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Belton Cooper Edit

1745 Hours 26 March 2006

Errors regarding Belton Cooper were corrected. Misleading/irrelevant information about his knowledge of armor tactics, etc. deleted.

Best Regards, Philippsbourg

I'm doing a rewrite at M4 Sherman\temp Oberiko 18:30, 8 Dec 2004 (UTC)

I've added some details you might (or might not :o)) want to include in your rewite.

MWAK--84.27.81.59 15:59, 19 Dec 2004 (UTC)

Actually, it looks like I'll have to put it on hold for awhile. Still have to finish the article on the Lorraine Campaign first. Eyes bigger then stomache. Oberiko 00:58, 20 Dec 2004 (UTC)

I think the following: "However, it was often less capable one-on-one than the German tanks it faced" is a gross understatement, almost to the point of being offensive.

A Sherman tank will almost never beat most German tanks on-on-one. It's not a "gross understatement", it's the truth! Aaron L

You do know what "understatement" means, don't you? --SpacemanAfrica 01:00, 11 April 2006 (UTC)

Comments on M4 Sherman article

1. The Sherman was definitely inferior to the German Tiger and Panther, still more so the King Tiger. It was more or less equivalent to the Panzer Mark IV, though even that tank possessed a superior main gun from 1942 and onwards. True, but it is worth pointing out a couple things: first, tank-vs-tank fighting is much rarer than most people suppose. Tanks fire vastly more HE than antittank ammunition. Their main role is infantry support and exploitation. Second, the Tiger II was a very rare opponent for the Sherman. Of course it was a much more capable vehicle, but it would have been impractical for the US to equip all armor units with a tank that could better the Tiger II. The Tiger I was also a rare opponent. The Panther was a common opponent so that part of your point is valid. But the Panther did not appear until mid-1943, and was not seen by US forces until mid-1944. The failure on the US side was not the initial Shemran design - it was the failure to improve it. DMorpheus

2. A very vivid impression of how Sherman tank crews experienced the fighting in Normandy can be gleaned from Ken Tout's excellent books, such as "To Hell with Tanks!"

3. The name "Tommy cooker" did not have anything to do with a WWI stove, AFAIK. The Germans coined the term because the Sherman, when hit, often ignited immediately and burned with flames up to 50 feet high, incinerating the crew - who were often British soldiers (known as "Tommies").

4. The British 17-pounder gun fitted in the Firefly was about as good as the German 88 mm or the Panther's long 75 mm. It could drill clean through the frontal armour of a Tiger I from several hundred yards; at least one photograph exists to substantiate this.

5. While American doctrine did indeed call for tank destroyers to deal with enemy armour, can that really be called an excuse for the fact that the Sherman was hopelessly outgunned by its German opponents and so thinly armoured that practically ever single german anti-tank weapon could destroy it by D day?

It isn't an excuse at all, but it is an explanation for why the US Army, with the biggest industrial base in the world behind it, entered the Normandy campaign with a tank that had severe weaknesses.

- Indeed, but some people insist that such is the case.

The Sherman won the war because it was manufactured and deployed in such large numbers. If it was upgunned, those numbers would have been impossible. That's the excuse. Aaron L.

The Sherman is a triumph of mass production so the German forces would be broken by outnumbering rather than one-on-one outfighting. GraemeLeggett 13:34, 15 May 2005 (UTC)

Considering the appalling number of tanks, not to mention crews, which were lost due to a lack of armour and firepower, it strikes me as ridiculous that you use the Sherman and the word triumph together in that way.

But the Sherman helped secure triumph for the Allies. Without it the outcome could have been quite different. It was a vital weapon, no matter how many lives were lost. Aaron L.

And yet the fact remains that the Sherman, this flawed yet capable and adaptable vehicle, was the primary tank used to achieve Allied victory in the west. Ridiculous? I think not. --Cavgunner 08:55, 22 July 2005 (UTC)

The primary instrument was flawed by it's lack of armour and firepower, as proven by the exceedingly high casualties taken by the tank crews. Yes, the Allies won the war with it, but it was still appallingly inferior when comparede to the opposition, and certainly could and should have been better by the middle of 1944. --?

WINNING THE WAR: the allies won the war with immensely greater material resources, manpower and airpower. They won it despite the Sherman tank, whose defects were effectively disguised. It could take five Shermans to knock out one Tiger Tank, and then only by outflanking it - surely a completely wasteful necessity. It might have been a triumph of mass production, but begins to look reminiscent of the immoral Russian tactic of clearing minefields by simply advancing troops into them, a similar triumph of material economy. Had a tank equivalent to the Panther been designed and produced, Allied victory in the West would have been won that little bit more easily and with less loss of tank crew life. Even universally up-gunning the Sherman from its anachronistic 75mm gun to the long-barrelled 17 pounder (as was only done in the Guards regiment) would have given parity of firepower. The resources of mass production could have been far more wisely employed. It's easy with hindsight. --Tyrenius 18 August 2005

Please note, I have removed the following simply because it is too vague at the moment and doesn't really mean anything. It needs to be clarified if it is to be useful:

The Sherman's battlefield performance did vary wildly especially when used outside the intended roles but this was true of other tanks as well. --Tyrenius 18 August 2005

Please let's not discuss the ethics of using the Sherman. Have you ever wondered why we didn't build a tank like the Panther? Maybe because it would be quite difficult to out-engineer the Germans. Aaron L.

Hardly. The Allies thoroughly out-engineered the Germans in the air. There are no German equivalents of the Allied heavy bombers, and the best fighters were Allied. There is no comparison in engineering equipment, trucks, ships....in many areas the Allies did as well or better than the Germans. Why they didn't with tank design is a very interesting question.

As I have said elsewhere, the critics of the Sherman tank need to understand that an army's one and only objective is winning, not perserving its soldiers. Any discussion of a weapon's performance is only meaningful if one place it within the military system that it operates. The M4 tank despite of its defects was a highly effective cog within the US war machine. Furthermore, any criticism against the M4 Sherman has to be put into the historical context of WWII. The attrition rate of the M4 Sherman was only appalling if one ignored the casualties of the T-34 that the Russians had to put up with. The allied report that said the blood-price of killing a Panther is five Shermans, also said nine T-34s are needed for the same result. The comparison in the air is largely meaningless, since the balance of the air war was already tilting to the Allies' favor when they were fighting with P-38s and P-47s. The Germans chose not to manufacture heavy bombers not becasuse they didn't have the technological ablity, but because they didn't have the industrial base. The V-2 rocket, the first ballistic missile, and the Nazi jet fighters, which surely was more advanced, were designed and built by the Germans. Furthermore, this over emphasis on the ability to win an 1 on 1 fight is an unhealthy obsession. Technology did not play a decisive role in any of the great battles of WWII, with the exception of the Battle of the Atlantic. It was the the army that was better led, supplied, and given an effective war-making doctrine (and luckier) that won. A tank need to be produced in sufficent quantities, has high mobility, is capable of sustained advance, to be the place that mattered in battle. That is the excelence of the M4 tank. --Chin, Cheng-chuan

I have to disagree with the idea of the excellence of the M4 tank. The ability to win a 1 to 1 fight has been the major design emphasis of the British and American military since WWII, this was brought about, in the main, by their experiences vs the German main battle tanks. The casualty rates of the T34 also needs some explanation. Russian crews had inferior training and suffered from poor communications which severely hampered their tank fighting ability. - Trafford

Misplaced Pages is an encyclopedia of published sources, not a place for us to publish our own opinions. There were no "main battle tanks" in WW2 - that is a postwar term. Both the Panther and the Sherman were medium tanks. I don't know anything about British doctrine but US doctrine was definitely not based on winning 1:1 fights. US doctrine during the cold war was all about fighting heavily outnumbered. That is a very different strategic situation from WW2. The experience fighting German tanks did play a role in shaping the concepts behind the M1, but it was far from the only consideration or even the primary one. DMorpheus 15:12, 11 October 2006 (UTC)

"High profile" myth

Height of:

• Sherman - 2.74m
• Panther - 2995mm
• T-34 - 2.7m
• Panzerkampfwagen IV - 2.68m

Surely 6cm difference does not create a "high profile"? --Roo72 05:58, 18 Feb 2005 (UTC)

The key word is profile (think of the silhouette) not just the absolute height. GraemeLeggett 13:44, 15 May 2005 (UTC)

So what makes Sherman's profile higher? Roo72 04:06, 15 July 2005 (UTC)

From a design point of view, the (stubby) Sherman could have been a lot lower; the height was of course due to its M2 ancestry. Your comparison to German types is somewhat problematic as the German tanks had higher cupola's. Roof height is more relevant.--MWAK 07:00, 31 July 2005 (UTC)

"High profile" in terms of tank defence can mean several things, which tend to be associated with each other. —Michael Z. 2005-08-28 22:04 Z

• A tall or large vehicle—I think shape is important, not just absolute height over the turret ceiling or commander's cupola (By the way, are all of the above-quoted vehicle heights measured the same way?)
• Boxy silhouette that visually stands out at a distance
• Poorly-sloped armour due to a boxy hull shape
• Awkward hull, turret, and armament configuration which exposes a lot of the vehicle when hull-down (e.g. M3 Lee tank with a big gun in the hull)

Sherman, and generally all American tanks afterwards, had very large turrents when seen in profile. The M4 might have been a foot or less taller than other contemporaries, but the turret was indeed wider in profile (compared to say the T-34 of any variant). Some will call this a disadvantage. In reality this is a significant ADVANTAGE. The crew had more room to operate. The actual combat rate of fire was inhanced, as the gunner and loader had room to coordinate their actions. Look inside a Tiger or Panther if you get a chance. Ammo handling inside those tanks was awkward. Inside the M4 one had more room to handle the ammunition.

But these are more or less minor and secondary things. Besides, the addition of another crewman to load ammunition meant sacrificing a bigger gun, which most Shermans desperately needed. 24.43.218.30 01:53, 24 April 2006 (UTC)

"Ronson" myth

The improvements to the safety of the Sherman was mostly due to the wet storage system, which reduced fire considerably, from 60-80% down to only 10-15% Since the diesel version was only used by the marines and for lend-lease purpose, the "safer" diesel argument does not hold for the majority of US and British tanks. Furthermore German tanks used gasoline and were never accused of being prone to burning up (the reference in the Patton film is wrong)

As I know, Panther Ds where prone to start burning (even if not under enemy fire). The Germans lost a lot of Panthers in Kursk because of this.

The most likely cause for a tank to brew up is not engine fire. It is ammunition exlosion.The fact that the Sherman burns less readily than the T-34 has nothing to do with the diesel. It has everything to do with Russian ammunition. The way it is designed, the shell casings can catch on fire easily after being hit by spalling or come too close to a heat source to a greater extend than American shells. Some experts believe that Russian armor, despite high hardness, is more prone to spalling as well, makes sense too since resilence is decreased with hardness. As for German tanks "never accused of being prone to bruning up," the poster before me is right. Panther Ds catch on fire by itself. Also, one can burn most medium tanks by hitting it with sustained shell fire, without outright penetration. There were many tanks killed that way. -Chin, Cheng-chuan

This did not however keep it from getting the nickname "Ronson: Guarenteed to light on the first strike". (70.118.115.49)

The weakness of the Sherman vs German tanks

The US tank doctrine is essentially the same as the German doctrine. The major difference is that the Germans did not exclude their tanks from fighting other tanks, though they still preferred to let the dedicated tank hunters do the job. The powerful HE round was considered critical, since the 76mm HE was very poor.

The US army has been criticized for failing to see the weakness of the Sherman, but it does not take actual experience in the field into account. Up until Normandy, the US army fought mostly the Panzer III as the main German tank. The Tiger was extremely rare both in Africa and Italy and it wasn't considered a threat. The 1943-1944 period was fought in Italy which is poor tank terrain and skewed the view of German armor deployment. Nevertheless the US army delivered 76mm Sherman from June 1944 onwards and demand only increased until September 1944, where the German army collapsed and was thought to be almost completely defeated. Most decision makers felt that the worst was over and that the Sherman was good enough for the job and the introduction of the Pershing was stalled because many felt the war would be over by Christmas anyway. And even though the Pershing could have been introduced earlier, the allies faced major logistics problems until the opening of the port of Antwerp, another tank and the need for specific spare parts would have been a huge problem.

The replacement of the Sherman by the Pershing was slowed by bureaucratic inertia, logistical fears and the feeling that investing in the Pershing, when the end of the war seemed only a matter of weeks or months away, was a waste of resources. (Patrick R.W.A. R. 17:27, 20 July 2005 (UTC))

The Army Ord Dept planned to place the M26 in production much earlier. The AGF vetoed that idea. One issue was one M26 took up the space of 2 M4s in cargo space. Secondly, the production lines would be interrupted for mass production of the M26. Interestingly, had the AGF placed the M26 into mass production in May 1944 (reasonably the earliest date), logistics lags ment a projected shortfall of availible tanks in December-January 1944.

Explaining this in short, if the M4 were replaced on the production lines in May '44, the retooling process, manufacturing, buildup of spares, training of crews, transport of the new tanks to the ETO, and so on would cause such an equipment shortfall. There would be a gap where M4 production was at ebb, and the M26s were not on hand in sufficient quantity. Thus, had the AGF pushed the M26 into production, who knows the Battle of the Bulge might have been a major allied defeat.

Another point on this, the AGF considered sending M6 Heavy Tanks with 90mm guns to the ETO prior to D-Day. The M6 cost, in terms of shipping overhead, as much as four M4s. However arguably the M6 with such a gun could stand toe to toe with the early Tigers and Panthers.

My understanding is that none of the American tanks on the pipeline deemed 'superior' to the M4 are good medium tanks. They were all overly engineered and too heavily armored to have the mobility required to be a proper medium tank. Likewise, the attritation rate of the M4 actually reflects the defensive nature of the German heavy armor. The beloved panther, tiger, and jagdt series are powerful weapons; but none of them are capable of the sweeping attacks and rapid advance that are essential for mechanized warfare. Critics of the M4 need to understand the fact that the purpose of an army is to win, not achieving Romantic heorics.--Chin, Cheng-chuan

Throwing my 2 cents in--as pointed out above, the role of the Sherman was infantry support. Arguing that the M4 was an inferior design to send against German armor is a straw man. It was neither built nor deployed to take on German armor, though sometimes that had to happen. US anti-armor doctrine was artilley, air support, and tank destroyers, in roughly that order. The M4 was like the bazooka--down the list.--Buckboard 10:01, 15 April 2006 (UTC)

Like the bazooka, it started it out good, but then it became nearly useless. 24.43.218.30 01:50, 24 April 2006 (UTC)

Needs accuracy improvement

The following section has some weaknesses:

It should also be considered that part of the blame lies in the cycle of tank development that was seen not only in US tanks, but in Russian and German tanks as well. The Russian T-34 developed out of experience gained in Russia's Winter War with Finland in the Winter of 1939-40. However it was not until the summer of 1941 that the T-34 became fully operational. A similar period of time was seen in the gap between Germany's rude shock on encountering the T-34 and KV-1 and the development of effective responses in the form of the Panzer IV Asuf F2 in 1942, and ultimately the Tiger I in 1943. Thus it is not suprising that there was a similar gap between the U.S. Army's first encounters with these improved German tanks in the summer of 1943 and fielding the M26 Pershing in late 1944. Developing new war machines takes time, and putting the war on hold was not an option. Besides the Germans had another series of even more powerful tanks being designed, ones which were designed to be simpler, more reliable, and easier to produce than the Tiger and Panther.

The T-34 was not developed as a result of the Finnish campaign. Development was underway long before the Finnish campaign started, and the major features were already in place.

The Pzkw-IV F (I believe the current research calls this a G, but, regardless, we are concerned with the first Pzkw-IVs with L/43 guns) with the long 75mm gun was operational by summer 1942, just under one year from the first encounters with the T-34.

The Tiger I was operational in Sep 1942, albeit in very small numbers.

The US Army first faced Tigers and Pzkw-IVs in the winter of 1942/43 in Africa, not the summer of 1943.

The T-26 (not M-26 until later) Pershing was not deployed in the field in late 1944. IIRC the first ones were issued to units in Feb 1945.

The major enemy tank threat to the M4 was the Panther, not the Tiger. The US Army did not encounter any Panther before the spring of 1944 at Anzio. The puzzle is why they did not react to the intel coming from the Red Army, which first faced Panthers in July 1943 and in increasing numbers thereafter. In Normandy half the German tanks were Panthers.

Thus this whole paragraph's timeline and logic really fall apart. The general point that there is a lag between the appearance of a threat and the reaction is valid. The idea that the US, Soviet, and German tank designers were all equally fast or slow to react to new threats is not supported by the evidence. It is precisely the too-slow improvement of the M4 series that gave it a poor reputation by 1944-45. In 1942 it was about as good as any other medium tank.

DMorpheus 16:29, 29 December 2005 (UTC)

Okay... I am responsible for writing part of that paragraph but not all of it. To respond to a couple of points that you made, first I should say that I did NOT say that the T-34 was the result of lessons learned from Winter Wars. The Pershing error might have been me, but it was awhile ago. If I said these things, it was a brain freeze. Then, to the things that I can respond to:

-The 76mm was already in existence before Overlord for tank destroyers. There were plans to issue the 76mm to the Sherman tanks. Gen. Patton terminated pre-1944 plans to replace the 75mm with 76mm because there was insufficient time to retrain the crew and refit the tanks for Overlord, which seemed justified given the objective of opening the already delayed 2nd front. But the weapon and the plans were there, and it was designed to counter heavier armor.

-The decision to delay its implementation came not because the commanders and policy makers refuse to recongnize the seriousness of the German armor threat, but because there existed pressures to get Operation Overlord on the way as quickly as possible, since Stalin was practically screaming for it and Marshall wanted to attack Germany as early as 1942. The 2nd Front was too important strategically to be delayed by issues of gun caliber.

-Also, the plans to replace the 75mm guns met significant opposition from the veterans, because the 75mm HE shell was twice as heavy as the 76mm, and packed a more powerful punch against earthworks, bunkers and the like. Creigton Abrams had to get his troopers to accept the 76mm gun by changing his old 75mm for the new gun.

-The window between the first encounter with the Panthers and issuing large numbers of 76mm guns were less than six months. After mid 1944 there were large numbers of 76mm Shermans available. As for the Soviet report--I can only attribute it to the prejudice against the socialist forces. Never the less, from the first time the US Army actually met the new generation of German tanks first hand, only less than six months had expired when 76mm guns were fielded to adequate numbers.

-Lastly, I did not wish to make the impression that the cycle of responding to new threats in all belligerents are the same. I merely wanted to point out that the absense of better armed Shermans in a historical context, that the urgency of developing a more powerful gun was absent due to the lack of experience. By the time the need for better armament is understood, they have missed the oppertunity to prepare for Overlord. The heart of the 76mm was politics and decision making, not the lack of know-how. --Chin, Cheng-chuan

Well, there where some good things, too

As I know, the Sherman was the first tank to include a gyroscopic stabilization for it's main gun. Also, later in the war the U.S. used special armor piercing rounds, which where similar in performance to the Panther gun at shorter ranges.

But the Sherman would still have to get really close, whereas the Panther can eliminate the Sherman with ease at long range. 24.43.218.30 01:14, 24 April 2006 (UTC)

Underating the Sherman

Surely the Sherman is a much better tank then its critics would concede. I would compare the Sherman to T-34 only, since the two tanks are closest in their designated roles and class. The Soviet T-34's 76mm and 85mm were no better then Sherman's 75mm and 76mm, respectively. The Sherman tank, with the 76mm gun and Hyper Velocity Armor Piercing ammo can kill a Panther at 200mm with a frontal shot. Its rubber tracks make it a very quiet tank. The Sherman tank also has a gyro stablizer and a very quick turret traverse, resulting in very high rate of fire. In short, a deadly combination in close combat. The Sherman's superior quality armor is also less prone to spalling then T-34. The Shermans also achieved an exchange ratio overwhelmingly in its favor against T-34/85s in Korea, proving that it is a tank that can at least give itself a good account in tank-to-tank fighting. --Chin, Cheng-chuan

Absolutely, Russians themselves, at least those who knew Shermans well. loved those tanks – . Roo72 04:07, 15 July 2005 (UTC)

Yes, the M4 with 76 mm gun was a very dangerous tank; however, at the time of the Invasion, very few had been delivered to the troops. Lack of firepower was therefore its most serious defect. On the other hand the tank was much better armoured than is often presumed. Applying both the cosinus-rule and the deflection effect to calculate the armour equivalence, it turns out its hull armour was basically better protected than the Tiger's! (only basically though: penetrator:plate thickness ratio was of course often unfavourable). Using the standard APBC-round the many German vehicles that used the various 75 mm L/48 guns could not penetrate the Sherman front hull at average combat distances. I'd hesitate to call the Sherman a quiet tank, rubber padded tracks or not. The M3 already had a stabiliser.--MWAK 07:00, 31 July 2005 (UTC)

Agree with you fully. I must say however that the Sherman was quieter than most. The Russians had at least used the lend-leased Sherman tanks in a number of night time raids. In one particular memorable instance the Russians overwhelmed a strong German position in a forest by a quiet night time raid, according to D.F.Loza in COMMANDING THE RED ARMY'S SHERMAN TANKS. On the otherhand, the 75mm gun was found to be wholey defficient in the bloody fighting in Normandy, despite the campaigns successful resolution. -Chin, Cheng-chuan

Way I see it, people who say the Sherman is a very good tank, are seriously overestimating it. I mean come on, it was nicknamed Ronson for a reason you know. Any tank that has to maneuvre around at close range to the sides and rear of an opposing tank to score a kill is definitely not good. The only notable good Sherman at the end of the war is the VC Firefly, but because the US Army Ordinance Department doubted the 17 pounder could be fitted onto the tank (one of their many mistakes), it was manufactured in limited quantities.

The only notable features of the Sherman was that it was produced in large quantities, had a mechanical reliability that beat the T-34, and came with better secondary equipment such as FM Radio and an elevation gyro-stabiliser.

Not to mention the extremely sad stories behind it. Once, a Sherman maneuvered around a building to hide from a Tiger tank. The Tiger shot at the building, and the shell went right through and penetrated the Sherman's turret. There are also tales of German tanks who take out two aligned Shermans in one shot. Also, do you know why you see all these wartime photos of crewmen who have Shermans with spare road wheels and tracks welded onto the hull? Those are efforts to help augment the armour of the Sherman. As a closer, I would like to also add that there was one armored unit that operated Shermans from Normandy to the inner parts of Germany, and it sustained losses amounting to 5 times its actual size as a unit. 24.43.218.30 01:36, 24 April 2006 (UTC)

"it sustained losses amounting to 5 times its actual size as a unit" Sure, but that sort of anecdotal evidence is not really useful when evaluating a tank. What for example was the loss of a similar german unit between Normandy and Berlin? Probably close to 100%, even though they were fighting a typically less costly defensive battle! Rommel lost some 80+% of his tanks at El-Alamein. Bt does that mean they were inferior? Not at all. The Tank to tank comparisons don't really matter much when evaluating the Sherman, because this was not the role for which it was designed, and has been noted tank-to-tank combat was relatively rare. Medium tanks were designed for the infantry support role, and in that case the ability to deliver in large numbers is a critical issue. The real question is: How did it do in the infantry support role? THe other issue is one of use. Throughout the war Sherman tanks were generally used offensively, while the heavier german tanks were used primarily defensively. Offensive use exposed the sherman frequently to anti-tank weapons and dug in tanks and artillery, factors certain to dramatically increase the loss rate, used offensively in the Battle of the Bulge german panthers suffered significant losses for the same reasons, no?

Firepower

"The Sherman tank, with the 76mm gun and Hyper Velocity Armor Piercing ammo can kill a Panther at 200mm with a frontal shot." That's in-accurate. Shermans had to flank to kill Panthers. Aaron L.

Not so. The US 76mm gun firing HVAP penetrates 132mm of armor at 1,000 meters. Source is Zaloga and Sarson 1993. The 76mm firing the standard M62 APC round cannot penetrate the Panther frontally at any range, even pointblank. Needless to say, neither can the 75-mm-armed Shermans. Since the vast majority of the anti-armor ammunition provided to Shermans was APC rather than HVAP, there is a belief that the gun was not capable of killing a Panther. Actually the problem was the decisions made in ammunition distribution. The M-18 tank destroyer weas armed with the same 76mm gun, but was typically provided with more of the HVAP ammo.

Penetration figures need to state the type of ammunition to be meaningful.

DMorpheus 21:01, 15 December 2005 (UTC)

The last time I checked, the Panther's frontal upper hull is 80mm thick, lower 60mm, turet 100mm. HVAP can and does kill Panthers at frontal aspect. As for HVAP ammo supply, a Sherman tank in average gets 2 shots per tank. The luckiest divisions get 5-6 rounds. -Chin, Cheng-chuan

Right, that's what I am trying to point out above. If you re-read my comment I am providing the figures to show that the 76mm gun was not the dud many people seem to think it was. The M62 ammo was poor; the HVAP ammo was very good and capable of killing a Panther frontally. Please note that most penetration stats are tested against armor at 30 degrees slope, and the Panther's armor obviously varied from that figure. DMorpheus 16:05, 29 December 2005 (UTC)

Right, my response is to Aron L.--Chin, Cheng-chuan

Didn't they test it against 90 degree plates at the time though? I mean the best angle that has been ever gotten onto a tank in WWII was 45 degrees I think. 209.221.73.5 14:32, 26 April 2006 (UTC)

Most tests were against plate sloped at 30 degrees from vertical; that's the convention if the slope is not stated in the report. I would have to go back and check that reference for that particular report, but the best thing to do is look at lots of sources because other test conditions may vary. For example, the hardness of the plate is a factor, but it isn't always stated in the reports. There is obviously some variation in ammo from round to round and lot to lot, so the figures published are averages, not guarantees. Performance against face-hardened plate differs from homogenous plate. I am not an engineer (which is probably obvious ;) so there may be other factors to consider.

Most German tanks had mostly vertical or nearly-vertical armor. Even the Panther, which has thick, well-sloped armor in front, has thin, vertical or nearly vertical side armor. That is why a T-34-85 has a slight range advantage against a Panther in side hits, despite its much less powerful gun. DMorpheus 15:29, 26 April 2006 (UTC)

Where at the frontal profile is also a question to ask. Standard M62 could penetrate the turret front at 300-400 meters since its vertical plate, while the lower front hull of the Panther could be penetrated easily at any range. The sloped glacis is usually invulnerable to M62. Due to the plate's inconsistent quality, 76mm HVAP has rather mixed success with it. Some were compromised at as far as 800 meters, but some not at all. -Chin, Cheng-chuan

Variants

We now seem to be in the state that half the article is a list of variants - why don't we remove the experimental ones to a list of ALL variants and retain the major ones for the main article? GraemeLeggett 05:56, 27 October 2005 (UTC)

Support - even better, why don't we move all the variants to M4 Sherman/variants ? Megapixie 07:45, 27 October 2005 (UTC)

Valid point, so long as we retain mention of the notable variants in the text (these being 75 ->76 mm gun, HVSS, addon armour "Jumbo", Firefly, and that it was adapted for specilaist roles as well (DD, Crab). I think that a table might help the layout as well if only just to show the US->British nomenclature since they aren't actually variants just other names for the same thing.GraemeLeggett 08:31, 27 October 2005 (UTC)

I like the table idea.

Support - For the U.K. names though, we can probably simply include them either in the name of the variant, like so: M4A4 (Sherman V). Or in the description of that variant: "...known to the UK as the Sherman V." Oberiko 12:21, 27 October 2005 (UTC)

As the person who bothered to add most of those, I don't understand why it can't be painfully comprehensive. This is an encyclopedia. The experimental ones don't warrant their own page. I just don't understand why you wouldn't want all the equipment variantions all in the same place. Thatguy96 08:33, 27 October 2005 (UTC)

Yeah, I agree. Putting the variants somewhere else would make things confusing. They should all be in the same place. Aaron L.

Aha, there's the word "painfully" - we don't want it to be hard to read, or unenjoyable. The suggestion is to make life easier on the eye by creating a full list of variants in one place (linked from within the article) while keeping reference to the more significant changes to the Sherman within the main article (see B-17 Flying Fortress for how it can be done. GraemeLeggett 13:22, 27 October 2005 (UTC)

Okay, I see what you're getting at, and it makes sense. Thatguy96 13:08, 27 October 2005 (UTC)

Naw, I still think they should be kept in one place. Does it really matter if half the article is variants? It's not like space is a concern here. And it doesn't really matter what the page looks like (to a certain extent), as long as the information is all there. Aaron L

Actually the horse has already bolted :) But, coming back to your point - checkout Misplaced Pages:Article size, the current article (without variants) is 22 k - the variants article is 22 k. Basically split they are the right size - together they are too big. Still needs a good variants paragraph or two though. Megapixie 00:51, 20 December 2005 (UTC)

Okay to move?

This has been proposed for a over a month now - I think it's probably okay to move it. Does anyone have a good 3 paragraph summary they'd like to put in the variants section - something like the B-17 one. Graeme ? Megapixie 05:38, 4 December 2005 (UTC)

Since nobody said anything - I have moved the variants to a subpage - however a suitable B-17 style paragraph (see the B-17 article) summarising the major models is needed. Anyone ? Megapixie 23:10, 13 December 2005 (UTC)

I will begin by saying that I am glad the revisionism and reductionist views on the talk page have not (for the most part) weaseled their way into this article. Observation indicates that the majority of contributers are drawing conclusions from specification charts rather than actual combat experiences.... and by doing so you run the risk of every historian's nightmare.... revisionism. The value of the Sherman was in it's production capability... but little else. It offered protection and support to infantry... but it's classification as a superior 'battle tank' is a dubious one at best - in more of the APC and infantry support role the Sherman may have had its day.... but it was woefully outclassed on the battlefield in WW2.

If nothing else this article is a great example of how opinions can be expressed without reverting into an edit war.

CanadianPhaedrus 22:16, 23 March 2006 (UTC)CanadianPhaedrus

==RE: Edits to Sherman page 23 March 2006.== I did not realize that I needed permission to contribute to the page. The contributions were based on the Armored Force History, The Operational History of the Third US Army, the Ordnance Dept. Annex of the Operational History of 12th US Army Group, and several unpublished SHAEF and ASF special reports including the Lutes Report. Some comments were also based on my extensive interviews with American tankers who served during WWII.

There seems to be a general misunderstanding of the role of the AGF in the development and implementation of Armored Force doctrine. It was the Armored Force under Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers, that created and codified armored doctrine, not the AGF. McNair and the AGF complicated matters by supporting the development and implementation of TDs, as well as advocating against more heavily armored tanks with greater firepower, but he did not influence Armored Force doctrine. Gen. Marshall made certain that Devers was left alone to do this without McNair's interference. At one point, Marshall gave serious consideration to placing the Armored Force on equal footing with the AGF and Army Air Corps, but decided against it when, in 1943, it became increasingly obvious that he would have to settle for fewer, lighter armored divisions. At that point it did not make sense to create a separate branch for what would be a smaller force, so the Armored Force remained under the AGF. Still, McNair was not allowed to interfere in the development of AF doctrine.

Armored Divisions and independent tank battalions trained extensively to fight tanks according to AF doctrine. The Armored Force required its tanks to fight tanks in both defensive and offensive roles. I ask that you check my sources and see for yourself.

Best Regards, Philippsbourg

Your edits were extensive and the issue to my mind is more with your deletions than your insertions. GraemeLeggett 17:20, 24 March 2006 (UTC)

REPLY: 11:00 hours RMT, 24 March, 2006.

The deletions were made to erroneous and misleading (unintentional I am sure) statements. Are you suggesting that they should be left in?

For example, the 76mm HVAP ammunition (second type: There were two types you know, and the first was so bad it had to be withdrawn.) arrived in the ETO so late that it wasn't just in short supply, most tankers never even saw one of the rounds until the very end of the war, much less fire one in combat. The Day of Supply for the round was about 2 rounds/tank/month by April, 1945. That does not mean that the rounds were "at the gun" only that they were in theater!

The description of Cooper was, for example, misleading. Cooper was the Ordnance Bn. officer responsible for the recovery of tanks for repairs. As such, he had intimate knowledge regarding the types of battle damage, destroyed tanks (as opposed to repairable), and the repairs that were made. This alone adds considerable weight to the accuracy of his figures. Cooper is right, and this is supported out by the battle losses and repairs shown in the Official Historical Reports, After-Action Reports, and Monthly Operations Reports of the various armored divisions that I have examined at the National Archives. The official US Army replacement rate for Shermans in the ETO was around 10-12% in the summer and fall of 1944. The actual replacement rate for the ETO was around 20%. (Replacement rate refers to estimated and actual losses for the entire theater for every month of combat.)

Here's another example. It did not take five Shermans to outmaneuver and destroy a single Panther or Tiger in Normandy or anywhere else for that matter. Five Shermans were, on average, knocked-out or destroyed for every Panther or Tiger knocked-out or destroyed in tank to tank fighting. This gives a combat loss ratio of about 5 to 1. This explains why the US had to ship so many replacement tanks to the ETO.

Here's one more. Most Shermans were lost to anti-tank guns (towed and SP) and other tanks, not to mines.

There are more examples, but I am sure you get my point.

Best Regards, Phillippsbourg

Edit 1630 Hours, 24 March 2006.

I have added some source material and comments concerning the investigations into the cause of catastrophic fires in early Shermans. Since I cited the original US Army Armored Force Study, I hope that everyone will respect my contribution, and not delete it.

While I am thinking about it, you might consider adding a brief discussion of the reasons why Lt. Gen. Devers chose to use gasoline engines rather than diesel in the Shermans used by US Army forces.

Do you guys know that the Armored Force under Devers, developed, implemented, and codified the Armored Doctrine, not McNair and the AGF?

Best Wishes, Phillipsbourg

Comments: 2120 Hours, 24 March 2006.

Just a few suggestions.

Now that I think about it, you guys might also include a description of the gyroscopic stabilizer used on the main gun. If you do, try to include some information about the actual effectiveness of the system in combat. (It was very inaccurate, and even the most experienced crews did not use it when they actually wanted to hit the target.)

Why isn't the 105mm howitzer Sherman mentioned on the page? (If you add it, you might think about mentioning the difference between the turret drives of the 105mm howitzer and the 75-76mm gun versions. You could also discuss the uses of this variant in different combat situations.

Best Regards, Phillippsbourg

Actually there were instances like the 5-1 scenario. 8 Tigers defending a hill... Im not sure which one... I'll find it somewhere... destroyed 30% of British Shermans in Europe. Perhaps one of you have read the the book as well... its an analysis of a Panzer unit through the war.... features the notes of the commanding officer.. ... I'll track it down at the library...

CanadianPhaedrus 08:54, 25 March 2006 (UTC)CanadianPhaedrus

Errors

1720 Hours 1 April 2006

This page contains numerous technical, historical, and doctrinal errors. There are simply too many errors to address individually. The best way to proceed is the following.

1. Delete the entire page and start over. 2. Recognize that a consensus of opinion formed by uninformed contributors will always result in an inaccurate document. 3. Obtain the services of a content expert to oversee the development of the new page and approve content. 4. Prevent the reversion of approved content by those who know little or nothing about the subject. 5. Lock the page when it is complete.

Good luck! Philippsbourg

My good sir, it appears you have mistaken Misplaced Pages for an infallible source, which is simply can never be as a product of what it is. You can either take the time to address all the issues permenantly and rewrite it yourself, or accept that it will simply not be 100% accurate (or according to you, anywhere close to that). I would think that if you have the time and inclination to be so personally afronted by the material presented here, that you would also have the time and the inclination to do something about it yourself instead of deciding what everyone else should do. This is wikipedia, the 💕, and if you want to treat it like a published and refined reference work, you'll be sorely dissappointed. It appears as if you already are as a matter of fact. -- Thatguy96 April 10 2006 20:02

1853 Hours 1 April 2006

Your position is that it is my responsbility to correct the multitude of errors on Sherman page because I pointed them out, and subsequently offered a course of action for correcting them.

Usually when someone makes the sort of remarks that you have, they realize that they do not know enough about the subject to assist in making the necessary corrections, and seek to avoid admiting it by raising unrelated questions. Prove this is not the case, and offer some improvements of your own. For example, you might write a paragraph about "Little Joe" and how it gave the Sherman crews an edge in the field. For my part, I will wait until the decision is made to delete the entire page, and start over. Then I will be more than happy to contribute to the development of a new page.

Best Regards, Philippsbourg

My position is that it is the responsibility of the community, not of some "content expert" to see that the information contained in the article is correct. Your course of action is simply not in the spirit of wikipedia. You do not need to wait until the page is deleted to begin revising it if you have the time and the inclination. The M4 Sherman is not a field of any sort of expertise for me. According to your complaints I would assume that it is one for you. There are dozens of articles on wikipedia that are blatantly incorrect, especially on the matter of military hardware. Instead of simply complaining that they are not accurate, I have taken what time I have to make small corrections and additions to them, and in certain cases deleted and rewritten the bulk of existing articles. I have also created a number of pages from scratch.

Misplaced Pages is a community effort, and that is both the source of its strengths and weaknesses. You simply cannot expect it to be a 100% accurate source unless you're willing to contribue, sometimes in large part, to it being such. I myself have been continually working and correcting things that I have added on the Sherman Variants page, initially a part of this article and then seperated, and I really don't see why I have to contribute to this one in order to convince you of anything. You can either contribute or be unsatisified by the results. Your complaints do nothing. -- Thatguy96 April 1 2006 21:29

0930 Hours, 2 April 2006

You are being intellectually dishonest. A quick examination of the "history" of the article will reveal that I made a rather significant contribution several days ago. My contribution was quickly reverted by someone who knows nothing about the subject.

Question: How can you create a page of any accuracy whatsoever without the involvement of a content expert?

Answer: You can't.

PS I made some comments about the content on the Variants Page. Lest you accuse me of doing nothing, I even provided an excellent source of information for you to look at on Lend-Lease.

Philippsbourg

0940 Hours, 2 April 2006

Do you really believe that you can deny my expertise so easily? (Your tactic is used by Holocaust Deniers too, and it does not work for them either.) After all, I spent years of serious study at major universities. I have written and published in professional military history journals, and have many, many years of experience in the field. So, as you can see, my expertise does not just "blow away" when you huff and puff.

Listen, I understand that you and many others here are seriously threatened by the involvement of a content expert. In fact, "wikipedians" have a solid reputation for agressive behavior towards content experts. Why? Because no one likes being told when they are wrong, and this venue allows the educationally and intellectually challenged to pretend to be something they are not, i.e. truly knowlegeable. Understandably, when a person arrives on scene who actually knows about a great deal about a particular subject, they are immediately perceived as a threat and attacked.

The Sherman page is riddled with errors, and should be deleted until such time as a completely new page can be researched and written. I will contribute, but I will not write the entire page for you.

Philippsbourg

blah blah blah blah blah. Experts are a dime a dozen, to coin a term, and self-appointed. You not only need not write the entire page, you "need" to put up or shut up about all the "errors". Perhaps that will lend some credence to your knowledge of "educationally and intellectually challenged". In other words, if you are so easily offended by "wikipedians", don't let it hit you in the... on your way out.--Buckboard 10:10, 15 April 2006 (UTC)

Where do you get off? Threatened by content experts? This isn't a controlled medium, its wikipedia. People are threatened by people who claim credentials without taking the five seconds to provide any solid proof. I'm not defending the content of the article AT ALL. All I'm saying is that if it bothers you this much, and obviously it does, you have the power to do something. All you're doing now is complaining. You're not doing anything constructive. No one is actively challanging your integrity, we're challanging your refusal to do anything about it yourself.

Oh, and your holocaust denier reference is totally out of line. Something bothers you, take control and do something about it, that's the spirit of Misplaced Pages. Right now you're claiming that everyone else here should know all of what you do and do it instead of you lending your expertise to the cause. Its selfish is really what it is, selfish and arrogant. -- Thatguy96 April 2 2006 16:17

Philippsbourg,

Hello. I'm interested in seeing your documents, especially on HVAP. U.S. government documents are public domain, so you can create a wiki article on them or post a scanned PDF of them on a website and then add links to this Sherman page. I look forward to your contribution. Thank you.Wikist 05:02, 4 April 2006 (UTC)

Reinstating my response that was deleted by Philippsbourg

In response to Philippsbourg.

1. No. If you want a clean slate - why not start your own webpage ?

2. Possibly, but then that's the nature of wikipedia. As long as edits are not Original research, and are based on Verifiable sources - then wikipedia will only ever be as wrong as the most recognized published source on any given subject.

3. I suppose you consider yourself to be such an expert. No.

4. For our own good (or for the sake of the children?), I suppose? No.

5. Possibly. What happens to an an article goes once a consensus is reached that the article is an Featured Article is an interesting topic for debate. However this is not the place for it.

Megapixie 03:40, 2 April 2006 (UTC)

Please refrain from deleting my comments from article talk pages in future. Megapixie 05:40, 11 April 2006 (UTC)

Delete Characteristics section?

• 1. We have a better stats box in the intro
• 2. We are not listing variants on this page
• 3. Neither example is typical of the primary user, the U.S.
• 4. One of the examples (Firefly) has its own article that links in the "See also" section
• 5. The other example can appear in the Soviet section of the variants page, also linked in "See also"

Wikist 05:38, 4 April 2006 (UTC)

A better idea would be a small table as used on the Supermarine Spitfire which could illustrate the major changes across the variants. Although the full list of vairant shas been migrated there should still be some dicussion of the variation in the Sherman over its lifetime. GraemeLeggett 08:25, 4 April 2006 (UTC)

A table would be better than what we have. Hopefully someone will start it and people can add columns to it as time allows. Wikist 11:48, 4 April 2006 (UTC)

Here's the start of the barn-raising. People can add here until it looks respectable:

1930 Hours 10 April, 2006

 Your table looks remarkably like those found on an unassociated website. Why don't you just admit you swiped the code from someone else rather than try an act like you wrote it yourself? 
 Philippsbourg

Photo caption of 105mm howitzer vehicle

I am not sure, but the vehicle shown in the 'Armamment" section may be mislabeled. It is an early 56-degree hull vehicle with 105mm howitzer and HVSS. It appears to be an M4 but it is labeled an M4A4. I don't think any M4A4 were built with 105mm howitzers, and the raised fan cover on the engine deck is consistent with an M4, not an M4A4. It's hard to tell for certain though. Anyone else have any thoughts on this?

The A4 had a bulge on the engine deck (but I know what you mean about the photo), the hull looked stretched at first glance, and that vehicle might be a post-war kitbash with the 105, HVSS, and the late, sharp-beak, single-piece cast transmission housing. However, that sentence was there when I poached the photo from the "M4 Sherman variants" page so I'll defer to anyone's closer inspection if they want to change or delete the 2nd sentence.Wikist 15:09, 4 April 2006 (UTC)

You're correct that there was a bulge in the engine deck of the M4A4, but it was much shorter (front to back) than the one on the M4 and M4A1. I agree it's a postwar refit, but I think it's an M4 and will edit the caption. Thanks. DMorpheus 14:18, 5 April 2006 (UTC)

Thank you for spotting the potential confusion: It was in divisions' headquarters units (at battalion level), it was not in "division HQ" (to my knowledge).

If it's a postwar refit, it could be re-engined like M50 Super Sherman. Read the strange hyrbrids claimed to exist as early as 1948 (http://www.israeli-weapons.com/weapons/vehicles/tanks/sherman/M-4.html), not to mention that a pedestal tank could be cobbled from the scrapyard. Without a positive ID, perhaps we should stay generic with "Sherman." Also, the caption appears on M4 Sherman variants, which is where I obtained the photo.Wikist 19:01, 5 April 2006 (UTC)

"Off-Topic" in Sections and Specific Problem in "Production" Section

There were many general statements repeated numerous times and many statements appeared in the wrong topic. Because section introductions or overviews about M4 tend to rehash the standard general arguments, it might be better if each section hewed to its narrow topic as much as possible.

For instance, the recent "production" section was 637 words but only required about 140 words to convey the actual original factory production information of engine, gun, suspension, etc. while 100 words were padding around that information, 200 were about mostly British conversions, 100 were about performance, and 100 were about operational service or doctrine.

I left brief mentions of performance to explain the "why" of production changes, although if you wanted to eliminate even that then the former original factory production information could have fit in one paragraph:

• The M4 had a 75 mm gun in a traversing turret on the interim M3 "Lee" chassis. Five main variants, the M4, the M4A1, the M4A2, the M4A3 and the M4A4, differed mainly in engine although the M4A1 had a fully cast upper hull. Upgrades included suspension units, ammunition stowage, and front hull protection like The M4 Composite which had a cast front hull section mated to a welded rear hull. Early models had a 75 mm low-velocity gun. Later M4A1, M4A2 and M4A3 were upgunned with the T23 turret and 76mm cannon, leading to the final M4A3E8/76(w) HVSS "Easy Eight" The US Ordnance Department rejected the British 17 pounder for factory production. Over 50,000 Shermans were produced during the war, and its chassis was the basis for many other vehicles including upgunned tank destroyers, armored recovery vehicles, artillery prime movers, and self-propelled guns.

The "production" section still has little production information: which factory built how many of which type when. It is important to distinguish:

• tank design (and possibly prototype tests)
• industrial manufacturing production
• post-production
  • factory conversions
  • field conversions
    • official
    • unofficial
• the resulting variants' characteristics

Would "Design Evolution" be a more accurate label for the "Production" section?

I'm interested to hear what others think. Thank you. Wikist 13:23, 5 April 2006 (UTC)

Service History?

1915 Hours, 10 April 2006

Equipment does not "serve." People do.

Philippsbourg

Incorrect. An active US Navy warship is in "service" which is a noun derived from "serve". So in effect a warship or a piece of equipment does "serve", as do people.. warships1

1000 Hours 13 April, 2006

You can stretch things as much as you want, but a warship and a tank are very different things. People "serve" tanks do not. At least according to the U.S. Army, that is.

At the very least, the terminology is inaccurate.

Philippsbourg

sorry,

a warship and a tank are essentially identical in that they are equipment used by combat personnel, same as M16's, F-16's etc etc. in fact almost every single piece of equipment used in the military has what is termed a "service" life..

The term "A Sherman tank served it's crew well" is an example of equipment serving people.. warships1

M4A2

quote  : "Using diesel, the M4A2 engine is atypical of those used in Western Europe"... wahoo, what a joke from the other side of the pond!!!! except more than 300 of them lend-leased to Free French! Leclerc's 2ème D.B. and de Lattre 1rst army were mainly M4A2 running... look at : http://www.chars-francais.net/archives/unites/1944/unites_1944-45.htm

Except that I, an Englishman, rewrote the section - I should have said atypical of US use in Europe. GraemeLeggett 14:31, 11 April 2006 (UTC)

You were right, though; no need to back off. The M4A2 was one of the rarer variants among all Allied users in western Europe. The US used M4, M4A1, and M4A3 mostly (all gas-powered). The British and Commonwealth forces used a few M4A2s, but used the M4, M4A1 and M4A4 much more commonly. Polish units used mainly M4A4 and M4A1. French forces used a lot of M4A2s, but also used every other variant; their 5th Armored Div used mostly M4A4s. So your statement was right and should remain. DMorpheus 14:39, 11 April 2006 (UTC)

"Atypical" in Western Europe is correct. I'd have to check for exactness but if memory serves the British, French, and Poles used the A2, and most photographs of those that I've seen put them in the Mediterranean Theater (including Dragoon/Anvil/southern France). Even if you note the French use and lump the MTO with the ETO, the A2 is atypical, i.e. outnumbered by the gasoline Shermans. It's interesting that the website indicates A2 mixed with gasoline Shermans within the same tactical unit, unless those lists mix different times.Wikist 14:52, 11 April 2006 (UTC) PS: It looks like DM posted while I was writing.

Probably ;). British M4A2 use in NWE was limited to a single Brigade IIRC. I wasn't 'counting' the MTO above but even if we do, the point still stands. French units mixed all types at the same time. Again if memory serves, the 2eme DB started with M4A2s and the 5 DB with M4A4s, but they got replacements of all types including at least one M4A3E2. The South African 6th AD was mostly equipped with M4A1s IIRC.

It's so refreshing to see people agreeing on wikipedia for a change ;) DMorpheus 15:55, 11 April 2006 (UTC)

This does not contradict the above consensus about the atypical diesel but Hunnicutt states that the "United Kingdom" received 5,046 A2 (all but 5 were 75 mm) and the USSR received 4,063 (over half 76 mm).

Wrong yet again!

1245 Hours, 11 April, 2006

The 2nd Division Blindee did not start solely "...with M4A2s..," nor did "...the 5 DB..." start solely "...with M4A4s,..." Vigneras Rearming The French, pp. 244-245.

Your discussion (above) is a prime example of why a consensus of opinion reached by those who are not content experts is invariably wrong. Remember, the Internet is often a poor source for reliable historical information.

Philippsbourg

Actually if you re-read that discussion the "consensus of opinion" is right: the the diesel engined A2 model Sherman was atypical. The free French bit you seem to take exception to was thrown in at the end and qualified with "if memory serves" and not the main topic of discussion in any case.

OK. I re-read the discussion, and based on your remarks, have concluded that you are merely trying to avoid admitting that you are wrong.

Philippsbourg

I fail to see how the first comment I make here could have been an admission that I was previously wrong, but fine, if what around 11,000 ? M4A2s compared to around, what 49-50 thousand total Sherman produced is equivalent to "typical Sherman is diesel powered" then yes I and everyone else here are wrong.

0945 Hours 14 April, 2006

Dear Sock Puppet:

Yes, everyone else is wrong. A concensus of ill-informed opinion is still ill-informed.

Diesel powered Sherman tanks were simply that, diesel powered. They were not carried in US Army inventories outside the ZI. If they were used in relatively small numbers by the French First Army, then they were, simply put, used by the French First Army, and were not repeat not atypical of anything. Based on your logic, every single variant of the Sherman would be atypical because they had different guns, armor, suspensions, etc. You are arguing for the incorrect application of the word "atypical," and it has nothing to do with creating an accurate article about Sherman tanks.

Philippsbourg

LOL. Repeat LOL. DMorpheus 17:11, 14 April 2006 (UTC)

I'm no sock puppet. I just don't want to have to put up with the kind of behavior you've been exhibiting towards DMorpheus, Megapixie and a few others, and so choose not to reveal who I am. I'm very easy to get rid of though. You claim: "I am a bona fide content expert on the Sherman and Armored Force Doctrine, not to mention a published military historian of some note." What books? (or articles, or publications, or whatever) If you've already published information regarding American armor in general, or the M4 in particular then there is no harm in telling us, and it should silence any critics here. Until then you are "just some guy on the net, says he's an expert" and how are we to know the difference?

And given that the A2 is the only production Sherman variant built to run on diesel where all others were gas I'd say that makes it unusual, or anomalous, or irregular, or possibly even atypical.

1125 Hours 14 Arpril, 2006

The A6 was also diesel (Caterpillar though) but few were made and some say that none saw combat so the A6 is atypical of the atypical (and, no, that's not a double negative).Wikist 12:34, 15 April 2006 (UTC)

OK I should have said all others used in combat, or something similar to completely cover myself. But you understand what I meant even if I didn't express myself all that clearly.

Dear Morpheus:

Do you know what would really be funny? If you were to actually contribute something of value to the Sherman article. That would be really repeat really funny!

Question.

What well-known, high-ranking WWII US Army officer used the style I've been emulating when I use the word "repeat" to emphasize a point? Do you know?

Philippsbourg

Hmmm....I'm going to guess Fredendall. Now seriously, my friend, if you can tone down the negativity towards virtually everyone else, and contribute some of your obvious store of knowledge, we'll all be much better off. You seem a bit skeptical of the whole wikipedia concept but it does generally work quite well. DMorpheus 20:23, 14 April 2006 (UTC)

1445 Hours 14 April 2006

There's your problem! You guessed instead of finding out or simply admitting that you didn't know. That's exactly what you did when you dropped by here on 24 March, and out of sheer ignorance, reverted the work of a content expert without bothering to even ask for sources. If you want to work well together, you should admit your error, and restore the material that you ignorantly and arrogantly reverted on that occasion.

As I asked before, why don't you contribute something of substantive value to the Sherman article?

No repeat No, it wasn't Fredendall. It was somebody much more famous, and of much higher rank than a mere corps commander.

Philippsbourg

Ambrose

1515 Hours, 11 April, 2006

Note: Steve Ambrose is not repeat not a good source of information regarding the Sherman tank! His comments regarding armored doctrine are completely in error.

Philippsbourg

please relate where and how his comments are in error, a generalisation without any evidence to back it up means little. warships1

Firefly variants and edits of April 17 06

I made a slight edit to the section describing Fireflies. An editor added content indicating Fireflies were built on M4A1 and "M4A1 composite" hulls. I am not aware of any M4A1-based Fireflies; does anyone else have better info on this?

Likewise although the M4 composite was a common Firefly conversion, there is no such vehicle as an "M4A1 composite".

Yes, this sounds like a confusion over Sherman IC Hybrids, which were built from Sherman I Hybrids. The Sherman I Hybrid is not to be confused with the Sherman II though. -- Thatguy96 17 April 15:58

I apologise for putting up the wrong info, i merley miss typed M4A1 composite, my mind was not properley on the task, however there was an M4A1 Firefly, built on Canandiasn liscence built Grizzlies, these were however only used for training. pictures of said vehicle can be found at: ]

Comparable to the T-34-85? Puleeze...

"The 75 mm gun was replaced in time with a much improved higher-velocity 76 mm M1 gun giving it firepower comparable to the Soviet T-34/85 and many of the AFVs it encountered, particularly the Pz III, Pz IV, and StuG vehicles."

The only thing wrong here is that it states the 76mm as comparable to the T-34's 85mm. The 76mm was much more inferior than the 85mm on the T-34 in terms of general performance. 24.43.218.30 01:49, 24 April 2006 (UTC)

Well, let's let the numbers do the talking:

Chris Foss, Artillery of the World, 1974

Soviet 85mm

Standard APHE ammo: penetrates 102mm at 1000 meters range

HVAP ammo: penetrates 130mm at 1000 meters

Bovington Tank Museum Fire and Movement, 1975

Soviet 85mm APCBC 103mm at 500 meters; 94mm at 1000 meters

US 76mm APCBC 94mm at 500 meters; 89mm at 1000 meters

US 76mm HVAP 158mm at 500 meters; 134mm at 1000 meters

Hunnicut Sherman, 1978

US 76mm APC M62: 93mm at 500 meters; 88mm at 1000 meters

US 76mm HVAP M93: 157mm at 500 meters; 135mm at 1000 meters

Woodman, Tank Armament in World War Two, 1991

US 76mm APCBC: 94mm at 500 meters; 89mm at 1000 meters

US 76mm HVAP: 158mm at 500 meters; 134mm at 1000 meters

Soviet 85mm APC: 96mm at 500 meters; 88mm at 1000 meters

Soviet 85mm HVAP: 121mm at 500 meters; 80mm at 1000 meters

Zaloga and Grandsen, Soviet Tanks and Combat Vehicles of World War Two, 1984

Soviet 85mm APHE (BR-365): 111mm at 500 meters; 102mm at 1000 meters

Soviet 85mm APCR (BR-365P): 138mm at 500 meters; 100mm at 1000 meters

Zaloga and Sarson, Sherman Medium Tank, 1993

US 76mm APC (M61): 98mm at 500 meters; 90mm at 1000 meters

US 76mm HVAP (T-4): 150mm (approximate) at 500 meters; 132mm at 1000 meters

Based on these figures I don't think the US 76mm gun/ammo combinations can be described as "much more inferior" than the Soviet 85mm gun/ammo combinations. It's true that the US HVAP ammo was very scarce; I don't know about the availability of Soviet HVAP and APCR ammo. Depending on the ammunition type specified, the US gun can outperform the Soviet gun. For the most common ammo types with each gun, the performance is similar. DMorpheus 01:44, 25 April 2006 (UTC)

Aren't 76mm Shermans much less common than the T-34/85? Also, the Russians had their own special armour piercing rounds.

Its true that some Panzer commanders considered the Sherman to be worthy opponents. However, for most part, a single Tiger was able to take out at least 3 Shermans before being taken out by a Sherman VC Firefly, or by a Sherman firing at the rear of the tank. Normally, the only chance a Sherman could have against a Tiger is to sneak up on it and get a shell into the rear of the tank. 209.221.73.5 14:25, 25 April 2006 (UTC)

Both 76mm-armed Shermans and T-34-85s were very common vehicles from the summer of 1944 onwards. I suspect there were more T-34-85s in service than 76mm Shermans (they were certainly produced in greater numbers) but then that is irrelevant to the question at hand -which is whether the US 76mm gun is comparable to the Soviet 85mm. I believe the data above show that it is highly dependent on ammunition type. I have shown data for all types of ammunition I had. If there is some 'special' type of ammo I haven't shown, please feel free to add it. I showed APHE, APCBC, APCR, and HVAP.

Since the vertical side armor on a Tiger hull is only 82mm, even a 75mm Sherman can achieve a side penetration at close range. The data above show that a 76mm Sherman firing the worst ammo can still get a side kill at normal WW2 ranges.

I've never seen a 3:1 kill ratio described before. I have seen 5:1 claimed, but by itself that doesn't mean much. Of course the Tiger is more formidable, tank-for-tank, than almost any other tank it ever faced. It was also much more expensive, less reliable, much heavier, and less mobile than most. Only about 1300 Tigers were built, so, just for the sake of argument, if they had a 3:1 kill ratio against Shermans, and no other weapons on the battlefield, and no noncombat losses, and no Red Army, there would still be over 40,000 Shermans left when the last Tiger exploded. DMorpheus 15:28, 25 April 2006 (UTC)

Point is, the Sherman was not the war winning weapon. Though relatively fast and very mechanically reliable, and having a few novel features such as a good radio, and a gun elevation gyrostabilizer, not a single Sherman was capable of going up against any of the German tanks one on one. They had to get frighteningly close to even penetrate the side armor, and there has been a report of a Sherman being cut open at 3000 yards. Also, the limited amount of armour piercing shells meant that you had to go very close to the German tanks anyways to ensure a kill. 24.43.218.30 03:34, 26 April 2006 (UTC)

That's a completely different discussion, isn't it? The original point was whether the US 76mm gun and ammo can perform comperably to the Soviet 85mm gun and ammo.

On your new issue, it seems to me the Sherman was precisely a "war winning weapon". How many Tigers were in the victory parades? Of course a Tiger or Panther could greatly outrange a Sherman; no one is denying that. The data prove it. We should stick to specific facts. Armor-piercing ammo was not in short supply. Only HVAP ammo was in short supply.

You wrote "...not a single Sherman was capable of going up against any of the German tanks one on one." Let's see, in 1942-43 in North Africa, Sicily and the Italian mainland, Shermans faced Panzer IIs, IIIs, and IVs, plus a few dozen Tigers. Are you suggesting a Sherman cannot take on a Panzer II or III? As for the Panzer IV, I would say they are a remarkably even match, with the German tank having an edge in firepower (the German 75mm gun/ammo combination outperformed the US 75mm by quite a bit). No US unit faced a Panther until the Anzio battle. So for the period up until early 1944 the Sherman was about as good as any of the tanks it faced, with the exception of a *very* small number of Tigers.

The problem with the Sherman came a bit later, when it was not improved enough in 1944 to take on the Panther, which formed half the German tank strength in Normandy. Nevertheless, despite its shortcomings in one-on-one fights, the US combined arms team as a whole outclassed the Germans, and that is what counts. The Germans did lose, after all.

In all of this we shouldn't lose sight of the fact that most tanks fire far more HE ammo than anti-tank ammo. Even US tank destroyers fired 11 HE rounds for every round of armor-piercing. Tank-vs-tank fighting is much rarer than most people think.

DMorpheus 13:35, 26 April 2006 (UTC)

I'm talking about the big German tanks. Hell, even some Shermans had difficulty facing up against improved MkIVs, the most common tank the Germans had. AP shells are not limited yes, but the HVAP shells which allowed 76mm armed Shermans to take on larger tanks with a chance of survival were, whereas the T-34/85 had a rough chance of taking on a Panther with standard AP ammunition. Even though the Panther could still destroy it at long ranges, the T-34's higher speed allowed it to catch up quickly.

And tank battles still happened nonetheless, and Shermans had to rely on sheer numbers or another arm (aircraft, tank destroyers) to take out any heavy tanks. Besides, the best way to take out a tank back then, would've been to use another tank, and the Russians and Germans realized this.

Also the Ordinance Department realized after D-Day that they really needed a heavier tank. One (which was the M26 Pershing) was already on the drawing board, but for reasons that related to the fact of the failure to match US equipment to its enemy, they continued production of the Sherman, delayed the development of the Pershing, and only started producing the Pershing when the Germans broke through in the Ardennes.

Also, by the end of the war, hell by the middle of the war, the Germans stopped producing MkIIs and MkIIIs.

I also blame General Leslie McNair for his tank destroyer doctrine. He insisted on mounting large guns onto these lightly armored but rather speedy tank destroyers, and keeping the Sherman as a "light, speedy, tank perfect for infantry support and breakouts".

And several former tank crew haven't exactly had the brightest opinion of Shermans, including veterans who live nearby me. 209.221.73.5 14:28, 26 April 2006 (UTC)

It's the nature of soldiers to bitch about their equipment whether it deserves it or not. You are ranging so widely I am not sure where to begin. Should the US have fielded a better tank than the Sherman? Of course. Was that a realistic option? Probably. As you point out the design expertise certainly existed, and the prototypes existed. Was McNair a big part of the problem? I guess we can debate that. IMO yes, he is to blame for too-light tanks, the whole TD doctrine, too-light Infantry Divisions, and WAY too-few automatic weapons in infantry units. On the other hand, how much credit do you give him for the phemonenally good US artillery? Should Ordnance have pushed for a better tank? They did. Army Ground Forces (McNair) didn't want one. This would make a great article on its own.

I don't see how a T-34's speed (which hardly differs from a Sherman) would help much in outrunning a Panther, which was also a fairly fast tank. Tactical mobility has many facets including the ability to move while under fire; thus armor is a contributor to mobility.

If you re-read the data above you'll see that the standard ammo for the US 76mm guns and Soviet 85mm guns did not differ all that much in performance. So I don't follow the logic of saying that the T-34-85 had a better chance of killing a German tank than a 76mm Sherman.

Finally, we cannot ignore that fact that the German's policy of building a few very expensive AFVs meant that they wouldn't have very many of them. Likewise the US decision to build masses of less-powerful tanks meant we'd have lots of them. Those were deliberate decisions, not accidents. For the individual US tank crewmen it was a harsh decision. But it meant that US units could generally count on numerical advantage, and that's worth a lot.DMorpheus 15:51, 26 April 2006 (UTC)

It is utter nonesense to say the T-34 doesn't rely on sheer mass to fight German tanks. It took eight T-34's to kill one panther, stated by the same infamous "five sherman" report. The T-34's speed can outtake Panzer IV's turret traverse, against Panzer V it's no use. As for "war winning weapon", there is hardly another tank more deserving of the title. The Sherman even fought the six day war and won.

DD Sherman

Can anyone confirm that the tank at the Exercise Tiger memorial is or could have been DD? picture at this link. It appears to be a cast hull job with no sign of the DD skirt plate. GraemeLeggett 14:32, 28 April 2006 (UTC)

Belay that. The pic on wp here "Sherman tank at memorial for those killed in Operation Tiger.JPG" shows it more clearly and has the hallmarks of a DD. GraemeLeggett 19:10, 28 April 2006 (UTC)

Too many photos

IMHO - recent edits have introduced too many photos ( as of here http://en.wikipedia.org/search/?title=M4_Sherman&oldid=54668227 ) I am proposing to revert to here http://en.wikipedia.org/search/?title=M4_Sherman&oldid=54319121 . I would like to discuss before taking any action. Any comments ? Megapixie 07:28, 23 May 2006 (UTC)

Hello. I thought I read somewhere that Misplaced Pages did not consider articles to be complete until they were illustrated thoroughly. This could be a matter of taste but I find the fairly uniform right-hand thumbs unobtrusive while providing relevance to specific text of specific paragraphs. I find the new version tidier than the old version with fewer, larger photos. M4 Sherman variants and F4F Wildcat have significantly more photos-per-text but I think that those pages look fine too. Let's see what the others say.Wikist 09:28, 23 May 2006 (UTC)

I would say that the pictures have to be relevant, A T-34 knocked out by aircraft and a museum piece Panzer IV do not help to illustrate the articles contents. The LCT is not much help either as I don't think that it is of the LCT(4) that could take 9 Shermans (or 9 Cromwells) but probabaly a smaller Mark V. GraemeLeggett 11:27, 23 May 2006 (UTC)

I agree about the need for relevance. I debated with myself about the non-M4 photos but I thought that the article should help novices who wouldn't know an LST from an LVT * and the PzKpfw IV and T-34 show readers the main competitors/opponents of the Sherman in two wars as discussed in the summary evaluation. For the moment, I had to settle for photo evidence of the T-34 in Korea but I'd be happy if someone posts better photos such as a Korean War Sherman caught in the act of shooting a T-34.Wikist 12:01, 23 May 2006 (UTC)*PS: I think the Ambrose mention needs to be corrected since an LST could hold more than 1 larger tank.

I have changed the article to reflect, what I feel is the right number of images, for reference this version. I feel that too many images, especially images that are on pages just a single click from this article makes the article look like a bad webpage, rather than an encylopedia article. Megapixie 07:46, 25 May 2006 (UTC)

Although I think the revert makes an article of this type less informative (especially for a beginner lost in the alphabet soup of T23, HVSS, LST, etc.), I'm surprised that this was the first objection to the major restructuring that I've done since the beginning of April (the article is now about 50% larger but leaner). Incidentally, does the recent project tag mean that we've been promoted or demoted?Wikist 17:41, 25 May 2006 (UTC)

Variants re-merge(d)

I see that the variants have been re-merged. I would like to re-state:

1. The article is now longer than Misplaced Pages:Article size
2. It's messy - "major" and "minor" without stating criteria are not a good way to distinguish between the types (also it breaks the "family tree"
3. It excludes "post-war" variants, simply because they were "post-war".
4. Also, there are now 3 places that document variants

1. This page
2. The variants page
3. The recently created post-war variants page (based on a copy and paste of the lower half of the variants page)

I think this is not a good thing.

I propose that since we discussed it the first time when we split the article, we discuss it now it has been merged / split. What does everyone else think? Megapixie 05:34, 27 May 2006 (UTC)

1. The variant page HAS NOT been merged, and HAS NOT had its family tree broken in any way. It has been left alone.
2. There is NO violation of article size: 30-50kb is a GUIDELINE, Origins of the Civil War was over 80kb before losing its FA status I believe, and just recently Military history of France is about DOUBLE the size of the current Sherman article and won FA status on 5/11/06. In other words, we could DOUBLE the current Sherman article and be eligible for FA.
3. Major-minor criterion is stated; majors merited sub-articles. The family tree is on the variants page. It is not broken there. This is not the variants page.
4. It doesn't exclude postwar any more than it excludes the Firefly or M10 that have their own pages (the M51 Isherman is not an "M4" any more than an M10 is)--and any typical Sherman book uses "postwar" as a logical chapter divider.
5. At least two people on the variants page talk suggested that some variants should get their own page to remove clutter on the variant page and the postwar Sherman page obliges them. The Sherman article is now reaching a comprehensive/self-contained size per WP:PERFECT where it can make use of summary style or something similar to spinoff chapter sub-articles such as Postwar Sherman Tanks.Wikist 07:12, 27 May 2006 (UTC)

• Size does matter If you actually read the French Military History FA debate size was an issue - the article was trimmed down to about 64 k before it made FA - see the actual FA page ( http://en.wikipedia.org/search/?title=Military_history_of_France&action=edit&oldid=52577560 ). The effect of a lot of this trimming was to move things, like - lists - to subpages. If you actually look at the article, that's what happened ( List of French wars and battles) compare the article to how it looked before the FAC nomination process began . The Sherman page is approx 44 k now - so it is 2/3rds the size of the French Mil article. We could double the article size - but to make FA, we'd have to trim to 64 k - I'm guessing we'd move the variants list to a subpage...
• I completely agree that some of the variants need their own pages, and some will never have their own pages.
• Fair enough - not merged - but duplicated - The duplication of the list of variants seems ill-advised (harded to maintain/keep vandalism free), since it's exactly the same information in three places. Why not just have a single variants page/place ?

Megapixie 09:58, 27 May 2006 (UTC)

Well... I don't want to join a discussion about what is the exact meaning of the wikipedia article size guidelines or other guidelines and if these guidelines were violated or not. However... I don't like what's going on with the variants list. I can understand a reason behind a partial list (of major variants) in the M4 Sherman article, but do we need there a full list of say experimental anti-mine attachments ? IMO it's quite enough to have this list at the variants page. And a duplicating list of post-war models as a separate article really confuses me. If it is not an unnecessary duplication I don't know what is. Bukvoed 10:44, 27 May 2006 (UTC)

Although I've advocated NON-duplication a number of times, the consensus always has been in favor of duplication, and so the current variant lists are perfect considering that we have plenty of room (nowhere near 64kb) and it follows the established pattern of variant lists on the M7, M10, and M36 pages. Although I agree that the M4 Sherman variants list page is largely redundant, it hasn't completely duplicated other pages because, since it's only a list, it's usually lacking information such as contained on Postwar Sherman Tanks.Wikist 12:06, 27 May 2006 (UTC)

Perhaps I don't understand something... Until a couple of days ago, we had: 1) the "main" M4 Sherman article with historical data, description etc. and link to the "variants" article; 2) the M4 Sherman variants article which was just a (hopefully) full list of varians; 3) articles on the firefly, the DD and possibly other variants linked from vthe "variants" article and possibly from the "main" one. To me, it looked like an ok arrangement.

Now we have another page, the "postwar" one. Right now, it's mostly a copy of the post-war section of the variants page with a small text on post-war employment. Why was that "postwar" article necessary ? Why couldn't the postwar employment fit in the "main" article, especially if you don't think that it's too long ? In addition, another part of the "variants" article was copied to the "main" article. Once again, why ? If you have in mind some specific arrangement that will be better than the previous one, can you please explain it (I'm sorry if I missed something) ? Because right now, the situation is rather - I'll say it again - confusing. Bukvoed 13:00, 27 May 2006 (UTC)

Hello. You still have your OK arrangement as far as I know; others have mentioned that they expect to change the variant page from a list into something else as soon as possible but you'll have to work that out with them over there because I'm not involved there. Actually, it was the main article that was copied to the variants page, but I think the main page is rounding out nicely and the postwar page is no different than the Hobart's Funnies page--an article on related variants in more detail than the main article provides (standard Misplaced Pages practice).Wikist 14:00, 27 May 2006 (UTC)

Naming

At present the start of the article says the name Sherman is British-derived rather than original. I would be very surprised were this the case, given that American tank designs before and since have all had General names and it's unlikely the British, rather than the manufacturers or the US authorities, would have supplied the name for this one. Can anyone provide a reliable source? The Land 17:19, 27 May 2006 (UTC)

I can't think of a single named tank prior to the M4 with the exception of the M3 General Lee. While I have no source this would not surprise me as this is definitly the case with US Aircraft names at the beginning of the second world war, in which there was an overly heavy influence. -- Thatguy96 13:33, 27 May 2006

The other pre-Sherman model was the Stuart. The Lee and Stuart articles have the same claim made about their name. It is something I find surprising but not totally implausible (after all, everyone calls the Hetzer the Hetzer....) I would like a source though! The Land 17:45, 27 May 2006 (UTC)

What's this about? The proper designation for the Americans; was Medium Tank M4, and like Stuart, Lee, Grant, Chaffee, Priest, & Wolverine names given by the British, the same was done for the M4, becoming the General/Sherman.
Source:
Quotes:
On the Medium M4:
"issued to the British, the M4 medium tank was named the "General Sherman", more often called the "Sherman", by which name it also became popularly known by other nations."
And others: On the Medium M3:
"This version was called the Grant by the British (after Geneal Ulysses S. Grant)"
"Standard M3 mediums were thus also supplied to the British Army who gave these vehicles the name Lee (after Robert E. Lee)"
On the Light M3:
"In British service, the M3 was named "General Stuart", more commonly called the "Stuart" and unofficially nick-named the "Honey"."
On the 3in GMG M10:
"A number of M10s and M10A1s were supplied to Britain in 1944 where they were designated "3in SP, Wolverine"."
On the 105mm HMV M7:
"In British service the M7 was designated "105mm SP, Priest"."
On the Light M24:
"In British service the M24 was called the Chaffee and this name was subqeuently adopted in the U.S. Army."
King nothing 14:42, 28 May 2006 (UTC)

Fair enough. Let's insert the source into the articles then. The Land 18:55, 28 May 2006 (UTC)

Layout problems?

I'm seeing the infobox and the "selected sub-types" table overlap in my browser (I use Firefox). I'm not sure how prevalent this is, but might it be an idea to move the table further down the article? Chris 14:26, 9 July 2006 (UTC)

It is probably because you have the TOC off and are running at a resolution different than other editors? It's unfortunate the software doesn't force tables below infoboxes in that situation.Michael Dorosh 15:04, 9 July 2006 (UTC)

That can probably be accomplished by adding the style="clear:both;" to the table attributes. —Michael Z. 2006-07-09 15:18 Z

I have my TOC on, although it's possible I'm using a less common resolution or font size. I think I'll let someone else play with the table style, I'm too concerned about making a mess of it myself! Chris 15:24, 9 July 2006 (UTC)

Hm. I just looked at the table code, and it was a bit of a mess. I cleaned it up, simplified, and added the "clear". Does this fix your problem, Chris? —Michael Z. 2006-07-09 15:44 Z

Yeah, it's looking a lot better now. Cheers! Chris 16:38, 9 July 2006 (UTC)

A strong tank?

After reading the article, it gives me the impression that the Sherman was as strong as German tanks.

"the top armor was equal to that of the Tiger."

"In 1944-45, Shermans with 105 mm howitzers provided even more powerful high-explosive armament."

"the Sherman's 75 mm gun, inherited from the M3 Lee, could kill any German tank then in service at normal combat ranges."

These are taken from the article. I have believed that the Sherman tank had a poor combat performance and the only superiority over German tanks it had was its mobility. The article is a little misleading. I am wondering if it is possible to edit the Sherman's performance and any other viewpoints. thank you Good friend100 03:53, 15 July 2006 (UTC)

Hello. The same paragraphs also mention "failures" with the intent to balance pros and cons, although there is room for improvement. If this article sounds different from other articles, that could be because other sources have mislead people. Thank you.Wikist 06:18, 16 September 2006 (UTC)

Israeli Sherman

Go to this site for upgraded oldies

http://www.israeli-weapons.com/weapons/vehicles/tanks/sherman/Sherman.html

Takima 01:49, 22 July 2006 (UTC)

Have you not seen the Postwar Sherman tanks article? -- Thatguy96 03:08, 22 July 2006 (UTC)

M4 production vs T-34 production

Many books and other sources state that more Shermans were produced than T-34's while just as many state the the opposite. Can someone tell me which tank was produced more and does someone know the exact number produced of each?chubbychicken 05:21, 30 August 2006 (UTC)

There are production figures here: Category:World War II armored fighting vehicle production. Bukvoed 07:38, 30 August 2006 (UTC)

Nice cutaway image - worth including in the article ?

I found this a while back, cleaned it up and uploaded it to the commons. Is it worth integrating into the article ? I'm in two minds about it, since the image would be too small to read any of the labels - but it is quite nice. What does everyone else think ? Megapixie 07:04, 8 September 2006 (UTC)

Yes, nice picture. I think an average reader is intelligent enough to click on the image to see a larger version :). Bukvoed 07:26, 8 September 2006 (UTC)

Agreed. Excellent pic in my opinion. I reckon it should be added to the article.chubbychicken 09:12, 8 September 2006 (UTC)

Production dates

The article doesn't mention when the Sherman was designed, first produced, and issued to troops.  —Michael Z. 2006-09-15 06:36 Z

Hello. You make an important point. I mentioned this issue earlier in the "Off-Topic" post on this page and I added many of the production and service dates that do appear but more dates still should be high on the to-do list so thank you for reminding everyone.Wikist 06:23, 16 September 2006 (UTC)

Subsection name

I don't think "Why wasn't" etc can be acceptable as a section name aside form capitalisation issues. can this not be rewritten? GraemeLeggett 13:25, 15 September 2006 (UTC)

I couldn't agree more. It is POV - both the title and the content - and begs questions that are not addressed. DMorpheus 14:38, 15 September 2006 (UTC)

Although the submission is a reasonable editorial for somewhere, the more fundamental problem is that many people tend to turn this M4 article into an M27 article, or M26 article, or T-34 article, or Tiger article. I moved this M27-design-history submission to the T20 article where it is more logical and more needed. If there is consensus for this location, discussion about factual errors and POV can continue there. Thank you.Wikist 06:51, 16 September 2006 (UTC)

Just so that you're all aware. I'm responsible for the "Why wasn't..." Submission. The copy is based primarily upon "British and American tanks of WWII" By Chamberlain and Ellis, published 1969, and is accurate as far as I am aware. I am entirely happy for article to be moved to the T20 entry, but still think the M4 article deserves some explaination as to why the Sherman was not replaced when alternatives became available. Cheers, Getztashida 1645, 18 September

Further to that point, the submission presented a deliberately simplified account of the dispute between the AGF and Ordnance dept in the interest of brevity. I am happy to expand the article significantly and present a better rounded description for the T20 article. Cheers,Getztashida 1715, 18 September

Hello. The explanation is in the M4 article and people can follow the T20 link if they want the full story, "Although Ordnance began work on the Medium Tank T20 as a Sherman replacement, ultimately the Army decided to minimize production disruption by incorporating elements of other tank designs into Sherman production. Later M4A1, M4A2, and M4A3 models received the larger T23 turret with . . . ." I will reply to your other points on the T20 page. Thank you.Wikist 18:35, 18 September 2006 (UTC)

Sources

Sources should be listed without including a "book review" like the one accompanying the Belton Cooper bibliographic citation.

Gen. Jacob L. Devers

Not one single mention of Gen. Devers. Amazing! Can someone explain the reasons for omitting the Chief of the Armor School who supervised the activation and training of 12 of the 16 armored divisions created by the US Army during WWII? By the way, this is the same man established armored force doctrine for the armored divisions. Wow!

Hello. Devers appears in the Service History section. Feel free to add to the Jacob L. Devers article. PS: Please sign your posts by typing 4 tildes (~) to add the auto-signature with timestamp. Thank you.Wikist 02:05, 14 October 2006 (UTC)

OK. A single mention of Devers hardly fills the bill when talking about the Sherman tank and the US Armored Force. Where is the discussion of his contribution to Armored Force Doctrine? After all, Devers is the one who oversaw its development. Hell. For that matter, Devers is the one who inherited the Sherman, and worked long and hard to make it a suitable combat weapon. (Devers even recommended a bigger gun for the Sherman in 1942, but got overruled by McNair. If he had his way the Sherman would have never seen combat with a 75mm gun. The 76mm would have been standardized, and the 90mm would have been in Shermans by late 1943 or early 1944.) Here's a hint. Armored Force Doctrine did not limit the use of Sherman tanks to the role infantry support weapons. Don't cite Ambrose for something like this. He is just plain wrong, and no serious military historian relys on Ambrose for this type of informaiton. Cite the History of the Armored Force prepared by the Army Ground Forces. It clearly states that Armored Force Doctrine called for tanks to be used as part of a combined arms force in which each of the three primary components were interdependent and mutually supporting. This was the case in the armored divisions even though the infantry divisions misused the GHQ tank battalions that were attached to them. In fact, the infantry divisions were soundly criticized during and after the war for not following Armored Force Doctrine. Gee Whiz. I have yet to find a WWII wiki article that was not riddled with errors.

22 October 2006 1220 Hours

Hello. Although I do not agree with everything in the article either, I do not see that your post identifies any errors in the Misplaced Pages article (e.g. stating what Ambrose wrote is as valid as stating what Cooper wrote) and you can see that Philippsbourg/Phillipsbourg already addressed many of your points on this talk page but feel free to add supportable information to the appropriate article (most of your points would be best in the US doctrine, 76 mm gun M1, Jacob L. Devers, and other articles). Thank you for reminding me to move the doctrine information (also affecting Lee, M10, et al.) to a doctrine article to which all the vehicle pages can link.Wikist 06:55, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

Ambrose Is Wrong

Please see: "Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The History of the US Armored Forces, George F. Hofmann and General Donn A. Starry, editors. In particular you will want to read Hofmann's chapter entitled "Army Doctrine and the Christie Tank," as well as Christopher Gabel's chapter, "WWII Armor Operations in Europe." And finally, General Starry's comments on the subject in the final chapter.

"Infantry divisions were assigned separate tank battalions to assist with infantry attacks. Armored divisions expanded on the cavalry's traditional missions of pursuit and exploitation, fighting as combined arms teams with the tank as the main maneuver element." pp. 130-131.

Armored force doctrine, that is to say how the Sherman tank was used in combat, was reflected in the operational art of the armored divisions, not in the misuse of the GHQ tank battalions by infantry officers who were ignorant of the correct armored force doctrine. The improper use of the GHQ tank battalions by infantry officers was the subject of much controversy during and immediately after the war, as evidenced in the relevant "Reports of the General Board, European Theater of Operations US Army."

Wake up children. Just because Ambrose is popular, does not mean he is right.

23 October, 2006 1750 Hours.

Still Nothing About Devers?

I am beginning to think that you kids don't know much about the man or what he accomplished as Chief of the Armored Force.

23 October, 2006 1755 Hours.

Ambrose and the LST

Ambrose did not do his homework. Marshall never said he favored the Sherman because two could fit in an LST. Why you might ask? Because an LST was designed to carry approximately one full company of Sherman tanks.

76mm vs T-34/85

The idea that the addition of the 76mm gun to the Sherman placed on par with the T-34/85 is open to question. The author of that revision should provide us with some sort of proof, especially since there are so many variablbles involved that a general statement on the subject is effectively useless. 14thArmored 1300 Hours, 26 October 2006

What's the problem with that comparison ? They just installed a better gun on the M4 to have better anti-tank performance. The gun performance was somewhat similar to the soviet 85 mm gun. --Denniss 21:00, 26 October 2006 (UTC)

Please cite your source for this otherwise useless comparison. 14thArmored 1500 Hours, 26 October 2006

The figures in the table in 76 mm gun M1 look to be in the ballpark to me, and the sources for that are cited. If you rewrote the sentence with the penetration figures, it would still make the same point. —Michael Z. 2006-10-26 23:37 Z

The source is inaccurate. It lists an M61 APC round for the 76mm gun, but the US Army Ordnance Supply Manual for 1944-45 does not list an M61 for the 76mm gun. There is an M61 for the 75mm gun. This makes the rest of the source's figures questionable. In fact, they do not match those found in the Supply Manual for the simple reason that the Ordnance Dept. tested penetration with the targets at 90 degress, and calculated the estimated penetration for an 20% slope instead of 30%. As it turns out, their slide-rule math was wrong, and the penetration figures were too optimistic. See Bailey's "Faint Praise" for more information on this subject.

The HVAP round was the only round that brought the penetration of the 76mm into the same realm as the T34/85, but the round was so rare during WWII that most tank crews never fired one in combat.14thArmored 1900 Hours, 27 October 2006

Thank you for noticing the M61 because it led me to spot and change a few other points as well.Wikist 12:32, 28 October 2006 (UTC)

HVAP, etc.

Sources are Green, Thomson, and Roots, "The Ordnance Dept.: Planning Munitions for War;" 6th Army Group/Seventh Army field tests conducted in Feb. 1945 by the 14th Armored Division; former logistics officer of the 14th Armored Division. 75mm Shermans remained in combat for the simple reason that there were not enough 76mm Shermans to replace them. Duh! By the way, I don't know who started the idea that the 75mm HE had so much more punch than the 76mm that it was a big deal. When more punch was needed a 105mm Sherman, a Calliope, an sp 155mm gun, or the field artillery was called in. More and more 105mm Shermans came in to replace the little 75mm how assault guns later in the war, and they did a much better job on fortifications than the 75mm guns. 14thArmored 1600 Hours, 26 October 2006

Hello, User:14thArmored. I am always interested in uncommon information so maybe you can explain a few points (and anyone else who can corroborate can comment):

1.“6th Army Group/Seventh Army field tests conducted in Feb. 1945 by the 14th Armored Division; former logistics officer of the 14th Armored Division”

Why did the logistics officer do something that is normally the job of the ordnance officer?

After thinking it over, I realized that I did not do a very good job explaining some of this stuff. So here is another try.

Lt. Col. Megica, the c.o. of the 136th Ordnance Bn. was probably responsible for conducting the tests (now that I think about it, it was really a demonstration, since the M93 was supposed to be issued, and they were trying to show what it could do.) I asked Col. (later Lt. Gen. I think) Seneff about it years ago at a reunion. Seneff was the G-4, and put the thing together since there were so many of the top brass coming. (You know that the ordnance officer reports to the G-4, right?) Anyway, Seniff told me to talk to the tanker who fired the HVAP. I did , and he told me all about it. We later became good friends. So years later I was talking to Eric Orsini, who was the c.o. of one of the tank bn. service companies, and this HVAP subject came up. (Eric served as a Deputy? Asst. Sec. of the Army (Logisitcs and Aquisitions?) for years and years after the war.) Anyway, Orsini started cussing about the HVAP. Couldn't get, he said. After the demo, word got around, and some tankers were asking for it, but there was none to be had. Sometime, I don't know when, he did some checking, and found out that very damn little got to the front line troops before the end of the war. Eric wrote me a letter about it a few years ago, but I don't know if I can find it now. They actually flew in a few emergency plane loads of the stuff from the US, but it took so long to get up front that the war was virtually over by the time it got there. Total theater supply was supposed to be about 2 rounds per tank per month, and the "peak" didn't hit until late April. So I did some checking myself. Can't find a single round of M93 in the division ammo sit. reps. for March or April, even after the division was attached to 3rd Army which was rumored to get the better stuff before 7th Army did. I've also never found a tanker who remembers firing an M93 in combat. My guess is that very few rounds of M93 made it "to the guns" in any tank unit, so it had virtually no effect on helping the 76mm in combat against panthers, lions, tigers, bears, or anything with a thick skin. Everybody loved the 90mm TDs of the 636th when they were attached. They were the real equalizers in armored combat, not the magical M93 that no one had anyway. In fact, those boys are always welcomed with open arms at our reunions, and are eligible to be members of the Association even though they were not organic to the division. I've probably said more than you or anyone else wants to hear about this so I'll shut up now. 14thArmored 1900 Hours, 1 November 2006

2.“Hypervelocity Armor Piercing HVAP ammunition, was developed for the 76 mm gun in late 1944. . . . This ammunition did not arrive in the ETO until early 1945”

There were 2 types of 76 mm HVAP and the date of use could be before the date of standardization. Green et al. (which you mentioned as a source) states that 76 mm HVAP was fielded by September 1944 (Green et al., 1955, p. 373).

Yes, and the same source says on the same page that the T4 HVAP "...failed to solve the major problem, for it did not successfully penetrate the glacis plate of the Panther tank a practical ranges." The source goes on to say that "Continued development produced an improved design, the T4E20 which was standardized early in 1945 as the M93." The source gives no indication that the original T4 ammunition was issued to combat units. If this were the case, the T4 round should appear on the ammunition reports for the various armies, and it does not. This means only one version of the HVAP, the M93 was actually used in combat, and it arrived in the ETO in early 1945. Of course, I would be happy to see any sources you might wish to cite regarding the issuance of the T4 ammunition to combat units.14thArmored 1900 Hours, 22 November 2006

3.The 76 mm gun M1 figures “do not match those found in the Supply Manual for the simple reason that the Ordnance Dept. tested penetration with the targets at 90 degress, and calculated the estimated penetration for an 20% slope instead of 30%. As it turns out, their slide-rule math was wrong, and the penetration figures were too optimistic. See Bailey's "Faint Praise" for more information on this subject.”

If the Ordnance Supply Manual is wrong, then isn’t it good that 76 mm gun M1 does not match the source that is wrong?

No sir. It means that the Ordnance Department's figures for penetration were too optimistic, which explains the variance between the calculated penetration and the actual experience on the battlefield. In short, penetration on the battlefield was not as good as it was on paper. 14thArmored 1900 Hours, 22 November 2006

4.“The HVAP round was the only round that brought the penetration of the 76mm into the same realm as the T34/85”

The Soviet Kubinka tests and the Western Isigny tests seem to match 76 mm gun M1 and support a “comparable” penetration claim for non-HVAP also.

5 “When more punch was needed a 105mm Sherman, a Calliope, an sp 155mm gun, or the field artillery was called in.”

Is there a citation for this as an Army reason in support of arming Shermans with the 76 mm gun?

Yes. It is called Combined Arms Warfare. You may also wish to see R.P. Hunnicutt's comments on the subject on page 213 of his "Sherman: History of the Medium Tank." Hunnicutt says that within a month of the landings in Normandy the armored units "...wanted every 76mm gun tank available..." Thus, as I previously pointed out, the 14thArmored 1900 Hours, 22 November 2006

6. "Damn. We couldn't tell a bit of difference between the damage done by the 75mm and 76mm HE rounds. Why? You might well ask. The extra kinetic energy of the standard 76mm HE round did all kinds of damage that the 75mm couldn't do."

This questions one of the basic concepts behind howitzers and suggests that a high-KE 76 mm HVAP against infantry might be as good as a 75 mm, 76 mm, or 105 mm HE shell. Where can I see the data about the interchangeability of HE and KE effects?

You are being silly about using HVAP against infantry, but I'll let it pass. The answer is Yes. See the technical section of Hunnicutt's book (cited above) and compare the KE of the 75 and 76mm HE rounds. (No one was talking about HVAP in this context, but you.) The KE of the 76mm HE round is more than 50% greater than its little brother. Also take the time to examine a quality text on military ballistics. Not a picture book, but a technical textbook. There, in a section dealing with terminal ballistics and blast effects you will see that KE potentiates the effects of HE.

7. “More and more 105mm Shermans came in to replace the little 75mm how assault guns later in the war.”

This information used to be in the article until Phillipsbourg deleted it by saying that it was false.

8. “75mm Shermans remained in combat for the simple reason that there were not enough 76mm Shermans to replace them. Duh!”

Overall supply not the point of the deleted sentence. The deleted sentence referred to some units which kept a 75mm gun because it had advantages over the 76 mm gun (Zaloga and Sarson, 1978, p. 37-38).

You may wish to see R.P. Hunnicutt's comments on the subject found on page 213 of his "Sherman: A History of the American Medium Tank." Hunnicutt says that within a month of the landings in Normandy the armored units "...wanted every 76mm gun tank available..." This is echoed repeatedly in various reports and other communications from the theater. The only exception was the stated need for more 105mm Shermans, provided they had power traverse. Thus, as I previously pointed out, the 75mm Sherman remained in combat only because of the supply shortages of the 76mm gun tank. 14thArmored 1900 Hours, 22 November 2006

Once again, here's the quotation: (Zaloga, Sarson - Sherman Medium Tank 1942-45, Osprey Publishing 1993, ISBN 1-85532-296-X, p 37-38) Col. James Leach, in 1944 a company commander with 37th Tank Bn, 4th Armored Division, recalled that in his unit at least one tank in each platoon was a 75mm gun tank. This was arranged because there was no WP smoke round for the 76mm gun. When venturing forward, the 75mm gun tank would keep a WP round loaded, and if an enemy tank or SP gun was encountered that coluld not be dealt with frontally, it was attacked with the smoke round to prevent it from engaging the Shermans.

The context is tactics used by US units to overcome the one-on-one superiority of some German vehicles, not the overall attitude toward the 76mm. Zaloga makes it clear that units were not reluctant to receive more 76mm (e.g. p 33, after describing an encounter with the Panther in Normandy: After a few of these incidents there were no more reports of any reluctance to take the 76mm gun Shermans.). It seems that Col. Leach was talking about the internal distribution of tanks the unit had anyway (one might speculate what would happen if the share of the 76mm would near 100%... perhaps then Leach's unit would say "no, we want to keep some 75mm for the WP"... but we don't deal with speculations here, right ?). The quotation does imply that the 75mm was useful in some situations; perhaps it deserves mention in the article. But if the deleted sentence in question was that one: "By the end of the war, half the US Army Shermans in Europe had the 76 mm gun <<for better anti-armor work while half had the 75 mm gun for better HE and smoke work, and some units intentionally kept a mix of both guns>>.", I'd say this wording might be a bit misleading. Bukvoed 08:51, 23 November 2006 (UTC)

Thanks for the additonal information. The 4th A.D. was a damn fine outfit! Different divisions handled the distribution of the 76mm gun tanks in different ways. The 14th A.D. organized them into platoons. At first it was one platoon per company until each company had a platoon of 76mm, and by the end of the war about 60% of the division's Shermans were 76mm so there had to be some mixed platoons. The use of WP was one of those heart in the throat (s---- your pants, really) kinds of things that occurred in a meeting engagement with something our tanks could not handle. If you were lucky, a direct hit with the WP might panic the German tank crew and cause them to do something dumb like stick their tank, throw a track or even abandon their tanks. If they were veterans, they would get their tank the hell out of there before the artillery started coming in on their position or before a 90mm TD (if one was around) got onto them or before the armored infantry could get into position or before a Sherman showed up on the flank. There were lots of things in and "over" an armored TF or combat command that could spook a Panther or Tiger, etc. and put a hell of a lot more WP and HE on it than a little 75mm tank gun. The problem was surviving long enough in the Sherman for these other weapons to be brought to bear. The best thing to do when you ran across a big German tank was to get the hell out of there, and wait for the artillery, air, etc. to take care of it or drive it off. Richochet fire was often attempted although conditions had to be just right, and assisted by considerable luck, for it to work.

Your assessment of the wording regarding units intentionally keeping 75mm Shermans seems dead on to me. I have yet to hear some veteran tanker say he wished for a 75mm Sherman instead of a 76mm. You can hear them say they wish they had more f.o.s with them to call in the big stuff.

Thanks again for the quotation. (I guess I need to go buy a copy of Zaloga.)

  14thArmored 1000 Hours 23 November 2006

9. “By the way, I don't know who started the idea that the 75mm HE had so much more punch than the 76mm that it was a big deal.”

I thought the US Army started the idea, since it designed the guns and shells in question (Armored Force 1943 statement, Zaloga and Sarson, 1978, p. 6).

You have overestimated the importance of the single word "inferior." Keep in mind that what was said in 1943 simply might no longer apply once the 76mm went into battle. 14thArmored 1900 Hours, 22 November 2006

OK. In the past two weeks or so I have talked with several armored division officers and NCOs who saw their fair share of combat during the war. Among them are one or two tank "aces," a USMA graduate who taught tank gunnery at Ft. Knox in 1943 and early 1944, and went on to become the S-3 of an organic tank battalion and later a battalion commander, and a former S-3 of a combat command, a former artilleryman who had previously taught advanced tank gunnery at either Ft. Knox or Camp Campbell. You or perhaps I should say Zaloga, have aroused our interest, and we all would appreciate knowing the designation/s of the armored units that Zaloga claims wanted to retain 75mm M4s over getting tanks with 76mm guns because no one we know would have willingly done this. In fact, we went through some "creative" logistical efforts to get more 76mm M4s instead of 75mm. If you could supply this information it would be very helpful, and much appreciated, as my local library does not have any of Zaloga's books, and I would prefer not to have to buy one unless I have to. I am sure you will understand my desire to see that only the most accurate information regarding the M4 tank is placed on this page, and that it reflects the realities of the battlefield.

Which, specific 1943 Armored Force "statement" is Zaloga talking about? I have a copy of an unpublished interview of Gen. Devers in which he says that he was fighting for a 76mm or larger gun for the M4 in 1943. He says nothing in favor of the 75mm gun except that it is not enough gun for his tanks.

Thank you for your help. 14thArmored 1400 Hours, 13 November 2006

Thank you.Wikist 12:02, 28 October 2006 (UTC)

It is obvious from your questions that I don't have a clue what I'm talking about. I was just trying to set you kids straight about a few things. Please feel free to change whatever you think I got wrong. 14thArmored 2000 Hours, 28 October 2006

About the Armored Force statement - perhaps this one (from Zaloga's M4 (76mm) Sherman Medium Tank 1943-65, Osprey Publishing 2003, ISBN 1-84176-542-2, p 7): General Devers ... was booted upstairs, departing Fort Knox in May 1943 to take command over the ETO. Devers was replaced by General Allan Gillem, an infantry officer. ... On September 1, 1943, Gillem sent a second letter to AGF, clarifying the Armored Force requirements: "The 76mm Gun M1 as a tank weapon has one superior characteristic to the 75mm Tank Gun M3 ... armored penetrating power. ... The high explosive pitching power of the 76mm gun is inferior to that of the 75mm gun. The 76mm HE shell weight 12.37lbs and has a charge of .86lbs explosive. The 75mm shell weighs 14.6lbs and has a charge of 1.47lbs of explosive. The exterior ballistics generally of the 76mm gun are less satisfactory for a general purpose medium tank weapon that the 75mm gun. The 76mm gun has an extremely heavy muzzle blast, such that the rate of fire when the groun is dry is controlled by the muzzle blast dust cloud. Under many conditions that dust cloud does not clear for 8 to 30 seconds. The presence of this heavy muzzle blast makes sensing the round extremely difficult for the tank commander and gunner." ... Gillem recommended that the M4 with a 76mm gun be deployed on a ratio of one per three tanks ... he rejected the idea of switching to 100% production of the M4 with 76mm gun. Bukvoed 13:01, 14 November 2006 (UTC)

More relevant (hopefully) quotations from the same source:

P 12: In spite of this attitude in the Italian Theater, there was no such enthusiasm in the ETO. ... on April 20, 1944 ... an officer from the AFV&W Section of the 1st Army persented a comparison between the 76mm tank and the more familiar 75mm tank. He stressed that the new tank offered greater accuracy and improved armor and concrete penetration, but that it suffered from blast obscuration that hindered direct fire control. It also had an inferior HE projectile, lacked smoke ammunition and had decreased ammunition storage.

P 13: On the June 12, 1944 a firing demonstration of the M4 tank with 76mm gun was conducted for Patton, the commanders of 2th, 5th and 6th Armored Divisions, and several other senior commanders. "All the commanders were reluctant to see it take the place of the 75mm in any quantity". Patton was willing to accept some as long as they were confined to separate tank battalions... Bukvoed 13:21, 14 November 2006 (UTC)

Thank you for the quotations. It is very interesting. I fear that the information is not in the proper context. For example, Gillem is merely explaining the results of testing in the US, and is not addressing actual battlefield performance, he is simply noting the differences between the two guns. The ground in the ETO was rarely dry enough for the muzzel blast to cause the problems he mentions, and if I remember correctly, the problem was at least partially solved by the addition of a muzzel brake. (The early 76mm guns were without one.) The blast radius between the 75mm and 76mm guns was not really noticeable in combat. After all, the 75mm gun's HE bursting charge was the same as the 75mm How., which was not that much. It is also noted that the 75mm Sherman nearly went out of production in the second half of 1944, and production was turned over almost completely to the 76mm and 105mm M4s. I also note that there is not given a single example of an experienced division, in combat in the ETO, rejecting a 76mm M4 in favor of a 75mm.

It is also interesting that none of the armored division commanders mentioned had much, if any experience with their divisions in combat on the continent at the time of the tests. I can promise you with confidence that none of these commanders had the same opinion after their divisions had a suitable amount of time in combat in the ETO.

(You must have meant the 1st A.D. in Italy, not 1st Army. 5th Army was in Italy. Still, it is not a battlefieled comparison.)

I think that our friend Zaloga has told us only part of the story in this regard, and in so doing, has failed to examine the actual relative value of the two HE rounds in combat. For example, the 76mm was a very accurate weapon even at long range. It was able to consistently place its HE rounds on target. What more is needed when you hit an appropriate target with .86 lbs instead of 1.47 lbs of HE? Nothing of course. So the article should reflect that any concerns about the differences in HE were expressed prior to the 76mm being used in combat for long enough to tell if your really needed the bigger charge in combined arms combat operations. Thanks again for the quotations. 14thArmored 1000 Hours, 14 November 2006

>You must have meant the 1st A.D. in Italy, not 1st Army. 5th Army was in Italy. Still, it is not a battlefieled comparison.

Well... I tried to avoid too much typing and apparently it was not a good idea... Zaloga says that there was an overwhelming demand in Italy for the 76mm, than that In spite of this attitude in the Italian Theater, there was no such enthusiasm in the ETO. A first bunch of M4A1 (76mm) tanks arrived in Britain on april 10, 1944. A conference was held at the 1st Army headquarters on April 20, 1944 to discuss how to distribute them. Since none of the officers present had seen the new type, an officer from the AFV&W Section of the 1st Army presented a comparison between the 76mm tank and the more familiar 75mm tank. He stressed that the new tank offered greater accuracy and improved armor and concrete penetration, but that it suffered from blast obscuration that hindered direct fire control. It also had an inferior HE projectile, lacked smoke ammunition and had decreased ammunition storage.

So the presentation had nothing to do with Italy or with 1st AD. I agree, it was not based on actual combat experience with 76mm Sherman. And of course Gillem's letter from 1943 could not be based on such. As far as I can see Zaloga brings all this and more in order to explain why it took so long for the US to develop and field the upgunned Sherman. He does say that combat experience in Normandy changed the opinion about the 76mm - because 75mm AP performance was inadequate by then, so the "only superior characteristic" of the 76mm all of a sudden became more critical (then the 76mm also turned out to be somewhat disappointing, but it's different story). He does not express opinion (or I failed to locate it) on whether those early concerns about weak HE action of the 76mm were justified or not, he just totally shifts the focus to the anti-armor performance.

Anyway, just happened to have the "right" book and just wanted to help. Bukvoed 19:51, 14 November 2006 (UTC)

I thank you for taking the time and effort in explaining Zaloga's statments and apparent intent regarding the 75mm vs 76mm M4. Your assessment of the source on this topic certainly "fits" with the experience of those who actually used them in combat in the ETO. For a while there, I thought that Zaloga was saying that veteran armored divisions in in the theater were refusing 76mm M4s in favor of 75mm. Thanks again. Your honest and forthright presentation of the sources comments are very much appreciated.14thArmored 1010 Hours, 15 November 2006

Bukvoed, hello and thank you for confirming what I was trying to explain about the difference between overall supply and unit composition (based on each gun’s capabilities). I began like you as a passer-by providing the Zaloga source to explain someone else’s edit. The editor who originally added that information about keeping mixed 75/76 units actually wrote “most medium battalions” (4/17/06) but I changed it to the more cautious “some units” because I quickly remembered only Zaloga’s reference to Leach’s platoons and I did not want to overstate the point. I agree that the deleted sentence could be improved when it gets restored. Thank you.Wikist 18:56, 4 December 2006 (UTC)

Wikist, RE: Courtesy Quite some time ago you presented me with a rather long list of questions (above) expressing what I took as an indication of sincere interest in what you termed "uncommon information." Despite my initial pique at the your tone of some of your questions, I took the time to answer them. It seems more than a little discourteous for you to ignore this fact while at the same time commending Bukvoed, who did your work for you by supplying additional information on the subject from Zaloga. In the future, please have the courtesy to acknowledge another editor's efforts to respond to your queries, especially when there are so many of them. Thank you. 14thArmord 1400 Hours, 4 December 2006

Hello. I thanked you in advance but I am sorry to hear that you are piqued by so many things (I was also sad to read that Bukvoed did all that work for you because you did not want to buy the $13 Zaloga book and then you decided to buy it anyway). You can avoid over-typing if you search previous discussions before posting, stay on topic, and follow Misplaced Pages policies on WP:Civility, WP:Verifiability, and Misplaced Pages:No original research. For the definite Misplaced Pages-acceptable sources; I know that Hunnicutt’s data show the 76 mm HE to have more KE than a 75 mm or 105 mm HE had but that does not refute Army statements that the 75 HE was better than the 76 HE (Zaloga and Sarson, 1978, p. 6, 12) so we can restore those explanations of Army decisions to the article; We agree that Green shows HVAP fielded by September 1944 (“early in 1945” is a standardization date, not a shipping date) so we can fix that sentence which has been wrong since October. Thank you.Wikist 18:38, 15 December 2006 (UTC)

Wikist: You are very rude to ask me so many questions, and then not bother with thanking me for taking the time to answer them.

It is a very serious mistake to rely on a single source, especially when it is refuted by more credible sources (and especially when it is not an academic, scholarly work). I can tell you for certain that the T4E20, 76mm HVAP(M93)did not arrive in the ETO until early 1945, and was not actually issued to combat units until that time. (They actually flew the stuff in directly from the factories in the US once it came into production.) Do you really thing the T4 was so quickly improved, tested, and accepted that it could be produced and into the hands of the troops in just two or three months? (See: M.G. Lutes' "Report to ASF and SHAEF on Shortages in the ETO," and the "12th Army Group Operational History: Armored Annex,"; "Official Munitions Production in WWII: War Department.") The D/S (Day of Supply) of M93 in the ETO never exceeded 2rds/gun/day. This means that damn little of the stuff made it to the front line troops, and that it had no impact at all on the battlefield. As far as penetration figures are concerned they must be expressed in terms of obliquity in order to be accurate. I can also tell you for certain that the HE effects of the 75mm were inferior to the 76mm under the battlefield conditions of armored warfare. (See: Mayo, "The Ordnance Dept.: On Beachead and Battlefront," p. 334.) For your information, the "Army statement" you refer to is not an "Army statement." It was actually a letter from M.G. Gillem, Commanding General of the Armored Center (no longer the "Armored Force" It was down-graded after Devers left to assume command of the ETOUSA in mid-1943.), to Lt. Gen. McNair. Gillem was merely stating a series of "facts" as they were determined from testing, (more HE = bigger bang!) not actual experience of combat troops on the battlefield. (See: "The Armored Force Command and Center: Historical Section, Army Ground Forces Study No. 27, 1946.)

No, we are not in agreement regarding the sentence/s in question unless they are strictly worded to acurately reflect the historical facts. If you can provide some compelling source/s to the contrary, I will be happy to discuss them with you. 14thArmored 1300 Hours 15 December 2006.

Just for the Record: I decided to purchase a copy of Zaloga's book so in the future I can check for myself to see if you are misrepresenting yet again what he writes. 14thArmored 1300 Hours 16 December 2006.

Wikist, My Dear Rude Fellow

On what day or in what month was T4, T4E20, M93 76mm HVAP ammunition first issued to American combat units in the ETO? What unit received this issue? What was the D/S issued? When was the first use of this ammunition in actual combat, and what unit used it? Source/s?

When during WWII did the US Army begin general issues of experimental tank ammunition for main guns to combat troops? Source/s?

Please name a specific combat unit of battalion or divisional size that refused 76mm Sherman tanks in favor of retaining or receiving 75mm Sherman tanks. Please name a specific combat unit of battalion or divisional size that stated a preference for the 75mm Sherman over the 76mm Sherman due to its "superior" HE shell after it was in combat for more than a few days? Source/s? 14thArmored 1310 Hours 15 December 2006.

Replies to several paragraphs since 12/15/06:

Hello. We definitely agreed to Green’s “by September” 1944 HVAP date (you wrote, “Yes,” to #2 on 11/22/06). Please follow Misplaced Pages policies on WP:Civility, WP:Verifiability, and Misplaced Pages:No original research. To wit, I am sorry that I do not have time to do your research for you about hypothetical edits that I have not made. Thank you.Wikist 03:55, 19 December 2006 (UTC)

You are sneaky and intellectually dishonest. You cannot answer my questions, and instead of saying so honestly, chose to deflect the blame for your failure onto me. Here is what I wrote in my answer to #2:

"Yes, and the same source says on the same page that the T4 HVAP "...failed to solve the major problem, for it did not successfully penetrate the glacis plate of the Panther tank a practical ranges." The source goes on to say that "Continued development produced an improved design, the T4E20 which was standardized early in 1945 as the M93." The source gives no indication that the original T4 ammunition was issued to combat units. If this were the case, the T4 round should appear on the ammunition reports for the various armies, and it does not. This means only one version of the HVAP, the M93 was actually used in combat, and it arrived in the ETO in early 1945. Of course, I would be happy to see any sources you might wish to cite regarding the issuance of the T4 ammunition to combat units.14thArmored 1900 Hours, 22 November 2006"

You can hardly expect a civil exchange when you are so uncivil as to ask many questions of me and never be bothered with acknowledging the answers or thanking me for my time and trouble. 14thArmored 1310 Hours 19 December 2006

High losses?

I added a tag to the statement that Sherman losses were 'high' in the ETO. The question is - higher that what or compared to what? German tank losses were high also at times - they lost almost every tank they had in Normandy. T-34 losses were high at times. It seems to me we need to either omit the statement in favor of something less POV-ish, or provide some statistics to show that M4 losses were higher, by some measure, than other types of tanks.

I ask that editors remove the fact tag only when this is resolved. DMorpheus 22:49, 18 December 2006 (UTC)

It's really hard to gather the will to answer your question, especially since you and Wikist consistently refuse to answer mine. (If you look, you will see that I have answered many questions for you and Wikist, but neither of you bother to answer mine.) Tell you what. You try to answer my questions, and I'll see what I can do. On a related note. You have an odd sense (read fundamentally wrong) of what represents a Point of View. (It should really be Personal Point of View, for obvious reasons.) Why do you think a statement of fact is a Point of View? You must be very confused about the difference between a personal opinion (Point of View) and a historical fact. Please answer my question, and I will think about answering yours. Why do you think the high losses of the M4 medium tank in the ETO have anything to do with other types of tanks? (That's a fairly unsophisticated way of looking at history.) Is it possible that the high losses statement relates to something entirely different? What might that be, do you think? I look forward to reading your answers to my questions. 14thArmored 22:49, 18 December 2006 (UTC)

Point of view is a wikipedia term - feel free to look it up on its page. If you find other editors reluctant to answer your questions, it may be because they are frequently wrapped inside personal attacks or lack the minimum civility asked fo all wikipedia editors. None of us is perfect....but a quick review of your edit summaries and discussion show your consistent attacking style. It simply makes for poor teamwork. People tend to react poorly to violations of wikipedia policy and guidelines, such as use of sockpuppets, personal attacks, lack of civility, wiki-stalking, and edit warring. I suspect if you try working with people, they will work with you.

When a term such as "high" is used it must be asked "high compared to what?" It is POV unless it can be backed up with some data. It is very far from a statement of fact. If the data can be produced, terrific - the edit can go back in. If not, it should stay out. DMorpheus 01:47, 19 December 2006 (UTC)

I see you were unable to answer my questions. Too bad. 14thArmored 22:49, 18 December 2006

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• World War II task force articles