Colonisation of Africa: Difference between revisions

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	=== "New Imperialism" (1880-1900) ===		=== "New Imperialism" (1880-1900) ===

			Until the dismissal of the aging Chancellor Bismarck by the pigheaded and belligerent Kaiser Wilhelm II, the expropriation of vast, unexplored areas of Asia and Africa by emerging imperial powers such as Italy and Germany and more-established empires such as Britain and France was nevertheless relatively orderly. The 1885 Congress of Berlin, initiated by Bismarck to establish international guidelines for the acquisition of African territory, formalized this new phase in the history of Western imperialism. Between the Franco-Prussian War and the Great War (the age of New Imperialism), Europe added almost 9 million square miles—one-fifth of the land area of the globe—to its overseas colonial possessions.
	Amalgamation of industrial cartels in the era of finance capitalism, in the forms of larger corporations and mergers and alliances of separate firms, and technological advancement during the Second Industrial Revolution, particularly the increased utilization of electric power and internal combustion engines fueled by coal and petroleum, were mixed blessings for British business during the late Victorian era. The ensuing development of more intricate and efficient machines along with monopolistic mass-production greatly expanded output and lowered production costs. As a result, production often exceeded domestic demand. Among the new conditions, more markedly evident in Britain, the forerunner of Europe’s industrial states, were the long-term effects of the severe ‘Long Depression’ of 1873-96, which had followed fifteen years of great economic instability. Business after 1873 in practically every industry suffered from lengthy periods of low—and falling—profit rates and price deflation .

			Since the “Scramble for Africa’ was the predominate feature of New Imperialism and formal empire, opponents of Hobson’s accumulation theory often point to frequent cases when military and bureaucratic costs of occupation exceeded financial returns. In Africa (exclusive of South Africa) the amount of capital investment by Europeans was relatively small before and after the 1885 Congress of Berlin, and the companies involved in tropical African commerce were small and politically insignificant, exerting only a tiny influence on domestic politics. First, this observation might detract from the pro-imperialist arguments of Leopold II, Francesco Crispi, and Jules Ferry, but Hobson argued against imperialism from a slightly different standpoint. He concluded that finance was manipulating events to its own profit, but often against broader national interests. Second, any such statistics only obscure the fact that African formal control of tropical Africa had strategic implications in an era of feasible inter-capitalist competition, particularly for Britain, which was under intense economic and thus political pressure to secure lucrative markets such as India, China, and Latin America. In Britain’s case this process of capitalist diffusion had in many regions led it to acquire colonies in the interests of commercial security; France and Germany would later follow suit. For example, although the then inconspicuously moribund Czarist Empire proved to be little treat to Great Britain following its stunning defeat in the 1905 Russo-Japanese War, British Conservatives in particular feared that Russia would continue to usurp Ottoman territory and acquire a port on the Mediterranean or even Constantinople—a long touted goal of Orthodoxy. These fears became especially pronounced following the 1869 completion of the near-by Suez Canal, prompting the official rationale behind Disraeli’s purchase of the waterway. The close proximity of the Czar’s (territorially) expanding empire in Central Asia to India also terrified Lord Curzon, thus triggering the Afghan Wars. Rhodes and Milner also advocated the prospect of a “Cape to Cairo” empire, which would link by rail the extrinsically important canal to the intrinsically mineral and diamond rich South, from a strategic standpoint. Though hampered by German conquest of Tanganyika until the end of the Great War, Rhodes successfully lobbied on behalf of such a sprawling East African empire.
	Some powerful industrial lobbies and government leaders in Britain, such as Joseph Chamberlain, concluded that that profits were falling because too many manufactures and too much capital were chasing too few markets. In such overseas markets, whether in colonial areas or in nominally sovereign, pre-industrial states outside Western Europe, with their cheep labor, limited competition, and abundant raw materials, a greater premium was often possible for investments of such surplus capital.

			Formal colonies were often, in hindsight, strategic outposts to protect large zones of ‘investment’, such as India, Latin America, and China. Britain, in as sense, continued to adhere to the Cobdenite notion that informal colonialism was preferable—the established consensus among industrial capitalists during the age of Pax Britannica between the downfall of Napoleon and the Franco-Prussian War. What changed since the Disraeli’s Crystal Palace Speech was not necessarily a preference for colonialism over informal empire, but the attitude toward formal rule in largely tropical areas once considered too ‘backward’ for trade. Sovereign areas already hospitable to informal empire largely avoided formal rule during the shift to New Imperialism. China, for instance, was not a backward country unable to secure the prerequisite stability and security for western-style commerce, but a highly advanced empire unwilling to admit western (often drug-pushing) commerce, which may explain the West’s contentment with informal ‘Spheres of Influences’. China, unlike tropical Africa, was a securable market without formal control. Following the First Opium War, British commerce, and later capital invested by other newly industrializing powers, was securable with a smaller degree of formal control than in Southeast Asia, West Africa, and the Pacific . But in many respects, China was a colony and a large-scale receptacle of Western capital investments. Western powers did intervene military there to quell domestic chaos, such as the horrific Taiping Rebellion and the anti-imperialist Boxer Rebellion. For example, General Gordon, later the imperialist ‘martyr’ in the Sudan, is often accredited as having saved the Manchu dynasty from the Taiping insurrection.
	But unfortunately for Britain, as the Long Depression had bred longstanding fears regarding economic decline and the emergent strength of trade unionism and socialism, Europe descended into an era of aggressive national rivalry with newly industrializing nation-states that were merely securing colonies before they strictly professed to needing them. German imperialists, for instance, argued that Britain’s world power position gave the British unfair advantages on international markets, thus limiting Germany’s economic growth and threatening its security . Their reasoning was that markets might soon become glutted, and a nation’s economic survival depend on its being able to offload its surplus products elsewhere. British reactionaries hence concluded that formal that formal imperialism was necessary for Britain because of the relative decline of the British share of the world’s export trade and the rise of German, American, and French economic competition.

			Formal empire in Sub-Saharan Africa, the last vast region of the world largely untouched by ‘informal imperialism’ and “civilization”, was also attractive to Europe’s ruling elites for other potential reasons. First, insofar as the “Dark Continent” was agricultural or extractive, and no longer ‘stagnant’ since its integration with the world’s interdependent capitalist economy, it required more capital for development that it could provide itself . Second, during a time when in nearly every year since the 1813 liberalization of trade onward Britain’s balance of trade showed a deficit, and a time of shrinking and increasingly protectionist continental markets, Africa offered Britain an open market that would garner it a trade surplus—a market that bought more from the metropole than it sold overall . Britain, like most other industrial countries, had long since begun to run an unfavorable balance of trade (which was increasingly offset, however, by the income from overseas investments). As perhaps the world’s first post-industrial nation, financial services became an increasingly more important sector of its economy. Invisible financial exports, as mentioned, kept Britain out of the red, especially capital investments outside Europe, particularly to the developing and open markets in Africa, predominately white ‘settler colonies’, the Middle East, the Indian Subcontinent, Southeast Asia, and the South Pacific .

	Continental political developments in the late nineteenth century also rendered such an imperial competition feasible. The decline of Pax Britannica, glaring after the Franco-Prussian War, was made possible by recent changes in the European and world economies and in the continental balance of power, such as the breakdown of the Concert of Europe and the consequent establishment of nation-states in Germany and Italy. Protectionism and formal empire, characteristic of an era neo-mercantilism during the age of New Imperialism, thus became the major tool of ‘semi-peripheral’, newly industrialized states, such as Germany, seeking to usurp Britain’s position at the ‘core’ of the global capitalist system . In Britain, a strategically minded and opportunistic Disraeli, thus ushered in this age of empire for empire’s sake in reaction to both depression at home and a shifting balance of power on the Continent with his watershed Crystal Palace Speech of 1873.

	The Age of Imperialism, to an extent, was the by-product of an undisputable flight of capital. Imperialism, in a sense, heralded a consistent, but gradual internationalization of economic connections from what contemporary World Systems Theorists, Dependency Theorists, and neo-Marxists would call the ‘core’ of the industrial countries to an overseas ‘periphery’. New Imperialism, in a sense, was one way of capturing new overseas markets. By the eve of the Great War, Europe, for instance, represented the largest share (27 percent) of the global ‘zones of investment’, followed by North America (24 percent), Latin America (19 percent), Asia (16 percent), Africa (9 percent), and Oceania (5 percent) for all industrial powers. Britain, the forerunner of Europe’s capitalist powers, however, was clearly the chief world investor, though the direction of its investments underwent a striking change, becoming oriented less toward Europe, the United States, and India, and more toward the rest of the Commonwealth and Latin America. Formal imperialism was often a last resort—an attempt to subjugate new markets in largely tropical areas, largely organized according to seasonal patterns and not wage productivity, where informal control was relatively difficult. Hobson observed this during the Boer War, concluding “It is not indeed necessary to own a country in order to do trade with it or to invest capital in it.” Such theory is justified when one considers this broader movement of European capital from domestic markets and to other industrial states or overseas in self-governing settler colonies and nominally sovereign states in Asia and Latin America, aside from formal colonies. Imperialism, in a sense, does not merely refer to the appropriation by the western nations of vast expanses of Asia and Africa. New Imperialism was just one means of many of securing overseas markets.

	Here is a list of the partition of Africa from the years 1885 to 1914; it shows the colonies as they were known then and who ruled them:		Here is a list of the partition of Africa from the years 1885 to 1914; it shows the colonies as they were known then and who ruled them:

Revision as of 20:07, 21 December 2002

Ancient colonization

North Africa in particular experienced colonization from Europe and Asia Minor in the early historical period.

The city of Carthage was established in what is now Tunisia by Phoenician colonists, becoming a major power in the Mediterranean by the 4th century BC. Over time the city changed hands, falling to the Romans after the Third Punic War, where it served as the capital city of the Roman's African province. Gothic Vandals briefly established a kingdom there in the 5th century, which shortly thereafter fell to the Romans again, this time the Byzantines. The Ancient Egyptian civilization also fell under the sway of the Greeks, later passing to the Romans. The whole of Roman/Byzantine North Africa eventually fell to the Arabs in the 7th century, who brought the Islamic religion and Arabic language (see History of Islam).

Early modern period

(Insert post-7th century, pre-1880 information here.)

"New Imperialism" (1880-1900)

Until the dismissal of the aging Chancellor Bismarck by the pigheaded and belligerent Kaiser Wilhelm II, the expropriation of vast, unexplored areas of Asia and Africa by emerging imperial powers such as Italy and Germany and more-established empires such as Britain and France was nevertheless relatively orderly. The 1885 Congress of Berlin, initiated by Bismarck to establish international guidelines for the acquisition of African territory, formalized this new phase in the history of Western imperialism. Between the Franco-Prussian War and the Great War (the age of New Imperialism), Europe added almost 9 million square miles—one-fifth of the land area of the globe—to its overseas colonial possessions.

Since the “Scramble for Africa’ was the predominate feature of New Imperialism and formal empire, opponents of Hobson’s accumulation theory often point to frequent cases when military and bureaucratic costs of occupation exceeded financial returns. In Africa (exclusive of South Africa) the amount of capital investment by Europeans was relatively small before and after the 1885 Congress of Berlin, and the companies involved in tropical African commerce were small and politically insignificant, exerting only a tiny influence on domestic politics. First, this observation might detract from the pro-imperialist arguments of Leopold II, Francesco Crispi, and Jules Ferry, but Hobson argued against imperialism from a slightly different standpoint. He concluded that finance was manipulating events to its own profit, but often against broader national interests. Second, any such statistics only obscure the fact that African formal control of tropical Africa had strategic implications in an era of feasible inter-capitalist competition, particularly for Britain, which was under intense economic and thus political pressure to secure lucrative markets such as India, China, and Latin America. In Britain’s case this process of capitalist diffusion had in many regions led it to acquire colonies in the interests of commercial security; France and Germany would later follow suit. For example, although the then inconspicuously moribund Czarist Empire proved to be little treat to Great Britain following its stunning defeat in the 1905 Russo-Japanese War, British Conservatives in particular feared that Russia would continue to usurp Ottoman territory and acquire a port on the Mediterranean or even Constantinople—a long touted goal of Orthodoxy. These fears became especially pronounced following the 1869 completion of the near-by Suez Canal, prompting the official rationale behind Disraeli’s purchase of the waterway. The close proximity of the Czar’s (territorially) expanding empire in Central Asia to India also terrified Lord Curzon, thus triggering the Afghan Wars. Rhodes and Milner also advocated the prospect of a “Cape to Cairo” empire, which would link by rail the extrinsically important canal to the intrinsically mineral and diamond rich South, from a strategic standpoint. Though hampered by German conquest of Tanganyika until the end of the Great War, Rhodes successfully lobbied on behalf of such a sprawling East African empire.

Formal colonies were often, in hindsight, strategic outposts to protect large zones of ‘investment’, such as India, Latin America, and China. Britain, in as sense, continued to adhere to the Cobdenite notion that informal colonialism was preferable—the established consensus among industrial capitalists during the age of Pax Britannica between the downfall of Napoleon and the Franco-Prussian War. What changed since the Disraeli’s Crystal Palace Speech was not necessarily a preference for colonialism over informal empire, but the attitude toward formal rule in largely tropical areas once considered too ‘backward’ for trade. Sovereign areas already hospitable to informal empire largely avoided formal rule during the shift to New Imperialism. China, for instance, was not a backward country unable to secure the prerequisite stability and security for western-style commerce, but a highly advanced empire unwilling to admit western (often drug-pushing) commerce, which may explain the West’s contentment with informal ‘Spheres of Influences’. China, unlike tropical Africa, was a securable market without formal control. Following the First Opium War, British commerce, and later capital invested by other newly industrializing powers, was securable with a smaller degree of formal control than in Southeast Asia, West Africa, and the Pacific . But in many respects, China was a colony and a large-scale receptacle of Western capital investments. Western powers did intervene military there to quell domestic chaos, such as the horrific Taiping Rebellion and the anti-imperialist Boxer Rebellion. For example, General Gordon, later the imperialist ‘martyr’ in the Sudan, is often accredited as having saved the Manchu dynasty from the Taiping insurrection.

Formal empire in Sub-Saharan Africa, the last vast region of the world largely untouched by ‘informal imperialism’ and “civilization”, was also attractive to Europe’s ruling elites for other potential reasons. First, insofar as the “Dark Continent” was agricultural or extractive, and no longer ‘stagnant’ since its integration with the world’s interdependent capitalist economy, it required more capital for development that it could provide itself . Second, during a time when in nearly every year since the 1813 liberalization of trade onward Britain’s balance of trade showed a deficit, and a time of shrinking and increasingly protectionist continental markets, Africa offered Britain an open market that would garner it a trade surplus—a market that bought more from the metropole than it sold overall . Britain, like most other industrial countries, had long since begun to run an unfavorable balance of trade (which was increasingly offset, however, by the income from overseas investments). As perhaps the world’s first post-industrial nation, financial services became an increasingly more important sector of its economy. Invisible financial exports, as mentioned, kept Britain out of the red, especially capital investments outside Europe, particularly to the developing and open markets in Africa, predominately white ‘settler colonies’, the Middle East, the Indian Subcontinent, Southeast Asia, and the South Pacific .

Here is a list of the partition of Africa from the years 1885 to 1914; it shows the colonies as they were known then and who ruled them:

British

The British were primarily interested in maintaining secure communication lines to India, which led to initial interest in Egypt and South Africa. Once these two areas were secure, it was the intent of British colonialists such as Cecil Rhodes to establish a Cape to Cairo railway.