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The Polish-Soviet War (also known as the Polish-Bolshevik War or the Polish-Russian War) was the war (February 1919 – March 1921) that determined the borders between the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic and Second Polish Republic. The war ended with the defeat of the Red Army.

An armed struggle between the Bolsheviks and Poland resulted from Russian attempts to recover territory lost by Russia in World War I and from Polish attempts to secure territories annexed by Russia in the late-18th-century partitions of Poland. The frontiers between Poland and Russia were not clearly defined in the Treaty of Versailles and were further rendered chaotic by the Russian revolutions and the Russian Civil War. Poland's head of state Józef Pilsudski envisioned a Polish-led East European confederation as a bulwark against German and Russian imperialism. Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks began to gain the upper hand in the Russian Civil War and advance west.

In 1919 the Poles gained control of most of the disputed territories. Border skirmishes then escalated into open warfare following Pilsudski's attempt to take advantage of Russia's weakness with a major incursion into Ukraine in early 1920 (the Kiev Operation). He was met by a Red Army counterattack in April 1920. This Bolshevik counter-offensive was very successful, throwing Polish forces back westward all the way to the Polish capital of Warsaw. Meanwhile, Western fears of Russian troops arriving at the German frontiers increased Allied interest in the war. French military mission operating in Poland since 1919, responsible for improvement of the organization and logistics of Polish forces was expanded up to about 600 advisors and was joined by General Maxime Weygand. For a time, in midsummer, the fall of Warsaw seemed certain. This generated great excitement among many communists in Moscow, who began to see Poland as the bridge over which communism would pass into Germany, bolstering the Communist Party of Germany. In mid-August the Polish forces achieved an unexpected and decisive victory at the Battle of Warsaw. The Polish forces advanced eastward, and the war ended with ceasefire in October 1920. A formal peace treaty, the Peace of Riga, was signed on March 18, 1921, dividing the disputed territory between Poland and Soviet Russia.

Names for the war

The war is referred to by several names. "Polish-Soviet War" may be the most common, but is potentially confusing, since "Soviet" is usually thought of as relating to the Soviet Union, which did not officially come into being until December 1922. Alternative names include "Russo-Polish War of 1919-21" (to distinguish it from earlier Polish-Russian wars), or "Polish-Bolshevik War". In Polish histories it has come down as the "War of 1920" (Wojna 1920 roku), while Soviet historians often either called it the "War against White Poland" or considered it a part of the "War against Foreign Intervention" or the Russian Civil War.

Prelude to the war

In 1918, with the end of the First World War, the map of Central and Eastern Europe had drastically changed. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March 3, 1918), by which Russia had lost to Imperial Germany all the European lands that Russia had seized in the previous two centuries, was repudiated by the Bolshevik government in November 1918, following armistice, the surrender of Germany and her allies, and the end of World War I. Germany, however, had not been keen to see Russia grow strong again and--exploiting her control of those territories, had quickly granted limited independence as buffer states to Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Belarus and Ukraine. As Germany's defeat rendered her plans for a Mitteleuropa obsolete, and as Russia sank into the depths of the Russian Civil War, the newly emergent countries saw a chance for real independence and were not prepared to easily relinquish this rare gift of fate. At the same time, Russia saw these territories as rebellious Russian provinces but was unable to react swiftly, as it was weakened and in the process of transforming herself into the Soviet Union through the Russian Revolution and Russian Civil War that had begun in 1917.

Meanwhile, with the success of the Greater Poland Uprising in 1918, Poland had regained her independence lost in 1795 with the Third Partiton of Poland. After 123 years' of Poland's rule by her three imperial neighbors, the Second Polish Republic was proclaimed and the reborn country proceeded to carve out its borders from the territories of her former partitioners, Russia, Germany and Austro-Hungary. The Western Powers, in delineating the new European borders after the Treaty of Versailles, had done so in a way unfavorable to Poland. Germany had decided to retain many of her eastern gains to recompense herself for expected losses in the west. Poland's western borders cut her off from the coal-basin and industrial regions of Silesia, leading to the Silesian Uprisings of 1919-1921. The eastern Curzon line left millions of Poles, living east of the Bug River, stranded inside Russia's borders.

Polish politics was under the strong influence of the statesman Józef Piłsudski, who envisioned a federation (the "Federation of Międzymorze"), a Polish-led confederation comprising Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine and other Central and East European countries now emerging out of the crumbling empires after the First World War. The new union would have had borders similar to those of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the 15th–18th centuries; and it was to be a counterweight to, and restraint upon, any imperialist intentions of Russia or Germany. To this end, Polish forces set out to secure vast territories in the east. However Piłsudski's federation plan was opposed by another influential Polish politican, Roman Dmowski, who favoured creating a larger, national Polish state.

In the chaos prevailing in the first months of 1919, it was unlikely that anyone in Bolshevik Russia or in the new Second Republic of Poland would have deliberately planned a major foreign war. The attention and policies of revolutionary Russia were predominantly directed at dealing with counter-revolution and with the intervention by the western powers. Bolshevik Russia had barely survived its second winter of blockade and mass starvation and was in the middle of a bloody civil war. Lenin could claim control over only part of central Russia, encircled on all sides by powerful internal and external enemies who denied the Bolsheviks access to the outside world. Even had the Bolshevik leaders wanted to attack their western neighbors, they would have been physically incapable of doing so.

Lenin's motives

This began to change in late 1919, however, when Vladimir Lenin, leader of Russia's new communist government, succumbed to a buoyant optimism, inspired by the Red Army's civil-war victories over White Russian anticommunist forces and their western allies on Russian territory. The Bolsheviks acted on a conviction that historical processes would soon lead to rule of the proletariat in all nations, and that the withering away of national states would eventually bring about a worldwide communist community. Lenin felt increasingly confident that the Revolution would survive and would soon sweep triumphant over Europe and the rest of the world. The main impetus to the coming war with Poland lay in the Bolsheviks’ avowed intent to link their Revolution in Russia with an expected revolution in Germany. Lenin saw Poland as the bridge that the Red Army would have to cross in order to link the two revolutions and to assist other communist movements in Western Europe. This course was explicit in early Bolshevik ideology, and was necessary if the Soviet experiment in Russia was to be brought into line with Marxist doctrine. However it was not until the Soviet successes in mid-1920 that this idea became dominant for a short time dominant in the Bolshevik policies.

Germany in 1918-1920 seethed with social discontent and political chaos. In the eighteen months since the Kaiser's abdication, it had seen a communist revolution, two provincial soviet republics (e.g. the Bavarian Soviet Republic), three reactionary putsches, at least four general strikes, and five chancellors. In July 1920 the Weimar Constitution had been in force for only twelve months, and the humiliating Peace of Versailles for only six. The central government was beset by separatism, by close scrutiny from the Allied powers, and by constant war in the streets between the Spartacist League's and Communist Party of Germany armed workers’ detachments and the right-wing Freikorps. The westward advance of the Red Army threatened to destroy the Versailles system and thus, whatever the other consequences, to free Germany from the humiliating restraints placed upon her. Many Germans thought that another revolutionary rising was a necessary prelude to Germany’s escape from the grip of the victorious western Entente. As Lenin himself remarked, "That was the time when everyone in Germany, including the blackest reactionaries and monarchists, declared that the Bolsheviks would be their salvation."

In April 1920 Lenin would complete writing The Infantile Disease of "Leftism" in Communism, meant to guide the Revolution through the few remaining months before its final stages. As his mood became expansive, he became overconfident, even messianic, and was less and less likely to resist a drift toward more serious war with Poland. According to a theory prevalent among Lenin's adherents, the Revolution in Russia would perish unless joined to revolutions in Lithuania, Poland and, most essentially, Germany. The debate in Russia was not as to whether the Polish bridge should be crossed, but how and when. Lenin formulated a new doctrine of "revolution from outside." The Soviet offensive into Poland would be an opportunity "to probe Europe with the bayonets of the Red Army." It would be the Soviet Union's first penetration into Europe proper, the first attempt to export the Bolshevik Revolution by force. In a telegram, Lenin exclaimed: "We must direct all our attention to preparing and strengthening the Western Front. A new slogan must be announced: Prepare for war against Poland.".

The political purpose of the Red Army’s advance was not to conquer Europe directly. The Red Army of 1920 could hardly be sent with 36 divisions to do what the Tsarist army of 1914-17 had failed to achieve with 150. Its purpose was to provoke social change and revolution. When the main Soviet offensive began in April 1920, the Red Army's commanders and soldiers were told, and probably believed, that if only they could reach Warsaw and defeat Poland, the "oppressed masses of the proletariat" would rise almost worldwide and begin the final struggle to create a "workers' paradise." In the words of General Tukhachevski: "To the West! Over the corpse of White Poland lies the road to world-wide conflagration. March on Vilno, Minsk, Warsaw!".

The Campaign

1919

Chaos in Eastern Europe

In 1918 the German Army in the east collapsed and, without any external pressure, proceeded to retreat westwards. Demoralized officers and mutinous soldiers abandoned their garrisons en masse and returned home. Only a limited number of units still retained any combat strength. The areas abandoned by the Central Powers became a field of conflict among local governments created by Germany, local governments that sprang up after the German withdrawal, and the Bolsheviks, who hoped to incorporate those areas into Bolshevik Russia. Internal power struggles prevented any of the governments in Belarus from gaining real power. The situation in Ukraine was even more complex, with sizable Ukrainian forces divided and ongoing conflicts among Nestor Makhno's anarchists, the communists, the White Russians, various governments of Ukraine, and the renascent Polish Army. The situation was further complicated when self-defence forces begun to form in Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia as well. Many of those groups were fragmented, merged, divided, formed short alliance with others, and almost constantly fought. Almost the entire Eastern Europe was in chaos.

On November 18, 1918, Vladimir Lenin issued orders to the Red Army to begin an operation, codenamed in some sources as Target Vistula. The basic aim of the operation was to drive through eastern and central Europe, institute Soviet governments in the newly independent countries of that region and support communist revolutions in Germany and Austria-Hungary. The Bolshevik Russian forces did not anticipate serious opposition on the way, but their advance was slow due to the continuing civil war. Faced with initial struggles with the uncoordinated local opposition and self-defense forces, the Red Army slow offensive westwards, codenamed Target Vistula, continued through late December 1918.

At the start of 1919, fighting broke out almost by accident and without any orders from the respective governments, when self-organized Polish military units in Kresy ("Borderland") areas of Lithuania, Belarus and western Ukraine (the Samoobrona Litwy i Białorusi numbering approximately ~2,000 soldiers under general Wejtko) clashed with local communist units and advance Bolshevik forces, each trying to secure the territories for its own incipient government. Eventually the more organised Soviet forces quelled most of the resistance and drove the remaining forces west.

On January 5, 1919, Red Army entered Minsk almost unopposed, thus putting an end to the short-lived Belarusian National Republic. At the same time, more and more Polish and Belarusian self-defense units sprang up across western Belarus and Lithuania. Ill-equipped and mostly comprising local recruits, they were determined to defend their homes from what the newspapers described as a "Red menace." Similar Bolshevik groups operated in the area, and a series of skirmishes ensued. The Polish Army began sending first of their newly organised units east to assist the self-defense forces, while the Russians sent their own units west. Open conflict seemed inevitable.

In the spring of 1919 Soviet conscription produced a Red Army of 2,300,000. However, few of these were sent west that year, as majority of Red Army forces were engaging the White Russians. In September 1919 Polish army had 540,000 men under arms, 230,000 of these on the Soviet front.

Polish goverment attempting to stop the westwards advance of Russian forces negotioated on February 2 a treaty with Germany, which allowed Polish units safe passage through the territories still under German administration. Small Polish forces (12 artillery battalions, 12 cavalry regiments, 3 artillery batteries) had been securing the eastern border. The southern sector, from the Pripyat River to the town of Szczytno, was assigned to Grupa Podlaska (the Podlaska Group, later known as Grupa Poleska), commanded by General Antoni Listowski. These units had concentrated near Antopol and moved toward Brest, Pinsk and Bereza Kartuska. The Wolyn region was assigned to Grupa Wołyńska (the Wolyn Group) under General Edward Rydz-Śmigły. The northern sector, from Szczytno to Skidel, was protected by Dywizja Litewsko-Białoruska (the Lithuanian-Belarusin Division) under General Wacław Iwaszkiewicz-Rudoszański, concentrated near Volkovysk. That division had also absorbed the former Samoobrona Litwy i Białorusi units which retreated from Wilno.

By February 14 Polish forces have secured positions along the line of Kobryn, Pruzhany, rivers Zalewianka and Neman. Around February 14 first organised Polish units made contact with the advance units of the Red Army and a border frontline slowly begun to form from Lithuania, through Byelorussia to Ukraine.

Avalanche starts: First Polish-Soviet conflicts

The first serious armed conflict of the war took place February 14. While Soviets units retreated without a fight from the town of Mosty, fighting has erupted near the towns of Maniewicze and Bereza Kartuska in Belarus. By late February the Bolshevik offensive had come to a halt, and it had become apparent that the Red Army would not break through the Polish lines with half-hearted attacks. On 27 February 1919 Soviets have proclaimed the creation of Bielorussian-Lithuanian Socialist Republic. Both Polish and Soviet forces have also been engaging the Ukrainian forces (Polish-Ukrainian War, unrest was growing in the territories of Baltic countries (Estonian Liberation War). Further escalation of the conflict seemed inevitable.

At the same time, Russian civil war raged on. In early summer 1920, White Russian gained an upper hand and White forces under the command of Anton Ivanovich Denikin were marching on Moscow. Piłsudski in his remarks on the war of 1919-20 cites some communication effort between Denikin and the government of Poland, where Denikin stood on a position of allowing the Polish Army into his ranks, "as obedient servants of the Empire", which was understood by the Polish side as a sign that Denikin will not accept Polish independence and wants to recreate Russia with the complete pre-First World War borders, encompassing Poland. Piłsudski thus decided to temporarily halt the Polish offensive so that the Bolsheviks could concentrate on stopping Denikin. Piłsudzki's is said to had considered Bolsheviks the less dangerous of the Russian civil war contenders, as the White Russians were not willing to accept Poland's independence, while the Bolsheviks did proclaim the Partitions of Poland null and void.

In early March 1919, Polish units opened an offensive and forces under general Stanisław Szeptycki captured the cities of Słonim (March 2) and crossed the Niemen river. Forces under gen A.Listowski took Pinsk (March 5) and secured passages through Jasiolda river and Oginski Canal. Northern units reached the outskirts of Lida and stopped for several weeks. Polish decisions regarding further action in the east were taken at the begining of April, when Józef Piłsudski determined that Polish forces must maintain the initative on the eastern front but should avoid tipping the balance of Russian Civil war in any direction. Both the Russian and Polish advance began around the same time in April, resulting in increasing numbers of troops being brought into the area. In April the Bolsheviks captured Grodno and Wilno, but were soon pushed out by a Polish counteroffensive. The newly formed Polish Army had proved to be a far more difficult opponent than the Russians had assumed. Although the Soviet orders for Operation Target Vistula (advance west) were never rescinded, the early Russian plans would soon be made obsolete by growing Polish resistance and eventually, in April, a Polish counteroffensive. Unable to accomplish their objectives and facing strenghtening offensives of White Russians, the Red Army withdrew from their positions and reorganized. Soon the Polish-Bolshevik War would begin in earnest.

Polish forces under general J.Lasocki recaptured Lida April 17), general A. Mokrzecki caputured Nowogródek and Baranowicze (April 18). On April 19 major city of Wilno was taken by Polish cavalry units under Władysław Belina-Prażmowski (~800 soldiers), soon reinforced with infantry under Rydz-Śmigły (1 Dywizja Legionów, ~2,500 soldiers), who swiftly defeated the Red Army units remaining near Wilno (near Podbrodzie, Oszmiany and Szyrwint). By May units of Rydz-Śmigły have advanced to the north and east and reached the line of Łyngmiany–Ignalino–Hoduciszki–Narocz lake, while gen. Mokrzecki engaged Russians east of Baranowicze and gen.Listowski moved west of Łunińc and near lower Styr on the Polesie Wołyńskie.

On 1 July Polish armies attacked Mołodeczno, captured on 4 July, Łuniec in the Polesie region was captured on 10 July and in mid-July Soviet counteroffensive near Naliboki was stopped. Polish forces continued their push and on 8 August captured Minsk. From 17 July Polish forces pushed towards Zbrucz and on 9 August captured Dubno and Krzemieniec in the Wołyń region. On 13 August town and fortress of Równe has been captured, 16 Auguest Ostroróg near Horyń, on 18 August Zasław and on 30 August Olewsko near Uborcia. In the lithuanian-bielarusian theater of operations Ihueń was captuered on 14 August, Borysów at Berezyna on 20 August and on 25 August an offensive towards Połock and Dyneburg was launched. On 28 August Polish forces for the first time have used tanks and after heavy fighting captured fortress Bobrujsk near Berezyna (29 August) and from October landed on the other side of the river (Bobrujsk on 1 October, Borysów on 11 October). On 2 October Polish forces reached Dźwina and secured the region from Dzisna to Dyneburg.

Until early 1920, the Polish offensive was quite successful. Sporadic battles erupted between Polish forces and the Red Army, but the latter was preoccupied with the Russian Civil War and White Russian conterrevolutionary forces and were slowly but steadily retreating.

Diplomatic Front, Part 1: Alliances

In 1919, everal attempts at peace negotiations had been made by various factions, but to no avail. First attempt at Polish-Soviet negotiations took place in Białowieza from June-August 1919. None of them where succesfull, and the war raged on. With White Russian general Denikin unwilling to guarantee Polish independence, Polish negotiators initiated another round of negotiations with the Bolsheviks, from October until December 1919 in Moscow and Mikaszewicze (on Polesie). While the negotiations slighty slowed down the pace of conflict between Poles and Bolshevicks, this mostly allowed Bolshevicks to concentrate bulk of their forces on destroying the Denikin's army advancing towards Moscow. The negotiations in early 1920 would be considered a token effort by both sides, which were preparing for a major offensive.

In the meantime, Polish-Lithuanian relations worsened as Polish politicians found it hard to accept Lithuanians demand for a complete independence and their territorial demands, especially on ceding the city of Wilno, Lithuanian historical capital which had nonetheless a Polish ethnic majority. Thus Lithuanian nationalist leaned more and more towards the Soviet side. Polish negotiators made some more progress in negotiations with Latvian Provisional Government, and in early 1920 Polish and Latvian forces were conducting some joint operations against Soviets.

The main Polish success was concluding signing a military alliance with the Ukrainian People's Republic of Symon Petliura. Ukrainians, who have faced a series of defeats on hands of both Poles and Soviets, decided that the only way to preserve some form of independence was to ally themselves with one faction and majority of Ukrainian leaders chose Poland as the less imperialistic of their enemies. Petliura had, after his government's defeat by the Bolsheviks, found asylum in Poland and now headed a new Ukrainian Army. The Polish-Ukrainian War ended around July 1919 and from September both Polish and Ukrainians fought together against the Soviets.

1920

Soviet Forces in early 1920

Soviet forces has recently been very successful against the White Russians, defeating Denikin, and signed peace treaties with Latvia and Estonia. The Polish front became the most important war theatere and majority of Soviet resources and forces were diverted into it. In January 1920, the Red Army began concentrating a 700,000-strong force near the Berezina River and on Bielarus. The Red Army totaled 5,000,000, with additional millions of Russian recruits to draw from, but much of that force was still engaged in the civil war. This number of troops was far greater than the number of weapons available, and only one in nine soldiers could be properly classified a fighting man. In the course of 1920, almost 800,000 Red Army personnel were sent to fight in the Polish war, of whom 402,000 went to the Western front and 355,000 to the armies of the South-West front in Galicia. The Soviet manpower pool in the West was estimated at 790,000. The Soviets had at their disposal many military depots left by German armies withdrawing from eastern Europe in 1918-19, and modern French armaments (including armoured cars, armoured trains, trucks and artillery) captured in great numbers from the White Russians and the Allied expeditionary forces following their recent collapse in the Russian Civil War.

Bolshevik commanders in the Red Army's coming offensive would include Mikhail Tukhachevski (new commander of the Western Front), Leon Trotsky, the future Soviet ruler Joseph Stalin, and the future founder of the Cheka secret police, Felix Dzerzhinsky.

With the new forces, Soviet High Command planned new offensive in late April/May.

Polish Forces in early 1920

The Polish Army was made up of soldiers who had formerly served in the various partitioning empires, supported by inexperienced volunteers and recruits. Logistics were a nightmare, relying on whatever equipment was left over from World War I and could be captured. The Polish Army employed guns made in five countries, and rifles manufactured in six, each using different ammunition. Before the Battle of Warsaw the 1st Legions Infantry Division comprised three regiments, one of which was armed with German Mauser rifles, a second with French Lebel rifles (carbines), while the third used Russian Mosin rifles. Each make of weapon took ammunition of a different caliber.

The Polish forces grew from approximately 100,000 in 1918 to over 500,000 in early 1920. In 20 August, 1920, Polish army had reached the strength of 737,767, so there was rough numerical parity between the Polish army and the Soviet forces acting against it.

Polish intelligence was aware that Soviets have been prepared for a new offensive and Polish High Command decided to launch their own offensive before the Soviets. The plan for Operation Kiev was to beat the Red Army on Poland's southern flank and establish a friendly government in Ukraine. After victory in the south, the Polish General Staff planned to withdraw its 3rd Army and strengthen the northern front, where Pilsudski expected the main battle with the Red Army to take place. As is often the case, the actual course of events turned out differently than envisioned.

The tide turns: Operation Kiev

Until April the Polish forces had been slowly but steadily advancing eastward. By early January 1920 Polish forces had reached the line of Uszyca-Płoskirów-Starokonstantynów–Szepetówka–Zwiahel-Olewsk–Uborć-Bobrujsk–rz. Berezyna–Dyneburg. New Latvian government requested Polish help in capturing Dyneburg, which was captured after heavy fighting (3 January - 21 January) by the Polish 1st and 3rd Legion Divisions under Rydz-Śmigły and handed to Latvians, which viewed Poles as liberators. By March Polish forces had driven a wedge between Soviet forces North (Bielorussia) and south (Ukraine) capturing the towns of Mozyrz and Kalenkowicze, significantly disrupting Soviet plans for an early offensive.

On April 24 Poland began its main offensive, the Operation Kiev, aimed at creating an independent Ukraine that would become part of Piłsudski's Międzymorze Federation and an ally in the fight against the Soviets. Poland was assisted by the allied forces of the Ukrainian People's Republic of Symon Petliura. A joint Polish-Ukrainian political campaign to raise the patriotic spirit of the Ukrainian population and form a strong Ukrainian army capable of taking over positions against the Soviets in Ukraine, while initially successful, had to be abandoned for lack of time. The population was tired by several years of war, and the Ukrainian Army attained a strength of only two divisions.

The Polish 3rd Army under Rydz-Śmigły, supported by 6th Army under W. Iwaszkiewicz and 2nd Army under Listowskiego, easily won border clashes with the Red Army in Ukraine, which was weakened by dissent and Galician uprisings. The combined Polish-Ukrainian forces captured Kiev on May 7, encountering only token resistance. The Bolshevik Army, however, though badly mauled, escaped complete destruction. The Polish offensive halted at Kiev, and only a small bridgehead was established on the eastern bank of the Dnieper River (May 9). Polish forces begun preparing for an offensive towards north and the city of Żłobin, which would open the shortest train communication between Polish held Mińsk and Kiev.

Polish military thrust soon met with Red Army counterattack (Soviet May Offensive). Soviet Southwest Front was commanded by Aleksandr Yegorov. On 15th May Soviet 15th Army attacked Polish postitions near Ułła, and 16th Army crossed Berezina River between Borysów and Bobrujsk. Polish forces in that area, preparing for offensive towards Żłobin, manged to push back the Soviet forces back into the river, but were unable to pursue their own planned offensive. In the north Polish forces have done much worse. Polish 1st Army was defeated and started a retreat towards Mołodeczno, pursued by the 15th army which recaptured territories between Dzwina and Berezyna.

Polish forces attempted to take advantage of Soviet exposed flanks. Armia Rezerwowa attacking from Święciany and Grupa Skierskiego attacking from Borysów were supposed to envelope and crush the advancing Soviet forces, and Soviet reinforcments were to be stopped by the 1st Army. This time the 1st Army done well but the enveloping forces failed to stop the Soviet advance. At the end of May the front has stabilised near the small river Auta, and Soviet forces begun preparing for the next push concentraing in the Połosck region.

On May 24, 1920, the Polish-Ukrainian forces in the south were engaged for the first time by Semyon Budionny's famous 1st Cavalry Army (Konarmia). The Polish-Ukrainian forces succeeded in slowing and even defeating the Red Army on a number of occasions. Morale was high: the Polish-Ukrainian forces were eager to defend the Dnieper in Ukraine and were confident in their ability to withstand the Soviet offensive. Polish High Command underestimated the quality of both Budionny's forces and the tactical role of cavalry, which didn't fair to well in the First World War trench warfare. Repeated attacks by Budionny's Cossack cavalry, however, broke the Polish-Ukrainian front on June 5th and sent mobile cavalry units to disrupt the Polish rear communication and logistics. By June 10th the Polish armies were in retreat along the entire front. Soviet forces under Golikow crossed Dniepr west of Czerniow cutting the rail communication in that region. Soviet forces under Jakir captured the Bila Tserkva, and Polish 3rd army in Kiev faced the danger of being completly enveloped.

It was a bitter day for the Poles and Ukrainians when, on June 13, they abandoned Kiev to the Bolsheviks. Petlyura's Ukrainians, though a small force, fought with fierce determination throughout the rest of the campaign. In the face of near-unlimited Russian reserves and only slow growth in the Ukrainian Army, the Polish and Ukrainian forces were ordered to retreat.

String of Bolshevik victories

Commander of the Polish 3rd Army in Ukraine, general Rydz-Śmigły decided to break through towards north-west and the town of Korosteń, thus avoiding a direct confrontation with the bulk of Soviet 1st Cavarly Army near Koziatyń. Soviet forces were plagued by communication and coordination difficulties, and Polish forces managed to withdraw in orderly fashion and relatively unscathed, they were tied down in Ukraine and lacked sufficient strength to support Poland's Northern Front and reinforce the defenses at the Auta River for the decisive battle that was soon to take place there.

Polish 3rd Army and newly formed 2nd Amry regrouped near Słucza and started a series of their own coutnerattacks. However Polish counterattacks in June and July all failed after initial successes. In the battles (19th June at Usza, 1 July at Horyń, 8 July at Równe) Bolshevicks were delayed but eventually Budionny's forces advanced east. When eventualy in mid July Bolsheviks forces in Ukraine appread to have been stopped by Polish forces, a new Soviet offensive north would prove even more devastating for the Polish forces.

Due to insufficient forces, Poland's 200-mile-long front was manned by a thin line of 120,000 troops backed by some 460 artillery pieces divided between the 1st and 4th Armies and Group Polesie. Gen. Szeptycki, commander of the Polish Northeast Front, had no strategic reserves, and some forces have been shuffled south to stop the Soviet offensive in Ukraine and Galicia. This approach to holding ground harked back to Great War practice of "establishing a fortified line of defense." It had shown some merit on a Western Front saturated with troops, machine guns and artillery. Poland's eastern front, however, was weakly manned, supported with inadequate artillery, and possessed of almost no fortifications. Pilsudski had called for a "strategie de plein air"--a stragegy of open space, rather than of fixed positions--but his calls had fallen on deaf ears.

Against the Polish linear formation the Red Army gathered their Northwest Front led by the young General Mikhail Tukhachevski. His troops were organized into one cavalry corps and four armies: the 3rd cavalry and 4th, 15th, 3rd and 16th armies, deployed respectively from north to south. Their numbers exceeded 108,000 infantry and 11,000 cavalry, supported by 722 artillery pieces and 2,913 machine guns. The Russians at some crucial places outnumbered the Poles four-to-one.

Tukhachevski launched his offensive July 4th along the axis Smolensk-Brest-Litovsk, crossing rivers of Auta and Berezyna. The northern 3rd Cavalry Corps of Gej-Chan was to envelope Polish forces from the north, moving near Lithuanian and Prussian border territories, both unfriendly to Poland. 4th, 15th and 3rd Armies were to push decisively west, supported from south by the 16th Army and Grupa Mozyrska. For the three days the outcome of the battle hung in the balance, but the Russians' numerical superiority finally became apparent. The battle was replete with wasted opportunities, encirclements, breakthroughs and heroic deeds. One of the latter was performed by two battalions of the Polish 33rd Infantry Regiment, which for a full day stopped the advance of two and a half Red Army divisions, denying them a chance to turn the northern flank of the Polish front.

After the day's heavy fighting, the 33rd Infantry still managed to withdraw. Due to the stubborn defense by Polish units, Tukhachevski's plan to break through the front and push the defenders southwest into the Pinsk Marshes (Błota Poleskie) failed. Gej-Chan broke through the northern Polish units on the first day of the offensive and Polish 1st Army pursued by Gej-Chan forces started a disorganised retreat. From July 7 the Polish forces were in full retreat on the entire front.

Polish resistance was offered again on a line of "German trenches," a heavily fortified line of World War I field fortifications that presented a unique opportunity to stem the Russian offensive. The "Battle for Vilno" took place here from July 11 to July 14. Once again, however, the Polish troops were insufficient to adequately man the whole line of defenses. Soviet forces selected a weakly defended part of the front and broke through. Gej-Chan forces, supported by Lithuanian forces, captured Wilno on 14th July, making Polish plans for defensive along old German trenches usless. On 19th July Grondo fell and after a failed Polish counterattack towards Grodno the 1st Army had to retreat behind Niemen river and was soon pushed further back. The whole front was rolled back as, once again, the Red Army turned the northern flank. Henceforth Polish war bulletins would keep on repeating that "due to our northern flank having been turned by the enemy, our armies have been forced to retreat west."

In the south, in Galicia, General Semyon Budionny's Red Cavalry Army advanced far into the Polish rears, capturing Brodno and approaching Lwów and Zamość. In early July it became clear to the Poles that the Russians' objectives were not limited to pushing their borders farther west. Poland's very independence was at stake.

The Russian forces relentlessly moved forward at the incredible, for those days, rate of 20 miles a day. When Grodno in Belarus fell July 19, Tukhachevski ordered that Warsaw be occupied by August 12. When Brest-Litovsk fell on August 1 and the Narew and Bug River--today's eastern border of Poland--were crossed by the Red Army, the last river barrier before the Vistula River and Warsaw had been breached. Polish attempt to defend the Bug river line with 4th Army and Grupa Poleska units stopped the advance of the Red Army for only one week. The Red Army had been marching for three weeks at an average speed of 12 miles a day. Their ongoing advance seemed unstoppable. Units of the Russian Northwest Front, after taking Łomża and Ostroleka (by Gej-Chan) and crossing the Narew River on August 2, were only 60 miles from Warsaw. Fortress of Brzesc which was to be the headquaters of Polish planned counteroffensive fell to the 16th Army in the first attack. The Russian Southwest Front had pushed Polish forces out of Ukraine and was closing on Zamość and Lwów, the metropolis of southeastern Poland and an important industrial center, defended by the Polish 6th Army. The way to the Polish capital lay open. Polish Galicia's Lwów (Ukrainian Lviv) was besieged, and five Russian armies were approaching Warsaw.

Polish forces in Galicia near Lwów launched a counteroffensive to slow the Soviets dawn. 6th Army of general Jędrzejewski and elements of the Ukrainian forces defended Lwów, and the 2nd Army and Grupa Operacyjna Jazdy attacked from Styr towards Brody and Radziwiłłow. During the battle of Brody (29 July – 2 August) Polish forces managed to recapture Brody (18 Dywizja Piechoty) and sourround parts of Soviets forces. This had put a stop to the retreat of Polish forces on the southern front, but the worsening situation near Polish capital of Warsaw prevented Poles from continuing that southern counteroffensive and pushig east. After Soviets captured Brześć Polish offensive in the south was put on hold and all available forces moved north to take part in the coming battle for Warsaw.

Diplomatic Front, Part 2: Polish and Soviet internal politics

With the turning tide against Poland, Pilsudski's political power has been weakened and his opponents including Roman Dmowski have risen to power but he has regained it as the Soviet forces were approaching Warsaw. The government of Leopold Skulski has resigned and new prime minister Stanisław Grabski has transferred all power to the Rada Obrony Państwa (Council of Country's Defence) which consisted of Naczelnik Państwa (the title of Józef Piłsudski), Marshall of the Sejm, prime minister, 3 ministers, 3 army's representatives and 10 members of the parliament. Grabski's government supported by the Western diplomats have attempted to restart peace negotiations with the Soviets, but their attempts were completly ignored by the Soviet Side. Stanisław Grabski resigned and a new government was formed by Wincenty Witos.

In Moscow, the delegates to the Second Congress of the Third International followed with enthusiasm the progress of the Russian forces. The delegates began to see Poland as the bridge over which communism would pass into Germany, bolstering the Communist Party of Germany. By the order of the Soviet Communist Party a Polish puppet government, the Tymczasowy Komitet Rewolucyjny Polski, TKRP (English: Provisional Polish Revolutionary Committee), has been formed on 28 July in Białystok to organise administration on the Polish territories captured by the Red Army. It was composed of Polish communists and members of the Politbiuro of the Central Committee Soviet Communist Party: Julian Marchlewski (chairmen), Edward Próchniak (secretary), Felix Dzerzhinsky, Feliks Kon and Józef Unszlicht. It begun operating from 1 August issuing various decrees like nationalisation of industry, promising the creation of Polish Socialist Republic (Polska Socjalistyczna Republika Rad), creating 65 revolutionary committees, issuing newspapr Goniec Czerwony and recruiting soldiers for the 1 Polish Red Army commanded by R.Łągwa. The TKRP had very little support from the Polish population and recruited its supporters mostly from the ranks of Bielorussians and Jews. TKRP was disbanded on 22 August.

In addition, political games between Soviet commanders of Soviet Fronts grew in the face of their more and more certain victory. Eventually the lack of cooperation between Soviet commanders would cost them dearly in the upcoming decisive battle of Warsaw.

Diplomatic Front, Part 3: International reaction

Western public opinion, swayed by the press and by left-wing politicians, was strongly anti-Polish. Many foreign observers expected Poland to be quickly defeated and become the next Soviet republic. Britain proposed negotiations between Poland and Russia to stabilize their border at the Curzon line or farther west, but the British proposal was disregarded by the Soviets, who expected a quick victory. Russian terms amounted to total Polish capitulation, and even so Lenin stalled in order to give his armies time to take Warsaw and conclude the war to Russia's advantage. Britain's Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, once a strong supporter of Imperial Russia, was now a Soviet sympathizer and authorized British sales of large quantities of armaments (including modern tanks) to fill urgent Soviet orders. Polish case in the United Kingdom was supported only by a small minority led by Winston Churchill, who advocated moving Royal Air Force to support Poland. On August 6, 1920, the British Labour Party published a pamphlet stating that British workers would never take part in the war as Poland's allies. French Socialists, in their newspaper L'Humanité, declared: "Not a man, not a sou, not a shell for reactionary and capitalist Poland. Long live the Russian Revolution! Long live the Workmen's International!" Poland suffered setbacks due to sabotage and delays in deliveries of war supplies, when workers in Austria, Czechoslovakia and Germany refused to transit such materials to Poland. In Gdansk harbor, British troops were used to unload munition ships because the mostly German longshoremen striked on learning the cargo; similar things happened in Czechoslovakian Brno.

Lithuania stance was mostly anti-Polish and the country eventually joined the Soviet side in the war against Poland in July 1919. Lithuania decision was dictated by a desire to incorporate the city of Wilno (in Lithuanian, Vilnius) and the nearby areas into Lithuania and to a smaller extent by Soviet diplomatic pressure backed by the threat of the Red Army stationed on Lithuania's borders. New Lithuanian government decided to make Wilno the capital of Lithuania (it was the historical capital of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania), despite it being mainly Polish- and Belarusin-populated in the 20th century (~2% according to the Russian census in 1915, although much higher in the nearby rural areas). The Polish-Lithuanian War would continue until the autumn of 1920. The Lithuanian alliance with the Bolsheviks was somewhat countered by Latvia, which unlike her neighbour decided to join forces with Poland in the fight against the Soviets.

Polish allies were few. France, continuing her policy of countering Bolshevism, now that the Whites in Russia proper had been almost completely defeated, sent in 1919 a small advisory group to Poland's aid. This group comprised mostly French officers, although it also included a few British advisers. It was headed by British General Adrian Carton De Wiart and French General Paul Prosper Henrys. The French mission commanded considerable respect and influence through the activities of its 400 officer-instructors. These men, distributed among the cadres of the Polish Staff, were entrusted with training the officer corps in military science and in the use of French army manuals. The French effort was vital to improving the organization and logistics of the Polish Army, which until 1919 had used diverse manuals, organizational structures and equipment, mostly drawn from the armies of Poland's former partitioners.

In addition to the Allied advisors, France also facilitated in 1919 the transit to Poland from France of the "Blue Army" (otherwise "Haller's Army"): a force of troops, mostly of Polish origin plus some international volunteers, formerly under French command in World War I. The army was commanded by the Polish general, Józef Haller.

The French offcers included a future President of France, Charles de Gaulle. Newly released from internment as a prisoner of war at Ingolstadt in Bavaria--where he had met Mikhail Tukhachevski--de Gaulle had been anxious for active service; as the son of a patriotic Catholic family, he was attracted by the prospect of an anti-Bolshevik campaign in Poland. In May 1919, he joined the 5th Chasseurs Polonais at Sille-le-Guillaume and in the body of Haller's army traveled with them to eastern Galicia. At the end of that campaign, he was transferred to Rembertów near Warsaw where, in the former school of the Tsarist Imperial Guard, he lectured on tactics. In July and August he was attached briefly to a Polish combat unit, and was promoted to major. He won Poland's highest military decoration, the Virtuti Militari. In 1921 he was offered a permanent commission in Poland, but preferred to develop his ideas and experiences by returning to France as a lecturer on military history at Saint-Cyr.

The Hungarians, too, who had experienced Bela Kun's communist regime, tried to extend a helping hand. They planned to dispatch a 30,000-man cavalry corps to join the Polish Army, but the Czechoslovak government denied them passage across Czechoslovak territory.

In mid-1920 the Allied Mission was expanded by some new advisers (the Interallied Mission to Poland). They included the French diplomat, Jean Jules Jusserand; Maxime Weygand, chief of staff to Marshal Ferdinand Foch, Supreme Commander of the victorious Entente; and the British diplomat, Lord Edgar Vincent D'Abernon. The newest members of the mission achieved little; indeed, the crucial Battle of Warsaw was fought and won by the Poles before the mission could return and make its report. Subsequently, for many years, the myth persisted that it was the timely arrival of Allied forces that had saved Poland, a myth in which Weygand occupied the central role.

Weygand had traveled to Warsaw in the expectation of assuming command of the Polish Army, but had found a disappointing reception. His first meeting with Piłsudski on July 24 began on the wrong foot when he had no answer to Piłsudki's opening question, "How many divisons did you bring?" Weygand had none to offer. On 27 July he was installed as adviser to the Polish Chief of Staff, Tadeusz Rozwadowski, but their collaboration went poorly. Weygand was surrounded by officers who regarded him as an interloper and deliberately spoke Polish, depriving him not only of a part in their deliberations but even of news from the front. His suggestions for the organization of Poland's defense were regularly disregarded. At the end of July he proposed that the Poles hold the line of the Bug River; a week later he proposed a purely defensive posture along the Vistula. Neither plan was adopted. One of his few contributions was to insist that a system of written staff orders replace the existing haphazard mode of passing orders by word of mouth. He was of special assistance to General Władysław Sikorski, to whom he expounded the advantages of the Wkra River. But on the whole he was quite out of his element, a man accustomed to command but placed among people with no inclination to obey, a proponent of defense in the midst of enthusiasts for the attack. On 18 August, when he met Piłsudski again, he was told nothing of the great victory but was "regaled instead with a Jewish tale." It offended his dignity as a representant de la France, and he threatened to leave. Indeed there was nothing to do but leave. The battle was won; armistice negotiations were beginning; the crisis had passed. He urged D'Abernon and Jusserand to pack their bags and make as decent an exit as possible. He was depressed by his failure and dismayed by Poland's disregard for the Entente. At the railroad station in Warsaw on 25 August he was consoled with the decoration of Virtuti Militari; at Kraków on the 26th he was feted by the mayor and corporation; at Paris, on the 28th, he was cheered by crowds lining the platform at the Gare de l'Est, kissed on both cheeks by French Premier Alexandre Millerand, and presented with the Grand Order of the Legion of Honor. He could not understand what had happened, and admitted in his memoirs that "the victory was Polish, the plan was Polish, the army was Polish." He was the first uncomprehending victim, as well as chief beneficiary, of a legend already in circulation that he, Weygand, had been the victor of Warsaw. This legend was to persist for more than forty years even in academic circles.

The tide turns: Miracle at the Vistula

On August 10, 1920, Russian Cossack units under Gay Dimitrievich Gay crossed the Vistula River. On August 13, an initial Russian attack under General Mikhail Tukhachevski was repulsed. The Polish 1st Army under Gen. Franciszek Latinik resisted a Red Army direct assault on Warsaw stopping the Soviet assault at Radzymin.

The Soviet commander-in-chief, Tukhachevski, feeling certain that all was going according to his plan, was actually falling into a trap set by Piłsudski. The Russian advance across the Vistula (in Polish, Wisła) River in the north was striking into an operational vacuum, as there were no sizable Polish forces in the area. On the other hand, south of Warsaw, where the fate of the war was about to be decided, Tukhachevski had left only token forces to guard the vital link between the Russian Northwest and Southwest Fronts. Another factor that influenced the outcome of the war was the effective neutralization in the battles around Lwów of Budionny's 1st Cavalry Army, much feared by Piłsudski and other Polish commanders. The Soviet High Command, at Tukhachevski's insistence, had ordered the 1st Cavalry Army to march north toward Warsaw towards Lublin. Budionny disobeyed the order due to a grudge between Generals Tukhachevski and Aleksandr Yegorov, commanding the Southwest Front. Additionally, the political games of Joseph Stalin, chief political commissar of the Southwest Front, decisively influenced the disobedience of Yegorov and Budionny. Stalin, seeking a personal triumph, was focused on capturing Lwów—far to the southeast of Warsaw—besieged by Bolshevik forces but still resisting their assaults.

The Polish 5th Army under General Władysław Sikorski counterattacked August 14 from the are of the Modlin fortress, crossing the Wkra River. It faced the combined forces of the numerically and materially superior Soviet 3rd and 15th Armies. The struggle at Nasielsk lasted till August 15 and resulted in the near-complete destruction of the town. However, by the end of that day the Soviet advance toward Warsaw and Modlin had been halted and soon turned into retreat. Sikorski's 5th Army pushed the exhausted Soviet formations away from Warsaw in a near-blitzkrieg operation. Polish forces advanced at a speed of thirty kilometers a day, soon destroying any Soviet hopes for completing their enveloping maneuver in the north. By August 16 the Polish counteroffensive had been fully joined by Marshal Piłsudski's "Reserve Army." Precisely executing his plan, the Polish force, advancing from the south, found a huge gap between the Russian fronts and exploited the weakness of the Soviet "Mozyr Group" that was supposed to protect the weak link between the Soviet Fronts. The Poles continued their northward offensive crossing the Wieprz river and moving towards Mińsk Mazowiecki–Kałuszyn–Siedlce–Biała Podlaska line; with two armies following and destroying the surprised and confused enemy, they reached the rear of Tukhachevski's forces, the majority of which were encircled on August 18. Only that same day did Tukhachevski, at his Minsk headquarters 300 miles east of Warsaw, become fully aware of the proportions of the Soviet defeat and order the remnants of his forces to retreat and regroup--but it was already too late. He hoped to straighten his front line, halt the Polish attack, and regain the initiative, but the orders either arrived too late or failed to arrive at all.

The Bolshevik armies in the center of the front fell into chaos. After the Polish 203rd Uhlan Regiment broke through the Bolshevik lines and destroyed the radio station of Dimitriy Shuvayev's Soviet 4th Army, that army continued to fight its way toward Warsaw alone, unaware of the overall situation. Only the Russian 15th Army remained an organized force and tried to obey Tukhachevski's orders, shielding the withdrawal of the westernmost 4th Army. But defeated twice, August 19 and 20, it became part of the general rout of the Northwest Front. Tukhachevski ordered a general retreat toward the Bug River, but by then he had lost contact with most of his forces near Warsaw, and all the Bolshevik plans had been thrown into disarray by communication failures.

The Bolshevik armies retreated in a disorganised fashion, entire divisions panicking and disintegrating. By the end of August the 4th and 15th Red Armies had been defeated in the field, and their remnants crossed the border into East Prussia and were disarmed. Nevertheless the troops were soon released and again fought against Poland. The Bolshevik 3rd Army retreated east so quickly that Polish forces could not catch up with them, and so that army sustained the fewest losses. The Bolshevik 16th Army disintegrated at Bialystok, and most of its men become prisoners of war. The Red Army's defeat was so great and so unexpected that, at the instigation of Piłsudski's detractors, the Battle of Warsaw is often referred to in Poland as the "Miracle at the Vistula."

On August 17 the advance of Budionny's Cavalry Army toward Lwów was halted at the Battle of Zadwórze, where a small Polish force sacrificed itself to prevent Soviet cavalry from seizing Lwów and stopping vital Polish reinforcements from moving toward Warsaw. On 29 August Budionny's cavalry moving through weakly defended areas reached city of Zamość and attempted to take the city in the battle of Zamość, but was soon facing increasing number of Polish units which could be spared from the succesfull Warsaw counteroffensive. On August 31 Budionny's cavalry finally broke off their siege of Lwów and attempted to come to the aid of Russian forces retreating from Warsaw, but were intercepted, encircled and defeated by Polish cavalry at the Battle of Komarów near Zamość, the greatest cavalry battle since 1813 (and one of the last cavalry battles ever). Budonny's Army managed to avoid encicrlement but its morale plummeted down. What was left of Buidonny's 1st Cavalry Army retreated towards Włodzimierz Wołyński on 6 September and was soon again defeated at the Battle of Hrubieszów. Suwalszczyzna was recaptured from the Lithuanian forces.

Tukhachevski managed to reorganize the eastward-retreating forces and in September established a new defensive line running from the Polish-Lithuanian border to the north to the area of Polesie, with the central point in the city of Grodno in Belarus. In order to break it, the Polish Army had to fight the Battle of the Niemen River, near the middle Niemen River, between the cities of Suwałki, Grodno and Białystok. Polish forces attempted to sourround the Soviet forces, moving through Lithuanian terrotory and Pinsk Marshes. After Polish forces crossed Niemen, captured Lida and Pińsk, between September 15 and September 25, 1920, the Polish forces defeated and outflanked the Bolshevist forces which were forced to retreat again.

On 12 September Polish offensive in Wołyń under gen. Sikorski started. On 18 September Polish forces recaptured Równe, by the end of September Polish forces reached the rivers of Uborcia and Słucza and the town of Korseń. Podle offensive started on 14 September under gen. Lemezan de Sakins and S.Haller by that time reached the line from Stara Uszyca on the south throug Zinków–Płoskirów–Starokonstantynów to Łabuń north.

On Ukraine between 8 and 12 October Polish cavalry under gen. J.Rómmel reached Korosteń. After the mid-October Battle of the Szczara River, the Polish Army had reached the Tarnopol-Dubno-Minsk-Drisa line. The Bolsheviks sued for peace and the Poles, exhausted and constantly pressured by the Western governemnts, with Polish army now controling majority of disputed terrotories, agreed to try diplomatic solution once again. A ceasefire was signed October 12 and went into effect .

Aftermath

The Bolsheviks offered the Polish peace delegation substantial territorial concessions. The exhausted Poles, pressured by the League of Nations, decided to sign a compromise Peace of Riga on March 18, 1921, splitting the disputed territories in Belarus and Ukraine between Poland and Russia. The treaty actually violated Poland's military alliance with Ukraine, which had explicitly prohibited a separate peace. It worsened relations between Poland and her Ukrainian minority, who felt Ukraine had been betrayed by her Polish ally, a feeling that would be exploited by Soviet propaganda and result in the growing tensions and eventual violence in the 1930s and 1940s. By the end of 1921, majority of Ukrainian, Bielorusian and White Russian forces have either crossed the Polish border and lied down their arms of have been annihilated by the Soviets.

The Polish military successes in autumn 1920 allowed Poland to reclaim the city of Wilno, but the control over city has been transferred to Lithuanians by the retreating Soviets. With Lithuanians unwilling to enter into an alliance with Poland, and wishing to avoid a full-out conflict and international condemnation, Poland staged a fake rebellion by Polish army units (under command by gen. Lucjan Żeligowski) in the Wilno area, which allowed the Polish army to take control of the city in 9 October 1920. The fighting ended this month. Despite the Poles’ claim to it, the League of Nations chose to ask Poland to withdraw. The Poles did not. Theoretically, British and French troops could have been asked to enforce the League’s decision. France, however, did not wish to antagonize Poland, seen as a possible ally in a future war against Germany, and Britain was not prepared to act alone. Thus the Poles were able to keep Wilno, where a puppet goverment (Komisja Rządząca Litwy Środkowej) was formed. A plebiscyte was carried out and the Wilno Sejm has voted on 20 February 1922 for incorporation into Poland. This has worsened Polish-Lithuanian foreign relations for many decades to come and was one of the reasons Piłsudski's Miedzymorze federation was never formed. And as Poland kept the city of Wilno, this further poisoned diplomatic relations between Poland and Lithuania. Repercussions continue (though to a diminishing extent) to affect the foreign relations among these countries.

The outcome of the Polish-Bolshevik War, while welcomed by some Polish politicians such as Roman Dmowski, who favored a relatively small, ethnically rather homogeneous state, was a death blow to Piłsudski's dream of reviving the powerful and multicultural Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the form of a "Międzymorze Federation."

Pilsudski's military and political victory ensured that the armed forces became an important national institution in the new government. His reputation as the creator of the miracle at Vistula has vastly risen, and the national democrats lost the post-war elections. The new president Gabriel Narutowicz elected in 1922 was a socialist politician. In 1926, after Poland had experienced several years of political uncertainty and weak leadership, Pilsudski took over the state in a coup d'etat, assuming the posts of minister of defense and general inspector of the army.

The Treaty of Riga avoided ceding historically Polish territory back to Russia, and ethnic Poles initially had two Polish Autonomous Districts within the Soviet Union, with an eventually tragic outcome for the Poles. The Ukrainian minority in Poland received some internal autonomy within the southeastern voivodships of Poland, but plans for a broader autonomy or for introduction of a federation finally came to nothing.

According to the British historian A.J.P. Taylor, the Polish-Bolshevik War "largely determined the course of European history for the next twenty years or more. Unavowedly and almost unconsciously, Soviet leaders abandoned the cause of international revolution." Certainly the Bolsheviks' defeat in the war prevented Poland from becoming another Soviet republic and likely saved Germany, Czechoslovakia and other nearby states from suffering a similar fate.

Bolshevism was not destroyed, however, only contained for a generation. Russia kept control of substantial western territories and their vast resources. Soon after the war officially ended, groups of Soviet-sponsored bandits and undercover agents begun raiding Polish eastern frontier, prompting Poland to creat a special, elite Border Defence Corps (Korpus Ochrony Pogranicza) to combat those constant incursions. A second Soviet effort at expansion was more successful. In August 1939 the Soviet Union allied itself with Nazi Germany in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and on September 17, 1939, invaded eastern Poland, ensuring Poland's defeat in the Polish Defence War of 1939 and sealing the fate of the Second Polish Republic. The Soviet occupation of eastern Poland rivaled in atrocities the German occupation of the remainder of the country. Persons who were deemed dangerous by the communist authorities were subject to sovietization, forced resettlement, and imprisonment in labor camps (the Gulags) or were simply murdered, as in the case of Polish officers in the Katyn massacres. Having served in the Polish-Bolshevik War on the side of Poland was punishable with death. After Poland had been "liberated" by the Red Army in 1944, Soviet atrocities resumed, with persecutions and prosecutions of Polish Home Army soldiers and executions of their leaders. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the Soviet Union succeeded in acquiring control of more territory than Imperial Russia had and partly fulfilled Lenin's original dream of bringing communist revolution to Germany. Until 1989, while communists held power in a People's Republic of Poland, the Polish-Bolshevik War was either omitted or minimized in Polish history books, or was presented so as to fit with the "truths" of communist propaganda.

Military strategy in the Polish-Bolshevik War influenced Charles De Gaulle, an instructor with the Polish Army who fought in several of the battles. He and Władysław Sikorski were the only military officers who, based on their experiences of this war, correctly predicted how the next one would be fought. Although they both failed in the interbellum to convince their militaries to heed those lessons, early in World War II they rose to command of their respective armed forces in exile. This war also influenced the Polish military doctrine, which for the next 20 years would stress the mobility of the elite cavalry units.

Among the technical advances ultimately associated with the Polish-Bolshevik War was one that would, two decades later, affect the course of World War II and whose story, when revealed decades after that, would astound the world. In the Polish-Bolshevik War, Poland's Marshal Piłsudski and his staff enjoyed a vast advantage from their military intelligence decrypting ("breaking") Red Army radio messages. These were encrypted in primitive ciphers and codes, and often involved incredible breaches of security by Bolshevik cipher clerks. The Polish cryptologists and commanders were thus regularly able to look over the shoulders of the Bolshevik commanders, including Mikhail Tukhachevski himself, and their superior, Leon Trotsky. (It is curious that, in this regard, the Red Army repeated mistakes that had been made in World War I by its Tsarist predecessor vis-a-vis the German Army, and that had contributed fundamentally to the Russian 1914 defeat at Tannenberg.) Poland's cryptological achievements in the Polish-Bolshevik War were a prelude to the spectacular achievements of her General Staff's Cipher Bureau (Biuro Szyfrow), from December 1932, in decrypting German Enigma machine ciphers. Their subsequent decryption in World War II by the Western Allies at Bletchley Park--made possible by Poland's having revealed her techniques and technology to Britain and France at Warsaw a month before the outbreak of war--substantially affected the outcome of the war.

List of battles

1. Soviet "Target Vistula" offensive (January-February 1919)
2. Battle of Bereza Kartuska (February 9, 1919: the first battle of the conflict)
3. Operation Wilno: Polish offensive to Wilno (April 1919)
4. First Battle of Lida (April 1919)
5. Operation Minsk: Polish offensive to Minsk (July-August 1919)
6. Battles of Chorupań and Dubno (July 19, 1919)
7. Battle of Daugavpils: joint Polish-Latvian operation (January 3, 1920)
8. Kiev Offensive (May-June 1920)
9. Battle of Volodarka (May 29, 1920)
10. Battle of Brody (29 July – 2 August 1920)
11. Battle of Lwów (July-September 1920)
12. Battle of Tarnopol (July 31-August 6, 1920)
13. Battle of Warsaw (August 15 1920)
14. Battle of Raszyn, Battle of Nasielsk, Battle of Radzymin (August 14-August 15, 1920)
15. Battle of Zadwórze: the "Polish Thermopylæ" (August 17, 1920)
16. Battle of Sarnowa Góra (August 21-August 22, 1920)
17. battle of Zamość (August 29, 1920) - Budiony's attempt to take Zamość
18. Battle of Komarów: great cavalry battle, ending in Budionny's defeat (August 31, 1920)
19. Battle of Hrubieszów (September 1, 1920)
20. Battle of Kobryń (September 14-September 15, 1920)
21. Battle of Dytiatyn (September 16, 1920)
22. Battle of Brzostowica (September 20, 1920)
23. Battle of the Niemen River (September 26-28 1920)
24. Battles of Obuchowe and Krwawy Bór (September 27-September 28, 1920)
25. Battle of Zboiska
26. Battle of Minsk (October 18, 1920)

See also

• Curzon's Note to the Soviet Government
• Estonian Liberation War
• Polish-Ukrainian War
• Western Betrayal

External links

• Electronic Museum of the Polish-Soviet War
• Maps of the Polish-Bolshevik War: ,
• The Polish-Russian War and the Fight for Polish Independence
• Józef Haller and the Blue Army
• Onwar.com
• Russo-Polish War bibliography in English

Notes

1. Lincoln, Red Victory: a History of the Russian Civil War.
2. Mikhail Tukhachevski, order of the day, July 2, 1920.
3. D'Abernon, 'The Eighteenth Decisive Battle of the World: Warsaw, 1920'.
4. Ścieżyński, Radjotelegrafja...
5. Kahn, The Code-Breakers.
6. Kozaczuk, Enigma.

References

• Norman Davies, White Eagle, Red Star: the Polish-Soviet War, 1919-20, Pimlico, 2003, ISBN 0712606947.
• Jeremy Keenan, The Pole: the Heroic Life of Jozef Pilsudski, Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd, 2004, ISBN 0715632108.
• Richard M. Watt, Bitter Glory: Poland and Its Fate, 1918-1939, Hippocrene Books, 1998, ISBN 0781806739.
• Edgar Vincent D'Abernon, The Eighteenth Decisive Battle of the World: Warsaw, 1920, Hyperion Press, 1977, ISBN 0883554291.
• W. Bruce Lincoln, Red Victory: a History of the Russian Civil War, Da Capo Press, 1999, ISBN 0306809095.
• Mieczysław Ścieżyński, , Radjotelegrafja jako źrodło wiadomości o nieprzyjacielu (Radiotelegraphy as a Source of Intelligence on the Enemy), Przemyśl, , 1928, 49 pp.
• David Kahn, The Code-Breakers, New York, Macmillan, 1967.
• Władysław Kozaczuk, Enigma: How the German Machine Cipher Was Broken, and How It Was Read by the Allies in World War Two, edited and translated by Christopher Kasparek, Frederick, Maryland, University Publications of America, 1984, ISBN 0890935475.
• Piotr Wandycz, General Weygand and the Battle of Warsaw, Journal of Central European Affairs, 1960
• Polish Politics, and the Battle of Warsaw, 1920 Slavic Review, Vol. 46, No. 3/4. (Autumn - Winter, 1987), p. 503
• Robert Himmer, Soviet Policy Toward Germany during the Russo-Polish War, 1920 Slavic Review, Vol. 35, No. 4. (Dec., 1976), p. 667
• Thomas Fiddick, The "Miracle of the Vistula": Soviet Policy versus Red Army Strategy, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 45, No. 4. (Dec., 1973), pp. 626-643
• M. B. Biskupski, Paderewski, Polish Politics, and the Battle of Warsaw, 1920, Slavic Review, Vol. 46, No. 3/4, Autumn - Winter, 1987 pp. 503-512

• Polish wars
• Soviet wars