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			The '''Zarqawi PSYOP program''' refers to a US ] program, or propaganda campaign, exaggerating the importance of ] in ] and the ].

			The program was allegedly primarily aimed at, but not limited to, the "Iraqi and Arab media" along with the "U.S. Home Audience," which was part of a "broader propaganda campaign."<ref name="WaPo"> By Thomas E. Ricks, The ], April 10, 2006</ref><ref name="Salon"> by ], ], June 15, 2006</ref><ref name="CounterPunch1"> by Jennifer van Bergen, ], June 12, 2006</ref><ref name="EP"> By Greg Mitchell, ], April 10, 2006</ref><ref name="Asheville_Global_Report "> by Greg White, Asheville Global Report, April 13-20, 2006 </ref><ref name="Global_Research"> by Michel Chossudovsky, Global Research, June 09, 2006,</ref><ref name="CounterPunch2"> by Patrick Cockburn, Counterpunch, June 9, 2006</ref><ref name="GRca"> by Michel Chossudovsky, ], April 18, 2006</ref><ref name="RollingStone"> by Tim Dickinson, ], April 12, 2006</ref>

			One of the presented goals was to alienate local citizens from him by portraying him as a foreigner and key actor in the insurgency.<ref name="WaPo"/> However, ] reported that, according to a "military source," this campaign ultimately revolved around "domestic political reasons."<ref name="Salon"/>

			Writing for ], Jennifer Schultz reported that terrorism expert stated that the US created a myth which resulted in those fabrications becoming a ].<ref name="Schultz"> By Jennifer Schultz, UPI, November 10, 2005</ref><ref name="Napoleoni"> By Loretta Napoleoni, Foreign affairs</ref><ref name="Napoleoni_2"> by Loretta Napoleoni, November 11, 2005</ref>

			==Program==
			]

			In ], ], The ] and ] reported that, according to a U.S. military intelligence agent, the U.S. was paying $10,000 to individuals in order to pass for fact the fiction and suppositions regarding Zarqawi.<ref name="TG"> By Adrian Blomfield, Telegraph, October 4, 2004</ref><ref name="Age"> By Adrian Blomfield, ], October 2, 2004</ref><ref name="Spiked"> by Brendan O'Neill, Spiked, October 5, 2004 </ref>

			The ] reported on ], ], that the role of Zarqawi was magnified by the ] in a ] campaign started in 2004. In the words of the Washington Post:
			<blockquote>''For the past two years, U.S. military leaders have been using Iraqi media and other outlets in Baghdad to publicize Zarqawi's role in the insurgency. The documents explicitly list the "U.S. Home Audience" as one of the targets of a broader propaganda campaign.''<ref name="WaPo"/></blockquote>

			The article goes on to explain that a slide created for a briefing by Army Gen. George W. Casey Jr,
			<blockquote>''describes the "home audience" as one of six major targets of the American side of the war.''</blockquote>
			Nevertheless, the slide did not specifically assert the program targeted U.S. citizens. Although other parts of the briefing did suggest it was directed at the U.S. media to alter the view of the war.

			Another slide in the briefing noted a "selective leak" to reporter ], about a letter boasting of suicide attacks in Iraq and allegedly written by Zarqawi. He used that information for an article<ref> By DEXTER FILKINS, New York Times, February 9, 2004</ref> in the ].<ref name="EP"/><ref name="RollingStone"/> Contacted by the Post Filkins commented he was skeptical at the time, and still is, about the document's authenticity.<ref name="WaPo"/><ref name="EP"/>

			According to Sidney Blumenthal, in an article for ], a military source told him that, for ultimately "domestic political reasons," ] and the ] resisted degrading the dramatically inflated image of Zarqawi.<ref name="Salon"/>

			Responding to the in the Post reported psychological operations aimed at Americans, Army Col. James A. Treadwell, commander of the U.S. military psyops unit in Iraq, but no longer present as the program was started, said that the US doesn't do that. Another officer commented in the Post that, although all material provided was in Arabic, the campaign probably influenced the view of the ] raising his profile. The Post continues that, according to an officer familiar with the case, this program was not related to another program which was linked to the ].<ref name="WaPo"/><ref> by Mark Mazzetti, ], January 27th, 2006</ref>

			By focusing on his terrorist activities and status as a foreigner the US tried to inflame Iraqi citizens against him.<ref name="WaPo"/><ref name="RollingStone"/><ref name="CounterPunch1"/> Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, the senior commander in charge, remarked, according to the Washington Post:
			<blockquote>''"The Zarqawi PSYOP program is the most successful information campaign to date."''<ref name="WaPo"/><ref name="EP"/><ref name="RollingStone"/></blockquote>

			Regarding the influence of this program on Al Qaeda ]
			reports the comments by terrorism expert ]:
			<blockquote>The myth of al-Zarqawi, Napoleoni believes, helped usher in al-Qaida's "transformation from a small elitist vanguard to a mass movement."<ref name="Napoleoni"/></blockquote>

			==Rise to power==
			{{main\|Abu Musab al-Zarqawi}}

			According to articles in ], ], and ] several incidents turned Abu Musab al-Zarqawi from an unknown and unimportant local terrorist into the well-known voice of Al Qaeda in ].<ref name="CounterPunch2"/><ref name="Newsweek"> By ], ], June 30, 2006</ref> The Asia Times contends that in February 2003 he was practically unknown outside Jordan.<ref name="Newsweek"/><ref name="ATO"> By Pepe Escobar, Asia Times Online, October 15, 2005</ref> Loretta Napoleoni, a terrorism expert, and and article in Spiked also commented that prior to the ] his scope was limited to corrupt Arab regimes, most notably ].<ref name="Schultz"/><ref name="Spiked"/> Both Newsweek and the Asia Times continue by commenting that initially he was largely unconnected to Saddam Hussein, and not part of ]'s group. ], terrorism expert, concurs that he never was part of al Qaeda prior to the ].<ref name="Margolis"> by Sarah Challands, CTV.ca, June 12, 2006</ref> The ] reported that one of his operatives stated during interrogation that Zarqawi "is against Al Qaeda."<ref> By Scott Peterson, The Christian Science Monitor, October 16, 2003</ref> Following the allegation he was a link between ] and ] (used as ]<ref name="Salon"/><ref name="Newsweek"/><ref name="ATO"/><ref name="Spiked"/><ref name="AGR"> by Eamon Martin, Asheville Global Report, June 15 - 21, 2006 </ref><ref name="GRca2"> by Michel Chossudovsky, GlobalResearch, May 15, 2006</ref>), by ] before the ] in ], he became the embodiment of resistance against the US in the Muslim world. Afer ] documents were found that showed Hussein's security forces had in fact attempted to apprehend him, contradicting Powell's allegations.<ref name="AGR"/> Also the ] by the Bush administration became another boost for his popularity, which ] in Newsweek describes as:
			<blockquote>''the Iraq invasion gave Zarqawi a chance to blossom on his own as a jihadi.''<ref name="Newsweek"/></blockquote>
			After the capture of ] the ] accused him of being behind the continuing mishaps in Iraq, or, as ] commented in an editorial for ]:
			<blockquote>''"No sooner had Saddam Hussein been captured than the US spokesmen began to mention al-Zarqawi's name in every sentence."''<ref name="CounterPunch2"/><ref name="AGR"/></blockquote>

			Articles in the ], the ], ], ] and Counterpunch Newsletter suggest his increased notoriety, as illustrated above, was the result of an orchestrated effort involving ].<ref name="WaPo"/><ref name="RollingStone"/><ref name="Newsweek"/><ref name="CounterPunch2"/><ref name="CJR"> By Daniel Schulman, ] at ]'s Graduate ]</ref>

			The Washington post cites Col. Derek Harvey who said at a meeting by the Army in ]:
			<blockquote>''"Our own focus on Zarqawi has enlarged his caricature, if you will - made him more important than he really is, in some ways."''<ref name="WaPo"/><ref name="RollingStone"/></blockquote>

			], CNN’s former Baghdad bureau chief, observed that there are discrepancies between what journalist encounter in Iraq ''“and a lot of the comments we see coming out of the administration and the Pentagon.”'' Commenting on this Daniel Schulman for Columbia Journalism Review said:
			<blockquote>''... it has become, in part, a contest over the framing of reality, and thus a hall of mirrors for the press.''<ref name="CJR"/></blockquote>

			In the wake of his assasination, which had erroneously been reported several times before,<ref> Balaji Reddy, India Daily, October 16, 2004 </ref><ref> By LEE KEATH, The ], March 4, 2004</ref> the U.S. military produced a video showing him to be the opposite of what the ] previously advocated him to be.

			==US psychological operations ==
			{{see\| Psychological operations (United States)\| Psychological warfare}}

			The US military defines psychological operations, or PSYOP, as:
			<blockquote>''planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.''<ref name="Definition"> Joint Publication 3-53, 5 September 2003 ]</ref></blockquote>

			The ], adopted in ], explicitly forbids information and psychological operations aimed at the US public.<ref name="NSA"> by ], January 26, 2006</ref><ref name="Lamb"> by ], senior fellow in the ] at the ] and has been Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Resources and Plans.</ref><ref name="CJR"/> Nevertheless, the current easy access to news and information from around the globe, makes it difficult to guarantee PSYOP programs do not reach the US public. Or, in the words of Army Col. James A. Treadwell, who commanded the U.S. military psyops unit in Iraq in 2003, in the Washington Post:
			<blockquote>''There's always going to be a certain amount of bleed-over with the global information environment.''<ref name="WaPo"/></blockquote>
			] reported on U.S. propaganda campaigns that:
			<blockquote>''The Pentagon acknowledged in a newly declassified document that the US public is increasingly exposed to propaganda disseminated overseas in psychological operations.'' <ref name="AP"> by Agence France Presse, January 27, 2006</ref></blockquote>
			US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has approved that document, which is called "]." <ref name="CJR"/><ref name="AP"/> The document acknowledges the Smith-Mundt Act, but fails to offer any way of limiting the effect PSYOP programs have on domestic audiences.<ref name="NSA"/><ref name="Lamb"/><ref name="BBC"> By Adam Brookes, ], January 27, 2006 </ref>

			Several incidents in 2003 were documented by ], a sixty-four-year-old retired Air Force colonel, which he saw as information-warfare campaigns that were intended for "foreign populations and the American public." ],<ref> by ], Colonel, ] (Retired),October 8, 2003, </ref> as the treatise was called, reported that the way the ] was fought resembled a ], stressing the message instead of the truth.<ref name="CJR"/> The ] reported that Zarqawi’s group, and three other groups of in Iraq, were disseminating propaganda in a sophisticated manner.<ref name="CJR"/>

			Although the Information Operations Roadmap does not specifically mention the Zarqawi PSYOP program it does show the general dilemma psychological operations pose regarding the effect they potentially have on the US public.<ref name="AP"/> The Asheville Global Report does comment on Zarqawi and contends that the
			<blockquote>"military's propaganda program apparently spilled over into the US media."<ref name="AGR"/></blockquote>


			==See also==
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			{{War on Terrorism}}

			==References==
			<references/>


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Revision as of 17:36, 11 March 2007

File:Zarqawi.jpg

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

The Zarqawi PSYOP program refers to a US Psychological operations program, or propaganda campaign, exaggerating the importance of Al Zarqawi in Al Qaeda and the Iraq insurgency.

The program was allegedly primarily aimed at, but not limited to, the "Iraqi and Arab media" along with the "U.S. Home Audience," which was part of a "broader propaganda campaign."

One of the presented goals was to alienate local citizens from him by portraying him as a foreigner and key actor in the insurgency. However, Sidney Blumenthal reported that, according to a "military source," this campaign ultimately revolved around "domestic political reasons."

Writing for UPI, Jennifer Schultz reported that terrorism expert Loretta Napoleoni stated that the US created a myth which resulted in those fabrications becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Program

In October, 2004, The Telegraph and The Age reported that, according to a U.S. military intelligence agent, the U.S. was paying $10,000 to individuals in order to pass for fact the fiction and suppositions regarding Zarqawi.

The Washington Post reported on April 10, 2006, that the role of Zarqawi was magnified by the Pentagon in a psychological operations campaign started in 2004. In the words of the Washington Post:

For the past two years, U.S. military leaders have been using Iraqi media and other outlets in Baghdad to publicize Zarqawi's role in the insurgency. The documents explicitly list the "U.S. Home Audience" as one of the targets of a broader propaganda campaign.

The article goes on to explain that a slide created for a briefing by Army Gen. George W. Casey Jr,

describes the "home audience" as one of six major targets of the American side of the war.

Nevertheless, the slide did not specifically assert the program targeted U.S. citizens. Although other parts of the briefing did suggest it was directed at the U.S. media to alter the view of the war.

Another slide in the briefing noted a "selective leak" to reporter Dexter Filkins, about a letter boasting of suicide attacks in Iraq and allegedly written by Zarqawi. He used that information for an article in the New York Times. Contacted by the Post Filkins commented he was skeptical at the time, and still is, about the document's authenticity.

According to Sidney Blumenthal, in an article for Salon, a military source told him that, for ultimately "domestic political reasons," Donald Rumsfeld and the White House resisted degrading the dramatically inflated image of Zarqawi.

Responding to the in the Post reported psychological operations aimed at Americans, Army Col. James A. Treadwell, commander of the U.S. military psyops unit in Iraq, but no longer present as the program was started, said that the US doesn't do that. Another officer commented in the Post that, although all material provided was in Arabic, the campaign probably influenced the view of the American press raising his profile. The Post continues that, according to an officer familiar with the case, this program was not related to another program which was linked to the Lincoln Group.

By focusing on his terrorist activities and status as a foreigner the US tried to inflame Iraqi citizens against him. Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, the senior commander in charge, remarked, according to the Washington Post:

"The Zarqawi PSYOP program is the most successful information campaign to date."

Regarding the influence of this program on Al Qaeda Jennifer Schultz reports the comments by terrorism expert Loretta Napoleoni:

The myth of al-Zarqawi, Napoleoni believes, helped usher in al-Qaida's "transformation from a small elitist vanguard to a mass movement."

Rise to power

Main article: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi

According to articles in Counterpunch, Newsweek, and Asia Times Online several incidents turned Abu Musab al-Zarqawi from an unknown and unimportant local terrorist into the well-known voice of Al Qaeda in Iraq. The Asia Times contends that in February 2003 he was practically unknown outside Jordan. Loretta Napoleoni, a terrorism expert, and and article in Spiked also commented that prior to the invasion of Iraq his scope was limited to corrupt Arab regimes, most notably Jordan. Both Newsweek and the Asia Times continue by commenting that initially he was largely unconnected to Saddam Hussein, and not part of bin Laden's group. Eric Margolis, terrorism expert, concurs that he never was part of al Qaeda prior to the Iraq war. The Christian Science Monitor reported that one of his operatives stated during interrogation that Zarqawi "is against Al Qaeda." Following the allegation he was a link between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda (used as casus belli), by Colin Powell before the UN Security Council in 2003, he became the embodiment of resistance against the US in the Muslim world. Afer invading Iraq documents were found that showed Hussein's security forces had in fact attempted to apprehend him, contradicting Powell's allegations. Also the invasion of Iraq by the Bush administration became another boost for his popularity, which Michael Hirsch in Newsweek describes as:

the Iraq invasion gave Zarqawi a chance to blossom on his own as a jihadi.

After the capture of Saddam Hussein the Bush administration accused him of being behind the continuing mishaps in Iraq, or, as Patrick Cockburn commented in an editorial for Counterpunch Newsletter:

"No sooner had Saddam Hussein been captured than the US spokesmen began to mention al-Zarqawi's name in every sentence."

Articles in the Columbia Journalism Review, the Washington Post, Rolling Stone, Newsweek and Counterpunch Newsletter suggest his increased notoriety, as illustrated above, was the result of an orchestrated effort involving psychological operations.

The Washington post cites Col. Derek Harvey who said at a meeting by the Army in Fort Leavenworth:

"Our own focus on Zarqawi has enlarged his caricature, if you will - made him more important than he really is, in some ways."

Jane Arraf, CNN’s former Baghdad bureau chief, observed that there are discrepancies between what journalist encounter in Iraq “and a lot of the comments we see coming out of the administration and the Pentagon.” Commenting on this Daniel Schulman for Columbia Journalism Review said:

... it has become, in part, a contest over the framing of reality, and thus a hall of mirrors for the press.

In the wake of his assasination, which had erroneously been reported several times before, the U.S. military produced a video showing him to be the opposite of what the media previously advocated him to be.

US psychological operations

Further information: Psychological operations (United States) and Psychological warfare

The US military defines psychological operations, or PSYOP, as:

planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.

The Smith-Mundt Act, adopted in 1948, explicitly forbids information and psychological operations aimed at the US public. Nevertheless, the current easy access to news and information from around the globe, makes it difficult to guarantee PSYOP programs do not reach the US public. Or, in the words of Army Col. James A. Treadwell, who commanded the U.S. military psyops unit in Iraq in 2003, in the Washington Post:

There's always going to be a certain amount of bleed-over with the global information environment.

Agence France Presse reported on U.S. propaganda campaigns that:

The Pentagon acknowledged in a newly declassified document that the US public is increasingly exposed to propaganda disseminated overseas in psychological operations.

US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has approved that document, which is called "Information Operations Roadmap." The document acknowledges the Smith-Mundt Act, but fails to offer any way of limiting the effect PSYOP programs have on domestic audiences.

Several incidents in 2003 were documented by Sam Gardiner, a sixty-four-year-old retired Air Force colonel, which he saw as information-warfare campaigns that were intended for "foreign populations and the American public." Truth from These Podia, as the treatise was called, reported that the way the Iraq war was fought resembled a political campaign, stressing the message instead of the truth. The International Crisis Group reported that Zarqawi’s group, and three other groups of in Iraq, were disseminating propaganda in a sophisticated manner.

Although the Information Operations Roadmap does not specifically mention the Zarqawi PSYOP program it does show the general dilemma psychological operations pose regarding the effect they potentially have on the US public. The Asheville Global Report does comment on Zarqawi and contends that the

"military's propaganda program apparently spilled over into the US media."

Revision as of 17:36, 11 March 2007

Program

Rise to power

US psychological operations

See also

References