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The Holodomor (Template:Lang-ua) is a term employed by some particularly Ukrainians of a nationalist political outlook that refers to a famine in the territory of Soviet Ukraine in the years 1932–1933. According to several scholars, famine occurred primarily from the insufficient harvests of 1931 and 1932 caused to a large extent by the unavailability of horses and poor weather

While the famine in Ukraine was a part of a wider famine that also affected other regions of the USSR, the term Holodomor is specifically applied to the events that took place in territories populated by the ethnic Ukrainians. As such, the Holodomor is sometimes referred to as the Ukrainian Genocide, or even the Ukrainian Holocaust, implying that the Holodomor was engineered by the Soviets to specifically target the Ukrainian people in order to destroy the Ukrainian nation as a political factor and social entity. While historians continue to disagree whether the policies that led to Holodomor fall under the legal definition of Genocide, numerous governments have officially recognized the Holodomor as such (see section Was the Holodomor genocide?).

The term Holodomor is derived from the Ukrainian expression moryty holodom (Морити голодом), which means "to inflict death by hunger". The fourth Saturday of November is the official day of commemoration of the Holodomor victims in Ukraine.

Causes and outcomes

While complex, it is possible to group the causes of the Holodomor. They have to be understood in the larger context of the social revolution 'from above' that took place in the Soviet Union at the time.

In the early 1920s, when the Soviet Union needed to win the sympathy of other nations for the newly born communist state, Ukraine enjoyed a short period of revival of its national culture under the policy of Ukrainization. This was, however, ended and replaced with a policy of effective Russification, as soon as the Soviet regime firmly took root, thereby causing significant social, cultural, and political conflict in the Ukrainian populated territories.

Simultaneously, a policy of collectivization of agriculture was introduced. Agriculture in Ukraine was affected more strongly by this than most other agricultural areas, as Ukraine has had a long tradition of individually owned farms, while most farms in Russia, for example, had been communal (not collective) property.

Unexpectedly, from the Bolshevik point of view, collectivization proved highly unpopular with the rural population. When collectivization was still voluntary, very few peasants joined collective farms. The regime therefore began to increasingly put pressure on peasants to join collective farms, and to speed up the process of collectivization, tens of thousands of officials were sent into the countryside in 1929–1930.

At the same time, the "Twenty-Five Thousanders", industrial workers, mostly devoted Bolsheviks, were sent to help run the farms. In addition, they were to fight the increasing passive and active resistance to collectivisation by engaging in what was euphemistically referred to as "dekulakization": the arresting of 'kulaks' — allegedly well to do farmers who opposed the regime and withheld grain — and forcibly deporting whole 'kulak' families to gulags and Siberia in general. In fact, most of the so-called 'kulaks' were no more well off than other peasants. Effectively, the term 'kulak' was applied to anybody resisting collectivization. It is documented that around 300,000 Ukrainians were subject to these policies in 1930-31.

Collectivization proved to negatively affect agricultural output everywhere, but since Ukraine was the most productive area (over 50% of Imperial Russian wheat originated from Ukraine in the beginning of 20th century), the effects here were particularly dramatic.

Despite the decrease in agricultural output, Soviet authorities soon drastically increased Ukraine's crop production quotas (by 44% in 1932). The targets were unrealistic and some historians believe that this was intentional. On August 7, 1932, the Moscow government passed a decree that would impose the death penalty in the USSR for any theft of public property . The scope of this law was very wide, and included even the smallest appropriation of grain by peasants for personal use.

Politburo protocols reveal that secret decisions had later modified the original decree. On September 16, 1932, the Politburo approved a measure that specificially exempted small-scale theft of socialist property from the death penalty. It declared that "organizations and groupings destroying state, social, and cooperate property in an organized way by fires, explosions and mass destruction of property shall be sentenced to execution without weakening", and listed a number of cases in which "kulaks, former traders and other socially-alien persons" should suffer the death penalty. So-called "kulaks", whether members of a kolkhoz or not, who "organize or take part in the theft of kolkhos property and grain", should also be sentenced "to the death penalty without weakening." But "working individual peasants and collective farmers" who stole kolkhoz property and grain should be sentenced to ten years; the death penalty should be imposed only for "systematic theft of grain, sugar beet, animals, etc"

Still, until October 25, Moscow received only 39% of the demanded grain supplies. When it became clear that the 1932 grain deliveries were not going to meet the expectations of the government, the decreased agricultural output was blamed on the "kulaks", "nationalists", and "Petluravites". According to a report of the head of the Supreme Court, by January, 15, 1933 as many as 103,000 people had been sentenced under the provisions of the August 7 decree. Of the 79,000 whose sentences were known to the Supreme Court, 4,880 had been sentenced to death, 26,086 to ten years' imprisonment and 48,094 to other sentences. Those sentenced to death were categorised primarily as kulaks; many of those sentenced to ten years were individual peasants who were not kulaks.

A special commission headed by Vyacheslav Molotov was sent to Ukraine in order to execute the grain contingent. On November 9, a secret decree urged Bolshevik police and repression forces to increase their "effectiveness". Molotov also ordered that if no grain remained in Ukrainian villages, all beets, potatoes, vegetables and any other food were to be confiscated.

On December 6, a new regulation was issued that imposed the following sanctions on Ukrainian villages: ban on supply of any goods or food to the villages, requisition of any food or grain found on site, ban of any trade, and, lastly, the confiscation of all financial resources. Measures were undertaken to persecute upon the withholding or bargaining of grain. This was done frequently with the aid of 'shock brigades', which raided farms to collect grain. This was done regardless of whether the peasants retained enough grain to feed themselves, or whether they had enough seed left to plant the next harvest. These, combined with the ban on travel and armed quarantines by the NKVD troops along the borders of Ukraine, turned the Ukrainian countryside into a gigantic death camp.

The famine mostly affected the rural population. In comparison to the previous famine in the USSR during 1921–22, which was caused by drought, and the next one in 1947, the famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine was caused not by infrastructure breakdown, or war, but by deliberate political and administrative decisions (e.g., see ).

The result was disastrous. Within a few months, the Ukrainian countryside, one of the most fertile agricultural regions in the world, was the scene of a general famine. The Soviet government denied initial reports of the famine, and prevented foreign journalists from traveling in the region. Some authors claim that "the Politburo and regional Party committees insisted that immediate and decisive action be taken in response to the famine such that 'conscientious farmers' not suffer, while district Party committees were instructed to supply every child with milk and decreed that those who failed to mobilize resources to feed the hungry or denied hospitalization to famine victims be prosecuted."

The reality was different according to thousands of eyewitness accounts. The masses of children fleeing the countryside were arrested by the Soviet authorities and were deported to "collectors" and orphanages, where they soon died of malnutrition. Here is a typical description:

"The government converted this building into a so-called "collector" for homeless children caught on the streets, and who, after sanitary inspection, were sent to orphanages. When leaving my home, I would often see how trucks would pull up there and the police would take out the filthy, bedraggled children who had been caught on the streets. A guard stood at the entrance and no one was permitted inside. During the winter of 1932-33, I often saw, five or six times, how in the early morning they took out of the building the bodies of half-naked children, covered them with filthy tarpaulins, and piled them onto trucks."

At the same time, however, the Soviet regime provided some aid to famine-stricken regions, arguably limiting the impact of the famine at least partially. Between February and July 1933 at least thirty-five Politburo decisions and Sovnarkom decrees authorised issue of a total of 320,000 tons of grain for food for 30 millions persons.

Grain exports during 1932-1933 continued, however, even though on a significantly lower level than in previous years. In 1930/31 there had been 5,832 thousand tons of grains exported. In 1931/32, grain exports declined to 4,786 thousand tons. In 1932/1933, grain exports were just 1,607 thousand tons and in 1933/34, this further declined to 1,441 thousand tons.

To further prevent the spread of information about the famine, travel from the Don, Ukraine, North Caucasus, and Kuban was forbidden by directives of January 22 1933 (signed by Molotov and Stalin) and of January 23 1933 (joint directive VKP(b) Central Committee and Sovnarkom). The directives stated that the travels "for bread" from these areas were organized by enemies of the Soviet power with the purpose of agitation in northern areas of the USSR against kolkhozes. Therefore railway tickets were to be sold only by ispolkom permits, and those who managed to travel northwards should be arrested. This travel ban aggravated the disaster.

Meanwhile, Stalin was also centralizing political power over Ukraine. In January 1933, in response to CP(b)U complaints about the disastrous effects of forced collectivization, Stalin sent Pavel Postyshev to Ukraine as Second Secretary in Ukraine, along with thousands of Russian officials. Postyshev purged Ukrainian officials who opposed collectivization or had supported Ukrainization in the 1920s, although some survived, including Stanislav Kosior and Vlas Chubar. He took control over the collectivization effort, and organized the confiscation of grain.

Seed grain stocks as a result of limited famine relief were low for the 1933 planting, but due to normalized climactic conditions for 1933, the 1932-33 harvest proved adequate to avoid famine.

In the spring of 1933, grain requisitions were stepped up even more, since the supply of grain to the cities had become precariously low. At the same time, grain exports continued as well, albeit at lower levels. Exports were seen as necessary by the Soviet government to provide hard currency for continued industrialization. The population responded to the situation with intense political resistance. However, this resistance never became organized on a wide scale owing to the scattered, low-density nature of the Ukrainian rural population. Furthermore, the Soviet authorities responded harshly to signs of dissent, often breaking up and deporting whole communities.

Estimation of the loss of life

While the course of the events as well as their underlying reasons are still a matter of debate, the fact that by the end of 1933, millions of people had starved to death or had otherwise died unnaturally in Russia and Ukraine is undisputed.

The Soviet Union long denied that the famine had ever existed, and the NKVD (and later KGB) archives on the Holodomor period were opening very slowly. The exact number of the victims remains unknown and probably impossible to find out even within an error of a hundred thousand.

The estimates vary as much as from 1.5 to 10 million. Even the results based on the scientific methods also vary widely but the range is somewhat more narrow, 2.5 million (Volodymyr Kubiyovych) and 4.8 million (Vasyl Hryshko). Modern calculation that use demographic data including those available from formerly closed Soviet archives narrow the losses to about 3.2 million or, allowing for the lack of the data precision, 3 to 3.5 million.

The following calculation is presented by Stanislav Kulchytsky. The official Soviet statistics show a decrease of 538 thousand people in the population of Soviet Ukraine between 1926 census (28,925,976) and 1937 census (28,388,000). The number of births and deaths (in thousands) according to the official records is:

According to the correction for officially non-accounted child mortality in 1933 by 150 thousand calculated by Serhiy Maksudov, the number of births for 1933 should be increased from 471 thousand to 621 thousand. Assuming the natural mortality rates in 1933 to be equal to the average annual mortality rate in 1927-1930 (524 thousand per year) a natural population growth for 1933 would have been 97 thousand, which is five times less than this number in the past years (1927-1930). From the corrected birth rate and the estimated natural death rate for 1933 as well as from the official data for other years the natural population growth from 1927 to 1936 gives 4,043 thousand while the census data showed a decrease of 538 thousand. The sum of the two numbers gives an estimated total demographic loss of 4,581 thousand people. A major hurdle in estimating the human losses due to Holodomor is the need to take into account the numbers involved in migration (including forced resettlement). According to the Soviet statistics, the migration balance for the population in Ukraine for 1927 - 1936 period was a loss of 1,343 thousand people. Even at the time when the data was taken, the Soviet statistical institutions acknowledged that its precision was worse than the data for the natural population change. Still, with the correction for this number, the total number of death in Ukraine due to unnatural causes for the given ten years was 3,238 thousand, and taking into account the lack of precision, especially of the migration estimate, the human toll is estimated between 3 million and 3.5 million.

In addition to the direct losses from unnatural deaths, the indirect losses due to the decrease of the birth rate should be taken into account in consideration in estimating of the demographic consequences of Holodomor. For instance, the natural population growth in 1927 was 662 thousand, while in 1933 it was 97 thousand, in 1934 it was 88 thousand. The combination of direct and indirect losses from Holodomor gives 4,469 thousand, of which 3,238 thousand (or more realistically 3 to 3.5 million) is the number of the direct deaths.

According to estimates about 81.3% of the victims were ethnic Ukrainians, 4.5% Russians, 1.4% Jews and 1.1% were Poles. Also many Belorussians, Hungarians, Volga Germans and Crim Tatars perished during the Holodomor. The rural Ukrainian rural population was the hardest hit by the Holodomor. Since the peasantry constituted demographically a backbone of the Ukrainian nation, the tragedy deeply affected the Ukrainians for many forthcoming years.

Elimination of Ukrainian cultural elite

The artificial famine of 1932-33 fit well into the politics of assault on Ukrainian national culture. The events of 1932-33 in Ukraine were seen by the Soviet Communist leaders as an instrument against possible Ukrainian self-determination. At the 12th Congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Moscow's plenipotentiary Postyshev declared that "1933 was the year of the defeat of Ukrainian nationalist counter-revolution." This "defeat" encompassed not just physical extermination of a significant portion of Ukrainian peasantry, but also virtual elimination of Ukrainian clergy and mass imprisonment or executions of Ukrainian intellectuals, writers and artists.

By the end of the 1930s, approximately four-fifths of the Ukrainian cultural elite had been "eliminated". Some, like Ukrainian writer Mykola Khvylovy, committed suicide. One of the leaders of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks, Mykola Skrypnyk, witnessing the results of his cooperation with Moscow, shot himself in the summer of 1933. The Communist Party of Ukraine, under the guidance of state officials like Kaganovich, Kosior, and Postyshev, boasted in early 1934 of the elimination of "counter-revolutionaries, nationalists, spies and class enemies". Whole academic organizations, such as the Bahaliy Institute of History and Culture, were shut down following the arrests.

In the 1920s, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church had gained a significant following amongst the Ukrainian peasants. Mass arrests of the hierarchy and clergy of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church culminated in the liquidation of the church in 1930. Thousands of priests were tortured, executed and sent to labor camps in Siberia and the Far North.

The Ukranian Communist Party also purged and executed many of its own members, mainly for failing to prevent the Ukranian revolt or speaking out against the famine.

Was the Holodomor genocide?

The inventor of the term "genocide", Raphael Lemkin was a featured speaker at the manifestation of Ukrainian-Americans in September 1953 to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the famine. Today, the heads of state, governments or parliaments of 26 countries recognized the 1932-1933 famine as an act of genocide. Among them Ukraine, Argentina, Australia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Canada, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, United States, and Vatican City. Still the Holodomor remains a politically charged topic not settled even within the mainstream scholarship.

Many historians agree that the famine of 1932–33 was artificial—that is a deliberate mass murder, if not genocide , committed as part of Joseph Stalin's collectivization program under the Soviet Union. Some historians maintain, however, that the famine was an unintentional consequence of collectivization, and that the associated resistance to it by the Ukrainian peasantry exacerbated an already-poor harvest. The researchers state that while the term Ukrainian Genocide is often used in application to the event, technically, the use of the term "genocide" is inapplicable. They argue that since the Holodomor did not affect cities, and was limited to rural areas of Ukraine, it is not plausible to argue that the government tried to destroy the Ukrainian people as such. It has been suggested that the Holodomor be classified not as genocide, but as democide.

In controversy, the term democide, introduced by R.J. Rummel is "the murder of any person or people by a government, including genocide, politicide, and mass murder". That the rural population (in 1932 75% to 85% of Ukrainians resided in villages) does not represent the whole nation, what terminology to use for the designation of an event that led to the extermination of roughly one quarter of the population of the former Soviet republic of the Ukraine in 1932-1933, as well as the dispute to what extent the Soviet government deliberately aggravated the famine are the arguments that are often used for confrontation and politicization of the tragedy.

Although the famine went outside Ukraine's borders into the Volga Basin and the Don and Kuban steppes of Russia, yet the full extensiveness of Stalin's intervention in crop seizure was seen only in Ukraine and Kuban - a region in Russia whose significant rural population was Kuban Cossacks - 18th century descendants from the Zaporozhian Host, and thus with potentially significant Ukrainian lineage.

According to the US Government Commission on the Ukrainian Famine () which investigated over 200 witnesses as well as documented data, the Holodomor was caused by the seizure of the 1932 crop by the Soviet authorities. The commission testified that "while famine took place during the 1932-1933 agricultural year in the Volga Basin and the North Caucasus Territory as a whole, the invasiveness of Stalin's interventions of both the Fall of 1932 and January 1933 in Ukraine are paralleled only in the ethnically Ukrainian Kuban region of the North Caucasus" (also , ). This was also confirmed by foreign observers in 1933.

On May 15, 2003, the Verkhovna Rada (parliament) of Ukraine passed a resolution declaring the famine of 1932–1933 an act of genocide, deliberately organized by the Soviet government against the Ukrainian nation.

Heads of state, governments and parliaments of other countries such as Argentina , Australia , Azerbaijan , Belgium , Canada ,Estonia , Georgia , Hungary , Italy , Latvia , Lithuania , Moldova , Poland , United States and the Vatican have also officially recognized the Holodomor as an act of genocide .

Politicization of the famine

The famine remains a politically charged topic and hence heated debates are likely to continue for a long time. Until around 1990, the debates largely were between Marxists who either stated that it was unintentional and scholars who accepted reports of famine but stated that it was intentional and those Ukrainian nationalists who allege that it was intentional and specifically anti-Ukrainian. Most scholars today see the famine as a policy blunder that affected millions belonging to other nationalities.

Nowadays, the serious debate is restricted mainly to whether the Holodomor qualifies as the act of Genocide since either Famine itself or that it was unnatural is not disputed. The debate is still ongoing wheather the natural reasons, weather or post-traumatic stress, played any role at all and in what degree the Soviet actions were caused by the country's economic and military needs as viewed by the Soviet leadership.

Nowadays, the Holodomor issue is politicized within the framework of uneasy relations between Russia and Ukraine (and also between various regional and social groups within Ukraine). The anti-Russian factions in Ukraine have vested interest in advancing the interpretation that the Holodomor was a genocide, perpertrated by Russia-centric interests within the Soviet government. Russian political interests and their supporters in Ukraine have reasons to deny the deliberate character of the disaster and play down its scale.

The Ukrainian communities are sometimes criticized for using the term Holodomor, or sometimes Ukrainian Genocide, or even Ukrainian Holocaust, to appropriate the larger-scale tragedy of collectivization as their own national terror-famine, thus exploiting it for political purposes.

One of the biggest arguments is that the famine was preceded by the onslaught on the Ukrainian national culture, a common historical detail preceding all known mass killings. Nationwide, the political repressions of 1937 under the guidance of Nikolay Yezhov were known for their ferocity and ruthlessness, but Lev Kopelev wrote, "In Ukraine 1937 began in 1933", referring to the comparatively early beginning of the Soviet crackdown in Ukraine. .

While the famine was well documented at the time, its reality has been disputed due to the ideological reasons, such as by the Soviet government and its spokespeople (as well as apologists of the Soviet regime), by others due to being deliberately misled by the Soviet government (such as George Bernard Shaw), and in at least one case, Walter Duranty, for personal gain.

An example of a late-era Holodomor objector is Canadian journalist Douglas Tottle, author of Fraud, Famine and Fascism: The Ukrainian Genocide Myth from Hitler to Harvard (1987). Tottle claims that while there were severe economic hardships in Ukraine, the idea of the Holodomor was fabricated as propaganda by Nazi Germany and William Randolph Hearst, to justify a German invasion. Tottle is not a professional historian and his revisionist work did not receive any serious attention in the historiography of the subject.

Remembrance

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To honor those who perished in the Holodomor, monuments have been dedicated and public events held annually in Ukraine and worldwide. In Ukraine, the fourth Saturday in November is the official day of remembrace for victims of Holodomor and repressions.

See also

• Famines in Russia and USSR
• Law of Spikelets
• Russian famine of 1921
• Walter Duranty
• Robert Conquest

Notes

1. Potocki, p. 320.
2. ibid, p. 321.
3. Serczyk, p. 311.
4. E.g. Encyclopedia Britannica, "History of Ukraine" article.
5. Rajca, p. 77.
6. Davies, Wheatcroft, pp. 424-5
7. Tauger 1991 and the acrimonious exchange between Tauger and Conquest .

References

1. Stephen Wheatcroft and R.W Davies, The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931-1933, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004,
2. Russia: A History, edited by Gregory Freeze
3. ^ Yaroslav Bilinsky (1999). "Was the Ukrainian Famine of 1932-1933 Genocide?". Journal of Genocide Research. 1 (2): 147–156.
4. Stephen Wheatcroft and R.W Davies, The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931-1933, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p.490
5. Stephen Wheatcroft and R.W Davies, The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931-1933, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, pp.167-168, 198-203
6. Stephen Wheatcroft and R.W Davies, The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931-1933, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p.198.
7. Stephen Wheatcroft and R.W Davies, The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931-1933, Palgrave Macmillian, pg.214
8. Stephen Wheatcroft and R.W Davies, The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931-1933, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p.471
9. Valeriy Soldatenko, "A starved 1933: subjectove thoughts on objective processes", Zerkalo Nedeli, June 28 - July 4, 2003. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian
10. Stephen Wheatcroft, R.W Davies in The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931-1933 cite that the demographic data from Russia's archives show that in Ukraine there were 1.54 million excess deaths in the course of 1932-1933 (pp.415).
11. For instance the speech of Stepan Khmara in Ukrainian parliament, sited by Kulchytsky
12. ^ Stanislav Kulchytsky, "How many of us perished in Holodomor in 1933", Zerkalo Nedeli, November 23-29, 2002. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian
13. Stalislav Kulchytsky, "Reasons of the 1933 famine in Ukraine. Through the pages of one almost forgotten book" Zerkalo Nedeli, August 16-22, 2003. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian.
14. Stanislav Kulchytsky, "Reasons of the 1933 famine in Ukraine-2", Zerkalo Nedeli, October 4-10, 2003. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian
15. Stalislav Kuchytsky, "Demographic lossed in Ukrainian in the twentieth century", Zerkalo Nedeli, October 2-8, 2004. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian.
16. ^ "I am not saying that the famine or the other components of the victimization narratives do not deserve historical research and reflection, nor that evil should be ignored, nor that the memory of the dead should not be held sacred. But I object to instrumentalizing this memory with the aim of generating political and moral capital, particularly when it is linked to an exclusion from historical research and reflection of events in which Ukrainians figured as perpetrators not victims, and when “our own” evil is kept invisible and the memory of the others’ dead is not held sacred." Himka, John-Paul. "War Criminality: A Blank Spot in the Collective Memory of the Ukrainian Diaspora". Spaces of Identity. 5 (1): 5–24. {{cite journal}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help); line feed character in |title= at position 62 (help)
17. J.Arch Getty, "The Future Did Not Work", The Atlantic Monthly, Boston: March 2000, Vol. 285, Iss.3, pg.113
18. Bradley, Lara. "Ukraine's 'Forced Famine' Officially Recognized. The Sundbury Star. 3 January 1999. URL Accessed 12 October 2006

1. US House of Representatives Authorizes Construction of Ukrainian Genocide Monument
2. Statement by Pope John Paul II on the 70th anniversary of the Famine
3. HR356 "Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the man-made famine that occurred in Ukraine in 1932-1933", U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., October 21, 2003
4. U.S. Congress Library Exhibit on Ukrainian Famine, "Resolution Of The Council Of People's Commissars Of The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic And Of The Central Committee Of The Communist Party (Bolshevik) Of Ukraine On Blacklisting Villages That Maliciously Sabotage The Collection Of Grain", December 6, 1932.
5. Dana G. Dalrymple, "The Soviet famine of 1932-1934" in Soviet Studies, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Jan., 1964). Pages 250-284.
6. Robert Conquest, "The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine" (Chapter 16: "The Death Roll" ), University of Alberta Press, 1986.
7. Template:En icon Mark B. Tauger, "The 1932 Harvest and the Famine of 1933" in Slavic Review 50 No 1, Spring 1991, pp. 70-89
8. Template:En icon Letters of Mark Tauger and Robert Conquest in Slavic Review 51 No 1, pp. 192-4
9. Template:En icon Letters of Mark Tauger and Robert Conquest in Slavic Review 53 No 1, pp. 318-9
10. Template:En icon David Marples, "Debating the undebatable? Ukraine Famine of 1932-1933" in Edmonton Journal, June 28, 2002.
11. Robert Potocki, "Polityka państwa polskiego wobec zagadnienia ukraińskiego w latach 1930-1939" (in Polish, English summary), Lublin 2003, ISBN 83-917615-4-1
12. Template:Pl icon Władysław A. Serczyk, "Historia Ukrainy", 3rd ed., Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław 2001, ISBN 83-04-04530-3
13. Andrew Gregorovich, "Genocide in Ukraine 1933", part 4: "How Did Stalin Organize the Genocide?" , Ukrainian Canadian Research & Documentation Centre, Toronto 1998.
14. U.S. Commission on the Ukraine Famine, "Findings of the Commission on the Ukraine Famine" , Report to Congress, Washington, D.C., April 19 1988
15. Dr. Otto Schiller, "Famine's Return to Russia, Death and Depopulation in Wide Areas of the Grain Country" , The Daily Telegraph, 25 August, 1933, as well as British Diplomatic Reports on the Ukrainian Famine.
16. "12th Congress of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine, Stenograph Record", Kharkiv 1934.
17. Miron Dolot, "Execution by Hunger. A Hidden Holocaust", New York 1985, ISBN 0-393-01886-5
18. Sergei Maksudov, "Losses Suffered by the Population of the USSR 1918–1958", in The Samizdat Register II, ed R. Medvedev (London–New York 1981)
19. R.W. Davies & Stephen G. Wheatcroft, "The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture 1931-33", Palgrave 2004.
20. Subtelny, Orest (1988). Ukraine: A History. Toronto: University of Toronto Press,. ISBN 0-8020-5809-6.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link)
21. Czesław Rajca, "Głód na Ukrainie", Werset, Lublin/Toronto 2005, ISBN 83-60133-04-2
22. James Mace, "The Man-Made Famine of 1933 in Soviet Ukraine" in "Famine in Ukraine 1932-1933", p. 1-14, Edmonton 1986
23. Ярослав Грицак (Jarosław Hrycak), "Historia Ukrainy 1772-1999. Narodziny nowoczesnego narodu", Lublin 2000, ISBN 83-85854-50-9, available online in Ukrainian language
24. Yuri Shapoval, "The famine-genocide of 1932-1933 in Ukraine", Kashtan Press, Ontario 2005, ISBN 1-896354-38-6 (a collection of source documents)

External links

Declarations and legal acts

• Findings of the Commission on the Ukraine Famine, U.S. Commission on the Ukraine Famine, Report to Congress. Adopted by the Commission, April 19 1988
• Joint declaration at the United Nations in connection with 70th anniversary of the Great Famine in Ukraine 1932-1933
• Address of the Verkhovna Rada to the Ukrainian nation on commemorating the victims of Holodomor 1932-1933 (in Ukrainian)

Books

• Robert Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine (1986)
• Douglas Tottle, Fraud, Famine, and Fascism: The Ukrainian Genocide Myth from Hitler to Harvard (1987)

External links

• Template:Uk icon Template:Ru icon "The Harvest of Sorrow". Retrieved 2006-07-05. by Robert Conquest.
• "US House of Representatives Authorizes Construction of Ukrainian Genocide Monument". Retrieved 2006-07-05.
• "Statement by Pope John Paul II on the 70th anniversary of the Famine". Retrieved 2006-07-05.
• HR356 "Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the man-made famine that occurred in Ukraine in 1932-1933". Retrieved 2006-07-05. {{cite web}}: Check |url= value (help) U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., October 21, 2003
• "Gareth Jones' international exposure of the Holodomor, plus many related background articles". Retrieved 2006-07-05.
• Template:Uk icon Famine in Ukraine 1932–1933 at the Central State Archive of Ukraine (photos, links)
• Template:Uk icon Lessons of History. Holodomor 1932-33
• 1932-34 Great Famine: documented view by Dr. Dana Dalrymple
• The Holodomor Memorial Website
• Testimony by Robert Conquest to the U.S. Commission on the Ukraine Famine
• Famine Genocide Commemorative Committee Ukrainian Canadian Congress, Toronto Branch
• Template:Uk icon/Template:Hu icon Collection of analytical articles and photos
• video recording of Valery Kuchinsky, the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations, addressing General Assembly at its plenary meeting on 1 November 2005 (the recording is of the whole session, Kuchinsky's address starts at 27 min)
• Carynnyk, Marco (1983). "The New York Times and the Great Famine". Ukraine Weekly. LI (37). {{cite journal}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
• Klid, Bohdan (2003). "Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies publicizes new research on Famine". Ukraine Weekly. LXXI (52). {{cite journal}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help) A summary of Yuri Shapoval's lecture, 2003
• Yaroslav Bilinsky (1999). "Was the Ukrainian Famine of 1932-1933 Genocide?". Journal of Genocide Research. 1 (2): 147–156.
• Web site of Mark Tauger, author of several of the references listed above

• Stanislav Kulchytsky, Italian Research on the Holodomor, October 2005.
• Template:En icon Stanislav Kulchytsky, "Why did Stalin exterminate the Ukrainians? Comprehending the Holodomor. The position of Soviet historians" - Six part series from Den: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6; Kulchytsky on Holodomor 1-6
• Template:Ru icon/Template:Uk icon Valeriy Soldatenko, "A starved 1933: subjectove thoughts on objective processes", Zerkalo Nedeli, June 28 - July 4, 2003. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian.
• Template:Ru icon/Template:Uk icon Stanislav Kulchytsky's articles in Zerkalo Nedeli, Kiev, Ukraine"
  • "How many of us perish in Holodomor on 1933", November 23-29, 2002. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian.
  • "Reasons of the 1933 famine in Ukraine. Through the pages of one almost forgotten book" Augist 16-22, 2003. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian.
  • "Reasons of the 1933 famine in Ukraine-2", October 4-10, 2003. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian.
  • "Demographic lossed in Ukrainian in the twentieth century", October 2-8, 2004. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian.

Template:Link FA

• Democides
• Famines
• History of the Soviet Union and Soviet Russia
• History of Ukraine
• Soviet repressions