Zarqawi PSYOP program: Difference between revisions

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	The '''Zarqawi PSYOP program''' refers to a US ] program, or propaganda campaign exaggerating the importance of ] in ] and the ].		The '''Zarqawi PSYOP program''' refers to a US ] program, or propaganda campaign exaggerating the importance of ] in ] and the ].

	The program was allegedly primarily aimed at, but not limited to, the "Iraqi and Arab media" along with the "U.S. Home Audience," which was part of a "broader propaganda campaign."<ref name="WaPo"> By Thomas E. Ricks, The ], April 10, 2006</ref><ref name="Salon"> by ], ], June 15, 2006</ref><ref name="CounterPunch1"> by Jennifer van Bergen, ], June 12, 2006~~</ref><ref name="Global_Research"> by Michel Chossudovsky, Global Research, June 09, 2006,~~</ref><ref name="CounterPunch2"> by Patrick Cockburn, Counterpunch, June 9~~, 2006</ref><ref name="GRca"> by Michel Chossudovsky, ], April 18~~, 2006</ref><ref name="RollingStone"> by Tim Dickinson, ], April 11, 2006</ref>		The program was allegedly primarily aimed at, but not limited to, the "Iraqi and Arab media" along with the "U.S. Home Audience," which was part of a "broader propaganda campaign."<ref name="WaPo"> By Thomas E. Ricks, The ], April 10, 2006</ref>
			<ref name="Salon"> by ], ], June 15, 2006</ref><ref name="CounterPunch1"> by Jennifer van Bergen, ], June 12, 2006</ref><ref name="CounterPunch2"> by Patrick Cockburn, Counterpunch, June 9, 2006</ref><ref name="RollingStone"> by Tim Dickinson, ], April 11, 2006</ref>
			The article goes on to explain:
			<blockquote>''That slide, created by Casey's subordinates, does not specifically state that U.S. citizens were being targeted by the effort, but other sections of the briefings indicate that there were direct military efforts to use the U.S. media to affect views of the war.''</blockquote>

	~~One~~ of the ~~presented goals~~ was to alienate local citizens from him by portraying him as a foreigner and key actor in the insurgency.<ref name="WaPo"/> However, ] reported that, according to a "military source," ~~this~~ ~~campaign~~ ~~ultimately~~ ~~revolved~~ ~~around~~ "domestic political reasons."<ref name="Salon"/> ~~Which an article hosted by ] describes as:~~		The goal of the program was to alienate local citizens from him by portraying him as a foreigner and key actor in the insurgency.<ref name="WaPo"/> However, ] reported that, according to a "military source," Rumsfeld and the White House resisted degrading Zarqawi's image for "domestic political reasons,"<ref name="Salon"/>
	<blockquote>''It builds the case for war out of whole cloth. Zarqawi has become the central justification for the ongoing occupation; a threatening, spectral figure who embodies the evils of terrorism.''<ref name="ICH"> By Mike Whitney, Information Clearing House</ref></blockquote>

	==Program==		==Program==
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	Nevertheless, the slide did not specifically assert the program targeted U.S. citizens. Although other parts of the briefings did suggest it was directed at the U.S. media to alter the view of the war.		Nevertheless, the slide did not specifically assert the program targeted U.S. citizens. Although other parts of the briefings did suggest it was directed at the U.S. media to alter the view of the war.

	Another slide in the briefing noted a "selective leak" to reporter Dexter Filkins, about a letter boasting of suicide attacks in Iraq and allegedly written by Zarqawi. ~~He used that information for an article<ref> By DEXTER FILKINS, New York Times, February 9, 2004</ref> in the ].<ref name="RollingStone"/>~~ Contacted by the Post Filkins commented he was skeptical at the time, and still is, about the document's authenticity.~~<ref name="WaPo"/>~~		Another slide in the briefing noted a "selective leak" to ] reporter Dexter Filkins, about a letter boasting of suicide attacks in Iraq and allegedly written by Zarqawi. Contacted by the Post Filkins commented he was skeptical at the time, and still is, about the document's authenticity.

		⚫	Responding to the articles reported psychological operations aimed at Americans, Army Col. James A. Treadwell, commander of the U.S. military psyops unit in Iraq but no longer present as the program was started, said that ''"It is ingrained in U.S.: You don't psyop Americans. We just don't do it,"''. Another officer commented in the Post that, although all material provided was in Arabic, the campaign probably ''"probably raised his profile in the American press's view."'' The Post continues that, according to an officer familiar with the case, this program was not related to another program which was linked to the ].<ref name="WaPo"/>
	According to Sidney Blumenthal, in an article for ], a military source told him that, for ultimately "domestic political reasons," Rumsfeld and the White House resisted degrading the dramatically inflated image of Zarqawi.<ref name="Salon"/>

⚫	Responding to the ~~in the Post~~ reported psychological operations aimed at Americans, Army Col. James A. Treadwell, commander of the U.S. military psyops unit in Iraq but no longer present as the program was started, said that ~~the~~ US ~~doesn~~'t do ~~that~~. Another officer commented in the Post that, although all material provided was in Arabic, the campaign probably ~~influenced~~ ~~the~~ ~~view~~ of the ~~] raising~~ ~~his profile~~. The Post continues that, according to an officer familiar with the case, this program was not related to another program which was linked to the ].<ref name="WaPo"/>

	By focusing on his terrorist activities and status as a foreigner the US tried to inflame Iraqi citizens against him.<ref name="WaPo"/><ref name="RollingStone"/><ref name="CounterPunch1"/> Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, the senior commander in charge, remarked, according to the Washington Post:		By focusing on his terrorist activities and status as a foreigner the US tried to inflame Iraqi citizens against him.<ref name="WaPo"/><ref name="RollingStone"/><ref name="CounterPunch1"/> Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, the senior commander in charge, remarked, according to the Washington Post:
	<blockquote>''"The Zarqawi PSYOP program is the most successful information campaign to date."''<ref name="WaPo"/><ref name="RollingStone"/></blockquote>		<blockquote>''"The Zarqawi PSYOP program is the most successful information campaign to date."''<ref name="WaPo"/><ref name="RollingStone"/></blockquote>

	] in an editorial for the ] suggested another goal for this campaign; which was the intend to mislead the US public by giving them a tangible enemy in the form of terrorists.<ref name="GRca"/> He remarks:
	<blockquote>''"Without Zarqawi and bin Laden, the "war on terrorism" would loose its ]. The main ] is to wage a " war on terrorism."'' <ref name="GRca"/></blockquote>

	==Rise to power==		==Rise to power==
	{{main\|Abu Musab al-Zarqawi}}		{{main\|Abu Musab al-Zarqawi}}
			Prior to the involvement of Zarqawi in the Iraqi insurgency, he was jailed in Jordan for attempting to overthrow the government. He was arrested while in possession of explosives and given a 5 year sentence. Upon release from the Jordanian prison in 1999, Zarqawi's involvement in an attempt to blow up the Radisson SAS hotel in Jordan was exposed and he fled the country. According to court testimony by Zarqwai followers he was able to secure funds from al-Qaeda to setup a training camp near Herat. <ref name="WPBio">{{cite news \| title=Al-Zarqawi's Biography \| date=], ] \| publisher=] \| url=http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/08/AR2006060800299.html?nav=rss_world/africa }}</ref>

	~~Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was already involved in terrorism, but several~~ incidents turned him from an unknown and unimportant indicidual into the well-known voice of Al Qaeda in Iraq.<ref name="CounterPunch2"/><ref name="Newsweek"> By ], ], June 30, 2006</ref> Following the allegation he was a link between ] and ] ~~(used as ]<ref name="Salon"/><ref name="GRca2"> by Michel Chossudovsky, GlobalResearch, May 15, 2006</ref>)~~, by ] before the ] in ], he became the embodiment of resistance against the US in the Muslim world. Then the ] by the Bush administration became another boost for his popularity. After the capture of Saddam Hussein the Bush administration accused him of being behind the continuing mishaps in Iraq, or, as Patrick Cockburn commented in an editorial for Counterpunch Newsletter:		Several incidents turned him from an unknown and unimportant indicidual into the well-known voice of Al Qaeda in Iraq.<ref name="CounterPunch2"/><ref name="Newsweek"> By ], ], June 30, 2006</ref> Following the allegation he was a link between ] and ], by ] before the ] in ], he became the embodiment of resistance against the US in the Muslim world. Then the ] by the Bush administration became another boost for his popularity. After the capture of Saddam Hussein the Bush administration accused him of being behind the continuing mishaps in Iraq, or, as Patrick Cockburn commented in an editorial for Counterpunch Newsletter:
	<blockquote>''"No sooner had Saddam Hussein been captured than the US spokesmen began to mention al-Zarqawi's name in every sentence."''<ref name="CounterPunch2"/></blockquote>		<blockquote>''"No sooner had Saddam Hussein been captured than the US spokesmen began to mention al-Zarqawi's name in every sentence."''<ref name="CounterPunch2"/></blockquote>

	Articles in the Wahington Post~~, Rolling Stone~~, Newsweek and Counterpunch ~~Newsletter~~ suggest his increased notoriety was the ~~result~~ of an orchestrated effort involving psychological operations.<ref name="WaPo~~"/><ref name="RollingStone~~"/><ref name="Newsweek"/><ref name="CounterPunch2"/>		Articles in the Wahington Post, Newsweek and Counterpunch Newslewtter suggest his increased notoriety was the resilt of an orchestrated effort involving psychological operations.<ref name="WaPo"/><ref name="Newsweek"/><ref name="CounterPunch2"/>

	In the wake of his assasination, which had erroneously been reported several times before, the ~~U.S.~~ military produced a video showing him to be the opposite of what the media previously advocated him to be. ~~] from the ] made this observation:~~		In the wake of his assasination, which had erroneously been reported several times before, the United States military produced a video showing him to be the opposite of what the media previously advocated him to be.
	<blockquote>''The video portrays "Terror Mastermind" Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi acting in a "foolish" and "incompetent" fashion.''<ref name="GRca2"/></blockquote>
	The article suggests that this might also be part of "successful propaganda." The editorial continues with:
	<blockquote>''What is rarely mentioned is that this outside enemy Al Qaeda is a CIA "intelligence asset", used in covert operations.''</blockquote>

	==Effect of US PSYOP on domestic audiences==
	{{see\| Psychological operations (United States)\| Psychological warfare}}

	The ], adopted in ], explicitly forbids information and psychological operations aimed at the US public.<ref name="NSA"> by ], January 26, 2006</ref><ref name="Lamb"> by ], senior fellow in the ] at the ] and has been Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Resources and Plans.</ref> Nevertheless, the current easy access to news and information from around the globe, makes it difficult to guarantee PSYOP programs do not reach the US public. Or, in the words of Army Col. James A. Treadwell, who commanded the U.S. military psyops unit in Iraq in 2003, in the Washington Post:
	<blockquote>''There's always going to be a certain amount of bleed-over with the global information environment.''<ref name="WaPo"/></blockquote>
	] reported on U.S. propaganda campaigns that:
	<blockquote>''The Pentagon acknowledged in a newly declassified document that the US public is increasingly exposed to propaganda disseminated overseas in psychological operations.'' <ref name="AP"> by Agence France Presse, January 27, 2006</ref></blockquote>
	US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has approved that document, which is called "]." <ref name="AP"/> The document acknowledges the ], but fails to offer any way of limiting the effect this program has on domestic audiences.<ref name="NSA"/><ref name="Lamb"/><ref name="BBC"> By Adam Brookes, ], January 27, 2006 </ref> And, although the Information Operations Roadmap does not specifically mention the Zarqawi PSYOP program, it shows the general dilemma psychological operations pose regarding the effect they potentially have on the US home audience.

	==Quotes==		==Quotes==
	The Washington post cites Col. Derek Harvey who said at a meeting by the Army in ]:		The Washington post cites Col. Derek Harvey who said at a meeting by the Army in ]:
	<blockquote>''"Our own focus on Zarqawi has enlarged his caricature, if you will - made him more important than he really is, in some ways."''<ref name="WaPo"/><ref name="RollingStone"/></blockquote>		<blockquote>''"Our own focus on Zarqawi has enlarged his caricature, if you will - made him more important than he really is, in some ways."''<ref name="WaPo"/><ref name="RollingStone"/></blockquote>

	] observed in ]:
	<blockquote>''The internal military documents leaked to Washington Post confirm that the Pentagon is involved in an ongoing propaganda campaign which seeks to provide a face to the enemy. The purpose is to portray the enemy as a terrorist, to mislead public opinion.''<ref name="GRca"/></blockquote>

	==See also==		==See also==
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Revision as of 19:38, 21 July 2006

It has been suggested that this article be merged into Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. (Discuss)

File:Zarqawi.jpg

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

The Zarqawi PSYOP program refers to a US Psychological operations program, or propaganda campaign exaggerating the importance of Al Zarqawi in Al Qaeda and the Iraq insurgency.

The program was allegedly primarily aimed at, but not limited to, the "Iraqi and Arab media" along with the "U.S. Home Audience," which was part of a "broader propaganda campaign." The article goes on to explain:

That slide, created by Casey's subordinates, does not specifically state that U.S. citizens were being targeted by the effort, but other sections of the briefings indicate that there were direct military efforts to use the U.S. media to affect views of the war.

The goal of the program was to alienate local citizens from him by portraying him as a foreigner and key actor in the insurgency. However, Sidney Blumenthal reported that, according to a "military source," Rumsfeld and the White House resisted degrading Zarqawi's image for "domestic political reasons,"

Program

The Washington Post reported on April 10, 2006, that the role of Zarqawi was magnified by the Pentagon in a psychological operations campaign started in 2004. In the words of the Washington Post:

For the past two years, U.S. military leaders have been using Iraqi media and other outlets in Baghdad to publicize Zarqawi's role in the insurgency. The documents explicitly list the "U.S. Home Audience" as one of the targets of a broader propaganda campaign.

The article goes on to explain that a slide created for a briefing by Army Gen. George W. Casey Jr,

describes the "home audience" as one of six major targets of the American side of the war.

Nevertheless, the slide did not specifically assert the program targeted U.S. citizens. Although other parts of the briefings did suggest it was directed at the U.S. media to alter the view of the war.

Another slide in the briefing noted a "selective leak" to New York Times reporter Dexter Filkins, about a letter boasting of suicide attacks in Iraq and allegedly written by Zarqawi. Contacted by the Post Filkins commented he was skeptical at the time, and still is, about the document's authenticity.

Responding to the articles reported psychological operations aimed at Americans, Army Col. James A. Treadwell, commander of the U.S. military psyops unit in Iraq but no longer present as the program was started, said that "It is ingrained in U.S.: You don't psyop Americans. We just don't do it,". Another officer commented in the Post that, although all material provided was in Arabic, the campaign probably "probably raised his profile in the American press's view." The Post continues that, according to an officer familiar with the case, this program was not related to another program which was linked to the Lincoln Group.

By focusing on his terrorist activities and status as a foreigner the US tried to inflame Iraqi citizens against him. Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, the senior commander in charge, remarked, according to the Washington Post:

"The Zarqawi PSYOP program is the most successful information campaign to date."

Rise to power

Main article: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi

Prior to the involvement of Zarqawi in the Iraqi insurgency, he was jailed in Jordan for attempting to overthrow the government. He was arrested while in possession of explosives and given a 5 year sentence. Upon release from the Jordanian prison in 1999, Zarqawi's involvement in an attempt to blow up the Radisson SAS hotel in Jordan was exposed and he fled the country. According to court testimony by Zarqwai followers he was able to secure funds from al-Qaeda to setup a training camp near Herat.

Several incidents turned him from an unknown and unimportant indicidual into the well-known voice of Al Qaeda in Iraq. Following the allegation he was a link between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda, by Colin Powell before the UN Security Council in 2003, he became the embodiment of resistance against the US in the Muslim world. Then the invasion of Iraq by the Bush administration became another boost for his popularity. After the capture of Saddam Hussein the Bush administration accused him of being behind the continuing mishaps in Iraq, or, as Patrick Cockburn commented in an editorial for Counterpunch Newsletter:

"No sooner had Saddam Hussein been captured than the US spokesmen began to mention al-Zarqawi's name in every sentence."

Articles in the Wahington Post, Newsweek and Counterpunch Newslewtter suggest his increased notoriety was the resilt of an orchestrated effort involving psychological operations.

In the wake of his assasination, which had erroneously been reported several times before, the United States military produced a video showing him to be the opposite of what the media previously advocated him to be.

Quotes

The Washington post cites Col. Derek Harvey who said at a meeting by the Army in Fort Leavenworth:

"Our own focus on Zarqawi has enlarged his caricature, if you will - made him more important than he really is, in some ways."

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