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			Other Names
	'''The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam''' (LTTE), also known as the Tamil Tigers, is a military and political organization that has waged a violent ]ist campaign against the ]n Government since the 1970s in order to secure independence for the traditional ] regions in the North and East of ].
			The Tamil Tigers
			The Ellalan Force

	The LTTE proclaims itself the sole representative and protector of ] whereas the ]n Government and several international players contend this claim is false and feel that the LTTE alone cannot be considered as such . Despite this the LTTE are still generally seen as being the main body with whom the government must negotiate in order to end the ] in ].

			Description
	The LTTE has been repeatedly accused of using ], violating human rights and is currently banned as a terrorist organisation in a number of countries (]). The UN has also accused the LTTE of continuing to recruit child soldiers. The LTTE itself rejects this characterisation, and in turn accuses the Sri Lankan government of ] and ] against the Tamil minority. While the international community has not accepted the charges of genocide by Sri Lanka, many rights groups have leveled accusations of human rights violations against the Sri Lankan government . Accusations of attempted ] have also been traded by both parties in the past. The LTTE contends proscription by certain international actors as a tactic used to pressurize the movement to seek an unfavourable negotiated settlement , while the Sri Lankan government and some international players contend the LTTE still uses acts of terrorism in an attempt to create an authoritarian mono-ethnic state.
			Founded in 1976, the LTTE is the most powerful Tamil group in Sri Lanka. It began its insurgency against the Sri Lankan Government in 1983 and has relied on a guerrilla strategy that includes the use of terrorist tactics. The LTTE currently is observing a cease-fire agreement with the Sri Lankan Government.

			Activities
	The LTTE primarily consists of an army, a ] and a recently created air wing. However, it also exercises some, but not all, civil functions in territory under its control, including legislative, judicial, police, financial, and cultural functions, but excluding monetary, educational and some administrative functions. It is headed by its reclusive founder, ].
			The LTTE has integrated a battlefield insurgent strategy with a terrorist program that targets key personnel in the countryside and senior Sri Lankan political and military leaders in Colombo and other urban centers. The LTTE is most notorious for its cadre of suicide bombers, the Black Tigers. Political assassinations and bombings were commonplace tactics prior to the cease-fire.

			Strength
			Exact strength is unknown, but the LTTE is estimated to have 8,000 to 10,000 armed combatants in Sri Lanka, with a core of 3,000 to 6,000 trained fighters. The LTTE also has a significant overseas support structure for fundraising, weapons procurement, and propaganda activities.

			Location/Area of Operation
	== The military LTTE ==
			The LTTE controls most of the northern and eastern coastal areas of Sri Lanka but has conducted operations throughout the island. Headquartered in northern Sri Lanka, LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran has established an extensive network of checkpoints and informants to keep track of any outsiders who enter the group’s area of control.

			External Aid
	The LTTE's fighters are noted for their loyalty to the organization. Recruits are instructed to be prepared to die for the cause, and are issued with a ] capsule to be swallowed in the case of capture. The LTTE also has a special squad of suicide troops, called the ], which it deploys for critical missions.
			The LTTE’s overt organizations support Tamil separatism by lobbying foreign governments and the United Nations. The LTTE also uses its international contacts and the large Tamil diaspora in North America, Europe, and Asia to procure weapons, communications, funding, and other needed supplies.

	The LTTE gets its main funding from contributions by Tamils residing in Western countries, although there is controversy about the extent to which such contributions are voluntary rather than the result of extortion.

	===The beginnings of the LTTE===

			Courtesy of Indian Front-Line Magazine, 24 Nov 2001.
	]

			BATTICALOA district in eastern Sri Lanka hangs tensely between the security forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Large tracts of land in the district are under the control of the LTTE. And people living in these areas have of late been providing the cannon fodder for its armed struggle.
	Until the 1970s, the ] had largely taken the form of a demand for autonomy for the Tamil-speaking regions under ]. The lack of results after twenty-five years of negotiations, and the rise of Sinhala nationalism as represented by the 1972 constitution, led to a significant section of young Tamils, particularly in ], adopting a more radical position which favoured the use of violent means. A large number of militant organisations were set up, one of which was the ] (TNT), formed in ] by a small group of young Tamils and university students led by ]. Many students joined the TNT thereafter due to the fact that they were not given equality in the grading systems and admission to post-graduate schools. The TNT's first military operation was the assassination of ], the ] mayor of ], in ], followed by a few successful bank robberies to fund their activities and the assassination of a number of minor police officials. The success of these early acts gave them confidence, and in ] they teamed up with the militants headed by ] to form the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. In ], ] joined the LTTE as their main ideologue. Balasingham added depth to the LTTE's politics. Whereas they had earlier been committed to the single idea of Tamil independence, Balasingham added a new layer of social policies, inspired by ] and anti-]ism, which profoundly shaped the LTTE's worldview.

			Like 10-year-old Sivaruban of Vakkarai, 45 km north of Batticaloa. When the LTTE began a recruitment drive in the village three months ago, his widowed mother moved out with him and his 16-year-old sister to an Army-controlled village in Valachenai to protect them. But to no avail. The recruiters came knocking at her door on September 15, and Sivaruban had to go with them.
	The LTTE continued the TNT's campaign of low-intensity violence against state agents, particularly policemen, and quickly became the most efficient and ruthless of the many Tamil militant groups. In ], they wiped out a police patrol which had discovered one of their training camps, the first major military victory for a separatist Tamil group. After ] was imposed in Jaffna in ], the LTTE began targeting the military. They were responsible for the attack which provoked the ] of ]. These riots and the government's crackdown on Tamil separatism produced a steady stream of volunteers for the LTTE, which they shaped into a militia. In ], they began launching higher intensity attacks against Sri Lankan troops. The same year they also formed a naval unit, the ].

			So did 10-year-old Thevaruban, also of Vakkarai. The LTTE wanted to recruit his elder brother, but the boy was away in Colombo. So they took away Thevaruban as a guarantee to ensure that his brother would return to Batticaloa and sign up with them. The parents were later told that Thevaruban was being given military training and would return when the LTTE concluded its mission.
	===Rise to dominance===
	The LTTE's discipline and efficiency, coupled with Prabhakaran's leadership and its strong ideological base, made the group much more effective than the other Tamil militant groups. As a result, for the next three years the LTTE was the main Tamil force in the civil war. The LTTE was militarily very successful against the Sri Lankan Army. In 1987 the ] was established; an elite unit of LTTE members responsible for conducting suicide attacks against political, economic and military targets.

	Initially, the LTTE's operations were carried on in cooperation with other militant groups. In April ], it had formally joined a common militant front, the ], or ENLF, which had been formed by the ], the ] and the ].

	In ], the LTTE launched a military attack on the ], the largest of the other Tamil militant groups in Sri Lanka. Over the next few months, the entire TELO leadership and several hundred volunteers were hunted down, and the group ceased to be a potent force. A few months later, they attacked training camps of the ], forcing it to withdraw entirely from the Jaffna peninsula.

			School children in LTTE controlled areas, prime targets for LTTE recruiters.
	The reasons for the LTTE's internecine attacks on other Tamil groups are much debated. The reason they themselves gave at the time was the other groups' connection with India. All the Tamil militant groups, including the LTTE, had received varying degrees of support from ]. However, while other groups such as the ] wholeheartedly embraced Indian support, the LTTE remained wary of India particularly after ] came to power, fearing that India was seeking primarily to advance its own interests, which were not the same as those of the Sri Lankan Tamils, and would therefore force the Tamils to accept an unfavourable settlement. They were particularly suspicious of the Indian intelligence agency, the ], which they said had completely infiltrated the TELO and EPRLF, and was using them to eliminate the LTTE. Some commentators have suggested that the LTTE were also unhappy that the most of the funding from expatriates went to the TELO, rather than to them (Jeyaratnam Wilson, 1999). It has also been suggested that they believed the struggle would only be effective if the other groups, who were much more willing to compromise, were not around (Narayan Swamy 2002). The effect of the attacks was that the LTTE consolidated the position their successful attacks had already established, as the main military group fighting for the cause of Tamil Eelam, with no credible rivals.

			These and many other instances of the LTTE's recruitment of children, with names of the recruits, their parents' names and address, are contained in a recent report by the University Teachers' Human Rights of Jaffna (UTHR).
	===The IPKF period===

			It has been public knowledge that the LTTE uses minors in its separatist war. It is difficult to say just how many under-age cadres the LTTE has, but there is no doubt that children have been part of the group's military machine since the early 1990s.
	In ], the ] launched a new assault to recapture Jaffna. In the Indian press, the attack was depicted as being brutal and leading to disproportionately large civilian casualties. Faced with growing anger amongst its own Tamils, India intervened directly in the conflict by air-dropping food parcels on Jaffna in what was interpreted as a show of strength. After negotiations, India and Sri Lanka entered into an agreement whereby Sri Lanka agreed to a federal structure which would grant autonomy to the Tamils. India was to send a peacekeeping force, the ], to Sri Lanka to enforce the agreement.

	Although most Tamil militant groups accepted this agreement, the LTTE only did so very grudgingly and very soon rejected it on the grounds that the reforms were only illusory. The result was that the LTTE now found itself engaged in military conflict against the ]. The army fought a bitter month-long campaign to win control of the Jaffna peninsula from the LTTE. This campaign and the army's subsequent anti-LTTE operations were ruthless, and made it extremely unpopular amongst the Tamils. The LTTE exploited this sentiment and, by painting themselves as the only group opposing the IPKF's "anti-Tamil aggression", as they termed it, they became increasingly popular. In addition, the implementation of the autonomy provisions under the agreement was perceived by the Tamils as giving them little or nothing, and the entire structure collapsed very quickly. As the only group to have held itself aloof from this process, the LTTE was able to portray this development as a vindication of their stance.


			LTTE 'Solders' are as young as 10
	===The post-IPKF LTTE===
	The IPKF's intervention was also unpopular amongst Sinhalese Buddhists, and the last IPKF members left the country ] upon request of the Sri Lankan government. During this period, the LTTE absorbed the remnants of the other rival militant groups, including the ] and ], which had tried to regroup with the help of the IPKF and RAW. In a series of military operations in 1995 and 1996, the army re-captured the Jaffna peninsula and the town of ] from the LTTE leaving the LTTE resources crippled and manpower depleted. The LTTE proposed peace talks in 1996, which the government rejected. Starting from 1997, the LTTE suffered a number of reverses, and lost control of large portions of the ], the town of Kilinochchi and many smaller towns. However, from 1998 onward the LTTE reversed these losses, culminating in the capture of the strategically vital ] base complex in ] after hard and long fighting against the Sri Lankan army .

			For civilians and LTTE cadres alike, the region affords an ease of movement between areas controlled by the two sides. As the LTTE looked to expand its strength for the battles ahead, its road-show, a regular feature of the recruitment drive, would stop at schools to screen videos of battles past. The recruiters, not much older than the school-children themselves, would exhort them to sign up for the cause. There is no denying that at first few of them volunteered, moved by fabricated lies of atrocities against the Tamil people. And many more might have been lured by the machismo and romance of guns and fatigues. With the LTTE at the height of its popularity with the Tamil people then, parents did little to stop them.
	== The peacetime LTTE ==

			But the realisation soon dawned that the blood was not ketchup, and that death was real. The turning point came perhaps at Weli Oya in July 1995 when an attack on the Army camp there proved disastrous for the LTTE. The television pictures later put out by the Defence Ministry told their own story: rows upon rows of dead children, who had been in the vanguard of the attack. Had the bodies not been mangled, they might have been mistaken for sleeping children.
	===The 2001 ceasefire===

			From the mid-1990s, there were reports of parents beseiging LTTE camps and demanding their children back and of school teachers trying to stop video-screenings in their classrooms.
	]

			In May 1998, United Nations Special Rapporteur for Children and Armed Conflict Olara Otunnu visited Sri Lanka and travelled to an LTTE area in the north, where he met the group's representatives, including its ideologue Anton Balasingham and its political wing leader S. Thamilchelvam.

	In 2001, the LTTE unexpectedly dropped its demand for a separate state, which had never been accepted by the government or the island's Sinhala majority. Instead, they stated a form of regional autonomy would meet their demands. The government invited ] to mediate in the dispute. Norway brokered a ] agreement, which remains precariously in effect.

	Norway and the other Nordic countries jointly monitor the ceasefire through the ]. Since the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement between the Sri Lankan Government and the Tamil Tigers, the Tigers have carried out more than 3,100 reported violations compared to about 140 by the government forces .

	Talks on an interim solution have currently stalled through political uncertainty. The President ] suspended the government of the then Prime Minister ] in ], accusing him of being too soft on the LTTE. Kumaratunga herself then took a more conciliatory line towards the LTTE, but the current president, ], who took office in November 2005, campaigned on a plank of being tougher on the LTTE. His prime minister, ] has also previously advocated a tougher line. The LTTE has recently stated that the gap between its position and the position of the new Sri Lankan government is vast, and has threatened to "intensify" its campaign if the government does not soon propose a reasonable political framework . The LTTE ordered a boycott of the 2005 presidential elections, which was won by ], amongst Tamil voters in the East and North of Sri Lanka. This action was condemned by the United States, who cited that "a significant portion of Sri Lanka's people were unable to express their views", and by opponents of Rajapakse who claim that the boycott played an important role in his victory. .

	Negotiations resumed briefly in February 2006, but were indefinitely postponed again in April after the parties were unable to agree on a mode of transport for LTTE commanders from the east of Sri Lanka to travel to the LTTE headquarters. Violent incidents increased, and by summer 2006 there was growing talk of a "Final War" for Tamil Eelam independence.

	===From army to quasi-governmental entity===
	]

	Even though the LTTE was formed as a military group, it also carries out a number of civilian duties. The LTTE controls sections in the north and east of the island, especially the regions lying outside the major cities. It runs a de facto government and provides public services in these areas, including schools, hospitals, police stations, courts and municipal administration. However it still uses the Sri Lanka rupee and many civil servants are paid by Sri Lanka government in areas controlled by the LTTE.

	Most of the structures supporting these functions developed during the period immediately after the ]'s withdrawal, when the LTTE controlled ] without significant opposition. During this period, it transformed itself from a purely military body to a quasi-government, complete with administrative organs. Between 1991 and 1993, it created the ] (including traffic police), the ], the ] a broadcasting authority called the , National Television of Tamil Eelam(NTT) -- a satellite TV station, a ] and a including a ] service and a public prosecution system. Although it no longer controls Jaffna, these structures continue to form the basis on which it runs the areas it does control. The LTTE's administrative agencies are integrated into the organisation's overall chain of command. It claims that this makes them better equipped to respond to emergencies.

	The LTTE's quasi-government was and continues to be run on socialist principles. For example, all litigants before a civil court are required to pay a fine for failing to settle their dispute amicably. Police and other employees of the administrative agencies are paid according to the number of dependents they have, rather than their position.

	In recent years, the LTTE has sought wider recognition for its administrative organs. After the ], it has sought to ensure that aid to the areas under its control is routed through its own administrative agencies. It entered into an agreement, called the P-TOMS, with the government of Sri Lankan president ] which recognised this principle to some extent. However, the agreement was bitterly opposed by hardliners in the Sri Lankan government and never saw implementation, the present administration of ] has announced that it will not be considering it anew.

	===Political activities===
	The LTTE also has a political wing, but despite the ceasefire it has not tried to formally create a political party. Instead, in the ], it openly supported the TNA (also called Thamizh Arasu Katchi or Federal Party), which won over 90% of votes in the ] of ], in the ].

	The LTTE's commitment to multi-party democracy has also been questioned. In an interview in 1986, Velupillai Prabhakaran, the leader of the LTTE, said that ] would be a one-party state rather than a multi-party democracy, because that would help it develop faster (Hellmann-Rajanayagam 1994, 183). He has not repeated this proposal, and the LTTE's main ideologue, ], publicly repudiated this position in ], stating that it was irrelevant after the collapse of the ]. However, the LTTE's critics state that it indicates their way of thinking, and point out that it has not organised, and shows no signs of organising, local elections in the areas it controls. The LTTE's supporters say that conditions make elections impossible, but that they will be held once Tamil Eelam is fully independent.

	===Dissension===
	An LTTE commander named ] ('']'' of Vinayagamoorthi Muralitharan) broke away from the LTTE in March 2004 amid allegations that the northern commanders were overlooking the needs of the eastern Tamils. This led to clashes between the mainstream LTTE and Karuna's faction. The LTTE has charged that Karuna's group is backed by the government.

	===Women in the LTTE===
	The LTTE advocates equality for women, and has a large number of female recruits. The Women's Wing of the LTTE is known as Suthanthirap Paravaikal (or Freedom Birds). The first woman combatant to die was 2nd Lt. ], on ] ], in an encounter with the ] at ] in ] peninsula. Women have also been part of the 'Black Tiger' squads. The assassination of the Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi, the attempt on President Chandrika Kumaranatunga and the latest attempt by a female suicide bomber on the Sri Lankan Army commander are notable instances.

	==Human rights and terrorism issues==

	The LTTE is sometimes labelled "terrorist" as part of a broader allegation that it does not have respect for human rights, and does not adhere to the standards of conduct expected of a resistance movement or what might be called "freedom fighters".

	The accusation of terrorism is based in part on claims that the LTTE has been responsible for targeted assassination of political figures and non-military officials, and in part on its use of suicide bombers. Between ] and ], it has been accused of killing ], ], ] and ]. It has also been accused of killing moderate Tamils and other Tamils with whose views it disagrees, such as ] , ], ], ], and ]. The LTTE has vehemently denied involvement in several of these incidents. However, Indian courts have issued an international warrant to arrest both Velupillai Prabhakaran and its intelligence chief Pottu Ammanin connection with the ] killing. Although the LTTE deny any involvement, they did issue a statement in June of 2006 calling the event a "monumental tragedy". In addition, LTTE bombings have been known to cause civilian casualties. The Sri Lankan government has accused the LTTE of targeting non-military and government targets including the ] in ], the Dehiwala trainand the Central Bank in ]. LTTE supporters have argued that civilian deaths were mainly due to collateral damage and it was not LTTE policy to target civilians. The theory of collateral damage appears to be invalidated by the fact that many ] have been directed against purely civilian targets such as farming villages, trains, temples, mosques and banks, resulting in large numbers of predictable civilian deaths .

	The LTTE's supporters justify some of the targeted assassinations by arguing that the people assassinated were either "Tamil traitors" or persons closely associated with Sri Lankan military intelligence. Specifically in relation to the TELO, the LTTE has said that it had to perform preemptive self-defence because the TELO was in effect functioning as a proxy for India. They also draw comparisons between the casualties caused by the LTTE's actions and the actions of European resistance forces against Nazi occupation during the Second World War. However, LTTE victims have included many unarmed Tamil politicians and civilians moderates who sought a peaceful solution to the Sri Lankan crisis.

	The LTTE has been accused of knowingly recruiting and using child soldiers as front-line troops (HRW 2003). Amid international pressure, LTTE announced in July 2003 that it would stop conscripting child soldiers, but both UNICEF and HRW have accused it of reneging on its promises, and of conscripting Tamil children orphaned by the ]. Civilians have also complained that the LTTE is continuing to abduct children, including some in their early teens, for use as soldiers. The LTTE, however, strongly denies any responsibility for recruitment of child soldiers. Its official position is that earlier, some of its cadres erroneously recruited volunteers in their late teens. It says that its official policy is now that it will not accept child soldiers. It also says that some underage youth lie about their age and are therefore allowed to join, but are sent back home to their parents as soon as they are discovered to be underaged.

	The LTTE has been blamed for forcibly removing (or "ethnically cleansing") Sinhalese and Muslim inhabitants from areas under its control, including through the use of violence against those who refuse to leave. Most notably, the LTTE forcibly expelled the entire Muslim population of Jaffna on 48 hours notice in ]. The LTTE are also accused of organising massacres of Sinhala villagers who settled in the Northeast under the dry lands policy. Whilst the LTTE's supporters do not deny these allegations, they argue that it is misleading to look at such allegations in isolation. They say that the LTTE actions are no worse than those of the Sri Lankan government, and are therefore an entirely proportionate response to repeated human rights violations by the Sri Lankan government, and are the only way to make the government stop violating the rights of the Tamils even if they are condemned in international law. However two thirds of Sri Lankas Tamils choose to live under government rule in the south of Sri Lanka, thereby raising serious doubts as to the rationale for the ethnic cleansing in areas under its contral by the LTTE{{fact}}.


	There are also charges that the LTTE coerces Tamil expatriates to give it money, by threatening the safety of their relatives or property in areas of ] under its control. This involves pressuring them to directly give it money, or to indirectly fund its activities by patronising businesses connected with it (La 2004). Although intelligence services have raised concerns about such activities, which are particularly controversial in Canada, few formal complaints have been made. During raids by the ] the LTTE front organisation, World Tamil Movement was found coordinating a number of illegal activities in order to control the tamil diaspora in Canada. A report by ] outlines the intimidation and extortion Tamil expatriates experience from the LTTE . However, several Tamil associations, from various countries mentioned in the report, have called in to question the veracity and accuracy of the Human Rights Watch report .
			The lucky once - LTTE child solders who surrendered to the Sri Lankan Army.
	Most of the organisations which question the HRW report are known to have pro-LTTE leanings.

			The LTTE pledged to Otunnu that it would not use children under 18 in combat, and would not recruit anyone below 17 years of age. But it is clear from the UTHR report and other accounts that this is a commitment that the LTTE has been observing mainly in the breach.
	== Proscription of the LTTE as a terrorist group ==

			One ready-made source for child soldiers is said to be the Chencholai (Red-Blossomed Gardens), a chain of orphanages set up by the LTTE.
	A number of countries have banned the LTTE as a terrorist organisation. As of July 2006, these include:

			According to the UTHR, parents have stopped sending their children to school in the LTTE-controlled areas of Batticaloa for fear they might be waylaid by press-gangs. Many, like Sivaruban's mother, are moving to Army-controlled areas for protection.
	*] (since 1992)
	*] (since 1997)
	*] (since 2000)
	*] (since 2006)
	*] (since 2006)

			A pamphlet bearing the LTTE insignia was distributed in Valachennai in early October asking parents to give voluntarily one child to the "liberation struggle".
	Additionally, ] has included the LTTE on its consolidated list of terrorist groups, thus freezing its assets and making it an offence to provide it assets, although it has not banned it completely (Hansard 2006, p. 99).

			Refusal to comply with this request has been met with punishment. Property belonging to those who said they would not give up their children have been confiscated. Notices now hang on the houses of three people in Pankudaveli, proclaiming the pieces of property as those of the LTTE, and prohibiting entry into them. In Kokkadicholai, parents who resisted the call were beaten with palm fronds. One mother was asked to perform squats (thoppukarnam) and her son and daughter were taken away. Three other women were imprisoned. The UTHR alleged that more than a dozen traumatised parents had committed suicide.
	Because of crimes against humanity committed by the LTTE, Canada does not grant residency to LTTE members .

			Alarmed by the happenings, a delegation of Tamil representatives led by the Bishop of Batticaloa, Reverend Kingsley Swamipillai, crossed military lines to meet the area LTTE leader Karikalan on September 25. According to accounts of the meeting, Karikalan denied that the LTTE was recruiting children forcibly and showed them a videotape in which parents giving in their children were shown declaring that they were doing so voluntarily.
	The first country to ban the LTTE was its early ally, India. The Indian change of policy came gradually, starting with the IPKF-LTTE conflict, and culminating with the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. In the following years a number of other countries also listed the LTTE as a terror organisation after lobbying from the Sri Lankan diplomatic service under ], the former Sri Lankan foreign minister who was allegedly assassinated by the LTTE in ]. The EU with its 25 member nations is the most recent entity to ban the LTTE. This was done explicitly to encourage them to participate in peace talks with the Sri Lankan government, under threat of having their international assets seized and other repercussions if they did not.

			The delegation returned without achieving anything. According to the UTHR, this only goes to show that leading members of Tamil society have lost all influence with the Tigers and are unable to assert that they be granted even the most basic humanitarian rights.
	Sri Lanka itself lifted the ban on the LTTE before signing the ceasefire agreement in 2001. The LTTE is not on the ]'s list of terror organisations.

			On the other hand, the Tamil press glorifies child warriors, with glowing accounts of ceremonies at which parents hand over their children for the Tamil cause.
	==See also==

			Both Amnesty International and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) have been critical of the LTTE for not honouring its commitment to the U.N. on the issue of child soldiers, but the UTHR charged that not much was done to rein in the group. The international aid agencies working in northern Sri Lanka would like to avoid a confrontation with the LTTE so that their work can continue, it said.
	*]
	*]
	*] anti-Tamil pogrom
	*]
	*]
	*]
	*]
	*]
	*]

			Says the UTHR report: "There can be no neutrality in the face of such crime. If the organisations representing the world community are not seen to take a clear position on this matter, their presence becomes largely meaningless for the ordinary people. On the other hand, a clear stand by them will also help local civil society groups, and finally the parents themselves, to defy the LTTE."
	==References==
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	</div>

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	==References==
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	*Balasingham, Adele. (2003) ''The Will to Freedom - An Inside View of Tamil Resistance'', Fairmax Publishing Ltd, 2nd ed. ISBN 1-903679-036
	*Balasingham, Anton. (2004) 'War and Peace - Armed Struggle and Peace Efforts of Liberation Tigers', Fairmax Publishing Ltd, ISBN 1-903679-05-2
	*de Votta, Neil. (2004) ''Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional Decay, and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka.'' Stanford University Press, ISBN 0804749248
	*Gamage, Siri and I.B. Watson (Editors). (1999) ''Conflict and Community in Contemporary Sri Lanka - 'Pearl of the East' or 'Island of Tears'?'', Sage Publications Ltd, ISBN 0-7619-9393-2
	*Hansard Australia (2006), Senate Transcript for 16 June 2006
	*Hellmann-Rajanayagam, D. (1994) "The Groups and the rise of Militant Secessions". in Manogaram, C. and Pfaffenberger, B. (editors). ''The Sri Lankan Tamils''. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0813388457
	*Human Rights Watch (2003) ''Child Soldier Use 2003: A Briefing for the 4th UN Security Council Open Debate on Children and Armed Conflict''
	*La, J.. 2004. "Forced remittances in Canada's Tamil enclaves". ''Peace Review'' 16:3. September 2004. pp. 379-385.
	*Narayan Swamy, M. R. (2002) ''Tigers of Lanka: from Boys to Guerrillas'', Konark Publishers; 3rd ed. ISBN 8122006310
	*Pratap, Anita. (2001) ''Island of Blood: Frontline Reports From Sri Lanka, Afghanistan and Other South Asian Flashpoints''. Penguin Books, ISBN 0142003662
	*Sri Kantha, Sachi.(2005) "Pirabhakaran Phenomenon", Lively COMET Imprint, ISBN 1-57087-671-1

	==External links==		==External links==

Revision as of 18:28, 4 August 2006

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Other Names The Tamil Tigers The Ellalan Force

Description Founded in 1976, the LTTE is the most powerful Tamil group in Sri Lanka. It began its insurgency against the Sri Lankan Government in 1983 and has relied on a guerrilla strategy that includes the use of terrorist tactics. The LTTE currently is observing a cease-fire agreement with the Sri Lankan Government.

Activities The LTTE has integrated a battlefield insurgent strategy with a terrorist program that targets key personnel in the countryside and senior Sri Lankan political and military leaders in Colombo and other urban centers. The LTTE is most notorious for its cadre of suicide bombers, the Black Tigers. Political assassinations and bombings were commonplace tactics prior to the cease-fire.

Strength Exact strength is unknown, but the LTTE is estimated to have 8,000 to 10,000 armed combatants in Sri Lanka, with a core of 3,000 to 6,000 trained fighters. The LTTE also has a significant overseas support structure for fundraising, weapons procurement, and propaganda activities.

Location/Area of Operation The LTTE controls most of the northern and eastern coastal areas of Sri Lanka but has conducted operations throughout the island. Headquartered in northern Sri Lanka, LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran has established an extensive network of checkpoints and informants to keep track of any outsiders who enter the group’s area of control.

External Aid The LTTE’s overt organizations support Tamil separatism by lobbying foreign governments and the United Nations. The LTTE also uses its international contacts and the large Tamil diaspora in North America, Europe, and Asia to procure weapons, communications, funding, and other needed supplies.

Courtesy of Indian Front-Line Magazine, 24 Nov 2001.

BATTICALOA district in eastern Sri Lanka hangs tensely between the security forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Large tracts of land in the district are under the control of the LTTE. And people living in these areas have of late been providing the cannon fodder for its armed struggle.

Like 10-year-old Sivaruban of Vakkarai, 45 km north of Batticaloa. When the LTTE began a recruitment drive in the village three months ago, his widowed mother moved out with him and his 16-year-old sister to an Army-controlled village in Valachenai to protect them. But to no avail. The recruiters came knocking at her door on September 15, and Sivaruban had to go with them.

So did 10-year-old Thevaruban, also of Vakkarai. The LTTE wanted to recruit his elder brother, but the boy was away in Colombo. So they took away Thevaruban as a guarantee to ensure that his brother would return to Batticaloa and sign up with them. The parents were later told that Thevaruban was being given military training and would return when the LTTE concluded its mission.

School children in LTTE controlled areas, prime targets for LTTE recruiters.

These and many other instances of the LTTE's recruitment of children, with names of the recruits, their parents' names and address, are contained in a recent report by the University Teachers' Human Rights of Jaffna (UTHR).

It has been public knowledge that the LTTE uses minors in its separatist war. It is difficult to say just how many under-age cadres the LTTE has, but there is no doubt that children have been part of the group's military machine since the early 1990s.

LTTE 'Solders' are as young as 10

For civilians and LTTE cadres alike, the region affords an ease of movement between areas controlled by the two sides. As the LTTE looked to expand its strength for the battles ahead, its road-show, a regular feature of the recruitment drive, would stop at schools to screen videos of battles past. The recruiters, not much older than the school-children themselves, would exhort them to sign up for the cause. There is no denying that at first few of them volunteered, moved by fabricated lies of atrocities against the Tamil people. And many more might have been lured by the machismo and romance of guns and fatigues. With the LTTE at the height of its popularity with the Tamil people then, parents did little to stop them.

But the realisation soon dawned that the blood was not ketchup, and that death was real. The turning point came perhaps at Weli Oya in July 1995 when an attack on the Army camp there proved disastrous for the LTTE. The television pictures later put out by the Defence Ministry told their own story: rows upon rows of dead children, who had been in the vanguard of the attack. Had the bodies not been mangled, they might have been mistaken for sleeping children.

From the mid-1990s, there were reports of parents beseiging LTTE camps and demanding their children back and of school teachers trying to stop video-screenings in their classrooms.

In May 1998, United Nations Special Rapporteur for Children and Armed Conflict Olara Otunnu visited Sri Lanka and travelled to an LTTE area in the north, where he met the group's representatives, including its ideologue Anton Balasingham and its political wing leader S. Thamilchelvam.

The lucky once - LTTE child solders who surrendered to the Sri Lankan Army.

The LTTE pledged to Otunnu that it would not use children under 18 in combat, and would not recruit anyone below 17 years of age. But it is clear from the UTHR report and other accounts that this is a commitment that the LTTE has been observing mainly in the breach.

One ready-made source for child soldiers is said to be the Chencholai (Red-Blossomed Gardens), a chain of orphanages set up by the LTTE.

According to the UTHR, parents have stopped sending their children to school in the LTTE-controlled areas of Batticaloa for fear they might be waylaid by press-gangs. Many, like Sivaruban's mother, are moving to Army-controlled areas for protection.

A pamphlet bearing the LTTE insignia was distributed in Valachennai in early October asking parents to give voluntarily one child to the "liberation struggle".

Refusal to comply with this request has been met with punishment. Property belonging to those who said they would not give up their children have been confiscated. Notices now hang on the houses of three people in Pankudaveli, proclaiming the pieces of property as those of the LTTE, and prohibiting entry into them. In Kokkadicholai, parents who resisted the call were beaten with palm fronds. One mother was asked to perform squats (thoppukarnam) and her son and daughter were taken away. Three other women were imprisoned. The UTHR alleged that more than a dozen traumatised parents had committed suicide.

Alarmed by the happenings, a delegation of Tamil representatives led by the Bishop of Batticaloa, Reverend Kingsley Swamipillai, crossed military lines to meet the area LTTE leader Karikalan on September 25. According to accounts of the meeting, Karikalan denied that the LTTE was recruiting children forcibly and showed them a videotape in which parents giving in their children were shown declaring that they were doing so voluntarily.

The delegation returned without achieving anything. According to the UTHR, this only goes to show that leading members of Tamil society have lost all influence with the Tigers and are unable to assert that they be granted even the most basic humanitarian rights.

On the other hand, the Tamil press glorifies child warriors, with glowing accounts of ceremonies at which parents hand over their children for the Tamil cause.

Both Amnesty International and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) have been critical of the LTTE for not honouring its commitment to the U.N. on the issue of child soldiers, but the UTHR charged that not much was done to rein in the group. The international aid agencies working in northern Sri Lanka would like to avoid a confrontation with the LTTE so that their work can continue, it said.

Says the UTHR report: "There can be no neutrality in the face of such crime. If the organisations representing the world community are not seen to take a clear position on this matter, their presence becomes largely meaningless for the ordinary people. On the other hand, a clear stand by them will also help local civil society groups, and finally the parents themselves, to defy the LTTE."

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