| Revision as of 00:29, 3 August 2004 edit64.154.26.251 (talk) added Senate pre-war intelligence on Iraq link← Previous edit | Revision as of 04:41, 4 August 2004 edit undo216.119.144.79 (talk) revised Feith intelligence cell storyNext edit → | ||
| Line 5: | Line 5: | ||
| ] writes that, according to an unnamed Pentagon adviser, " was created in order to find evidence of what ] and his boss, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, believed to be true—that Saddam Hussein had close ties to ], and that ] had an enormous arsenal of chemical, biological, and possibly even nuclear ] that threatened the region and, potentially, the United States. “The agency was out to ''disprove'' linkage between Iraq and ],” the Pentagon adviser told me. “That’s what drove them. If you’ve ever worked with intelligence data, you can see the ingrained views at C.I.A. that color the way it sees data.” The goal of Special Plans, he said, was “to put the data under the microscope to reveal what the intelligence community can’t see.” | ] writes that, according to an unnamed Pentagon adviser, " was created in order to find evidence of what ] and his boss, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, believed to be true—that Saddam Hussein had close ties to ], and that ] had an enormous arsenal of chemical, biological, and possibly even nuclear ] that threatened the region and, potentially, the United States. “The agency was out to ''disprove'' linkage between Iraq and ],” the Pentagon adviser told me. “That’s what drove them. If you’ve ever worked with intelligence data, you can see the ingrained views at C.I.A. that color the way it sees data.” The goal of Special Plans, he said, was “to put the data under the microscope to reveal what the intelligence community can’t see.” | ||
| These allegations are supported by an annexe to the ] ], published in July 2004. The review, which was highly critical of the CIA's Iraq intelligence generally but found its judgments were right on Iraq-al Qaeda relationship, suggests that the OSP sought to |
These allegations are supported by an annexe to the ] ], published in July 2004. The review, which was highly critical of the CIA's Iraq intelligence generally but found its judgments were right on the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship, suggests that the OSP, if connected to an "Iraqi intelligence cell" also headed by Douglas Feith which is described in the annexe, sought to discredit and cast doubt on CIA analysis in an effort to establish a connection between Saddam Hussein and terrorism. In one instance, in response to a cautious CIA report, "''Iraq and al-Qa'eda: A Murky Relationship''", the annexe relates that "one of the individuals working for the stated that the June report, '...should be read for content only - and CIA's interpretation ought to be ignored.'" An "Iraqi intelligence cell" briefing to Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz in August 2002 condemned the CIA's intelligence assessment techniques and denounced the CIA's "consistent underestimation" of matters dealing with the alleged Iraq-al Qaeda co-operation. In September 2002, two days before the CIA's final assessment of the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship, Feith briefed senior advisers to ] and ], undercutting the CIA's credibility and alleging "fundamental problems" with CIA intelligence-gathering. As reported in the conservative British newspaper ], ], senior Democrat on the Senate committee, said that Mr Feith's cell may have undertaken "unlawful" intelligence-gathering initiatives. (Coman, 2004) | ||
| see also: ] | see also: ] | ||
| ==External links== | ==References and External links== | ||
| * Coman, Julian (July 11, 2004). [http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/07/11/wsept11.xml&sSheet=/news/2004/07/11/ixnewstop.html | |||
| Fury over Pentagon cell that briefed White House on Iraq's 'imaginary' al-Qaeda links.] ''news.telegraph.co.uk''. | |||
| * | * | ||
| * | * | ||
Revision as of 04:41, 4 August 2004
The Office of Special Plans is a Pentagon unit created by Donald Rumsfeld and led by Douglas Feith, dealing with intelligence on Iraq. In July of 2003 it was renamed to Northern Gulf Affairs Office.
In an interview with the Scottish Sunday Herald, former CIA officer Larry Johnson describes the OSP was "dangerous for US national security and a threat to world peace. lied and manipulated intelligence to further its agenda of removing Saddam. It's a group of ideologues with pre-determined notions of truth and reality. They take bits of intelligence to support their agenda and ignore anything contrary. They should be eliminated."
Seymour Hersh writes that, according to an unnamed Pentagon adviser, " was created in order to find evidence of what Wolfowitz and his boss, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, believed to be true—that Saddam Hussein had close ties to Al Qaeda, and that Iraq had an enormous arsenal of chemical, biological, and possibly even nuclear weapons that threatened the region and, potentially, the United States. “The agency was out to disprove linkage between Iraq and terrorism,” the Pentagon adviser told me. “That’s what drove them. If you’ve ever worked with intelligence data, you can see the ingrained views at C.I.A. that color the way it sees data.” The goal of Special Plans, he said, was “to put the data under the microscope to reveal what the intelligence community can’t see.”
These allegations are supported by an annexe to the Senate intelligence committee's Report of Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq, published in July 2004. The review, which was highly critical of the CIA's Iraq intelligence generally but found its judgments were right on the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship, suggests that the OSP, if connected to an "Iraqi intelligence cell" also headed by Douglas Feith which is described in the annexe, sought to discredit and cast doubt on CIA analysis in an effort to establish a connection between Saddam Hussein and terrorism. In one instance, in response to a cautious CIA report, "Iraq and al-Qa'eda: A Murky Relationship", the annexe relates that "one of the individuals working for the stated that the June report, '...should be read for content only - and CIA's interpretation ought to be ignored.'" An "Iraqi intelligence cell" briefing to Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz in August 2002 condemned the CIA's intelligence assessment techniques and denounced the CIA's "consistent underestimation" of matters dealing with the alleged Iraq-al Qaeda co-operation. In September 2002, two days before the CIA's final assessment of the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship, Feith briefed senior advisers to Dick Cheney and Condoleezza Rice, undercutting the CIA's credibility and alleging "fundamental problems" with CIA intelligence-gathering. As reported in the conservative British newspaper The Daily Telegraph, Jay Rockefeller, senior Democrat on the Senate committee, said that Mr Feith's cell may have undertaken "unlawful" intelligence-gathering initiatives. (Coman, 2004)
see also: Operation Rockingham
References and External links
- Coman, Julian (July 11, 2004). [http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/07/11/wsept11.xml&sSheet=/news/2004/07/11/ixnewstop.html
Fury over Pentagon cell that briefed White House on Iraq's 'imaginary' al-Qaeda links.] news.telegraph.co.uk.