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Geelani

@Owais Khursheed: by the statistics that you yourself included, 87% of the Srinagar population want independence, and 3% want to join Pakistan. Syed Ali Shah Geelani is in this 3%. By what measure do you claim that he represents "Kashmiri views" ?

Mountbatten & Gurdaspur

@NadirAli:, I am reverting your addition to the Partition and invasion section, which reads as follows:

According to Yaqoob Khan Bangash it was certain that Lord Mountbatten did not want Kashmir to remain independent and he was possibly trying to get the state to accede to India. Nehru had made it clear in a letter on 17 June 1947 that ‘f any attempt is made to push Kashmir into Pakistan Constituent Assembly, there is likely to be much trouble... obvious course appears to be for Kashmir to join the Constituent Assembly of India’. Evidence for Mountbatten’s attempting the state to accede to India can be gleaned from the fact that on 4 August 1947 Mountbatten remarked that Kashmir could join either Dominion provided that the Radcliffe Boundary Commission awarded Gurdaspur District to India. This was despite the fact that it was generally accepted at the time that Gurdaspur District, due to its Muslim majority, would be awarded to Pakistan. When its three sub-districts were instead awarded to India, Liaquat Ali Khan complained to Lord Ismay, Mountbatten’s chief of staff, that the award was a political instead of judicial decision and an injustice and breach of faith by the British.

References

1. Yaqoob Khan Bangash (2010) Three Forgotten Accessions: Gilgit, Hunza and Nagar, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 38:1, 124.

It is out of order and completely undue. The passage preceding it states that the Maharaja had decided to be independent and this was communicated by the prime minister Ram Chandra Kak to Mountbatten, and Indian and Pakistani leaders in unequivocal terms on 23 July. So, what happened earlier is of no consequence, and what Mountbatten thought is entirely inconsequential because it wasn't his decision.

The Gurdaspur District issue is a red herring. What matters is the Pathankot tehsil, which contained India's land route to Kashmir and it happened to be Hindu majority. Had the Pathankot tehsil been awarded to Pakistan, all hell would have broken loose. But it wasn't. What happened to the other two tehsils has no bearing on the Kashmir conflict. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 00:50, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

Many historians such as Alistair lamb say Mountbatten influenced the Radcliffe commission on Nehru’s urging so that India could access Kashmir through Gurdaspur which should have gone to Pakistan. If its in the sources and repeated by a number of historians its relevant. Even if Pathankot was the only tehsil not given to Pakistan India still would not have gained access to Kashmir because Muslim majority tehsils Batala and Gurdaspur would block India’s access. These tehsils were given to India. Shireen Ilahi does not counter this.--NadirAli نادر علی (talk) 06:38, 3 June 2017 (UTC)

There are two issues that should be separated:

• Whether the awarding of Batala and Gurdaspur tehsils to India affected the Kashmir conflict.
• Whether Mountbatten influenced the Radcliffe award in this instance.

For the second issue (Mountbatten), yes, there have been many speculations about it, but no conclusive evidence. Until there is such, that discussion does not belong in this article. It can go in the Radcliffe Line article though.

As to the first issue, the railway line to Pathankot went through Batala and Gurdaspur tehsils, but there were separate road connections to Pathankot that did not go through these tehsils. So, to argue that these tehsils were pertinent to Kashmir, it should be shown that the railway lines were crucial. Do you have such a source? Since there was no railway between Pathankot and Kashmir and the road that existed was an abysmal one, India was able to manage a poor communication line from Pathankot to Kashmir. So, how is it possible that a good roadway to Pathankot wasn't good enough? This seems to be a highly dubious argument. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 08:59, 3 June 2017 (UTC)

You say, Shireen Ilahi does not counter this. Quite disingenuous. Here it is in black and white:

Both Lamb and Ziegler, and the historians that side with either one or the other, seem to forget the crucial point that the consensus records have already illuminated - only Pathankot tehsil was of consequence to Indian access to Kashmir (by road) and its non-Muslim majority placed it solidly on the Indian side of the line.

Her entire article is devoted to refuting the non-arguments of Lamb and co. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:35, 3 June 2017 (UTC)

To editor Kautilya3: Many historians such as Alistair lamb say Mountbatten influenced the Radcliffe commission on Nehru’s urging so that India could access Kashmir through Gurdaspur which should have gone to Pakistan. If its in the sources and repeated by a number of historians its relevant. Even if Pathankot was the only tehsil not given to Pakistan India still would not have gained access to Kashmir because Muslim majority tehsils Batala and Gurdaspur would block India’s access. These tehsils were given to India. Shireen Ilahi does not counter this.--NadirAli نادر علی (talk) 06:45, 9 June 2017 (UTC)

@NadirAli: why are you repeating the same post all over again? Did you read my response? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 08:44, 9 June 2017 (UTC)

For reference: A map of the Pathankot tehsil] with respect to Jammu and Kashmir. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:40, 21 July 2017 (UTC)

To editor Kautilya3: Yes, there were other roads connecting Pathankot that didn't pass through Batala and Gurdaspur Tehsils, for example the Pathankot-Dunera and Pathankot-Palampur cart roads, but it was (and still is) Pathankot that was the major Rail-head in Punjab that provided main access to the hilly areas of (now) Himachal Pradesh from Punjab, and not the other way around. Had Gurdaspur and Batala not been given to India along with Pathankot, it would have taken years, if not decades, for India to construct a reliable all weather rail/road infrastructure in its northern hilly areas to connect to Pathankot, and then onwards to Jammu. Shereen Ilahi, whoever she is, has completely missed the point. Lamb and co (sic) didn't argue that it was 'impossible' for India to annex Kashmir had Gurdaspur district been transferred to Pakistan, they argued that the controversial award of Muslim majority Gurdaspur district to India made the (otherwise non-viable) accession of Kashmir to India 'feasible' . Also, Shereen Ilahi is 'assuming' that the Pathankot tehsil was to be transferred to India anyway as its non-Muslim majority placed it solidly on the Indian side of the line. She has ignored the fact that in the `notional' award attached to the Indian Independence Act, all of Gurdaspur District was marked as Pakistan, and later, several Muslim majority tehsils were handed over to India. So Ms. Ilahi is making a baseless "assumption" here. Samm19 (talk) 21:20, 17 July 2017 (UTC)

The 'Gurdaspur district' was not awarded to India. Three tehsils out of four were awarded to India. If I recall correctly, Wavell's line gave all of the Gurdaspur district to India. (You say it was "rejected", but by whom?) However, whether it was "rejected" or not is not the point. Whatever reasons made Wavell give Gurdaspur district to India, didn't disappear by the time Radcliffe came on the scene? So, the theory that Mountbatten was conspiring with India to influence the award is very weak. Unlike Radcliffe, Wavell did explain the reasons for his award. You can go and read them.

If I were Radcliffe, I would say that the district is roughly 50-50 Muslim vs. non-Muslim. I know that population exchange is taking place. So, perhaps I would want to give half of it to India and half to Pakistan. But, unfortunately, the Gurdaspur's tehsils were stacked on top of each other along the north-south axis rather than east-west axis. So, there was no clean way to divide them 50-50. Giving three tehsils to India would preserve the railway line and canals. That seems visibly unfair to Pakistan. Perhaps I could make it up by giving some other territory to Pakistan in exchange.

That could have been the reasoning that went on with Radcliffe. There is no Kashmir here and no Mountbatten either. Whoever wants to make theories needs to address all such issues. Shereen Ilahi is doing that. Bangash is just repeating the standard Pakistani gripes without rhyme or reason. That is not scholarly at all. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:04, 17 July 2017 (UTC)

The 'notional' award is precisely what the name says. It was notional. It was a rough and ready line drawn for the purpose of illustration to the British Parliament, as part of passing the Indian Independence Act. If the notional award was to be the final one, there would have been no need for a Boundary Commission at all. So there is no point discussing the notional award. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:23, 17 July 2017 (UTC)

Also, interestingly, an explicit denial has been given:

Lord Radcliffe has denied that access to Kashmir and Jammu was at any time of the 'other factors' affecting the award.

So, I am afraid idle speculations won't do. Some solid evidence is necessary to make any headway. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 23:08, 17 July 2017 (UTC)

To editor Kautilya3: Wavell's plan was rejected by HMG; The British Cabinet in Jan 1947. Wavell was a strong proponent of united India and his whole idea of 'breakdown' was meant to make Pakistan small, weak and unattractive for Jinnah. Wavell in his breakdown plan did mention that his 'proposal' of giving Gurdaspur to India was, of course, negotiable. There is a reason for which Wavell never acknowledged that Punjab was partitioned according to his breakdown plan. But that is another debate.

The point is, you are rejecting the opinion of Mr. Bangash, an Oxonian currently serving as Assistant Professor of history at one of the most prestigious universities in Pakistan, and deriding him as "not scholarly" and trying to present Ms. Shereen Ilahi (whoever she is) as a true scholar, just because the views held by the former are opposed to your own and the latter agrees with you. You, of course, are entitled to your opinion but removing/deleting properly referenced content from wikipedia just because you don't agree with it, or personally find it 'not scholarly', is not very 'neutral', and if I am not mistaken, wikipedia is supposed to be neutral. As already pointed out by @NadirAli:, If an opinion is held by a number of historians, and has been repeated many times, it is relevant (and therefore should not be deleted).

As for Lord Radcliffe, he himself is "the accused", whatever he says holds little, if any, credibility. Samm19 (talk) 23:24, 17 July 2017 (UTC)

• Wavell's 'Breakdown Plan' had nothing to do with the partition line, and is irrelevant to the discussion. (And, I should note, there is way too much WP:OR in your commentary.)
• Bangash may be an Oxonian, but all that it means here is that he is a reliable source. So is Shereen Ilahi. Other than that, it is the evidence and the analysis that matters. Bangash too is conceding Ilahi's point in his footnote 22:

Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, 215-20. Only Pathankot tehsil had a Hindu majority, but, without Gurdaspur and Batala tehsils which had Muslim majorities, India could still not have unfettered access to Kashmir.

So it is not the Pathankot tehsil that is being contested, but the Gurdaspur and Batala tehsils. Supposedly it provided "unfettered access", which was important enough for Nehru, Mountbatten as well Radcliffe to bend the rules and cheat in favaour of India. It is a pretty far-fetched theory that might have currency in Pakistan, but note here. Victoria Schoefield, who is sensible about these matters says this:

In the final award the three tehsils... went to India. A memorandum prepared by the minister of state, which included Radcliffe's observations after he returned to England, reported that the reason for changing the 'notional' award regarding Gurdaspur was because 'the headwaters of the canals which irrigate the Amritsar District lie in the Gurdaspur District and it is important to keep as much as possible of these canals under one administration'. Wavell, however, had made a more significant political judgement in his plan, submitted to the secretary of state, Lord Pethick-Lawrence, in February 1946: 'Gurdaspur must go with Amritsar for geographical reasons and Amritsar being sacred city of Sikhs must stay out of Pakistan... Fact that much of Lahore district is irrigated from upper Bari Doab canal with headworks in Gurdaspur district is awkward but there is no solution that avoids all such difficulties.' Wavell had also noted the problem this would create by leaving Qadian, the holy city of the Ahmadiyyas, in India, but the interests of the Sikhs were considered to be paramount. 'The greatest difficulty is position of Sikhs with their homelands and sacred places on both sides of the border. This problem is one which no version of Pakistan can solve'.

There the matter rests, unless somebody can dig up some evidence to the contrary.

• Please don't speak of "accusing" people. That is not the job of Misplaced Pages. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 15:15, 18 July 2017 (UTC)

To editor Kautilya3:

• Let me remind you my friend that Wavell's 'Break Down' plan was brought into discussion by you and I have only replied/responded. As for WP:OR, I am new to wikipedia editing and am trying to learn about 'how to add references', but rest assured I know what I am talking about, and I can back up everything I write/say with authentic sources.
• No, Mr. Bangash is not conceding Ilahi's point. As already shown, she doesn't even have 'a point' to begin with.
• If one goes through the section 'Partition and Invasion', he may find out that the entire section is dedicated to Indian POV only and contains different kinds of unsubstantiated allegations leveled against Pakistan by Indian authors and scholars. I am surprised that you have no problem with that but are unwilling to let anyone post Pakistan's point of view in that section. So, let's leave aside other things and concentrate on this. What makes you believe that posting/presenting the official position maintained by Pakistan in this regard (that is corroborated by multiple local and international sources) should not be allowed ? Samm19 (talk) 16:48, 18 July 2017 (UTC)

• As I said right in the beginning it would be "completely UNDUE" to go into the issues of partition or the British role in the whole affair. The British role was of course not limited to the allocation of Gurdaspur. It started sometime around 1939 in promising the creation of Pakistan and it went all the way until Pakistan signed the Mutual Defence Treaty with the US in 1954. There is long story to be told, and there are plenty of books about it.
• This article is on Kashmir conflict and it focuses on India, Pakistan and the people of the state, who are the main people that are "conflicted". The maximum that can be put in this article is the mention that the award of Gurdaspur to India made Kashmir contiguous to India, and Pakistanis allege British manipulation of the award. I will add that in the next couple of days.
• Regarding Wavell, you are confusing the 'breakdown plan' (January 1947) with his partition line (February 1946). The Radcliffe line essentially followed Wavell's, except for a few details. So, Wavell's line is quite important, even though it is hard to find sources about it.
• As for Radcliffe, most people don't seem to know the process. Radcliffe didn't lock himself up in a room and work in vacuum. He was the head of Commission (in fact, two Commissions), which held public hearings with copious presentations and argumentations made by both the sides. Radcliffe didn't attend all the sessions, but the proceedings were flown in to him on a daily basis. So he knew what the issues were. It is quite ridiculous to claim that some letter from Nehru to Mountbatten was evidence of "cheating". All kinds of people were trying to talk to all kinds of people, trying to influence the award. You yourself quoted Liaquat Ali Khan trying to pressure Ismay. That was equally evidence of "cheating".
• Christopher Beaumont, Radcliffe's secretary, has revealed that the only time Radcliffe met Mountbaten without an aide was on 11 August for a lunch. The Gurdaspur decision had been made before that date, and the Pakistan government has in its possession (through another instance of "cheating") a copy of the older map which shows that fact. So, sorry to burst your bubble. It is quite easy to prove that the Gurdaspur decision was Radcliffe's own decision.

This is my last post on this topic here. The rest to be continued at the Radcliffe Line article. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 03:44, 20 July 2017 (UTC)

To editor Kautilya3: My friend, I know what I am talking about and I am not confusing anything. However, I am unable to understand that why are you so much against allowing Pakistani View to be presented/posted? Pakistan, after all, is a party to the Dispute. You have every right to disagree with the Pakistani position, but why censor it ? Pakistan bases its entire Kashmir case on the unfair and planned transfer of the Muslim majority Gurdaspur District to India in order to give it a land access to Kashmir, and it considers this controversial transfer to be the 'origin' of the dispute. I fail to see how is this 'not related' to the topic. We all have our prejudices and biases but we shall not let our prejudice cloud our judgement. So, I would say that Pakistani View definitely deserves more than just 'two lines'. Samm19 (talk) 05:06, 20 July 2017 (UTC)

And... respected sir, I request you not to use phrases like "burst your bubble" etc., trust me, you haven't even come close to 'proving' anything. We can always agree to disagree however Samm19 (talk) 05:41, 20 July 2017 (UTC)

You have asked multiple times why I am "against" Pakistani View to be presented. So, here is the answer. Misplaced Pages is an encyclopedia (click that and read it), which focuses on presenting factual information. Views come into the picture only to the extent that facts may not be known, and multiple sources provide conflicting views. However, Misplaced Pages is not a forum to present "views". That would be a WP:SOAPBOX, which Misplaced Pages is not.

Now you assert Pakistan bases its entire Kashmir case on the unfair and planned transfer. That is complete WP:OR as far as I can see. You need to provide reliable third party sources that attest to that. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 10:41, 20 July 2017 (UTC)

To editor Kautilya3: Yes, you are right, sir. Misplaced Pages is an encyclopedia that is supposed to be neutral and present 'facts'. But the problem here is that you are presenting unsubstantiated Indian allegations as factual information, and are parading the opinions of Indian authors as 'facts'. India and Pakistan see Kashmir issue through different prisms and what is considered 'fact' by one is rejected as 'fiction' and 'fabrication' by the other. The international opinion on this matter is divided. Some scholars accept the Indian position while many others reject it. Same holds true for the Pakistani position. I believe that the proper approach in such matters is to allow both sides to present their views and leave it to the readers to decide who is right and who is not, and what the actual 'facts' of the matter are. Why double standards ?? Why allow Indian view but censor Pakistani? You are ignoring Misplaced Pages's basic principle and core content policy of NPOV:

All encyclopedic content on Misplaced Pages must be written from a neutral point of view (NPOV), which means representing fairly, proportionately, and, as far as possible, without editorial bias, all of the significant views that have been published by reliable sources on a topic.

About what I have posted, I have backed it up with proper and reliable sources/references, Pakistani as well as neutral. Please read it through. So, I will ask you once again to stop deleting/disallowing properly referenced content that goes against your pre-conceived notions, and that challenges the Indian position. I believe we can sort out this 'dispute' mutually. Otherwise, we can ask for 'neutral' opinion on this. Regards Samm19 (talk) 15:06, 20 July 2017 (UTC)

I am afraid you are being evasive. You have started this entire discussion of the Gurdaspur Award and wrote reams of posts, claiming Pakistan bases its entire Kashmir case on the unfair and planned transfer. I have asked for reliable sources that state this. You haven't provided any. Can you do that please? If there are problems with other issues in the article, you are welcome to raise them separately. But as far as this discussion is concerned, you need to demonstrate the claimed centrality of the Gurdaspur Award to the Kashmir conflict. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 18:05, 20 July 2017 (UTC)

To editor Kautilya3: You, my friend, seem to have some serious comprehension issues. Read "Pakistani PoV" through, carefully, and then please tell us what makes you believe that it is not related to the (history/origin of the) Kashmir Dispute ???. And please tell us that why do you think that the 'provided sources' are not reliable ? or why should it not be included in the section "Partition and invasion" ? Also, please tell us that why are you OK with the unsubstantiated allegations leveled against Pakistan by Indian authors in the aforementioned section but NOT ok with Pakistani view ? Samm19 (talk) 18:52, 20 July 2017 (UTC)

References

1. Ilahi, Shereen (2003). "The Radcliffe Boundary Commission and the Fate of Kashmir". India Review. 2 (1): 77–102. doi:10.1080/714002326. ISSN 1473-6489.
2. ^ Hafeez Malik (27 July 2016). Soviet-Pakistan Relations and Post-Soviet Dynamics, 1947–92. Springer. pp. 55–. ISBN 978-1-349-10573-1. Cite error: The named reference "Malik2016" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
3. Hodson, H. V. (1969), The Great Divide: Britain, India, Pakistan, London: Hutchinson, p. 354
4. F. Riddick, John (2006), The History of British India: A Chronology, p. 119, ISBN 9780313322808
5. Schofield, Victoria (2003) , Kashmir in Conflict, London and New York: I. B. Taurus & Co, p. 35, ISBN 1860648983

Notional award

About Notional Award, of course it wasn't 'final'. The point is, the notional award, in accordance with 'The terms of reference to the Boundary Commission'; of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims, did 'suggest' that the entire Gurdaspur District, including the Hindu majority tehsil of Pathankot, would be included in Pakistan as it was 51.14% Muslim majority. All of the 5 Muslim majority tehsils of Non-Muslim majority districts of Punjab that were to be included in India as per the notional award were handed over to India. But the only non-Muslim majority Tehsil (i.e. Pathankot) that was to be included in Pakistan, was not given to Pakistan, and then to add insult to injury, two more Muslim majority tehsils (Gurdaspur and Batala) were given away to India along with Pathankot. Therefore, Ms. Shereen Ilahi's assertion/claim that 'the non-Muslim majority of Pathankot tehsil placed it solidly on the Indian side of the line' cannot be accepted, and the assumption that Pathankot, owing to its Hindu majority, was to be included in India anyway, is ill-founded. Samm19 (talk) 00:19, 18 July 2017 (UTC)

References

1. V.P. Menon (1957). Transfer of Power in India. Orient Blackswan. p. 402. ISBN 9780691626666.
2. Schofield 2003, p. 35.
3. ^ Pervaiz I Cheema; Manuel Riemer (22 August 1990). Pakistan's Defence Policy 1947-58. Palgrave Macmillan UK. pp. 27–. ISBN 978-1-349-20942-2.

Arbitrary break

The following discussion is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

To editor Kautilya3: I have a question for you. What was the the basic sub-unit to divide Punjab, district or tehsil ? If it was Tehsil, then why were Muslim majority Tehsils of Ferozepur, Zira, Ajnala, Nakodar and Jullundur given to India ? If it was district, then what is the basis of your claim that the only Non-Muslim majority Tehsil (i.e. Pathankot) of Muslim Majority district of Gurdaspur was to be included in India anyways giving it a road-access to Kashmir ?? 7-8 Muslim majority Tehsils of Punjab were given to India, no Non-Muslim majority Tehsil was given to Pakistan. Pathankot could easily have been the one (if those drawing lines were not pro-India) Samm19 (talk) 01:14, 16 July 2017 (UTC)

The terms of reference to the Boundary Commission had no requirements about any levels. But it was widely assumed that it would be at the tehsil level at least, with the possibility that it could go down to even finer levels when necessary. If it was at the district level, the entire Gurdaspur district (incuding the Shakargarh tehsil) might have gone to India as per Wavell's decision earlier. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:42, 16 July 2017 (UTC)

To editor Kautilya3: So, it was neither Tehsil nor District that was the basic sub-unit to divide Punjab but whatever suited the agenda of those drawing the line?. "Other Factors" too came into play. This gives rise to a very important question that why, without any exception, India 'gained territory' and Pakistan 'lost territory' whenever and where ever those ambiguous "Other Factors" came into play?. While a Muslims majority district of Punjab and several Muslim majority tehsils were handed over to India, ironically or perhaps strategically no non-Muslim majority tehsil or district was given to Pakistan.

As for Wavell's breakdown plan, it had been already rejected, and in the `notional' award attached to the Indian Independence Act, all of Gurdaspur District was marked as Pakistan. Gurdaspur district along with four to five Muslim majority tehsils were given to India despite Mountbatten’s assurance that ‘there can be no question of coercing any large areas in which one community has a majority to live against their will under a Government in which another community has majority.’

Radcliffe Award was altered by Mountbatten; Gurdaspur was handed over to India and thus was manipulated the accession of Kashmir to India. Despite all protestations ‘to the effect that if it was proved true that the Gurdaspur district in the north Punjab area or even a large part of ithad been given to East Punjab by the Boundary Commission, this would be regarded as a most serious fact by Jinnah and the Pakistan Government’ amounting to ‘so grave a breach of faith as to imperil the future friendly relations between Pakistan and the British’, no attempt was made to redress the Muslim grievances.(Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 17, 16 August 1947, IOR/L/P/6/123.) Samm19 (talk) 17:44, 17 July 2017 (UTC)

References

1. Schofield 2003, p. 35.
2. The Partition of the Punjab, 1947: A Compilation of Official Documents, Volume 2, Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1993, p. 253, ISBN 9789693502862
3. Zaidi, Z. H. (2001), Pakistan Pangs of Birth, 15 August-30 September 1947, p. 379, ISBN 9789698156091

@Kautilya3: @NadirAli:, guys, need feedback

Pakistani POV

The following discussion is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

Pakistan maintains that the Radcliffe Award was altered by Mountbatten; Gurdaspur was handed over to India and thus was manipulated the accession of Kashmir to India. District Gurdaspur was a Muslim majority district, three of its four sub-districts (or tehsils) were Muslim majority. In the `notional' award attached to the Indian Independence Act that had already been put into effect for purposes of administration ad interim, all of Gurdaspur district was marked as Pakistan with 51.14% Muslim majority. Mountbatten, well aware of what was impending, delayed the announcement of the Radcliffe Award until 36 hours after India and Pakistan had received their independence and in the final award, the major part of Gurdaspur district, i.e. three of the four tehsils (including two Muslim majority tehsils) and also a small part of the fourth, was handed over to India, giving India practical land access to Kashmir, thus making the Indian intervention in Kashmir possible. It came as a great blow to Pakistan. Jinnah, other leaders of Pakistan, and particularly its officials, criticized the Award as ‘extremely unjust and unfair’.

Muhammad Zafarullah Khan, who represented the Muslim League in July 1947 before the Radcliffe Boundary Commission, stated that the Boundary Commission was a farce. A secret deal between Mountbatten and Congress leaders had already been struck. Mehr Chand Mahajan, who represented Congress before the Radcliffe Boundary Commission, in his autobiography, has acknowledged that when he was selected for the boundary commission, he was not inclined to accept the invitation as he believed that the commission was just a farce and that decisions were actually to be taken by Mountbatten himself. It was only under British pressure that the charges against Mountbatten of last minute alterations in the Radcliffe Award were not officially brought forward by Pakistani Government in the UN Security Council while presenting its case on Kashmir.

Stanley Wolpert writes that Radcliffe in his initial maps awarded Gurdaspur district to Pakistan but one of Nehru’s and Mountbatten’s greatest concerns over the new Punjab border line was to make sure that Gurdaspur should not go to Pakistan, since that would have deprived India of direct road access to Kashmir. As per “The Different Aspects of Islamic Culture”, a part of UNESCO’s Histories flagship project, recently disclosed documents of the history of the partition reveal British complicity with the top Indian leadership to wrest Kashmir from Pakistan. Alastair Lamb, based on the study of recently declassified documents, has convincingly proved that Mountbatten, in league with Nehru, was instrumental in pressurizing Radcliff to award the Muslim-majority district of Gurdaspur in East Punjab to India which could provide India with the only possible access to Kashmir. Andrew Roberts believes that Mountbatten cheated over India-Pak frontier and states that If gerrymandering took place in case of Ferozepur, it is not too hard to believe that Mountbatten also pressurised Radcliffe to ensure that Gurdaspur wound up in India giving India a road access to Kashmir. Perry Anderson states that Mountbatten, officially supposed neither to exercise any influence on Radcliffe, nor to have any knowledge of his findings, intervened behind the scenes – probably at Nehru’s behest – to alter the award. He had little difficulty getting Radcliffe change his boundaries to allot the Muslim-majority district of Gurdaspur to India rather than to Pakistan thus giving India the only access road from Delhi to Kashmir Professor Lawrence Ziring, considered an authority on Pakistan's political development writes that the Gurdaspur district of the Punjab, a Muslim-dominant area, had been demarcated for India not Pakistan in order to provide New Delhi with direct land access to Kashmir. Jinnah’s effort to prevent this geopolitical strategizing provide futile, and indeed the granting of Gurdaspur to India by Britain signaled India’s intention to occupy the mountain kingdom with British acquiescence.

However some British works suggest contrary to that 'Kashmir State was not in anybody's mind' when the Award was being drawn and that even the Pakistanis themselves had not realized the importance of Gurdaspur to Kashmir until the Indian forces actually entered Kashmir. Both Mountbatten and Radcliffe, of course, have strongly denied these charges. It is impossible to accurately quantify the personal responsibility for the tragedy of Kashmir as the Mountbatten papers relating to the issue at the India Office Library and records are closed to scholars for an indefinite period. Samm19 (talk) 23:56, 19 July 2017 (UTC)

References

1. Zaidi, Z. H. (2001), Pakistan Pangs of Birth, 15 August-30 September 1947, p. 379, ISBN 9789698156091
2. Schofield 2003, p. 38.
3. Schofield 2003, p. 35.
4. The Reminiscences of Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan by Columbia University, 2004, p. 155
5. Anderson, Perry, Why Partition?
6. The Reminiscences of Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan by Columbia University, 2004, p. 158
7. Zaidi, Z. H. (2001), Pakistan Pangs of Birth, 15 August-30 September 1947, p. 380, ISBN 9789698156091
8. Muhammad Zafarullah Khan, Tahdith-i-Ni‘mat, Pakistan Printing Press, 1982, p. 515
9. Mehr Chand Mahajan, Looking Back: The Autobiography Bombay, 1963, p. 113
10. The Reminiscences of Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan by Columbia University, 2004, p. 149-150
11. Sohail, Massarat (1991), Partition and Anglo-Pakistan relations, 1947-51, Vanguard, p. 76-77
12. Wolpert, Stanley (2009), Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire in India, Oxford University Press, USA, p. 167
13. The Different Aspects of Islamic Culture (PDF), 2016, p. 355
14. Author's Review, Eminent Churchillians
15. Robert, Andrew (1994), Eminent Chruchillians
16. Sher Muhammad Garewal,“Mountbatten and Kashmir Issue”, Journal of Research Society of Pakistan, XXXIV (April 1997), pp.9-10
17. Anderson, Perry, Why Partition?
18. Book Review, Lawrence Ziring: Pakistan in the twentieth century: a political history
19. Pakistan Journal of History & Culture (Quaid-i-Azam Number) Vol. XXII, No. 2,July - Dec, 2001Nazaria-i-Pakistan Trust
20. Hodson, H. V. (1969), The Great Divide: Britain, India, Pakistan, London: Hutchinson, p. 355
21. Hugh Tinker, Journal of Asian Studies, XXXVI, 4, p. 701
22. Robert, Andrew (1994), Eminent Chruchillians, p. 105

To editor Kautilya3: Why do you want to move this discussion to another page, my friend ? I believe It belongs here Samm19 (talk) 05:41, 20 July 2017 (UTC)

Pathankot tehsil

Coming back to this issue after a long break, it came as surprise to me to find that the Pakistani delegation never laid claim to the Pathankot tehsil. V. N. Datta says:

Besides 17 districts listed in the notional divisions in the Appendix to the 3rd June statement (minus a non-Muslim majority area of Pathankot tehsil) the Muslim League claimed the following areas:...The Muslim League claimed 19 1/2 districts of Punjab for the new West Punjab leaving 9 1/2 districts for East Punjab in India.

Sir Zafrullah Khan does not mention Pathankot tehsil by name, by he does concede:

We rested our case on the tehsil, or sub-district being adopted as the unit for the purpose of determining contiguous majority areas.

So, it appears that the Pakistani delegation had always conceded the Pathankot tehsil to India, ergo they conceded India's land route into Kashmir. I don't really know what the controversy is about. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 21:33, 15 October 2017 (UTC)

References

1. Datta, V. N. (1998), "The Punjab Boundary Commission Award (12 August, 1947)", Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, 59: 850–862, JSTOR 44147058
2. * Wilcox, Wayne; Embree, Aislie T., eds. (2004), Reminiscences of Sir Muhammad Zufrulla Khan, Oriental Publishers, p. 154

Indo-Pak war of 1947

The following discussion is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

To editor Kautilya3: Here it is:

With this summit between Jinnah and Mountbatten at Lahore on 1 November, we enter a decisive phase of negotiations on Kashmir between India and Pakistan... A full account is available in a “Note of Discussion” by Mountbatten of his talks with Jinnah in the presence of Lord Ismay his Chief of Staff at Government House, Lahore. The talks spread over three and a half hours, covered Kashmir (“most of the time”), Hyderabad and Junagadh.

Mountbatten offered a six para “proposals to form the basis of discussion.” It proposed plebiscite in Kashmir under the United Nations’ supervision and “a joint India-Pakistan force should hold the ring while the plebiscite is being held.” This was to form part of a wider accord on “procedure for accession of those States in which this matter is in dispute.” That was formulated in a draft which is quoted in extenso: “The Governments of India and Pakistan agree that, where the ruler of a State does not belong to the community to which the majority of his subjects belong, and where the State has not acceded to that Dominion whose majority community is the same as the State’s, the question of whether the State should finally accede to one or the other of the Dominions should in all cases be decided by an impartial reference to the will of the people.”

It was a fair offer. The “communal factor” was untied by India. It was ignored by Pakistan only to rely on it later. It clearly had Nehru’s endorsement since he repeated this offer to Liaquat a week later. Mountbatten claimed that Jinnah considered plebiscite to be “redundant and undesirable” and proposed an outright exchange of Junagadh for Kashmir. “Mr. Jinnah then went on to say that he could not accept a formula if it was so drafted as to include Hyderabad, since he pointed out that Hyderabad did not wish to accede to either Dominion and he could not be a party to coercing them to accession.” Jinnah said that “there was no sense in having Junagadh in the Dominion of Pakistan.” He had accepted it reluctantly. He explained that he was opposed to a plebiscite in Kashmir because of the presence of Indian troops there and with Sheikh Abdullah in power.

Samm19 (talk) 09:46, 21 July 2017 (UTC)

References

1. Bilateral Negotiation on Kaskmir: Unlearnt Lesson by A.G. Noorani

To editor Lopki90: before making edits, please discuss it here. Samm19 (talk) 11:01, 21 July 2017 (UTC)

To editor Kautilya3: I have added a 'more balanced' narrative. Jinnah was not against plebiscite, he believed that a plebiscite under the supervision of the Indian Army would be sabotaged. And he didn't trust Sheikh Abdullah. He alone is not to be blamed for the failure of Jinnah-Mountbatten talks. And Please read paragraph 2 and 3 (about Jinnah-Mountbatten talks), if needed, remove the redundant lines/parts as the same thing is being repeated in both paras. Regards Samm19 (talk) 13:07, 21 July 2017 (UTC)

To editor Kautilya3: Thanks for the advice. Now A G Noorani is not a reliable source ?? Why am I not surprised ?? anyway, if you insist on pushing Indian PoV and deleting everything that goes against your view, this section too has to be marked "Not Neutral"

Tell us why you believe that only Jinnah is to be blamed for failure of Jinnah-Mountbatten talks ? just because he was a Pakistani ? Samm19 (talk) 01:02, 22 July 2017 (UTC)

NPOV changes

Misplaced Pages's NPOV policy states that Avoid stating seriously contested assertions as facts. If different reliable sources make conflicting assertions about a matter, treat these assertions as opinions rather than facts, and do not present them as direct statements.

NPOV policy also states: Misplaced Pages describes disputes. Misplaced Pages does not engage in disputes. A neutral characterization of disputes requires presenting viewpoints with a consistently impartial tone; otherwise articles end up as partisan commentaries even while presenting all relevant points of view. Even where a topic is presented in terms of facts rather than opinions, inappropriate tone can be introduced through the way in which facts are selected, presented, or organized. Neutral articles are written with a tone that provides an unbiased, accurate, and proportionate representation of all positions included in the article. The tone of Misplaced Pages articles should be impartial, neither endorsing nor rejecting a particular point of view. Try not to quote directly from participants engaged in a heated dispute; instead, summarize and present the arguments in an impartial tone.

Since there are different scholarly opinions on this matter we can't state Mahesh Shankar's views as fact nor give it as preference over other scholarly views.

Mahesh Shankar, who published his work in the "India Review" in 2016, himself admitted in the same work that other scholars do not share his views and they say that Nehru deliberately delayed a plebiscite.

Shankar says on page 2 of his journal article which is cited in the body:

It particularly addresses critics’ claims—in Pakistan and in the scholarly community—that the failure of the plebiscite option owed itself solely to Nehru’s intransigence.

Shankar also says on page 6 of his journal article:

Scholars have similarly pointed to Nehru’s occasional expression of skepticism about the wisdom and practicality of holding a plebiscite. Noorani, for instance, points to a missive from Nehru to Sheikh Abdullah in August 1952 in which the former admitted to having “ruled out the plebiscite for all practical purposes.

So Shankar's views, by his own confession, are not shared by other scholars. As per Misplaced Pages's NPOV policy we have to describe all the scholarly viewpoints without giving preference to one in Misplaced Pages voice. I will be adding more scholarly views, such as those quotes in the archives by Mar4d, as required under our NPOV policy.

I am also making a change under Dixon section. What American ambassador Loy Henderson is saying looks UNDUE (and incorrect too because the main issue was demilitarisation).

Note there are ARBIPA sanctions in place on this page. I am also inviting others to review how this article has been written so far and to ensure we achieve a NPOV result. NadirAli نادر علی (talk) 04:30, 28 October 2017 (UTC)

Nehru's withdrawal of his plebiscite offer (which was different from the UN resolutions) is one of the major reasons the Kashmir conflict persists. So, an explanation of the offer as well as its withdrawal is necessary in this article. I am not confident that you hae read and understood what is described in the article regarding these subjects. The offer was made in July 1953, after Sheikh Abdullah government was dismissed, when most analysts would have expected that India would lose a plebiscite. It was withdrwan in September 1953, after Pakistan signed a defence pact with the US. And, Shankar has made a detailed study of what happened in between as well as what drivers Nehru had to make this decision. The "views" wherever they appear are attributed to Shankar or Nehru as appropriate. I believe this satisfies WP:NPOV. If you know of any scholar that has studied all the evidence presented by Shankar and drew different conclusions, please bring them forward. Note also that India Review is an international journal published by Taylor & Francis. If you believe there are reliability issues with it, please take it to WP:RSN.

I am always happy for other editors to read and review my content, and revise it as necessary for WP:RS and WP:NPOV purposes. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:30, 28 October 2017 (UTC)

I have read Shankar's 'analysis' but do not see any conclusive evidence for his POV rather it is his own interpretation of the primary sources. Scholars as we know have different understandings of the same events. Where scholarly understandings differ, as Shankar himself admits, we include all of them as per Misplaced Pages's NPOV policy. There is no Misplaced Pages policy requirement that a scholar has to study "all" of Shankar's 'evidence' before having the right to arrive at an opposing conclusion. Indeed there are several things missing or overlooked in Shankar's 'analysis'. There were other stages too for example the Menzies proposal when Pakistan accepted a plebiscite under a joint or Commonwealth force but India did not. India suddenly remembered then that Pakistan was the 'aggressor'. Shankar doesn't seem to factor that into his analysis. Nor the military threats India posed to Pakistan. Other scholars have their own 'evidence'. In fact the statement 'who has studied the matter in detail' lacks a source. It is likely to go. NadirAli نادر علی (talk)

@NadirAli: thanks with respect to your additions from my sources in the archives. The questions surrounding plebiscite and the various roadblocks around it are something of historical interest. I've made some copyedits and expansions on further developments, particularly those relevant to the 1950s. As regards to the above, WP:NPOV fundamentally requires consulting a multitude of sources. So there is nothing wrong with using other authoritative sources, provided they offer a fuller and clear sequence of events. Mar4d (talk) 10:44, 5 November 2017 (UTC)

My position is that, as an encyclopedia, we want to report facts as far as possible, and minimize "views". There are too many views out there and, if we keep reporting views, we are just liable to pick views that we like and dismiss those we don't like. And, all editors push for their favourite views to be included and the article degenerates into a quagmire. That is not the way to go. We report scholars as far as possible, and we also check if they are making evidenced statements or just stating their personal views. Not all scholars are equal. Some give copious notes for their evidence and some give cursory notes or refer to some other scholar's "view" which is in turn not evidenced. You might say, we attribute views and that satisfies our NPOV mission. Not so. If you add an "attributed" view, which is contradicted by another scholar with evidence, what value does the attributed view have?

If you start adding diplomats' views, you get into even more tricky territory. The diplomats are there to represent their country's position in the negotiations and their view of other parties is only based on what has been said in the negotiations. The conclusions they draw are based on a narrow base. It is better to report such views filtered by scholars, who presumably take the trouble to double check the facts.

With regard to the so-called "Loy Henderson's view" by NadirAli, I maintain that it is not a "view". William Reid, a former UNMOGIP soldier, did a BA Honours thesis at Deakin University, which has apparently unearthed for the first time what happened with the Dixon Mission. Both Raghavan and Lamb have referenced the thesis and spoke highly of it. So does Noorani. Reid has said that Dixon's conclusions regarding the Indian position were wrong. India had accepted the plebiscite proposals made by Dixon (in fact they wre India's own proposals!), but it rejected the idea of suspending the Sheikh Abdullah government. This information comes to us via Loy Henderson and William Reid, and it is preposterous to label it "Loy Hender's view". It is information. Of course, the Indian government could have been lying to Henderson and Henderson could have been lying in his reports. But unless there is evidence to the contrary, we report the information. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 14:48, 5 November 2017 (UTC)

To editor Mar4d: Thank you for your expansions, it has made the sequence of events in the 1950s much clearer. It is good you have added a fuller sequence of events from Schofield's neutral and authoritative book. Our senior editor user:Fowler&fowler has recommended using Schofield. It has clarified many developments such as the Menzies proposal which were missing in the article when it was based on Shankar's so-called 'analysis'. There's many factors missing from Shankar's analysis which is mostly based on conjecture of a few developments rather than solid fact and the evidence is lacking too. But the more worrying concern is WP:WEIGHT and WP:FRINGE for Shankar's POV in the article. He writes in his own conclusion that 'most accounts' regard Nehru the reason for plebiscite failure (in other words Shankar's view is a minority view). It raises the question whether such a fringe view should be given so much space here. WP:WEIGHT applies here, I think. Otherwise this article will be POV and NPOV will be left on the sidewalk. Should it be removed or shortened? What say you Mar4d?

References

1. http://www.bioone.org/doi/full/10.1659/0276-4741(2000)020%5B0292:KICIPA%5D2.0.CO%3B2

-- NadirAli نادر علی (talk) 03:45, 6 November 2017 (UTC)

Loy Henderson's view

I would also recommend that you make separate posts to raise separate issues.

What American ambassador Loy Henderson is saying looks UNDUE (and incorrect too because the main issue was demilitarisation).

I think this has no basis whatsoever. What is UNDUE about it? America is the leading Security Council member whose resolution was being implemented by Dixon. India kept America informed about what its plans and negotiating positions were and the American ambassador's assessment of them is entirely pertinent. And, you are entirely wrong that the issue was "demilitarisation". It wasn't. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:37, 28 October 2017 (UTC)

I agree with your first sentence, I'll take care to do that. Thank you. If you do not believe demillitarization was the main issue, you should read Dixon himself and Nimitz's complaints. Secondly, if the view of one American ambassador matters so much then so do the views of American diplomats in general and most observers, which I will be adding soon. NadirAli نادر علی (talk) 03:45, 29 October 2017 (UTC)

U:NadirAli The Kautilya3 user has removed your NPOV contribution from Copland which provided a nuanced analysis regarding the accession's 'popular' support. But Kautilya3 has not removed the primary-sourced view of Syed Mir Qasim which is a biased sentence on the accession's 'popular' support. It was just before your neutral sentence from a scholarly source. The section is called 'Accession' and not Indian military arrival so Kautilya's reason for removal (Is Copland talking about the invasion and dispatching of Indian troops) looks baseless and misrepresentative of what the content under the Accession section is about.

Also to Kautilya3:

• I have read Mahesh Shankar to verify whether NadirAli is speaking the truth. He is. And I now find that since Shankar has admitted in his conclusion and throughout his article that his is a minority POV, so unfortunately WP:WEIGHT is becoming an issue here. Giving uncorroborated and self admitted fringe viewpoints paragraph length space is UNDUE. I am removing it. I don't think Misplaced Pages will agree to WP:FRINGE views being given so much attention so it might be better to discard the fringe scholar and not attempt to bring him back either.

• I am also adding back the 'most observers' comments under Dixon Plan not only because of NPOV (which requires it) but also because Loy Henderson got it wrong. Previously, Nehru didn't agree to a Nimitz supervised UN Commission for an arbitrated withdrawal of troops on both sides. Dixon got a similar feel to Nimitz and believed there would be no fair vote with the Indian soldiers hanging around. So Henderson saying that Dixon only thought what he did because he believed there won't be a fair plebiscite under the Sheikh Abdullah regime is a misrepresentation of Dixon's position. Dixon himself that the issue was also that of India not demilitarizing. So I am also adding the first half of Dixon's complaint, from his own 'grievance' quote. We don't need Henderson when he is cutting words out of Dixon's mouth and misrepresenting his concern, so he is being removed from this article.

• As for Bowles I can't find anything about these 'concessions ' from Pakistan, will research it further, but the only reason I am restoring and retaining him is that I can't find any source denying that Nehru rejected Pakistani concessions on its military presence in exchange for plebiscite. What RS reports we include in Misplaced Pages as NPOV requires. I also do not agree with this DUE argument because it's relevant to the 1950s developments between India and Pakistan which were about a plebiscite.

• Titles such as 'Nehru's plebiscite offer' and 'withdrawal of plebiscite offer' are POV forks. The titles seem to be taken from or influenced by Mahesh Shankar's fringe journal article. Not good. Besides it's an incorrect title because there was no gracious 'offer' out of the blue rather there were ongoing negotiations between Nehru and Bogra before this so called offer was made and it's actual reason for failure was Pakistan's rejection of a plebiscite administrator other than Nimitz. The Cold War and Indo-pak military concerns' factors background analysis is just hypothetical opinion of scholars, which we only include for

NPOV demand of fairly representing scholarly viewpoints. KA$HMIR (talk) 09:50, 8 November 2017 (UTC)

DUE and UNDUE for the Timeline

Please note that there is a separate page for the Timeline of the Kashmir conflict. If people want to add Menzies mediation, Chester Bowles or others, that is where they can go. There have been many mediations. I have put here in my write-up, the three most important initiatives that came close to solving the dispute:

• UNCIP resolution from January 1948, which defined a three-step process, with Pakistani withdrawal being the first step.
• Dixon Plan, which awarded AJK & GB to Pakistan and Jammu & Ladakh to India, and the plebiscite to be confined to the Kashmir valley. (Mind you that the idea for this was Nehru's, which Faizan's POV edit clobbered, now reinstated by KA$HMIR.)
• "Nehru's offer", which proposed a zonal plebiscite in all areas without requiring any withdrawal.

To my mind, these were the only proposals that took both India and Pakistan's concerns into account (to varying degrees, of course). If you want to add any other initiatives, you need to at least explain why they are important. Saying that X made some unstated concession, which Y rejected, (pick your X and Y) doesn't add any value the article. Without even knowing what is being talked about, the readers have really no idea. This kind of shrubbery and innuendo is exactly why people are fed up with it. But the problem seems clear enough to me, after having read high quality sources. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 12:11, 8 November 2017 (UTC)

Chester Bowles comment

This paragraph was stuck into the Dixon Plan section. Ostensibly it had nothing to do with Dixon Plan:

In mid-1952 Pakistani Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin unveiled to Bowles "substantial" concessions that Pakistan was prepared to make on its military presence in Kashmir if India agreed to the appointment of a plebiscite administrator. The Pakistanis asked Bowles to convey this message informally and Bowles was also instructed to do this in the "capacity of a friendly messenger". Nehru rejected this offer. Bowles concluded that "Nehru is acting in a wholly unreasonable manner and will probably continue to do so... definitely hopes the whole situation can be made to go away."

References

1. Howard B. Schaffer (1993). Chester Bowles: New Dealer in the Cold War. Harvard University Press. pp. 103–. ISBN 978-0-674-11390-9.

First of all, what were the "concessions"? How did they meet the requirements of the UN Resolutions?

Secondly, the matter was in the UN, and a UN-appointed mediator Frank Graham came and went. If anything, that mediation is probably what should be covered, not some informal negotiation by the American Ambassador, who was trying to do what he could to help.

Coming to Chester Bowles himself, he was quite in favour of the Dixon Plan, and he tried to pursue it while he was in Delhi. But Washington told him to stop it. So, within the limitations he did what he could. The same page that has been cited here also gives Bowles's assessment that the Indians believe that the American policy has hindered rather than helped, and that the Americans didn't really understand the Indian position. I think what has been included is UNDUE, given all the context, and also given how little information this passage really contains. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 03:53, 8 November 2017 (UTC)

KA$HMIR revert justifications

Mahesh Shankar

• I have read Mahesh Shankar to verify whether NadirAli is speaking the truth. He is. And I now find that since Shankar has admitted in his conclusion and throughout his article that his is a minority POV, so unfortunately WP:WEIGHT is becoming an issue here. Giving uncorroborated and self admitted fringe viewpoints paragraph length space is UNDUE. I am removing it. I don't think Misplaced Pages will agree to WP:FRINGE views being given so much attention so it might be better to discard the fringe scholar and not attempt to bring him back either. -- KA$HMIR (talk) 09:50, 8 November 2017 (UTC)

What views of Mahesh Shankar does the article have, which you supposedly object to? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 16:02, 8 November 2017 (UTC)

Observers comments

• I am also adding back the 'most observers' comments under Dixon Plan not only because of NPOV (which requires it) but also because Loy Henderson got it wrong. Previously, Nehru didn't agree to a Nimitz supervised UN Commission for an arbitrated withdrawal of troops on both sides. Dixon got a similar feel to Nimitz and believed there would be no fair vote with the Indian soldiers hanging around. So Henderson saying that Dixon only thought what he did because he believed there won't be a fair plebiscite under the Sheikh Abdullah regime is a misrepresentation of Dixon's position. Dixon himself that the issue was also that of India not demilitarizing. So I am also adding the first half of Dixon's complaint, from his own 'grievance' quote. We don't need Henderson when he is cutting words out of Dixon's mouth and misrepresenting his concern, so he is being removed from this article. -- KA$HMIR (talk) 09:50, 8 November 2017 (UTC)

The only substantial comment that was there in that section is that of Francis Pike, who is not a reliable source. See Talk:Hyderabad State#Country.

As for demilitarisation, I will look into it. Neither Raghavan nor Snedden state it as having been an issue. Snedden rather says that Pakistan rejected plebiscite confined to Valley.

On the other hand, you have removed Loy Henderson's observations, claiming they are "wrong". Is it your own opinion, or do you have a source that questions it? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 16:51, 8 November 2017 (UTC)

Chester Bowles again

• As for Bowles I can't find anything about these 'concessions ' from Pakistan, will research it further, but the only reason I am restoring and retaining him is that I can't find any source denying that Nehru rejected Pakistani concessions on its military presence in exchange for plebiscite. What RS reports we include in Misplaced Pages as NPOV requires. I also do not agree with this DUE argument because it's relevant to the 1950s developments between India and Pakistan which were about a plebiscite. -- KA$HMIR (talk) 09:50, 8 November 2017 (UTC)

Verifiability does not guarantee inclusion. Misplaced Pages is written for people to read and understand. Not for beating one's drum. This is an extremely long article. Only the material that absolutely needs to be there should be included. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 16:58, 8 November 2017 (UTC)

Nehru's Plebiscite Offer

• Titles such as 'Nehru's plebiscite offer' and 'withdrawal of plebiscite offer' are POV forks. The titles seem to be taken from or influenced by Mahesh Shankar's fringe journal article. Not good. Besides it's an incorrect title because there was no gracious 'offer' out of the blue rather there were ongoing negotiations between Nehru and Bogra before this so called offer was made and it's actual reason for failure was Pakistan's rejection of a plebiscite administrator other than Nimitz. The Cold War and Indo-pak military concerns' factors background analysis is just hypothetical opinion of scholars, which we only include for NPOV demand of fairly representing scholarly viewpoints. KA$HMIR (talk) 09:50, 8 November 2017 (UTC)

This is the closest India and Pakistan ever came to solving the Kashmir problem. It is Nehru's personal initiative, and it should obviously go by his name. Since you and other editors are busy filling up the page with invective against Nehru, let true Nehru speak for himself. What is the harm? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 17:11, 8 November 2017 (UTC)

• @Kautilya3: Can you please keep your comments structured in one place rather than many sections, as it's becoming hard to follow. It's not necessary to paste the comments while replying. I also think you should self-revert, since you've broken WP:1RR. A few more points:

1) For Shankar's analysis, I have to concur with KA$HMIR and NadirAli that the source is not good enough. He's an assistant professor at Skidmore College, not a historian to begin with. And because he's unknown as an author, I've been unable to locate any books or reviews. As noted, he as a matter of fact admits in his own conclusion that his view is a revisionist one which contradicts with "most important accounts" about Nehru's culpability, so he is merely trying to rebut that mainstream view. Yet you've given his personal analysis more WP:WEIGHT and WP:UNDUE space than any of the reliable scholars and analysts on Kashmir. So he will have to go, or be condensed significantly as raised by NadirAli.

2) My take on Henderson, and a question: Why do we need him telling us what Dixon thought, when Dixon himself said the issue was India not agreeing to demilitarize? His quote is quite clearly in the source. So why not let Dixon speak for himself.

3) As for the Bowles section, that is simply your opinion on it. Howard B. Schaffer is however a reputable and well-known expert who spent decades serving and dealing with South Asia, so he knows the ins-and-out of regional diplomacy credibly better. The 1950s was by far the most significant period than any other in negotiations and discussions that could have led to plebiscite. So it is of substance and relevance to those early developments which took place. You did argue that the Americans did not understand India's position; however, I don't see how that affects what we report or cover what's present in the sources, since that's not our job.

4) Your point about Nehru's offer being the "closest India and Pakistan ever came to solving" Kashmir, this is not really different to the other developments where there were offers (formal and informal, in your terms), albeit there was stalling for some reason or the other each time. This doesn't seem to address, IMO, the point about these headings being lifted out of Shankar's article above. Mar4d (talk) 08:09, 9 November 2017 (UTC)

My comments were structured. They were structured by issues. I am sure that there will be several rounds of discussion on each of them, judging by past experience, and the sources we will use for each of them will be different too. Anyway, I will humour you for now.

1) For Shankar's analysis, as you rightly observe, what I have covered is his analysis, not his "view". The views are those of Nehru, available in ample measure in the more than two dozen volumes of his writings that are in public domain and several others that aren't. As I said, Nehru needs to be given space because of the badgering he gets, in the so-called reliable sources as well as on this page. Most of these views are based on some diplomat or journalist who had a one-hour meeting with him where he lost his temper and they came away thinking he is not going to agree to anything. Scholars who have actually studied his views in depth get shunned. If we give an honest treatment of Nehru, then there would be no need to give so much space to his own writings. The fact that Nehru actively pushed for a plebiscite after Sheikh Abdullah was dismissed when India had very little chance of winning a plebscite is basically unknown, except for the readers of this page. Almost everybody ignores it becaust it doesn't fit into their preconceived world view of Nehru. The facts contradict, quite spectacularly, almost all the half-baked views found in the literature. So, I am willing to condense Shankar's analysis, but only if we agree to throw out all other half-baked views that are contradicted by facts.

2) Regarding Loy Henderson and Dixon, you claim that this is what "Dixon himself has said". Is it really? Then why isn't Bradnock citing Dixon's report? He is citing a book on Pakistan's Foreign Policy written by a Pakistani diplomat (Burke) and a Pakistan's historian (Ziring). What evidence is there that Bradnock has even read the report? Somebody who has actually read it says this:

Pakistan, however, rejected any such regional-only plebiscite. Rather, it wanted the plebiscite conducted for all J&K-ites. If this was not possible, then Pakistan wanted a division of J&K along religious lines—as a result of which Pakistan naturally would have obtained all Muslim-majority areas, including the prized region of Kashmir.

Pakistan threw a big fit after the Dixon Mission and almost went to war. Why did it do that? Kashmiris on the other hand, warmly remember the Dixon Plan. That was the only proposal that came close to giving them the voice they needed.

As for demilitarisation, as Noorani explains, Dixon was a jurist, not a political negotiator. He needed a political assistant who could have helped him with negotiations. So, Dixon might have thought that demilitarisation was an issue, but he didn't really explore the art of the possible. India had agreed to lots of demilitarisation proposals before and after the Dixon Mission (with the UNCIP as well as the Graham Mission). So, responsible scholars like Raghavan and Snedded ignore it. Burke and Ziring, on the other hand, are documenting Pakistan's perception of why the Dixon Mission failed, a perception that deflects away from their own rejection of it.

3) Regarding Chester Bowles, everything I said also comes from Schaffer. Schaffer is still an American diplomat and he is taking the American government line, which seems to have been supportive of Pakistan's rejection of the Dixon Plan. But Bowles seems to have understood that the Dixon Plan was the only thing that would work.

4) For the Nehru's offer, there was no rejection from Pakistan. If there was "stalling", please feel free to find out why. From my point of view, the biggest question is, was Pakistan ever prepared to accept a plebiscite? Was it ready to lose Kashmir if the Kashmiris decided against it? For Nehru, we know the answer. For Pakistan, we don't. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 12:02, 9 November 2017 (UTC)

References

1. Snedden, Christopher (2015), Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-1-84904-342-7
2. Schaffer, Howard B. (2009), The Limits of Influence: America's Role in Kashmir, Brookings Institution Press, ISBN 978-0-8157-0370-9

• Kautilya3 you need to remember that this page is under ARBIPA sanctions and repeated POV pushing and edit warring can have severe consequences. In your latest revert you claim that a peer-reviews journal article with 126 citations (not that it means anything much since we do not know Shankar's methodology of interpreting these 'citations', nor does 'peer-reviewed' mean majority approved) is not 'FRINGE'. But Misplaced Pages says clearly

• In Misplaced Pages parlance, the term fringe theory is used in a very broad sense to describe an idea that departs significantly from the prevailing views or mainstream views in its particular field. Because Misplaced Pages summarizes significant opinions with representation in proportion to their prominence, a Misplaced Pages article should not make a fringe theory appear more notable or more widely accepted than it is. Statements about the truth of a theory must be based upon independent reliable sources. If discussed in an article about a mainstream idea, a theory that is not broadly supported by scholarship in its field must not be given undue weight, and reliable sources must be cited that affirm the relationship of the marginal idea to the mainstream idea in a serious and substantial manner.

• Any idea in any field which departs from the mainstream idea will get treated as a minority. Shankar's revisionist account is self admitted minority POV. Therefore, will be treated as FRINGE. Misplaced Pages cares not what kind of a source the fringe account is. Repeatedly trying to add a fringe analysis/view is and basing whole sections of the article on it because it is one's favourite view or personally-judged correct view is POV pushing. The rest of your demand that we go against the scholarly views which Misplaced Pages follows and turn this page into Nehruvian apologia is also the same POV pushing Misplaced Pages bans. You should also keep in mind Misplaced Pages is not a forum or a place for original research.

• Another extremely controversial source you are basing this article on is Raghavan whose links with the Indian Government and background in the Indian Army are no secret. He is also known for 'selection bias...which distorts research findings'. His work inhhis book is explaining India's "perceptions" of the events. Therefore, his book is not a good source to write about the events. What his book "may" be okay for is our Indian view section where you are free to include India's perceptions about the 1950s events. For the 1950s events themselves we will use Schofield which is noted to be a neutral and authoritative source on the conflict. KA$HMIR (talk) 08:33, 10 November 2017 (UTC)

Knowledge progresses with new discoveries and new research. Peer-reviewed journal articles, supported by ample evidence provided, are not called FRINGE theories. You need to quit making this argument.

At the same time, you keep inserting content from Schofield who is not an academic and doesn't have any research training. She is just a writer who happens to have written one of the earliest books on Kashmir in this century. It is only good for bare facts. When there are contentious issues, her account is totally inadequate. I have given you Christopher Snedden's assessment of the Dixon Plan in a book published by Oxford University Press. That should have been enough.

Raghavan is a highly acclaimed world-class historian on contemporary history. It doesn't do you any good to start throwing mud at him. If there is any "Indian perception" in the content of the article, please feel free to point it out and I will amend it accordingly. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 00:29, 11 November 2017 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: First, please discontinue the slow edit war, which you haven't even after violating WP:1RR. You're making a lot of unsourced and unverifiable claims including personal opinions about parties, or scholars' research and their motivations. You should stick to the sources and subject matter, as you advise fellow editors. You need to WP:DROPTHESTICK, especially about the first point. It's fringe because it doesn't conform to the majority view (it's crystal clear in WP:DUE), two, it's not a mainstream source yet you wanted to lend it weight, and three, because the writer isn't a historian as you know. So it spectacularly fails your own standards, ironically while you deny sources like Victoria Schofield on flimsy pretext. Our work as Wikipedians is to summarise the WP:RS by their prominence and not do our own research. And where WP:RS contradict, we represent both as per WP:NPOV unless its a fringe view which gets different treatment. Bradnock, whom you called partisan, actually gives both sides' perspectives in his article. Lawrence Ziring is not a Pakistani. And Snedden (who you lambasted at Talk:1947 Poonch Rebellion), not sure why you need his assessment now when we have Dixon's quote. It is like WP:POV pushing, where only sources conforming to India's foreign policy are tenable. While Raghavan does appear to focus a lot on India's strategic and military calculus in the backdrop of the 1950s negotiations, he mostly ignores Pakistan's security concerns. So he is good only so far as documenting India's perceptions are concerned. Schofield on the other hand isn't as lopsided, as she evidently gives more analysis and space to both, her work's been vetted for neutrality, and she's scholarly reviewed as one of the best experts in the field.

About Dixon's quote sourced to Bradnock, that's only a half-truth. It's also included by Schofield and she provides additional comments of Dixon too. As for UNCIP and Graham, that's again not true. The key issue for Graham was demilitarization; India and Pakistan could not agree over the number of troops to keep in Kashmir during plebiscite, that's why it failed. India also apparently rejected various UNCIP proposals on the basis of dubious legal technicalities. And for the concessions to Bowles, there's no actual requirement for knowing the micro-modalities of the offer. Just that there was an offer which India rejected, which Schaffer calls evidence of "Indian intransigence". All of that is sourced. Mar4d (talk) 09:08, 11 November 2017 (UTC)

See, you have merged all four issues into one, and now I don't even know which issue you are talking about. Let me repeat that knowledge progresses through new discoveries and new research. In case of the Dixon Plan, William Reid's BA thesis

* Reid, W. A., Sir Owen Dixon's mediation of the Kashmir dispute 1950, Deakin University, 2000.

was a breakthrough. Before it, most scholars haven't seen the report and don't know what was in it except for a few isolated quotes that somebody or other propagandised. I give priority to the scholars who have studied the report and/or Reid's thesis. Raghavan and Noorani have explicitly discussed the thesis, and Snedden I presume must have known it, having worked at the same University. All the other sources should be measured against them. (Your allegation that I downrated Snedden previously is explained by the fact that it was a different book of Snedden that was talked about at Talk:1947 Jammu massacres. That book I continue to regard as BIASED because of the source material used in it, not to reflect on Snedden himself. Note also that that book was published by HarperCollins whereas the current book is by OUP. Higher quality publisher often ensures higher quality content.)

Regarding demilitarisation, I promise to look into the issues, not only in the context of the Dixon Plan, but in general, we need to document the positions of the two countries. (But I am not interested in offers made and rejected. I don't think our reders care about them either.)

You claim that Raghavan represented only India's strategic concerns. Yes, but at the same time, he also treats Pakistan neutrally. The fact that Pakistan rejected the Dixon Plan, mentioned by Snedden, did not find mention by either Raghavan or Noorani. So, Indian schoalrs deserve more credit than you give them.

I am certainly not going to use terms like "Indian intransigence" used by western scholars, when the Western powers completely ignored the basic complaint India made to the UN. I have reams of evidene that shows that they did it deliberately and consciously, ignoring what their own experts told them about the international law. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 18:21, 11 November 2017 (UTC)

To Kautilya3 a PhD thesis is not acceptable for such a sensitive topic. You also need to drop this WP:OR attitude of making claims about the scholarly methodologies without sources.

Okay, the best sources to write summary level article are the accepted university textbook histories, which Schofield certainly is as recommended by Joseph Schaller. We only really need the 'bare facts' (which you accept Schofield contains) outside the Indian/Pakistani views section.

And I don't understand what you mean by promising to research demilitarization. You know about it already. Even Mahesh Shankar, of whom you are adamant offers a solid analysis, admits that India laid obstacles during the negotiations on demilitarization (although Shankar thinks it was due to genuine concerns rather than Indian intransigence, but still even he accepts this fact that India did lay obstacles; India laying obstacles is a bare fact, the rest on India's motives being Shankar's opinion)

"Rather the Indian obstacles to the plebiscite-preconditions regarding demilitarization" and the political dispensation in the state-were motivated not by a desire to stall the process altogether, but by fear that by making concessions on those issues would carry with them strategic and reputational costs

On an elaborated note the more I read and re-read Shankar and Raghavan the more I see their works are full of unscholarly and unsubstantiated POV gripes against Pakistan; not really fact based but their analysis is more 'perception based'. You have to admitted this much about Raghavan that he represents India's security concerns. So he is writing according to India's threat perceptions. We cannot have this article written according to India's insecurities and imaginary threat perceptions. Raghavan's links to the Indian government also bring up question marks on him according to Misplaced Pages policies on independent and non-independent sources. As I said earlier, this article should be stripped to the bare facts using Schofield.--NadirAli نادر علی (talk) 04:48, 12 November 2017 (UTC)

It is mentioned in the tertiary sources such as Schofield that the key sticking point in the Dixon Mission was demilitarisation. This is corroborated in all the multiple ] except by the fringe Shankar and government hired Raghavan. India rejected all of Dixon's demilitarisation proposals including the final one which caused Dixon to come to the conclusion quoted by Schofield. I am expanding on Dixon with an Indian 'scholar' Das Gupta. Although Gupta has severe pro-India POV problems in their book but they have given a more detailed account of the bare facts. Namely what the proposals were and who rejected what and what grounds they cited for their rejection. These facts, because they're corroborated in other sources, are being incorporated. I am surprised that Kautilya3 did not read about the Dixon Mission in a book he praised on Talk:1947 Jammu massacres. I will also take care to give more space to Schaffer than Gupta since the former has been cited more than the latter if you note their profiles on Google Scholar.

It also turns out that Dixon came to implement McNaughton's demilitarisation proposals. Proposals which Pakistan accepted but India rejected (a bare fact in Schofield's tertiary work). So content on McNaughton proposals is also needed and is being added.

Given the fact that the US-Pakistan defence pact was a major controversy used by the Indians to erase the Nehru-Bogra breakthroughs, it also looks necessary to include the general American involvement with the 50s developments. As an example it turns out America offered similar weaponry to India as was to be given to Pakistan, an offer which India turned down before using the pact to go back on all the progress the talks had made. It also appears that the Commonwealth involvement was a product of American-Indian tensions. I will be careful to streamline the article with the mainstream scholarly view of Indian intransigence. --NadirAli نادر علی (talk) 04:22, 19 November 2017 (UTC)

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