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Throughout World War II Poland was a member of the Allied coalition. During the German occupation of Poland, some Polish citizens of diverse ethnicities collaborated with the occupation authorities. Estimates of the number of collaborators vary from several thousand to about a million. The main collaborators were members of Poland's German minority. During and after the war, the Polish State and resistance movement executed collaborators.

Background

Following the German occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, Hitler sought to establish Poland as a client state, proposing a multilateral territorial exchange and an extension of the German–Polish Non-Aggression Pact. The Polish government, fearing subjugation to Nazi Germany, instead chose to form an alliance with Britain (and later with France). In response, Germany withdrew from the non-aggression pact and, shortly before invading Poland, signed the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact with Soviet Union, safeguarding Germany against retaliation if it invaded Poland, and prospectively dividing Poland between the two powers.

On 1 September 1939 Germany invaded Poland. It quickly overran the Polish defenses while inflicting heavy civilian losses, and by September 13th had conquered most of western Poland. On 17 September the Soviet Union invaded, conquering most of eastern Poland, along with the Baltic states and parts of Finland. Some 140,000 Polish soldiers and airmen escaped to Romania and Hungary, many soon joining the Polish Armed Forces in France. Poland's government did not surrender, and instead crossing over to Romania and forming a government-in-exile.

Germany annexed the westernmost parts of Poland and the former Free City of Danzig, and placed the remaining German-occupied territory under the administration of the newly formed General Government. The Soviet Union annexed the rest of Poland, incorporating its territories into the Belorussian and Ukrainian republics. Germany’s primary aim in Eastern Europe was the expansion of the German "lebensraum" ("living space"), which necessitated according to Nazi views the elimination or deportation of all non-Germanic ethnicities, including the Poles; the areas controlled by the General Government were to become "free" of Poles within 15–20 years. This resulted in harsh policies targeting the Polish population, in addition to the explicit goal of exterminating the Jewish people, which was carried out by Nazi Germany in the occupied Polish territories.

Individual collaboration

Estimates regarding the number of Polish collaborators vary from several thousand to about a million, depending on the definition of "collaboration".The main active group of Poland's citizens collaborating with Nazi Germany were members of German minority in Poland, which before the war numbered approximately 741,000 people.

Historian Leszek Gondek estimates the number of Polish collaborators at about 17,000, relying on the number of death sentences for treason issued by Special Courts of the Polish Underground State, and describes the phenomena as "marginal", and Connelly writes that "only a relatively small percentage of the Polish population engaged in activities that may be described as collaboration, when seen against the backdrop of European and world history." According to Gondek the courts heard at least 5,000 collaboration cases and sentenced 3,500, or according to Madajczyk over 10,000 people to death for collaboration offenses.

Prewar Poland had a population of some 35 million, including over 3 million Polish Jews. Postwar statistics of the Israeli War Crimes Commission gave the number of Polish collaborators as about 7,000.

The higher collaborator estimates include workers in labor camps (Baudienst), low-ranking Polish bureaucrats, the Polish Blue Police, Poland's prewar German minority and former Polish citizens who declared themselves of German ethnicity (Volksdeutsche), and even all of Poland's peasants, whose produce fed the German military and administration. Polish labor-camp workers were sometimes used in rounding up Jews for transportation to ghettos, or to dig graves for massacre victims; evasion of such service was punishable by death, and the individual's family could suffer reprisals. Varying interpretations of what constitutes collaboration account for the broad range of estimates of Poles' collaboration with the Germans in World War II.

Ethnographic groups

The Germans also singled out, as potential collaborators, two ethnographic groups in Poland which had some limited separatist interests. The scheme was directed at the Kashubians in the north and the Gorals in the south. The German attempt to reach out to the Kashubians proved a "complete failure", but in the south the Germans met with limited success, and Katarzyna Szurmiak has called the resulting Goralenvolk movement "the most extensive case of collaboration in Poland during the Second World War." Still, Szurmiak writes, "when talking about numbers, the attempt to create Goralenvolk was a failure... a mere 18 percent of the population took up Goralian IDs... Goralian schools consistently boycotted, and... attempts to create Goralian police or a Goralian Waffen-SS Legion... failed miserably."

Political collaboration

In Poland

Unlike in most of occupied Europe, Poland did not have a collaborationist government. The Germans made several early attempts at acquiring senior Polish political collaborators, targeting mainly peasantry leaders and nobility, but were turned down. These attempts, fueled in part by the military's approach towards the occupation, as well as by diplomatic and propagandaistic needs, ended by October 1939. Nazi racial policies, along with its [[intentions for the future of the conquered territories, meant the Germans had no interest in Polish governmental collaboration, and they ignored such advances by Polish pro-German politicians throughout the war. Accordingly, the German army made preparations for a military administration of the occupied territories, while civil authorities were working towards a civilian one, with the prospects of a future annexation to Germany.

Abroad

During the Fall of France, French government suggested to Polish politicians in France to negotiate a deal with Germany, and Stanislaw Cat Mackiewicz in Paris tried to convince Polish President Wladyslaw Raczkiewicz to negotiate with Germans as France was falling and it seemed German victory was inevitable. Three days later both Polish Government and Polish national council rejected discussing capitulation and declared that they will fight till full victory over Nazi Germany. A group of eight lower rank Polish politicians and officers breaking off from Polish government addressed a memorandum to Nazi Germany in Lisbon asking for discussion about restoring Polish state under German occupation, the memorandum was rejected. According to Czeslaw Madajczyk, the low profile of the individuals involved and rejection of the memorandum by Berlin means there can be no discussion about it being a politicall collaboration, as none took place..

Security forces

In October 1939 the Nazi authorities ordered mobilization of the pre-war Polish police to the service of the German occupation, thus creating the "Blue Police". The policemen were to report for duty by 10 November 1939 or face death. At its peak in May 1944, the Blue Police numbered some 17,000 men. Their primary task was to act as a regular police force and deal with criminal activities, but they were also used by the Germans in combating smuggling and resistance, in roundups of random civilians (łapanka), in patrolling for Jewish escapees from ghettos, and in support of some military operations against the Polish resistance.

The German General Government also tried to create additional Polish auxiliary police—Schutzmannschaft Battalion 202 in 1942 and Schutzmannschaft Battalion 107 in 1943. Very few people volunteered and the Germans were forced to forcefully conscript them to fill up the ranks. Subsequently, most of the men deserted, and the two units were disbanded. Schutzmannschaft Battalion 107 mutinied against its German officers, disarmed them, and joined the Home Army resistance.

In 1944 the General Government tried to recruit 12,000 Polish volunteers to "join the fight against Bolshevism". The campaign failed: only 699 men were recruited, 209 of whom either deserted or were disqualified for health reasons.

Poles in the Wehrmacht

Following the German invasion of Poland in 1939, many former citizens of the Second Polish Republic from across the Polish territories annexed by Nazi Germany were forcibly conscripted into the Wehrmacht in Upper Silesia and in Pomerania. They were declared citizens of the Third Reich by law and therefore subject to drumhead court-martial in case of draft evasion. Professor Ryszard Kaczmarek of the University of Silesia in Katowice, author of a monograph, Polacy w Wehrmachcie ("Poles in the Wehrmacht"), noted that the scale of this phenomenon was much larger than previously assumed, because 90% of the inhabitants of these two westernmost regions of prewar Poland were ordered to register on the German People's List (Volksliste), regardless of their wishes. The exact number of these conscripts is not known; no data exist beyond 1943.

In June 1946 the British Secretary of State for War reported to Parliament that, of the pre-war Polish citizens who had involuntarily signed the Volksliste and subsequently served in the German Wehrmacht, 68,693 men were captured or surrendered to the Allies in northwest Europe. The overwhelming majority, 53,630, subsequently enlisted in the Polish Army in the West and fought against Germany to the end of World War II.

Collaboration and resistance

The main Polish resistance organization was the Home Army (Armia Krajowa, or AK), numbering some 400,000 Poles, including Polish Jews. It actively fought the Germans. In one instance however, in 1944, the Germans clandestinely armed a few AK units operating in the Wilno area in the hope that they would act against local Soviet partisans; soon, during Operation Ostra Brama, the AK turned these weapons against the Germans. Such arrangements were purely tactical and did not evince the kind of ideological collaboration shown by France's Vichy regime or Norway's Quisling regime. The Poles' main motive was to gain intelligence on German morale and preparedness and to acquire much-needed equipment. Further, most such collaboration by local commanders with the Germans was condemned by AK headquarters. There were no known joint German-AK operations, and the Germans were unsuccessful in getting the Poles to fight exclusively the Soviet partisans. Tadeusz Piotrowski quotes Joseph Rothschild as saying that "The Polish Home Army was, by and large, untainted by collaboration" and adds that "the honor of the AK as a whole beyond reproach."

A single partisan unit of the Polish right-wing National Armed Forces (Narodowe Siły Zbrojne, or NSZ), the Holy Cross Mountains Brigade, numbering between 800 and 1,500 soldiers, decided to tacitly cooperate with the Germans in late 1944. It ceased hostile operations against the Germans for a few months, accepted logistical help, and—late in the war, with German approval, to avoid capture by the Soviets—withdrew from Poland into Czechoslovakia. Once there, the unit resumed hostilities against the Germans and on 5 May 1945 liberated the Holýšov concentration camp. The brigade did not accept Jews into its ranks, and on occasion killed or gave up Jewish partisans to the Germans.

The AK at large did not view Jews as part of the Polish nation, and so did not feel obliged to protecting them, and in some cases “actively engaged in hunting down and murdering Jews”. In some areas AK units posed a greater risk to Jewish partisans than the occupation forces.

During and after the war, the Polish State and resistance movement executed collaborators.

Jewish Holocaust

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While some Poles helped the Jews escape from German, many were passive, and a few actively helped Germans to hunt for Jews in hiding. According to historian Gunnar S. Paulsson, in occupied Warsaw (a city of 1.3 million, including 350,000 Jews before the war), some 3,000 to 4,000 Poles acted as blackmailers (szmalcownik), exploiting Jews and their Polish rescuers, or denouncing both to the Germans. On the other hand, in Warsaw alone the Żegota organization saved some 20,000 Jews from certain death, and scores of individual rescuers across the city also helped Jews survive. About 2,000 Poles who paid with their lives for saving Jews are known by their full names to Warsaw's Jewish Historical Institute and to Poland's Institute of National Memory.

According to historian Jan Grabowski in his 2013 book "Hunt for the Jews", 200,000 Jews "were killed directly or indirectly by the Poles". The book was awarded the 2014 Yad Vashem International Book Prize. However, the book sparked a controversy in Poland and the estimate has been criticized, notably by fellow historians and by the Polish League Against Defamation. In response, the Polish Center for Holocaust Research and a large group of international Holocaust scholars published statements in defense of Grabowski.

According to historian Gunnar S. Paulsson, in Warsaw alone some 3,000 to 4,000 Poles acted as blackmailers (szmalcownik), exploiting Jews and their Polish rescuers, or denouncing both to the Germans.

Historian John Connelly writes that the vast majority of ethnic Poles showed indifference to the fate of the Jews; and that "Polish historiography has hesitated to view as collaboration." On the other hand, Klaus-Peter Friedrich writes that "most adopted a policy of wait-and-see.... In the eyes of the Jewish population, almost inevitably had to appear as silent approval of the occupier's actions."

Collaboration by ethnic minorities

Germans used the divide and rule method to create tensions within the Polish society, by targeting several non-Polish ethnic groups for preferential treatment or the opposite, in the case of the Jewish minority.

Ethnic Germans

During the invasion of Poland in September 1939, members of the ethnic German minority in Poland assisted Nazi Germany in its war effort. They committed sabotage, diverted regular forces and committed numerous atrocities against civilian population.

Shortly after the German invasion of Poland, an armed ethnic-German militia, the Selbstschutz, was formed, numbering 100,000 members. It organized the Operation Tannenberg mass murder of Polish elites. At the beginning of 1940, the Selbstschutz was disbanded, and its members transferred to various units of SS, Gestapo, and German police. The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle organized large-scale looting of property, and redistributed goods to Volksdeutsche. They were given apartments, workshops, farms, furniture, and clothing confiscated from Jewish Poles and ethnic Poles.

During the German occupation of Poland, Nazi authorities established the German People's List (Deutsche Volksliste, DVL), whereby former Polish citizens of German ethnicity were registered as Volksdeutsche. The German authorities encouraged registration of ethnic Germans, and in many cases made it mandatory. Those who joined were given benefits, including better food and better social status. However, Volksdeutsche were required to perform military service for the Third Reich, and hundreds of thousands joined the German military, either willingly or under compulsion. People who became Volksdeutsche were treated by Poles with special contempt, and their having signed the Volksliste constituted high treason according to Polish underground law.

Ukrainians and Belorussians

Before the war, the Second Polish Republic had a significant population of Ukrainian and Belorussian minorities living in the eastern Kresy region of the country. After the Soviet invasion of Poland on 17 September 1939, those territories were annexed by the USSR. Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, the German authorities recruited Ukrainians and Belorussians who were former citizens of Poland (prior to September 1939) for service in the Waffen-SS, and auxiliary police units. In District Galicia, the SS Division Galicia and Ukrainian Auxiliary Police made up of ethnic Ukrainian volunteers took part in the widespread massacres and persecution of Poles and Jews.

Polish Jews

During the September 1939 invasion of Poland, Jews in some areas welcomed German Wehrmacht soldiers, presenting them with traditional gifts of bread and salt, and setting up triumphal arches in Łódź and Pabianice.

The Judenrat (Jewish council) was a Jewish-run governing body set up by the Germans in every ghetto and Jewish community across occupied Poland. The Judenrat functioned as a self-enforcing intermediary that was used by the Germans to control a ghetto's or Jewish community's inhabitants and to manage the ghetto's administration. A Judenrat collected information on the Jewish population and supervised the volunteer Jewish Ghetto Police (Jüdischer Ordnungsdienst) in helping the Germans collect Jews and load them onto transport trains bound for concentration camps. In some cases, Judenrat members exploited their positions to engage in bribery and other abuses. In the Łódź Ghetto, the reign of Judenrat head Chaim Rumkowski was particularly inhumane, as he was known to get rid of his political opponents by submitting their names for deportation to concentration camps, hoard food rations, and sexually abuse girls. Political theorist Hannah Arendt stated that without the assistance of the Judenrat, the Germans would have encountered considerable difficulties in drawing up detailed lists of the Jewish population, thus allowing for at least some Jews to avoid deportation.

The Jewish Ghetto Police were recruited from among Jews living in the ghettos who could be relied on to follow German orders. They have issued batons, official armbands, caps, and badges and were responsible for public order in the ghetto; they were used by the Germans for securing the deportation of other Jews to concentration camps. The numbers of Jewish police varied greatly depending on the location, with the Warsaw Ghetto numbering about 2,500, Łódź Ghetto 1,200 and smaller ghettos such as that at Lwów about 500. The Jewish ghetto police distinguished themselves by their shocking corruption and immorality. Historian and Warsaw Ghetto archivist Emanuel Ringelblum described the cruelty of the ghetto police as "at times greater than that of the Germans."

Some Polish Jews, belonging to the collaborationist groups Żagiew and "Group 13", also known as Jewish Gestapo, inflicted considerable damage on both the Jewish and Polish underground movements. Over a thousand these Jewish Nazi collaborators, some armed, served the German Gestapo as informers on Polish resistance efforts to hide Jews, and engaged in racketeering, blackmail, and extortion in the Warsaw Ghetto. Similar Jewish group and individual collaborators of the Gestapo operated in other towns and cities across German-occupied Poland — Abraham Gancwajch and Alfred Nossig in Warsaw, Józef Diamand in Kraków, and Szama Grajer in Lublin. One of the Jewish collaborationist groups' baiting techniques was to send agents out as supposed ghetto escapees who would ask Polish families for help; if a family agreed to help, it was reported to the Germans, who—as a matter of announced policy—executed the entire family.

Another Jewish group that collaborated with the Nazi Germans was Jewish Social Self-Help (Template:Lang-de), also known as the Jewish Social Assistance Society. It was funded by the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, which also supplied it with legal cover. The group was authorized to work in the General Gouvernment under Hans Frank; it eventually moved to Kraków, where Hans Frank had set up his headquarters in occupied Poland. Some Jewish Social Self-Help members were active in sending Warsaw Jews to death camps. Both Jewish and Polish underground actively resisted the Jewish Social Self Help organization

See also

• Collaboration with the Axis Powers during World War II
• Polish resistance movement in World War II

References

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16. "The Germans became interested at first in 's suggestions, which reached the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but when it turned out that the Western powers were not going to allows themselves to be misled by Hitler's 'peace' initiative, he ceased to be of interest to them."
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63. Timothy Snyder. (2004) The Reconstruction of Nations. New Haven: Yale University Press: pp. 165–166
64. http://www.uwazamrze.pl/artykul/995313/jak-zydzi-kolaborowali-z-niemcami Jak Żydzi kolaborowali z Niemcami Leszek Pietrzak, Uwazam Rze
65. Bauman, Robert J. (2012-04-19). Extension of Life. Xlibris Corporation. ISBN 9781469192451.
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67. Rees, Laurence,Auschwitz: The Nazis and the "Final Solution", especially the testimony of Lucille Eichengreen, pp. 105-131. BBC Books. ISBN 978-0-563-52296-6.
68. Rees, Laurence."Auschwitz: Inside the Nazi state". BBC/KCET, 2005. Retrieved: 01.10.2011.
69. "Judischer Ordnungsdienst". Museum of Tolerance. Simon Wiesenthal Center. Retrieved 14 January 2008.
70. ^ Collins, Jeanna R. "Am I a Murderer?: Testament of a Jewish Ghetto Policeman (review)". Mandel Fellowship Book Reviews. Kellogg Community College. Retrieved 13 January 2008.
71. Raul Hilberg: The Destruction of the European Jews, Quadrangle Books, Chicago 1961, p. 310.
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82. Alexandra Garbarini, Jewish Responses to Persecution: 1938–1940, p. 198.
83. "In Warsaw, participants in the organizing of deportation to a death camp included not only Jewish policemen but also members of the żydowska służba ratunkowa , part of the Judenrat, and even some members of Jewish Social Self-Help." ("Do zachowań jednoznacznie kolaboracyjnych ze strony przedstawicieli żydowskich instytucji "samorządowych" dochodziło podczas wysiedleń do obozów zagłady w ramach "akcji Reinhard", gdy niemieckie oddziały wysied­leńcze wymagały od żydowskich funkcyjnych czynnego wspomagania akcji. W Warszawie przy organizowaniu deportacji do obozu zagłady uczestniczyli nie tylko żydowscy policjanci, lecz także członkowie żydowskiej służby ratun­ kowej, część judenratu, a nawet niektórzy członkowie Żydowskiej Samopomocy Społecznej" Unambigious acts of collaboration from the side of Jewish "self-rule" institutions happened during deportations to extermination camps in "Reinhard action" when German units involved in expulsions demanded from Jewish functionaries active support. In Warsaw deporations to extermination camp were organized not only by Jewish police, but also Jewish rescue service, part of Judenrat, and even some members of Jewish Self-Help" )
84. http://www.jhi.pl/psj/Zydowski_Urzad_Samopomocy_(ZUS)

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• Collaboration during World War II
• Poland in World War II