| Revision as of 11:53, 12 January 2003 editKaren Johnson (talk | contribs)3,676 editsmNo edit summary← Previous edit | Revision as of 12:02, 12 January 2003 edit undoKaren Johnson (talk | contribs)3,676 edits typosNext edit → | ||
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| ==Prelude== | ==Prelude== | ||
| ===Soviet Strategy=== | ===Soviet Strategy=== | ||
| The Soviet government realized in ] that any future war would be largely nuclear, and in that same year the ] were founded. The Soviet government became increasingly militaristic in the face of ]'s rearmament program. In response, the Soviets decided to install nuclear weapons in Cuba. Their reasoning was two-fold -- first, to defend this new Communist state from American or American-sponsored invasion, and second, to |
The Soviet government realized in ] that any future war would be largely nuclear, and in that same year the ] were founded. The Soviet government became increasingly militaristic in the face of ]'s rearmament program. In response, the Soviets decided to install nuclear weapons in Cuba. Their reasoning was two-fold -- first, to defend this new Communist state from American or American-sponsored invasion, and second, to shift the nuclear balance of power away from the US. | ||
| ===American Missile Sites in Turkey=== | ===American Missile Sites in Turkey=== | ||
| The US had recently begun to deploy missiles in ], which directly threatened the western sections of the Soviet Union. Soviet technology was well developed in the field of medium-range |
The US had recently begun to deploy missiles in ], which directly threatened the western sections of the Soviet Union. Soviet technology was well developed in the field of medium-range ballistic missiles (], as opposed to ]s). The Soviets did not believe they could achieve parity in ICBMs before ], but saw that a certain kind of equality could be quickly reached by placing missiles in Cuba. Soviet MRBMs on Cuba, with a range of around 1,000 miles, could threaten Washington DC and around half of the ] bases with a flight time of under twenty minutes. In addition, the US radar warning system was orientated towards the USSR and would provide little warning of a launch from Cuba. | ||
| ] had devised the plan in May of ], and by late July over sixty Soviet ships were en-route to Cuba, with some of them carrying military material. ], director of the ], warned Kennedy that some of the ships were probably carrying missiles but a meeting of John and ], ] and ] decided that the Soviets would not try such a thing. | ] had devised the plan in May of ], and by late July over sixty Soviet ships were en-route to Cuba, with some of them carrying military material. ], director of the ], warned Kennedy that some of the ships were probably carrying missiles but a meeting of John and ], ] and ] decided that the Soviets would not try such a thing. | ||
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| ==The U-2 Flights== | ==The U-2 Flights== | ||
| A ] flight in late August photographed a new series of ] missiles sites being constructed, but on September 4 Kennedy told Congress that there were no ''offensive'' missiles |
A ] flight in late August photographed a new series of ] missiles sites being constructed, but on September 4 Kennedy told Congress that there were no ''offensive'' missiles in Cuba. On the night of September 8, the first consignment of SS-4 MRBMs was unloaded in ], and a second shipload arrived on September 16. The Soviets were building nine sites, six for SS-4s and three for longer-ranged SS-5s (up to 2,000 miles). The planned arsenal was forty launchers, a increase in Soviet first strike capacity of 70%. | ||
| A number of unconnected problems meant that the missiles were not discovered by the Americans until a U-2 flight of ] clearly showed the construction of |
A number of unconnected problems meant that the missiles were not discovered by the Americans until a U-2 flight of ] clearly showed the construction of an SS-4 site near ]. By October 19 the then almost continuous U-2 flights showed four sites were operational. Initially, the US government kept the information secret, telling only the fourteen key officials of the executive committee. ] was not informed until the evening of ]. | ||
| ==The American Response== | ==The American Response== | ||
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| ==Aftermath== | ==Aftermath== | ||
| The crisis was a tactical victory for the Soviets but a strategic loss. They had been seen backing down, and the attempt to gain strategic parity had failed, to the anger of the Soviet military commanders. |
The crisis was a tactical victory for the Soviets but a strategic loss. They had been seen backing down, and the attempt to gain strategic parity had failed, to the anger of the Soviet military commanders. Khrushchev's fall from power a few years later can be partially linked to ] embarrassment at both Khrushchev's backing down from the Americans and Khrushchev's creation of the crisis by deciding to install missiles in Cuba in the first place. | ||
| America military commanders were not happy with the result either. ] told the President that it was "the greatest defeat in our history" and that they should invade today. But the event brought much needed stability to the US-USSR strategic relationship. | America military commanders were not happy with the result either. ] told the President that it was "the greatest defeat in our history" and that they should invade today. But the event brought much needed stability to the US-USSR strategic relationship. | ||
Revision as of 12:02, 12 January 2003
The Cuban missile crisis was the clash between the USSR and the USA over the Soviet deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba. The crisis began on October 15, 1962 and lasted for thirteen days.
Prelude
Soviet Strategy
The Soviet government realized in 1959 that any future war would be largely nuclear, and in that same year the Strategic Rocket Forces were founded. The Soviet government became increasingly militaristic in the face of Kennedy's rearmament program. In response, the Soviets decided to install nuclear weapons in Cuba. Their reasoning was two-fold -- first, to defend this new Communist state from American or American-sponsored invasion, and second, to shift the nuclear balance of power away from the US.
American Missile Sites in Turkey
The US had recently begun to deploy missiles in Turkey, which directly threatened the western sections of the Soviet Union. Soviet technology was well developed in the field of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs, as opposed to ICBMs). The Soviets did not believe they could achieve parity in ICBMs before 1970, but saw that a certain kind of equality could be quickly reached by placing missiles in Cuba. Soviet MRBMs on Cuba, with a range of around 1,000 miles, could threaten Washington DC and around half of the SAC bases with a flight time of under twenty minutes. In addition, the US radar warning system was orientated towards the USSR and would provide little warning of a launch from Cuba.
Nikita Khrushchev had devised the plan in May of 1962, and by late July over sixty Soviet ships were en-route to Cuba, with some of them carrying military material. John McCone, director of the CIA, warned Kennedy that some of the ships were probably carrying missiles but a meeting of John and Robert Kennedy, Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara decided that the Soviets would not try such a thing.
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The U-2 Flights
A U-2 flight in late August photographed a new series of SAM missiles sites being constructed, but on September 4 Kennedy told Congress that there were no offensive missiles in Cuba. On the night of September 8, the first consignment of SS-4 MRBMs was unloaded in Havana, and a second shipload arrived on September 16. The Soviets were building nine sites, six for SS-4s and three for longer-ranged SS-5s (up to 2,000 miles). The planned arsenal was forty launchers, a increase in Soviet first strike capacity of 70%.
A number of unconnected problems meant that the missiles were not discovered by the Americans until a U-2 flight of October 14 clearly showed the construction of an SS-4 site near San Cristobal. By October 19 the then almost continuous U-2 flights showed four sites were operational. Initially, the US government kept the information secret, telling only the fourteen key officials of the executive committee. Britain was not informed until the evening of October 21.
The American Response
The officials discussed the various options - an immediate bombing strike was dismissed early on, as was a potentially time consuming appeal to the UN. The choice was reduced to either a naval blockade and an ultimatum, or full-scale invasion. A blockade was finally chosen, although there were a number of hawks (notably Paul Nitze, Douglas Dillon and Maxwell Taylor) who kept pushing for tougher action. An invasion was planned, and troops were assembled in Florida (although with over 40,000 Russian soldiers in Cuba, complete with tactical nuclear weapons, the proposed invading force would have been in trouble).
There were a number of issues with the naval blockade. There was legality - as Fidel Castro noted, there was nothing illegal about the missile installations; they were certainly a threat to the US, but similar missiles aimed at the USSR were in place in Britain, Italy and Turkey. Then there was the Soviet reaction to the blockade - would a conflict start out of escalating retaliation?
Kennedy spoke to the US people (and the Soviet government) in a televised address on October 22. He announced the naval blockade as a quarantine zone of 500 miles around the Cuban coast, warned that the military was "prepare for any eventualities", and condemned the Soviet "secrecy and deception". The US was surprised at the solid support from its European allies and also from much of the remaining international community.
The Soviets had delivered two different deals to the American government. On October 26, they offered to withdraw the missiles in return for a US guarantee not to invade Cuba or support any invasion. The second deal was broadcast on public radio on October 27, calling for the withdrawal of US missiles from Turkey in addition to the demands of the 26th. The crisis peaked on October 27, when a U-2 was shot down over Cuba and another U-2 flight over Russia was almost intercepted. At the same time, Soviet merchant ships were nearing the quarantine zone. Kennedy responded by publicly accepting the first deal and sending Robert to the Soviet embassy to accept the second in private - the small number of Jupiter missiles in Turkey would be removed. The Soviet ships turned back. "We went eyeball to eyeball, and the other fellow just blinked".
Aftermath
The crisis was a tactical victory for the Soviets but a strategic loss. They had been seen backing down, and the attempt to gain strategic parity had failed, to the anger of the Soviet military commanders. Khrushchev's fall from power a few years later can be partially linked to Politburo embarrassment at both Khrushchev's backing down from the Americans and Khrushchev's creation of the crisis by deciding to install missiles in Cuba in the first place.
America military commanders were not happy with the result either. Curtis LeMay told the President that it was "the greatest defeat in our history" and that they should invade today. But the event brought much needed stability to the US-USSR strategic relationship.
See also: Cold War