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: Unusual or not, Appleman is still a reliable source ... perhaps the best on the Korean War and by categorizing infiltration events, which led to the refugee policies and ultimately contributed to the killings, you are steering the article towards one POV to the exclusion of the other. ] (]) 01:18, 12 August 2015 (UTC)
: Unusual or not, Appleman is still a reliable source ... perhaps the best on the Korean War and by categorizing infiltration events, which led to the refugee policies and ultimately contributed to the killings, you are steering the article towards one POV to the exclusion of the other. ] (]) 01:18, 12 August 2015 (UTC)
== 'Diametric opposition' and 'credence' ==
Noting Iryna Harpy's comment at ArbCom about the "two diametrically opposed editors" reminds me how absurd this all is. (This also relates to WeldNeck's latest claim there of a "significant POV" being left out of the article.)
As you know, Robert Bateman, the 7th Cavalry enthusiast, is the sole source for the contrarian fantasies about NGR. But listen to what he said at a 2004 Pritzker Military Library (Chicago) "debate," when the moderator challenged him:
::MODERATOR: What I came away from your book and your comments ... is that yes, all kinds of atrocities were going on. ... But the one that's reported by Hanley and company is the one that you don't give any credence to. It is like everybody else is right except the AP team which did all that work.
::BATEMAN: I point out -- I do give credence to it. These are all the points that we agree on. We agree that South....
::MODERATOR: You are very critical of it.
::BATEMAN: I am very critical of the assertion that 400 people were killed there.
That's it. That's what it comes down to. There's the diametric opposition. Well, of course, No. 1, the AP doesn't "assert" anything. That was the survivors' estimate (reported along with lower guesses from soldiers). Bateman, who is clueless about what journalists do and forever attributed the 400 to "the AP," apparently felt the witnesses should have been ignored. But to bring things up to date, No. 2, what about the minimum 163 dead and missing of the 2005 inquest? What about the government foundation's 2011 estimate of 250-300 dead? At those authoritatively determined levels, is he still "very critical" ... of the AP? of Koreans? of what?
Of course, no one should care what Major Bateman thinks or thought. He did nothing but sit at his keyboard and pound out wild "theories," perhaps on orders from above, perhaps not. He didn't go to Korea, to the site, to talk to survivors. And even then his "criticism" evaporates in the heat of his own self-contradictory fantasizing. ''This is very important''; this alone is reason enough to purge the bizarre Bateman from this article:
:*On page 126 of his book, he writes of the No Gun Ri killings, "If they took place as described at all. ... the killings occurred in dozens and possibly hundreds of the small misfortunes that make war so horrible." (In other words, in various places across South Korea. No kidding, that's what he wrote, and repeated orally.)
:*Then on his pages 198-199, he lays out "the truth, supported by historical evidence," that is, his scenario of mortar and small arms fire at NGR, and between a dozen to "slightly more" than two dozen refugees killed.
:*In between, on his page 151, he again denies the confirmed reality of No Gun Ri, saying of a 19th-century massacre, "in the case of Wounded Knee, at least the event itself had occurred."
Elsewhere in his chaotic book, as he swings back and forth between accepting and denying that No Gun Ri took place, he cites ridiculously precise but ever-changing casualty tolls, from 8 to 70. (Meantime, he misreads documents, prints rumors, and spouts the fabricated foolishness about GI witnesses Flint and Hesselman.)
'''Is this the "other viewpoint" that I keep hearing should be in the article'''? But ''what'' is that viewpoint, ''which'' will it be, that No Gun Ri didn't happen? That it did and the sedentary major knows all the details? That the refugees were caught in a US-North Korean crossfire (as he writes on his page 206), or that they were hit by mortar "warning shots" as he says in the above-cited pages 198-199? That he gives "credence" to the AP story? That he doesn't?
Where some might see diametric opposition, I see on one side a picture of a historic event, its knowns and unknowns, as drawn by journalists, scholars and others doing careful, objective work, and the other side a black hole, i.e., there is no other side, other "version" of NGR. This is the absurdity. There's no "significant POV" that's being left out. If anyone believes there is, I'm all ears. Tell me about it. Thanks. ] (]) 20:39, 13 August 2015 (UTC)
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Irrelevant photo
Smart edit by Newzild on that alleged "snipers" photo. The caption was pretty much verbatim from the U.S. Army caption, but that hardly qualifies it as truthful. Since when do snipers wear two-foot-wide, bright white hats? It's obviously a case of sniping in the vicinity, and everyone in the nearby rice paddies being rounded up. If they were known snipers, they'd have been dead. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 11:39, 1 August 2015 (UTC)
The problem with "suspected" is that it could well be factually incorrect. The caption was written by the military during wartime, and must therefore be treated with caution. The people in the photograph may not have been "suspected" snipers at all, but simply civilians who appear in a photo being used for propaganda purposes. The word "alleged", on the other hand, is correct in that the US military is certainly alleging that the people in the photo are snipers - whether they were snipers or were not snipers is irrelevant.Newzild (talk) 14:58, 1 August 2015 (UTC)
In as far as the use of WP:ALLEGED goes, the use of the term should be avoided unless it is an absolute imperative. It's essential to stick to WP:WORDS for the sake of best practice and, in context, I certainly don't find it appropriate for a photo caption. Such usage of 'alleged' really does need to be qualified by WP:INTEXT attribution (i.e., "According to the U.S. Army..."). As such, I'd consider such usage without qualification to be highly problematic. --Iryna Harpy (talk) 04:58, 2 August 2015 (UTC)
If we step back, we'll see that the photo doesn't belong in the article to begin with -- and it was a late addition. If anywhere, it belongs in an article about irregular warfare in Korea, not in an article about the massacre of unarmed civilians. (More relevant would be my inserting a photo of piles of dead Korean civilians, and there are plenty of those.) The "sniper" pic was Exhibit X in one editor's effort to justify the mass killing of women and children at No Gun Ri, along with his gratuitous piling on of questionable and, at times, false "examples" of enemy infiltration via refugees (see the current "Background" section). His point: These "snipers" were wearing white, and so were the No Gun Ri refugees. Ergo, the refugees got what they deserved.
This article has many serious problems. A start was made on a fix, with the Lead section. That effort needs to be resumed. We can start by deleting this photo. The point raised by Iryna Harpy means that the only way to correct this photo's caption would be to write: "The U.S. Army caption on this Army photo reads, 'Enemy snipers are questioned...'" But the Army caption is clearly ludicrous: the big white farmers' hats? a whole squad of "snipers" captured at once? where are the weapons? etc. etc.
The photo belongs in the article to show us what the situation on the ground was like. I understand its been a key focus of some POV's to cast as much doubt on Nork irregular warfare but it happened and shaped both the refugee control policies as well as the events in the article. WeldNeck (talk) 17:18, 2 August 2015 (UTC)
No, the infiltration worry is clear in the text, beginning right in the Lead, and there's no call for an irrelevant photo with nonsensical caption as some kind of "evidence." There are many aspects to your "situation on the ground," including trigger-happy soldiers ordered to "fire on everyone." Shall we "show the situation" by inserting a photo of some dead civilians who, like these rounded-up farmers, have no connection with No Gun Ri? WeldNeck, you have said of supposed infiltration episodes, including false "examples" you refused to remove, "I will put every single account I can find in the article." So much for good faith and balance. It's long been unavoidably clear where the POV pushing comes from in this article, and it's long past time to restore objectivity and coherence to it. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 17:59, 2 August 2015 (UTC)
Instead of taking even more potshots at one another, here are the options:
We keep the photo in, and revert to its last caption or change the caption in some other way to satisfy everyone.
We keep the photo in, and keep the caption as is.
We take the photo out altogether.
We replace it with a different photo that everyone is happy with, and formulate an appropriate caption.
I realize we cannot all be totally happy with the results here. But I do think that it is important to remember, regardless of whether the suspicions were true, the significance of the Army's fear of infiltration. That's the most I'm going to verge off-topic into a subject discussion. GAB23:40, 2 August 2015 (UTC)
If you have photo's of dead civilians at NoGunRi, I would encourage you to add them. Seems relevant to the article ... just like a photo of Nork guerrillas that was in the DOD report. WeldNeck (talk) 23:52, 2 August 2015 (UTC)
Ah, yes, photos (not photo's) of the No Gun Ri dead would, indeed, "seem" relevant. But, as usual, you're not getting the point: The "Nork guerrillas" -- and that's "alleged" guerrillas, by the way -- have no connection with No Gun Ri, and yet you feel their photo belongs in the article. Well, then, photos of any dead Korean civilians would just as much belong in the article, since mass killings of innocents by the U.S. military were also part of "the situation on the ground," as you put it. (And, no, there are no available photos of the NGR dead.)
To address GAB's points: The problem with the "sniper" photo (and the motivation behind it) was self-evident as soon as it was inserted, but there were bigger fish to fry in this unfortunate article and I was content to let it slide until happier times. Then Newzild sensed the problem and took a stab at it (and Iryna Harpy dove even deeper). And so it was appropriate then to point out the root problem. And that is that no proper caption can be devised. Do we write that the "Army caption claims" these were snipers, but then not note the illogic of that? And even more fundamentally, why is the photo there in the first place? And with a ridiculous caption saying these bad guys wore white, just like those damned refugees. Well, EVERYONE in Korea wore white in those days. Why not suggest that the U.S. Army was justified in shooting ANY and EVERY Korean?
On GAB's specific final point, the "fear of infiltration" is all over the article, including in the caption to the other photo in the Background section. The "alleged/suspected/sniper/farmer/who knows what" photo is gratuitous, highly misleading and should simply be dropped, rather than our wasting time trying to justify and caption it. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 03:14, 3 August 2015 (UTC)
What we are addressing is a two-pronged problem. 1) WeldNeck, I see that it is you who uploaded the photo and provided the description, but you have not provided your source. Under such circumstances, we have no way of evaluating whether it is reliably sourced or verifying the description. 2) WP:PERTINENCE vs. WP:POINTy: without being able to place the context or source, the image is redundant. The only way in which we can use 'alleged' is where we are dealing with highly contentious material where there are polarised opinions expressed by academic sources that we are obliged to represent for the sake of WP:BALANCE. Even there, it is necessary to attribute the use of 'alleged'.
Under these circumstances, unless you can provide the source there is no question about using an image in order to "show us what the situation on the ground was like" . This is not a simple example of a photo of generic domestic cat for the Cat article in keeping with the WP:TITLE, nor is a simplistic MOS:CAPTION provable one way or the other. The use of the image contravenes both WP:OR and WP:SYNTH. --Iryna Harpy (talk) 03:56, 3 August 2015 (UTC)
The source is: "DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY INSPECTOR GENERAL NO GUN RI REVIEW" and the photo can be found on page 71. WeldNeck (talk) 13:34, 3 August 2015 (UTC)
Addendum: as a 'my final word on the subject' reading of the content, substitution can be used for empirical absolutes and highly tangential subject matter. We are not dealing with such subject matter. Articles dealing with specific events must use images that have been identified as addressing the TITLE. For example, any generic photograph of Eastern Europeans dying of starvation, or of bodies of those who died in the famine piled up are not used for the Holodomor article. All images there are heavily scrutinised for verifiability as there have been mix ups over the years with the 1921 famines in other Soviet regions. The same has happened with Holodomor images turning up in other Eastern European famine articles. Such photos are fine for usage in the article entitled Famine, but we should not grab at just any photo because it's from the region and era in order to 'convey a sense of' for the reader and caption it further to 'convey a sense of'. That's a double-whammy misdirection, whether done in good faith or not. --Iryna Harpy (talk) 04:34, 3 August 2015 (UTC)
This isnt a generic photo being used to provide an illustration of Nork guerrilla activities, I realize that would be WP:NOR. This picture was used by the Army IG specifically to illustrate that point. WeldNeck (talk) 13:34, 3 August 2015 (UTC)
In other words, it IS a generic photo used to illustrate "Nork" guerrilla activities.
Isn't the photo's irrelevance clear? We don't know who these men in white are (though they certainly look like farmers); we don't know that they're "infiltrators" (local guerrillas were active in their own districts, not needing to "infiltrate"); we don't know that they had any link to refugees; and they certainly don't have any connection with the No Gun Ri refugees. But the photo and caption (read it) are intended to establish guilt by wardrobe: These men wore white, and so did the NGR refugees. There's your "evidence." But, I must repeat, everyone wore white in Korea. The photo should go, and we should move on to weightier problems. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 16:40, 3 August 2015 (UTC)
This source indicates who these people are and why they were detained. The source meets Misplaced Pages's criteria for reliabiliyt and the source chose it to include in the report signifying its relevance. WeldNeck (talk) 16:50, 3 August 2015 (UTC)
Even this article, in its current state, makes it obvious that the U.S. Army NGR report is far, far from "reliable," with all of its suppressed documents and testimony and misrepresentations. To me, the photo's source isn't the point; it's the bias and the irrelevance. But any assertion that the Army did a "reliable" job investigating itself must always be refuted. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 17:33, 3 August 2015 (UTC)
I imagine if we applied the same degree of scrutiny to all sources in the article some other ones (like the AP) would have to be discarded as well. WeldNeck (talk) 17:54, 3 August 2015 (UTC)
Take the photo out. Nobody ever gathers together so many enemy snipers in wartime, and such snipers don't wear white clothing unless it's snowy weather. It's ridiculous to believe otherwise. These guys look like farmers. Binksternet (talk) 17:12, 3 August 2015 (UTC)
Binksternet: these arent snipers in the context you are thinking, they are wearing white clothing so they can covertly mingle with refugees. They looking like farmers is the whole point. WeldNeck (talk) 17:54, 3 August 2015 (UTC)
Were you there, WeldNeck, when these guys donned the white "so they can covertly mingle with refugees," when they talked about "looking like farmers"? How do you know this? How do you know this photo shows people who "mingled with refugees"? Of course you don't know that. This made-up back story for an indecipherable photo, with no relation to NGR, exposes the motivation here, to plant suspicion about the NGR refugees. The Army's own caption says nothing of the sort. The photo must go. Charles J. Hanley (talk) — Preceding undated comment added 18:47, 3 August 2015 (UTC)
The caption from the photo:
August 5,1950 "North Korean snipers being searched and interrogated by American and South Korean troops somewhere in Korea." National Archives-Still Pictures Branch, Record Group 111, Entry 111-SC Signal Corps Photographs of American Military Activity 1900-1981, Box 187, Photograph SC 346059.
Thats how I know.
A final warning you Mr Hanley ... I have had to listen to your insults long enough. One more time and I take this to arbitration. WeldNeck (talk) 19:02, 3 August 2015 (UTC)
The whole point is that the No Gun Ri massacre did not involve a fear of snipers. Some 500–600 displaced villagers, civilian refugees, came up to a roadblock and were directed to sit on the nearby railroad tracks. The fear of snipers was not present at that time. Thus the bit about enemy snipers dressed in civilian clothes is not relevant to the massacre. Binksternet (talk) 18:25, 3 August 2015 (UTC)
Of course it was. Every investigation into this incident cites fear of infiltration as a motivating factor for some of the men who opened fire. WeldNeck (talk) 18:33, 3 August 2015 (UTC)
I would not oppose including a photo of refugees and U.S. troops (if we could find/source it), since it seems difficult to agree on "alleged snipers" and similar subjects. GAB18:35, 3 August 2015 (UTC)
This is a fairly simple content dispute. Weldneck wants an irrelevant photo to be in the article, and others do not. Arbitration might be appropriate for other concerns but not for this easy-to-solve problem. The photo must go. Binksternet (talk) 19:27, 3 August 2015 (UTC)
WeldNeck is the only one defending this photo. Binkersnet did the sensible thing, after a too-long discussion. (And the "owner" of the article then fell back on his usual edit warring and threats.) Arbitration? On this simple item? This article has too many serious problems to get bogged down in item-by-item arbitration. GAB suggested a substitute photo of troops and refugees. WeldNeck, how about if I see whether I can turn up such a non-problematical photo of interaction?
Meantime, I sincerely hope Timothyjosephwood, Irondome and Wikimedes and others will return and resume the constructive work of some weeks back. With enough editors involved, a way can be found. Meantime, I will re-post in Talk the last proposed edit to the Background section. Thanks. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 19:39, 3 August 2015 (UTC)
This discussion has been going on for two days, I doubt anyone will think thats too long. Arbitration will be about your continued poor behavior and I think its long overdue. WeldNeck (talk) 19:44, 3 August 2015 (UTC)
Thanks for your help, @Ritchie333:, but this is about much more than just the photo -- this has been going on for years about one issue related to the article or another, whether it be aerial imagery, infiltration, the reliability of certain sources, etc. GAB20:15, 3 August 2015 (UTC)
Okay but the photo, which has seen a silly amount of back and forth today, is probably a good place to start. This is an important piece of Korean history, so bickering over relatively trivial details isn't really useful, is it? Ritchie33320:20, 3 August 2015 (UTC)
Exactly. As you said, the photo issue is really the least of the worries, considering there have been extensive disputes over article content. Those are the ones I would like to remedy as well, although any progress is great. GAB20:23, 3 August 2015 (UTC)
Apologies for not being on subject of late, but I have received several pings and I have caught up with this. The photo inclusion does not seem critical. I would incline to not include it, and my view on this whole article is complex, so I have no POV. Aspects of both views have merit. But why are we dragging this to arbcom? Overkill gents. Lets withdraw the Arbcom filing and settle it here. Irondome (talk) 21:49, 3 August 2015 (UTC)
Thanks for your timely arrival. I redact my statements about arbitration, but I do think that mediation is a necessity. GAB21:56, 3 August 2015 (UTC)
Can we at least discuss an intelligent caption for the photo which would satisfy all sides? Suggestion "Fear of infiltrators was intense..suspected infiltrators being detained..." I still think we can sort this here GAB. But i'm an eternal optimist. Irondome (talk) 22:01, 3 August 2015 (UTC)
I admire that, although I think my optimism has been severely tested. In any event, let's get cracking... GAB22:05, 3 August 2015 (UTC)
Do what you all want with it ... I have bigger fish to fry which I hope will alleviate the underlying issue with this article. WeldNeck (talk) 22:06, 3 August 2015 (UTC)
@WeldNeck: Could you please return to the WikiCommons page and fill in the source details. In that way, if it is used, editors are welcome to cite check in order to verify the attribution. Thanks. --Iryna Harpy (talk) 03:41, 4 August 2015 (UTC)
I will, but I am not sure where the report it came from can still be found online. The original link is dead. I downloaded the PDF. WeldNeck (talk) 03:35, 5 August 2015 (UTC)
@WeldNeck: I've found the archived version/s here, but only as a 13 part download. Could you confirm that you have it as a single download? I'm going to add it to the 'External links section, but would prefer a single download. If it's only available in a multiple part format, I'm not going to go spend more time looking. Thanks! --Iryna Harpy (talk) 00:54, 6 August 2015 (UTC)
@WeldNeck: Ah, well if you downloaded it as a single PDF, chances are that I'll be able to find it archived somewhere. It's best to leave it as is since readers can now download the entire thing, albeit in numerous parts. It's best that everyone can be assured that the PDFs come from the official site intact (i.e., as they were posted, therefore cannot have been tampered with). Thanks all the same. --Iryna Harpy (talk) 04:41, 6 August 2015 (UTC)
Excellent work! Thank you WeldNeck. I've now substituted the multiple download versions and made certain that the single version is actually archived so that it won't be lost. Cheers! --Iryna Harpy (talk) 23:15, 7 August 2015 (UTC)
Photo caption revision
Alright. Using this space, let's discuss the captions. If the caption can't be agreed upon, then let's move on to talking about a new photo. Please, no more personal attacks -- we've seen too many of them, and they are counterproductive. GAB22:10, 3 August 2015 (UTC)
I suggest it be settled here by a simple count of heads for deletion, and then moving on to the surrounding Background section. Irondome is inclined to exclude, Binksternet obviously believes it's off-topic, as do I. Newzild and Iryna Harpy were clearly troubled by the photo, the one by its flat statements, the other by its unconnectedness to the subject of the article. How do they feel about deletion?
A very basic problem is that no good WP caption could be written for the photo anyway, since these men are clearly not a "squad of snipers" (no such thing) captured in one fell swoop, but we cannot say who they are. Misplaced Pages cannot on its own say they are infiltrators and then raise the "fear of infiltration" issue. We cannot say infiltrators posed as refugees, implying that this group did. We don't know how, why they were detained. If we simply quote the Army photographer (all "snipers"), how do we link them to NGR and infiltration?
I have found a public-domain photo of U.S. troops and refugees sharing a road, moving in opposite directions. I don't think such a photo is needed, particularly since the other photo in the section discusses infiltration. But it's available. Thanks. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 22:24, 3 August 2015 (UTC)
We have a WP:RS detailing who these individuals were and why they are relevant and connected to the topic. FWIW, a 'sniper' needn't be a trained specialist but anyone, as in this context, who attacks from a position of concealment. WeldNeck (talk) 22:37, 3 August 2015 (UTC)
Delete photo. Fails Verifiability. Kudos to whomever (Weldneck?) searched through the National Archives to find the photo, but in all the discussion so far I have not seen evidence of a reliable, independent secondary source confirming that these were in fact snipers. Also, this photo was taken after the No Gun Ri Massacre, so the events depicted in the photo could not have contributed to the suspicion of enemy infiltration at the time of the No Gun Ri Massacre.--Wikimedes (talk) 02:47, 4 August 2015 (UTC)
Actually, it fails inclusion as any caption for it would be WP:OR unless a WP:RS (as in secondary source) describes the scene in question. In as much as I can establish, it is taken from a WP:PRIMARY source. The document in question is a US military 'investigation' into an incident which took place in a war they were party to (it is irrelevant how long after the event this 'investigation' took place). There appear to be numerous scholarly secondary sources actually discussing the document itself. While I'm neutral as to its inclusion, it can't be captioned on the basis of what it is described as being in a primary document. If it's considered to be WP:ITSIMPORTANT, can we please stop bickering here and take it to the WP:RSN or the WP:NPOVN for evaluation by a larger group of neutral editors. --Iryna Harpy (talk) 03:55, 4 August 2015 (UTC)
I do not see reference to the photo on the cited page (v) of the linked US Army report, so it appears wrong to cite the US Army report in the first place. Nor do I see mention of "snipers" on the page, nor does a text search of the document come up with any hits for "sniper" or "snipers" anywhere in the document. "Infiltrators" are mentioned on the cited page, but that's not the same thing, and does not refer to the photo. Is the photo mentioned somewhere in the hard copy of the report?--Wikimedes (talk) 05:54, 4 August 2015 (UTC)
Yes, it struck me as being problematic. The hard copy must be heavily reliant on pictorial information for this to be on pg.71. If not, the online version of the doc could only be a redacted version. I don't see how it could possibly be stretched to over 71 pages. --Iryna Harpy (talk) 06:13, 4 August 2015 (UTC)
We seem to be mostly in agreement, so please forgive me for taking up space to track down loose ends, but where does pg.71 come from? It looks to me like the page number is Roman numeral five.--Wikimedes (talk) 06:29, 4 August 2015 (UTC)
Not a problem, Wikimedes. Trivia isn't always trivial, and this is a point worth sorting out. The information comes from WeldNeck here in answer to my question as to the source. S/he is the uploader of the photo in question, but didn't provide the source at WikiCommons, which is what I've suggested they do now. While there are some placeholders in the online document for graphics, I'm unable to do anything more than you: guesstimate what the photo would relate to. I'm assuming that WeldNeck has a hard copy or a full PDF version of the document and has scanned (or extracted) the image. --Iryna Harpy (talk) 10:22, 4 August 2015 (UTC)
Thank you, that helps. Since the photo actually was in the US Army No Gun Ri Report, my first reason has to change a bit from not being in the source cited to the source cited being a non-independent, primary source. But I still !vote to remove the photo.--Wikimedes (talk) 17:34, 4 August 2015 (UTC)
Remove photo. Too many serious issues have been raised about this photo, from its being taken after the massacre, the non-neutral Army involvement in presenting the photo, the problem of enemy snipers not being reported as a reason for the massacre, to questions of the photo's sourcing. Basically, it is off-topic. Binksternet (talk) 05:15, 4 August 2015 (UTC)
Delete photo: I'm the guy who originally changed the caption. I don't have any special interest in this article. However, it was clear to me when I read it has a lot of problems. The caption jumped out at me as being especially problematic. Given that photo was taken after the events of this article, that it is captioned by an unreliable source, and that it does not show anything of particular interest, my vote is for deletion. (This comment was added by User:Newzild.)
Remove photo. There are many issues with this photo, but the basic, slam-dunk objection, in my view, is that we cannot say these guys are "infiltrators" connected with refugees. Why, then, are they in the article? Moving on, now that a good number of editors are involved, I think quick progress can be made toward improving the article's coherence and veracity. However, Ritchie333 has put a 3-day hold on editing, which risks dissipating that interest. In view of the above discussion, Ritchie333, I'd urge that the hold be lifted. Thanks. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 12:25, 4 August 2015 (UTC)
Okay, I will unlock the article hopefully sometime later today with a consensus that there is no obvious evidence of the photo being related to the incident and hence it should be removed. The implication then is that anyone who restores the photo may be blocked for disruptive editing against consensus. If anyone disagrees with what I have just said, shout now! Ritchie33314:36, 4 August 2015 (UTC)
Delete: Although I was originally not entirely sure about this one, Wikimedes' argument clinches it for me. If it was dated after, it is certainly not relevant, and we could argue over the caption for ages. Best to just start afresh with a new photo, if we add one after all. GAB21:37, 4 August 2015 (UTC)
Remove: Clarifying my somewhat vague opposition to inclusion upthread. Based strongly on Iryna Harpy's compelling reasoning for the impossibility of providing a viable caption for the photo, based on sourcing issues. Irondome (talk) 21:53, 4 August 2015 (UTC)
...And Irondome has provided the second part of my rationale. As soon as I saw the archival notation in the caption, I was uneasy. GAB21:57, 4 August 2015 (UTC)
Once the hold is lifted, I'll post proposed edits to the Background section. (The Lead section was the only one recently edited into adequate shape.)
As one much involved in researching No Gun Ri beginning in 1998, I can see extensive problems with the article. They're extensive in the sense that they are spread throughout the article. But for the most part they they are not complex problems, requiring deep knowledge of NGR. I think common sense and an appreciation for clear writing and structure, and a neutral point of view, should enable any editor to assess the problems and what's proposed.
For example, the Background section suffers badly from "undue weight," i.e., imbalance.
In my opinion, all the article needs is repeated concise statements, beginning in the Lead section, of the rationale for firing on refugees, i.e., the reports and fear of enemy infiltrators. One editor thought otherwise, and inserted in the Background section paragraph after paragraph of sometimes questionable (on two occasions, false) "examples" of refugee infiltration, along with the irrelevant "sniper" photo, as though building a legal brief defending the massacre. The result is undue weight, making the top look like an article about irregular warfare in Korea 1950, rather than one about a civilian massacre.
A middle ground (quite imperfect IMO) can be achieved by removing the more questionable "examples," but leaving some of that material. We should then, however, insert balancing material: official and-or scholarly statements that the threat was exaggerated (the widely held view).
OK. While I'm very wary of making a Fork, I see nothing wrong with putting in language along the lines of, "Issue X has been disputed..." The question of undue weight can be a judgment call, so I hope we can figure out how much coverage each topic warrants. GAB22:12, 4 August 2015 (UTC)
Yes, Hanley, I agree that the article should be focused on the specific topic rather than getting bogged down right at the start in a description of the kind of asymmetric warfare encountered in Korea. Certainly the conditions prevailing at the time of the massacre must be described, but these should not overtake the topic itself.
The Tirman book – a top-level Oxford and MIT scholarly source – should be given higher prominence as it places in context the 2001 Army report and the Robert Bateman account versus the AP reporters version and also subsequent evidence that came to light, showing the Army review to be incomplete and biased, and Bateman to have failed in his analysis.
More sources could be brought to bear, for instance the 2014 Jonathan M. House book titled A Military History of the Cold War, 1944–1962. House covers the massacre briefly on page 162, showing how recent scholarship views the massacre as stemming from a USAF standing order, a lack of coordination between the Air Force and the Army, and the inexcusable subsequent ground fire into the refugees.
Also, Major Ryoo's research and analysis should be brought up from "Further reading" and his findings incorporated into the article body. Binksternet (talk) 22:25, 4 August 2015 (UTC)
I dont agree that there is a weight issue with the current background section. The infiltration events described are wrapped up in three brief sentences. The Battle of Taejon being the most important as it was specifically cited in the Muccio letter.
In addition to Major Ryoo's research we should also incorporate Kuehl's paper into the body. Kuehl's research is probably the best most concise reconstruction of the events as well as what led up to them.
There's a fairly tight summary here as well
I will reiterate whats been said about Batman elsewhere: his book was very well received in the scholarly community.
With respect to Tirman, he uses a quote from Eugene Hessleman in his book to provide evidence that a direct order was given to open fire on the civilians ... we know from medical records though that Hessleman was injured and was not present for the events. With that in mind, be careful to place to much "prominence" on his interpretation.
As for Hanley's arguement, the three incidents are all supported by secondary sources as contributing factors to the events as well as the nature of the battlefield in late July. One of the problems is Hanley seems to want to use sources to downplay and ignore Nork irregular warfare and the use of refugees to cover troop movement and exclude well sourced incidents of them doing just that .. claims of "false examples" aside (look up the sources if you disagree). WeldNeck (talk) 03:56, 5 August 2015 (UTC)
Since fear of enemies infiltrating while disguised as refugees affected policy and actions, enemy infiltration does need to be established. If I recall correctly, a previous version of the article only mentioned the example of the 24 hour search of all refugees on the main road that turned up no infiltrators (or perhaps the article was pointedly worded so that that was the example the readers were supposed to believe - lack of neutral wording was and is a problem with the article).
It should be possible to establish enemy infiltration concerns in the background section in less than the current 4 paragraphs.
Opinions after the fact that the threat of infiltration was exaggerated would not have affected the US Army's actions at the time, and would probably be better mentioned in an aftermath section. Unless there is a solid scholarly consensus (including military analysts) that there was no infiltration threat at all, the article should should not be made to imply that "exaggerated threat" means "no threat". Slightly off topic, but having civilians on the battle field, even when not infiltrated by enemy forces, is a huge concern for a military that cares about not killing civilians, so again "exaggerated threat" should not be made to imply "no problem".--Wikimedes (talk) 04:51, 5 August 2015 (UTC)
If anyone needs sources, I can send them to you. I've also got Suhi Choi's "Silencing Survivors' Narratives," which may be helpful. I also have a source criticizing the peace memorial, although that's probably less helpful. In general, I have access to most sources besides the books. As to Ryoo, I think we should certainly try to include more of his monograph. There's also Bruce Cumings' source on No Gun Ri and legal articles by Tae-Ung Baik and Christopher Booth, although they were published fairly early on. What I'm looking for is "No Gun Ri: A Cover-Up Exposed" by Martha Mendoza, and it would be nice to find the South Korean report cited in the article (although I found a TRCK report in English.) GAB23:22, 4 August 2015 (UTC)
A strong note of caution to all: WN writes above (and this is symptomatic of a broader problem), “Tirman … uses a quote from Eugene Hessleman in his book to provide evidence that a direct order was given to open fire on the civilians ... we know from medical records though that Hessleman was injured and was not present for the events.” This is categorically false and was shown to be so in Associated Press articles in 2000-2001. The only people with the man’s medical records were the AP reporters. WN’s “we know” is simply absurd.
Believe me, after two years of this stomach-churning ordeal, I above all dread getting back into this nonsense. But it must be done. As Ritchie333 noted, this is historically important. What WP says about No Gun Ri must be as truthful as possible. And an overriding, severe problem with the article is that too many flat statements such as the one above are presented as “fact,” when in fact they’re patently false. And when the solidly sourced, contradictory material is inserted, WeldNeck reverts/deletes that material.
With you all watching, the usual POV pushing may not recur. But then we’ll have a new problem: an overloaded article running too long with ping-ponging, wordy “he said vs. he said” over trivia. The above Corporal Hesselman, for example, isn’t even needed in the article. (SKorean investigators said 17 ex-soldiers spoke of orders at NGR.) Such are the decisions that will have to be made as we go along. Thanks. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 15:03, 5 August 2015 (UTC)
A quick reply. Mr Hanley has yet to cite a WP:RS stating Hesselman wasn't medically evacuated. Hesselman's memory is so taineted, in fact, that he remembers individuals present who were positively proven to have not been there. This is not trivia, either. Hesselman is/was on of three individuals who recalled explicit orders from the chain of command to open fire on the refugees. If he wasn't there (and for the record, neither were the other two who stated there were direct chain of command orders) that is 100% relevant to this article. Not just because I say it is but because many reliable second hand sources have written about its relevance to these vents.
This also an example of Hanley's WP:COI. The only place Hesselman is mentioned is in the AP subsection and directly goes to challenge the credibility of several assertions made by the AP team. You can all understand now why Mr Hanley would like to see it removed. WeldNeck (talk) 15:23, 5 August 2015 (UTC)
CJHanley and WeldNeck, aside from being an opportunity to cast ad hominems at various sources and eachother, is any of this relevant to the background section in general or the refugee situation in particular?--Wikimedes (talk) 15:45, 5 August 2015 (UTC)
An earlier editor complained the Background section was too long and shouldn’t have so much about the Korean War itself. If trimming out nonessentials saves words, why not? The "Korean War" link is there for the curious. This involves a tightening of Background's first two paragraphs.
I propose replacing these current two paragraphs…
Hundreds of thousands of South Koreans fled south in mid-1950 after the North Korean army invaded. North Korean forces used the refugee crisis to infiltrate soldiers behind American lines to conduct guerilla operations.
The immediate U.S. response was to dispatch the 24th Infantry Division, which had been part of the occupation forces from Japan to fight alongside the South Korean Army. These American troops were insufficiently trained, poorly equipped and often led by inexperienced officers. In particular, they lacked training in how to deal with war-displaced civilians. In the two weeks after the Americans first arrived on July 5, 1950, the U.S. Army estimated that 380,000 South Korean civilians fled south, passing through U.S. and South Korean lines, as the defending forces retreated.
References
^ Office of the Inspector General, Department of the Army. No Gun Ri Review. Washington, D.C. January 2001
Huge numbers of South Koreans fled south in mid-1950 after the North Korean army invaded. By spring 1951, the U.S.-led U.N. Command estimated 5 million South and North Koreans had become refugees. (U.S. Defense Department photo)
On June 25, 1950, the communist-led North Korean army invaded South Korea to try to reunify the peninsula, a former Japanese colony divided at the end of World War II. The United States quickly dispatched troops from its occupation forces in Japan to fight alongside the South Korean army. These American troops were insufficiently trained, poorly equipped and often led by inexperienced officers.. In particular, they lacked training in how to deal with war-displaced civilians. Over two weeks in mid-July, the U.S. Army estimated 380,000 South Korean civilians fled south, passing through U.S. and South Korean lines, as the defending forces retreated.
References
Conway-Lanz, Sahr (2006). Collateral damage: Americans, noncombatant immunity, and atrocity after World War II. New York: Routledge. ISBN0-415-97829-7.
(e/c) It sacrifices numerous links which would be of interest to the casual reader whose understanding of the conflict may wish to be broadened by following them. Some trimming is in order, but this appears fairly drastic. Irondome (talk) 22:26, 5 August 2015 (UTC)
I'm in agreement with Irondome on this. The background section isn't particularly hefty in order to merit such redaction, but could do with tightening up. In the meantime, I think it would be far more productive to tackle this on a section by section basis beginning with the lead (as was initially suggested) which does need a rework as it currently stands as a battle of POVs trying to assert themselves rather than introducing what happened. All this accomplishes is confusing the reader: i.e., why is "a South Korean government inquest" in 2005 in the lead paragraph, subsequently followed by a paragraph informing the reader that it was overlooked globally until an AP story came out in 1999? Parsing the lead may also assist in decisions made as to how best to handle subsections. --Iryna Harpy (talk) 06:38, 6 August 2015 (UTC)
Well, as a superannuated journalist, I learned long ago about the subjectivity of editing, and learned to roll with it. A leader of the previous discussion two months ago, who has since drifted away, wanted to eliminate the Background section entirely! (He also, Iryna Harpy, tongue-lashed me for suggesting editing section by section, rather than line by line.) Anyway, that led me to now propose trimming. I also feel the entire article is too wordy and rambling. But I'm fine with a bit more on the war. I also like IHarpy's suggestion of starting over again with the Lead. It does have problems, including the use of footnotes, generally avoided in WP leads. Major problem with that: Essential matters might appear to hinge on a single source, when that's not the case, as the article body will show. On IHarpy's one point, re the "inquest," the Lead does need to lay out the casualty estimates. Shall we move on to the Lead? Thanks. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 15:17, 6 August 2015 (UTC)
I think the LEDE should be the last thing thats edited ... the lede should reflect whats in the body and after we figure out what goes in the body we should concentrate on the opening. WeldNeck (talk) 15:59, 6 August 2015 (UTC)
WeldNeck and I don't agree on much, but the lead section being last is one positive point. Per WP:LEAD, the lead section should be a summary of the article body. I find when I'm writing an article alone that my first attempt at a lead section is later modified by the strength of arguments I discover as I fill out the body of the article, so for me both parts get worked on simultaneously. But in a group editing environment the article body should be the main focus, with the lead section following. Binksternet (talk) 16:45, 6 August 2015 (UTC)
(ecx2) While the lead definitely needs improvement, I agree with WeldNeck and Binkerstreet on leaving the lead for last. Space is more limited in the lead, so questions of undue weight become more acute. Also, if the lead is to be done without citations (not strictly necessary) reliable sources have a tendency to disappear from the discussion as well, and the discussion can easily degenerate into different editors asserting their opinions. Agreement that the lead summarizes the article should be much easier to achieve.--Wikimedes (talk) 17:42, 6 August 2015 (UTC)
I don’t know if the background section is too long or not, maybe it just needs some improvement. Also, the massacre didn’t take very long and was not particularly complicated (though the disagreement of what actually happened is somewhat complicated), so it may well be that the article will have more space covering events before and after the massacre that it does of the massacre itself. See if this improves on the current first two paragraphs of the section:
Huge numbers of South Koreans fled south in mid-1950 after the North Korean army invaded. By spring 1951, the U.S.-led U.N. Command estimated 5 million South and North Koreans had become refugees. (U.S. Defense Department photo)
The invasion caught South Korea and its American ally completely by surprise, and sent the defending South Korean forces into retreat. On June 30th, the U.S. began to move the 24th Infantry Division to Korea from Japan, followed by the 25th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division. These American troops were insufficiently trained, poorly equipped and often led by inexperienced officers. In particular, they lacked training in how to deal with war-displaced civilians. The combined U.S. and South Korean forces were initially unable to stop the North Korean advance, and continued to retreat throughout July.
The war quickly created hundreds of thousands of refugees. In the two weeks following the first significant US ground troop engagement on July 5th, the U.S. Army estimated that 380,000 South Korean civilians fled south, passing through the retreating U.S. and South Korean lines.
References
Conway-Lanz, Sahr (2006). Collateral damage: Americans, noncombatant immunity, and atrocity after World War II. New York: Routledge. ISBN0-415-97829-7.
Dupuy and Dupuy. The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History 4th Ed. p.1356. New York: HarperCollins 1993 ISBN 0-06-270056-1
Discussion of later events is not necessary here: “that would draw in both the U.S. and Chinese militaries and end in a stalemate and armistice three years later.”
It’s worth mentioning that the S Korea and the US were caught by surprise.
If the 24th ID is mentioned, also mention 1st Cav (the subject of this article) and the 25th ID.
US troops began to arrive June 30th (according to Dupuy and Dupuy), and began fighting on July 5th (1st significant ground troop engagement according to Korean War.)
Begin mentioning refugees in new paragraph.
A lot more could be said about the military situation – S Korean forces lacked heavy equipment and weapons capable of destroying N Korean tanks, for example (Dupuy and Dupuy again). As GAB said, it’s a matter of what the article needs.
That looks good. The official Army history (the cited Appleman) says the first troops landed at 11 a.m., July 1. (The order went out from Washington on June 30; the troops weren't on the move in Japan until early morning July 1.) Also, my editing instinct is always to cut material not contributing to the story at hand, such as the IDs of the other divisions. I suggest...
The first American troops sent from Japan to fight alongside the South Koreans landed on July 1, and by July 22 three U.S. Army divisions were in Korea, including the 1st Cavalry Division. (the same Appleman cite, pp. 61 and 197).
That looks pretty good. I’m ambivalent about naming the divisions. For some reason, as a reader, when I see “The first American troops sent from Japan…” I think that I should have been told earlier that troops were moving from Japan. How about:
The U.S. began to move troops from Japan to fight alongside the South Koreans. The first of these troops landed on July 1, and by July 22 three U.S. Army divisions were in Korea, including the 1st Cavalry Division. (ref Applebaum)
The U.S. moved troops from Japan to fight alongside the South Koreans. The first troops landed on July 1, and by July 22 three U.S. Army divisions were in Korea, including the 1st Cavalry Division. (ref Appleman, pp 61 and 197)
Huge numbers of South Koreans fled south in mid-1950 after the North Korean army invaded. By spring 1951, the U.S.-led U.N. Command estimated 5 million South and North Koreans had become refugees. (U.S. Defense Department photo)
The invasion caught South Korea and its American ally completely by surprise, and sent the defending South Korean forces into retreat. The U.S. moved troops from Japan to fight alongside the South Koreans. The first troops landed on July 1, and by July 22 three U.S. Army divisions were in Korea, including the 1st Cavalry Division. These American troops were insufficiently trained, poorly equipped and often led by inexperienced officers. In particular, they lacked training in how to deal with war-displaced civilians. The combined U.S. and South Korean forces were initially unable to stop the North Korean advance, and continued to retreat throughout July.
The war quickly created hundreds of thousands of refugees. In the two weeks following the first significant US ground troop engagement on July 5th, the U.S. Army estimated that 380,000 South Korean civilians fled south, passing through the retreating U.S. and South Korean lines.
References
Conway-Lanz, Sahr (2006). Collateral damage: Americans, noncombatant immunity, and atrocity after World War II. New York: Routledge. ISBN0-415-97829-7.
Just a tiny request. Remove completely (para 2, line 1). Keeps the wording sober and we lose another word, on the principle of trimming all unneeded fat. Also in the two weeks following July 5th, to replace In the first significant U.S. ground troop engagement on July 5th We could link Task Force Smith there. I think that it what it is referring to. Other than that i'm totally fine with it. Irondome (talk) 21:41, 6 August 2015 (UTC)
I was planning on waiting a day for User:WeldNeck, User:Iryna Harpy, or User:Binksternet to weigh in. So far I count CJHanley, GeneralizationsAreBad, Irondome, and myself as approving, and I'd feel better about making the change if there were one more !vote. On the other hand, this really isn't a major change, and further tweaks could be made later....--Wikimedes (talk) 22:36, 7 August 2015 (UTC)
I'm all for the suggested rework per the existing consensus. We all have our own personal strategies for developing an article – and I believe that this article needs to be reworked – my own being that, for the sake of the reader, stripping down the lead and revisiting it after the body has been redeveloped can be a useful tool. My opinion was, however, a reflection of my personal preference for methodology for article development therefore, personal preferences aside, I "support"/"!vote" for the most recent proposal for the "Background" section. The lead can be revisited at a later point in the reworking. --Iryna Harpy (talk) 23:00, 7 August 2015 (UTC)
I have no strong opinion about this suggested change, as I had no problem with the earlier version, but I like the latest suggested version somewhat better. This part of the article text is not the locus of the recent friction. I guess what we're doing here is developing a process on safe ground, before we get into the next proposal. Binksternet (talk) 23:26, 7 August 2015 (UTC)
Just as an irrelevant side note, it would be great if we could use this site to insert URLs into some of the news article citations, just to make them more accessible to readers. I'll get rolling on that when I can. GAB01:15, 6 August 2015 (UTC)
I'll take a look at it. I'm currently going through the history of the article to see whether I can find more archived refs. Unfortunately, at some stage someone's thought they're doing it a favour by removing the urls for dead links, whereas best practice is to keep them. Most people would be surprised at how much can be resurrected. --Iryna Harpy (talk) 01:49, 6 August 2015 (UTC)
Citation of dubious necessity
(First, let me preface this by saying that I may regret bringing this up.)
Under "Additional criticism of the U.S. investigation," next to the sentence saying, "The report did not address the commanding general’s July 26, 1950, instruction in the 25th Infantry Division saying civilians in the war zone would be considered unfriendly and shot," there is a citation for the NGRR, page xiii. I have cross-referenced this, and the page does mention that the order was found but dismissed because it did not deal with NGR in specific. Should the citation be kept in? GAB23:40, 6 August 2015 (UTC)
No. WP:SYNTH is a danger. If it does not deal with our specific topic, it may cause added issues to getting this article in shape. Just my 10p Irondome (talk) 00:04, 7 August 2015 (UTC)
I think it should probably be removed, and maybe the sentence itself should be reworked as well... GAB01:12, 7 August 2015 (UTC)
Do you mean the "25th Infantry Division Commander's order" in "Although the U.S. Review Team found four references (entry in the 8th Cavalry Regiment Message Log, 25th Infantry Division Commander's order, Colonel Rogers' memorandum, and an extract from the U.S. Navy's Aircraft Carrier Valley Forge Activity Summary) discussing actions against civilians, it did not find evidence of an order given to soldiers by a U.S. commander, orally or in writing, to kill Korean civilians in the vicinity of No Gun Ri in the last week of July 1950."?--Wikimedes (talk) 02:02, 7 August 2015 (UTC)
Sorry, but I really would urge that we stick to a section-by-section approach. Otherwise, we'll spiral down into a rather disorderly situation. I, for one, have umpteen issues with the article. But, for example, I won't bring up the serious "Aerial imagery" problems now. Can we stick to Background? Charles J. Hanley (talk) 03:57, 7 August 2015 (UTC)
A few thoughts, the upshot of which is to remove the sentence:
The wording in the U.S. Report is vague enough that I'm not sure that Conway-Lanz, Sahr, and Hanley (the reporter, not the Misplaced Pages editor) are talking about the same order.
This order was given to the 25th ID, not the 1st Cav, so it is only periferally (sp?) related to the No Gun Ri Massacre. At most it could be consolidated into a sentence or two about other periferally related orders.
It seems somewhat petty to say, in effect: 'The U.S. Report on the No Gun Ri massacre mentioned several orders to shoot civilians, but it didn't mention this order to a unit that didn't commit the massacre, therefore the report is a whitewash of events." It's good for the literature to have a thorough accounting of such orders, but this one makes a poor blunt instrument with which to bludgeon the Report.
Cjhanley's recommendation to work through the article systematically and not lose focus has merit. However, I don't think this particular sentence need be a part of the inter-related considerations that will come up while reworking the section it's in and the previous section. We could wait a few months to remove the sentence when we get to these sections. But why not do it now?--Wikimedes (talk) 17:14, 8 August 2015 (UTC)
I agree that it makes more sense to consolidate it into a part on other orders than to keep it where it is. GAB17:24, 8 August 2015 (UTC)
As I understand your original point, GAB, you are simply suggesting that because the USNGRR does not itself say, "We are not addressing the 'civilians should be shot' order," then to cite the USNGRR for the sentence saying it failed to address the order seems incongruous; it does not explicitly support the sentence. And that’s an understandable point/question. But I'm sure those citations were conceived in this way: The Conway-Lanz book and the 2001 news story, both cited for that sentence (as could be other sources), pointed out that the USNGRR did not disclose the existence of and address the 25th Div communication saying Gen. Kean wants civilians in the war zone “shot.” The USNGRR addressed only the 25th ID communication saying civilians should be “considered unfriendly and action taken accordingly.” The USNGRR suggests this means they should be arrested. That is not credible (you kill the enemy in a war zone), particularly in view of the follow-on communication saying they should be “shot.”
Links to both communications are in the “Notes” section of the article. I believe the USNGRR was cited for the operative sentence so that the reader could see where the USNGRR discussed one document but failed to address the other. I now see, however, that if we retain the USNGRR cite, it really should be for pages xii-xiii (not just xiii), to get the full discussion. But I also see your point, and think that USNGRR citation could be eliminated, to avoid confusion.
On the broader question Wikimedes seems to be raising, this is an extremely vital point.
All of those orders, communications, documents – in the 1st Cav Div, the 25th ID, Eighth Army, Fifth Air Force, the U.S. Navy, the State Department – attest, shockingly to military lawyers and historians, to a mindset, a policy and a practice of indiscriminately killing South Korean noncombatants in July and August 1950, a policy those experts had never seen documented before in the U.S. military. And in the middle of that period of 1950 we have one of the biggest, with My Lai, U.S. massacres of noncombatants of the 20th century. Allow me to elaborate:
Any and all orders to indiscriminately kill noncombatants are prima facie war crimes.
All of these smoking-gun documents (approx two dozen) would have remained hidden from history had it not been for journalistic and scholarly investigations of NGR.
These are all the more materially relevant to NGR because the 7th Cav log for July 1950, which would have held similar orders, is missing from the U.S. National Archives, a fact the USNGRR concealed. The July 24 divisional order “no refugees to cross the line. Fire everyone…” found in the 8th Cav Regt log almost certainly would also have been in that 7th Cav log, along with discussion and orders regarding killing the NGR refugees. (And, in fact, 7th Cav ex-soldiers attested to such July 26 communications about the NGR refugees.)
The few orders the USNGRR did address were addressed only because it was unavoidable: Those documents had been revealed in the media in 1999-2000. And then the USNGRR addressed those few highly dishonestly.
Otherwise, the USNGRR concealed many “kill” orders and similar documents, not because they were peripheral, but because they were too damning, showing such orders had spread across a war front where No Gun Ri sat right in the middle. Army researchers inside the investigation, knowing the significance of those documents, highlighted those passages with arrows, asterisks, underlines. ("Hold on to your hat," one researcher warned his superior in a cover note with one explosive document.) But the Army brass deep-sixed those documents. In the months following the USNGRR's 2001 release, those highlighted but suppressed document copies were uncovered by assiduous outside researchers.
Among those deep-sixed was the Muccio letter, which showed that there was a theater-wide policy of shooting refugees. All the other documents, in effect, were manifestations of that policy. And common sense tells us, as Conway-Lanz notes, that this policy was promulgated by word of mouth more than in writing.
In the same way, the Air Force memo by Rogers, which the USNGRR lied about, confirms there was a theater-wide policy of strafing refugees. And so USAF mission reports telling of attacks on refugees are the result of that policy. And the NGR refugees were in the middle of that theater, and the NGR refugees were attacked by air.
Bottom line: The world doesn't need the mysteriously missing 7th Cav log to know why those refugees were killed. A mountain of documents (and testimony from ex-soldiers who were there) make very clear there was, across that war front in 1950, a mindset, a policy and a practice of indiscriminately killing noncombatants. And the Army's wholesale effort to suppress and misrepresent the documents -- and testimony ("shoot everyone 6 to 60") -- make very clear that there was, in 2001, a whitewash of the investigation.
Enough from me. But, as I say, these are vitally important points. And the subject sentence must stay, although it could lose the USNGRR cite. Thanks. (Well, that sentence per se is not sine qua non, but the 25th ID orders and the others, and the overarching point, are absolutely essential to the NGR story. But things can always be clarified, consolidated etc. When we reach that section.)Charles J. Hanley (talk) 21:40, 8 August 2015 (UTC)
The Background section pre-August 2013 dealt with the infiltration subject perfectly well. After the Lead section established that refugee infiltration was the concern that led to the mass killing(s), the Background section elaborated by saying troops were being attacked from behind, reports spread that NKs were disguised as civilians and infiltrating via refugee columns, and Gen. Gay declared he believed most of the people on the roads were infiltrators.
But then supposed “examples’’ of infiltration were unnecessarily piled into the section, one after another, five separate elements, some weakly sourced, giving the article the look of one about irregular warfare in 1950 Korea, not about a massacre of unarmed civilians. And eventually two more, patently false “examples” were added, and there was a flat refusal to remove them. (Uniformed NK units that “infiltrated,” i.e., via gaps in the line, according to the official history, were transformed by this anonymous hand into soldiers disguised as refugees.) Other hands had to remove the bogus examples. The purpose was clear, especially when it was declared that every “example” that could be found would be inserted into Background.
Here’s a proposed edit to restore some balance, retaining “examples,” although I consider them unneeded and not necessarily solid:
With miles-wide gaps in their front lines, the Americans were sometimes attacked from behind, and word spread that disguised North Korean soldiers were infiltrating south with refugee columns Reports told of uniformed and civilian-clad North Koreans emerging from behind and among a refugee crowd to attack 1st Cavalry Division troops at the central South Korean town of Yongdong, and of a refugee woman’s “pregnancy” turning out to be a smuggled field radio . At the same time, an Army intelligence report said one daylong search of refugee columns found no infiltrators, and a frontline Pentagon observer team described reports of civilian-clad infiltrators as “unconfirmed,” saying “strong flanking elements” of uniformed enemy troops were penetrating the gaps in U.S. lines.
Research in declassified archives decades later found orders were being issued at this time to fire on Korean civilians. Maj. Gen.Hobart R. Gay, 1st Cavalry Division commander, told rear-echelon reporters he suspected most refugees on the road were disguised enemy.
War correspondent O.H.P. King recalled in his memoirs that Gay in late July 1950 ordered all Koreans in the war zone shot on sight, as well as all rural structures burned down during the retreat. William C. Kaluf, an officer with the division’s 7th Cavalry Regiment, would recall that on the night of July 24, 1950, the regiment’s first day at the war front, a staff officer radioed that Lt. Kaluf’s patrol should fire on a refugee group. He said he disregarded the order: “We had enough enemy to shoot at in uniform without shooting civilians.” The next night, the 7th Cavalry’s 2nd Battalion , hearing a false rumor of an enemy breakthrough, fled rearward in disorder from its forward positions, to be reorganized the next morning, digging in near the village of No Gun Ri, 7 miles (11 km) east of Yongdong. It was later that day, July 26, 1950, that the dug-in troops saw an approaching throng of hundreds of refugees, most from the nearby villages of Chu Gok Ri and Im Ke Ri.
References
Office of the Inspector General, Department of the Army. No Gun Ri Review. Washington, D.C. January 2001
Johnston, Richard J.H. (1950-07-27). "Guile Big Weapon of North Koreans". The New York Times. p. 1,3.
Eighth U.S. Army. July 23, 1950, Interrogation report, "North Korean methods of operation," Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; and Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces. “Report of first OCAFF observer team to the Far East Command.” August 16, 1950. Cited in Hanley, Charles J. (2012). "No Gun Ri: Official Narrative and Inconvenient Truths". Truth and Reconciliation in South Korea: Between the Present and Future of the Korean Wars. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 74 and 79. ISBN978-0-415-62241-7. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |editors= ignored (|editor= suggested) (help)
Cumings, Bruce (December 2001). "Occurrence at Nogun-ri Bridge". Critical Asian Studies. 33 (4): 512. ISSN1467-2715.
Williams, Jeremy (2011-02-17). "Kill 'em All: The American Military in Korea". British Broadcasting Corp. Retrieved 2015-08-13. Declassified military documents ... show clearly how US commanders repeatedly, and without ambiguity, ordered forces under their control to target and kill Korean refugees caught on the battlefield
Chandler, Melbourne C. (1960). Of Garryowen in Glory: The History of the 7th U.S. Cavalry. Annandale, Virginia: The Turnpike Press. p. 246.
In addition to the rebalancing:
I remembered King’s memoir reporting Gay ordered civilians shot (cited in Conway-Lanz’s book, but I also have a copy of King’s).
I rediscovered the disclosure by Lt. Col. Kaluf, a young officer in Korea, about an order to shoot refugees before NGR, and realized it belonged here in the lead-up to the mass killing.
The 2nd Battalion panic of the night of July 25 appears later in the current article, in the midst of the disorganized, problematical “Events" section, out of sequence. It belongs in Background.
The "pre August 2013" background section ignored all Nork irregular warfare which many WP:RS's cite as a significant factor in the events. Also, Bruce Cummings is too unrelated a source to be used for a topic like this.
Any direct quotations or snippets of document from the AP must be confirmed by another source considering their well documented misrepresentation of this material in the past.
An alternative text:
During the Battle of Taejon later in mid-July, hundreds of North Korean soldiers, many dressed in white to disguise themselves as refugees, infiltrated behind the lines of the U.S. 24th Infantry Division and played a crucial role in the defeat of the 24th at Taejon and the capture of Major General William Dean, the conflict's highest-ranking prisoner of war. Two days before the incident at No Gun Ri, a company from the 8th U.S. Cavalry Regiment was reportedly attacked by North Korean irregulars who infiltrated a crowd of refugees west of Yongdong with the KPA driving hundreds of refugees towards US positions to clear minefields. In addition to harassment from disguised North Korean forces, the allies also had to contend with South Korean communist guerrillas>. On July 24, a man dressed in the traditional white peasant clothing accompanied by a seemingly pregnant woman were searched by members of the 8th Cavalry Regiment and the woman's "pregnancy" proved to be a small radio hidden under her clothes used to report American positions to KPA forces.
References
Bill Sloan. "The Darkest Summer: Pusan and Inchon 1950: The Battles That Saved South Korea--and the Marines--from Extinction". Simon and Schuster, Nov 10, 2009. pg 72
Johnston, Richard J.H. (July 27, 1950). "Guile Big Weapon of North Koreans". The New York Times. p. 1.
Korea Institute of Military History. The Korean War: Volume 1. University of Nebraska Press. 2000
^ Cite error: The named reference Appleman was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
WP:NPA -- things are going well so far. On a side note, Bruce Cumings' article cited in the paragraph deals with No Gun Ri, and I believe it is a good (if slightly outdated) source to use. GAB14:47, 9 August 2015 (UTC)
The suggestion by WeldNeck is not appropriate as it brings in later events which could not possibly have any bearing on the NGR massacre. Binksternet (talk) 17:38, 9 August 2015 (UTC)
The article as of June 2013 had 10 sentences totaling 329 words dealing with the concern over infiltration. More than enough. (And I would sincerely urge all to read that article, already too long at 5,151 words, and compare its coherence and readability with the current one, which has added 1,238 words in order to shoehorn in various chunks of out-of-place POV material.)
Now my revised Background section above would expand the sentences dealing with the infiltration concern to 12 totaling 469 words, more than enough, and thensome.
And please step back and consider the factors, besides fear of infiltrators, that contributed to the No Gun Ri killings and that are not dealt with in this article:
Racism. There’s plenty of potential material on that, beginning with Gen. Gay’s description of the Koreans as “trash,” war correspondents’ observations about GIs’ open contempt for them, and NGR survivors’ own observations on the subject (“They played with our lives like boys playing with flies.”)
American ineptitude. The SK police, who could have handled the refugees, were evicted from the area by the 1st Cav Division; the Americans, simultaneously, were telling villagers to stay put, head south and go north. (Remember, the 5th Cav forced these villagers, who wanted to stay put, into the guns of the 7th Cav.)
American unreadiness. They intervened in a strange country without any Korean speakers, with experience only as “parade-ground soldiers,” and with a severe shortage of sergeants, an army’s backbone.
I'm not saying we need 1,000 more words on those subjects. I'm saying 12 sentences dealing with the infiltration concerns are plenty. After all, a woman with a hidden radio in Yongdong doesn’t justify killing hundreds of women and children at NGR. Iryna Harpy, GeneralizationsAreBad, Wikimedes, Irondome,Binksternet, Newzild, I hope we can discuss this expeditiously and get on to more challenging matters. Thanks. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 21:09, 9 August 2015 (UTC)
I just noticed a potentially serious issue with the text as proposed by Mr Hanley:
At the same time, an Army intelligence report said one daylong search of refugee columns found no infiltrators, and a frontline Pentagon observer team described reports of civilian-clad infiltrators as “unconfirmed,” saying “strong flanking elements” of uniformed enemy troops were penetrating the gaps in U.S. lines.
References
Eighth U.S. Army. July 23, 1950, Interrogation report, "North Korean methods of operation," Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; and Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces. “Report of first OCAFF observer team to the Far East Command.” August 16, 1950. Cited in Hanley, Charles J. (2012). "No Gun Ri: Official Narrative and Inconvenient Truths". Truth and Reconciliation in South Korea: Between the Present and Future of the Korean Wars. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 74 and 79. ISBN978-0-415-62241-7. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |editors= ignored (|editor= suggested) (help)
The report citing the "unconfirmed" reports of civilian-clad infiltrators is actually referring to unconfirmed reports of Nork troops using US uniforms to infiltrate. This would also appear to contradict many other reports from the time frame in questions where Nork troops were found to have hid themselves among refugees. I would suggest Mr Hanley provide a copy of the report for all interested parties to evaluate. Since its a work of the US Gov't it could be uploaded on commons. WeldNeck (talk) 18:49, 10 August 2015 (UTC)
WeldNeck, please, you're not making sense. Don't you realize that by saying you "know" what the report says, you're saying you have the report? But what you "know" isn't true, and therefore ... Please, no time-wasters, no ploys. We've got enough to deal with. How about simply acknowledging that we don't need every example we can find of reported infiltration, that two is plenty? Or if you want to argue we need more than two, that we need four, five, six, in descending order of credibility .... do so. I'll then argue we need four, five, six war correspondents/historians saying the threat was exaggerated. And then we can decide and move on to meatier matters. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 19:18, 10 August 2015 (UTC)
I have a snippet of the report, not the entire thing which leads me to believe the report is talking about Nork troops using US uniforms to infiltrate. I stated that I believe I have accurately summarized its contents and that your representation is not accurate. Are you stating you cant or wont provide the report in its entirety? I dont think we need to provide every instance, but we do need to provide the most important (Taejon) and they most relevant. While some war correspondents/historians have stated the threat was exaggerated others do not. Leaving out one part of the argument is a violation POV. WeldNeck (talk) 20:11, 10 August 2015 (UTC)
This little transparent game ("I have here behind my back a snippet, but you show me yours first") is getting us nowhere. More than that, of course, it's an outrage. Please, all, do you have issues, suggestions regarding the proposed edit? I hereby propose to sub it for the bottom of Background. Any objections? Thanks. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 20:51, 10 August 2015 (UTC)
This isnt a game, I only have a snippet because its from a library archive that only shows a small portion.
I do have issues with the edit. It largely not entirely) ignores reports of infiltration, doesnt mention guerilla activity at all, does not mention the Battle of Taejon and places too much emphasis on correspondents/historians who believe the threat was exaggerated to the exclusion of those that do not. WeldNeck (talk) 21:17, 10 August 2015 (UTC)
I don't know what you're reading, but it's not Proposed Edit - Background 2. Does anyone else have issues, objections? If not, I'll sub the passage tomorrow. And then we can plunge into "Events of 25-29 July, 1950" and begin by getting rid of that military dating convention. Thanks. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 22:09, 10 August 2015 (UTC)
3 general principles on the content of this part of the article
This one has gotten off to a rancorous start. Which is too bad, because I think most of us agree on the general outline of what needs to be said here:
1) There are reasons that the massacre occurred. I don't think all the reasons have been brought up yet, so I won't try to list them. The reasons should be included in the article.
2) There are mitigating factors. Chief among these is the refugee situation and the perceived and actual use of the refugee situation by North Korean forces. The mitigating factors should be included in the article.
3) Neither reasons nor mitigating factors are excuses. Killing civilians is still a crime. Ordering the deaths of civilians is still a crime. In covering the reasons and mitigating factors, the article should not be turned into an apologia.
There are many ways to write this section within the constraints of the above 3 principles. If everyone agrees to the above 3 principles, it might save a lot of time wasted on assumptions of bad faith. Are we all on the same page on these 3 basic principles?
--Wikimedes (talk) 00:48, 10 August 2015 (UTC)
Could not have said it better. This is not going to go anywhere if attacks continue. More insults only add to a long, tired list of personal attacks hurled at this page by one editor or another. GAB01:07, 10 August 2015 (UTC)
Agree with all three statements. My current issue with Haley's proposed texts is although he states infiltration by Nork forces and guerrilla activity has been addressed at length, it is only addressed with emphasis on downplaying the threat giving an undue weight to one particular POV, the AP's POV in this case.
Numerous examples can be found of the Nork army using refugees to mask regular forces, screen for offensives, infiltrate small groups of soldiers and provide cover for guerrillas. My text has only a handful of those deemed most relevant by secondary sources with the use of disguised KPA forces at Taejon to be the most significant in context of this discussion because its directly addressed in the Mussio letter. WeldNeck (talk) 13:32, 10 August 2015 (UTC)
This particular portion of a source we have in the article is an excellent summary of my issues with the proposed changes
The AP version does warrant some level of criticism. The reporters relied heavily on the testimony of Korean witnesses and told the story primarily from the Korean point of view. While the Koreans were probably not intentionally lying, studies have shown that a person’s memory changes as they age, and memories of early childhood events in particular become distorted through time.2 While focusing on the Korean point of view, the AP does not clearly address the complexity of the battlefield. They downplayed reports of guerrillas intermingling with refugees as exaggerations by soldiers. They do not mention North Korean attacks that used the refugees to mask their movement as recorded by army records and press accounts on 24 July, 26 July, and 28 July. The AP does not mention guerrilla attacks in rear areas of the division during this period. On midnight 25 July, just an hour before 2-7 CAV’s panicked withdrawal, thirty guerrillas fired on the division headquarters at Kwan-ni. At 1415 hours on the 26th in the same area guerrillas wounded two American soldiers.3 Other documents report enemy snipers in rear areas and attacks on artillery units.4 The Division Artillery reported that the enemy was even using children as young as ten years olds to observe and report on positions.5
I trust everyone else reading the fat paragraph immediately above realizes that "guerrilla" does not equal "refugee." Indigenous leftist guerrillas were active in South Korea from years before the war; the U.S. lines had gaps of up to seven miles between units, an invitation to such surprises in the rear; and the entire American left flank was wide open, from the 1st Cavalry's leftmost north-facing positions, 80 miles west to the Yellow Sea. And the NK 6th and 4th Divisions were rolling down that western corridor. Who needs disguises?
Meantime, Irondome, seeing your comment below, I would ask whether others also fail to see the brilliance of my suggestion (immediately below this comment), of starting with a workable base, instead of an unholy mess of an article. I do think it's a more practicable approach. Meantime, while awaiting further discussion, I will note that Proposed Edit - Background 2 has stood there for more than 48 hours without real comment (well, the existing text was offered as an "alternative," but that wasn't necessary). If we're going to fix this article, I'd urge that we get down to it, and we discuss the proposal or take a vote. The proposal includes two supposed "examples" of infiltration via refugees, and two items suggesting the threat may have been exaggerated. I say go with it. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 18:03, 10 August 2015 (UTC)
Yes, of course, on the 3 General Principles. And again I would strongly urge all to read the article as of June 2013. It flows; it makes sense. Trying to untangle the current article is going to be a herculean task. In all seriousness, in the interest of efficiency and effectiveness, I suggest instead taking the June 2013 version, tweaking such things as the Legal Framework section (which I believe initially caught Wikimedes' eye), updating casualties etc. as necessary, and then holding the 3 General Principles up against it and adding/rewriting as necessary. If we want to add a couple of supposed cases of infiltration, fine. If we want to elaborate on troops' unpreparedness, we have the material. If we want a whiff of the racism, it's at hand.
That way we have a good chance to get the job done, not just in a reasonable time frame, but get it done at all. (I, for one, must bow out from Aug. 20 to Sept. 5 because of travel.) Otherwise, here's what we face, and now's as good a time as any to lay out this extremely important point, in hopes of heading off a lot of grief:
Plowing on through the current article will present us countless times with a choice of "Cut or Bloat." This Background section is minor stuff. Everywhere one turns, if we go on, we will find the article seeded since 2013 with land mines, untruths, each of which, if left in, will require the insertion of a counterpoint. And, believe me, we're talking about the article ballooning with many hundreds of additional words, dealing with truly insignificant matters.
Please consider these concrete examples. It begins in the "Events" section with the Ha Ga Ri deaths. The NKs were not "advancing," there was no "crossfire," the official investigators jointly agreed American soldiers killed those people at Ha Ga Ri. Moving on to the pointless discussion of the "TACPs" etc.: There were air and ground controllers spotting targets in the area, there were myriad ways to call in air strikes, there were mission reports/summaries showing air attacks in the NGR area, and no one should care whether a couple of these surviving peasants thought some soldier radioed in the air strike. And all agree there was a strafing, although these needless sentences hint otherwise. And then we have Wenzel speaking of gunfire from the refugees. But Wenzel said otherwise in earlier interviews. And Carroll says he didn't order his men to fire; well, then, why does he say on videotape that he did give an order and, "We had to shoot them to hold them back"? And, by the way, regarding Wenzel and infiltrators, Carroll says he, Carroll, "went down there" and "there weren't any North Koreans in there the first day." Should we quote him? Believe me, I could go on and on with these pointless problems.
Should we go on forever, expending everyone's valuable time, cherrypicking men's changeable quotes, citing one unreliable source's misreading of documents to be countered by a correct reading, setting up endless point-counterpoints, larding on more confusion and hundreds of words, almost exclusively on matters that don't belong in the article in the first place, or that can be summarized in a single sentence?
Or do we go back to a sound, sensible version, acceptable then to all but one of those who cared, and build on that, using Wikimedes' excellent 3 General Principles and our own general common sense? Please think about it. And please, everyone, let's hear your thoughts. Thanks. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 13:59, 10 August 2015 (UTC)
TCAP’s: All published sources agree there were no were none in the region during these events. The 7th didn’t have one, even though they requested one after their regimental HQ’s was attacked by the USAF. The 8th did have one, but was nowhere near the bridge. This is notable because many of the Koreans
As for Wenzel .. don’t mention something if you are unwilling to produce the source which the AP never has and has refused to when asked. There are currently WP:RS citing Wenzel’s statements.
As for Carroll, I suspect his statement to the AP has been taken out of context (something which the AP has been caught doing many times with respect to this story)
However, retired Col. Robert Carroll, who was a lieutenant on the scene at No Gun Ri, tells CNN he is convinced no slaughter of civilians took place. He called the allegation "selective and imaginative memory on the part of a lot of people." Carroll said the orders he received, while ordering troops to fire on anyone trying to cross the front lines, also urged discretion in the case of women and children. "'Use discretion' was part of that order," he said. "We used discretion. We did not fire automatic weapons. There was a few riflemen fired at them when they came around the bend. I stopped that. I personally stopped all the firing. "If there was any firing at those (people), it had to be later in the day, after I left. And somebody would have countermanded that order," he said. "We were not using our machine guns except when we were under attack because we were short on ammunition," Carroll said. "We had not been resupplied; we had been moving, retreating, falling back for about a week. So that guy is dreaming."
Your pleas to revert back to a “sound, sensible version” continues to show ownership issues which is why I have not withdrawn the ArbCom request. WeldNeck (talk)
Thank you for the further concrete examples of what lies ahead if we plow on.
Irondome once suggested starting from scratch, with a fresh article, an idea that has obvious merit. But I would think that would be much more time-consuming than taking an earlier, largely satisfactory version, critiquing it, updating it and applying Wikimedes' 3 General Principles (sounds like a Greek math theorem), something that gives us a framework for what the article must do. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 15:19, 10 August 2015 (UTC)
Apologies for not being on line for the past 48 hrs. I would fully agree with the 3 principles, and plough on. Let us deal with the points that we can broadly agree on in a timely fashion, and leave the real tough stuff to the last, within a framework of working section by section. We could list and put aside the most intractable issues, and address them at the end of the process. Something like Section two (for example) major controversies. This approach will speed things up. I suspect the majority of material has broad consensus. Lets deal with that first, instead of increasing our efforts, time and blood pressure levels on small stuff. Irondome (talk) 16:33, 10 August 2015 (UTC)
A wild editor appears
My apologizes to all involved. Unfortunately I have been moved to the periphery of this review. My schedule has gone from consistent night/evening shifts where I have nothing to do but this, to total insanity, including weeks in the field where I barely have cell service. Also unfortunately, this moves forward so quickly it is difficult to keep up even if one is gone for several days. Thanks to everyone who has kept this going in my absence. I wish I could say my life will organize itself soon, but it's anybody's guess.
So as penance, here is my best attempt to piss off both sides of the debate and cut all the fat from both proposals. This is a background section; it should, as quickly as possible, orient the reader to the situation with the absolute minimum of extraneous information not directly relevant to the topic of the article. So let the flame war begin, or cordial compromise, you know...whatever.
With miles-wide gaps in their front lines, the Americans were sometimes attacked from behindUS forces suffered from rear attacks, and word spread that disguised North Korean soldiers were infiltrating south with refugee columns (Note 1)
Reports told of uniformed and civilian-clad North Koreans emerging from behind and among a refugee crowd to attack 1st Cavalry Division troops at the central South Korean town of Yongdong, and of a refugee woman’s “pregnancy” turning out to be a smuggled field radio....engaging in combat at the Battle of Yongdong, the Battle of Taejon, and conducting reconnaissance operations.Note 2
During the Battle of Taejon later in mid-July, hundreds of North Korean soldiers, many dressed in white to disguise themselves as refugees, infiltrated behind the lines of the U.S. 24th Infantry Division and played a crucial role in the defeat of the 24th at Taejon and the capture of Major General William Dean, the conflict's highest-ranking prisoner of war. Two days before the incident at No Gun Ri, a company from the 8th U.S. Cavalry Regiment was reportedly attacked by North Korean irregulars who infiltrated a crowd of refugees west of YongdongNote 2
In addition to harassment from disguised North Korean forces, the allies also had to contend with South Korean communist guerrillasNote 3
At the same time, an Army intelligence report said one daylong search of refugee columns found no infiltrators, and a frontline Pentagon observer team described reports of civilian-clad infiltrators as “unconfirmed,” saying “strong flanking elements” of uniformed enemy troops were penetrating the gaps in U.S. lines.However, this conflicted with official US Army Intelligence reports.Note 4
Research inAs a result, declassified archives decades later found orders were being issued at thisthe time to fire on Korean civilians. Maj. Gen.Hobart R. Gay, 1st Cavalry Division commander, told rear-echelon reporters he suspected most refugees on the road were disguised enemy.
War correspondent O.H.P. King recalled in his memoirs that Gay in late July 1950 ordered all Koreans in the war zone shot on sight, as well as all rural structures burned down during the retreat.William C. Kaluf, an officer with the division’s 7th Cavalry Regiment, would recall that on the night of July 24, 1950, the regiment’s first day at the war front, a staff officer radioed that Lt. Kaluf’s patrol should fire on a refugee group. He said he disregarded the order: “We had enough enemy to shoot at in uniform without shooting civilians.” Note 5
The next night, The 7th Cavalry’s 2nd Battalion , hearing a false rumor of an enemy breakthrough, fled rearward in disorder from its forward positions, to be reorganized the next morning, digging in near the village of No Gun Ri, 7 miles (11 km) east of Yongdong. It was later that day, July 26, 1950, that the dug-in troops saw an approaching throng of hundreds of refugees, most from the nearby villages of Chu Gok Ri and Im Ke Ri.Note 6
References
Office of the Inspector General, Department of the Army. No Gun Ri Review. Washington, D.C. January 2001
Johnston, Richard J.H. (1950-07-27). "Guile Big Weapon of North Koreans". The New York Times. p. 1,3.
Bill Sloan. "The Darkest Summer: Pusan and Inchon 1950: The Battles That Saved South Korea--and the Marines--from Extinction". Simon and Schuster, Nov 10, 2009. pg 72
Johnston, Richard J.H. (July 27, 1950). "Guile Big Weapon of North Koreans". The New York Times. p. 1.
Eighth U.S. Army. July 23, 1950, Interrogation report, "North Korean methods of operation," Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; and Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces. “Report of first OCAFF observer team to the Far East Command.” August 16, 1950. Cited in Hanley, Charles J. (2012). "No Gun Ri: Official Narrative and Inconvenient Truths". Truth and Reconciliation in South Korea: Between the Present and Future of the Korean Wars. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 74 and 79. ISBN978-0-415-62241-7. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |editors= ignored (|editor= suggested) (help)
Cumings, Bruce (December 2001). "Occurrence at Nogun-ri Bridge". Critical Asian Studies. 33 (4): 512. ISSN1467-2715.
Chandler, Melbourne C. (1960). Of Garryowen in Glory: The History of the 7th U.S. Cavalry. Annandale, Virginia: The Turnpike Press. p. 246.
Note 1: Tightening
Note 2: Getting my pound of flesh. Link to the main articles on Yongdong and Taejon; no reason to go any deeper. No reason to commit any words to the one "pregnant" "woman". Get used to modern combat. This kind of thing is as common place as saying that combatants in Iraq or Afghanistan used IEDs. Just link to the reference and point out the important issue: namely, they were engaged in recon ops. Also the capture of this one general is not relevant unless he himself was involved in NGR, which it does not appear he was.
Note 3: There is no need to list every hardship the troops had to endure simply because we can find a source for it. This goes into the same category as ammo shortages or Russian air support. It's simply more information than the reader needs to understand NGR.
Note 4: The core issue seems to be that some people said A while others said B. We don't need to specify that PFC Snuffy at Camp Carroll issued a report that a search from 0900 to 2100 on 21 August returned no results.
Note 6: The first sentence is actually directly relevant to the article. Remove "the next day" because this is not a novel. The last sentence just seems like bloat that is mostly loaded or overly colorful language: "later that day", "dug in", "throng"...and is unsourced to boot. I'm not sure I care what villages they were from. And "most" is a quantitative statement (i.e. more than 50%).
So when we take all this together we get:
With gaps in their lines, US forces suffered from rear attacks, and word spread that disguised North Korean soldiers were infiltrating refugee columns, engaging in combat at the Battle of Yongdong, the Battle of Taejon, and conducting reconnaissance operations. However, this conflicted with official US Army Intelligence reports. As a result, declassified archives later found orders issued at the time to fire on Korean civilians.
The 7th Cavalry’s 2nd Battalion, hearing a false rumor of an enemy breakthrough, fled rearward in disorder from its forward positions, to be reorganized the next morning, digging in near the village of No Gun Ri, 7 miles (11 km) east of Yongdong.
References
Office of the Inspector General, Department of the Army. No Gun Ri Review. Washington, D.C. January 2001
Johnston, Richard J.H. (1950-07-27). "Guile Big Weapon of North Koreans". The New York Times. p. 1,3.
Bill Sloan. "The Darkest Summer: Pusan and Inchon 1950: The Battles That Saved South Korea--and the Marines--from Extinction". Simon and Schuster, Nov 10, 2009. pg 72
Johnston, Richard J.H. (July 27, 1950). "Guile Big Weapon of North Koreans". The New York Times. p. 1.
Eighth U.S. Army. July 23, 1950, Interrogation report, "North Korean methods of operation," Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; and Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces. “Report of first OCAFF observer team to the Far East Command.” August 16, 1950. Cited in Hanley, Charles J. (2012). "No Gun Ri: Official Narrative and Inconvenient Truths". Truth and Reconciliation in South Korea: Between the Present and Future of the Korean Wars. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 74 and 79. ISBN978-0-415-62241-7. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |editors= ignored (|editor= suggested) (help)
Cumings, Bruce (December 2001). "Occurrence at Nogun-ri Bridge". Critical Asian Studies. 33 (4): 512. ISSN1467-2715.
1. However, this conflicted with official US Army Intelligence reports.. This isnt true in this instance. The report referenced (I will post a copy of it to commons in a few days) refers to KPA soldiers and guerrillas using US uniforms to infiltrate.
2. hearing a false rumor of an enemy breakthrough, Appleman does not call the breakthrough rumors false.
3. As a result, declassified archives later found orders issued at the time to fire on Korean civilians. I would like this to be more specific. The ROE's for refugee control might deserve an entire section to themselves, but it needs to be stated that lethal force against refugee groups was a last option after verbal orders and warning shots. WeldNeck (talk) 18:11, 13 August 2015 (UTC)
Very nice to see you back, TJWood. Do you promise never to leave us again?
On second thought. ...
At this rate we'll end up with a bite-sized article that will leave readers wondering what this No Gun Ri thing was all about. Some of what you've written would need clarifying, such as the reference to intell reports. But at another level, although the trimming works in places, you've deleted material very relevant to NGR, most worryingly dropping the fact that Gen. Gay (incredibly) declared half the refugees on the roads were infiltrators, and ordered civilians shot. Couldn't be more relevant: He was commander of the division that shot the NGR refugees.
The joy of communal editing: Many moons ago I had to cajole an editor out of identifying and describing the railroad line under which the refugees were killed. Now you don't even want to identify their home villages. They should be named; in fact, at some point the article should feature a map showing the locations and sequence of events.
By the way, you may or may not be aware that a charge sheet has been filed against me at ArbCom by one of our merry crew. The hanging judges are pondering my fate. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 18:39, 13 August 2015 (UTC)
Counter 1
With gaps in their lines, U.S. forces were sometimes attacked from behind, and word spread that disguised North Korean soldiers were infiltrating refugee columns reportedly taking part in the Battle of Yongdong and the Battle of Taejon, and conducting reconnaissance operations. Other reports, from Army intelligence and Pentagon observers, indicated this threat may have been exaggerated.But because of these concerns, archival research found decades later, orders were issued in July 1950 and later to fire on Korean civilians in front-line areas.
Sometime in late July, 1st Cavalry Division commander Maj. Gen.Hobart R. Gay, who told reporters he suspected most refugees were disguised enemy, ordered all Koreans in the war zone to be shot on sight, a war correspondent later wrote.On the night of July 25, the division’s 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, hearing a rumor of an enemy breakthrough, fled rearward in disorder from its forward positions, to be reorganized the next morning, digging in near the village of No Gun Ri, 7 miles (11 km) east of Yongdong.
References
Office of the Inspector General, Department of the Army. No Gun Ri Review. Washington, D.C. January 2001
Johnston, Richard J.H. (1950-07-27). "Guile Big Weapon of North Koreans". The New York Times. p. 1,3.
Eighth U.S. Army. July 23, 1950, Interrogation report, "North Korean methods of operation," Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; and Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces. “Report of first OCAFF observer team to the Far East Command.” August 16, 1950. Cited in Hanley, Charles J. (2012). "No Gun Ri: Official Narrative and Inconvenient Truths". Truth and Reconciliation in South Korea: Between the Present and Future of the Korean Wars. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 74 and 79. ISBN978-0-415-62241-7. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |editors= ignored (|editor= suggested) (help)
Cumings, Bruce (December 2001). "Occurrence at Nogun-ri Bridge". Critical Asian Studies. 33 (4): 512. ISSN1467-2715.
Williams, Jeremy (2011-02-17). "Kill 'em All: The American Military in Korea". British Broadcasting Corp. Retrieved 2015-08-13. Declassified military documents ... show clearly how US commanders repeatedly, and without ambiguity, ordered forces under their control to target and kill Korean refugees caught on the battlefield
Introducing Graham’s Hierarchy of Disagreement (and other suggestions for smoother discussion)
Stay in the top three sections of this pyramid.
Perhaps we should get on with discussing the individual points of the article, but given all the bad blood and sheer wasted time in past discussions, it’s probably worthwhile to spend a little time discussing how to discuss things. (Or, if after reading or not reading what I have to say, you decide I just needed to vent a bit, then nevermind.)
This pyramid is useful in deciding which arguments to make. The pertinent point is that if someone comes up with a suggestion you disagree with, it’s best to address the suggestion directly.
This talk page is fraught with ad hominems that accomplish little besides wasting time. These include general criticisms of reliable sources that do not address the topic at hand, as well as criticisms of other editors, which are even worse. On this latter point I must unfortunately single out Cjhanley. Each time you take a swipe at WeldNeck (we all know who you mean), as you have several times in the last few days (diffs below), you are making one of the worst arguments you can possibly make. Try and focus on content, not editors. Misplaced Pages even has a little acronym link WP:FOC.
(Cjhanley's ad hominems against Weldneck in the last 2 days: 2nd paragraph,
,
3rd paragraph, last paragraph,
1st sentence.) (Other ad hominems against editors are much less frequent.)
Off-topic ad hominems against sources don’t usually engender the visceral negative response that ad hominems against other editors do, but they are also wastes of time.
I’ve been looking through the list of sources used in the article. Aside from the primary sources used for additional reading, most of the sources used, in spite of their flaws, do appear to be reliable sources by Misplaced Pages standards. Notable exceptions are the US and S Korean reports, which are primary, non-independent sources. How we use “Committee for the Review and Restoration of Honor for the No Gun Ri Victims” should probably be addressed at some point. Masters’ theses (i.e. Kuehl) are not considered reliable sources unless additional criteria are met, outlined at Misplaced Pages:Identifying_reliable_sources#Scholarship third bullet. But let’s leave off discussing these (last two, at least) until they come up.
Several attempts to exclude Bateman’s book have failed. The AP reports, in spite of their flaws, are extremely unlikely to be excluded in toto from being used as reliable sources.
What this means is that if a part of the article is referenced with a reliable source, saying that we should exclude that part because the source is crap is not useful. Saying we should exclude that part because the source is crap for extremely good reasons x, y, and z is also not useful. (There’s been a lot of this.) Instead, if you know that a source is wrong about a specific item, cite several sources that point out the error. If it ends there, we can remove the item from the article. If another editor comes up with several other sources supporting the item, things get complicated, but what is likely to happen is that the Misplaced Pages article will end up describing the disagreement in the sources. Ideally, we will have already elucidated both the disagreement and the relevant sources on the talk page, making transfer to the article that much easier.
The above is what I consider the important stuff, or at least a start. I think I had about 4 more things on discussion to talk about, but it’s probably better to stop here.
--Wikimedes (talk) 23:40, 10 August 2015 (UTC)
On a completely different note (although Wikimedes' analysis was top-notch) there is an arbitration case pending, so personal attacks will not look good at all in front of the arbitrators. This applies for everyone on the page, me included. GAB00:01, 11 August 2015 (UTC)
Thank you, Wikimedes, for your continued efforts. Now I think the best way to make progress is to make progress. Does anyone have any comments, suggestions regarding Proposed Edit-Background 2? It adds a strong new element to the lead-up to the massacre (Lt. Kaluf) and reins in the overkill on irregular warfare. I believe all that's needed is a general statement of the reports and fear of infiltration, but this proposal retains two supposed "examples," unrelated to NGR, as a compromise (one of which is shaky; Yongdong is not corroborated in official documents). And let's then please move quickly to a support/oppose canvass. Thanks. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 15:13, 11 August 2015 (UTC)
An interesting statement, "Yongdong is not corroborated in official documents" .. what "official documents" might you be referring to? If you are referring to Appleman's history of the war, its right there on pg 199:
The large numbers of Korean refugees crowding the Yongdong area undoubtedly helped the enemy infiltrate the 1st Cavalry Division positions. On 24 July, for example, a man dressed in white carrying a heavy pack, and accompanied by a woman appearing to be pregnant, came under suspicion. The couple was searched and the woman's assumed pregnancy proved to be a small radio hidden under her clothes. She used this radio for reporting American positions. Eighth Army tried to control the refugee movement through the Korean police, permitting it only during daylight hours and along predetermined routes.
And again on pg 202
While this untoward incident was taking place in their rear, other elements of the 1st Cavalry Division held their defensive positions east of Yongdong. The 7th Regiment of the N.K. 3d Division, meanwhile, started southwest from Yongdong on the Muju road in a sweeping flank movement through Chirye against Kumch'on, twenty air miles east-ward. That night, elements of the enemy division in Yongdong attacked the 1st Cavalry troops east of the town. Four enemy tanks and an infantry force started this action by driving several hundred refugees ahead of them through American mine fields. Before daybreak the 1st Cavalry Division had repulsed the attack
Your repeated attempts to turn documented incidents of the KPA using the refugee crisis to mask its movements, infiltrate forces and cause chaos in the US lines in to 'rumors' serves only the interest of the AP's POV in this debate. WeldNeck (talk) 21:00, 11 August 2015 (UTC)
Last I looked, the Appleman official history, highly unusually, perhaps uniquely, footnote-attributed the Yongdong story to a newspaper report, not an Army document. In other words, it isn't reported in the contemporary daily unit documents; and since the news reporter didn't see the action, it's hearsay. But what's the problem? Yongdong is in the proposed edit, attributed to the newspaper. WeldNeck, these eruptions of yours are getting me in trouble. When I'm forced to respond, I'm seen as argumentative, "not willing to work with other editors." Let's calm down. By the way, the AP is a news organization, the most important in America; it doesn't have a "POV." Charles J. Hanley (talk) 21:37, 11 August 2015 (UTC)
Unusual or not, Appleman is still a reliable source ... perhaps the best on the Korean War and by categorizing infiltration events, which led to the refugee policies and ultimately contributed to the killings, you are steering the article towards one POV to the exclusion of the other. WeldNeck (talk) 01:18, 12 August 2015 (UTC)
'Diametric opposition' and 'credence'
Noting Iryna Harpy's comment at ArbCom about the "two diametrically opposed editors" reminds me how absurd this all is. (This also relates to WeldNeck's latest claim there of a "significant POV" being left out of the article.)
As you know, Robert Bateman, the 7th Cavalry enthusiast, is the sole source for the contrarian fantasies about NGR. But listen to what he said at a 2004 Pritzker Military Library (Chicago) "debate," when the moderator challenged him:
MODERATOR: What I came away from your book and your comments ... is that yes, all kinds of atrocities were going on. ... But the one that's reported by Hanley and company is the one that you don't give any credence to. It is like everybody else is right except the AP team which did all that work.
BATEMAN: I point out -- I do give credence to it. These are all the points that we agree on. We agree that South....
MODERATOR: You are very critical of it.
BATEMAN: I am very critical of the assertion that 400 people were killed there.
That's it. That's what it comes down to. There's the diametric opposition. Well, of course, No. 1, the AP doesn't "assert" anything. That was the survivors' estimate (reported along with lower guesses from soldiers). Bateman, who is clueless about what journalists do and forever attributed the 400 to "the AP," apparently felt the witnesses should have been ignored. But to bring things up to date, No. 2, what about the minimum 163 dead and missing of the 2005 inquest? What about the government foundation's 2011 estimate of 250-300 dead? At those authoritatively determined levels, is he still "very critical" ... of the AP? of Koreans? of what?
Of course, no one should care what Major Bateman thinks or thought. He did nothing but sit at his keyboard and pound out wild "theories," perhaps on orders from above, perhaps not. He didn't go to Korea, to the site, to talk to survivors. And even then his "criticism" evaporates in the heat of his own self-contradictory fantasizing. This is very important; this alone is reason enough to purge the bizarre Bateman from this article:
On page 126 of his book, he writes of the No Gun Ri killings, "If they took place as described at all. ... the killings occurred in dozens and possibly hundreds of the small misfortunes that make war so horrible." (In other words, in various places across South Korea. No kidding, that's what he wrote, and repeated orally.)
Then on his pages 198-199, he lays out "the truth, supported by historical evidence," that is, his scenario of mortar and small arms fire at NGR, and between a dozen to "slightly more" than two dozen refugees killed.
In between, on his page 151, he again denies the confirmed reality of No Gun Ri, saying of a 19th-century massacre, "in the case of Wounded Knee, at least the event itself had occurred."
Elsewhere in his chaotic book, as he swings back and forth between accepting and denying that No Gun Ri took place, he cites ridiculously precise but ever-changing casualty tolls, from 8 to 70. (Meantime, he misreads documents, prints rumors, and spouts the fabricated foolishness about GI witnesses Flint and Hesselman.)
Is this the "other viewpoint" that I keep hearing should be in the article? But what is that viewpoint, which will it be, that No Gun Ri didn't happen? That it did and the sedentary major knows all the details? That the refugees were caught in a US-North Korean crossfire (as he writes on his page 206), or that they were hit by mortar "warning shots" as he says in the above-cited pages 198-199? That he gives "credence" to the AP story? That he doesn't?
Where some might see diametric opposition, I see on one side a picture of a historic event, its knowns and unknowns, as drawn by journalists, scholars and others doing careful, objective work, and the other side a black hole, i.e., there is no other side, other "version" of NGR. This is the absurdity. There's no "significant POV" that's being left out. If anyone believes there is, I'm all ears. Tell me about it. Thanks. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 20:39, 13 August 2015 (UTC) Cite error: There are <ref group=nb> tags on this page, but the references will not show without a {{reflist|group=nb}} template (see the help page).
Referencing and citation: criterion met
