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'''Physical determinism''' is a position in ] that holds that all ''physical'' events occur as described by ''physical'' laws.<ref name=Bishop/> A narrower definition states that physical determinism holds that a complete description of the ''physical'' state of the world at any given time and a complete statement of the ''physical'' laws of nature together entail every truth as to what ''physical'' events happen after that time.<ref name=Ginet/> The emphasis upon a particular time in the last definition may be too specific to encompass all forms of physical determinism and, as is discussed below, a broader view requires only that events be logically connected by a physical theory. '''Physical determinism''' generally refers to the assertion of a ] ] (greater ]).<ref name="Papineau2002">{{cite book|author=David Papineau|title=Thinking About Consciousness|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=N__qpV4e9-sC|accessdate=6 February 2013|year=2002|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-924382-2|page=240}}</ref><ref name=stanfordcausaldeterminism>{{cite encyclopedia|last=Hoefer |first=Carl |editor=Edward N. Zalta | title=Causal Determinism | encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009 edition) |date=Apr 1, 2008 |editor=Edward N. Zalta, ed |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/determinism-causal/}} See also {{cite book|author=Popper, K| name=Of Clouds and Cuckoos, included in Objective Knowledge|date=1978|page=p212|quote=Newton himself may be counted among the few dissenters, for he regarded the solar system as ''imperfect'', and consequently as likely to perish (citing, Henry Pemberton's ''A View of Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophy)}}</ref> Physical determinism holds that a complete description of the ''physical'' state of the world at any given time and a complete statement of the ''physical'' laws of nature together entail every truth as to what ''physical'' events happen after that time.<ref name=Ginet /> Physical determinism is therefore synonymous for ], that all future events are governed by the past or present according to all-encompassing deterministic laws.<ref name=Horst />


Physical determinism has also been considered more broadly as a position in ], in which all ''physical'' events occur as described by ''physical'' laws, but this definition is at odds with the definition of ] (which is only the opposite of physical determinism in its common sense above).<ref name=Bishop />
Sometimes the restrictions to ''physical'' events and ''physical'' laws are ignored, and physical determinism is used as a synonym for ], that all future events are governed by the past or present according to all-encompassing deterministic laws.<ref name=Horst/> However, in this article this practice is avoided.

These definitions leave open just what "physical" might include. So, for example, one could limit the scope of ''physical determinism'' as:
{{quote|"Physical determinism might be a concept only relevant to the mathematical models of physics and other physical sciences, although its relevance to the world of everyday choice and action is questionable...if thoughts, feelings, and desires are not physical events, it is unlikely that physical theories are appropriate models for thinking about such nonphysical events."<ref name=Bishop/>|Robert C. Bishop |Chaos, indeterminism, and free will, p. 84}}

These limitations of physical determinism can be expressed in terms of its origin in a third-person perspective, from which "thoughts, feelings, and desires are not physical events":
{{quote|"Epistemically, the mind is determined by mental states, which are accessible in First-Person Perspective. In contrast, the brain, as characterized by neuronal states, can be accessed in Third-Person Perspective. The Third-Person Perspective focuses on other persons and thus on the neuronal states of others' brain while excluding the own brain. In contrast, the First-Person Perspective could potentially provide epistemic access to own brain...However, the First-Person Perspective provides access only to the own mental states but not to the own brain and its neuronal states."
<ref name=Northoff/>|Georg Northoff |''Philosophy of the Brain: The Brain Problem'', p. 5 }}


==Causal completeness== ==Causal completeness==
{{See also|Causal closure}} {{See also|Causal closure}}
The scope of physical determinism is related to the question of the ''causal completeness'' of science, the idea that every real event has a scientific explanation, that science need not search for explanations beyond itself.<ref name=Sarkar/> If causal completeness does not apply to ''everything'' in the universe, then the door is open to events that are not subject to physical determinism.<ref name=Atmanspacher/> For example, a common view of mental events is that they are an ] only correlated with neurological activity, and without causal impact. For more detail, see the article on ]. However, a failure of physical determinism would allow room for their causal significance. Physical determinism is related to the question of ''causal completeness'' of science, the idea that every real event has a scientific explanation, that science need not search for explanations beyond itself.<ref name=Sarkar/> If causal completeness does not apply to ''everything'' in the universe, then the door is open to events that are not subject to physical determinism (see causal closure below).<ref name=Atmanspacher/> For example, a relatively common view of mental events is that they are an ] produced as a by-product of neurological activity, and without ]. In this case, only a failure of physical determinism would allow room for their causal significance.

The scope of physical determinism is also related to the question of ''causal closure'', the idea that no physical event has a cause outside the physical domain. The notion of causal completeness (physical system integrity) has been claimed to be maintainable even when rejecting causal closure if the physical system is ].<ref name="CSLewis1">{{Cite book| author=Lewis, C.S. | title=Miracles | year=1947| page=24| isbn=0-688-17369-1}}</ref>


==Other theories==
A more careful formulation of physical determinism skirts the issue of causal completeness. It is based upon connections between 'events' supplied by a theory: A peculiar formulation of physical determinism skirts the issue of causal completeness. It is based upon connections between 'events' supplied by a theory:
{{quote| "a theory is deterministic if, and only if, given its state variables for some initial period, the theory logically determines a unique set of values for those variables for any other period."<ref name=Nagel/>|Ernest Nagel|''Alternative descriptions of physical state'' p. 292 }} {{quote| "a theory is deterministic if, and only if, given its state variables for some initial period, the theory logically determines a unique set of values for those variables for any other period."<ref name=Nagel/>|Ernest Nagel|''Alternative descriptions of physical state'' p. 292 }}
This quote replaces the idea of 'cause-and-effect' with that of 'logical implication' according to one or another theory that connects events. In addition, an 'event' is related by the theory itself to formalized ''states'' described using the parameters defined by that theory. Thus, the details of interpretation are placed where they belong, fitted to the context in which the chosen theory applies. Using the definition of physical determinism above, the limitations of a theory to some particular domain of experience also limits the associated definition of 'physical determinism' to that same domain. That limitation leaves open the question whether there is a physical "]" waiting to be invented. This quote replaces the idea of 'cause-and-effect' with that of 'logical implication' according to one or another theory that connects events. In addition, an 'event' is related by the theory itself to formalized ''states'' described using the parameters defined by that theory. Thus, the details of interpretation are placed where they belong, fitted to the context in which the chosen theory applies. Using the definition of physical determinism above, the limitations of a theory to some particular domain of experience also limits the associated definition of 'physical determinism' to that same domain. That limitation leaves open the question whether there is a physical "]" waiting to be invented.

==Popper's three worlds==
A much more general reservation about the scope of physical determinism stems from the formulation of ]. ] split the world into three categories:<ref name=Popper/>

* World 1: the world of physical ]s and ]s, including ] entities
* World 2: the mental or psychological world, the world of our feelings of pain and of pleasure, of our thoughts, of our decisions, of our perceptions and our observations; in other words, the world of mental or psychological states or processes, or of subjective experiences.
* World 3: the world of products of the human mind, including art, science, and religion.

World 3 includes physical theory as a particular case. But World 3 is a creation of the human imagination, and such acts of imagination are a part of World 2. Accordingly, one could argue that physical determinism is a child of the imagination, and although physical determinism has its successes in describing World 1, it may not apply to World 2 or World 3. The subjective aspects of theories contained in World 3 are not readily framed within the third-person perspective of science used to explain World 1. These subjective aspects, including those pointed out by ] and many others,<ref name=Kuhn/> are described in the article ].


==See also== ==See also==
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<ref name=Horst> <ref name=Horst>
{{cite book |title=Laws, Mind, and Free Will |author=Steven W Horst |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=B58sSJy0eN0C&pg=PA98 |page=98 |isbn= 0262015250 |year=2011 |publisher=MIT Press}} {{cite book |title=Laws, Mind, and Free Will |author=Steven W Horst |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=B58sSJy0eN0C&pg=PA98 |page=98 |isbn= 0262015250 |year=2011 |publisher=MIT Press}}
</ref>

<ref name=Kuhn>
One of his discussions is reprinted in {{cite book |title=The Road since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 1970-1993, |author=Thomas S Kuhn |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=sXufWLnPp94C&pg=PA208 |pages=208 ''ff'' |chapter=Chapter 9: Rationality and Theory Choice |editor=James Conant, John Haugeland, eds |edition=2nd |publisher=University of Chicago Press |isbn=0226457990}}
</ref> </ref>


<ref name=Nagel> <ref name=Nagel>
{{cite book |title=The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation |author=Ernest Nagel |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=u6EycHgRfkQC&pg=PA285 |pages =285-292 |chapter=§V: Alternative descriptions of physical state |isbn=0915144719 |year=1999 |publisher=Hackett |edition=2nd }} {{cite book |title=The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation |author=Ernest Nagel |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=u6EycHgRfkQC&pg=PA285 |pages =285-292 |chapter=§V: Alternative descriptions of physical state |isbn=0915144719 |year=1999 |publisher=Hackett |edition=2nd }}
</ref>

<ref name=Northoff>
What Northoff calls the ''epistemic mind problem'' is described in {{cite book |title=Philosophy of the Brain: The Brain Problem |author=Georg Northoff |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=CJq4QDixIg0C&pg=PT11 |chapter=Chapter 1: The brain problem |publisher=John Benjamins Publishing |isbn=1588114171 |year=2004 |edition=Volume 52 of Advances in Consciousness Research}}
</ref>

<ref name=Popper>
{{cite web |title=Three Worlds|author=Karl Popper |date=April 7, 1978 |work=The Tanner lectures on human values |url=http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/documents/popper80.pdf |publisher=The University of Utah |accessdate=2013-01-24}} The list of lectures is found in the .
</ref> </ref>


Revision as of 03:31, 6 February 2013

Physical determinism generally refers to the assertion of a deterministic physical universe (greater physical system). Physical determinism holds that a complete description of the physical state of the world at any given time and a complete statement of the physical laws of nature together entail every truth as to what physical events happen after that time. Physical determinism is therefore synonymous for nomological determinism, that all future events are governed by the past or present according to all-encompassing deterministic laws.

Physical determinism has also been considered more broadly as a position in philosophy, in which all physical events occur as described by physical laws, but this definition is at odds with the definition of physical indeterminism (which is only the opposite of physical determinism in its common sense above).

Causal completeness

See also: Causal closure

Physical determinism is related to the question of causal completeness of science, the idea that every real event has a scientific explanation, that science need not search for explanations beyond itself. If causal completeness does not apply to everything in the universe, then the door is open to events that are not subject to physical determinism (see causal closure below). For example, a relatively common view of mental events is that they are an epiphenomenon produced as a by-product of neurological activity, and without causal impact. In this case, only a failure of physical determinism would allow room for their causal significance.

The scope of physical determinism is also related to the question of causal closure, the idea that no physical event has a cause outside the physical domain. The notion of causal completeness (physical system integrity) has been claimed to be maintainable even when rejecting causal closure if the physical system is indeterministic.

Other theories

A peculiar formulation of physical determinism skirts the issue of causal completeness. It is based upon connections between 'events' supplied by a theory:

"a theory is deterministic if, and only if, given its state variables for some initial period, the theory logically determines a unique set of values for those variables for any other period."

— Ernest Nagel, Alternative descriptions of physical state p. 292

This quote replaces the idea of 'cause-and-effect' with that of 'logical implication' according to one or another theory that connects events. In addition, an 'event' is related by the theory itself to formalized states described using the parameters defined by that theory. Thus, the details of interpretation are placed where they belong, fitted to the context in which the chosen theory applies. Using the definition of physical determinism above, the limitations of a theory to some particular domain of experience also limits the associated definition of 'physical determinism' to that same domain. That limitation leaves open the question whether there is a physical "theory of everything" waiting to be invented.

See also

References

  1. David Papineau (2002). Thinking About Consciousness. Oxford University Press. p. 240. ISBN 978-0-19-924382-2. Retrieved 6 February 2013.
  2. Hoefer, Carl (Apr 1, 2008). "Causal Determinism". In Edward N. Zalta, ed (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009 edition). {{cite encyclopedia}}: |editor= has generic name (help) See also Popper, K (1978). p. p212. Newton himself may be counted among the few dissenters, for he regarded the solar system as imperfect, and consequently as likely to perish (citing, Henry Pemberton's A View of Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophy) {{cite book}}: |page= has extra text (help); Missing or empty |title= (help); Unknown parameter |name= ignored (help)
  3. This definition is from Carl Ginet (1990). On Action. Cambridge University Press. p. 92. ISBN 052138818X.
  4. Steven W Horst (2011). Laws, Mind, and Free Will. MIT Press. p. 98. ISBN 0262015250.
  5. Robert C Bishop (2011). "Chapter 4: Chaos, indeterminism, and free will". In Robert Kane, ed (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Free Will: Second Edition (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press. p. 84. ISBN 0195399692. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)
  6. See for example, Sahotra Sarkar, Jessica Pfeifer (2006). "Physicalism: The causal impact argument". The Philosophy of Science: N-Z, Index. Taylor & Francis. p. 566. ISBN 041597710X.
  7. Robert C Bishop, Harald Atmanspacher (2011). "Chapter 5: The causal closure of physics and free will". In Robert Kane, ed (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Free Will: Second Edition (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press. p. 101. ISBN 0195399692. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)
  8. Lewis, C.S. (1947). Miracles. p. 24. ISBN 0-688-17369-1.
  9. Ernest Nagel (1999). "§V: Alternative descriptions of physical state". The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation (2nd ed.). Hackett. pp. 285–292. ISBN 0915144719.
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