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The '''Zarqawi PSYOP program''' refers to a US ] program, or propaganda campaign, implemented as part of the ], exaggerating the importance of ] in ] and the ]. | The '''Zarqawi PSYOP program''' refers to a US ] program, or propaganda campaign, implemented as part of the ], exaggerating the importance of ] in ] and the ]. | ||
The program was primarily aimed at, but not limited to, the "Iraqi and Arab media" along with the "U.S. Home Audience," which was part of a "broader propaganda campaign." |
The program was primarily aimed at, but not limited to, the "Iraqi and Arab media" along with the "U.S. Home Audience," which was part of a "broader propaganda campaign."<ref name="WaPo">, The Washington Post, 10 April 2006</ref> | ||
<ref name="Salon"> Ignoring U.S. intelligence, Bush inflated Zarqawi, then made a pointless trip to Iraq to pose as a heroic dragon slayer. It doesn't work anymore, By Sidney Blumenthal, ], June 15, 2006</ref><ref name="CounterPunch1"> by Jennifer van Bergen, ], June 12, 2006</ref><ref name="Global_Research"> by Michel Chossudovsky, Global Research, June 09, 2006,</ref><ref name="CounterPunch2">, Patrick Cockburn, Counterpunch, June 9, 2006</ref><ref name="GRca"> by Michel Chossudovsky, ], April 18, 2006</ref><ref name="RollingStone"> by Tim Dickinson, ], April 11, 2006</ref><ref name="Daily_Kos"> by DelicateMonster, ], June 10, 2006 </ref> | <ref name="Salon"> Ignoring U.S. intelligence, Bush inflated Zarqawi, then made a pointless trip to Iraq to pose as a heroic dragon slayer. It doesn't work anymore, By Sidney Blumenthal, ], June 15, 2006</ref><ref name="CounterPunch1"> by Jennifer van Bergen, ], June 12, 2006</ref><ref name="Global_Research"> by Michel Chossudovsky, Global Research, June 09, 2006,</ref><ref name="CounterPunch2">, Patrick Cockburn, Counterpunch, June 9, 2006</ref><ref name="GRca"> by Michel Chossudovsky, ], April 18, 2006</ref><ref name="RollingStone"> by Tim Dickinson, ], April 11, 2006</ref><ref name="Daily_Kos"> by DelicateMonster, ], June 10, 2006 </ref> | ||
One of the goals was to set up local citizens against him by portraying him as a foreigner and key actor in the insurgency. <ref name="WaPo"/> However, ] reported that, according to a "military source," this campaign ultimately revolved around "domestic political reasons."<ref name="Salon"/> | One of the goals was to set up local citizens against him by portraying him as a foreigner and key actor in the insurgency. <ref name="WaPo"/> However, ] reported that, according to a "military source," this campaign ultimately revolved around "domestic political reasons."<ref name="Salon"/> Which an article hosted by ] describes as: | ||
:''It builds the case for war out of whole cloth. Zarqawi has become the central justification for the ongoing occupation; a threatening, spectral figure who embodies the evils of terrorism.''<ref name="ICH"> By Mike Whitney, Information Clearing House</ref> | |||
==Rise to power== | ==Rise to power== | ||
Prior to the involvement of Zarqawi in the Iraqi insurgency, he was jailed in Jordan for attempting to overthrow the government. He was arrested while in possession of explosives and given a 5 year sentence. Upon release from the Jordanian prison in 1999, Zarqawi's involvement in an attempt to blow up the Radisson SAS hotel in Jordan was exposed and he fled the country. According to court testimony by Zarqwai followers he was able to secure funds from al-Qaeda to setup a training camp near Herat. <ref name="WPBio">{{cite news | title=Al-Zarqawi's Biography | date=], ] | publisher=] | url=http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/08/AR2006060800299.html?nav=rss_world/africa }}</ref> | |||
Several incidents turned him from an unknown and unimportant individual into the well-known voice of Al Qaeda in Iraq.<ref name="CounterPunch2"/><ref> By ], ], June 30, 2006</ref> Following the allegation he was a link between ] and ] (used as ]<ref name="GRca2"> by Michel Chossudovsky, GlobalResearch, May 15, 2006</ref>), by ] before the ] in 2003, he became the embodiment of resistance against the US in the Muslim world. Another stimulus for his popularity was the ] by the Bush administration. After the capture of Saddam Hussein the Bush administration accused him of being behind the continuing mishaps in Iraq, or, as Patrick Cockburn commented in an editorial for Counterpunch Newsletter: | Several incidents turned him from an unknown and unimportant individual into the well-known voice of Al Qaeda in Iraq.<ref name="CounterPunch2"/><ref> By ], ], June 30, 2006</ref> Following the allegation he was a link between ] and ] (used as ]<ref name="GRca2"> by Michel Chossudovsky, GlobalResearch, May 15, 2006</ref>), by ] before the ] in 2003, he became the embodiment of resistance against the US in the Muslim world. Another stimulus for his popularity was the ] by the Bush administration. After the capture of Saddam Hussein the Bush administration accused him of being behind the continuing mishaps in Iraq, or, as Patrick Cockburn commented in an editorial for Counterpunch Newsletter: | ||
:''"No sooner had Saddam Hussein been captured than the US spokesmen began to mention al-Zarqawi's name in every sentence."''<ref name="CounterPunch2"/> | :''"No sooner had Saddam Hussein been captured than the US spokesmen began to mention al-Zarqawi's name in every sentence."''<ref name="CounterPunch2"/> | ||
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:''What is rarely mentioned is that this outside enemy Al Qaeda is a CIA "intelligence asset", used in covert operations.'' | :''What is rarely mentioned is that this outside enemy Al Qaeda is a CIA "intelligence asset", used in covert operations.'' | ||
==Program== | |||
] | |||
The ] reported on April 10, 2006, that the role of Zarqawi was magnified by the ] in a ] campaign started in 2004. In the words of the Washington Post: | |||
:''For the past two years, U.S. military leaders have been using Iraqi media and other outlets in Baghdad to publicize Zarqawi's role in the insurgency. The documents explicitly list the "U.S. Home Audience" as one of the targets of a broader propaganda campaign.''<ref name="WaPo"/> | |||
Part of the goals was to inflame Iraqi citizens against him by focusing on his terrorist activities and status as a foreigner.<ref name="WaPo"/><ref name="CounterPunch1"/> | |||
] reported on such propaganda campaigns in foreign ] by the US: | |||
:''The Pentagon acknowledged in a newly declassified document that the US public is increasingly exposed to propaganda disseminated overseas in psychological operations.'' <ref name="AP"> by Agence France Presse, January 27, 2006</ref> | |||
US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has approved the document, which is called "]." <ref name="AP"/> The document acknowledges the ], adopted in 1948, which explicitly forbids information and psychological operations aimed at the US public, but fails to offer any way of limiting the effect this program has on domestic audiences.<ref name="NSA"> by ], January 26, 2006</ref><ref name="Lamb"> by ], senior fellow in the ] at the ] and has been Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Resources and Plans.</ref><ref name="BBC"> By Adam Brookes, ], January 27, 2006 </ref> | |||
==Quotes== | ==Quotes== | ||
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{{War on Terrorism}} | |||
==References== | ==References== |
Revision as of 09:32, 18 July 2006
It has been suggested that this article be merged into Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. (Discuss) |
The Zarqawi PSYOP program refers to a US Psychological operations program, or propaganda campaign, implemented as part of the War on Terror, exaggerating the importance of Al Zarqawi in Al Qaeda and the Iraq insurgency.
The program was primarily aimed at, but not limited to, the "Iraqi and Arab media" along with the "U.S. Home Audience," which was part of a "broader propaganda campaign."
One of the goals was to set up local citizens against him by portraying him as a foreigner and key actor in the insurgency. However, Sidney Blumenthal reported that, according to a "military source," this campaign ultimately revolved around "domestic political reasons." Which an article hosted by Information Clearing House describes as:
- It builds the case for war out of whole cloth. Zarqawi has become the central justification for the ongoing occupation; a threatening, spectral figure who embodies the evils of terrorism.
Rise to power
Several incidents turned him from an unknown and unimportant individual into the well-known voice of Al Qaeda in Iraq. Following the allegation he was a link between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda (used as casus belli), by Colin Powell before the UN Security Council in 2003, he became the embodiment of resistance against the US in the Muslim world. Another stimulus for his popularity was the invasion of Iraq by the Bush administration. After the capture of Saddam Hussein the Bush administration accused him of being behind the continuing mishaps in Iraq, or, as Patrick Cockburn commented in an editorial for Counterpunch Newsletter:
- "No sooner had Saddam Hussein been captured than the US spokesmen began to mention al-Zarqawi's name in every sentence."
In the wake of his assasination, which had erroneously been reported several times before, the US produced a video showing him to be the opposite of what the media previously advocated him to be. Michel Chossudovsky from the Centre for Research on Globalization made this observation:
- The video portrays "Terror Mastermind" Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi acting in a "foolish" and "incompetent" fashion.
The article suggests that this might also be part of "successful propaganda." It continues with:
- What is rarely mentioned is that this outside enemy Al Qaeda is a CIA "intelligence asset", used in covert operations.
Program
The Washington Post reported on April 10, 2006, that the role of Zarqawi was magnified by the Pentagon in a psychological operations campaign started in 2004. In the words of the Washington Post:
- For the past two years, U.S. military leaders have been using Iraqi media and other outlets in Baghdad to publicize Zarqawi's role in the insurgency. The documents explicitly list the "U.S. Home Audience" as one of the targets of a broader propaganda campaign.
Part of the goals was to inflame Iraqi citizens against him by focusing on his terrorist activities and status as a foreigner.
Agence France Presse reported on such propaganda campaigns in foreign media by the US:
- The Pentagon acknowledged in a newly declassified document that the US public is increasingly exposed to propaganda disseminated overseas in psychological operations.
US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has approved the document, which is called "Information Operations Roadmap." The document acknowledges the Smith-Mundt Act, adopted in 1948, which explicitly forbids information and psychological operations aimed at the US public, but fails to offer any way of limiting the effect this program has on domestic audiences.
Quotes
The Washington post cites Col. Derek Harvey who said at a meeting by the Army in Fort Leavenworth:
- "Our own focus on Zarqawi has enlarged his caricature, if you will - made him more important than he really is, in some ways."
Citing an internal memo by Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, the senior commander in charge, the Washington Post states:
- "The Zarqawi PSYOP program is the most successful information campaign to date."
According to the same article:
- A goal of the campaign was to drive a wedge into the insurgency by emphasizing Zarqawi's terrorist acts and foreign origin, said officers familiar with the program.
Michel Chossudovsky in an editorial for the Centre for Research on Globalization commented:
- The internal military documents leaked to Washington Post confirm that the Pentagon is involved in an ongoing propaganda campaign which seeks to provide a face to the enemy. The purpose is to portray the enemy as a terrorist, to mislead public opinion.
and another quote states:
- "Without Zarqawi and bin Laden, the "war on terrorism" would loose its raison d'être. The main casus belli is to wage a " war on terrorism."
See also
- Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
- Doublespeak
- Information Operations Roadmap
- Iraq war
- Newspeak
- Propaganda
- Psychological operations (United States)
- Psychological warfare
- PSYOP
- Smith-Mundt Act
- War on Terrorism
References
- ^ Military Plays Up Role of Zarqawi By Thomas E. Ricks, The Washington Post, 10 April 2006
- ^ "Mission Accomplished" in a business suit Ignoring U.S. intelligence, Bush inflated Zarqawi, then made a pointless trip to Iraq to pose as a heroic dragon slayer. It doesn't work anymore, By Sidney Blumenthal, Salon, June 15, 2006
- ^ Was There a Legal Basis for His Assassination? The Story Behind Zarqawi's Death by Jennifer van Bergen, CounterPunch, June 12, 2006
- Who was Abu Musab al Zarqawi? by Michel Chossudovsky, Global Research, June 09, 2006,
- ^ America Put Him in the Big Time The Short, Strange Career of Abu Masab al-Zarqawi, Patrick Cockburn, Counterpunch, June 9, 2006
- ^ Who is behind "Al Qaeda in Iraq"? Pentagon acknowledges fabricating a "Zarqawi Legend" by Michel Chossudovsky, GlobalResearch, April 18, 2006
- ^ Hyping Zarqawi by Tim Dickinson, Rolling Stone, April 11, 2006
- Updated: Anatomy of a Lie: The Zarqawi Psy-Ops, and an opportune death by DelicateMonster, Daily Kos, June 10, 2006
- Zarqawi; the Pentagon’s ongoing war of deception By Mike Whitney, Information Clearing House
- The Myth of Al Qaeda Before 9/11, Osama bin Laden’s group was small and fractious. How Washington helped to build it into a global threat By Michael Hirsh, Newsweek, June 30, 2006
- ^ Pentagon PSYOP: "Terror Mastermind" Abu Musab Al Zarqawi is "Incompetent" by Michel Chossudovsky, GlobalResearch, May 15, 2006
- Abu Musab al-Zarqawi: Dead Again By Kurt Nimmo, Kurtnimmo.com, June 8, 2006
- ^ US Propaganda Aimed at Foreigners Reaches US Public: Pentagon Document by Agence France Presse, January 27, 2006
- Rumsfeld's Roadmap to Propaganda - Secret Pentagon "roadmap" calls for "boundaries" between "information operations" abroad and at home but provides no actual limits as long as US doesn't "target" Americans by National Security Archive, January 26, 2006
- Operations as a core competency by Christopher J. Lamb, senior fellow in the Institute for National Security Studies at the National Defense University and has been Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Resources and Plans.HTML version
- US plans to 'fight the net' revealed By Adam Brookes, BBC, January 27, 2006