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Template:Campaignbox Napoleon's invasion of Russia

The Battle of Borodino (Template:Lang-ru, Template:Lang-fr) (September 7, 1812, or August 26 in the Julian calendar then used in Russia), was the largest and bloodiest single-day battle of the Napoleonic Wars, involving more than a quarter of a million soldiers.

It was fought by the French Grande Armée under Napoleon I of France and the Russian army of Alexander I near the village of Borodino, west from the town of Mozhaysk. The battle ended with inconclusive tactical results for both armies, and only strategic considerations forced the Russians to withdraw. The clash at Borodino was a pivotal point in the campaign as it was the last offensive battle fought by Napoleon. His conduct during the battle suggests that his tactical decisions were marred by his efforts to avoid a "Pyrrhic victory". He was also suffering from a fever at the time, which may explain his uncharacteristic detachment from the battle as well as his unusually simplistic battle plan.

Background

The French Grande Armée had begun the invasion of Russia in June, 1812. Alexander I proclaimed a Patriotic War in defence of the fatherland. The Russian forces — previously massing on the Polish frontier — fell back before the invaders in the face of the speedy French advance (see main article on the invasion). Count Michael Barclay de Tolly was commander-in-chief of the Russian army. His attempts at forming a defensive line were thwarted time and again by the fast moving French line, but Barclay's constant retreat was nevertheless perceived as an unwillingness to fight, and he was removed. The new Russian commander, Prince Mikhail Kutuzov, although much more fierce in his rhetoric, was also unable to establish a defensive position until within 125 kilometers of Moscow. Kutuzov picked an eminently defensible area near the village of Borodino and from September 3 strengthened it with earthworks, notably the Rayevski Redoubt in the center-right of the line and three open arrow-shaped 'Bagration fleches' to the left.

The opposing armies

Earlier estimates placed the size of Kutuzov's army at 112,000, but this figure later grew to 125,000. Most recently, however, historians believe the true figure was much higher — in fact somewhere between 154,800 and 157,000. The reason for the disparity between the original figures and the modern ones is the presence of 30,000 Russian militia or opolcheniye as well as around 10,000 irregular Cossacks. Most of these never took part in the combat operations and so are discounted. However if this is to be done, then all 25,000 men of the French Imperial Guard should also be discounted as they never fired a shot all day (Napoleon kept them in reserve as he awaited raids by Russian light cavalry). Either way the Russians had a numerical advantage (there were approximately 125,000 - 130,000 French and allied soldiers). Furthermore their fortified position and their artillery superiority — 640 pieces to 584 — further accentuated this advantage. All in all Kutuzov can be praised for setting himself up very effectively prior to the battle.

The Battle

When Napoleon was faced with the Russian defences his usual tactical skill appears to have left him, although regular bouts with illness since entering Russia, might be to blame for this lack of genius. He ordered a frontal assault straight at the Russians. It is believed he was seeking a decisive encounter that would destroy the Russian army in one day. The initial French attack was successful if costly; the King of Naples, Joachim Murat, directed a joint cavalry and infantry attack that by early afternoon had broken through the Russian line and seized the Rayevski Redoubt, lost it and retaken it. But the Russians committed their reserves and the battle ground down into a bloody attritional mess. Even with the Russians nearly at breaking point, Napoleon would not commit to sending in the French Imperial Guard, fearing a battle possible the next day. A Russian counter-attack was broken by artillery; and as night fell, both sides disengaged. At night, after discussing with his officers, Kutozov decided not to resume battle the next day and retreat, allowing the French to take Moscow. He had doubts that the Russian army could withstand another day of battle, and thought it was more important to preserve its strength rather than try to save Moscow at all cost. In retrospect, it was a wise decision.

Statistical discussion

Casualty estimates vary dramatically. The French are said to have suffered 28,000 dead and wounded including 48 generals, according to historian Adam Zamoyski. Others put the figure as high as 50,000 (Stephen Pope). The Russians lost between 38,500 - 58,000 (45,000 is the generally accepted number). Some believe that combined casualties were as high as 125,000, but this is unlikely. The lowest casualty estimates (28,000 French and 38,500 Russians) together give a combined total of 66,500. Even using the lowest casualty figures, the battle of Borodino is the bloodiest single day battle in human history, surpassing the First Day on the Somme during World War I and the Battle of Cannae during the Second Punic War. Though other battles may have ended with a higher number of casualties, none surpassed Borodino in only a single day.

Around 8,500 casualties were sustained each hour of the conflict— the equivalent of a full-strength company wiped out every minute. In some divisions casualties exceeded 80% of the strength prior to the battle.

If between 1/5 to 1/3 of casualties were killed, it seems likely that between 12,000 and 25,000 soldiers died at Borodino. The battle was the bloodiest single day of the Napoleonic Wars and also the bloodiest in modern times, not even exceeded by the First Day on the Somme in 1916 or any of the three days of the Third Battle of Nanking in 1864.

Adam Zamoyski, in his in depth account of the Russian campaign, estimates that 1,400,000 rounds were discharged by the French infantry and a further 60,000 to 91,000 by the artillery. This averages as 2,300 rounds of musketry per minute from the French.

The cavalry assault on the Russian redoubt was not made by the French army, but led by Major Friedrich Wilhelm Carl Luffleholtz von Colberg, in command of the Saxon Heavy Cavalry, and by Oberstleutnant Christian Günther von Selmitz, leading the Zastrow Cuirassiers.

Aftermath

The Russian retreat opened the way for the French to seize Moscow on September 14 1812, but the capture of the city would prove to be a Pyrrhic victory for the French.

The battle was famously described by Leo Tolstoy in his novel War and Peace as "a continuous slaughter which could be of no avail either to the French or the Russians". A huge panorama representing the battle was painted by Franz Roubaud for the centenary of Borodino and installed on the Poklonnaya Hill to mark the 150th anniversary of the event.

References

• Chandler, David. Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars (Wordsworth editions Ltd., 1999).

• Markham, David. Napoleon for Dummies (Wiley Pub Inc., 2005).

Footnotes

1. ^ Markham, David. Napoleon for Dummies, Wiley Pub Inc., 2005. pgs. 193-49.

External links

• A very detailed description of the battle
• The Battle of Borodino, situation at 12.30 p.m.: Classic battlefield panorama by Franz A. Roubaud (1912) with explanations
• BORODINO: Eight Attacks on Bagration Fleches
• The Virtual Battle of Borodino

• 1812
• Battles of the Napoleonic Wars
• Battles of Russia
• Moscow Oblast
• Battles of France
• History of France