativistic.


Kant himself asserts that if the ''summum bonum'' cannot be attained, then the moral law which bids us to seek it “must be fantastic and directed to imaginary ends and must therefore in itself be false”. Critics point out a certain type of circularity: Kant's argument presupposes that both the pursuit of moral virtue and the pursuit of happiness must be rational enterprises; however, this is precisely the sort of thing that may not be true in a non-theistic universe. Kant's conception of God arises as an attempt to harmonize these two conflicting goals, but critics assert that practical reason is not committed to the pursuit of two ends that apparently conflict.
The last point may be raised by some believers as an objection. It is entirely possible that those who make the laws are failing to conform with the "correct" moral standards (for example, most modern societies do not punish divorce or homosexual behaviour, which most believers consider to be morally wrong).


==General criticisms==
'''Response:''' Many theists may posit that certain societies, such as that of the United States, have been so molded by believers, that the modern individual morals of ]s are often molded by the historic values of the believers in that society. Thus, the behaviors of the two would be very similar in most circumstances.
<br />'''Counter-response:''' While this may be so in some cases, there is nothing to suggest that this is always the case (i.e., the argument is not universal or objective). Indeed, there are counterexamples, for example in ] where there was no structured concept of ], yet it had a highly advanced moral and legal system for its time.


All these variations depend on some way on premise (1): that moral normativity is a real objective phenomenon. Some critics reject this very first premise, rendering all subsequent argumentation moot. Morality, they argue, may have the strong appearance of objectivity but is actually ].
'''Response:''' Another viewpoint to consider is that if God is not responsible for morality, then moral values are simply social constructs (or ]) created by a certain individual or group to abridge the behavior of another group to benefit themselves or others like themselves. (For example, a mother who has been abandoned by her partner may teach her sons not to cheat on their wives to spare other women from her pain, which eventually leads to the concepts of monogamy and chastity.) In this way, morality originates as a principle of self-preservation. But as it is propagated, it is ingrained into the younger generation and colours their conception of morality. The logical conclusion to this viewpoint is that the morals of a society are ultimately subjective (even though certain morals are quite ubiquitous, suggesting a common psychological prompt), so nothing is objectively wrong.


For example, it is possible to view moral values as social constructs, created by certain individuals or groups to abridge the behavior of another group to benefit themselves or others like themselves. To illustrate, a mother who has been abandoned by her partner may teach her sons not to cheat on their wives to spare other women from her pain, eventually leading to the concepts of monogamy and chastity. In this way, morality originates as a principle of self-preservation. But as it is propagated, it is ingrained into the younger generation and colors their conception of morality. ] provides elaborate explanations of this sort of how initially amoral social practices became artificially colored with moral significance. In modern science, similar explanations of the phenomenon of morality have been given and analyzed through fields like ] and ].
A possible reason that certain morals are so ubiquitous in otherwise divergent societies, is to be found in evolutionary theory. If consider that a society may be susceptible to ], we can determine that certain moral behaviors, when practiced by a majority of a population, will give an advantage to those societies that practice them over those that do not (see ], ], ], etc). Thus, rather than having a divine source, morality simply consists of a consensus behavior that benefits the population as a whole.


==External links== ==External links==
*
* *
* *
*
*


] ]

Revision as of 06:33, 28 April 2006

The argument from morality is one of several arguments for the existence of God. This argument comes in different forms, all aiming to prove God’s existence from the evidence of morality in the world.

The argument

All forms of the moral argument begin with the observation of moral normativity. That is, human beings are typically aware of actions as being right and wrong. This awareness seems to bind us toward certain obligations, regardless of our personal goals and ends. In this sense, moral qualities have the appearance of universality and objectivity.

In its most general form, the moral argument takes the following form:

  1. Moral normativity exists.
  2. The best explanation of moral normativity is God.
  3. Therefore God exists. (from 1 and 2)

What follows are some of the more common variations of the moral argument. The list is by no means exclusive.

Variation 1: Moral sanctions

  1. Moral norms exist and have authority.
  2. If they have authority, there must be a reliable motive for human beings to be moral.
  3. No such motive could exist, unless there was an omniscient, omnipresent, wholly just agent to attach sanctions to behavior under moral norms.
  4. Therefore God exists.

One may ask why the required recognition and upholding of moral norms must be carried out by divine intelligence, as opposed to human intelligence. A. E. Taylor explains that the moral law holds everywhen and everywhere, whereas the human mind is limited in its comprehension and scope. Only a sovereign God could properly detect infringements of the moral law and apply sanctions. In his Letter concerning Toleration, John Locke contends that one of the few religious stances that the commonwealth cannot tolerate is atheism, for atheists have no motive to act upon their promises and oaths.

Criticism

Critics assert that laws can carry normative force without being derived from an act of legislation. Here are some examples:

  • If someone affirms both "p" and "p implies q", he or she cannot deny "q".
  • It is wrong to believe both "p" and "not-p" at the same time.

These laws carry clear normative force over our speech and thought. Yet, one does not feel compelled to posit the existence of a Great Logician in the sky to sanction infringements of these laws. In this light, the argument is seen to rest on the following questionable assumption: "All authoritative norms are based on the acts of a legislator." However, some theistic philosophers maintain that even such "norms of reason" derive their authority from God in some fashion.

Furthermore, critics assert that this argument denies one of the main features of moral normativity. The two norms of reason given above can be thought of as being intrinsically normative. A rule such as, "If you want to stay healthy, exercise daily", on the other hand, is extrinsicially normative, since its normative force derives from a secondary desire (the desire to stay healthy). The given argument, and its thought that God must exist to attach a fail-safe system of rewards and punishments to moral rules, concedes that moral facts are not intrinsically normative. Bindingness attaches to them only in so far as they engage with a secondary desire (the desire to avoid punishment).

Variation 2: Transcendentality of morality

  1. Moral facts exist.
  2. Moral facts are transcendental in nature.
  3. The best explanation of there being transcendental moral facts is provided by theism.
  4. Therefore the existence of moral facts provides good grounds for thinking theism is true.

Here, a transcendental fact is one that cannot be stated entirely in the language of the natural sciences, and that is true irrespective of human opinion. Theism provides the most intelligible explanation for such moral facts via the notion that rightness is one and the same property as the property of being commanded by God (wrongness consists in being forbidden by God).


In order for this argument to work, it should be shown that a non-theistic worldview cannot adequately account for transcendental normative facts. Historically, the burden of proof has been placed on the non-theist to demonstrate a naturalistic metaphysics for morals, as both proponents and opponents of the moral argument tend to agree that morality may be a phenomenon which shows that there is more to the real world than meets the physicalist's eye.

Criticism

Critics point out this argument's appeal to a divine command theory of ethics. Objections to divine command theories of ethics are numerous, most stemming from forms of the Euthyphro dilemma. Is an action good because God commanded it, or did God command it because it is good? The first horn would imply that what is good is arbitrary; God decides what is right and wrong in the same way that a government decides which side of the street cars should drive on. This seems unreasonable. The second horn would imply that God made his commands in accordance with transcendental facts that exist apart from God - exactly the types of facts that the theist is asking the non-theist to provide an account for. The argument is thus turned over on its head: the theist must account for the existence of these transcendental facts without invoking God. The non-theist can thus recognize the transcendentality of moral facts and yet still reject premise (10) on the basis that a theistic hypothesis still leaves transcendental moral facts unexplained.

Proponents of the argument maintain that the Euthyphro dilemma can be adequately resolved. Thomas Aquinas, for example, explains that God indeed commands something because it is good, but the reason it is good is that good is an essential part of God's nature. Some criticize such a response as exhibiting circularity.

Variation 3: Moral order (Kant)

  1. The summum bonum is where moral virtue and happiness coincide.
  2. We are rationally obliged to attain the summum bonum.
  3. What we are obliged to attain, it must be possible for us to attain.
  4. If there is no God or afterlife, it is not possible to attain the summum bonum.
  5. God (and the afterlife) must exist.

Premises (12) and (13) reflect Immanuel Kant's belief that behaving morally should lead to happiness. Premise (14) tells us that “ought implies can”. It cannot be true that we ought to seek an end if there is no chance of our attaining it. Premise (15) points to the fact that the world as it appears to us is governed by morally blind causes. These causes give no hope whatsoever that pursuit of moral virtue will lead to happiness. They do not even give hope that we can become morally virtuous. Human agency is beset by weaknesses that make the attainment of virtue — in the absence of external aid — seem impossible. The being postulated in (16) has omniscience and omnipotence combined with perfect goodness. Thus it will ensure that the pursuit of a virtuous state is possible through external aid (as in grace) and will promise an immortality where the moral journey can be completed. It will also ensure that in the long run happiness will result from virtue. Its existence would mean that there is a perfect moral causality at work in the world.

Criticism

Kant himself asserts that if the summum bonum cannot be attained, then the moral law which bids us to seek it “must be fantastic and directed to imaginary ends and must therefore in itself be false”. Critics point out a certain type of circularity: Kant's argument presupposes that both the pursuit of moral virtue and the pursuit of happiness must be rational enterprises; however, this is precisely the sort of thing that may not be true in a non-theistic universe. Kant's conception of God arises as an attempt to harmonize these two conflicting goals, but critics assert that practical reason is not committed to the pursuit of two ends that apparently conflict.

General criticisms

All these variations depend on some way on premise (1): that moral normativity is a real objective phenomenon. Some critics reject this very first premise, rendering all subsequent argumentation moot. Morality, they argue, may have the strong appearance of objectivity but is actually relative.

For example, it is possible to view moral values as social constructs, created by certain individuals or groups to abridge the behavior of another group to benefit themselves or others like themselves. To illustrate, a mother who has been abandoned by her partner may teach her sons not to cheat on their wives to spare other women from her pain, eventually leading to the concepts of monogamy and chastity. In this way, morality originates as a principle of self-preservation. But as it is propagated, it is ingrained into the younger generation and colors their conception of morality. Friedrich Nietzsche provides elaborate explanations of this sort of how initially amoral social practices became artificially colored with moral significance. In modern science, similar explanations of the phenomenon of morality have been given and analyzed through fields like evolutionary psychology and game theory.

External links

Categories: