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| ==Rise to power== | ==Rise to power== | ||
| {{main|Abu Musab al-Zarqawi}} | {{main|Abu Musab al-Zarqawi}} | ||
| Prior to the involvement of Zarqawi in the Iraqi insurgency, he was jailed in Jordan for attempting to overthrow the government. He was arrested while in possession of explosives and given a 5 year sentence. Upon release from the Jordanian prison in 1999, Zarqawi's involvement in an attempt to blow up the Radisson SAS hotel in Jordan was exposed and he fled the country. According to court testimony by Zarqwai followers he was able to secure funds from al-Qaeda to setup a training camp near Herat. <ref name="WPBio">{{cite news | title=Al-Zarqawi's Biography | date=], ] | publisher=] | url=http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/08/AR2006060800299.html?nav=rss_world/africa }}</ref> | |||
| Several incidents turned Abu Musab al-Zarqawi from an unknown and unimportant terrorist into the well-known voice of Al Qaeda in ].<ref name="CounterPunch2"/><ref name="Newsweek"> By ], ], June 30, 2006</ref> Newsweek continues by commenting that initially he was largely unconnected to Saddam Hussein, and not part of ]'s group.<ref name="Newsweek"/> Following the allegation he was a link between ] and ] (used as ]<ref name="Salon"/><ref name="Newsweek"/><ref name="GRca2"> by Michel Chossudovsky, GlobalResearch, May 15, 2006</ref>), by ] before the ] in ], he became the embodiment of resistance against the US in the Muslim world. Then the ] by the Bush administration became another boost for his popularity, which ] in Newsweek describes as: | Several incidents turned Abu Musab al-Zarqawi from an unknown and unimportant terrorist into the well-known voice of Al Qaeda in ].<ref name="CounterPunch2"/><ref name="Newsweek"> By ], ], June 30, 2006</ref> Newsweek continues by commenting that initially he was largely unconnected to Saddam Hussein, and not part of ]'s group.<ref name="Newsweek"/> Following the allegation he was a link between ] and ] (used as ]<ref name="Salon"/><ref name="Newsweek"/><ref name="GRca2"> by Michel Chossudovsky, GlobalResearch, May 15, 2006</ref>), by ] before the ] in ], he became the embodiment of resistance against the US in the Muslim world. Then the ] by the Bush administration became another boost for his popularity, which ] in Newsweek describes as: | ||
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| In the wake of his assasination, which had erroneously been reported several times before, the U.S. military produced a video showing him to be the opposite of what the ] previously advocated him to be. | In the wake of his assasination, which had erroneously been reported several times before, the U.S. military produced a video showing him to be the opposite of what the ] previously advocated him to be. | ||
| ==Quotes== | ==Quotes== | ||
Revision as of 01:13, 22 July 2006
 | It has been suggested that this article be merged into Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. (Discuss) |
The Zarqawi PSYOP program refers to a US Psychological operations program, or propaganda campaign exaggerating the importance of Al Zarqawi in Al Qaeda and the Iraq insurgency.
The program was allegedly primarily aimed at, but not limited to, the "Iraqi and Arab media" along with the "U.S. Home Audience," which was part of a "broader propaganda campaign."
The goal of the program was to alienate local citizens from him by portraying him as a foreigner and key actor in the insurgency.
Program
The Washington Post reported on April 10, 2006, that the role of Zarqawi was magnified by the Pentagon in a psychological operations campaign started in 2004. In the words of the Washington Post:
For the past two years, U.S. military leaders have been using Iraqi media and other outlets in Baghdad to publicize Zarqawi's role in the insurgency. The documents explicitly list the "U.S. Home Audience" as one of the targets of a broader propaganda campaign.
The article goes on to explain that a slide created for a briefing by Army Gen. George W. Casey Jr,
describes the "home audience" as one of six major targets of the American side of the war.
Nevertheless, the slide did not specifically assert the program targeted U.S. citizens. Although other parts of the briefings did suggest it was directed at the U.S. media to alter the view of the war.
Another slide in the briefing noted a "selective leak" to reporter Dexter Filkins, about a letter boasting of suicide attacks in Iraq and allegedly written by Zarqawi. He used that information for an article in the New York Times. Contacted by the Post Filkins commented he was skeptical at the time, and still is, about the document's authenticity.
According to Sidney Blumenthal, in an article for Salon, a military source told him that, for ultimately "domestic political reasons," Donald Rumsfeld and the White House resisted degrading the dramatically inflated image of Zarqawi.
Responding to the in the Post reported psychological operations aimed at Americans, Army Col. James A. Treadwell, commander of the U.S. military psyops unit in Iraq but no longer present as the program was started, said that the US doesn't do that. Another officer commented in the Post that, although all material provided was in Arabic, the campaign probably influenced the view of the American press raising his profile. The Post continues that, according to an officer familiar with the case, this program was not related to another program which was linked to the Lincoln Group.
By focusing on his terrorist activities and status as a foreigner the US tried to inflame Iraqi citizens against him. Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, the senior commander in charge, remarked, according to the Washington Post:
"The Zarqawi PSYOP program is the most successful information campaign to date."
Rise to power
Main article: Abu Musab al-ZarqawiPrior to the involvement of Zarqawi in the Iraqi insurgency, he was jailed in Jordan for attempting to overthrow the government. He was arrested while in possession of explosives and given a 5 year sentence. Upon release from the Jordanian prison in 1999, Zarqawi's involvement in an attempt to blow up the Radisson SAS hotel in Jordan was exposed and he fled the country. According to court testimony by Zarqwai followers he was able to secure funds from al-Qaeda to setup a training camp near Herat.
Several incidents turned Abu Musab al-Zarqawi from an unknown and unimportant terrorist into the well-known voice of Al Qaeda in Iraq. Newsweek continues by commenting that initially he was largely unconnected to Saddam Hussein, and not part of bin Laden's group. Following the allegation he was a link between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda (used as casus belli), by Colin Powell before the UN Security Council in 2003, he became the embodiment of resistance against the US in the Muslim world. Then the invasion of Iraq by the Bush administration became another boost for his popularity, which Michael Hirsch in Newsweek describes as:
the Iraq invasion gave Zarqawi a chance to blossom on his own as a jihadi.
After the capture of Saddam Hussein the Bush administration accused him of being behind the continuing mishaps in Iraq, or, as Patrick Cockburn commented in an editorial for Counterpunch Newsletter:
"No sooner had Saddam Hussein been captured than the US spokesmen began to mention al-Zarqawi's name in every sentence."
Articles in the Washington Post, Rolling Stone, Newsweek and Counterpunch Newsletter suggest his increased notoriety, as illustrated above, was the result of an orchestrated effort involving psychological operations.
In the wake of his assasination, which had erroneously been reported several times before, the U.S. military produced a video showing him to be the opposite of what the media previously advocated him to be.
Quotes
The Washington post cites Col. Derek Harvey who said at a meeting by the Army in Fort Leavenworth:
"Our own focus on Zarqawi has enlarged his caricature, if you will - made him more important than he really is, in some ways."
See also
- Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
- Doublespeak
- Iraq war
- Newspeak
- Propaganda
- Psychological operations (United States)
- Psychological warfare
- PSYOP
- War on Terrorism
References
- ^ Military Plays Up Role of Zarqawi - Jordanian Painted As Foreign Threat To Iraq's Stability By Thomas E. Ricks, The Washington Post, April 10, 2006
- ^ "Mission Accomplished" in a business suit - Ignoring U.S. intelligence, Bush inflated Zarqawi, then made a pointless trip to Iraq to pose as a heroic dragon slayer. It doesn't work anymore by Sidney Blumenthal, Salon, June 15, 2006
- ^ Was There a Legal Basis for His Assassination? The Story Behind Zarqawi's Death by Jennifer van Bergen, CounterPunch, June 12, 2006
- ^ America Put Him in the Big Time The Short, Strange Career of Abu Masab al-Zarqawi by Patrick Cockburn, Counterpunch, June 9, 2006
- ^ Hyping Zarqawi by Tim Dickinson, Rolling Stone, April 11, 2006
- U.S. Says Files Seek Qaeda Aid in Iraq Conflict By DEXTER FILKINS, New York Times, February 9, 2004
- "Al-Zarqawi's Biography". Washington Post. June 8, 2006.
{{cite news}}: Check date values in:|date=(help) - ^ The Myth of Al Qaeda Before 9/11, Osama bin Laden’s group was small and fractious. How Washington helped to build it into a global threat By Michael Hirsh, Newsweek, June 30, 2006
- Pentagon PSYOP: "Terror Mastermind" Abu Musab Al Zarqawi is "Incompetent" by Michel Chossudovsky, GlobalResearch, May 15, 2006