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] building after Operation Blue Star]] | ] building after Operation Blue Star]] | ||
'''Operation Blue Star''' (] to ], ]) was the ]n military operation at the ] in ], ], the holiest temple of the ] religion. | |||
The ] attacked the ] complex, along with 37 other ] simultaneously, in June 1984. This assault was code-named, Operation Bluestar.<ref>Mahmood, Cynthia Keppley, “Dynamics of Terror in Punjab and Kashmir,” Jeffrey A. Sluka, ed., Death Squad: The Anthropology of State Terror, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000, p. 77.</ref> | |||
==Occupation of Harmandir Sahib == | |||
Following a crackdown on Sikh militants in early 1984, ]'s militant faction fortified the ] complex. Bhindaranwale along with Gen. ], a retired General from the Indian army took to heavily arming and fortifying the Harmandir Sahib. | |||
===Details=== | |||
On the ], a 36 hour ] was imposed on the state of Punjab. The period coincided with the anniversary of the ]dom of ], who built the Harmandir Sahib and compiled the Sikh's Holy book - Shri Guru Granth Sahib. As a result of this, when the curfew was imposed the temple was filled with worshippers. | |||
The entire operation was undertaken, and executed by Maj General Kuldip Brar, who was from a Sikh background himself. In subsequent interviews, he has said that initially there was just to be a swift commando action to eliminate the revolutionaries holed inside the temple; However, they had grossly underestimated the firepower and fortifications of the Sikh terrorists. The operation was undertaken in the cover of the night, and due to the immense firepower and sophisticated weapons the revolutionaries had, the Indian army suffered casualties. Gen Brar was thus forced to order the tanks to be brought in, lest his commando unit be open targets in daylight. | |||
For over a year, the Indian army had been preparing for an attack on the terrorists hiding within Darbar Sahib. The state sought to “make out that the Golden Temple was the haven of criminals, a store of armory and a citadel of the nation’s dismemberment conspiracy.”<ref>Swami, Subramaniam, Imprint, July 1984, p. 7-8. Quoted in Kumar, Ram Narayan, et al, Reduced to Ashes: The Insurgency and Human Rights in Punjab, Kathmandu: South Asia Forum for Human Rights, 2003, p. 34. (Hereafter, Reduced to Ashes.)</ref> | |||
==Bluestar operational plans and how it went == | |||
The Indian Army had thought counted on the operation lasting a few hours at most. Operation Bluestar commander Major General Brar visited the Harmandir Sahib complex the day before the operation and realized that the Sikh militants had prepared well and built defensive positions against an attack. The Sikh separatist forces within the Harmandir Sahib were led by former Major General ] (dismissed from the ] in 1976). Gen. Brar and Lt. Gen. Sundarji, another senior commander, believed there was no way to avoid a violent resolution. Brar went in and briefed all troops. | |||
The first task was the destruction of Major-General Shabeg Singh's outer defenses. Much of this had been completed in the preliminary firing when Major-General Brar had hoped to frighten Bhindrenwale into surrendering. These defences included the seventeen houses which the police had allowed Bhindanwale's followers to occupy in the alleys sorrounding the Golden Temple. Some of them were as far as 800 yards away from the complex. These outposts were all in wireless contact with Shabeg Singh's command post in the Akal Takht. The Temple view hotel outside the Temple complex had also been occupied. Next to it was Brahmbuta Akhara, a large bulding housing the headquarters of a Sikh sect. Then there were three main towers which had been fortified to make positions from which Bhindranwale's men could fire into the Golden Temple complex. Because they stood well above the rest of the building, the towers were also excellent observation posts for watching the movement of troops in the narrow alleys sorrounding the Temple. The tops of these towers were blasted off by the artillery fire. The use of artillery in the dense city of Amritsar proved very costly; many innocent people living in close proximity of Golden Temple lost their lives. Then the commando operation was planned. | |||
It was between 10 and 10:30 PM when commandos from 1st Battalion, the parachute regiment, wearing black denims were ordered to run down the steps under the clock tower on to the parikarma, or pavement, turn right and move as quickly as they could round the edge of the sacred tank to the Akal Takht. But as the paratroopers entered the main gateway to the Temple they were mowed down. Most of the casualties were caused by Sikhs with light machine-guns who were hiding on either side of the steps leading down to the parikarma. The few commandos who did get down the steps were driven back by a barrage of fire from the building on the south side of the sacred pool. In the control room, in a house on the opposite side of the clock-tower, Major-general Brar was waiting anxiously with his two supporting officers to hear that the commandos had established positions inside the complex. When no report came through he was heard over the command network saying, "You bastards, why don't you go in." | |||
'''The role of the Third Agency''' | |||
The few commandos who survived regrouped in the square outside the Temple, and reported back to Major-General Brar. He reinforced them and ordered them to make another attempt to go in. The commandos were to be followed by the 10th Battalion of the Guards commanded by a Muslim, Lieutenant-colonel Israr Khan. This battalion had Sikh soldiers in its rank. The second commando attack managed to neutralise the machine-gun posts on either side of the steps and get down on to the parikarma. They were followed by the Guards who came under withering fire and were not able to make any progress radioed for permission to fire back at the buildings on the other side of the tank. That would have meant that the Golden Temple itself, which is in the middle of the tank, would have been in the line of fire. Brar initially refused permission, but then started to get messeges from the commander of Guards reporting heavy casualties. They had suffered almost 20 percent casualties without managing to turn the corner of parikarma to the western sides. Sikhs would also suddenly appear from man-holes in the parikarma the Guards were fighting from, let off a burst of machine-gun fire or throw grenades, then disappear into the passages which run under the Temple. These machine-gunners had been taught to fire at knee-level because Major-General Shabeg Singh expected the army to crawl towards its objective, But the Guards and commandos were not crawling, and so many of them received severe leg injuries. | |||
The ] magazine published a special report detailing how the Third Agency, a special intelligence outfit created by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s Secretariat, R. Shankaran Nair, was instrumental in smuggling most of the arms inside the Darbar Sahib.<ref>Bajaj, Rajeev, K., “Dead Men Tell No Tales,” Surya, September 1984, p. 9-10.</ref> “One week before the Army action, Punjab police had intercepted two truck loads of weapons and ammunition in the ] sub-division of ] district. But the officer of the Third Agency, in-charge of Amritsar, persuaded the director-general of police (DGP) to release them and send them along safely to the Golden Temple.”<ref>Kumar, Ram Narayan, et. al., Reduced to Ashes, p. 34. For full details, see Surya cover story, ibid, p. 13. </ref> There are claims that Sikh leaders such as Dr. Jagjit Singh Chohan, Harchand Singh Longowal, Didar Bains, Ganga Singh Dhillon, much of the Akali Dal leadership, and others were complicit in the attack on the Golden Temple. <ref>Singh, Professor Gurtej, IAS, Chakravyuh: Web of Indian Secularism <!-- NOTE Page reference needed --> </ref> | |||
Brar, then decided on a change of plan. He ordered his troops to occupy the roof tops of the clock towers as well as all the rooms along the parikarma. Army commandos rushed in from the main clock tower entrance, their objective being to neutralize fire from Akal Takht in the North. They ran into trouble as soon as they went down the steps - automatic gunfire hit them from both sides of stairs and more then 40 commandos lost their lives in less then five minutes. Amazingly only two Bhindrenwale supporters were firing at them. The next batch of commandos were able to run down the stairs and turn right but here again, automatic gun fire from Akal Takht as well as old towers and water tank hit them. By this time soldiers from Bihar regiment had cordoned off the whole Golden Temple complex, albeit not very effectively. The Madras regiment was trying to enter through the Eastern gate but had encountered difficulties. Kumaonis regiment from the North, close to Langar was trying desperately to assist without much success. General Brar requested tanks to be brought in to Golden Temple, but he was only given an armored personnel carrier. This was blown up by a rocket launcher as soon as it had crossed Baba Deep Singh's Samadh. | |||
'''Invasion takes place on a major Sikh holiday''' | |||
Brar again requested tanks and was this time granted his request. According to Giani ji of Golden Temple, who was present at the Golden Temple itself during all this time, as many as 13 tanks were brought into the parikarma and lined up on the eastern side. Expensive marble was crushed and whole eastern parikarma broke. Brar ordered the destruction of Akal Takht and thus the highest seat of Sikh authority was brought down by Indian army. | |||
According to plan, the Indian army invaded the temple in an assault that was code named “]” on ], ] to coincide with the martyrdom day of ]. It is common knowledge that this ] (commemoration of Guru Arjan’s martyrdom) attracts an unusually large number of Sikh visitors to the temple, just like a large number of ]s visit ] during the month of ]. Ram Narayan Kumar notes, “Operation Blue Star was not only envisioned and rehearsed in advance, meticulously and in total secrecy, it also aimed at obtaining the maximum number of Sikh victims, largely devout pilgrims unconnected with the political agitation.”<ref>Kumar, Ram Narayan, et. al., Reduced to Ashes, p. 34. For full details, see Surya cover story, ibid, p. 35.</ref> | |||
Sikh pilgrims were held by the Indian army in buildings in and around Guru Ram Das Sarai, Teja Singh Samundri Hall, etc. These innocent bystanders were not given any food or water for 4 days. One army soldier went berserk and fired on these innocent pilgrims killing 70. About 40 or so bodies of Sikh men with their hand tied up behind them in execution style, were found in several rooms. A journalist claims to have seen a whole truck filled with bodies of women and children. There is evidence that army soldiers were served alcohol as well as cigarettes inside the Golden Temple complex. | |||
'''The scale of the attack''' | |||
Cynthia Kepply Mahmood, describing the scale of the attack, writes: | |||
<blockquote>"When it attacked the Golden Temple complex at Amritsar in 1984, containing the holiest shrine of the Sikhs, the ostensible aim was to rid the sacred buildings of the militants who had taken up shelter inside. But the level force used in the attack was utterly incommensurate with this limited and eminently attainable aim. Seventy thousand troops, in conjunction with the use of tanks and chemical gas, killed not only the few dozen militants who didn’t manage to escape the battleground but also hundreds (possibly thousands) of innocent pilgrims, the day of the attack being a Sikh holy day. The Akal Takht, the seat of temporal authority for the Sikhs, was reduced to rubble and the Sikh Reference Library, an irreplaceable collection of books, manuscripts, and artifacts bearing on all aspects of Sikh history, burned to ground. Thirty-seven other shrines were attacked across Punjab on the same day. The only possible reason for this appalling level of state force against its own citizens must be that the attempt was not merely to “flush out,” as they say, a handful of militants, but to destroy the fulcrum of a possible mass resistance against the state."<ref>Mahmood, Cynthia Keppley, “Dynamics of Terror in Punjab and Kashmir,” Jeffrey A. Sluka, ed., Death Squad: The Anthropology of State Terror, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000, p. 77.</ref></blockquote> | |||
'''The targeting of civilians during the attack''' | |||
The most disturbing aspect of the operation was the targeting of civilians by the Indian army. Contrary to the army Lt. General K. Sundarji’s statement—“We went inside with humility in our hearts and prayers on our lips”<ref>Quoted in Brar, K.S., Operation Blue Star: The True Story, New Delhi: UBSPD, 1993, p. 74.</ref>-—for the invading troops “every Sikh inside was a militant.”<ref>Kumar, Ram Narayan, et. al., Reduced to Ashes, p. 38.</ref> ], in his famous account of the invasion, writes: “Karnail Kaur, a young mother of three children…said, ‘When people begged for water some jawans told them to drink the mixture of blood and urine on the ground.’” Tully records an eye-witness account by Bhan Singh, the then SGPC Secretary: | |||
<blockquote>"I saw about thirty-five or thirty-six Sikhs lined up with their hands raised above their heads. And the major was about to order them to be shot. When I asked him for medical help, he got into rage, tore my turban off my head, and ordered his men to shoot me. I turned back and fled…Sardar Karnail Singh Nag, who had followed me, also narrated what he had seen, as well as the killing of thirty-five to thirty-six young Sikhs by cannon fire. All of them were villagers."<ref>Tully, Mark and Jacob, Satish, Amritsar: Mrs Gandhi’s Last Battle, New Delhi: Rupa and Co., 1985, p. 170.</ref></blockquote> | |||
C.K.C. Reddy, while writing on the army action notes: | |||
<blockquote>"The whole of Punjab and especially the Golden Temple Complex, was turned into a murderous mouse trap from where people could neither escape nor could they seek succor of any kind...The bodies of the victims of military operation in Punjab were unceremoniously destroyed without any attempt to identify them and hand them over to their relatives...The most disturbing thing about the entire operation was that a whole mass of men, women, and children were ordered to be killed merely on the suspicion that some terrorists were operating from the Golden Temple and other Gurdwaras. There had been no judicial verdict of guilt against definite individuals who had been taking shelter in the Golden Temple."<ref>Reddy, C.K.C., et. al., Army Action in Punjab: Prelude & Aftermath, New Delhi: Samata Era Publication, 1984, p. 46-48</ref></blockquote> | |||
'''The Sikh remembrance of the attack as a holocaust''' | |||
The Indian army’s invasion of the Golden Temple, which is remembered as a ghalughara (holocaust) by Sikhs, claimed as many as “7,000 to 8,000” lives according to some eyewitness accounts.<ref>For a range of number estimates, see Kumar, Ram Narayan, et. al., Reduced to Ashes, p. 38.</ref> While there is ample evidence to show that Bhindranwale was fighting for the demands articulated in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution and not for the separate state of ], the Indian army’s invasion was not seen by the Sikhs as “a security operation but a clash between two nations, the first ‘war for ]’”.<ref>Singh, Gurharpal, Ethnic Conflict in India: A Case-Study of Punjab, New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 2000, p. 114.</ref> As Joyce Pettigrew puts it: | |||
==Timeline== | ==Timeline== | ||
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Eyewitnesses say that the army deployed tanks, armed personnel carriers, rocket launchers, heavy machine guns and helicopters. Many of the buildings surrounding the Temple were reduced to rubble. The damage inside of the temple complex was severe. The ] ], is kept during the day] received many bullet holes. The book itself was hit by a bullet. | Eyewitnesses say that the army deployed tanks, armed personnel carriers, rocket launchers, heavy machine guns and helicopters. Many of the buildings surrounding the Temple were reduced to rubble. The damage inside of the temple complex was severe. The ] ], is kept during the day] received many bullet holes. The book itself was hit by a bullet. | ||
The militants in the temple appeared to be armed with ]s, anti-tank missiles and ] and resisted the army's attempts to dislodge them from the shrine. The militants also appeared to have planned for a long occupation of the shrine having arranged for water from wells within the temple compound, and had stocked food provisions that would have lasted months. Thus it is a difficult point as to whether the Army could have waited out the militants, cut off electricity, water etc in order to ensure a peaceful non-violent end without the loss of life and desecration of the temple; this was the siege approach taken by ] five years later, in ]. | The militants (Kharakus) in the temple appeared to be armed with ]s, anti-tank missiles and ] and resisted the army's attempts to dislodge them from the shrine. The militants also appeared to have planned for a long occupation of the shrine having arranged for water from wells within the temple compound, and had stocked food provisions that would have lasted months. Thus it is a difficult point as to whether the Army could have waited out the militants, cut off electricity, water etc in order to ensure a peaceful non-violent end without the loss of life and desecration of the temple; this was the siege approach taken by ] five years later, in ]. | ||
The fighting between the militants and the Indian military continued throughout the night. Major General Brar, made the decision to bring in tanks to support the military in hopes of finishing the operation before dawn. After two days of heavy fighting with the assistance of superior military equipment the Indian military was able to bring most of the ] complex under its control. | The fighting between the militants and the Indian military continued throughout the night. Major General Brar, made the decision to bring in tanks to support the military in hopes of finishing the operation before dawn. After two days of heavy fighting with the assistance of superior military equipment the Indian military was able to bring most of the ] complex under its control. | ||
Despite the government's claims that only extremists were killed other reports claim that many innocent visitors, pilgrims and priests were killed in the cross-fire. ], ] and ] links to the Harimandir Sahib were cut off. | |||
On ], ] ] reported: -" For five days the Punjab has been cut off from the rest of the world. All telephone and telex links are cut. No foreigners are permitted entry and on Tuesday, all Indian journalists were expelled. There are no newspapers, no trains, no buses- not even a bullock cart can move." | |||
The success in emptying and depoliticising the temple was marred by the damage to the temple building and the death of civilian worshipers caught in the fire. | The success in emptying and depoliticising the temple was marred by the damage to the temple building and the death of civilian worshipers caught in the fire. | ||
Operation Blue Star led to an estrangement between the Indian Central government and large portions of the Sikh community. ] |
Operation Blue Star led to an estrangement between the Indian Central government and large portions of the Sikh community. It was considered by many Sikhs as a great insult because of the use of force at their holy place, on one of the most holiest of days. The later ] of ] by her Sikh bodyguards was said to be in response to desecrating the temple. The assassination triggered ] broke out in North India killing as many as 4000; and then ] lasted for more than a decade in which many thousands more, civilians, terrorists and security personnel, were killed. | ||
Later on numerous ] volunteered to rebuild the ], turning down an offer to do so by the government. |
Later on numerous ] volunteered to rebuild the ], turning down an offer to do so by the government. | ||
Operation Bluestar was followed by ], in which the Indian government expanded their operations in Punjab. | |||
⚫ | ==References and notes== | ||
<div class="references-small"><references/></div> | |||
==External links== | |||
* | |||
* | |||
* | |||
* | |||
* | |||
* | |||
* | |||
== Further reading == | |||
* Jaskaran Kaur, Barbara Crossette. ''Twenty Years of Impunity: The November 1984 Pogroms of Sikhs in India.'' London: Nectar, 2004. | |||
* Cynthia Keppley Mahmood. ''Fighting for Faith and Nation: Dialogues With Sikh Militants.'' University of Pennsylvania Press, ISBN 0812215923. | |||
* Cynthia Keppley Mahmood. ''A Sea Of Orange: Writings on the Sikhs and India.'' Xlibris Corporation, ISBN 1401028578 | |||
* Ram Narayan Kumar et al. ''Reduced to Ashes: The Insurgency and Human Rights in Punjab.'' South Asia Forum for Human Rights, 2003. | |||
* Joyce Pettigrew. ''The Sikhs of the Punjab: Unheard Voices of State and Guerrilla Violence.'' Zed Books Ltd., 1995. | |||
* Anurag Singh. ''Giani Kirpal Singh’s Eye-Witness Account of Operation Bluestar.'' 1999. | |||
* Patwant Singh. ''The Sikhs.'' New York: Knopf, 2000. | |||
* Harnik Deol. ''Religion and Nationalism in India: The Case of the Punjab.'' London: Routledge, 2000 | |||
* Jacob Tully. ''Amritsar: Mrs Gandhi's Last Battle.'' ISBN 0224023284. | |||
* Ranbir Singh Sandhu. ''Struggle for Justice: Speeches and Conversations of Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale.'' Ohio: SERF, 1999. | |||
* Iqbal Singh. ''Punjab Under Siege: A Critical Analysis.'' New York: Allen, McMillan and Enderson, 1986. | |||
* Paul Brass. ''Language, Religion and Politics in North India.'' Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974. | |||
* Julio Riberio. ''Bullet for Bullet: My Life as a Police Officer.'' New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1999. | |||
Operation Blue Star is regarded by some military observers in India and the international community as a military embarrassment, poorly conducted and managed. | |||
⚫ | ==References== | ||
* | |||
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] | ] | ||
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Revision as of 20:58, 23 August 2006
The Indian Army attacked the Harmandir Sahib complex, along with 37 other gurduārās simultaneously, in June 1984. This assault was code-named, Operation Bluestar.
Details
For over a year, the Indian army had been preparing for an attack on the terrorists hiding within Darbar Sahib. The state sought to “make out that the Golden Temple was the haven of criminals, a store of armory and a citadel of the nation’s dismemberment conspiracy.”
The role of the Third Agency
The Surya magazine published a special report detailing how the Third Agency, a special intelligence outfit created by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s Secretariat, R. Shankaran Nair, was instrumental in smuggling most of the arms inside the Darbar Sahib. “One week before the Army action, Punjab police had intercepted two truck loads of weapons and ammunition in the Batala sub-division of Gurdaspur district. But the officer of the Third Agency, in-charge of Amritsar, persuaded the director-general of police (DGP) to release them and send them along safely to the Golden Temple.” There are claims that Sikh leaders such as Dr. Jagjit Singh Chohan, Harchand Singh Longowal, Didar Bains, Ganga Singh Dhillon, much of the Akali Dal leadership, and others were complicit in the attack on the Golden Temple.
Invasion takes place on a major Sikh holiday
According to plan, the Indian army invaded the temple in an assault that was code named “Operation Blue Star” on 5 June, 1984 to coincide with the martyrdom day of Guru Arjan. It is common knowledge that this gurpurab (commemoration of Guru Arjan’s martyrdom) attracts an unusually large number of Sikh visitors to the temple, just like a large number of Muslims visit Mecca during the month of Ramadan. Ram Narayan Kumar notes, “Operation Blue Star was not only envisioned and rehearsed in advance, meticulously and in total secrecy, it also aimed at obtaining the maximum number of Sikh victims, largely devout pilgrims unconnected with the political agitation.”
The scale of the attack
Cynthia Kepply Mahmood, describing the scale of the attack, writes:
"When it attacked the Golden Temple complex at Amritsar in 1984, containing the holiest shrine of the Sikhs, the ostensible aim was to rid the sacred buildings of the militants who had taken up shelter inside. But the level force used in the attack was utterly incommensurate with this limited and eminently attainable aim. Seventy thousand troops, in conjunction with the use of tanks and chemical gas, killed not only the few dozen militants who didn’t manage to escape the battleground but also hundreds (possibly thousands) of innocent pilgrims, the day of the attack being a Sikh holy day. The Akal Takht, the seat of temporal authority for the Sikhs, was reduced to rubble and the Sikh Reference Library, an irreplaceable collection of books, manuscripts, and artifacts bearing on all aspects of Sikh history, burned to ground. Thirty-seven other shrines were attacked across Punjab on the same day. The only possible reason for this appalling level of state force against its own citizens must be that the attempt was not merely to “flush out,” as they say, a handful of militants, but to destroy the fulcrum of a possible mass resistance against the state."
The targeting of civilians during the attack
The most disturbing aspect of the operation was the targeting of civilians by the Indian army. Contrary to the army Lt. General K. Sundarji’s statement—“We went inside with humility in our hearts and prayers on our lips”-—for the invading troops “every Sikh inside was a militant.” Mark Tully, in his famous account of the invasion, writes: “Karnail Kaur, a young mother of three children…said, ‘When people begged for water some jawans told them to drink the mixture of blood and urine on the ground.’” Tully records an eye-witness account by Bhan Singh, the then SGPC Secretary:
"I saw about thirty-five or thirty-six Sikhs lined up with their hands raised above their heads. And the major was about to order them to be shot. When I asked him for medical help, he got into rage, tore my turban off my head, and ordered his men to shoot me. I turned back and fled…Sardar Karnail Singh Nag, who had followed me, also narrated what he had seen, as well as the killing of thirty-five to thirty-six young Sikhs by cannon fire. All of them were villagers."
C.K.C. Reddy, while writing on the army action notes:
"The whole of Punjab and especially the Golden Temple Complex, was turned into a murderous mouse trap from where people could neither escape nor could they seek succor of any kind...The bodies of the victims of military operation in Punjab were unceremoniously destroyed without any attempt to identify them and hand them over to their relatives...The most disturbing thing about the entire operation was that a whole mass of men, women, and children were ordered to be killed merely on the suspicion that some terrorists were operating from the Golden Temple and other Gurdwaras. There had been no judicial verdict of guilt against definite individuals who had been taking shelter in the Golden Temple."
The Sikh remembrance of the attack as a holocaust
The Indian army’s invasion of the Golden Temple, which is remembered as a ghalughara (holocaust) by Sikhs, claimed as many as “7,000 to 8,000” lives according to some eyewitness accounts. While there is ample evidence to show that Bhindranwale was fighting for the demands articulated in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution and not for the separate state of Khalistan, the Indian army’s invasion was not seen by the Sikhs as “a security operation but a clash between two nations, the first ‘war for Khalistan’”. As Joyce Pettigrew puts it:
Timeline
Eyewitnesses say that the army deployed tanks, armed personnel carriers, rocket launchers, heavy machine guns and helicopters. Many of the buildings surrounding the Temple were reduced to rubble. The damage inside of the temple complex was severe. The Harmandir Sahib received many bullet holes. The book itself was hit by a bullet.
The militants (Kharakus) in the temple appeared to be armed with machine guns, anti-tank missiles and rocket launchers and resisted the army's attempts to dislodge them from the shrine. The militants also appeared to have planned for a long occupation of the shrine having arranged for water from wells within the temple compound, and had stocked food provisions that would have lasted months. Thus it is a difficult point as to whether the Army could have waited out the militants, cut off electricity, water etc in order to ensure a peaceful non-violent end without the loss of life and desecration of the temple; this was the siege approach taken by Rajiv Gandhi five years later, in Operation Black Thunder.
The fighting between the militants and the Indian military continued throughout the night. Major General Brar, made the decision to bring in tanks to support the military in hopes of finishing the operation before dawn. After two days of heavy fighting with the assistance of superior military equipment the Indian military was able to bring most of the Harmandir Sahib complex under its control.
Despite the government's claims that only extremists were killed other reports claim that many innocent visitors, pilgrims and priests were killed in the cross-fire. Water, electricity and telephone links to the Harimandir Sahib were cut off.
On June 18, 1984 Christian Science Monitor reported: -" For five days the Punjab has been cut off from the rest of the world. All telephone and telex links are cut. No foreigners are permitted entry and on Tuesday, all Indian journalists were expelled. There are no newspapers, no trains, no buses- not even a bullock cart can move."
The success in emptying and depoliticising the temple was marred by the damage to the temple building and the death of civilian worshipers caught in the fire.
Operation Blue Star led to an estrangement between the Indian Central government and large portions of the Sikh community. It was considered by many Sikhs as a great insult because of the use of force at their holy place, on one of the most holiest of days. The later assassination of Indira Gandhi by her Sikh bodyguards was said to be in response to desecrating the temple. The assassination triggered Anti-Sikh riots broke out in North India killing as many as 4000; and then militancy in Punjab lasted for more than a decade in which many thousands more, civilians, terrorists and security personnel, were killed.
Later on numerous Kar Sevaks volunteered to rebuild the Harmandir Sahib, turning down an offer to do so by the government.
Operation Bluestar was followed by Operation Woodrose, in which the Indian government expanded their operations in Punjab.
References and notes
- Mahmood, Cynthia Keppley, “Dynamics of Terror in Punjab and Kashmir,” Jeffrey A. Sluka, ed., Death Squad: The Anthropology of State Terror, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000, p. 77.
- Swami, Subramaniam, Imprint, July 1984, p. 7-8. Quoted in Kumar, Ram Narayan, et al, Reduced to Ashes: The Insurgency and Human Rights in Punjab, Kathmandu: South Asia Forum for Human Rights, 2003, p. 34. (Hereafter, Reduced to Ashes.)
- Bajaj, Rajeev, K., “Dead Men Tell No Tales,” Surya, September 1984, p. 9-10.
- Kumar, Ram Narayan, et. al., Reduced to Ashes, p. 34. For full details, see Surya cover story, ibid, p. 13.
- Singh, Professor Gurtej, IAS, Chakravyuh: Web of Indian Secularism
- Kumar, Ram Narayan, et. al., Reduced to Ashes, p. 34. For full details, see Surya cover story, ibid, p. 35.
- Mahmood, Cynthia Keppley, “Dynamics of Terror in Punjab and Kashmir,” Jeffrey A. Sluka, ed., Death Squad: The Anthropology of State Terror, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000, p. 77.
- Quoted in Brar, K.S., Operation Blue Star: The True Story, New Delhi: UBSPD, 1993, p. 74.
- Kumar, Ram Narayan, et. al., Reduced to Ashes, p. 38.
- Tully, Mark and Jacob, Satish, Amritsar: Mrs Gandhi’s Last Battle, New Delhi: Rupa and Co., 1985, p. 170.
- Reddy, C.K.C., et. al., Army Action in Punjab: Prelude & Aftermath, New Delhi: Samata Era Publication, 1984, p. 46-48
- For a range of number estimates, see Kumar, Ram Narayan, et. al., Reduced to Ashes, p. 38.
- Singh, Gurharpal, Ethnic Conflict in India: A Case-Study of Punjab, New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 2000, p. 114.
External links
- Ensaaf: Fighting Impunity in India
- The Sikh Genocide Project
- Human Rights Watch India Page
- Report by Committee for Information and Initiative on Punjab, led by Human Rights Activist Ram Narayam Kumar
- Human Rights in India -- Harvard Law School
- Website by the attorney defending November 1984 pogrom victims in Delhi. Contains important affidavits and other documentation.
- Self-Determination as a Human Right and its applicability to the Sikhs
Further reading
- Jaskaran Kaur, Barbara Crossette. Twenty Years of Impunity: The November 1984 Pogroms of Sikhs in India. London: Nectar, 2004.
- Cynthia Keppley Mahmood. Fighting for Faith and Nation: Dialogues With Sikh Militants. University of Pennsylvania Press, ISBN 0812215923.
- Cynthia Keppley Mahmood. A Sea Of Orange: Writings on the Sikhs and India. Xlibris Corporation, ISBN 1401028578
- Ram Narayan Kumar et al. Reduced to Ashes: The Insurgency and Human Rights in Punjab. South Asia Forum for Human Rights, 2003.
- Joyce Pettigrew. The Sikhs of the Punjab: Unheard Voices of State and Guerrilla Violence. Zed Books Ltd., 1995.
- Anurag Singh. Giani Kirpal Singh’s Eye-Witness Account of Operation Bluestar. 1999.
- Patwant Singh. The Sikhs. New York: Knopf, 2000.
- Harnik Deol. Religion and Nationalism in India: The Case of the Punjab. London: Routledge, 2000
- Jacob Tully. Amritsar: Mrs Gandhi's Last Battle. ISBN 0224023284.
- Ranbir Singh Sandhu. Struggle for Justice: Speeches and Conversations of Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. Ohio: SERF, 1999.
- Iqbal Singh. Punjab Under Siege: A Critical Analysis. New York: Allen, McMillan and Enderson, 1986.
- Paul Brass. Language, Religion and Politics in North India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974.
- Julio Riberio. Bullet for Bullet: My Life as a Police Officer. New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1999.