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The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Template:Lang-ua) was a Ukrainian guerrilla army formed on October 14, 1942, in Volhynia. The UPA was the military branch of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. The main goal of the UPA was an independent Ukraine. Its leaders were Roman Shukhevych and Stepan Bandera.
The UPA fought a broad spectrum of military forces in the area: the German Wehrmacht, the Polish Armia Krajowa and the Soviet Red Army. After World War II, UPA partisan units continued fighting the Soviet Union and communist Poland until the early 1950s, especially in Carpathian Mountains regions. It was unique among practically all resistance movements in Nazi-occupied Europe in that it had no significant foreign support, making its growth and strength an indication of its popularity among the Ukrainian people.
UPA's struggle against Germany
UPA was formed in late 1942 for three reasons: in order to serve as a foundation for a Ukrainian army; in response to the needs of Ukrainian villagers who demanded protection against German repression; and in order to prevent Soviet partisans who had begun penetrating into northwestern Ukraine from assuming the role of the people's protector. During this struggle it grew in size and its activities increased in scope to cover much of western Ukraine, and were able to send small groups of raiders deep into eastern Ukraine. German estimates stated that UPA had up to 100,000 soldiers (other estimates are as low as 35,000 and as high as 200,000), and they conducted hundreds of raids on German police stations and military convoys. By late 1943 and early 1944, UPA controlled much of the territory in Volyn outside of the major cities, and was able to organize basic services for the villagers such as schools, hospitals, and the printing of newspapers. In the region of Zhitomir, for example, Ukrainian fighters were estimated by the German General-Kommisar Leyser to be in control of 80% of the forests and 60% of the farmland.
The Carpathian mountains saw some of the heaviest fighting between UPA and German forces in late 1943 and early 1944, as the UPA struggled to maintain control over several of the mountain passes. In November 1943, UPA battle groups Black Forest and Makivka defeated 12 German battalions supported by the German airforce, in a battle over control of UPA-held territory. In May and July 1944, two more attempts by the Germans to capture Carpathian mountain passes were repulsed. The latter victory involved the defeat of two German divisions supported by artillery. On July 26, 1944, near the village of Nedilna, the UPA defeated another German division, and captured its entire supply column, including many officers and soldiers.
In a debriefing before U.S. authorities in 1948, a Committee of former German commanders on the Eastern front claimed that "the Ukrainian Nationalist movement formed the strongest partisan movement in the East, with the exception of the Russian Communists."
UPA's struggle against Soviet forces
UPA's struggle against Soviet forces began when they encountered Soviet partisans in late 1942 and early 1943. In early 1943, the famous Communist partisan leader Sydir Kovpak established himself in Ukraine and in the summer of 1943, well-armed with supplies delivered to secret airfields and with several thousand soldiers (only one third of whom were ethnic Ukrainians) , launched a raid deep into the Carpathians. Attacks by the German air force and military forced Kovpak to break up his force into smaller units, which were mostly destroyed by UPA in the Carpathian mountains. During this time, famous Soviet intelligence agent Nikolai Kuznetsov was captured and executed by UPA.
UPA began fighting Soviet military units when they appeared on its territory as the Soviet Army advanced into western Ukraine. UPA tried to avoid clashes with the regular units of the Soviet military because many of them were ethnic Ukrainians and were seen as a source of recruits into UPA. Instead, UPA focused its energy on NKVD units and Soviet officials of all levels, from high rank NKVD and military officers to the school teachers and postal workers attempting to establish Soviet control over Ukraine after the front line had passed. UPA also disrupted Soviet efforts at collectivization. In March 1944, UPA insurgents ambushed and killed Nikolai Vatutin, the famous commander of the Battle of Kursk, who led the liberation of Kiev. Several weeks later an NKVD battalion was annihilated by UPA near Rivne, beginning the full-scale struggle in the summer of 1944, involving 30,000 Soviet troops against UPA in Volyn that, despite heavy casualties on both sides, was inconclusive. As late as summer 1945, many battalion-size UPA units continued to control and administer large areas of territory in western Ukraine.
In November 1944, Khrushchev launched the first of several large-scale Soviet assaults on UPA throughout western Ukraine, involving at least 20 NKVD combat divisions supported by artillery and armored units. They blockaded villages and roads and set parts of the forests on fire; NKVD units dressed as UPA soldiers and committed atrocities in order to demoralize the civilian population. Areas of UPA activity were depopulated. An estimated 500,000 Ukrainians were sent to the North between 1946 and 1949. Although the Soviets failed to wipe out UPA, heavy casualties forced UPA to split into small units consisting of 100 soldiers, and many of the troops demobilized and returned home. For this reason, by 1946, UPA was reduced to a a core group of 5-10 thousand fighters, and large-scale UPA activity shifted to the Soviet-Polish border, where in 1947 they have been accused of killing general Karol Świerczewski. During the latter phase of its struggle, UPA obtained help from the CIA and British intelligence, although the operation was betrayed by Kim Philby. Only in 1947-1948 was UPA resistance broken enough to allow the Soviets to implement large-scale collectivization throughout western Ukraine. Sporadic UPA raids continued until the mid 1950's, and UPA's leader, general Roman Shukhevych, was killed in an ambush near Lviv in March 1950.
Metropolitan Oleksiy (Hromadsky) of the Ukrainian Autonomous Orthodox Church was also killed by UPA insurgents, as was pro-Soviet writer Yaroslav Halan.
UPA and the destruction of Western Ukraine's Polish community
The UPA strove to remove Poles from areas that it regarded as indigenously Ukrainian, and often succeeded. Most estimates have put the Polish death toll between 35,000 and 60,000 in Volhyn alone (see Massacre of Poles in Volhynia for more details). Many historians, particularly in Poland, use the term genocide or ethnic cleansing to denote the events; some estimates of all Polish dead in Ukraine run as high as 100,000 or even 500,000.
The UPA's activities are sometimes seen as a response to actions of the inter-war Polish government, which sought to limit the number of Ukrainian institutions in the same areas, often regarded as indigenously Polish. However, the scope of such actions, although unquestionably anti-Ukrainian, was mostly limited to cultural suppression, such as closing Ukrainian-language schools and shutting down Ukrainian churches.
Retaliation by Polish Home Army forces resulted in the deaths of 10,00 to 60,000 Ukrainian civilians; the exact number is not documented.
Aftermath
During the Soviet years, UPA was officially mentioned only in negative terms, and was considered to have been a terrorist organization. After Ukraine gained independence in 1991, former UPA members struggled for official recognition as legitimate combatants, with the accompanying pensions and benefits due to war veterans. They have also striven to hold parades and commemorations of their own, especially in Western Ukraine. This, in turn, led to opposition from the Ukrainian veterans of the Soviet Army, and disapproval from the Russian government too. So far the attempts to reconcile the two groups of veterans have made little progress. An attempt to hold a joint parade in Kiev in May, 2005, to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II, proved unsuccessful. The assessment of the historical role of UPA remains a controversial issue in Ukrainian society, although Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko joined several public Ukrainian organizations in calls for reconciliation, pensions, and other benefits for UPA veterans that would equate them in status with the veterans of the Soviet Army, and aid the understanding of their role in the chaotic times of UPA operations.
Recently, attempts to reconcile former Armia Krajowa and UPA soldiers have been made by both the Ukrainian and Polish sides. Individual former members UPA have expressed their readiness for mutual apology . Some of the past soldiers of both organisations have met and asked for forgiveness for the past misdeeds. Restoration of graves and cementeries in Poland, where fallen UPA soldiers were placed have been agreed to by the Polish side.
See also
- Massacre of Poles in Volhynia
- 14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS Galizien (1st Ukrainian)
- Galicia (Central Europe)
- Operation Wisła
- Ukrainian Military Organization, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists
References
- Inline
- ^ Subtelny, O. (1988). Ukraine: A History. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. p. 474. Cite error: The named reference "Subtelny" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
- Toynbee, T.R.V. (1954). Survey of International Affairs: Hitler's Europe 1939-1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Krokhmaluk, Y. (1973). UPA Warfare in Ukraine. New York: Vantage Press.
- Russian Combat Methods in World War II. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History. 1950. p. 111.
- General
- John-Paul Himka, "War Criminality: A Blank Spot in the Collective Memory of the Ukrainian Diaspora", from Significance of the Second World War for establishing of state symbols and collective cultural memory in Central-Eastern Europe, International conference, Lviv, 2003 (also available online at Spaces of Identity, Vol. 5, pp. 9-24, ISSN 1496-6778).
- Norman Davies, "God's playground : a history of Poland : in two volumes", Vol. 2, Chapter 19, Oxford; New York, Oxford University Press, 2005, ISBN 0199253404.
- Orest Subtelny (1988). Ukraine: A History. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. ISBN 0-8020-5809-6.
- Template:Pl icon Wiktor Poliszczuk,, Memory of the Polish Diaspora
- Template:Pl icon Andrzej Sowa, "Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie 1939-1947", Kraków 1998, ISBN 839093158
- Template:Uk icon UIA Start the Active anti-German actions