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{{Campaignbox Axis-Soviet War}} {{Campaignbox Axis-Soviet War}}


The ] '''Battle of the Lower ]''' of ] is considered to be one of the largest battles in world history, involving almost 4,000,000 men on both sides and stretching on a front 1400 kilometers wide. During a four-month campaign, Soviet troops liberated the left shore of the ], crossed it in force, and created several ] on the right shore, liberating ] as well. The ] '''Battle of the Lower Dnieper''' of ] (also: Battle of the Dnieper, Battle for Dnieper, in Ukrainian: Битва за Днiпро, in Russian: Битва за Днепр) is considered to be one of the largest battles in world history, involving almost 4,000,000 men on both sides and stretching on a front 1400 kilometers wide. During a four-month campaign, ] liberated the left shore of the ] from ] occupation, crossed it in force, and created several ]s on the right shore, liberating ] as well.


It is also considered one of the bloodiest battles, with estimates ranging from 1,700,000 to 2,700,000 casualties on both sides. Since the area involved was huge, some historians do not consider it a discrete "battle," and grant the ] the title of the bloodiest battle in history. It is also considered one of the bloodiest battles, with estimates ranging from 1,700,000 to 2,700,000 casualties on both sides. Since the area involved was huge, some historians do not consider it a discrete "battle", and grant the ] the title of the bloodiest battle in history.


== Prelude == == Background ==
After the end of the ], the ] lost all hope of regaining the initiative. Losses were considerable, and, worse, its army as a whole was less experienced than before, as many of its best men had fallen in the ]. Therefore, despite considerable numbers, the Wehrmacht could only react and defend. After the ], the ]'s ability to regain the initiative on the ] was severely diminished. Its losses had been considerable and many of its best men had fallen in the ]. Despite considerable numbers, the Wehrmacht could only react and defend. ] ordered the construction of a series of fortifications to slow down the ] and demanded that the Wehrmacht defend its positions on the ] at all costs.


⚫ On the Soviet side, ] was determined to pursue his liberation of occupied territories, begun earlier in the year. The ] industrial region was the first priority, since it was a densely populated area and its ]s and other ]s would provide precious resources for the ]. Therefore, the main axis of the attack was in a southerly direction; the northern regions were largely neglected in the Soviet offensive.
By mid-August, ] understood that the Soviet offensive could not be contained - at least, not until some internal disagreement broke out within the ]. He decided to buy time by constructing a series of fortifications to slow down the ], and he demanded the Wehrmacht to defend its positions on the ] at all costs.


== Start of the Soviet Offensive ==
⚫ On the Soviet side, ] was determined to pursue his liberation of occupied territories, started at the beginning of the year. The Ukrainian industrial region was the first priority, since it was a densely populated area and its ] mines and other ores would provide precious resource for the Soviet state. Therefore, the main axis of the attack was in a southernly direction; the northern regions would be neglected in this offensive.
⚫ === German defensive setup ===

== The Start ==
⚫ === German defense setup ===


] ]


The order to construct the Dnieper defense complex, known as "Eastern Wall", was issued on 11 August 1943 and immediately executed. Hitler's order to construct the Dnieper defense complex, known as the ''Ostwall'' or Eastern Wall was issued on 11 August 1943 and immediately executed. Fortifications were erected up and down the Dnieper, but with the Soviet Army's rapid advance this large undertaking could not be completed in time. The Eastern Wall was not uniform, but heaviest in areas where large Soviet crossings were most likely, such as near ], ] and ].

All over Dnieper, fortifications were erected. However, there was no hope to achieve such a huge defense setup in such a short time. Therefore, the "Eastern wall" was not uniform. In areas where Soviet force-crossing was most likely, such as near ], ] and ], the defense was the heaviest, whilst being lighter in other areas.

Additionally, on 7 September 1943, the SS forces and the Wehrmacht received an order to thoroughly pillage areas they had to retreat from to slow down the Red Army and to try and create supplies issues for Soviet forces.


Additionally, on 7 September 1943, the Wehrmacht and ] forces were ordered to commence ] against the area they were retreating from to slow the Soviet advance and deny it supplies.
⚫ === Soviet offensive on the left shore ===


⚫ === Offensive on the left shore ===
''Main article: ]'' {{Main|Battle of Ukraine (1943)}}


On 24 August 1943, the Soviet divisions started moving on a 1400 kilometer front stretching between ] and the ]. The operation staged was huge, mobilizing 2,650,000 men, 51,000 guns, 2,400 tanks and 2,850 planes, and involving 5 fronts: On 24 August 1943, the Soviet divisions began moving on a 1400 kilometer front stretching between ] and the ]. The operation staged was huge, mobilizing 2,650,000 men, 51,000 guns, 2,400 tanks and 2,850 planes, and involving 5 fronts:
* ] (known as the ] after ] ]) * ] (known as the ] after ] ])
* ] (known as the ] after ] ]) * ] (known as the ] after ] ])
Line 53: Line 48:
Overall, the operation was executed by 36 rifle armies, 4 Tank and 5 Air armies. Overall, the operation was executed by 36 rifle armies, 4 Tank and 5 Air armies.


Despite a great superiority in numbers, the offensive was by no means easy. German opposition was ferocious and fight raged for every town and city. One tactic widely used by the Wehrmacht was leaving some troops in each city and on each hill, slowing down the Soviet offensive. Despite a great superiority in numbers, the offensive was by no means easy. German opposition was ferocious and fights raged for every town and city. One tactic widely used by the Wehrmacht was to leave some troops in each city and on each hill to slow the Soviet offensive.


Three weeks after the start of the offensive, and despite heavy losses on the Soviet side, it became all too clear that the Wehrmacht could not possibly hope to contain the Soviet offensive in the flat, open terrain of the steppes, where the Red Army's numerical strength would prevail. Manstein asked for as many as 12 new divisions in hopes of containing the Soviet offensive – but German reserves were perilously thin. Years later, Manstein wrote in his ]: Three weeks after the start of the offensive, and despite heavy losses on the Soviet side, it became clear that the Wehrmacht could not contain the Soviets in the flat, open terrain of the ], where the Red Army's numerical strength would prevail. ] asked for as many as 12 new divisions in hopes of containing the Soviet offensive – but German reserves were perilously thin. Years later, Manstein wrote in his ]:
⚫ {{cquote|''After analysing this situation, I concluded that we can't keep the ] with the forces that we already possess, and that even a greater danger for the whole ] is being created on the north flank of the group. The 8th and 4th armies won't be able to contain the Soviet offensive for very long.''}}


⚫ On 15 September 1943, Hitler ordered ] to retreat to the Dnieper defense line.
⚫ :''"After analysing this situation, I concluded that we can't keep the Donbass with the forces that we already possess, and that even a greater danger for the whole Eastern Front is being created on the north flank of the group. The 8th and 4th armies won't be able to contain the Soviet offensive for very long".''


⚫ The fight for the city of ] was especially bitter, having been well fortified and its garrison well prepared. After a few days of inconclusive ] ] bypassed the city and rushed towards the Dnieper, although the German garrison fell shortly after.
⚫ Therefore, on 15 September 1943, Hitler ordered the Army Group South to retreat to the Dnieper defense line.


⚫ Towards the end of September 1943, Soviet forces reached the lower part of the Dnieper.
⚫ The fight for city of ] was especially bitter. The city was heavily fortified and its garrison ready. After a few inconclusive days that greatly slowed down the Soviet offensive, Marshal Konev decided to bypass the city and rush towards the Dnieper. After two days of violent ], the Poltava garrison was overcome.


⚫ === Airborne operation ===
⚫ Towards the end of September 1943, Soviet forces reached the lower part of the Dnieper. The hardest part was still to come, though.
⚫ In order to soften the defenses on Dnieper's right shore, the Soviet command decided to attempt a ] on the right shore. On ] ] the Dnieper airborne operation was launched. The Soviet ]s' objective was to secure a ] until reinforcements could arrive.


⚫ The operation was an almost complete failure. Because pilots were completely unfamiliar with the area, the first wave of paratroopers was dropped on Soviet lines or in the Dnieper, while the second wave of 5,000 troops were scattered over several dozen square kilometers. Moreover, because of a poor ] that failed to spot German ], most troops, lacking ]s, were overwhelmed shortly after their landing. The others, having lost all radio link with their ], tried to attack German supply depots or join ] forces.
⚫ === Dnieper airborne operation ===
⚫ In order to soften the defenses on Dnieper's right shore, the Soviet command decided to attempt a paradrop on the right shore. On ] ] the Dnieper airborne operation was launched. The Soviet ]s' objective was to secure a ] until the reinforcements could arrive.


⚫ Despite heavy losses, it is estimated that the Dnieper airborne operation, which attracted the attention of a significant number of German mechanized troops, allowed a Soviet crossing in better conditions. Nevertheless, after the failure of the ] and Dnieper paradrops, the ] refused to use massive airborne operations again.
⚫ The operation turned out to be a complete failure. Because pilots were completely unfamiliar with the area, the first wave of paratroopers was dropped on Soviet lines or in the Dnieper, while the second wave of 5,000 troops got scattered over several dozen square kilometers. Moreover, because of a poorly performed ] that failed to spot German mechanized forces, most troops, lacking ]s, were overwhelmed shortly after their landing. The others, having lost all radio link with their ], tried to attack German ]s or joined the ] forces.


⚫ == Soviet Crossing of the Dnieper ==
⚫ Despite heavy losses, it is estimated that the Dnieper airborne operation, which attracted the attention of a significant number of German mechanized troops, allowed a force-crossing in better conditions. Nevertheless, after the failure of Vyazma and Dnieper paradrops, the ] refused to use massive airborne operations again.
=== Tactical considerations ===

⚫ == Force-crossing the Dnieper ==
=== Choosing the scenario ===
] (the sign reads "To Kiev!")...]] ] (the sign reads "To Kiev!")...]]


] ]


Dnieper is the third largest ] in ], second only to ] and ]. In its lower part, its width can easily reach 3 kilometers, and the fact that it was ]med in several places made it even larger. Moreover its right shore —the one still to be retaken— was much higher and steeper than the left one, thus complicating the offensive even further. In addition, the opposite shore was transformed into a vast complex of defenses and ]s held by the Wehrmacht. The ] is the third largest ] in ], second only to the ] and the ]. In its lower part, its width can easily reach 3 kilometers, and the fact that it was ] in several places made it even larger. Moreover, its right shore — the one still to be retaken — was much higher and steeper than the left one and had been transformed into a vast complex of defenses and ]s by the Wehrmacht.


In front of such a situation, the Soviet commanders had two options. The first would be to give themselves time to regroup their forces, find a weak point or two to exploit (not necessarily in the lower part of Dnieper), stage a ] and encircle the German defenders, rendering the defense line next to useless (very much like ] ]s bypassed the ] in 1940). This, however, would give Germans time to get more ]s and futhermore, would expose Soviet troops to ] mechanized attacks, every Soviet commander's nightmare since 1941. The Soviet commanders were faced with two options. The first was to give themselves time to regroup their forces, find a weak point or two to exploit (not necessarily in the lower part of the Dnieper), stage a breakthrough and encircle the German defenders, rendering the defense line next to useless (similar to when ] ]s bypassed the ] in 1940). This, however, would give the Germans time to get more ] and futhermore, would expose Soviet troops to mechanized attacks on their flanks, every Soviet commander's nightmare since ]. The second option was to stage a massive assault without waiting, and ] the Dnieper on a large front. This option left no additional time for the German defenders, but would lead to much larger casualties.


The second option would be to stage a massive assault without waiting, and force the Dnieper on a large front. This option left no additional time for the German defenders, but would lead to much larger casualties. For political reasons (] wanted ] to be retaken on ]), the second option was chosen. For political reasons, ] wanted ] to be retaken on ]). The second option was chosen.


The assault would be staged on a 300-kilometer front almost simultaneously. All available means of transport would be used to transport the attackers to the opposite shore, including small ] boats and improvised ]s of barrels and trees (like the one on the photograph). The crucial issue would obviously be heavy equipment. Without it, the bridgeheads would not stand for long. The assault would be staged on a 300-kilometer front almost simultaneously. All available means of transport would be used to transport the attackers to the opposite shore, including small ] boats and improvised ]s of barrels and trees (see photograph). The crucial issue would be transporting heavy equipment, without which the bridgeheads would not stand for long.


=== The crossing === === The crossing ===
] ]


The first ] on Dnieper's right shore was established on ] ] at the confluence of Dnieper and ] rivers, in the northern part of the front. On ], another bridgehead was created near ], another on ] near ] and yet another one on ] near Kremenchug. By the end of the month, 23 bridgeheads were created on the right shore, some of them 10 kilometers wide and 1-2 kilometers deep. The first ] on the Dnieper's right shore was established on ] ] at the ] of the Dnieper and ] rivers, in the northern part of the front. On 24 September, another bridgehead was created near ], another on 25 September near ] and yet another on 28 September near ]. By the end of the month, 23 bridgeheads were created on the right shore, some of them 10 kilometers wide and 1-2 kilometers deep.


By all accounts, the crossing of the Dnieper can be described as an "attack rage". Soldiers used every available floating device to cross the river, under heavy German fire and taking heavy losses. After that, Soviet troops had to basically dig themselves into the clay ravines composing Dnieper's right shore. By all accounts, the crossing of the Dnieper can be described as an "attack rage". Soldiers used every available floating device to cross the river, under heavy German fire and taking heavy losses.
Soviet troops dug in to the clay ravines composing Dnieper's right shore.


=== Securing the bridgeheads === === Securing the bridgeheads ===
Line 99: Line 95:
German troops soon launched heavy ]s on almost every ], hoping to annihilate them before heavy equipment could be transported across the river. German troops soon launched heavy ]s on almost every ], hoping to annihilate them before heavy equipment could be transported across the river.


For instance, the Borodaevsk bridgehead, mentioned by Marshal ] in his memoires, was under a heavy armored and air assualt. Bombers were everywhere, bombing both the bridgehead and the reinforcements crossing the river. Konev complained at once about a lack of organization of Soviet air support, set up air ]s to prevent bombers from approaching the bridgeheads and ordered forward more artillery to counter tank attacks from the opposite shore. When Soviet aviation became more organized and hundreds of guns and ]s started firing, the situation started to improve and the bridgehead was eventually preserved. The ] bridgehead, mentioned by ] in his memoires, was under a heavy armored and air assualt. Konev complained at once about a lack of organized air support and set up air ]s to prevent bombers from approaching the bridgeheads and ordered forward more ] to counter tank attacks from the opposite shore. With improved air support and ] ]s, the situation began to improve and the bridgehead was eventually preserved.


Such fights were commonplace on every bridgehead. Even if all bridgeheads were preserved, losses were terrific – at the beginning of October, most divisions were at only 25 to 50% of their nominal strength. Such heavy fighting was commonplace on every bridgehead, and while Soviet forces managed to preserve every one, most divisions were at only 25 to 50% of their nominal strength.


== Right shore campaign == ] == Right Shore Campaign == ]


=== Lower Dnieper offensive === === Lower Dnieper offensive ===


By mid-October, the forces accumulated on the lower Dnieper bridgeheads were strong enough to stage a first massive attack to definitely secure Dnieper's right shore in the southern part of the front. Therefore, an vigorous attack was staged on Kremenchug-] line. Simultaneously, a major diversion was conducted in the south to draw German forces away both from Lower Dnieper and from Kiev. By mid-October, the forces accumulated on the lower Dnieper bridgeheads were strong enough to stage a massive attack to better secure the Dnieper's right shore in the southern part of the front. A vigorous attack was staged on the ]-] line. Simultaneously, a major diversion was conducted further south to draw German forces away both from the Lower Dnieper and from ].

⚫ At the end of the offensive, Soviet forces controlled a bridgehead 300 kilometers wide and up to 80 kilometers deep in some places. In the south, the Crimea was now cut off from the rest of the German forces. Any hope of stopping the Red Army on Dnieper's left shore was lost.


⚫ At the end of the offensive, Soviet forces controlled a bridgehead that was in some places 300 kilometers wide and up to 80 kilometers deep. In the south, the ] was now cut off from the rest of the German forces.
=== Kiev liberation ===


''Main article: ]'' === Liberation of Kiev ===
{{Main|Battle of Kiev (1943)}}


== Criticism of Stalin's Tactics ==
=== Criticisms ===


Stalin's will to retake Kiev before ] have raised quite a few criticisms among historians. It is commonly accepted now that bridgeheads on the Lower Dnieper were deliberately "left alone" in order to draw German forces from Kiev, resulting in heavy losses. While this hypothesis could be true to some extent, one must not forget that the action of establishing a bridgehead alone is dangerous enough and can (and usually does) lead to heavy losses. Stalin's desire to retake Kiev before ] has raised criticism from some historians. A common historical perspective of the battle is that bridgeheads on the Lower Dnieper were deliberately "left alone" in order to draw German forces from Kiev, resulting in heavy Soviet losses.


== Aftermath == == Aftermath ==


The Battle of Dnieper was another stinging defeat for the Wehrmacht. The Red Army, which Hitler hoped to contain at the Dnieper, forced the Wehrmacht's defenses. Kiev was liberated and German troops lacked forces to annihilate Soviet troops on Lower Dnieper bridgeheads. The right shore was still in German possession for most part, but both sides knew that it would not last for long. The Battle of the Dnieper was another stinging defeat for the Wehrmacht. The Red Army, which Hitler hoped to contain at the Dnieper, broke through the Wehrmacht's defenses. Kiev was liberated and German troops lacked the forces needed to halt the Soviet advance across the Lower Dnieper. For the time being, the right shore was still largely in German possession, but General Manstein's ] failed to turn the tide.


Additionally, the Battle of Dnieper demonstrated the strength of Soviet partisan movement. The "]" operation staged during September and October 1943 struck German logistics very hard, creating heavy supplies issues. The Battle of the Dnieper demonstrated the strength of the ] movement. The "]" operation staged during September and October 1943 struck German logistics very hard, creating heavy supply issues.


The Soviet advances during this period, along with other major advances during ] gained Stalin considerable influence in negotations at the first formal ] conference, ].
Incidentally, between ] and ], ] the ] was held between ], ], and Stalin. The battle of Dnieper, along with other major offensives staged in 1943, certainly allowed Stalin to be in a dominant position to negotiate with his Allies.


== Casualties debate == == Casualties Debate ==


Casualties during the Battle of Dnieper are still a subject of a heavy debate. Some sources put very low figures (200,000 to 300,000 total casualties) which is much lower than the ] for instance. However, given the duration of the campaign and the huge area involved, more than one historian argues that the losses involved were huge, easily reaching or even surpassing those at the Battle of Stalingrad, but going "unnoticed" because of the big operation area (and of the aura of fame enveloping the latter). The death toll also depends on the time frame considered. It also depends whether the toll of the 1943 Smolensk battle, which was used as a kind of "]" for the Dnieper battle, is included in the Battle of Dnieper's statistics. Casualties during the Battle of the Dnieper are a subject of heavy debate and estimates vary widely. Some sources put the figures at 200,000 to 300,000 total casualties. Given the duration of the campaign and the huge area involved, more than one historian argues that the losses involved were huge, easily reaching or even surpassing those at the ], but going "unnoticed" due to that battle's aura of fame and the Dniepper conflict having been spread across such a vast ]. The numbers also depend on the time frame considered and whether statistics from the 1943 ] battle (which was used as a kind of ] by the Soviets to aid the Dnieper campaign) are included.


On the subject of Soviet casualties, Nikolaï Shefov in his ''Russian fights'' puts the figure of 373,000 ] and more than 1,500,000 total Soviet casualties. British historian, ] in his ''Russian fights'' puts Soviet casualties at 373,000 ] and more than 1,500,000 total casualties. British historian ] in his ''Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies'' puts Soviet KIA at 173,201 during a time frame of 26 September to 20 December 1943, hence not taking into account the period from 24 August to 26 September.
], in his ''Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies'', puts a figure of 173,201 USSR KIA, during a time frame from ] to ] 1943, therefore not taking into account the period going from ] to ]. Given the heavy German resistance even before Dnieper force-crossing, this figure seems a low estimate (Soviet sources estimate casualties from the post-Kursk offensive alone at 250,000 killed, wounded and captured), the figure of 300,000+ KIA seems quite correct and acceptable, with the ] number following the 3:1 empiric ratio.


Shefov and other Soviet/Russian historians quote German casualties as high as 1,500,000.
German losses, however, are more difficult to evaluate. The simple rule of 3:1 losses during an offensive operation against a heavily defended enemy would lead to a 500,000 casualties toll, reaching the one of Kursk. Shefov and other Soviet/Russian historians quote casualties as high as 1,500,000. Indeed, if one considers the casualties per day ratio of Kursk battle, an operation twice as long under similar conditions would lead to a 1,000,000 toll.


== References == == References ==
Line 140: Line 134:
* ''History of Great Patriotic War'', 1941 — 1945. Мoscow, 1963 * ''History of Great Patriotic War'', 1941 — 1945. Мoscow, 1963
* ], ''Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies'', Edinburgh University Press, 1994 * ], ''Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies'', Edinburgh University Press, 1994
* Marshal ], ''Notes of a front commander', Science, Moscow, 1972. * ], ''Notes of a front commander'', Science, Moscow, 1972.
* ], ''Lost Victories'', Мoscow, 1957. * ], ''Lost Victories'', Мoscow, 1957.


Revision as of 08:37, 2 May 2006

Battle of The Lower Dnieper
Part of World War II

Soviet soldiers crossing the Dnieper on self-made rafts.
Date24 August, 1943 — 23 December, 1943
LocationDnieper river, USSR
Result Decisive Soviet Victory
Belligerents
Axis Soviet Union
Commanders and leaders
Erich von Manstein Konstantin Rokossovsky,
Ivan Konev
Strength
1,250,000 men
12,600 guns
2,100 tanks
2,000 planes		 2,650,000 men
51,000 guns
2,400 tanks
2,850 planes
Casualties and losses
Low est.: 500,000+ killed and wounded
High est.: 1,250,000 killed and wounded		 300,000+ killed, 900,000+ wounded
Eastern Front
Naval warfare
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945

The World War II Battle of the Lower Dnieper of 1943 (also: Battle of the Dnieper, Battle for Dnieper, in Ukrainian: Битва за Днiпро, in Russian: Битва за Днепр) is considered to be one of the largest battles in world history, involving almost 4,000,000 men on both sides and stretching on a front 1400 kilometers wide. During a four-month campaign, Soviet troops liberated the left shore of the Dnieper River from German occupation, crossed it in force, and created several bridgeheads on the right shore, liberating Kiev as well.

It is also considered one of the bloodiest battles, with estimates ranging from 1,700,000 to 2,700,000 casualties on both sides. Since the area involved was huge, some historians do not consider it a discrete "battle", and grant the Battle of Stalingrad the title of the bloodiest battle in history.

Background

After the Battle of Kursk, the Wehrmacht's ability to regain the initiative on the Eastern Front (World WarII) was severely diminished. Its losses had been considerable and many of its best men had fallen in the Battle of Stalingrad. Despite considerable numbers, the Wehrmacht could only react and defend. Hitler ordered the construction of a series of fortifications to slow down the Red Army and demanded that the Wehrmacht defend its positions on the Dnieper at all costs.

On the Soviet side, Stalin was determined to pursue his liberation of occupied territories, begun earlier in the year. The Ukrainian industrial region was the first priority, since it was a densely populated area and its coal mines and other ores would provide precious resources for the Soviet Union. Therefore, the main axis of the attack was in a southerly direction; the northern regions were largely neglected in the Soviet offensive.

Start of the Soviet Offensive

German defensive setup

Map of the battle of the Dnieper and linked operations

Hitler's order to construct the Dnieper defense complex, known as the Ostwall or Eastern Wall was issued on 11 August 1943 and immediately executed. Fortifications were erected up and down the Dnieper, but with the Soviet Army's rapid advance this large undertaking could not be completed in time. The Eastern Wall was not uniform, but heaviest in areas where large Soviet crossings were most likely, such as near Kremenchug, Zaporizhzhia and Nikopol.

Additionally, on 7 September 1943, the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS forces were ordered to commence scorched earch tactics against the area they were retreating from to slow the Soviet advance and deny it supplies.

Offensive on the left shore

Main article: Battle of Ukraine (1943)

On 24 August 1943, the Soviet divisions began moving on a 1400 kilometer front stretching between Smolensk and the Azov Sea. The operation staged was huge, mobilizing 2,650,000 men, 51,000 guns, 2,400 tanks and 2,850 planes, and involving 5 fronts:

Overall, the operation was executed by 36 rifle armies, 4 Tank and 5 Air armies.

Despite a great superiority in numbers, the offensive was by no means easy. German opposition was ferocious and fights raged for every town and city. One tactic widely used by the Wehrmacht was to leave some troops in each city and on each hill to slow the Soviet offensive.

Three weeks after the start of the offensive, and despite heavy losses on the Soviet side, it became clear that the Wehrmacht could not contain the Soviets in the flat, open terrain of the steppes, where the Red Army's numerical strength would prevail. General Manstein asked for as many as 12 new divisions in hopes of containing the Soviet offensive – but German reserves were perilously thin. Years later, Manstein wrote in his memoirs:

After analysing this situation, I concluded that we can't keep the Donbass with the forces that we already possess, and that even a greater danger for the whole Eastern Front is being created on the north flank of the group. The 8th and 4th armies won't be able to contain the Soviet offensive for very long.

On 15 September 1943, Hitler ordered Army Group South to retreat to the Dnieper defense line.

The fight for the city of Poltava was especially bitter, having been well fortified and its garrison well prepared. After a few days of inconclusive urban warfare Marshal Konev bypassed the city and rushed towards the Dnieper, although the German garrison fell shortly after.

Towards the end of September 1943, Soviet forces reached the lower part of the Dnieper.

Airborne operation

In order to soften the defenses on Dnieper's right shore, the Soviet command decided to attempt a paradrop on the right shore. On 24 September 1943 the Dnieper airborne operation was launched. The Soviet paratroopers' objective was to secure a bridgehead until reinforcements could arrive.

The operation was an almost complete failure. Because pilots were completely unfamiliar with the area, the first wave of paratroopers was dropped on Soviet lines or in the Dnieper, while the second wave of 5,000 troops were scattered over several dozen square kilometers. Moreover, because of a poor reconnaissance that failed to spot German mechanized forces, most troops, lacking anti-tank weapons, were overwhelmed shortly after their landing. The others, having lost all radio link with their HQ, tried to attack German supply depots or join partisan forces.

Despite heavy losses, it is estimated that the Dnieper airborne operation, which attracted the attention of a significant number of German mechanized troops, allowed a Soviet crossing in better conditions. Nevertheless, after the failure of the Vyazma and Dnieper paradrops, the STAVKA refused to use massive airborne operations again.

Soviet Crossing of the Dnieper

Tactical considerations

Soviet soldiers preparing the rafts to cross the Dnieper (the sign reads "To Kiev!")...
File:Dnieper Forcing Raft1.jpg
...and crossing the river.

The Dnieper is the third largest river in Europe, second only to the Volga and the Danube. In its lower part, its width can easily reach 3 kilometers, and the fact that it was dammed in several places made it even larger. Moreover, its right shore — the one still to be retaken — was much higher and steeper than the left one and had been transformed into a vast complex of defenses and fortifications by the Wehrmacht.

The Soviet commanders were faced with two options. The first was to give themselves time to regroup their forces, find a weak point or two to exploit (not necessarily in the lower part of the Dnieper), stage a breakthrough and encircle the German defenders, rendering the defense line next to useless (similar to when German Panzers bypassed the Maginot line in 1940). This, however, would give the Germans time to get more reserves and futhermore, would expose Soviet troops to mechanized attacks on their flanks, every Soviet commander's nightmare since 1941. The second option was to stage a massive assault without waiting, and forge the Dnieper on a large front. This option left no additional time for the German defenders, but would lead to much larger casualties.

For political reasons, Stalin wanted Kiev to be retaken on 7 November). The second option was chosen.

The assault would be staged on a 300-kilometer front almost simultaneously. All available means of transport would be used to transport the attackers to the opposite shore, including small fishing boats and improvised rafts of barrels and trees (see photograph). The crucial issue would be transporting heavy equipment, without which the bridgeheads would not stand for long.

The crossing

File:Dnieper Forcing Boats.jpg
Soviet soldiers using small fishing boats to cross the Dnieper under enemy fire.

The first bridgehead on the Dnieper's right shore was established on 22 September 1943 at the confluence of the Dnieper and Pripyat rivers, in the northern part of the front. On 24 September, another bridgehead was created near Dneprodzerzhinsk, another on 25 September near Dnepropetrovsk and yet another on 28 September near Kremenchug. By the end of the month, 23 bridgeheads were created on the right shore, some of them 10 kilometers wide and 1-2 kilometers deep.

By all accounts, the crossing of the Dnieper can be described as an "attack rage". Soldiers used every available floating device to cross the river, under heavy German fire and taking heavy losses.

Soviet troops dug in to the clay ravines composing Dnieper's right shore.

Securing the bridgeheads

Soviet soldiers attacking on a bridgehead in October 1943.

German troops soon launched heavy counterattacks on almost every bridgehead, hoping to annihilate them before heavy equipment could be transported across the river.

The Borodaevsk bridgehead, mentioned by Marshal Konev in his memoires, was under a heavy armored and air assualt. Konev complained at once about a lack of organized air support and set up air patrols to prevent bombers from approaching the bridgeheads and ordered forward more artillery to counter tank attacks from the opposite shore. With improved air support and Katyusha rocket barrages, the situation began to improve and the bridgehead was eventually preserved.

Such heavy fighting was commonplace on every bridgehead, and while Soviet forces managed to preserve every one, most divisions were at only 25 to 50% of their nominal strength.

== Right Shore Campaign ==

The Wehrmacht fires across the Dnieper.

Lower Dnieper offensive

By mid-October, the forces accumulated on the lower Dnieper bridgeheads were strong enough to stage a massive attack to better secure the Dnieper's right shore in the southern part of the front. A vigorous attack was staged on the Kremenchug-Dnepropetrovsk line. Simultaneously, a major diversion was conducted further south to draw German forces away both from the Lower Dnieper and from Kiev.

At the end of the offensive, Soviet forces controlled a bridgehead that was in some places 300 kilometers wide and up to 80 kilometers deep. In the south, the Crimea was now cut off from the rest of the German forces.

Liberation of Kiev

Main article: Battle of Kiev (1943)

Criticism of Stalin's Tactics

Stalin's desire to retake Kiev before 7 November has raised criticism from some historians. A common historical perspective of the battle is that bridgeheads on the Lower Dnieper were deliberately "left alone" in order to draw German forces from Kiev, resulting in heavy Soviet losses.

Aftermath

The Battle of the Dnieper was another stinging defeat for the Wehrmacht. The Red Army, which Hitler hoped to contain at the Dnieper, broke through the Wehrmacht's defenses. Kiev was liberated and German troops lacked the forces needed to halt the Soviet advance across the Lower Dnieper. For the time being, the right shore was still largely in German possession, but General Manstein's counterattacks in late 1943 and early 1944 failed to turn the tide.

The Battle of the Dnieper demonstrated the strength of the Soviet partisan movement. The "rail war" operation staged during September and October 1943 struck German logistics very hard, creating heavy supply issues.

The Soviet advances during this period, along with other major advances during 1943 gained Stalin considerable influence in negotations at the first formal Allied conference, held in Teheran between 28 November and 1 December, 1943.

Casualties Debate

Casualties during the Battle of the Dnieper are a subject of heavy debate and estimates vary widely. Some sources put the figures at 200,000 to 300,000 total casualties. Given the duration of the campaign and the huge area involved, more than one historian argues that the losses involved were huge, easily reaching or even surpassing those at the Battle of Stalingrad, but going "unnoticed" due to that battle's aura of fame and the Dniepper conflict having been spread across such a vast area of operations. The numbers also depend on the time frame considered and whether statistics from the 1943 Smolensk battle (which was used as a kind of deceptive manoeuvre by the Soviets to aid the Dnieper campaign) are included.

Nikolai Shefov in his Russian fights puts Soviet casualties at 373,000 KIA and more than 1,500,000 total casualties. British historian John Erickson in his Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies puts Soviet KIA at 173,201 during a time frame of 26 September to 20 December 1943, hence not taking into account the period from 24 August to 26 September.

Shefov and other Soviet/Russian historians quote German casualties as high as 1,500,000.

References

  • Nikolai Shefov, Russian fights, Lib. Military History, Moscow, 2002
  • History of Great Patriotic War, 1941 — 1945. Мoscow, 1963
  • John Erickson, Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies, Edinburgh University Press, 1994
  • Marshal Konev, Notes of a front commander, Science, Moscow, 1972.
  • Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories, Мoscow, 1957.
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