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==The disaster== ==The disaster==


At 16:53 on Saturday ] ], the temporary bypass pipe (containing cyclohexane at 150°] (302°F) and 1 ]]) ruptured, possibly as a result of a fire on a nearby 8 inch (20 cm) pipe which had been burning for nearly an hour. Within a minute, about 40 tonnes of the plant's 400 tonne store of ] leaked from the pipe and formed a vapour cloud 100–200 metre (320-650 foot) diameter. The cloud, on coming in contact with an ignition source (probably a furnace at a nearby ] production plant) exploded, completely destroying the plant. Around 1,800 buildings within a ] radius of the site were damaged. At 16:53 on Saturday ] ], the temporary bypass pipe (containing cyclohexane at 150°] (302°F) and 1 ]]) ruptured, possibly as a result of a fire on a nearby 8 inch (20 cm) pipe which had been burning for nearly an hour. Within a minute, about 40 tonnes of the plant's 400 tonne store of ] leaked from the pipe and formed a vapour cloud 100–200 metre (320-650 foot) diameter. The cloud, on coming in contact with an ignition source (probably a furnace at a nearby ] production plant) exploded, completely destroying the plant. Around 1,800 buildings within a ] radius of the site were damaged.


The ] was estimated to be equivalent to 15 tonnes of ] (60 ]) and it killed all 18 employees in the nearby control room. Nine other site workers were killed, and a delivery driver died of a ] in his cab. All the dead were adult males. The ] was estimated to be equivalent to 15 tonnes of ] (60 ]) and it killed all 18 employees in the nearby control room. Nine other site workers were killed, and a delivery driver died of a ] in his cab. All the dead were adult males.

Revision as of 11:23, 10 June 2006

The Flixborough disaster was an explosion at a chemical plant close to Flixborough (near Scunthorpe), North Lincolnshire, England, on 1 June 1974. It killed 28 people and seriously injured 36.

Background

The chemical plant, owned by Nypro (UK) and in operation since 1967, produced caprolactam, a precursor chemical used in the manufacture of nylon. The process involved oxidation of cyclohexane with air in a series of six reactors to produce a mixture of cyclohexanol and cyclohexanone. Two months prior to the explosion, a crack was discovered in the number 5 reactor. It was decided to install a temporary 50 cm (20 inch) diameter pipe to bypass the leaking reactor to allow continued operation of the plant while repairs were made.

The disaster

At 16:53 on Saturday 1 June 1974, the temporary bypass pipe (containing cyclohexane at 150°C (302°F) and 1 MPa) ruptured, possibly as a result of a fire on a nearby 8 inch (20 cm) pipe which had been burning for nearly an hour. Within a minute, about 40 tonnes of the plant's 400 tonne store of cyclohexane leaked from the pipe and formed a vapour cloud 100–200 metre (320-650 foot) diameter. The cloud, on coming in contact with an ignition source (probably a furnace at a nearby hydrogen production plant) exploded, completely destroying the plant. Around 1,800 buildings within a mile radius of the site were damaged.

The fuel-air explosion was estimated to be equivalent to 15 tonnes of TNT (60 gigajoules) and it killed all 18 employees in the nearby control room. Nine other site workers were killed, and a delivery driver died of a heart attack in his cab. All the dead were adult males.

Observers have said that had the explosion occurred on a weekday, more than 500 plant employees would likely have been killed. Resulting fires raged in the area for over 10 days.

Consequences

The official inquiry into the accident determined that the bypass pipe had failed due to unforeseen lateral stresses in the pipe during a pressure surge. The bypass had been designed by engineers who were not experienced in high-pressure pipework, no plans had been produced or calculations produced, the pipe was not pressure-tested, and was mounted on temporary scaffolding poles that allowed the pipe to twist under pressure. These shortcomings led to a widespread public outcry over industrial plant safety, and significant tightening of the UK government's regulations covering hazardous industrial processes. See COMAH Regulations.

The plant was repaired, but went out of business a few years later.

See also

External links

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