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The other POV

The reason I initially put the NPOV tag in the article (and which I will do again) is because a significant POV is missing from the article. We have Hanley and AP's POV firmly established and it is the POV that pervades the entire article: This was an intentional, deliberate and most importantly "coldblooded killing" of innocent civilians with no justification.

The other POV, shared by a number of historians and writers is best summed up by an excerpt in Armchair General from LtCol Robert Bateman:

What took place at No Gun Ri was definitely not the under-orders, cold-blooded “execution” of up to 400 unarmed Korean civilians as claimed in the AP report. It certainly was no Korean War version of Vietnam’s My Lai massacre. Instead, the few minutes of undisciplined, panicked smallarms fire that killed or wounded up to 35 civilians was the nearly predictable result of hastily throwing mostly inexperienced, poorly led and inadequately trained U.S. troops into a confused, chaotic situation for which they were completely unprepared.

Its the exclusion of this POV that warrants the tag. WeldNeck (talk) 15:44, 9 August 2013 (UTC)

Bateman is not a good source, and should be used with extreme caution (and possibly not at all, I am unsure) - he having a strong close connection to the subject and due to a distinct lack of journalistic skill and outright fabrication. --Errant 15:47, 9 August 2013 (UTC)

Thats a pretty bold statement. Do you have something to back that? What is Bateman alleged to have fabricated? Can we say the same about Hanley and the AP as they sat on news that their star witness was a fraud until after the Pulitzer Committee made its award? WeldNeck (talk) 16:25, 9 August 2013 (UTC)

We'll again address Bateman's gross unreliability. But first of all, WeldNeck, your own bold statement above is categorically false. You continue to be duped by Bateman's made-up drivel, rather than any independent (at least non-7th Cavalry) sources, which would inform you that Daily (hardly a "star witness," since he was quoted only briefly in the 56th paragraph long after other GI witnesses were quoted in the original journalism; please do your homework on such things) was determined by the AP to have only secondhand information weeks after the Pulitzers were announced. In a story with some 60 eyewitnesses, Daily was barely a minor sideshow and has been irrelevant to No Gun Ri for years. That's what's not being grasped here: The article is about the No Gun Ri Massacre, not about the AP, or any of the dozen or more journalists who worked on No Gun Ri, or extraneous matters like Daily, or anything other than what is known and not known about No Gun Ri here in 2013.

As for Bateman, if you're interested in learning about his fabrications and distortions, I would have expected you to accept my invitation to review the lengthy analysis exposing it all page by page. Send me your email address, read the damning analysis, and ask any questions or raise any objections you like. If you choose not to, you're only suggesting that you're operating with a closed mind. Meanwhile, view the C-SPAN video, as I previously advised. There you'll find the respected moderator, John Callaway, of the Pritzer Military Library, taking the unprecedented step of berating an author, Bateman, for producing such an execrable piece of work. From the transcript: CALLAWAY, ``Why do the project if you can't do it right? ...You talk about lack of resources. Once you do that -- say I want to write a book about what's really going on inside Russia today, but I don't have the money to go to Russia. Wouldn't a good editor or publisher say to me, Mr. Callaway perhaps you shouldn't do that book? ... Why would you do a critical book on this subject if you didn't have the resources to go into the field to do that half of the story (the Korean half)? ... Whose account should we pay more attention to, the person who has the resources to go to South Korea and conduct the interviews, or the person who doesn't go to South Korea?"

I gave you here in Talk the example of Bateman's hijacking an irrelevant document, claiming it said something it didn't say, hiding it from his readers, and then having the gall to point to it as his central finding. How is that critique a show of "bias" on my part? I'll send you the document. Or would you rather to continue to blindly accept Bateman as a reliable source?

Meantime, I was ready to post in Talk saying that your pointing out the NYTimes report on infiltration (via Kuehl) is a helpful addition. But now I see there are other changes -- I hope not too many -- that are damaging to the article, such as what I believe is your removal of the 1950 North Korean journalistic report on the massacre. I don't understand: Isn't it clear who was lying and covering up No Gun Ri, and which sources actually had it right, to be begrudgingly acknowledged by the U.S. Army a half-century later? The same thing happened with My Lai in Vietnam (Please, please, read the Talk discussions on such matters; we're going over old ground here.) I believe you also removed eyewitness Tom Hacha. This sort of illogical thing totally baffles me. It'll be dealt with.

Finally, there are not "two sides" or "another POV" on No Gun Ri. There is simply the historical event, affirmed and accepted by two sovereign governments, with elaboration from eyewitnesses and documents, with gaps in our knowledge (such as the precise death toll, and the missing 7th Cav log that would have held any orders relating to NGR), and with repercussions in contemporary Korea. We scoured Bateman's book for anything useful and came up with less than zero. Any legitimate info advancing Misplaced Pages's knowledge of NGR is obviously welcome. Attacks on contributors' integrity are not.

Meantime, please come ahead with your email address, so you'll better understand Bateman's machinations. Charles J. Hanley 12:48, 10 August 2013 (UTC). Charles J. Hanley — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cjhanley (talk • contribs)

I would like to add my two cents to this discussion, having just discovered the back-and-forth between WeldNeck and Charles Hanley. It seems that certain motivations (biases?) are clouding some salient points: Isn’t this WP article entitled the “No Gun Ri Massacre”? Shouldn’t the facts drive the narrative? Are not those in the media -- as well as official sources within the two governments -- the best providers of the truth, vis-à-vis others who attempt to minimize this historic war crime? It would seem that the meticulous research undertaken by the Pulitzer Prize-winning Associated Press journalists and others (I find CBS, BBC, German television, Korean MBC, Sahr Conway-Lanz, et al. in the references) has time and again withstood the scrutiny of naysayers, regardless of their motivations. Don't WP readers come to this article to learn about the massacre, not about one person’s petty battle a decade ago with the AP? Reader0234 (talk) 14:32, 12 August 2013 (UTC)(Reader0234)

Reader. all relevant material and any notable POV's should be included in the article. Hanley's insistence on the exclusion of Bateman and anyone else whose perspective on the nature of the events differs from his is intolerable and unjustifiable. No one, especially me is arguing that (CBS, BBC, German television, Korean MBC, Sahr Conway-Lanz, etcetera) should be excluded, only that other notable voice be included. WeldNeck (talk) 18:15, 12 August 2013 (UTC)

WeldNeck: "notable voice" has a nice ring to it. But, it seems to ring hollow when referring to Robert Bateman and his speculations on the massacre. From what I read above, Bateman is a highly untrustworthy source. His key finding hinges on a made-up No Gun Ri link to an unrelated document, and you think he's reliable? He didn't even interview the survivors or go to Korea, and you think that's fine? And, don't forget, he got censured on national television for shoddy work. I think all this adds up to one "hugely problematic" voice, not a "notable" one.

He's obviously a biased 7th Cavalry guy trying to downplay what the 7th Cavalry did in Korea. And I see he is included in the article, questioning the death toll -- in the face of all kinds of evidence and an official finding that it was substantial. Anybody can question anything they like about anything, but that doesn't make them a reliable Misplaced Pages source.Reader0234 —Preceding undated comment added 16:01, 13 August 2013 (UTC)

BAteman has a great deal of other material from witness accounts (that not surprisingly differ dramatically form the AP account) to documentation. None of this is mentioned in the article. WeldNeck (talk) 12:52, 14 August 2013 (UTC)

What I'd suggest with Bateman is that we let other sources identify if any of the information is useable. So if e.g. other books draw on Bateman (although I don't believe any do) or other sources identify material as accurate. This is a fairly typical approach for biased sources. --Errant 13:16, 14 August 2013 (UTC)

Do we also use this approach with Hanley and the AP? WeldNeck (talk) 14:37, 14 August 2013 (UTC)

No, because they are an independent source. --Errant 14:48, 14 August 2013 (UTC)

What makes Bateman a non independent source, hsi affiliation with the US Army? WeldNeck (talk) 15:16, 14 August 2013 (UTC)

Well... yes. He's an active-duty Army officer and the Army was the perpetrator in this case. More than that, he's a longtime 7th Cavalry booster (a former 7th Cav officer), and it was specifically the 7th Cav that did the killing. In 2000 he openly declared his intent to "get" the AP, the first media organization to pin No Gun Ri on what he refers to as "my regiment." This bias ought to be enough to disqualify him prima facie. But meantime the felonies he has committed against the truth have been pointed out to you here in Talk, and you've chosen to ignore them. That bespeaks a closed mind, and an unhelpful contributor. Charles J. Hanley 16:49, 14 August 2013 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cjhanley (talk • contribs)

You opinion is not enough, sorry, but thats the way things appear to be run around here. I tell you what, I will take this to the reliable source forum and see what a few outside opinons say. WeldNeck (talk) 18:01, 14 August 2013 (UTC)

Speaking as a PHD candidate researching the NGR Incident and other similar episodes (committed by ROK or KPA forces), who has read English and Korean documents on this, and visited and spoken to survivors and their families, I can shed some light on this. Contrary to WeldNeck's observations that critcisms of Bateman are based solely on Hanley's personal animosity, there are a number of obvious flaws in the book which render it suspicious. Furthermore, the Bateman/Hanley debate is well known to scholars of Korean War massacres, and Bateman's book is seldom used for a number of reasons, a few of which are as follows:

1. He did not visit or contact any of the victims from the massacre, nor does he consult any Korean government sources. Basic standards of objectivity suggests that this is a rather dubious approach to scholarship. Most scholars who cannot access a foreign language at least have the foresight to use an Research Assistant. In the debate that Hanley describes, Bateman excuses this on the grounds that he has a family, not a lot of money, etc. As a grad-student who is in a similar situation, I can tell you that this excuse would not be accepted by my PHD defence committee.

2. He claims that it is certain that guerrillas were among the refugees. This is a minority viewpoint within the veterans' testimony (in the US ARMY NGR report for example), and non-existent in the victims' version. While it is certainly plausible that fear of guerrilla infiltration was a major motivating factor in the massacre (as it is in the case of most civilian killings), the evidence for the actual existence of guerrillas is weak.

3. He claims without any evidence that the survivors all suffer from group think. Again, since he did not interview any of them, one is left to wonder how he arrived at this judgment.

4. He ignores (or didn't bother to do enough research) evidence of a number of memos, documents, and vet testimonials suggesting that a tacit, if not official, policy was in place by the last week of July to shoot refugees deemed suspicious. Most glaring is the absence of the "Muccio letter" (uncovered by Sahr Conway-Lanz). I would encourage readers to read Sarh-Conway Lanz's treatment of this issue published in the Journal of Diplomatic History. After reading this piece, it is difficult to take Bateman's work seriously. The reviews that WeldNeck refers to were all published prior to Lanz's work. He also does not mention that the 7th Cavalry journal was missing from the US archives, yet he claims that there is no evidence that kill orders existed. This is either remarkably careless scholarship or a deliberate distortion, given that other journals from similar locales were uncovered by the AP team (and verified by countless other independent scholars) indicating an understood policy to fire on refugees.

5. His low and inconsistent estimate of those killed (35 at times, 18-70 at others) does not appear to be based on any actual findings. While it is inevitable there is debate and ambiguity concerning the actual number of those killed, Bateman in his debate with Hanley comments that he arrived at this number through a "Ballpark" estimation. This is rather careless. In 2005, the "No Gun Ri Incident Review Report" was commissioned and determined the total number of victims to be 218 (150 killed, 13 missing, 55 disabled). This number was arrived at by searching censuses, family registers, visiting graves of families, victim testimonials, and a detailed, multi-step verification process. It has also uncovered the specific identity of many of those who died, and they have been officially registered with the South Korean government. While no methodology is perfect, this is clearly more useful than "ballpark" estimate. One of the above flaws alone ought to render any work of research seriously compromised. When taken as a whole, however, it is impossible for an impartial observer to claim that Bateman's work constitutes a legitimate work of scholarship, suitable as resource for an institution as integral to public understanding as Misplaced Pages.

One of the above flaws alone ought to render any work of research seriously compromised. When taken as a whole, however, it is impossible for an impartial observer to claim that Bateman's work constitutes a legitimate work of scholarship, suitable as resource for an institution as integral to public understanding as Misplaced Pages. Finally as Weldneck appears to be raising the need for an alternative point of view defense, it should be noted that the article cites the US Army report multiple times and provides a link to it. In this report, one can find a flawed (in my view), but similar similar sentiment (that the killings were accidental, "tragic" etc). As it is mentioned not only in the notes, but also the text, it is a little confusing to read Weldneck's complaints that alternative viewpoints are not accounted for. The predominant issue with Bateman is unfortunately one of reliability, not interpretation.

BW5530 (talk) 14:31, 26 August 2013 (UTC)BW5530

Thanks for the review of Bateman, that is quite useful.--Kmhkmh (talk) 03:50, 17 October 2013 (UTC)

As soon as you are published your opinion might become notable enough to include in the article. WeldNeck (talk) 13:53, 27 August 2013 (UTC)

For some reason I get the sense that when I do publish you won't be bothered to read it. In the same way that you likely have not bothered to actually read Bateman's account (since you claim below to not actually have a copy). In the same way that Bateman did not bother to read or consult any Korean sources (or a number of US ones for that matter). Seems to be a pattern here, no?

BW5530 — Preceding unsigned comment added by BW5530 (talk • contribs) 14:11, 29 August 2013 (UTC)

The aerial photo taken 11 days after No Gun Ri shows no indication of bodies, or of recent burial. This cannot be squared with the claim that hundreds were killed in the incident. The people who testified in 2005 were children at the time. They were not doing body counts. A lot of bad stuff happened to refugees during the war. Over the course of 55 years, memory can conflate incidents that occurred separately. The refugees at No Gun Ri charged toward a U.S. military position. So even with U.S. guns pointed at them, they were more afraid of the North Koreans behind them. A lovely bunch of coconuts (talk) 21:38, 22 October 2013 (UTC) User:Kauffner sockpuppet

I'm sorry, lovely bunch, but you don't know whereof you speak. Perhaps journalists who spent months and, eventually, years reporting professionally on the events can straighten you out: No one "charged" the U.S. Army. (Where did you get that one from?) The refugees were sitting on the railroad tracks when they were attacked from the air, and then by mortar or artillery fire. They weren't fleeing the North Koreans; they were trying to stay in their nearby village when they were forced out by U.S. troops, who then set the village ablaze. The many, many who testified (not in "2005" -- where'd that come from? -- but in 1960, the 1980s, the 1990s and, finally, in the 1999-2000 Korean investigation, with consistent accounts throughout) included people who were young adults in 1950, such as the young mother who watched her two small children die, the 17-year-old who lost most of his family, the ex-policeman who collected survivors' stories from the earliest years. This notion of conflated stories is an obnoxious invention we've heard before from people who, in their ignorance or inhumanity, suppose that people who watched their mothers, their children or other loved ones die before their eyes would forget where it happened -- when it happened under a concrete railroad bridge they saw down the road every day of their lives, and they all held annual memorial services in the village every year of their lives. This business of the aerial photos -- the spliced, questionable film -- has gotten mighty tiresome. The Army contends the photos cast doubt on hundreds of casualties; the Koreans cast doubt on the photos and say, anyway, remaining bodies were out of sight under the bridge (where ex-GIs also say they were). That's all in the article. Survivors estimate 400 dead; Command Sergeant-Major Garza saw 200-300 bodies in one tunnel, and most may have been dead; the Korean commission finally certified 163 dead and missing, and 55 wounded, some who died, and said "many" more names were not reported.

Much of the above may not suit your views, or what you'd like to believe. But those are the facts, professionally delivered. And my impression was that facts are what Misplaced Pages's all about. Charles J. Hanley 22:57, 22 October 2013 (UTC) Cjhanley (talk • contribs)

• I count three Korean witnesses in the original AP story: Chun Choon-ja (12), Park Hee-sook (16), and Chung Koo-ho (61-49=12). None of them said anything nearly as dramatic as what is being asserted above. I'm sure there were more who testified, but what kind of journalist holds back his best material? I don't see Garza in the AP report, the army report, or even the news archives. He's mentioned in exactly one place on Google Books (Truth and Reconciliation in South Korea), and the actual reference isn't even online. So I guess he's another secret source, or at least an extremely obscure one. To put this kind of material in the article goes against WP:DUE.
• No, the much quoted figure of 400 dead is not a "survivors' estimate," at least not in the sense that some survivors' group came up with this number. It comes from a 1950 news report that appeared in a North Korean newspaper. This information is actually in the article already. But why should a journalist who spend years on this story bother to read it? A lovely bunch of coconuts (talk) 02:29, 23 October 2013 (UTC) User:Kauffner sock

Good point Mr Hanley, the idea that eyewitness memories could become confused after 50 years is impossible:

When confronted with the fact that Daily could not have been at No Gun Ri, one of the AP’s other notable witnesses, Eugene Hesselman, repeated over and over again, “I know that Daily was there. I know that. I know that.”

As for the aerial imagery, a picture's worth 1000 words, unless it doesnt tell us what we want it to, then its fake. WeldNeck (talk) 02:18, 23 October 2013 (UTC)

Actually, in the Korean survivors’ community, they collected accounts of survivors about the massacre from earlier time. They filed petitions to investigate this massacre to the Korean government and the U.S. government. Several petition were filed in 1960 to these governments but all were denied (it’s obvious when considering the politically suppressive atmosphere in Korea—pro-American government, worrying to harm the friendship with the US government—during the Cold War). (If you want sources of this information, there are plenty in Korean publications about these petitions, such as “황순구, 노근리 피난민 적으로 취급하라, 미군 양민학살 공식문서 확인, 한겨레 Sep.29, 1999” or “정은용, 그대, 우리의 아픔을 아는가, 다리 미디어, 1994”. Korean researchers read and study publications in Korea and the U.S. but American researchers seem to have neglected Korean sources. I’m a Korean scholar and have consulted sources from both countries.)

The survivors’ claims were consistent over the years (petitions in 1960 and interviews in 1999 and afterwards). Human memory can be inaccurate and modified along the life experiences. However, such collective memory in the Korean survivors’ community from the time of the massacre can bear more accurate information, especially when the memory is about something that affects your entire life (extreme tragic, violent, fearful ones). — Preceding unsigned comment added by SeoulScholar (talk • contribs) 17:46, 17 January 2014 (UTC)

Infiltration

I am not sure if my comments are welcome here because what I gather from this voluminous talk page is that publishing on a subject means that one has a conflict of interest on that subject, a position I find perplexing. I am Sahr Conway-Lanz, the historian who wrote the article “Beyond No Gun Ri” cited in the current No Gun Ri Misplaced Pages article. But at the risk of offering an “interested” comment, I want to point out the difference between the US Army believing that the North Koreans disguised significant numbers of their troops as refugees and the North Koreans actually doing so. There is much evidence for the American fear, but very limited evidence for the North Koreans using this infiltration tactic in reality. Even Lt. Col. Bateman in his book agrees that the actual number of infiltrators was quite small (p. 71). The Misplaced Pages article should make this distinction more clearly. The current version suggests a level of actual infiltration, as opposed to feared and suspected infiltration, that the published accounts (Bateman, Hanley, me) do not support. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Noncombatant917 (talk • contribs) 19:58, 23 November 2013 (UTC)

If you are who you say you are, then perhaps Weldneck was right, and Cjhanley has resorted to meatpuppetry rather than sockpuppetry.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 04:13, 24 November 2013 (UTC)

I was thinking the same thing. WeldNeck (talk) 16:04, 24 November 2013 (UTC)

ALCON, I know Sahr and agree with him. See pages 68-74 of my book for an in-depth explanation of the term "infiltration" and my debunking that there actually was much, if any, infiltration through the lines by NKA forces dressed in civilian clothing. Most of the time they just went around units, in full uniform. What was happening was that there was massive fear that the NKA was doing that, but I found that to be largely unsubstantiated and a classic example of how rumors get turned into "facts." The sum of the rumors, and the citations such as Appleman, all stem from a single source so far as I can tell. (This is in footnote 12 in chapter 4 of my book, the infamous "pregnant woman with a radio" report.) See: 1st Cavalry Division War Diary, July 1950, RG 338, Box 42, see also the G2 report for the same period. Although it is also similar to an event cited in the 1 Cav Div radio log as something occuring near the 77th Field Artillery in the same time period. Sahr is an honest and open scholar. We disagree on some things, but I would never support anyone's idea that he is a "meat puppet" for anyone, let alone Hanley. Robert Bateman 86.188.140.194 (talk) 14:04, 5 December 2013 (UTC)

Aren't editors supposed to be welcoming to new voices? If I am violating some Misplaced Pages community standard by adding my voice, I would appreciate guidance about my misstep. I am who I say I am, and I will assume your good faith if you can accept mine. I am only trying to help improve the entry. If the Misplaced Pages community believes that I have a conflict of interest because I have published on this topic, I will bow out of commenting on this page. I am certainly not simply parroting Mr. Hanley's views since my comment on infiltration suggests that some of Lt. Col. Bateman's views should be taken into account. I hope folks can engage my comment on its substance. Thanks. Noncombatant917 (talk) 19:41, 24 November 2013 (UTC)

New voices are welcome and there was no misstep as such. However what the article primarily needs now is not yet another opinion by a newcomer (though there is nothing wrong with that) but reliable sources and it would be great if you could help out with additionally academic sources on the subject. As far as a possible conflict interest is concerned so far I can't see one in your case. Having published on the subject or in the associated field in general doesn't necessarily create a conflict of interest but rather makes you a (welcome) expert in the field. C. J. Hanley however has a conflict of interest since his reputation is partially tied to his view being the correct view on no-gun ri and since he had public feud with Bateman over no-gun ri, so his situation is currently totally different from yours.--Kmhkmh (talk) 23:13, 24 November 2013 (UTC)

There are very few academic publications on No Gun Ri, and few of these are comprehensive treatments of the No Gun Ri massacre. The four peer-reviewed academic journal articles and anthology chapters that I am aware of are Bruce Cumings, “Occurrence at Nogun-ri Bridge,” Critical Asian Studies, 2001, Conway-Lanz, “Beyond No Gun Ri” (cited in current article), Young, “An Incident at No Gun Ri” (cited in current article), and Charles Hanley, “No Gun Ri,” Critical Asian Studies, 2010. Hanley’s 2010 article is currently the most comprehensive account of No Gun Ri peered reviewed by academics. Lt. Col. Bateman is not an academic nor is his book a peer-reviewed publication. Bateman’s publisher Stackpole Books is a trade press and does not vet its manuscripts through anonymous peer review (peer review is different and more significant, because anonymous, than a book review after publication). Personally, I have serious reservations about Bateman’s book as a source on No Gun Ri, especially because the book claims to be a comprehensive account of No Gun Ri but does not use Korean sources. I would only use Bateman as a source when he agrees with other reliable sources. This Misplaced Pages article also needs to draw more on the Korean academic literature, but I do not read Korean and so it is harder for me to help here. I will continue looking for academic sources, though. Noncombatant917 (talk) 13:43, 28 November 2013 (UTC)

What hath POV wrought? A warning to readers

The POV pushing at this article since August has, predictably, produced a mess and a muddle -- even putting aside the untruths, superfluities, bad syntax and transparent prejudices that have infected the text. Any poor reader interested in understanding what happened at No Gun Ri will encounter many "Huh?" moments because a single, half-informed contributor was bent on introducing baseless speculation and pointless tangents that facts and common sense show to be, at a minimum, a waste of words.

One example: The "Events of 25-29 July" section now suggests that U.S. warplanes had no "confirmed" reason to attack those refugees and, besides, the record shows no "air assets" operating in the area. Might the Korean survivors (and ex-GI witnesses) have made up this story about their loved ones' deaths? Or, at worst, surely this was only a tragic mistake? Not until many hundreds of words later does the reader learn that the No. 2 Air Force officer in Korea himself reported explicitly that refugee groups approaching U.S. lines were intentionally being strafed. As for those "air assets" (telltale jargon now litters the text), the cited source, the Army investigative report, suppressed the Air Force mission reports showing operations in the area at the time, and showing pilots attacking refugee groups in July 1950. (This points up a related problem: Citing more than the requisite minimum from that deeply dishonest Army report will require still more words to knock it down, ballooning the article into a critique of the Army report, not a look at what's known of the massacre. Blindly citing the Army report as though authoritative may be fine within the Pentagon, but it isn't on Misplaced Pages.)

Many other examples of the mess exist, including the wasteful overkill on infiltration in the "Background" section, the illogical flow and gratuitous material (Bosnia etc.) in the "Aerial imagery" section (as noted by Drmies), and the ridiculous raising of Bateman's sophomoric snit in defense of "my regiment" in the "Associated Press story" section, adding nothing to our knowledge of No Gun Ri, but still more wasted -- and, in this case, untruthful -- words to this article.

Until these problems can be remedied, readers seeking a sensible accounting of the No Gun Ri Massacre are urged to refer to the article as it stood as of June 24. Charles J. Hanley 16:54, 9 December 2013 (UTC) ((User:Cjhanley|Cjhanley)) (((User talk:Cjhanley|talk)) • ((Special:Contributions/Cjhanley|contribs)))

Yeah, I'm certain people will get right on that. WeldNeck (talk) 17:50, 9 December 2013 (UTC)

WeldNeck, do you care that the above cited deceptive material about "no confirmed reason" for a refugee strafing and the lie about no air operations in the area damage the integrity of the "25-29 July" section? That section need only tell what happened (strafing, seeking refuge, shootings etc.), and not get into speculative material that in this case turns out to be false. If you care, will you fix it? If you don't, why not? Charles J. Hanley 23:15, 9 December 2013 (UTC) ((User:Cjhanley|Cjhanley)) (((User talk:Cjhanley|talk)) • ((Special:Contributions/Cjhanley|contribs)))

I agree with Cjhanley. The main notable fact of this incident is that refugees were "intentionally being strafed". That needs to be up there in the first paragraph to make clear why this incident is different from most other "collateral damage" incidents. In ictu oculi (talk) 01:20, 10 December 2013 (UTC)

I second/third Cjhanley's and IIO's view on this matter. This should be done right away IMO. warshy 01:33, 10 December 2013 (UTC)

In ictu oculi, where is the evidence that refugees were intentionally strafed? Isnt it the contention of many that it was a case of target misidentification (friendly fire)? WeldNeck (talk) 17:56, 10 December 2013 (UTC)

Such evidence that exists should be presented and sourced. I would like to hear what User:Drmies - a signature I recognise as a neutral editor in other contexts - has to say. In ictu oculi (talk) 15:14, 11 December 2013 (UTC)

Let's take a step back and review the basics:

1) The No Gun Ri refugees were attacked from the air; the South Korean and U.S. investigations acknowledged that. They were attacked from the ground; the two investigations acknowledged that. The article reports that.

2) The No. 2 U.S. Air Force officer in Korea reported a day before the attacks that U.S. warplanes were following a policy of strafing refugee groups approaching U.S. lines. U.S. Navy pilots reported a day before the attacks that they had been instructed to attack any groups of more than eight people. The South Korean investigators reported in 2001 that five former Air Force pilots testified they had been directed to attack civilians. The article reports all of that, linking to relevant documents. (What it does not report: In at least three Air Force mission reports from July 1950, here here and here, pilots reported being directed to attack apparent refugees/civilians. It also does not report that there are significant gaps in the record of such mission reports.)

3) The U.S. ambassador wrote the day of the attacks that U.S. ground troops would shoot approaching refugee groups. Word went out from 1st Cavalry Division headquarters two days before the attacks to shoot refugees trying to cross U.S. lines. Various orders went down from the HQ of the other front-line division, the 25th Infantry Division, to consider civilians in the war zone to be enemy and shoot them. An order went down from overall HQ, Eighth Army, the morning of the attacks to stop all refugees trying to cross U.S. lines. The South Korean investigators said 17 ex-soldiers said they believed they were ordered to shoot the No Gun Ri refugees. Two radiomen remembered such orders. The regimental document that would have carried such orders is missing. In the days following No Gun Ri, archived documents show other orders to shoot refugees flew around the war front. All of that is reported in the article, linking to relevant documents.

The reader, armed with that information, can make his/her own surmisals.

Raising this business of who called in the air strike and how is decidedly secondary, because it's unknowable and speculative. Bringing up, for example, the Army report's claim that there were no air controllers around -- and its suggestion there were no such air operations in the area -- would simply require more words to discuss the documents that refute that. Besides, the Army's 2001 investigative report itself says there was such an air operation: the attack at No Gun Ri !

Zero sum: a lot more words adding nothing. This article is already too long, is it not? Charles J. Hanley 20:15, 11 December 2013 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cjhanley (talk • contribs)

(Random break)

What speculative material is false? Is it false because it has been falsified, or is it false because the nature of the material leaves it open to interpretation? Put more directly: were there any flight logs of after action reports that describe an attack on the 25th of a large group of individuals? WeldNeck (talk) 17:54, 10 December 2013 (UTC)

That section has other problems, cases of what we might call "mutual cancellation," matters that are in dispute but that are inconsequential anyway, and that if explained inflate the article further toward incoherence. For example, it raises this matter of survivors believing the air attack was called in by ground troops, and the Army report saying no, there was no ground-to-air communication. But documents show the 1st Cav Division was, indeed, coordinating air strikes from the ground, and liaisons, ground air controllers (code-named "Angelo"), and a division spotter aircraft ("Pineapple") were calling in strikes in the immediate area at the time. But why even get into this wordy on-the-one-hand, on-the-other-hand stuff? What's important is that they were strafed, and the reader later learns this was policy, a common event. The same can be said of the new wordy quotes from Wenzel, regarding gunfire from the refugees. In earlier interviews, he said just the opposite, that there was no provocation. Men's stories changed. Do we really want to confuse readers with such things? We can just briefly say a handful of soldiers said they believed gunfire came from the refugees, but there's no supporting evidence.

Improving the text will be complicated. But it seems the original structure should remain: A lead tersely saying refugees were killed, there was fear of infiltrators, and a half-century later orders to shoot civilians were found. Then, chronologically, the war's background and infiltration fears; basic description of what happened between July 25 and July 29; then the journalism and investigations that filled in the details of "kill" orders etc. Bottom line: To now try weaving those orders into the July 25-29 section would require a major overhaul of structure, which IMO the article doesn't need. Charles J. Hanley 17:10, 10 December 2013 (UTC) ((User:Cjhanley|Cjhanley)) (((User talk:Cjhanley|talk)) • ((Special:Contributions/Cjhanley|contribs))) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cjhanley (talk • contribs)

If I red you correctly, information from other eyewitnesses like Wenzel regardless of how well sourced they are are 'confusing' because they don't follow the AP's cannon. That doesn't seem like a sufficient reason to remove it. As for the presence of a TACP, do you have some documentation that either the 1st Cav's TACP or spotter called in an airstrike on the refugees for whatever reason? How would this information square with the documented fact that the the 1st Cav's TACP was found to not be in the vicinity of NoGunRi? How could a TACP call in an air strike on a target he was no where near? To your contention that this was 'policy', how could a letter outlining a proposed policy dated on the 26th of July been communicated from the State Department and transformed into a change in SOP the same day? Even with the speed of communications that take place today, it couldn't happen. Are we to believe the command structure worked faster in 1950 than it does today?

You speak of "kill orders" when no such thing exists. Are you saying you have some solid documentary evidence than an order was given to fire on refugees at No Gun Ri? Certainly the eyewitnesses on the US side cannot verify this. There is no documentary evidence to support this. Have you been holding back on us this whole time? WeldNeck (talk) 17:54, 10 December 2013 (UTC)

WeldNeck, I'm afraid your comment doesn't relate to the reality of what we're talking about. Perhaps, indeed, you need to read mine again, correctly. But let me try:

* Wenzel contradicted himself in various interviews; I'm merely suggesting we stick with unnamed "soldiers" talking about gunfire out, since there were a couple of other men who did so.

You saying that Wenzel "contradicted himself" in interviews isnt really too impressive given your documented track record of deliberately misrepresenting individuals you interviewed. WeldNeck (talk) 20:58, 10 December 2013 (UTC)

* I didn't say there's documentation of a particular TACP directing the air strike at No Gun Ri; I said there were TACPs and a division spotter plane operating in the area. (Your "documented fact" in that regard is not a fact; it's another misstatement, deliberate or not, by the Army report. Please don't wave "documented facts" at WP readers when all you know is what you read in that highly untrustworthy report or in Bateman's nonsense).

The IG report specifically noted that based of the relevant documentation no TACP's were anywhere near No Gun Ri. Do you have some documentary evidence contrary to this? WeldNeck (talk) 20:58, 10 December 2013 (UTC)

* The policy of strafing refugees was reported in Col. Rogers' USAF memo; please read my comments more carefully. (And the practice thereof is found in several USAF mission reports.)

Rogers' USAF memo isn't about No Gun Ri. Note that the Roger's memo says they were strafed when requested to by the Army. Since a TACP would be needed to relay this request and no TACP was present, how would this order to strafe the refugees have been given? WeldNeck (talk) 20:58, 10 December 2013 (UTC)

* I said nothing about an order at No Gun Ri. I would hope the "kill" orders referred to are obvious to anyone reading this article: civilians should be "considered unfriendly and shot," "no refugees to cross the line. Fire everyone trying to cross the line," and on and on. (Whoops, I forgot: You didn't like that "unfriendly and shot" quote and so you deleted it.)

The "no refugees to cross the line" was to an entirely different regiment in an completely different area. "considered unfriendly and shot" refers to individuals in combat zones cleared by the ROK and was issued to the 25th ID, not the 2/7. Please dont bait and switch. WeldNeck (talk) 20:58, 10 December 2013 (UTC)

Finally, it would help if you dialed down the belligerence a few notches, and dialed up the cooperativeness. You could start by fixing some of what we've been discussing. ???? Charles J. Hanley 20:39, 10 December 2013 (UTC) ((User:Cjhanley|Cjhanley)) (((User talk:Cjhanley|talk)) • ((Special:Contributions/Cjhanley|contribs)))

Sorry, WeldNeck, you're still not connecting with the reality of what's being said. On your one question that makes sense, yes, there is documentation that 1) the division spotter plane overflew the division area at midday July 26, just when Korean survivors say they saw a light plane overhead, 2) USAF "Angelo" TACP ground controllers were calling in strikes in the Yongdong area on July 26 and thereafter, and 3) USAF Mosquito air controllers called in strikes on July 26 and thereafter right at or close to No Gun Ri. Nos. 2 and 3 are based on USAF mission reports; No. 1 is an Army Field Forces observer team report, in which one observer reported flying with the Pineapple pilot at that time and place.

For the rest of it, for the moment, I can only throw up my hands. I've been chastised for too-lengthy postings at "Talk," but, I swear, I've been doing my best to meet you more than halfway and make you see the light, but you persist in misreading and misunderstanding everything, disrespecting the professional work that has been done on this subject, accusing honest contributors of lying, and thinking you have some right to sugarcoat war crimes on Misplaced Pages. Charles J. Hanley 21:44, 10 December 2013 (UTC).

So you are claiming to have documentation that hasnt been published by the AP, IG, or any other involved party. How convenient. WeldNeck (talk) 14:39, 11 December 2013 (UTC)

'According to the South Koreans'

The problem spotted and fixed by KorAmProf -- a fix then reverted by WeldNeck -- is that leading off a description of the massacre by the 2nd Battalion with "According to the South Korean government’s investigation..." (under "Events of 25-29 July 1950") makes it sound as though only the Koreans found the battalion responsible, when in truth, of course, everyone -- ex-soldiers, journalists, the U.S. Army -- confirmed it. The root of the problem appears to be benign (unusual among all the malign POV pushing that has damaged the article):

The article at some point had a stand-alone box quoting verbatim a description of events by the Truth and Reconcilation Commission, a widely accepted, broad-stroke description by a South Korean body that did not itself investigate No Gun Ri. That box was unnecessary and duplicative. All that was needed was the basic investigative findings and firsthand descriptions from survivors and other witnesses. When the box was eliminated, the commission was retained as the sole source for important elements incorporated in the main text. That shouldn't have happened. It was not the investigative body. The joint U.S.-Korean Statement of Mutual Understanding, for one, contains all the basic elements of the events and could be a source if needed.

Many, more serious fixes are needed in the article. All will be done in due course, in hopes that 2014 will bring a spirit of cooperation, rather than knee-jerk reverts. Charles J. Hanley 19:10, 7 January 2014 (UTC) ((User:Cjhanley|Cjhanley)) (((User talk:Cjhanley|talk)) • ((Special:Contributions/Cjhanley|contribs))) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cjhanley (talk • contribs)

Improving the article: Lead and Background sections

We’ll begin improving this article section by section, in some cases cleaning up syntax, and in other cases trimming extraneous, pointless wordiness. General Dean, Bosnia etc., among other things, bloated the article unnecessarily by 1,000 words; a further 200 words was added recently with an unsourced paragraph (“On November 17…”) that is inaccurate when it’s not simply repetitive of what the article has already established. In the most important cases, we’ll restore references to the U.S. military’s long-running rejection of the No Gun Ri allegations (removed without explanation or justification) and Army investigators’ suppression of evidence (removed without explanation or justification).

In the lead section, “authorizing the use of lethal force” is wordy and inaccurate, since we’re talking about direct orders to “shoot” and “fire”; the reference to a “series of reports” is incorrect and incomplete; and the reference to Taejon is gratuitous, since the paragraph above already establishes the rationale for the shootings and Taejon is dealt with in the body of the article.

The Background section can be trimmed, saying the same thing in 25 percent fewer words – e.g., “refugees fleeing the onrush of the North Korean advance” is redundant; this has just been established in the preceding graf. In addition: The quote attributed to the 25th Infantry Division war diary appears misattributed, since the Army investigative report and Conway-Lanz (and my own files) show it only in 1st Cav Division archives. At the same time we’ll add a quote from a U.S. official saying soldiers regarded all Koreans as the enemy.

Finally, the insertion of irrelevant events during the Chinese civil war will be removed. Surely we don’t think a good Misplaced Pages article should be an ever-expanding grab bag of “fun facts” that are not essential to the subject at hand. Charles J. Hanley 14:59, 18 February 2014 (UTC) Cjhanley (talk • contribs)

The material you call bloat, some would call relevant material which provides a great deal of context to the article and has been cited by other WP:RS as such.

The phrase “authorizing the use of lethal force” is more accurate than shooting.

The Nork infiltration at Taejon was specifically mentioned by Muccio in his letter. That certainly belongs in the lede.

There is no misattribution in the 25th ID War Diary. I suggest you check your sources again as I have found this particular passage mentioned several times in other reliable sources.WeldNeck (talk) 19:49, 18 February 2014 (UTC)

I think Cjhanley’s edit was more accurate. “Authorizing the use of lethal force” seems to me an interpretation. Any wordings that may suggest potential interpretation or inference should be used very prudently or should not be used at all. Using actual wordings from military documents will give the wiki readers a better sense of No Gun Ri and its background. The actual quotes in those documents are,

“fire everyone trying to cross lines” in Communication Log, the 8th Regiment of the 1st Cavalry Division, July 24 1950

“All civilians seen in this area are to be considered as enemy and action taken accordingly” in Memorandum, Commander, 25th Infantry Division, 27 Jul 50

“we strafe all civilian refugee parties” in Memorandum to General Timberlake, Policy on Strafing Civilian Refugees, Colonel T.C. Rogers, 27 Jul 50 and

“all civilians moving around the combat zone will be considered as unfriendly and shot” in Journal, HQ 25th Infantry Division, 26 Jul 50.

To me, these wordings suggest actual orders of “shooting” rather than giving the power (“authorizing”) to make decisions on shooting. — Preceding unsigned comment added by SeoulScholar (talk • contribs) 05:32, 19 February 2014 (UTC)

WeldNeck, you continue to trample all over Misplaced Pages's principles of cooperativeness, assumption of good faith, and everything else. Incredibly, you seem to feel you have a right to revert, wholesale, intelligent and well-informed edits. And all the while you continue to fail to grasp the simplest of points. For one, orders to consider civilians enemy and "shoot" them, and to "fire" everyone trying to cross the line, are not a grant of "authority" to shoot. They are ORDERS to shoot. Do you not grasp that?

Do you not understand that the lead should be kept to the barest of essentials, and certainly does not need to repeat the rationale for shooting refugees? Once it's stated in the second paragraph, it doesn't need to be repeated in the third.

Do you not understand that an event in the Chinese civil war has no place in this article, especially when the text is nearly illiterate? Why did you revert that deletion?

One had hoped for a more cooperative spirit in 2014, but it appears that you're only interested in pushing your POV.

Finally, please cite for us a "reliable source" that attributes that quote to a 25th Infantry Division "war diary." You simply footnote the document, not a secondary source. But do you have the document? Meantime, the Army IG report, the Conway-Lanz book and my own files find that quote only in the 1st Cav Division. Please come ahead with a source. Charles J. Hanley 23:30, 18 February 2014 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cjhanley (talk • contribs)

There is an issue with the War Diary citation, I will correct that. WeldNeck (talk) 14:32, 19 February 2014 (UTC)

There are many, many more corrections needed in this article, not to mention the need to fix the lousy writing, restore essential points that you deleted because they disturbed your point of view, eliminate your falsification of the wording of orders etc etc etc. How about continuing your corrections by restoring to the lead the fact that the Pentagon stonewalled for years on the allegations (or come up with a reason why readers should not know that), correcting "authorizing lethal force" to what the orders actually said, and getting rid of the ridiculous Chinese civil war material? How about it? Charles J. Hanley 14:56, 19 February 2014 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cjhanley (talk • contribs)

I cannot understand why Weldneck continues to make unnecessary edits which blatantly undercut the spirit of Misplaced Pages. Just a couple of basic examples: Why did Weldneck remove references to the fact that the U.S. military rejected the No Gun Ri allegations for years? And the fact that its investigators in 2001 suppressed incriminating evidence? An understanding of the truth about No Gun Ri requires the restoration of those essential facts. Will you, Weldneck, restore those facts now?Reader0234 (talk) 16:14, 19 February 2014 (UTC) Reader0234 (talk • contribs)

Events of July 25-29, 1950

Continuing the fixes, this section will now read in a logical, sequential manner, with 200 fewer words, and yet with strong new descriptive quotes from a variety of new media and academic sources (quotes from Chung Koo-hun, Yang Hae-sook, Kerns, Preece, Levine, Patterson, Durham).

We'll tighten the Ha Ga Ri material, saying the same thing in fewer words; trim superfluous material; eliminate out-of-place military jargon (2-7, 1-7); note that arriving North Koreans rescued children. We'll note the specific number of men who testified about a supposed exchange of fire (as has been said, Wenzel is not quotable on this because he contradicted himself on this point at various times).

We'll also eliminate the pointless discussion of whether air controllers were in the area. As has been pointed out, that material is drawn from a section of the Army's 2001 report that is rife with deception, specifically suppression of documents showing air-control activity, air operations and a division spotter plane in the immediate area at the time. Leaving this pointless discussion in the text would require many more words and sources knocking down the untruths, while adding nothing at all to the article. We still wouldn't know how the air attack originated. It would also require upending the article's entire structure, to note, for one thing, the Air Force command's report that it was strafing all refugees approaching U.S. lines. This "Events" section should be limited to what happened on the ground from the 1950 point of view of the survivors and soldiers. Charles J. Hanley 16:43, 19 February 2014 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cjhanley (talk • contribs)

There's issues with all the eyewitnesses and removing some because they, according to you, "contradicted themselves" is dangerous considering how many witnesses the AP cited who stated they were taken out of context or directly misquoted by the AP team. As for the Norks "rescuing children" ... is that some kind of joke? WeldNeck (talk) 17:08, 19 February 2014 (UTC)

Two North Korean newspapers from Aug. 1950 describe the after-scene of the massacre. These were found from NARA. The actual citation of one of these is Choson In Min Bo (조선인민보, Korean People’s Daily), by Chon Uk (전욱). Aug 19 1950. These sources include information that North Korean solders met some children and elderly who survived from the killing and they escorted them to the villages. WeldNeck, that is not a “joke.”

In addition, the 2008 article from the journal Rhetoric & Public Affairs, cited as the source for the sentence about the North Korean rescue, now expunged by the uncomprehending WeldNeck, quoted survivor Yang Hae-sook as saying, "If they did not come to No Gun Ri ... if American soldiers stayed there longer, no one would have survived from that tunnel," and survivor Chung Koo-Ho as remembering that the North Koreans advised them not to leave the tunnel until nighttime, or they'd be killed by U.S. warplanes. Chung said, "On the way home, North Korean soldiers even gave us meals ... I felt a sense of same race-consciousness." The survivors, of course, told the same to many journalists and to South Korean government interviewers. It's simply a well-known fact. And so, WeldNeck, how about restoring this fact to the article? No joke. Charles J. Hanley 22:46, 25 February 2014 (UTC)

Casualties

This section will be improved by sharpening the sourcing on the report of 218 casualties. Charles J. Hanley 17:23, 19 February 2014 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cjhanley (talk • contribs)

Aftermath

This section will be improved by restoring the sentence -- unjustifiably deleted without a word of explanation -- regarding the fact that no investigation was conducted in 1950, despite knowledge of the massacre. Charles J. Hanley 17:29, 19 February 2014 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cjhanley (talk • contribs)

Petitions

This section will be improved by restoring text that was deleted without explanation regarding the survivors' 1994 petition and the Army's claim of combat, and by restoring text regarding the official history's agreeing with the survivors on two points. Charles J. Hanley 19:08, 19 February 2014 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cjhanley (talk • contribs)

it was deleted because you are using Appleman as a source to make an arguemnt which Appleman is not making. Its a combination of sources to make a conclusion not explicitly stated by any of the sources. WeldNeck (talk) 19:24, 19 February 2014 (UTC)

Appleman on page 179 says the 1st Cav Division took up positions in the Yongdong (No Gun Ri) area, and on 203 that it "faced no immediate enemy pressure" prior to its withdrawal from the area. Quid est demonstratum. Charles J. Hanley 19:41, 19 February 2014 (UTC)

Sorry, but it doesnt work that way. WeldNeck (talk) 20:27, 19 February 2014 (UTC)

What is the "it" that doesn't work what way? What you're saying is that the official Army history didn't uncover the whereabouts of an entire Army division in late July 1950. Please, WeldNeck, this is a serious subject. If you cannot engage seriously, if you can only deal dismissively with others while having nothing to offer, I would urge you to stand down for a while and let knowledgeable people repair this article. Charles J. Hanley 21:33, 19 February 2014 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cjhanley (talk • contribs)

Knowledgeable people who also have raging COI's? — Preceding unsigned comment added by WeldNeck (talk • contribs) 21:35, 19 February 2014 (UTC)

Are you or are you not going to restore the official history reporting the location of the 1st Cav? Surely you understand the point: the Army kissed off the petition without even checking the official history. There's nothing that "doesn't work," nothing to be disputed, about what the history says. Will you restore what you've wrongly deleted? Charles J. Hanley 22:44, 19 February 2014 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cjhanley (talk • contribs)

I take your silence to be a "no." We'll fix it. Charles J. Hanley 23:19, 19 February 2014 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cjhanley (talk • contribs)

Weldneck- Speaking of conflict of interest and POV problems how about yours? You seem to repeatedly nitpick on things that point to responsibility in the higher ranks. You ignore Pete McCloskey's statements which seem to me to support the conclusion that what happened at No Gun Ri resulted from orders issued by general officers. Hanley's alleged POV & COI have been debated for months yet WP has not pulled the plug on him? That says something to me about the merit of the criticism. Hanley has made it clear who he is so we know his NGR connection. Who are you? How do you explain your POV/COI issues? The fact that you devote so much time to this small slice of the police action tells me that you may have an axe to grind. Come on out of the shadows and be as open as Hanley. Let us see what makes you tick. In closing, I'd like to say that your snark & attitude, obvious even to a newbie, is offensive and not in the WP spirit.Breckenridge51 (talk) 23:59, 19 February 2014 (UTC)

Hey, another one of Hanley's meat puppets, welcome to the show. As for McClosky I dont usually take input from holocaust deniers too seriously, but hey there's a first for everything I suppose. WeldNeck (talk) 00:36, 20 February 2014 (UTC)

Not sure what a meat puppet is but from what I've seen of your track record it must be a nasty crack. And then the slam on McCloskey- deabate 101- when they go to the personal attacks they've got nothing else. As to McCloskey's alleged anti-semitism, what does that have to with his veracity on NoGunRi- just more smoke and mirrors from you. Your real issue with McCloskey is that despite his documented heroism in the Korean War, he's never been a member of the protect Mother Green club, as you so clearly are. Here's a question- you'll toss out McCloskey as reliable because of something he may have said once, does that apply to Bateman, who seems to be the foundation of your entire approach? Bateman- a self-identified serving military officer has written several times recently about how if he came to power he'd scrap the Constitution and take discriminatory action against law abiding gun owners. Clearly his career is terminal so he'll write these things, but he's crazy, not to mention seditious. So I throw out Bateman because I disagree. That's your reasoning on McCloskey & most everything else here. Here's my pov- my Dad was a rifle platoon leader in 1952 Korea with the 7th ID; I was a company grade officer for a few years & most of friends were em's. I resent it when people like you try to blame the lower ranks to protect a few top dogs and the Service.Breckenridge51 (talk) 19:50, 20 February 2014 (UTC)

Meatpuppet – it means Hanley asked you to come into this debate.

As for McCloskey he like Bateman seems to drink more Kool-Aid the longer they are around and the effects seem to compound with every passing year. While that certainly doesn’t disqualify either of them I am not just going to acquiesce to a tirade made on a Misplaced Pages talk page. McCloskey had some bad experiences with the Cav in Korea and certainly and that clouds his ability to be an impartial arbiter here. To McCloskey’s point that the Army is to blame because it sent inexperienced units to fight the KPA … you go to war with the Army you have not the army you want. That’s a simple truth about warfare and the nature of it.

Were there general guidelines to fire on refugees – yes, when they were approaching US positions it was left to the discretion of the CO’s or commanding NonComs to determine if they were a threat and what to do about it. A Life Magazine dispatch by John Osborne sums this dilemma up quite well:

“Oh, Christ, there’s a column of refugees, three or four hundred of them, coming right down on B company.” A major in the command tent says to the regimental commander, “Don’t let them through.” And of course the major is right. Time and again, at position after position, this silent approach of whitened figures has covered enemy attack and, before our men had become hardened to the necessities of Korean war, had often and fatally delayed and confused our own fire. Finally the colonel says, in a voice racked with wretchedness, "All right, don’t let them through. But try to talk to them, try to tell them to go back.” “Yeah,” says one of the little staff group, “but what if they don’t go back?” “Well, then,” the colonel says, as though dragging himself toward some pit, “then fire over their heads.” “Okay,” an officer says, “we fire over their heads. Then what?” “The colonel seems to brace himself in the semidarkness of the blackedout tent. “Well, then, fire into them if you have to. If you have to, I said.”

In this situation, what are the soldiers or their commanders supposed to do? There are many examples of the KPA using refugees to cover their movement and infiltrate their troops (a point the AP teams does its best to ignore or gloss over even though the evidence to the contrary is quite staggering). It was a bad situation for the soldiers and an even worse situation for the refugees, but what were the options?

Were there specific orders given from any officer present that day to fire on the refugees – although the AP would like to convince the reader otherwise, there is no documented order to fire on the approaching refugees and individuals there have conflicting accounts as to whether or not there were verbal orders given

The narrative the AP and much of the rabidly partisan and anti-military portions of the press and academia want to convey is that these blood thirsty/brainwashed troopers were ordered to fire on defenseless noncoms by wicked commanders who didn’t care how many pee-ons they put through the meat grinder … oh yeah, and they all liked it too. Furthermore, the AP and other pushers of that POV want the reader to believe there was no rationale for these orders (which there was) and any rationale given was baseless (which they weren’t). For Christ sake, look how many times the AP team was caught using fake witnesses or misrepresenting the interviews with the witnesses they had. If their story was that strong, they wouldn’t have needed to resort to such sloppy techniques and deliberate misrepresentation to make it.

Tell me, if you were an infantry man explain to me this: how could a group of civilians take sustained fire by an entire battalion for three days and any of them survive? That’s the story the AP is telling here. According to them, the 2-7 attacked these refugees nonstop for three days. If that were so, how did any of them survive?

Along the same lines, how did aerial surveillance taken ten days after this not find any bodies? Do you honestly think a couple hundred corpses could be stacked up under that rail bridge and the survivors would have taken to time to do this with the KPA only a few miles away and advancing on their position?

Its ridiculous on its face.

(WeldNeck, how can you, again and again, show such ignorance of basic facts of No Gun Ri and yet deign to have some right to shape the Misplaced Pages article on the subject to your liking -- i.e., pro-refugee killing? The bodies weren’t dragged in and stacked up; they were there to begin with, in heaps of dead later attested to from all sides, SKorean, NKorean and American. At least four GIs spoke of seeing “stacks,” “a crowd” etc. of dead; Garza, who walked among them, said, “They were stacked on top of one another, trying to prevent getting hit. … I saw little babies trying to nurse on dead mothers.” Every paragraph of this latest comment of yours is full of similar nonsense. What is “ridiculous” is that the Misplaced Pages community has allowed this stuff to be spewed out for so long, and to infect such an important article. Charles J. Hanley 22:18, 25 February 2014 (UTC) ) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cjhanley (talk • contribs)

More than likely, a few died when the mortars went off and a handful more when someone got jumpy and fired into them. That’s the extent of the “massacre”.

As for my POV – its really none of your business but let me assure you I am not, as you put it, trying to blame on the enlisted and junior officers to spare the “top dogs” in the service. WeldNeck (talk) 21:33, 20 February 2014 (UTC)

A lot to sift through here. As to meat puppetry you'll think what you want. You could be bateman or a his "fanboy", no way to know. On to McCloskey/Bateman- an awful lot of what you want believed is your opinion. Example- you throw MCC out because his experiences bias him in your opinion, but not Bateman, although you do allow he's drunk the koolaid. But it appears to9 this observer that McC's out because he supports Hanley's pov & bateman is in because his book suypports your pov. No logic there. You may not want to believe McC but your opinion isn't conclusive reason for others to disregard him. In addition I read thru McC statement just now and you badly misstate his opinion. He says nothing about inexperienced troops. His comment was regarding UNTRAINED troops. this is certainly one of my issues with the entire general staff in FE Command. Maybe MacArthur was too busy playing Emperor of Japan but his staff were not requiring that troops be trained up nor did division commanders do it. Here's a quote from SECDEF Bob Gates new book "The key to success, as with most things military,is training, education and above all, strong and principled leadership up and down the chain of command." Truman & Congress are to blame for not enough troops, but the Generals are to blame for untrained troops. I threw in the Gates b/c you were paraphrasing Rumsfeld. I'm afraid I have problems with your next point as well. There were not general guidelines- there were orders. I've read them. In the Army I knew, the brass didn't issue general guidelines, unless they were in CYA mode. But in this case, in this desperate time they were ordering that if refugees tried crossing/coming thru lines they were to be shot.Period. The Osborne excerpt is very powerful, but I can't tell whether the original story was hard news reporting or a 'this is what war is like' piece. I'd also feel a little more confident in the excerpt if it didn't have a major giving orders to a regimental commander But putting that aside for a minute it shows why war is such a bitch. That's why the existence of ORDERS in this instance is important. Let's be clear KILLING CIVILIANS is against the rulesPERIOD. So the regimental commander follows orders and hopes the USA wins the war. If North Korea wins"I was just following orders' doesn't help. He'd be just like all the fellows tried at Nuremburg. If the US wins he's committed war crimes but the Army doesn't care and they wouldn't go after the Gen'ls who gave the orders. If, as you suggest, he ordered his men to shoot civilians w/o orders from higher and his rationale is 'Gee it was a tough spot and what was I to do? Well then he could be in a world of hurt. It's as simple and unfair as that. But in war, fair isn't even in the same universe. Sherman didn't say "War can be a trying experience" now did he? HELL is what the man said. I'm not gonna debate infiltrators, they are a red herring. I'll also point out some inconsistency here. On the one hand you argue no orders, then bring up infiltrators to justify the orders. Infiltrators is a red herring because ordering troops to shoot civilians is aginst the rules. Refer back to previous sentences. OK- moving on "Were there specific orders give by an officer present?" Once in a while you write something that makes me question whether you have ever been in the military, or maybe you think you'll blow one by me. The Place officers would have been present at was a battalion in combat. Commander a major, at most LTC. At best 4 rifle companies, maybe a weapons platoon. He's not writing up orders, depending on the situation he calls them together, or uses the radio or sends one of his staff,xo,s1 etc to them. ORAL orders. The company commanders- CPT's or 1LT's- get their platoon ldrs together and pass on the order they got. Plt ldrs. go to squad ldrs. who then tell the men. Sorry to say- the point about no proof of orders may be true but there would not ever be written proof at that level- just not the way the Army works. You either know that or you don't. Inconsistency among the troops about whether orders were given. Well, DUH? That would have been true 40 minutes later, much less 40 years. Moving right along- the rant about the press and academia. That's not a not a knock on you, it is a rant & I do it myself all the time. I don't see it so much about the military but guns and politics. DON"T get me started. BUT- Hanley's book is very sympathetic to the grunts. I haven't read anything that attempts to paint them as bloodthirsty or that they liked doing what they were ordered to do. Seems to me Hanley's target are the Big Green Machine and the 'evils' of war. Referring to your comment about 'wicked commanders' I didn't see that in the book either. My personal opinion is that in a war, officers from platoon to corps/Army, give orders that result in men dying. By the time some LT's make it to stars they've learned that lesson. You can't do what needs to be done w/o men dying. Maybe it gets easier the further away you are, like the difference between a rifleman and a bombardier. If you haven't read any of Rick Atkinson's non-fiction trilogy about WW2, you really should. More about Atkinson later.

  Next topic- battalion firepower. 1st off- never said I was in the Inf. My dad was. I spent my time wearing crossed cannon. But I can answer your question b/c I do know small unit tactics and how the Army functions defensively. In terms of who would be shooting at the civilians, it would be only those troops who were dug in at the at the point the civilians approached. Maybe a a few squads, a platoon? And some mortar, firing from behind the front line. This is another of the things that make me wonder. You've hinted of military experience with jargon {norks,etc] but then you refer to non-combatants as noncoms, the previously mentioned expectation of written orders being issued from Battalion down to Company cmdrs in the field in combat and then the battalion firepower as if all the riflemen and machineguns in a battalion would be in the same place at the same time. Also, no one was attacking. They were in place shooting at the civilians and not non-stop. Whoops, the wife is telling me to get off the computer & get something done. Life, huh? To sum up for today. I can certainly see that you're pretty pissed about the bias in the press and academia. Join the club. But the specific angry comments don't hit their mark about this book. I mean bloodthirsty troops & all that. Not in the book, or this wiki art that I can see. Also- you assured me that you weren't looking to blame the troops and shield the brass but that is exactly where your 'logic' seems headed. Civilians WERE killed; if no orders were given to 2/7 then elements of that unit killed civilians w/o orders. This is exactly what Clinton's coverup said  blamed it on a few grunts, just like always. You may want to believe numbers of dead were lower than Hanley says, but even dozens is still killing civilians, it matters, because to be cynical/realistic about it, people found out about it. And your scenario seems to me to lead right to blaming a few frightened enlisted men and incompetewnt jr officers. You say that is not your intent but that's the direction of your arguments are going. Don't you see that or were you just blowing smoke up my butt figuring I'd go away. Bottom line- no blaming rifle platoon line troops on my watch. What puzzles me is why NOGUNRI? Why not Benghazi or the IRS, or Fast & Furious.````

Looks like I may have screwed up here. not all got in & I'm out of time. Try to fix it another day.Breckenridge51 (talk) 21:06, 22 February 2014 (UTC)

Investigations, 1999-2001 investigations

This section will be improved by:

• Recasting the first paragraph to clarify.
• Adding, improving sourcing.
• Restoring Army's years of dismissing allegations, and the specific reasons for the shootings cited by the Army report. (Again, critical elements deleted with nary an excuse from WeldNeck.)
• Adding a key quote from the prime minister's office regarding orders to shoot at No Gun Ri.
• Substituting a better quote from adviser McCloskey, and adding a quote from adviser Gen. Trainor regarding le0adership to blame.

Charles J. Hanley 19:41, 19 February 2014 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cjhanley (talk • contribs)

Legal framework

This section will be improved by trimming the unnecessarily wordy reference to the 1949 Geneva Conventions' status. Charles J. Hanley 22:50, 19 February 2014 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cjhanley (talk • contribs)

Further evidence emerges

This section will be improved by:

• Restoring the reference to the Army's acknowledging it had deliberately omitted the incriminating Muccio letter from its investigative report. (Outrageously, WeldNeck had removed this crucially important fact twice, from the article's body text and from the caption to the document excerpt, as usual without any attempt at justifying its removal. How could one justify trashing the most glaring example of the 2001 cover-up? Too glaring?)
• Improving sourcing.
• Inserting ex-soldier's testimony about shooting civilians.
• Noting new academic research that found much strafing of refugees in 1950.

Charles J. Hanley 23:06, 19 February 2014 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cjhanley (talk • contribs)

Aerial imagery, excavations

This section will be improved by trimming and being made more logical by, for example, putting the important explanation of the disposition of bodies (under the bridge etc.) in the first paragraph.

The paragraph "Archeological survey" was also weak, relying on prospective articles as sources and lacking the forensic team's final report and explanations, now inserted. The excavations are now incorporated under the "Aerial imagery" heading. Charles J. Hanley 14:39, 20 February 2014 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cjhanley (talk • contribs)

Just a word of caution - any attempt to downplay the most important piece of information and the only truly objective evidence will not be allowed. WeldNeck (talk) 17:23, 20 February 2014 (UTC)

What should be "not allowed," WeldNeck, is your arrogance. Meantime, the "only truly objective evidence" is a highly questionable and seriously questioned half-century-old roll of film whose key frames were spliced into it by unknown hands at Defense Intelligence, from a camera that couldn't see anyway under the bridge where the bodies were? What about the ream of documents showing orders to shoot refugees? They're not "objective"? What about the ambassador's letter and USAF operations chief's memo saying refugees are being deliberately killed? They dreamed that up? What about the hundreds of American bullets and bullet holes that forensic teams documented in the bridge's concrete? What about the bullet-damaged faces and bodies of survivors? What about the graves of the dead, and the July 26 memorials for the dead? What about the area residents and North Korean eyewitnesses and the GIs who agree with the survivors about heaps of dead in the tunnel, including Command Sgt. Maj. Garza's "two or three hundred piled up there"? What about the South Korean government's confirmation of a minimum of 218 casualties? What about the U.S. government's affirmation that they were killed by "small-arms fire, artillery and mortar fire, and strafing" -- a hell of a lot of firepower? The deeply suspect -- and, at the very least, irrelevant -- aerial recon photos eventually became the last flimsy refuge of a little band of flag-waving denialists who, bizarrely, argue out of one side of their mouths that the U.S. military had to kill refugees (after all, one was found carrying a radio!), and out of the other that No Gun Ri didn't happen, that the overwhelmingly powerful evidence should all be disregarded because... well, just say it ain't so, not our good ol' American military. And this article, sadly for the truth and sadly for Misplaced Pages's ideals, has been in the clutches of one of them, for too long. Charles J. Hanley 19:11, 3 March 2014 (UTC)

• highly questionable

Other than the fact that it is one of the few pieces of physical evidence and it absolutely demolishes claims that several hundred refugees were killed, what makes it “highly questionable”?

• seriously questioned

Seriously questioned by whom, the South Korean team who couldn’t be bothered to look at the originals when offered?

• half-century-old

What does age have to do with it?

• roll of film whose key frames were spliced into it by unknown hands at Defense Intelligence,

Index map were the only things spliced into the footage. Additionally, the DIA team cut frames around the railway tunnel for easier viewing. Originals from the overflight mission were available for the South Koreans to inspect if they chose to do so. An interesting observation is that the DIA analysists were not given the specifics so their analysis.

• from a camera that couldn't see anyway under the bridge where the bodies were?

The analysis were able to determine what was into the tunnel to a depth of three meters. Were the hundreds of bodies stacked in the rail tunnel intentionally placed in a location where the analysts could not see them, or was this mere coincidence?

• What about the ream of documents showing orders to shoot refugees? They're not "objective"? What about the ambassador's letter and USAF operations chief's memo saying refugees are being deliberately killed? They dreamed that up?

None of that is physical evidence as to what took place. The aerial footage is.

• What about the hundreds of American bullets and bullet holes that forensic teams documented in the bridge's concrete?

Interesting you should bring this up and I don’t really understand why its not in the article. The FBI team found a grand total of 316 bullets marks at both the culvert and tunnel. Considering the Korean claims that 7th Cavalry soldiers fired at them for up to four days with both machine guns and small arms for hours at a time something just doesn’t add up. How could there be only 316 bullet marks if thousands, potentially tens of thousands, of rounds were fired for four days?

The Koreans determined that 20 of the 50 bullets they were able to recover (not hundreds) were from 50 cal. With no eyewitnesses stating any strafing took place while the refugees were under the bridge these 50 cals must have come from a different engagement as the heavy weapon companies assigned to the battalion were only armed with 30 calliber machine guns.

• What about the graves of the dead,

What graves? To the best of my knowledge there hasn’t been one documented excavation of any grave or graves related to this event.

• and the July 26 memorials for the dead? What about the area residents and North Korean eyewitnesses and the GIs who agree with the survivors about heaps of dead in the tunnel, including Command Sgt.

What of the witnesses who recalled far fewer numbers of dead and injured? I know it wasn’t enough for the AP to twist their words out of context when reporting their story, but are you going to claim that every account is exactly the same?

• Maj. Garza's "two or three hundred piled up there"?

What physical evidence supports this?

• What about the South Korean government's confirmation of a minimum of 218 casualties?

Confirmation based upon what? 60 year old contradictory recollections?

• What about the U.S. government's affirmation that they were killed by "small-arms fire, artillery and mortar fire, and strafing" -- a hell of a lot of firepower?

Where does the DAIG report confirm that the numbers of dead are anywhere near what the Koreans claim?

• The deeply suspect

Suspect only to you evidently.

• -- and, at the very least, irrelevant

How can photographic evidence of the aftermath be irrelevant?

• -- aerial recon photos eventually became the last flimsy refuge of a little band of flag-waving denialists who, bizarrely, argue out of one side of their mouths that the U.S. military had to kill refugees (after all, one was found carrying a radio!)

I am not arguing that anyone had to do anything, only that there were severe aggravating and mitigating factors involved in these decisions.

• and out of the other that No Gun Ri didn't happen,

Never said it didn’t. No one says it didn’t. All I am arguing no one ordered the attack and claims of several hundred dead cannot be supported by any of the physical evidence.

• that the overwhelmingly powerful evidence should all be disregarded because... well, just say it ain't so, not our good ol' American military.

Eyewitness testimony, especially memories that have been contaminated by unethical teams of journalists are especially reliable. WeldNeck (talk) 20:30, 3 March 2014 (UTC)

Later developments

This section will be improved by expanding a footnote to list other No Gun Ri novels. Charles J. Hanley 15:31, 20 February 2014 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cjhanley (talk • contribs)

WSWS

The WSWS content seems rather odd; basically a summary of the web link (which duplicates most of this article) rather than just the additional information. Imagine if we did this for every source! Can someone help work any pertinent details into the right place in the body? --Errant 15:22, 19 February 2014 (UTC)

Yes, as noted above, that paragraph is either redundant with what the article already establishes, or is inaccurate. It will be dealt with. Thanks. Charles J. Hanley 16:39, 19 February 2014 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cjhanley (talk • contribs)

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