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| '''Borovo Selo massacre''' (]:''Pokolj u Borovom Selu'') or '''Borovo Selo raid''' (]: ''Напад на Борово Село'') refers to the armed confrontation between ]n police and ethnic ] paramilitaries in the village of Borovo Selo near ] around ] ] <ref>http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/ses-ii030115e.htm</ref>. The incident which resulted in the killings of a number of Croatian policemen was the bloodiest event preceding the break-up of ], which began two months later. | '''Borovo Selo massacre''' (]:''Pokolj u Borovom Selu'') or '''Borovo Selo raid''' (]: ''Напад на Борово Село'') refers to the armed confrontation between ]n police and ethnic ] paramilitaries in the village of Borovo Selo near ] around ] ] <ref>http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/ses-ii030115e.htm</ref>. The incident which resulted in the killings of a number of Croatian policemen was the bloodiest event preceding the break-up of ], which began two months later. | ||
| The incident was indirectly caused by increasing tensions regarding the early stages of the break-up of Yugoslavia. |
The incident was indirectly caused by increasing tensions regarding the early stages of the break-up of Yugoslavia. ] of the Serbian leader ] had swept through sections of the Serbian minority in Croatia who were strongly opposed to Croatia's independence attempting to preserve Serbia's dominant role in the Yugoslav federation. <ref>http://www.janes.com/defence/news/kosovo/misc990301_02_n.shtml</ref>. Borovo Selo soon became one of the hotbeds of this movement. Often violent armed groups were aided and encouraged from Serbia, especially by the members of the ] <ref>http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/ses-ii030115e.htm</ref>. As a consequence, parts of Croatian territory surrounding Vukovar, effectively became an exclave dominated and governed by the local Serb paramilitary groups loyal to ] <ref>http://www.un.org/icty/glance/milosevic.htm</ref>. | ||
| In Spring ], shortly after ], a group of Croatian high ranking officials, including the future |
In Spring ], shortly after ], a group of Croatian high ranking officials, including the future defense minister ], visited Eastern Slavonia to assess the situation. The result was an order to dismantle roadblocks near Borovo Selo erected by the Serbian rebels. The task was subsequently successfully carried out. | ||
| ⚫ | However, it wasn't until ] that the local Croatian authorities decided to bring Borovo back under Croatian control. Their decision was prompted by the killing of two Croatian policemen on routine patrol the day before by Serbian paramilitaries <ref>http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D0CEEDB1031F937A2575BC0A967958260</ref>. Croatian government faced with an eruption of violence then decided to send a convoy of special police to Borovo Selo to disarm the paramilitaries and restore order. The convoy was ambushed as it entered the village; 12 policemen were killed and 21 were wounded. After the retreat of police, Serbian paramilitaries went on to mutilate the dead bodies of Croatian policemen which further aggravated the situation <ref>http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/00117.pdf</ref>. | ||
| The first victim of inter-ethnic tensions fell on May 1st 1991 when Stevan Inić (born ]), a Serb, was shot in head in the village of Brsadin near Vukovar from the gun fired by Croat Djuro Gelenčir, member of the Croatian Democratic Union's party militia. <ref></ref> <ref></ref> | |||
| ⚫ | The fighting was halted with the arrival of the ] forces, which initially acted as a buffer between the two sides. The federal prime-minister ] whose authority was diminishing in tandem with the growing influence of Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic visited Borovo Selo in attempt to negotiate the release of the captured Croatian policemen. | ||
| ⚫ | However, it |
||
| ⚫ | The fighting was halted with the arrival of the ] forces, which initially acted as a buffer between the two sides. The |
||
| Croatia's government, in turn, agreed to the increased presence of the Yugoslav National Army in the area, which would later have important consequences during the ]. | Croatia's government, in turn, agreed to the increased presence of the Yugoslav National Army in the area, which would later have important consequences during the ]. | ||
| The whole incident strengthened the nationalist |
The whole incident strengthened the nationalist fervor among Serbs in Croatia and other parts of the former Yugoslavia who called on Serbia's leadership to crush the democratic leaderships of ] and ]. Croatians were, on the other hand, furnished with another piece of evidence that the break-up of Yugoslavia was inevitable and imminent. | ||
| Borovo Selo massacre was quickly overshadowed by the start of war in ]. Some argue that the incident prevented ] from buying more time to properly prepare for eventual |
Borovo Selo massacre was quickly overshadowed by the start of war in ]. Some argue that the incident prevented ] from buying more time to properly prepare for eventual defense against the full-scale Serbian assault {{citation needed}}. | ||
| Others argue that Croatian special police units were nothing more than inexperienced local policemen who were no match for heavily armed Serbian rebels {{citation needed}}. Lack of Croatian military competence at Borovo Selo was later addressed by ] mayor ] in one of the more controversial sections of his memoirs |
Others argue that Croatian special police units were nothing more than inexperienced local policemen who were no match for heavily armed Serbian rebels {{citation needed}}. Lack of Croatian military competence at Borovo Selo was later addressed by ] mayor ] in one of the more controversial sections of his memoirs. | ||
| ==References== | ==References== | ||
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Borovo Selo massacre (Croatian:Pokolj u Borovom Selu) or Borovo Selo raid (Serbian: Напад на Борово Село) refers to the armed confrontation between Croatian police and ethnic Serb paramilitaries in the village of Borovo Selo near Vukovar around May 1 1991 . The incident which resulted in the killings of a number of Croatian policemen was the bloodiest event preceding the break-up of Yugoslavia, which began two months later.
The incident was indirectly caused by increasing tensions regarding the early stages of the break-up of Yugoslavia. Greater Serbian nationalism of the Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic had swept through sections of the Serbian minority in Croatia who were strongly opposed to Croatia's independence attempting to preserve Serbia's dominant role in the Yugoslav federation. . Borovo Selo soon became one of the hotbeds of this movement. Often violent armed groups were aided and encouraged from Serbia, especially by the members of the Serbian Radical Party . As a consequence, parts of Croatian territory surrounding Vukovar, effectively became an exclave dominated and governed by the local Serb paramilitary groups loyal to Slobodan Milosevic .
In Spring 1991, shortly after Plitvice Bloody Easter, a group of Croatian high ranking officials, including the future defense minister Gojko Šušak, visited Eastern Slavonia to assess the situation. The result was an order to dismantle roadblocks near Borovo Selo erected by the Serbian rebels. The task was subsequently successfully carried out.
However, it wasn't until May 2 that the local Croatian authorities decided to bring Borovo back under Croatian control. Their decision was prompted by the killing of two Croatian policemen on routine patrol the day before by Serbian paramilitaries . Croatian government faced with an eruption of violence then decided to send a convoy of special police to Borovo Selo to disarm the paramilitaries and restore order. The convoy was ambushed as it entered the village; 12 policemen were killed and 21 were wounded. After the retreat of police, Serbian paramilitaries went on to mutilate the dead bodies of Croatian policemen which further aggravated the situation .
The fighting was halted with the arrival of the Yugoslav People's Army forces, which initially acted as a buffer between the two sides. The federal prime-minister Ante Marković whose authority was diminishing in tandem with the growing influence of Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic visited Borovo Selo in attempt to negotiate the release of the captured Croatian policemen.
Croatia's government, in turn, agreed to the increased presence of the Yugoslav National Army in the area, which would later have important consequences during the war in Croatia.
The whole incident strengthened the nationalist fervor among Serbs in Croatia and other parts of the former Yugoslavia who called on Serbia's leadership to crush the democratic leaderships of Croatia and Slovenia. Croatians were, on the other hand, furnished with another piece of evidence that the break-up of Yugoslavia was inevitable and imminent.
Borovo Selo massacre was quickly overshadowed by the start of war in Slovenia. Some argue that the incident prevented Croatia from buying more time to properly prepare for eventual defense against the full-scale Serbian assault .
Others argue that Croatian special police units were nothing more than inexperienced local policemen who were no match for heavily armed Serbian rebels . Lack of Croatian military competence at Borovo Selo was later addressed by Osijek mayor Zlatko Kramarić in one of the more controversial sections of his memoirs.
References
- http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/ses-ii030115e.htm
- http://www.janes.com/defence/news/kosovo/misc990301_02_n.shtml
- http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/ses-ii030115e.htm
- http://www.un.org/icty/glance/milosevic.htm
- http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D0CEEDB1031F937A2575BC0A967958260
- http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/00117.pdf